public disclosure authorized - world bank · investment programme; samuel phiri, principal...

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Glossary

G L O S S A R Y

African Development Bank

African Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions

Assisted Medical Treatment Orders

Association of Rural District Councils of Zimbabwe

Budget Call Circular

Basic Education Assistance Module

Balance of Payments

Budget Strategy Paper

Better Schools Programme-Zimbabwe

Capital Expenditure

Conditional Cash Transfer

Corporate Income Tax

Cultivating New Frontiers in Agriculture

Classification of Functions of Government

Consumer Price Index

Civil Service Commission

Data Envelopment Analysis

Department for International Development (United Kingdom)

Development Policy Operation

Disaster Response and Risk Reduction

Debt Sustainability Analysis

Department of Social Services

Early Childhood Development

Education Development Fund

Education Management Information System

Education Medium Term Plan

Education Transition Fund

United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization

Fiscal Year

Gross Domestic Product

Girls Education Challenge

Government Financial Management Information System

Government Finance Statistics Manual

AfDB

AFROSAI

AMTO

ARDCZ

BCC

BEAM

BOP

BSP

BSP-Z

CAPEX

CCT

CIT

CNFA

COFOG

CPI

CSC

DEA

DFID

DPO

DRRR

DSA

DSS

ECD

EDF

EMIS

EMTP

ETF

FAO

FY

GDP

GEC

GFMIS

GFSM

ii

Glossary

Government of National Unity

Government of Zimbabwe

Global Partnership for Education

Human Immunodeficiency Virus Infection and Acquired

Immune Deficiency Syndrome

Headquarters

Harmonized Social Cash Transfer System

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development

Information and Communications Technologies

International Development Association

Infrastructure Development Bank of Zimbabwe

International Financial Institutions

Integrated Financial Management Information System

International Financial Reporting Standards

International Monetary Fund

International Organization of Supreme Audit Institutions

Interim Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper

International Public Sector Accounting Standards

Information Technology

Key Performance Area

Local Authority

Local Authorities Pension Fund

Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty program

Latin American Laboratory for Assessment of the Quality of Education

Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development

Malawi Social Action Fund

Ministries, Departments, and Agencies

Management Information System

Ministry of Local Government, Public Works, and National Housing

Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigation Development

Ministry of Finance and Economic Development

Ministry of Health and Child Care

Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education

Ministry of Public Service, Labor and Social Welfare

Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises and Cooperative Development

Mid-Term Expenditure Framework

Mid-Term Fiscal Framework

Ministry of Women Affairs, Gender and Community Development

Ministry of Youth, Indigenization and Economic Empowerment

Non-Governmental Association

GNU

GoZ

GPE

HIV/AIDS

HQ

HSCT

IBRD

ICT

IDA

IDBZ

IFIs

IFMIS

IFRS

IMF

INTOSAI

I-PRSP

IPSAS

IT

KPA

LA

LAPF

LEAP

LLECE

MAMID

MASAF

MDA

MIS

MLGPWNH

MoAMID

MoFED

MoHCC

MoPSE

MPSLSW

MSMECD

MTEF

MTFF

MWAGCD

MYIEE

NGO

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Glossary

Non Performing Loan

National Social Security Authority

Office of the Auditor General

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development

Office of the President and Cabinet

Open Society Initiative for Southern Africa

Orphans and Vulnerable Children

Public Accounts Committee

Program on the Analysis of Education Systems

Pay-As-You-Go

Public Community Works

Public Expenditure Review

Public Financial Management

Public Finance Management Act

Public Financial Management Enhancement Project

Poverty, Income, Consumption, Expenditure Survey

Public Investment Management

Progress in International Reading Literacy Study

Programme for International Student Assessment

Personal Income Tax

Performance Lag Address Programme

Productive Safety Net Programme

Public-private Partnerships

Public Service Commission

Public Sector Investment Programme

Public Service Pension Fund

Results-Based Budgeting

Results-Based Management

Reserve Bank of Zimbabwe

Southern and Eastern Africa Consortium for Monitoring Educational Quality

Southern African Customs Union

Southern African Development Community

Systems Application Products

School Development Committee

Sustainable Development Goal

Special Drawing Rights

Small Enterprises Development Corporation

Strategic Economic Research and Analysis Program (USAID)

State Enterprises Reform Agency

Stochastic Frontier Analysis

NPL

NSSA

OAG

OECD

OPC

OSISA

OVC

PAC

PASEC

PAYG

PCW

PER

PFM

PFMA

PFMEP

PICES

PIM

PIRLS

PISA

PIT

PLAP

PSNP

PPPs

PSC

PSIP

PSPF

RBB

RBM

RBZ

SACMEQ

SACU

SADC

SAP

SDC

SDG

SDR

SEDCO

SERA - USAID

SERA

SFA

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Glossary

Small and Medium Enterprises Development Corporation

Staff Monitored Program

State-Owned Enterprises

Social Safety Nets

Seasonal Targeted Assistance Program

Technical Assistance

Total Consumption Poverty Line

Teacher Development Information System

Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study

Teacher Minimum Standards

Urban Councils Association of Zimbabwe

Unconditional Cash Transfer

Institute for Statistics (UNESCO)

United Nations Development Programme

United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund

United States Agency for International Development

United States Dollar

Value-Added Tax

United Nations World Food Program

Zimbabwe Asset Management Company

Zimbabwe Investment Authority

Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation

Zimbabwe Revenue Authority

Zimbabwe National Statistics Agency

Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee

Zimbabwe National Roads Administration

Zimbabwe National Water Authority

SMEDCO

SMP

SEPs

SSN

STAP

TA

TCPL

TDIS

TIMSS

TMS

UCAZ

UCT

UIS

UNDP

UNESCO

UNICEF

USAID

USD

VAT

WFP

ZAMCO

ZIA

ZIMASSET

ZIMRA

ZIMSTAT

ZIMVAC

ZINARA

ZINWA

v

Table of Contents

TA B L E O F C O N T E N T S

Glossary ..........................................................................................................................................

Table of Contents ...........................................................................................................................

Acknowledgements .......................................................................................................................

Executive Summary .......................................................................................................................

1. Sector Context ............................................................................................................................ Role of Social Protection, Key Risks and Vulnerabilities ................................................................ Core Interventions .............................................................................................................................

2. Expenditure Trends .................................................................................................................... General Trends ................................................................................................................................... Social Safety Nets ............................................................................................................................... Social Insurance Expenditure ........................................................................................................... Labor Market Expenditure ................................................................................................................ Social Care Services ...........................................................................................................................

3. Challenges & Opportunities ................................................................................................... Financing and Sustainability ............................................................................................................. Coverage and Equity ......................................................................................................................... Results and Efficiency ....................................................................................................................... Capacity ..............................................................................................................................................

4. Conclusions & Priority Options ..............................................................................................

Bibliography .................................................................................................................................

FiguresFigure 1: Total Program Expenditure as % GDP by Sub-sector FY2010-2015 (US$) ......................Figure 2: Actual Versus Budgeted Social Protection Expenditure FY2010-2015 (US$) .................Figure 3: Expenditure on Different Types of Social Safety Nets Interventions (US$) ....................Figure 4: Expenditure Trends of Main Social Safety Nets Interventions (US$) ..............................Figure 5: Spending on Social Safety Nets and Humanitarian Interventions (US$) ........................Figure 6: Overall Sources of Financing for Social Protection in Zimbabwe ......................................Figure 7: Overall Sources of Financing for Social Safety Nets in Zimbabwe (US$) ........................Figure 8: Social Safety Net Expenditure, % GDP Select Sub Saharan African Countries (Most Recent Year Estimates) ..........................................................................................................................Figure 9: Civil Service Pension Expenditure % GDP Select SubSaharan African Countries (Most Recent Year Estimates) .........................................................................................................................Figure 10: Benefits Incidence by Quintile ...........................................................................................

TablesTable 1: An Inventory of Zimbabwe’sCore Social Protection Programs (2010-2015) ....................Table 2: Actual Expenditure on Various Social Safety Nets Programs (US$) ..................................

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678121314

1414162023

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27

77910111515

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1619

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Table of Contents

Table 3: Trends in Expenditure on Various Social .............................................................................Table 4: Trends in Expenditure on Various Social Insurance Programs (US$) Insurance Programs (US$) ...Table 5: Trends in Expenditure in Various Social Care Services Programs ....................................Table 6: Trends in the Numbers of Beneficiaries of Social Safety Nets Programs ........................Table 7: Coverage of Main Safety Nets Programs as a Share of Overall and Extreme Poverty ....Table 8: Coverage of Pension Programs by Population ........................................................................

BoxesBox 1: The Rise of Social Safety Nets in Africa ....................................................................................Box 2: Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Report on Food Aid Distribution 2016 .................

121314171820

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vii

A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T S

This volume is the fifth in a series of Public Expenditure Reviews (PERs) prepared jointly by the Government of Zimbabwe and the World Bank. Each report benefited from the support of the Honorable Patrick Chinamasa, Minister for Finance and Economic Development and Mr. W. Manungo, Permanent Secretary of this Ministry. Each report further benefited from the guidance of Camille Nuamah, World Bank Country Manager for Zimbabwe; Mark Roland Thomas, Manager, Macroeconomics & Fiscal Management Global Practice and Guang Zhe Chen, World Bank Country Director for Zimbabwe. The joint team was led by Mr. Z.R. Churu, Principal Director, National Budgets at the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development and at the World Bank by co-team leaders, Johannes (Han) Herderschee and Leif Jensen, both Senior Economist, Macroeconomics & Fiscal Management Global Practice supported by Marko Kwaramba, Economist in the same Global Practice. At the Ministry of Finance and Economic Development the team comprised of Fidelis Ngorora, Director, Public Sector Investment Programme; Samuel Phiri, Principal Economist; Marcos Nyaruwanga, Chief Economist and Brian Goredema, Chief Economist. The volumes were edited by Sean Lothrop, Oscar Parlback and Dean Thompson. Cybil Maradza (Design Consultant) prepared the design and typesetting. Nyasha Munditi (Consultant) completed copy editing. Photos presented in the report were taken by Arne Hoel. Farai Sekeramayi-Noble organized the workshops and other communication events and managed all contracts involved.

This volume five of the Public Expenditure Review (PER) series was prepared jointly by the Zimbabwe Ministry of Public Services, Labour and Social Welfare (MPSLSW) and the World Bank. At the Ministry of MPSLSW the team benefited from the support of the Honorable P. Mupfumira and Permanent Secretary Mr. N. Masoka. The team at the MLSPSC was led by Mr Laxon Chinhengo (Deputy Director in the Department of Social Services). The World Bank team contributions were prepared by Colin Andrews (Sr. Social Protection Specialist, World Bank) and Ruth Wutete (Social Protection Specialist, Consultant, World Bank). Fortune Chigumira (Consultant) provided valuable research assistance. The team is grateful for the cooperation and support of government ministries during the data collection process, including the Ministries of Agriculture, Mechanisation and Irrigating Development; Primary and Secondary Education; Small and Medium Enterprises; Health and Child Care; Youth, Indigenization and Economic Empowerment; Women Affairs, Gender and Community Development; Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare; Finance and Economic Development; and the Department of Pensions. The team gratefully acknowledges development partners who provided data including: the Department for International Development (DFID); the United States Agency for International Development (USAID); United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF); Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations; United Nations World Food Programme (WFP); CARE International, and World Vision. In addition, the team acknowledges the Local Authority Pension Fund, National Authority, and Social Security Agency (NSSA) for having provided information and data. Jamele Rigolini (Lead Economist, World Bank) and Maddalena Honorati (Senior Economist, World Bank) provided valuable comments as peer reviewers. The team is grateful for helpful feedback and guidance from Dena Ringold (Practice Manager, World Bank), Qaiser Khan (Program Leader, World Bank), Paolo Belli (Program Leader, World Bank), Johannes (Han) Herderschee (Senior Economist, World Bank), Leif Jensen (Senior Economist, World Bank), Camille Lampart Nuamah (Country Manager, World Bank), Melis Guven (Senior Economist, World Bank), Robert Palacios (Lead Economist, World Bank), Miglena Abels (Research Analyst, World Bank), Ronald Upenyu Mutasa (Senior Health Specialist, World Bank), and Laurence Lannes (Senior Economist, World Bank).

The report was finalized in October 2016 and macroeconomic indicators for 2016 were updated on March 6, 2017.

Acknowledgements

viii

Social Protection

E X E C U T I V E S U M M A R Y

K E Y C H A L L E N G E S1. Given economic and recurrent crises, Zimbabwe’s social protection system no longer

meets the needs of its population. In the immediate-term, authorities must respond to growing poverty and food insecurity under the drought. In 2015, 16 percent of the population had insufficient means to meet their minimum food requirements. Over a longer-term, authorities must align the system to the demands of a growing youth population.

2. Financing for social protection is unsustainable, and financing for most basic social safety net programs is in jeopardy. Expenditure on social protection was driven by social insurance obligations, which grew from two percent of GDP in 2010 to 4.39 percent in 2015. Spending on social insurance is unsustainable, reflecting the unwieldy public wage bill and

The National Social Protection Strategy Framework for Zimbabwe defines social protection as a set of interventions whose objectives are to reduce social and economic risk and vulnerability, and alleviate poverty and deprivation. Such interventions are designed to form a coherent system that promotes equity, resilience, and opportunities for the poor and vulnerable. As in many other countries, Zimbabwe’s social protection system funds social safety nets (SSNs), social insurance, labor market programs, and social care services.

Though Zimbabwe’s social protection system once ranked impressively in coverage and other measures, recent crises and structural challenges have eroded its quality and reach. Though Zimbabwe now spends almost 5 percent of its GDP on what could be defined as social protection, most expenditures do not benefit the poor. Interventions targeting the poor and vulnerable are heavily dependent on development partner financing, which has steadily declined in recent years. Even well-targeted programs tend to incur high administration costs, owing to a lack of harmonized processes and inadequate coordination across implementing agencies.

Compared with other countries in Africa, Zimbabwe’s system is an outlier on many fronts. Though many African countries face unsustainable payments for public service pensions, Zimbabwe’s expenditure of four percent of GDP ranks far ahead of other high spenders, including South Africa (2.1 percent), Cabo Verde (1.7 percent) and Botswana (1.7 percent). Spending on social safety nets is on a downward trajectory and reached only 0.72 percent of GDP in 2015, compared with an average of 1.1 percent in other African countries. Zimbabwe supports a highly varied, diffuse mix of social safety nets interventions, while many African countries today are backing the emergence of single flagship interventions, such as the Livelihood Empowerment Against Poverty (LEAP) programme in Ghana, the Productive Safety Net Programme in Ethiopia (PSNP), and the Malawi Social Action Fund (MASAF). Despite a sustained economic crisis and recurrent emergencies, Zimbabwe has retained many of the same social safety nets interventions for over 20 years. Most programs have not been scaled up to respond to recent crises, which is a key shortcoming in the sector.

Amid such challenges, this review aims to inform the GoZ’s efforts to reform its social protection system, mainly by bridging gaps in critical information on expenditure and program effectiveness. The review examines expenditure and program information provided by the government and development partners on social safety nets, pensions, labor programs and social care services from 2010 to 2015. The review considers challenges and opportunities in financial sustainability; coverage and equity; results and efficiency; and institutional capacity.

In addition, the review identifies immediate and longer-term options for allocating resources to ensure an equitable and sustainable system, with a view to meeting the evolving needs of Zimbabwe’s population.

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Social Protection

related issues. Expenditure on social safety nets dropped starkly from an average of 1.9 percent from 2010 to 2014 to 0.72 percent in 2015. The drop is attributable to declining development partner commitments, and a shift in resources towards emergency assistance. Such financing constraints require rethinking social protection interventions and priorities.

3. Most social protection expenditure is not directed towards the poor. A substantial 67 percent of social protection expenditure is devoted to civil service pensions, which covers just 1.3 percent of the population. Zimbabwe’s basic social safety net programs have low and unpredictable coverage, and reach only a small share of the poor. Efforts to better serve the poor are impaired by weak targeting mechanisms and insufficient information on the efficacy of most programs. An exception is the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer System (HSCT), which imposes strict eligibility requirements and clear mechanisms for identifying beneficiaries, such as household and proxy means testing.

4. Social protection programs are uncoordinated and fragmented, which undermines the efficiency of public spending and potential for social gains. Though authorities have consolidated certain cash grants, multiple ministries continue to support uncoordinated, sometimes duplicative social safety nets and labor market programs. Many programs have large and costly administrative structures and separate targeting and tracking systems—but little coverage. By contrast, the HSCT within the MPSLSW benefits from a robust, coordinated management information system, but there is a need to develop an integrated social registry for all MPSLSW programs.

5. Social protection programs suffer from weak accountability and transparency. Zimbabwe has seen instances of alleged bias in administering social programs, especially food aid. There is scope for greater program-level controls, such as audits, and mechanisms for engaging beneficiaries in monitoring program performance.

6. The government has inadequate capacity to monitor and evaluate programs, which impairs effective decision-making. Authorities have not rigorously evaluated most social protection programs, partly due to insufficient funding, weak staff skills, and poorly integrated information systems. An exception is the HSCT, which has showed gains in increasing incomes, food security, life satisfaction, and agricultural assets.

P O L I C Y O P T I O N S

To improve the social protection system’s efficiency and outcomes, authorities should work to consolidate disparate safety net interventions around a core set of programs, based on clear guiding principles, such as instilling greater dynamism and flexibility to the system. The economic challenges facing Zimbabwe underscore the need for the GoZ to prioritize high-impact social protection interventions, especially as funding is currently spread thinly across too many programs. In particular, authorities might scale the HSCT, whose design and results suggest it could underpin Zimbabwe’s basic social safety nets platform. As a key next step, officials could reallocate funding towards the HSCT to cover more districts and households.

In parallel, the GoZ should work to improve the equity of social protection, by identifying and building on strategies that are pro-poor and meet both chronic and transitory needs. In particular, officials could improve mechanisms for targeting the poor. To do so, it will be important to establish a clearer evidence base on program impacts and effectiveness.

Authorities could take steps to reform the pension system. This review highlights the unsustainable nature of social insurance expenditure. Follow up analysis is needed in line with the overall public administrative reform of the civil service wage bill.

Efforts should be invested to improve administrative capacities and processes in social protection. The absence of effective mechanisms for targeting, payments and monitoring has led to implementation delays, duplication, and overlaps across programs. Small social

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Social Protection

safety nets schemes are implemented in parallel, with their own administrative mechanisms. A notable performance gap is program transparency and accountability. To inform related reforms, authorities might seek to examine the good practices of other countries (e.g., Ethiopia, Brazil, Colombia) in implementing audits, operational assessments, grievance mechanisms, and diverse social accountability measures.

In the near-term, authorities should work to ensure stronger engagement with development partners. This engagement should focus on collaboration to strengthen the core social safety net, and longer-term positioning of social protection given Zimbabwe’s tight fiscal space.

S E C T O R C O N T E X T1

Role of Social Protection, Key Risks and Vulnerabilities

The National Social Protection Strategy Framework (2015) defines social protection as: “…a set of interventions whose objective is to reduce social and economic risk and vulnerability and alleviate poverty and deprivation”. Zimbabwe’s Constitution recognizes and upholds the need to provide social protection to its citizens as evidenced in Section 30, which states that … “the state must take all practical measures, within the limits of the resources available to it, to provide social security and social care to those who are in need” In addition, Zimbabwe has specific national Acts that form the basis for providing social protection in Zimbabwe.

Since Zimbabwe gained independence in 1980, social protection has been part of development policies and all national poverty reduction strategies. Indeed, Zimbabwe had a tradition of social safety nets even in colonial times, when the English Poor Laws influenced support for social welfare, particularly targeting the urban poor, which was the visible face of poverty. Since 1980, several national development plans have embraced social protection as a key to poverty reduction, which led to greater recognition and prioritization of the sector. Such plans include the “National Economic Revival Programme, 2001; Towards Sustained Economic Growth”; “National Economic Development Priority Programme (NEDPP), 2008-2009”; “Zimbabwe Economic Development Strategy (ZEDS), 2009-2013”, and the “Medium Term Plan (MTP), 2011-2015”. The GoZ’s current blueprint is the Zimbabwe Agenda for Sustainable Socio-Economic Transformation, (ZimAsset), which prioritizes poverty eradication through higher economic growth. ZimAsset focuses on main pillars of growth: Food Security and Nutrition; Social Services and Poverty Eradication; Infrastructure and Utilities; and Value Addition and Beneficiation. ZimAsset delineates targets for social protection outcomes.

During the 1990s, the GoZ introduced non-contributory, social safety nets interventions under the Enhanced Social Protection Programme (ESPP), focused largely on the formal sector. Such interventions included public assistance programs, public works programs, the Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM), and a program for Children in Especially Difficult Circumstances (UNICEF, 2012). Before the economic crisis, the Department of Social Services provided a variety of these transfers to needy persons at provincial and district levels.

Yet today, Zimbabwe’s social protection system supports an array of fragmented, poorly targeted, and donor dependent programs, achieving different degrees of performance. During and after the economic crisis, Zimbabwe’s financial resources and human capacity eroded, such that many social protection programs are no longer operational without development partner support (e.g., BEAM). The implementation of parallel social safety nets programs raises considerable administrative costs, with considerable duplication in core processes.

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Social Protection

In this review, social protection includes four main pillars: social safety nets, social insurance, labor market programs, and social care services. Social safety nets comprises an array of non-contributory safety net programs, including cash transfers, public works programs, and in-kind food distribution and fee waivers for basic services, such as in health and education. Social insurance includes the national social insurance scheme, the government public service insurance scheme, and the Local Authority Pension Scheme. Though in early stages, labor market programs include skills-development programs; job-search and matching programs; and improvements in labor policies. Social care services are typically programs targeting the most vulnerable and destitute. This PER considers relevant lessons from other African countries, including on how they have adapted their own safety net strategies in recent years (see Box 1).

Box 1: The Rise of Social Safety Nets in Africa

Countries worldwide and in Africa have increased their use of social safety net instruments, especially cash-based programs. Globally, the number of countries with conditional cash transfer (CCT) programs grew from 27 in 2008 to 64 in 2014. In Africa, 21 countries – about half of the continent’s countries – had some form of unconditional cash transfers (UCTs) in place in 2010. By 2014, the number of African countries implementing UCTs had nearly doubled to 40. Public works programs have also been implemented in 94 countries – many facing fragile and conflict-affected situations.

Countries seeking to establish functioning safety nets commonly base systems on a high impact intervention. For example, two of the largest safety net programs in Africa include South Africa’s Child Support Grant, and Ethiopia’s Productive Safety Nets Program (PSNP). An important feature of safety net programs in Africa is their ability to adapt to crisis settings, scale up responses to crises, and scale down during ‘steady states’. For instance, Ethiopia’s PSNP increased its case load to cover 18 million beneficiaries in response to the El Nino drought. The capacity of a country to scale in response to a crisis depends on the existence of a functioning system, early warning information flows, ex-ante financial contingency planning, and strong political support.

Recent experiences highlight that safety nets are affordable at all levels of country income. Low income and middle-income countries devote about the same level of resources to social safety nets (i.e., 1.5 and 1.6 percent of GDP, respectively), while richer countries spend 1.9 percent of GDP.

Sources: World Bank 2015

In today’s economic and social context, Zimbabwe faces risks and vulnerabilities that a strong social protection system could help address. In 2011-12, about 72.3 percent of Zimbabweans (9.1 million people) were poor, and 22.5 percent (2.8 million) were extremely poor. Poverty and extreme poverty were more prevalent in rural areas: the 2011/2012 PICES Survey indicated that 92 percent of the extremely poor population and 91 percent of extremely poor households reside in rural areas. Within rural areas, the shares of the poor population and households reached 80 percent and 78 percent, respectively. The rural population suffers from deeper poverty, facing a Poverty Gap Index of 42.8 percent in 2011/12, compared with 15.5 percent in urban areas. Nationally, Zimbabwe’s Poverty Severity Index (PSI) remained high at 19.6 percent in 2011/12, having dropped from 23.2 percent in 1995. Severity of poverty is higher in rural areas. Zimbabwe’s income Gini-coefficient was 0.42 in 2011/12. A high 83.7 percent of paid employees received incomes between US$1 and US$500, with women disproportionately represented in the lowest incomes in 2011/12. Slightly more than half (51.5 percent) of paid employees were “working poor”, receiving incomes below the individual total consumption poverty line (TCPL). Only 3.3 percent received incomes above the average household TCPL.¹

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Social Protection

¹ ZIMSTAT (2012)² 2015 ZIMVAC Report

Food insecurity is a major challenge in Zimbabwe, which received substantial humanitarian food aid during most recession years. In 2015, about 1.6 million people, or 16 percent of the population, had insufficient means to meet their minimum food needs.² Such food insecurity has endured for years. The GoZ must find ways to increase households’ capacity to manage risks, especially from droughts, floods, and the HIV/AIDS epidemic. HIV/AIDS continues to burden and erode household resources. About one million children have been orphaned due to HIV/AIDS and related causes.

To advance the social protection agenda, the Government developed a National Social Protection Policy Framework in 2015, but it is not yet operationalized. Designed within ZimAsset, this policy framework recognizes Zimbabwe’s commitment to poverty eradication in the Constitution; the sustainable Development Goals; and other international declarations that identify social protection as a basic human right. The policy framework is devised to mitigate weaknesses in the country’s social protection system, including fragmentation and duplication, and make the system more predictable, consistent, transparent, and accountable. To achieve these goals, the GoZ must consider a number of reforms, including, to program financing, coverage, effectiveness and capacity. These issues are addressed in Section 3.

Core Interventions

The review identifies the 31 core social protection programs implemented by the GoZ from 2010 to 2015. Despite gaps in coverage and data, these programs reflect the core interventions and mix of social protection programs in Zimbabwe. Table 1 summarizes programs by sub-sector, highlighting each program’s targeting approach, start year, number of beneficiaries, and implementing agency.

The programs share important characteristics. The programs are priority interventions under the National Social Protection Policy Framework, and are federally-managed and implemented by national agencies—with financial support from international bodies. Most programs have been established for a few years, though some have been more recently supported by Development Partners. Individual programs are analyzed in subsequent sections.

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Social Protection

Basic education Assistance Module (BEAM) primary

Basic education Assistance Module (BEAM) secondary

Public Assistance

World Food Programme in Zimbabwe-Lean Season Assistance

Food Mitigation Program


Public works Programme (Ended 2012)

Pauper burial

Amalima- Response to Humanitarian Situation

ENSURE - Humanitarian Assistance

World Food Programme Productive Asset Creation Program

Harmonized Social Cash Transfers

Market Based Input Assistance Programme

Livestock Drought Mitigation Programme

Community Based

Community Based

Demand Driven + Means Testing

Community Based

Community Based

Demand Driven + Means Tested

Community Based

Demand Driven

Community Based

Community Based

Community Based

Demographic, Proxy Means Tested,

Community Based

Community Based

298,518

112,890

7,856

1,209,472

810,000*

26,400*

21,956

406

135,888

60,000

518,345

249,795*

300,000*

89,000*

MoPSLSW

MoPSLSW

MoPSLSW

WFP

MoPSLSW

MoPSLSW

MoPSLSW

MoPSLSW

CNFA

World Vision

WFP

MoPSLSW

FAO

FAO

Program

Social Safety NetsObjective: To reduce poverty, inequality and vulnerability and

enhance access to basic social services.

Targeting Approach

Beneficiaries(2014)

ImplementingAgency

StartYear

Table 1: An Inventory of Zimbabwe’s Core Social Protection Programs (2010-2015)

2002

2002

1989

2002

2010

1985

2011

2013

2013

2002

2012

5

Social Protection

Community Recovery and Rehabilitation Programme

Small Holder Farm Input Support Scheme

Monthly Pensions to surviving spouses and children

Workers Compensation Insurance Fund

National Pensions Scheme

Public Service Pension Fund

Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) Revolving Fund

Job placement services (National Employment Services)

Youth Development Loan Facility for income generating projects through CBZ Bank

Youth Development Loan Facility for income generating projects through CABS Bank

Women's Development Fund

Vocational training Centers – training on entrepreneurial skills and technical skills

Geographical + Community Based

Community Based

Not targeted

Not targeted

Not targeted

Not targeted

Demand driven

Demand driven

Demand driven

Demand driven

Demand driven

1859*

1,600,000

4,378

27,662

177,757

54,054**

32 (firms)

11,603

104

1,738

437

2,064

MoPSLSW

MoAMID

LAPF

NSSA

NSSA

MPS

SMEDCO

MoPSLSW

MoYIEE / CBZ

MoYIEE / CABS

MWAGCD

MoYIEE

Program

Social Safety NetsObjective: To reduce poverty, inequality and vulnerability, and

to enhance access to basic social services.

Targeting Approach

Beneficiaries(2014)

ImplementingAgency

StartYear

2010

2009

1950

1994

1994

1986

1983

1985

2009

2012

2010

1991

Social InsuranceObjective: To protect workers and their dependents against loss of income from exposure to risks.

Labor ProgramsObjective: To create employment opportunities through development of appropriate

labor market policies and programs that enhance employability.

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Social Protection

Support to Children in Difficult Circumstances

Maintenance of Disabled Persons

Maintenance of Older Persons

Street Children

Demand driven

Demand driven

Demand driven

Demand driven

2,013

3,741

86

MoPSLSW

MoPSLSW

MoPSLSW

MoPSLSW

Program

Social Care ServicesObjective: To provide protective and developmental social welfare services to persons with

disabilities, elderly persons, orphans and vulnerable children.

Targeting Approach

Beneficiaries(2014)

ImplementingAgency

StartYear

Source: Authors’ compilation.(* Household data converted to individual estimates assuming an average household size of five, ** 2012 data)

1985

1985

Programs do not sufficiently target the poor and needy. Social insurance programs are not targeted towards the poor, benefiting instead civil service retirees or spouses of deceased military. Benefits are solely for people who have worked in the formal sector. Programs targeting the poor and vulnerable are heavily dependent on donor support, and are typically hampered by the lack of unified targeting criteria and high administrative costs. One bright spot: evaluations of the recently introduced HSCT suggest that effective targeting is the key feature of this program’s early success.

Excluded from this analysis are social protection interventions managed by NGOs and select other programs. Programs supported by NGOs and other non-state actors are scattered throughout the country, and typically small in investment and coverage—but with a large aggregate impact. This analysis excludes pilot programs, such as the Productive Community Works Project supported by the World Bank from November 2011 to December 2012. Beneficiary data from the Civil Service Pension scheme was not factored in this analysis, as such data was available only for 2012. In addition, this review does not examine subsidies and tax exemptions, as authorities were not able to provide relevant information citing fragmentation of the data across districts.

E X P E N D I T U R E T R E N D S2

The review assesses budget, expenditure and financing data for social safety nets, social insurance, labor market programs, and social care services. The data presented is based mainly on a detailed desk review, which analyzed the various social protection interventions implemented by the GoZ and development partners in Zimbabwe from 2010 to 2015. To complement the desk review, consultations were organized with relevant government departments and development partners.

A key value of this review is its pulling together of disparate sources of information and data, which can help facilitate a comprehensive overview of social protection in Zimbabwe. Planning for social protection has been hindered by a gap in compiling basic expenditure data. In short, the GoZ lacks a harmonized information system, resulting in fragmented data across multiple agencies and government departments—with most data in paper form. The World Bank’s close collaboration with authorities on this PER has helped to overcome challenges in data access and analysis.

7

Social Protection

General Trends

Figure 1 presents trends in social protection spending disaggregated by categories of interventions from 2010 to 2015. In this period, total social protection expenditure as a percent of GDP averaged 5.03 percent, albeit with some variability. Average expenditure on social safety nets was steady at 1.9 percent of GDP between 2010 and 2014, though fell to 0.7 percent of GDP in 2015. The vast bulk of expenditures – approximately 98 percent – comprise of spending on social safety nets and social insurance programs. Labor market interventions make up a much smaller share, and expenditure on social care services is almost negligible.

Expenditure on social protection grew by 15 percent in nominal terms from 2010 and 2014. During this period, actual expenditure slightly surpassed budgeted expenditure, as reflected in Figure 2. The marked 17 percent drop in 2015 in total social protection expenditures from 2014 was driven by government fiscal challenges and decreased support from development partners for certain social protection programs, such as the Basic Education Assistance Module. Section 3 details trends in domestic and development partner financing.

Figure 1: Total Program Expenditure as % GDP by Sub-Sector FY2010-2015 (US$)

Figure 2: Actual Versus Budgeted Social Protection Expenditure FY2010-2015 (US$)

Source: Authors’ compilation, and ASPIRE Database.

Source: Author’s compilation.

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Social Protection

Table 2: Actual Expenditure on Various Social Safety Nets Programs (US$)

Social Safety Nets

Table 2 shows social safety net expenditure trends by classification of safety net program. Social safety nets expenditure as a percent of GDP fell from 1.92 percent in 2010 to about 0.72 percent in 2015. Social safety nets programs accounted for 28 percent of total social protection expenditure from 2010 to 2014.

Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM) primary

Basic Education Assistance Module (BEAM) secondary



WFP Asset Creation Programme

Community Recovery Programme

Market Based Input Assistance Programme



Pauper burial

15,000,000

13,000,000

448,710

2,000,000

21,033,410

421,000

-

-

89,700,000

307,042

15,000,000

5,600,000

707,872.00

6,221,000

21,748,238

521,000

-

2,432,698

1117000

49,862

10,000,000

12,270,000

617,190

1,350,000

22,242,816

370,000

-

-

84,524,000

92,475

15,000,000

10,800,000

799,994

9,200,000

13,466,735

604,000

9,787,440

2,432,698

158,000,000

149,992

10,000,000

7,000,000

249,992

200,000

15,963,763

481,000

5,998,756

2,432,698

160,240,000

140,000

2,520,000

4,200,000

739,999

3,060,000

6,663,283

197,000

-

-

31,671,000

28,417

Programs

In Kind: Fee Waivers

Public Works

In Kind: Agriculture / Small Holder Farmers

In Kind: Other

2010(US$)

2012(US$)

2011(US$)

2013(US$)

2014(US$)

2015(US$)

9

Social Protection

Public Assistance

Harmonized Social Cash Transfers

Amalima/Ensure - Humanitarian assistance

WFP Lean Season Assistance

-

-

-

49,077,954

350,000

5,598,491

-

50,745,888

1,473,657

-

-

51,899,905

900,000

7,621, 452

-

31,539,046

120,000

17,600,768

5,491,216

37,248,710

1,187,000

16,360,734

6,190,582

15,547,660

Programs

Cash Transfers

In Kind: Food

2010(US$)

2012(US$)

2011(US$)

2013(US$)

2014(US$)

2015(US$)

Source: Authors’ compilation, and ASPIRE Databse.

A striking aspect of social safety nets has been the diversity of programs. Social safety nets programs range from in kind transfers, including fee waivers, food transfers, and agricultural technology inputs, to pure cash transfers, mixed cash and food transfers, and public works schemes. Until recently, Zimbabwe has strongly emphasized fee waivers and input support schemes, which have been scaled down or phased out in other countries.

Figure 3 highlights how the shares of different types of social safety nets interventions have evolved from 2010 to 2015. In complement, Figure 4 highlights the evolution of spending for the most prominent social safety nets programs within these interventions categories. Spending is dominated by two programs: the Small Holder Farm Input Support Scheme, and WFP’s Lean Season Assistance program.

Figure 3: Expenditure on Different Types of Social Safety Nets Interventions (US$)

Source: Author’s own calculations.

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Social Protection

Figure 4: Expenditure Trends of Main Social Safety Nets Interventions (US$)

In kind agricultural benefits make up the largest share of social safety nets financing—averaging 53 percent from 2010 to 2015, and peaking at 67 percent in 2013. As the primary intervention, the Small Holder Input Support programme rapidly expanded by 40 percent from $87.7 million in 2010 to about $160 million in 2014. This programme aims to provide input technologies, such as seeds and fertilizer, to small holder farmers. Between 2014 and 2015, expenditure of this programme fell by 80 percent as the GoZ focused on supporting only vulnerable households without other sources of agricultural inputs. In 2015, a small share of households received support under the Presidential Input Support Scheme, which distributed agricultural inputs left over from the 2014/15 agricultural cycle. Moreover, the GoZ has now emphasized reducing dependency and focusing on command agriculture. As discussed in Section 3, Zimbabwe is unique in emphasizing agricultural inputs, unlike more prominent social safety nets interventions, which emphasize cash and food transfers, or public works.

Fee waivers in education and health represent a significant but declining share of social safety nets expenditure, peaking at 15 percent in 2010 and falling to nine percent in 2015. Fee waiver programs are special subsidies to help poor households maintain minimum socially acceptable standards of living, which entails access to health and education facilities. Fee waivers have been prominent parts of social safety nets initiatives in Zimbabwe, including the BEAM and the Assisted Medical Treatment Orders (AMTO). Administered by the MPSLSW, BEAM targets and provides educational support to orphans and other vulnerable children aged 6-19. The GoZ has sharply decreased funding for BEAM, and in 2015 donors pulled funding. As a result, the GoZ has accumulated debt to schools under BEAM of more than $20 million. The GoZ’s budget allocation of $10 million to the program in 2016 is likely to be applied to partly pay arrears. Similarly, AMTO is a fee waiver or voucher issued to indigent people to access intermediate and tertiary health services, such as a provincial or national hospitals, or other specialist facilities. The Department of Social Services (DSS) implements AMTO, which relies on a means test and an assessment by DSS staff. AMTO faces funding challenges, as the DSS has accumulated debts to hospitals. Financing for AMTO has been relatively stable in recent years, but with low coverage. As discussed in Section 3, the effectiveness of user fees has been much debated in Zimbabwe, Uganda, and South Africa—and fees were eventually eliminated in the latter two countries.

Cash transfers have made up a small, but highly visible, share of safety net financing. Spending on pure cash interventions made up less than one percent of total social safety nets expenditure from 2011 to 2013, though increased in recent years, reaching 21 percent in 2015. The Harmonized Social Cash Transfer is an unconditional cash transfer (UCT) program channeling cash to labor-constrained households. The GoZ and a multi-donor Child Protection Fund jointly fund the HSCT, while the DSS with support from UNICEF implements the program. The HSCT’s objectives are to reduce the number of ultra-poor households, and enable beneficiary households to increase consumption and improve their nutritional status, health, and education. The HSCT started in 2012 by supporting 20,000 households at an annual cost of $5.6 million. By 2015, the HSCT had been scaled from 10 to 19 districts assisting 52,000 households at a cost of $16.4 million. Authorities envisage that the HSCT will replace the Public Assistance and other small cash transfer programs. Yet due to funding constraints, the HSCT in 2016 was scaled down from 19 to eight districts, reducing beneficiaries to 23,000 households. As further described in Section 3, the emergence of the

11

Social Protection

HSTC coincides with growing international evidence on the positive impacts of cash transfers, especially on consumption, human development, productive assets, and multiplier outcomes.

Public works programs made up a very small amount of total social safety nets from 2010 to 2015, peaking at 13 percent in 2011 and falling to less than one percent in 2013. Some public works programs in Zimbabwe provide short-term employment in community works to create productive assets. The GOZ, WFP, USAID, DFID, and NGOs implement public works programs. The GoZ’s public works program is the Food Mitigation Program, though this program has been dormant for some years due to funding constraints. With funding from bilateral donors, the WFP implements public works programs to respond to humanitarian needs across the country. Since 2013, USAID through the ENSURE and Amalima programs has funded public works programs. The government has made progress in harmonizing programs through its Productive Community Works Policy Framework and Operational Guidelines, which was important, given the number of implementing agencies. In 2011, the Government with financial and technical support from the World Bank successfully piloted a Public Works Programme that tested the Operational Guidelines, but scaling up this program was hindered by funding constraints. Public Community Works (PCW) initiatives, however, lack continuity and solid evidence of their actual impact on beneficiary households. PCW programs (mainly project based) produce productive assets expected to build resilience to poverty and food insecurity.

Food transfers remain a consistent intervention, and comprised 22 percent of social safety nets expenditure from 2010 to 2015. The Seasonal Targeted Assistance Program (STAP) provides food transfers to food-insecure households in rural areas. A World Food Program (WFP) initiative, the STAP relies on geographic, community-based, and administrative targeting methods to select households. Community-based methods include community mapping and a wealth ranking, where community members identify and categorize different beneficiaries. Geographical targeting is based on the Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessments, which are conducted annually soon after the harvest. The WFP’s Health and Nutrition Safety Net Program supports supplementary feeding. This latter program targets malnourished HIV/AIDS and TB patients, pregnant women, and children aged 0-5 years.

Recurrent emergencies and food insecurity have influenced financing from development partners on social safety nets. Figure 5 juxtaposes total humanitarian aid and social safety net spending from 2010 to 2016. Surprisingly, it suggests Zimbabwe’s safety net interventions lacked responsiveness to transitory shocks, as financing for safety nets was not greatly scaled during crisis events.

Yet from 2013 to 2015, donors paid significant attention to disaster preparedness and flexibility. The WFP was particularly active. The WFP Protracted Relief and Recovery Operations (PRRO) document budgeted $206 million to support SSN programs in: i) creation of productive assets; ii) promotion of health and nutrition; and iii) disaster response and risk reduction (DRRR). The aim was to support about 1.2 million beneficiary households every year. DFID and USAID were also instrumental in funding social safety nets, having supported productive safety net programs implemented by partners, such as FAO, World Vision and Care International.

Figure 5: Spending on Social Safety Nets and Humanitarian Interventions (US$)

Source: Author’s data, and UN Financial Tracking Service: Tracking Global Humanitarian Aid.

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Social Protection

Table 3: Trends in Expenditure on Various Social Insurance Programs (US$)

Finally, data suggests that between 86 to 90 percent of social safety nets expenditure is for benefits. This figure compares favorably to international comparators, and reflects a typical trend for administrative expenditure to be around 10 percent. However, administrative costs, especially for Government-led programs, are likely to be underestimated, as staff tend to work across various tasks, making it difficult to correctly attribute their time.

Social Insurance Expenditure

Zimbabwe operates three main pension schemes to protect old-age income: the Public Service Pension Fund (PSPF), the National Pension Fund (NPF), and the Local Authorities Pension Fund (LAPF). Expenditure for these pension programs has grown substantially—reaching 2.02 percent of GDP in 2010 and 4.93 percent of GDP in 2015. Social insurance expenditure represents 86 percent of social protection financing. Yet even this expenditure may be underestimated as this review is based on partial information from the LAPF.

The PSPF makes up about 86 percent of total social insurance expenditure. As detailed in the Public Service (Pensions) Regulations, 2992, the PSPF is designed as an unfunded Defined Benefit pension arrangement, which is commonly known as ‘Pay-As-You-Go’ (PAYG). The ‘Pay-As-You-Go’ arrangement uses pension contributions from employees to meet benefits of those who have retired, withdrawn from service, or died. Despite this design, the GoZ has funded the PSPF entirely since 2009, as employee contributions have not been solicited amid worsening economic conditions. Since June 2009, all members in the Public Service have received a standard ‘allowance’, initially pegged at US$100 per month, but reviewed and increased regularly. This expected ‘Pay-As-You-Go’ pension arrangement suffers from a huge mismatch between employee contributions and payments for pension benefits, which is undermining the PSPF’s sustainability. In 2015, the Government estimated that it incurs a monthly additional expenditure of US$39.8 million without adequate employee contributions.

Civil Service Pensions Fund

National Social Security Authority Pensions Fund

Local Authority Pension Fund

160,881,441

24,623,734

4,941,508

401,346,938

70,267,285

7,092,944

275,045,900

50,672,878

6,041,981

383,235,240

87,735,737

7,452,156

477,158,562

114,609,716

7,021,456

477,600,000

126,307,529

6,558,456

Programs 2010(US$)

2012(US$)

2011(US$)

2013(US$)

2014(US$)

2015(US$)


The National Pension Fund, which is administered by the National Social Security Authority (NSSA), provides old-age, disability, and survivor pensions and grants for workers employed by private sector firms. The NPF does not cover self-employed persons, but about 20 percent of the working age population are estimated to participate therein. National Social Security Expenditure has increased from 11 percent in 2010 to 19 percent of total social insurance spending in 2015. The NSSA in 2015 had a total expenditure of $126 million, which benefited 209,300 people.

The Local Authorities Pension Fund provides employees in local authorities with retirement, disability, and death benefits. The LAPF is financed on a pay-as-you-go basis, and covers 44 local authorities. The contribution rate to the Fund is 23.3 percent, which includes contributions of 17.3 percent from employers and 6 percent from employees. In 2015, 12,481 beneficiaries were receiving pensions under the LAPF, which reported a deficit in excess of $400 million, and faces an uncertain future.

13

Social Protection

Similar to many African countries, Zimbabwe faces challenges in financing social insurance. The civil service pension bill is unaffordable, and delays in benefit payments have been widely discussed and reported in recent years. Although the NSSA and CSPF provide greater than average coverage in the formal labor market, the vast majority of informal sector workers are excluded from the social insurance system. These issues are explored in Section 3.

Labor Market Expenditure

Labor market programs are in early stages in Zimbabwe. Such programs are commonly devised to promote employment opportunities, especially for youth. Compared to other sub-categories, expenditure for labor market programs is very low (see Table 4). Direct line ministries tend to support these programs in collaboration with the private sector.

Most prominently, the Ministry of Youth, Indigenization and Economic Empowerment has developed two programs providing finance and entrepreneurial trainings to youth aged 18 and 35 years via a loan scheme. Administered with support of commercial banks, these programs are devised to be revolving, thus their scale depends on borrower repayments. This dependence explains expenditure variations reflected in Table 4. The programs in 2014 had a total expenditure of $3.0 million benefiting 1,842 youths.

Vocational Training Centers provide non-formal trainings on entrepreneurial and technical skills for school drop-outs and disabled youth. A network of 42 vocational training centers, train youth in residential and non-residential settings. Training is provided in mechanics, civil engineering, construction-related trades, catering, tourism, cosmetology, fashion design, and other fields. The Centers supported 1,211trainees in 2014. Total expenditures in 2014 reached $104,586, representing an increase of about 286% from expenditure of $36,515 in 2010.

Table 4: Trends in Expenditure on Various Social Insurance Programs (US$)

Vocational training Centers – training on entrepreneurial skills and technical skills

Women's Development Fund

Small and Medium Enterprises (SME) Revolving Fund

Job placement services (National Employment Services)

Youth Development Loan Facility for income generating projects through CABS Bank

Youth Development Loan Facility for income generating projects through CBZ Bank

36,515

815,000

2,000,000

14,186

-

450,870

100,613

1,101,770

239,300

16,700

2,843,946

954,758

89,212

-

1,500,000

18,421

-

957,400

165,784

778,600

395,000

21,314

2,885,729

71,900

104,586

560,541

140,000

18,741

2,944,537

101,317

61,235

355,077

150,000

11,712

1,736,934

-

Programs 2010(US$)

2012(US$)

2011(US$)

2013(US$)

2014(US$)

2015(US$)


14

Social Protection

Table 5: Trends in Expenditure in Various Social Care Services Programs

Children in Difficult Circumstances

Maintenance of Disabled Persons

Maintenance of Older Persons

Street Children

190,688 186,640 287,210

-

200,000

210,000

-

14,310

208,000

920,000

80,000

30,000

65,000

550,000 50,000

21,211

108,000

540,000

55,000

14,086

Programs 2010 20122011 2013 2014


The Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises and Cooperative Development (MSMECD) delivers entrepreneurial training and financing through the Small Enterprises Development Corporation (SEDCO). SEDCO, a statutory body, provides incubation services for start-up businesses, as well as training, mentoring, market linkages, and business extension services. Expenditure on this programme fell from $2 million in 2010 to $1.5 million in 2011– but to only $150,000 in 2015. This program has suffered from defaults and late repayment by SMEs, which has eroded its financing capacity as a revolving fund.

Social Care Services

Social care services represents a tiny share of social protection expenditure, having averaged $764,000 annually from 2010 to 2014 (see Table 5). The DSS provides social care services, including residential and non-residential care. The DSS supervises residential homes for the elderly, persons with disabilities, and children. Specifically, the DSS supports 29 homes for the elderly, 62 institutions for persons with disabilities, and residential homes for over 1,100 children.

CHALLENGES & OPPORTUNIT IES3

This section considers reform options for designing and implementing Zimbabwe’s social protection system. To appropriately assess a social protection system, the analysis covers financing and sustainability, coverage and equity, and effectiveness and institutional capacity.

Financing and Sustainability

A prudent, sustainable social protection system appropriately balances its programs with other government expenditure and initiatives, and integrates financing from development partners into the public sector budget. Individual programs should be financially and politically sustainable so that benefits reach target populations predictably. Such programs should also avoid “stop/start” cycles, which impair the efficient administration of social protection and achievement of program goals.

Figure 6 illustrates the shares of social protection financing assuming two key government funding pools and development partners. Moreover, government expenditure on pensions is highlighted separately given its magnitude. Expenditure on pensions programs grew from $190

15

Social Protection

million in 2010 to $610 million in 2015. Social insurance expenditure made up 66 percent of social protection spending during this time period.

Figure 6: Overall Sources of Financing for Social Protection in Zimbabwe

Figure 7: Overall Sources of Financing for Social Safety Nets in Zimbabwe (US$)

Source: Authors and ASPIRE Database.


Development partners have provided a sizeable share of Zimbabwe’s expenditure on social safety net programs. However, financing from development partners has trended downward, falling from 84 percent of overall expenditure in 2010 to 59 percent in 2015 (see Figure 7). During this period, development partners were reluctant to finance social safety net interventions without government contributions. From 2010 to 2014, the share of government financing towards some social safety net programmes, particularly the Small Holder Input Support Programme, increased notably, yet declined in 2015. As suggested in Section 2, development partners have shifted their resources from social safety nets to humanitarian aid, including to respond to the El Nino drought.

Notably, Zimbabwe now spends less on social safety nets as a percentage of GDP than other countries in the region (Figure 8). On average, African countries commit about 1.1 percent of GDP to social safety net expenditure. In Zimbabwe and most other regional countries, most expenditure tends to be from development partners.

16

Social Protection

Figure 9: Civil Service Pension Expenditure % GDP Select SubSaharan African Countries (Most Recent Year Estimates)

Figure 8: Social Safety Net Expenditure, % GDP Select Sub-Saharan African Countries (Most Recent Year Estimates)


Source: Abels & Melis, 2016.

In contrast, Zimbabwe spends comparatively more on its Civil Service Pension Fund (see Figure 9). Many African countries face unsustainable public service pension payments. Zimbabwe’s expenditure ranks far ahead of high spenders in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as South Africa (2.1 percent of GDP), Cabo Verde (1.7 percent) and Botswana (1.7 percent). Of note, any reform of pensions should be linked to reform of Zimbabwe’s high wage bill in the public sector.

Apart from expenditure on social insurance, government spending on broader social protection interventions has been very modest. Excluding social insurance interventions, the Government financed on average 12 percent of total social protection expenditures, peaking at 20 percent in 2014. The effectiveness of this expenditure is examined in Section 3.

Coverage and Equity

When designing social protection interventions, policymakers are typically concerned about the coverage and equity of different interventions. Programs should be adequate to cover various groups in need of assistance, including the chronic poor, transient poor, and other priority groups. Country authorities, who aim to provide full coverage and meaningful benefits, commonly seek to support a balanced set of programs targeted and tailored to the needs of specific populations. In this context, equity implies ensuring that benefits reach targeted groups in a fair manner, and indeed reach the poorest and most vulnerable.

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Social Protection

Social safety nets programs in Zimbabwe tend to cover a small share of the poor, and benefits are subject to significant unpredictability and exclusion errors. Table 6 provides the number of beneficiaries covered by different social safety nets programs each year from 2010 to 2015.

Table 6: Trends in the Numbers of Beneficiaries of Social Safety Nets Programs



Public Assistance

Food Mitigation Program*

Assisted Medical Treatment Orders*

Pauper burial

Harmonised Social Cash Transfers*

Ensure - Humanitarian Assistance

Amalima – Response to Humanitarian Situation

WFP: Productive Asset Creation Program

World:- Lean Season Assistance

Market Based Input Assistance Programme*



Community Recovery and Rehabilitation*

537,594

198,229

1,591

463,530

557,700

1,591

-

-

-

547,840

1,278,293

-

-

1,000,000

3105

339,827

106,216

14,501

375,000

600,000

429

100,000

-

-

560,406

1,307,614

-

89,000

-

4,005

408,486

119,498

14,011

279,005

625,000

1,591

-

-

-

549,938

1,283,189

-

-

800,000

1890

345,567

92,917

9,671

702,500

625,000

489

162,955

30,000

-

648,617

1,513,439

300,000

89,000

1,540,000

3,540

298,518

112,890

7,856

180,000

660,000

406

277,545

60,000

135,888

518,345

1,209,472

300,000

89,000

1,600,000

2,065

118,408

78,920

4,875

900,000

625,000

346

260,000

80,900

266,277

112,816

263,237

-

-

300,000

1405

Programs 2010 20122011 2013 2014 2015


18

Social Protection

Table 7: Coverage of Main Safety Nets Programs as a Share of Overall and Extreme Poverty

Unfortunately, this review cannot calculate an estimate of coverage of the poor by all programs, since available data accounts for neither overlaps across programs nor the degree of exclusion error. In addition, some programs have not disbursed benefit payments in certain periods, which would erode data quality. Of note, those receiving HSCT transfers are ineligible to receive other assistance programs, most notably Public Assistance benefits.

Table 7 indicates the extent to which each social safety net program covers Zimbabwe’s poor and extreme poor – assuming perfect targeting. This table suggests considerable gaps in coverage, especially for programs with potential for scale, such as the HSCT.





Harmonised Social Cash Transfers

Amalima - Response to Humanitarian Situation

WFP: Productive Asset Creation Program

WFP: Lean Season Assistance


1.05%

0.70%

8.01%

5.56%

2.31%

6.00%

1.00%

2.34%

2.67%

4.74%

3.16%

36.05%

25.04%

10.41%

10.67%

4.52%

10.54%

12.02%

Coverage as share of overall poverty

Coverage as share of extreme poverty

* Based on 2015 UN Populat on Estimates. Using 2011/2012 PICES Poverly Line data.

The 2012 Poverty and Income Expenditure Survey (PICES) provides a more comprehensive picture of coverage and equity, by supporting analysis of a smaller share of higher performing social assistance programs, namely ALTO, BEAM and the Food Mitigation Program. The PICES did not include the HSCT, as the HSCT was in an early stage of implementation in 2012. The charts in Figure 10 help to highlight key issues:

• Generosity: Based on the average value of transfers, the generosity of safety net programs is quite low in Zimbabwe.

• Coverage: The BEAM and Food Mitigation Program covered 40 percent of the poorest consumption quintile.

• Beneficiary incidence is the share of beneficiaries in each consumption quintile. Zimbabwe provides a progressive distribution of benefits in lower quintiles, though with considerable spread across quintiles (note: data on beneficiary incidence is based on a mix of programs, including the BEAM, ALTO, Food Distribution program, and Transfers for disasters).

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Social Protection

• Benefits incidence is the transfer amount received by a group as a percent of total transfers received by the population. Benefit incidence is quite pro-poor: 43% of benefits reach the poorest quintile (note: this data is from only the Food Distribution program and Transfers in response to disasters).

Figure 10: Benefits Incidence Coverage by Quintile

A. Average per capita public and private transfers (monthly US$)

B. Coverage of private transfers by poorest and richest quintile (%)

Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5

C. Distribution of beneficiaries: All social assistance (%)

D. Distribution of benefits:All social assistance (%)

The text below highlights trends of key main safety net interventions in coverage and equity:

• Coverage of BEAM fell steadily in recent years. From 2011 to 2015, beneficiaries of BEAM in primary school dropped from 537, 594 to 118,408, and in secondary school from 198,220 to 78,925. Though the coverage of BEAM has been high—reaching 80 percent of primary school students in 2013—the program suffers from significant errors of exclusion. In 2011, 42 percent of students identified as needy by communities did not receive BEAM financing. The formula of allocating BEAM resources does not reflect poverty incidence in schools, which suggests the equity of transfers has not been optimal. The GoZ has funded the BEAM secondary school component, but has faced challenges in the past four years in disbursing required resources to cover all targeted children. Of $16 million budgeted in 2014 for the secondary school children, only $7million was disbursed and spent towards the programme, to clear previous arrears.

• Since 2013, the Harmonized Social Cash Transfer Program has been scaled, reaching about 260,000 beneficiaries in 2015. The rigorous targeting mechanisms incorporated in HSCT have been a key to ensuring that the program is reaching intended beneficiaries (see next section).

20

Social Protection

However, the HSCT has experienced funding challenges, and has been scaled back to cover 112, 790 beneficiaries. To date, the HSCT has had the sharpest pro-poor incidence among all social safety nets programs, and has emerged as a priority program for Government and development partners in a reform agenda.

• The WFP’s Seasonal Targeted Assistance Program has played an important role in promoting food security in rural areas, reaching about 1.2 million beneficiaries in 2014. Although coverage of the STAP fell in 2015, the WFP is expected to continue assistance in this area and provide additional support to respond to the El Nino crisis. The WFP also provides support on a smaller scale for public works and nutrition, and previously for school feeding programs.

• Designed to target small holder farmers, the Agricultural Inputs Support Program reported about 1.6 million beneficiaries at its peak in 2014, but coverage fell to 300,000 in 2015. In recent years, concerns have been expressed about corruption and inadequate transparency in targeting benefits under this program. From 2016, Government will shift from this programme to a “Command Agriculture” approach, whereby inputs will be distributed only to small holder farmers with identified capacity to produce for their own consumption, and for the national strategic reserve.

Available evidence suggests that despite high expenditure, the vast majority of the working age population does not have access to social insurance. Table 8 summarizes the uneven coverage of pensions among different population groups. Most social protection expenditure is devoted to just 1.6 percent of the population, who have higher incomes. Among this population group, benefits are perceived as inadequate. The NSSA has higher coverage, yet excludes the informal sector. The informal sector comprises 84 percent of the labor force, which implies a strong equity concern going forward.

Table 8: Coverage of Pension Programs by Population

Contributors, % 15-64

*Beneficiaries, % 60+

*Members, % total population

14.3%

26.2%

9.1%

2.30%

7.90%

1.60%

NSSA(2015)

PSPF(2012)

Source: Abels & Guven, 2016

Results and Efficiency

To understand the results and efficiency of Zimbabwe’s social protection system, this section explores available evidence of the system’s appropriateness, effectiveness, and dynamism. Typically, an “appropriate” social protection system includes a range of well-balanced programs complementing other elements of public policy. An “effective” system will channel resources to intended groups and economize administrative resources. A “dynamic” system will evolve as the economy changes, other elements of policy develop, or shocks occur. It is important to note that despite the long life of many programs, very few of them have been evaluated, thus authorities often lack systematic evidence to make informed decisions in social protection.

As it evolved, Zimbabwe’s social protection system has trended away from international best practice, and is no longer appropriate for addressing current challenges. Social protection in Zimbabwe is molded by government financed programs, including fee waivers for health and education (e.g., BEAM and AMTO), the Small Holder Farm Inputs Support Scheme, and the Civil Service Pension Fund. Though such interventions are common and fundamental in other countries, their higher scale and dominance in Zimbabwe does not appear appropriate. Moreover, authorities may find the best practices of other countries informative as they embark on a new reform agenda. Key considerations of this reform agenda are noted below.

• Zimbabwe is considering ways to reform its “in-kind” support programs, including fee waivers and agricultural inputs. Criticisms have been leveled at Fee Waiver schemes in health and education for highly excluding the poor and making irregular payments to service providers.

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In short, the GoZ has struggled to identify the most deserving beneficiaries and achieve a balance between required fee payments and compensation for institutions and service providers—in contrast to successful models in countries such as Indonesia and Thailand. As authorities consider options for further review of its in-kind support programs, such as BEAM and AMTO, the experiences of South Africa and Uganda may be informative. Both countries chose to eliminate fee waivers after realizing that fees and waivers improved neither service quality nor access among the poor (Grosh et al, 2008). Uganda and South Africa replaced user fees and fee waivers with free access to services, which proved costly and placed pressure on service providers. A more realistic option for Zimbabwe might be targeted cash transfers to improve the poor’s access to services. There is a fine line between a fee waiver and a conditional cash transfer (CCT): fee waivers and vouchers reimburse households and/or service providers for actual expenditures, while CCTs provide additional resources to encourage households to use health or education facilities. Similarly, authorities have recognized shortcomings in the Small Holder Farm Input Support Scheme, and efforts are underway to scale down this program yet improve its targeting.

• Zimbabwe must reform the social insurance system to ensure it meets the needs of Zimbabwe’s economy and population. The previous discussion highlighted the social insurance system’s highly unsustainable financing for the CSPF and high exclusion of the informal sector. Zimbabwe has a young population, which favors a more integrated social insurance program as dependency ratios are still low. However, high death rates and emigration, especially among the economically active labor force, might negatively affect the social security schemes’ future revenue base. The effects of a declining revenue base might be felt only in the long run, when it translates to higher demand.

Authorities should take steps to improve the transparency and accountability of the social protection system. Weaknesses in transparency and accountability threaten the credibility of social protection delivery systems, and prevent programs from operating as designed. As noted, various programs have reported poor targeting (Small holder Farmer Input Support) and exclusion errors, which effectively reduce services for the poor (BEAM). Media coverage routinely reports on grievances. The Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission (ZHRC) published a report on Food Aid Cases reinforcing these concerns (See Box 2). Major aid agencies, including the WFP and USAID, welcomed the findings of the ZHRC, and highlighted efforts to ensure systematic monitoring and accountability of their programs. Taken together, such factors reveal systemic challenges impeding Zimbabwe’s reform agenda. Yet authorities could learn from global good practices to guide their reforms of social protection, such as robust international experiences on program-level controls (e.g. audits, operational assessments) and beneficiary-level controls (e.g. grievance redress systems, citizens committees, score cords). Among others, authorities might consider learning from Colombia (program spot checks), Brazil (national, state and municipal hotlines), Ethiopia (social accountability, financial transparency) and India (social audit forums and ombudsman program).

Box 2: Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission Report on Food Aid Distribution 2016

Between May and August 2016, the Zimbabwe Human Rights Commission – an independent body – investigated complaints of alleged discrimination in distributing agricultural inputs and food aid in some areas, including Bikita East, Buhera North, Mazoe Central, Zvimba South, and Muzarabani North and South. The investigations found that there was “unbridled maladministration” on the part of some public officials, who were allegedly performing their duties partially, and with bias against persons of particular political affiliations.

In all five districts covered by the investigations, community leaders, such as Village Heads, Headmen, Village Secretaries and District Administrators, were alleged to be biased towards members of their own party and against members of the opposition, whom they told openly that those affiliated with the opposition would never get food aid. In two districts, youths from the ruling party who were not even part of distribution committees were involved in distributing

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food aid and agricultural inputs. Established complaints mechanisms were ineffective to address reported grievances.

Based on the facts of this report, the ZHRC made the following recommendations:

• Food aid should not be distributed on partisan lines.

• The Ministry of Public Service, Labour and Social Welfare should strengthen its mechanisms for addressing complaints arising out of food aid or agricultural inputs distribution, or any other programme that is intended to assist vulnerable households, to ensure that there is equity and public confidence in the system.

• The Ministry should also ensure that public officials act in their official capacity and desist from using political affiliations as yardsticks, and guarantee impartiality in any food aid or distribution of inputs, or any other programme meant to assist those in dire need.

• Relevant NGOs involved in the food aid distribution should also ensure distribution in a non-partisan manner.

• The Zimbabwe Republic Police (ZRP) should at all times act impartially in investigating criminal violations of human rights.

• A human rights based approach should be adopted in implementing ZIM-ASSET and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs 2030).

The strongest evidence of program effectiveness comes from evaluations of cash transfers programs—the only interventions subject to rigorous impact evaluation. According to such evaluations, the HSCT increased the average consumption expenditure of recipient households by $2.74 per month, representing about 55 percent of median expenditure (American Institutes for Research (2014)). Increases were particularly evident in smaller households, whose expenditure represents 82 percent of median expenditure. The HSCT also increased the number of food groups purchased by beneficiary households—a common indicator of diet diversity. The share of recipient households who are food secure increased significantly. Respondents reported higher scores on a Life Satisfaction Scale (by 12 percent). Over a 12 month period, the HSCT was credited for enabling households to strengthen resilience. Specifically, the HSCT helped increase agricultural assets (hoes, sickles) and livestock (goats, donkeys), diversify income sources (different cropping patterns, more non-farm enterprises), and reduce debt (improvement in credit market position). Notably, the HSCT did not reduce exposure to shocks among smaller households. According to a simulation of the HSCT’s impacts on the local economy (Taylor et al (2014)), the program generates a total income multiplier of 1.73 in nominal terms—with a confidence interval of 1.42 to 2.00. In other words, each transferred dollar has the potential to generate 1.73 dollars of income. By stimulating demand for locally supplied goods and services, this study concluded that cash transfers have productive impacts. The study’s findings are reinforced by findings of similar models in Kenya, Lesotho, Ghana and Zambia.

Robertson et al (2013) conducted a smaller scale evaluation on a cash pilot program, finding positive impacts of conditional and unconditional transfers on health vaccination, school attendance and acquisition of birth certificates. This evaluation provides further rationale for integrating cash transfers into social protection in Zimbabwe, while recognizing more analysis is needed on the comparative effectiveness of UCT and CCT programs. The results of this evaluation also reconcile with emerging evidence in the region on how “conditionalities” can be helpful to realize human development outcomes, by providing behavioral nudges to beneficiaries, such as in Kenya, Tanzania, and Malawi (Ward et al, 2010; Evans, 2015; Baird et al, 2015). In many countries, conditional cash transfers have been applied in a ‘soft’ manner through deliberate messaging to beneficiaries, such as in Lesotho (Daidone et al, 2014).

The HSCT has been effective owing to its careful design features, including strong eligibility criteria, transparent programming, and appropriate benefits. To qualify for the HSCT, households

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must have per capita total expenditure below the national food poverty line, and demonstrate appropriate household labor constraints. Beneficiaries are identified through clear mechanisms, including a household census and proxy means test. The HSCT monthly benefit ranges from US$10 for a single-person household, to a maximum of US$25 per household for a family of five.

Authorities are expected to expand the HSCT and make it a priority program promoting a harmonized approach to social safety nets. Despite its impressive results, the HSCT remains in infancy, and has been subject to funding shortfalls and scale-back in 2015. It will be important for authorities to address findings of its evaluation, particularly to ensure the HSCT is better equipped to address challenges in communications, monitoring, grievance mechanisms and harmonization (AIR, 2014).

Finally, Zimbabwe appears to lack the dynamism to adapt its social protection system to changing economic and social conditions, which undermines its credibility. As noted, Zimbabwe has faced recurring shocks in recent years, and in 2016 has faced its most serious drought in 35 years. The failure of the social safety nets programs to adapt to changing needs is striking, especially now when mechanisms should be in place to scale up and respond accordingly.

Capacity

Although Zimbabwe benefits from an educated workforce and social protection programs with long lifespans, capacity constraints are a strong concern. This section looks briefly at institutional capacities in overall coordination and harmonization, and considers human resource capacities based on case studies from the HSCT.

Management of social protection is fragmented and rationalization is needed (World Bank, 2014). The Social Transfers Policy Framework and consolidation of some cash grants under the HSCT are key steps to building a more coherent social safety net. However, responsibilities for delivering social protection are spread thinly across government—with limited financing to build requisite capacity. The Ministry of Public Service, Labor and Social Welfare (MPSLSW) is the lead agency for social transfers and social care services, but clear plans for administrative harmonization are not in place. Separately, the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education (MPSE) and the Ministry of Agriculture, Mechanization and Irrigation Development (MAMID) implement their own social safety nets programs. Agencies delivering social insurance include the National Social Security Authority (e.g., contributory retirement and disability scheme and a workplace injury scheme), and the Ministry of the Public Service (e.g., civil service pensions). Each pension scheme has its own management structure, investment policies, financial systems, monitoring systems, and requirements for actuarial valuation. Despite receiving very limited financing, labor market programs are implemented by numerous actors: the MPSLSW, MPSE, MYIE, Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises and Cooperative Development (MSMECD), the Small Enterprise Development Corporation, and others.

Authorities must take steps to harmonize administrative processes and structures. Programs in Zimbabwe tend to have separate applications and targeting, payment, and information systems. Many programs maintain their own databases and follow different reporting structures, weakening transparency and oversight. Many district and provincial offices maintain paper-based records. A key priority is to integrate the social registry for all MPSLSW programs. The HSCT, which is managed by the MPSLSW, has a fairly robust management information system (MIS), recording and updating beneficiary data and accommodating add-on case management software. However, other MPSLSW programs do not have that capacity. Without an integrated social registry, beneficiary-level information is not readily available.

The evaluation of the HSCT revealed constraints in local capacity, which might be typical for such programs. Interviews indicated limited capacity in the number of staff and trainings for staff to run the HSCT at each level (AIR, 2014). Additionally, staff did not appear to fully understand the roles of counterparts at other levels, meaning that much work is relegated to headquarters (HQ) instead of staff at district or provincial levels. Deferring tasks to HQ reduces the effectiveness of overall system management, targeting, and addressing beneficiary needs – issues that staff mentioned affect scale-up. Overall, staff would benefit from a clearer understanding of how their role supports the overall functioning of the HSCT as delineated in the Operations Manual, and from periodic refresher courses to review tasks and address issues.

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CONCLUSIONS & PRIORITY OPTIONS4

Zimbabwe stands at a crossroads in developing and reforming its social protection system. While Zimbabwe’s social protection system was once renowned for its comprehensive set of programs to meet the needs of its population, the legacy of economic crisis and recurrent emergencies have taken a heavy toll.

The social protection system is financially unsustainable. Programs have not been pursued in a balanced manner with other aspects of government expenditure and development partner dissipating. Public service pensions make up almost 70 percent of social protection financing, and expenditure on social safety nets has dropped dramatically amid tight budget constraints.

Current programs suffer from poor coverage and equity weaknesses. Social safety nets programs tend to cover a small share of the poor, with benefits subject to unpredictability and exclusion errors. Social insurance provisions are focused on the formal sector, excluding about 84 percent of the labor force.

Despite the long lifespans of a range of programs in Zimbabwe, evidence on program impacts and effectiveness is very thin. Operational experiences from the vast majority of programs have not been adequately assessed. Rigorous impact evaluations have been applied on cash transfer interventions, including the HSCT, and show encouraging results.

Management of social protection is fragmented and further rationalization is needed. The limited funding disbursed to respective ministries has been spread thinly across programs. The absence of an effective coordination mechanism for social protection programming has resulted in significant duplication and overlaps.

The system lacks dynamism and flexibility. Program interventions have failed to evolve in response to economic crisis and recurrent emergencies. A notable shortcoming of social safety nets programs has been their inability to scale up to respond to transitory food insecurity. The GoZ still implements the same number of programs from the early 1990s, despite a marked drop in government revenue and a huge decline in the Gross Domestic Product. Of particular concern are weaknesses in transparency and accountability, which threaten the credibility of social protection delivery systems, and prevent programs from operating as designed.

Zimbabwe faces a complex reform agenda, especially given the tight fiscal space that social protection programs now operate within. There are four priority areas where attention should be devoted:

1. Consolidation of disparate safety net interventions around a core set of programs, based on clear guiding principles.

2. A stronger focus on equity, identifying and building on strategies that are pro-poor and meet both chronic and transitory needs.

3. Simplifying institutional capacities to improve the delivery of social protection including less program fragmentation and harmonized administrative processes.

4. Reform of the pension system, aligned to the public administration reform strategy for the overall civil sector wage bill.

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1. Prioritizing interventions. The current scenario where funding is spread thinly across too many programmes is highly unsustainable and ineffective. Given current economic challenges, it is important that government make a deliberate effort to prioritize high impact social protection interventions to be funded from the Exchequer.

2. Maintaining progress under the HSCT: The HSCT shows the strongest potential to expand and be featured as the basic social safety nets platform in Zimbabwe. The strongest evidence of program effectiveness comes from evaluations of cash transfers programs, including the HSCT. An immediate priority should focus on restoring the number of beneficiary households in the HSCT to 51,134 (in the 19 districts).

3. Reviewing social insurance programs: The review highlights the unsustainable nature of social insurance expenditure across the three main pensions programs. A complete assessment of social insurance reform options is beyond the scope of this analysis, but given the large financing commitments involved, further analysis would be helpful, for example to determine the scope for revisiting basic design parameters of core programs. This analysis needs to be calibrated in line with the overall public administrative reform of the civil service wage bill.

4. Engaging with Development Partners: Development partner financing for social safety nets has been following a downward trend since 2010, decreasing from approximately 84 percent to 59 percent of overall expenditure between 2010 and 2015. Development partners have been reluctant to fully finance programs without corresponding financial commitments from Government. It is also likely that development partner resources have shifted somewhat from social safety nets to humanitarian requirements, including the current El Nino. There is a need to engage development partners around the short term positioning of social protection, with a view to achieving buy-in for the long term reform agenda. Given the tight fiscal space, engagement of the international community remains a priority.

5. Strengthening Transparency and Accountability Mechanisms: Current weaknesses in transparency and accountability threaten the credibility of social protection delivery systems and prevent programs from operating as designed. There is an urgent need to demonstrate that interventions are being monitored and safeguarded for their intended purposes. Even in the short term, programs can ensure the effective implementation of program-level controls (e.g. audits, operational assessments) and consider what beneficiary-level controls may be introduced or strengthened (e.g., grievance redress systems, citizens committees, scorecards). There is considerable international experience that can inform such efforts, including interventions in Brazil, Ethiopia and India.

1. Revising overall objectives and program mix: At the core of the longer term reform agenda is the prioritization of different objectives and core target groups. The review highlights the overall risk and vulnerability context in with social protection programs now in operation in Zimbabwe. The most pressing challenges seem to face children, underemployed youth and those facing transitory food insecurity. The current set of social protection programs attempt to address an array of problems, through an array of different programs with declining financial support. It is unclear how the National Social Protection policy will remedy this, even if operationalized. Greater selectivity is required to ensure a more refined program mix. Central to these decisions will be the future phase out of support for fee waivers, and agricultural input schemes.

2. Follow up on Expanding the HSCT. The agreement to make HSCT the main social safety net platform will require expanding it to new districts, which in turn will require increasing

Longer Term Actions

Based on the above priorities, the following short and longer term actions might be considered:

Short Term Actions

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the number of beneficiary households to about 200,000 using current targeting criteria at an estimated annual cost of US$40,000,000. Due to the rigorous targeting requirements, the expansion would need to be phased in over four to five years (adding about 30,000 to 40,000 households every year). During the same period 10,000 to 12,000 households will need to be recertified.

3. Rationalizing institutional coordination and support for social protection: Management of social protection is fragmented and further rationalization is needed. The Social Transfers Policy Framework and the consolidation of some cash grants under the HSCT are important steps in the direction of building a more coherent social safety net system. However, responsibilities for the delivery of social protection are spread thinly across government, with limited financing to support capacity requirements. As policymakers consider the desirable set of objectives and program mix to frame social protection, a key part of this discussion should feature the institutional coordination mechanisms that will support such efforts.

4. Harmonizing data and information management: Programs have separate applications, targeting, payment, and information systems. A key priority is harmonizing data and information management arrangements, in the form of a single social registry for all MPSLSW programs. The absence of a single social registry means that beneficiary-level information is not readily available. Data weaknesses reduce transparency and oversight. In 2015, the MPSLSW with financial assistance from the World Bank started work on a harmonized MIS system. This is a good initiative, which urgently needs to be supported and finalized to enhance reporting and monitoring of programs. A key challenge in this review was the lack of systematized and available information, which is reflected in the lack of evaluative evidence to assess program effectiveness and results. As Zimbabwe enters a new chapter of reform, the promotion of evidence and sharing of information will be critical to assess program implementation, take corrective actions, and mobilize support across different stakeholder groups. A robust monitoring and evaluation framework will need to be put in place.

5. Longer term follow up on the pension reform agenda. The pension reform agenda is a longer term issue, and actions arising from immediate assessments and consultations will need to be operationalized, in line with overall public wage bill reform initiatives.

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