Document ofThe World Bank

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Report No: 22293

IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION REPORT(IDA-27480; PPFI-P8670; PPFI-P8671; TF-23048)

ONA

CREDIT

IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 14.0 MILLION(US$22.0 MILLION EQUIVALENT)

TO THE

REPUBLIC OF GUINEA-BISSAU

FOR A

TRANSPORT AND URBAN INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT

June 18, 2001

Water and Urban IICountry Department 14Africa Region

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in the performance of theirofficial duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed without World Bank authorization.

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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS

(Exchange Rate Effective May 8, 2001)

Currency Unit = CFA franc (CFAF)1 CFAF = US$ 0.00136

US$ 1 = 735.42 CFAF

FISCAL YEARJanuary 1 December 31

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AGEOPPE Gumean Executing Agency for Public Works and Employment Creation (AgenciaGuineense de Execuspo de Obras de Interesse Publico e Promocao de Emprago)

AGETIP Public Works Executing Agency (Agence d'Excution de Travaux d'Interet Public)CAS Country Assistance StrategyDCA Development Credit AgreementERR Economic Rate of RetumnMOP Manual of ProcedureMSI Ministry of Social InfrastructurePPF Project Preparation FacilityRODOFLUVIAL Road and River Transport Public Company (Empresa Putblica de Transportes

Rodoviarias e Fluviais)SAR Staff Appraisal ReportTAGB Airline of Guinea-Bissau (Transporte Aero do Guinea-Bissau)

Vice President: Callisto E. Madavo, AFRVP|Country Director: John McIntire, AFC14Sector Manager: Letitia A. Obeng, AFT`U2

Task Team Leader: Matar Fall, AFTU2

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

GUINEA-BISSAUTransport and Urban Infrastructure Project

CONTENTS

Page No.1. Project Data 12. Principal Performance Ratings 13. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry 14. Achievement of Objective and Outputs 35. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome 66. Sustainability 87. Bank and Borrower Performance 98. Lessons Leamed 119. Partner Comments 1110. Additional Information 11Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix 12Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing 14Annex 3. Economic Costs and Benefits 15Annex 4. Bank Inputs 16Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components 17Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance 18Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents 19Annex 8. Project Outputs by Cornponents 20

This document has a restricted distribution and may be used by recipients only in theperformance of their official duties. Its contents may not otherwise be disclosed withoutWorld Bank authorization.

Project ID: P035915 Project Name: Transport and Urban InfrastructureProject

Team Leader: Matar Fall TL Unit: AFTU2ICR Type: Core ICR Report Date. June 18, 2001

1. Project Data

Name: Transport and Urban Infrastructure Project L/C/TF Number: IDA-27480;PPFI-P8670;PPFI-P8671; TF-23048

Country/Department: GUINEA-BISSAU Region: Africa Regional OfficeSector/subsector: UY - Other Urban Development

KEY DATESOriginal Revised/Actual

PCD: 04/12/1994 Effective: 11/14/1995 01/08/1996Appraisal: 02/22/1995 MTR: 12/31/1997 10/15/1999Approval: 06/22/1995 Closing. 12/31/1999 12/31/2000

Borrower/lImplementing Agency: REPUBLIC OF GUINEA-BISSAU/MINISTRY OF SOCIALINFRASTRUCTURE

Other Partners:

STAFF Current At AppraisalVice President: Callisto E. Madavo E.V.K. JaycoxCountry Manager: John Mclntire Jean-Louis SarbibSector Manager: Letitia A. Obeng Alberto HarthTeam Leader at ICR: Matar Fall Leslie PeanICR Primary Author: Eleanor Wamer

2. Principal Performance Ratings

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HL=Highly Likely, L=Likely, UN=Unlikely, HUN=HighlyUnlikely, HIU=Highly Unsatisfactory, H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N-=Negligible)

Outcome: U

Sustainability: UN

Institutional Development Impact: M

Bank Performance: U

Borrower Performance: U

QAG (if available) ICRQuality at Entry: U

Project at Risk at Any Time: Yes

3. Assessment of Development Objective and Design, and of Quality at Entry

3.1 Original Objective:

The project objectives, as stated in the Development Credit Agreement (DCA), were to assist the Borrowerin: (i) improving the management of economic and social urban infrastructure; (ii) rehabilitating transport

and urban infrastructure; and (iii) increasing the efficiency of private and small- and medium-sizedenterprises to carry out works within the transport and urban infrastructure sectors.

3.2 Revised Objective:

Not applicable.

3.3 Original Components:

The project as described in the DCA consisted of the following:Component A: Rehabilitation and Maintenance Program of the Priority Network of Roads and Ports(US$14.7 million or 49 percent of base costs)

1. Rehabilitation of about 150 kms of roads, including the construction of necessary engineeringstructures, such as service bays, inverts, culverts, and small bridges.

2. Periodic maintenance of about 90 kms of roads through, inter alia, pavement sacrification, grading andshoulder regravelling, and small engineering structures.

3. Routine maintenance of the road network through selective interventions, including cleaning ditches,filling potholes, regravelling dirt roads, grass clearance from shoulders, and installation of wet setbarriers.

4. Rehabilitation of the Bubaque and Cacheu ports, including rehabilitation of the quay, berthingstructures and storage facilities.

Component B: Urban Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Maintenance Program (US$10.5 million or35 percent of base costs)

A. Water and Sanitation:1. Rehabilitation of the water distribution primary network (including the replacement of about 7 km of

leaking main water pipes) and water storage; connecting and extending approximately 2.4 km of200-250 mm water pipes; and strengthening about 4.5 km of piping.

2. Rehabilitation of earth and concrete drainage, including the rehabilitation of four outlets, clearingexisting and new earth and concrete drainage.

3. Implementation of a pilot program intended to develop adapted and sustainable methods for solid wastecollection and disposal.

B. Street Paving and Drainage:Carrying out a street improvement program in Bissau and seven secondary market towns (Buba, Bissora,Canchungo, Farim, Bafatu, Gabu and Catio), including street paving for motorized and non-motorizedtraffic, repairs of sidewalks and culverts, and construction of neighborhood access streets and intersections.

C. Small Urban Infrastructure:1. Constructing and rehabilitating small economic and social infrastructures; such as primary schools,

basic health centers, neighborhood markets, butcheries and small terminals for inter-city transport.2. Carrying out strategic studies to improve investment planning and maintenance of social infrastructure

in urban areas.

Component C: Capacity Building Program in Sector Management and Planning (US$4.1 million or13 percent of base costs)

1. Institutional strengthening of the Ministry of Social Infrastructure (MSI) through, inter alia, carryingout studies on: (i) traffic; (ii) Road Fund administration and management; and (iii) future sectoral

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operations, carrying out in-service and short-tern training programs for staff, providing technicaladvisory services, office equipment acquisition (including computers and materials), vehicles andrehabilitation of existing MSI facilities.

2. Carrying out short-term workshops on business administration, financial management, workorganization and labor intensive techniques for contractors, architects and engineers taking part in theexecution of the project.

3. Strengthening municipalities capacity, neighborhood and user associations to secure minimum fundingor participation for maintenance of existing urban infrastructure, through information programs andtechnical advisory services to assist in preparing feasibility studies and technical project proposals.

4. Institutional strengthening of AGEOPPE through, inter alia, the acquisition of goods (including officeequipment, computers and vehicles) and providing technical advisory services.

3.4 Revised Components:

Not Applicable.

3.5 Quality at Entry:

Quality at entry is considered unsatisfactory. On the one hand, project objectives were in line with CountryAssistance Strategy (CAS) priorities of February 1993 and the Government's Letter of Sector DevelopmentPolicy of May 1995. They were clearly stated in the SAR and did not lead to any ambiguity duringimplementation. By appraisal, the Government had taken steps to demonstrate its readiness for the projectby reducing the number of public sector staff, particularly, through the privatization of public enterprisesand road maintenance brigades. The Government also agreed to establish an AGETIP-type agency(AGEOPPE) and delegate contract management to it. AGEOPPE was successfully created prior tonegotiations and a draft statute and Manual of Procedures (MOP) were prepared. Being a new agency, theproject included a program of technical assistance for capacity strengthening of AGEOPPE. Projectpreparation was financed by a Japanese Trust Fund and a PPF. The preparation team completed severalkey activities, including (a) inventory of subprojects for the first year's portfolio; (b) selection of pilotworks to be contracted after negotiations; and (c) preparation of the 1995-99 rehabilitation andmaintenance program of the roads priority network.

On the other hand, the number of policy changes was ambitious. The project expected total disengagementof the Government from direct involvement in road, water and air transport during the life of the project.While some reforms were initiated or completed prior to project effectiveness, there were a few that provedto be overly demanding and complex for the Government and were not completed within the timeframeintended. For example, the country was unable to attract serious investors to its air and water transportindustries during the project. Another problem is that the project team failed to secure donor commitmentfor 30 percent of project costs, as planned at the beginning of the project. While cofmancing "was expectedto be confirmed before credit effectiveness" (SAR p. 25), the project became effective even though thecofmancing arrangement was not pinned down.

4. Achievement of Objective and Outputs

4.1 Outcome/achievement of objective:

Overall the project outcome is rated unsatisfactory.

Improve the management of economic and social urban infrastructure:The outcome of this objective is mixed. On the one hand, the Ministry of Social Infrastructure (MSI)

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succeeded in streamlining its activities and surrendering execution of public works to AGEOPPE during theearly part of the project. This allowed the MSI to focus on key policy-setting activities. MSI's mostsignificant achievement was setting up a sector development policy and a sector specific policy matrix thatallowed it to guide and control sector activities. However, execution remains weak, as discussed in Section4.5. Its staff were also trained. Unfortunately, MSI headquarters, including project assets, such asvehicles and office equipment, were completely destroyed by the civil war. While MSI is operating intemporary facilities, its effectiveness is seriously constrained by inadequate logistics.

Rehabilitate transport and urban inffrastructure:The outcome of this objective is also mixed. Many roads were successfully rehabilitated and maintained:114 km of paved roads and 112 km of dirt roads were rehabilitated, and successful periodic maintenancewas carried out on 17 km of paved road and 24 km of dirt road. Some of these achievements exceeded SARexpectations (see Section 4.2). Routine maintenance activities were carried out during 1996, 1998 and2000, which alleviated transport bottlenecks and vehicle maintenance costs for a short period of time. Thetwo ports slated for rehabilitation under the project were successfully rehabilitated. Similarly, most streets,particularly in Bissau central, were improved through paving, provision of sidewalks, repair of culverts,and drainage, for example. The problem, however, is that roads deteriorated badly as a result of the civilwar, heavy rains, and continued lack of maintenance, which increased transportation costs and worsenedtransport bottlenecks, particularly with respect to access to poor areas.

The Government did not succeed in refomning and managing the Road Fund as set out in the project. Adelay in carrying out a study to reorganize the Road Fund (i.e. setting up payment mechanisms andaccountability) contributed to the first project suspension (Section 5). Once the suspension was lifted, therewere further delays in adopting the recommendations of the Road Fund study; hence, covenanted amountswere not channeled into a dedicated Road Fund account to be used primarily to pay the project counterpartfunds and for road maintenance.

The Government was slow in carrying out reforms related to the liquidation/privatization of TransportAero de Guinea-Bissau (TAGB) and Empresa Publica de Transportes Rodoviarias e Fluvais(RODOFLUVIAL) in the air and maritime sub-sectors. While liquidation did occur, the country could notattract private investors, nor did the project provide support for the next phase of the privatization process.

The program for rehabilitation and improvement of the water supply distribution system was not executed.Similarly, health centers and markets were not rehabilitated as had been envisaged in the project. Thesecomponents were designed to be financed by other donors. As the project did not succeed in attractingdonors, they could not be implemented as planned.

Increase the efficiency of private and small- and medium-sized enterprises to carry out works within thetransport and urban infrastructure sectors:This objective has been partially met. In compliance with the Development Credit Agreement (DCA), theGovernment provided funds, facilities, services and other needed resources to establish AGEOPPE anddelegated to it the necessary powers to procure goods and services. The Government produced andimplemented an action plan. There were difficulties with the Manual of Procedures (MOP) and applicationof the Bank's procurement guidelines. These were addressed late in the project, including a completerevision of the MOP for all AGETIP operations throughout West Africa and training on procurementissues conducted by Bank staff. A discussion of procurement problems is provided in Section 5.3.

Local private enterprises were successfully used for periodic and routine road maintenance, instead of theformer inefficient force account method. The project provided employment to over 720 road maintenance

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laborers during implementation. As described below, local skill capacity was enhanced to execute contractwork, which was satisfactory. From March 1996 to March 2000, AGEOPPE successfully organized 23training programs in the form of seminars, workshops, and courses for its staff, Government (particularlythe MSI), consultants and contractors. These programs were implemented over a total of 202 training days(an average of 50 training days per year) and were attended by over 510 participants. In the field ofconstruction, about 115 work contracts were prepared, and 98 of them awarded (mostly to localcontractors) through local competitive bidding and sole selection.

In the field of consultant services, one of the project objectives was to generate a market for the emergenceof small- and medium-sized consulting finns, while the number of employees at the MSI was supposed tobe reduced. This did not materialize, as the country's crisis situation was not conducive to developing areal private sector in Guinea-Bissau, and the solution adopted by AGEOPPE was to distribute contracts tosmall firms owned by active civil servants. As this practice is not allowed in IDA-financed projects, mostconsultant contracts under the project were declared misprocurement cases (see Section 5.3).

4.2 Outputs by components:

An evaluation of the achievement of objectives and outputs by project components is presented in thematrix in Annex 8.

As indicated in the Annex, the project succeeded in meeting and/or exceeding SAR expectations in therehabilitation of roads (component Al) and the improvement of two ports (component A4). A total of 114km of roads were paved (as against the planned 74 kIn); similarly, 112 km of dirt roads were rehabilitated(compared with the planned 76 kIn). Work on the ports was satisfactorily completed in September 1999.Periodic road maintenance (component A2. 1) was satisfactorily done, although the completed work wasabout 30 percent of SAR expectation. Finally, capacity building in sector management and planning(component C) was satisfactorily done.

By mid-1998, routine maintenance was carried out on about 47 percent of roads targeted at appraisal.Maintenance work was interrupted by the civil war and, unfortunately, it never resumed to the pre-warlevel because of continued failure to use the Road Fund as agreed.

The water supply and sanitation component was not implemented as designed (as indicated in Section 4.1above). Instead, 11 boreholes were sunk to provide emergency relief Investments in social infrastructurerehabilitation (health centers, slaughter houses, markets and small tenninals for inter-city transport) werealso not carried out. Because of the project's failure to secure extemal donor funding, as intended at thestart of the project, about 30 percent of the project remained unfunded.

4.3 Net Present Value/Economic rate of return:

While a detailed ex-ante economic rate of return (ERR) was not done for the entire project, analyses weredone for the rehabilitation and maintenance program of the priority network of roads, which account forover 50 percent of project investments. The SAR estimated that ERRs for road repair and maintenanceranged from 20 to 61 percent, with an average of 38 percent based on the standard user cost-savingsmethodology, but the SAR did not provide details on the economic evaluation. Economic benefits werealso expected from a reduction of vehicle operating costs (SAR estimates 40 to 45 percent). Atcompletion, it is noted that most works have been done as planned, but were negatively impacted by thecombined effects of the war, heavy rains and lack of maintenance. Additionally, traffic data collection thatmight have been done during project execution was destroyed during the war. The basic traffic data for

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measuring the actual economic impact of the road component of the project is therefore not available.While some investments may have positive ERRs, overall, there is no apparent reduction in vehicleoperating costs as a result of the project.

4.4 Financial rate of return:

Because of the varied nature of the project's investments, a financial rate of return calculation was notincluded in the SAR.

4.5 Institutional development impact:

Overall, the institutional development impact of the project in the road sub-sector is modest. Sectormanagement and planning remains weak at the central level. Instruments for road maintenance planninghave not been developed efficiently. The Road Fund has been created, but it continues to finance generalbudgetary activities of the Government rather than being solely used for road maintenance. Procedures arenot transparent and work supervision is not up to standard. Technical assistance has been provided, but theproject has failed to develop a real private sector for consultant services (see Section 5.3).

AGEOPPE was successfully created under the project and survived the civil war. In the context of GuineaBissau, it constitutes the main reference for public works, construction and urbanization sectors, since MSIhas been further weakened by complete destruction of its headquarters and disappearance of almost all ofits files and equipment. However, AGEOPPE still does not have an adequate contract management system,which needs to be urgently addressed, since AGEOPPE will be responsible for managing the civil workscomponents of Bank-financed projects. AGEOPPE is currently supervising the civil works componentunder an ongoing National Health Development Program (Cr. 3010). A detailed action plan wasrecommended by the final IDA supervision mission to improve AGEOPPE's contract managementcapacity.

5. Major Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcome

5.1 Factors outside the control of government or implementing agency:

The implementation period was marked by very high inflation and local currency erosion, which made itdifficult for the Governmuent to meet its agreed counterpart funding obligation.

Eleven months of political conflict and civil war (June 1998 to May 1999) led to the second suspension ofthe project (June 1998 to August 1999). The Bank placed the country in non-accrual status as ofDecember 2, 1998. While the accrual status was restored on May 28, 1999 following the Government'sclearance of its arrears to IDA, suspension on this Credit was not lifted until the Government removedproject implementation constraints. The physical impact of the war on the project includes:

* Total destruction of the MSI building, which had been rehabilitated by the project and equipped withcomputers and other office equipment. Five new vehicles purchased under the project were eitherdestroyed or stolen during that period. Although AGEOPPE's office was spared during the war, it lostsome project assets (vehicles, computers and motorcycles).

* Most contractors lost materials and equipment, and a few went bankrupt and were unable to continuetheir contracts after the war. In most cases, AGEOPPE was unable to recover advanced paymentsmade to contractors who became bankrupt as their bank guaranties were not honored on the basis offorce majeure.

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* The conflict broke out at a time when most road contractors had already started construction with aview to completing works prior to the start of the rainy season. When the rains started inAugust/September, roads were washed away and made worse than pre-construction conditions. Mostcontracts, subsequently, had to be regrouped into lots and were retendered and re-awarded.

Donors were expected to provide about 30 percent of the project costs. This did not materialize, andimplementation of the project, as designed, was substantially affected.

5.2 Factors generally subject to government control:

The Government defaulted on three DCA provisions, which led to the first Credit suspension in April 1997.These include: (a) carrying out a study and implementing an action plan (no later than June 30, 1996) toprivatize or liquidate TAGB; (b) carrying out a study and implementing an action plan to reform the RoadFund no later than December 31, 1996 (including the promotion of road users' participation in managingthe Road Fund); and (c) agreeing to pay counterpart funds of US$555,000 in 1996 and US$580,000 in1997. It is noted that the suspension was lifted in June 1997 when prescribed conditions were met,including partial payment of counterpart funds.

5.3 Factors generally subject to implementing agency control.

AGEOPPE did not use agreed procedures with regard to procurement of works and consultant services. Aprocurement audit, done by an independent auditor in September 2000, pointed out many cases ofnon-compliance in contract award with regard to either the DCA or AGEOPPE's MOP. Some of thesecivil works contracts were given the Bank's no-objection, and because of this, a decision was taken not todeclare misprocurement for civil works.

Regarding consultant services, AGEOPPE allowed the use of civil servants as contractors, which in partstems from the scarcity of skilled manpower for the prescribed work. In any event, this apparent conflict ofinterest did not support the project's objective of improving the skills and competitiveness of contractorsand encouraging the formation of indigenous consulting firms while reducing the size of civil service staff.As the use of civil servants as consultants is not allowed in Bank-financed projects, and taking into accountthat contracts were awarded on a sole source basis without IDA prior review and no-objection, theconsultant contracts under review were considered as having been misprocured. As a result, theGovernment has been asked to reimburse the related funds representing a total amount of US$92,925.Following the technical audit, an Action Plan was prepared for implementing improved procurementprocedures by AGEOPPE.

The MOP was revised and standardized in 2000 for adaptation and use by all AGETIPs. AGEOPPE has'completely and formally adopted the new MOP, a copy of which was sent, to the Bank after a jointBank-AGEOPPE review in January 2001.

5.4 Costs andfinancing:

The total project cost was estimated at US$33.5 million to be financed by: IDA (US$22.0 million or 60percent of total costs); the Government (US$2.5 million or 7 percent); and donors (US$9.0 million or 27percent). Because firm commitments were not obtained from donors, a reduced project was executedwithout their contribution.

Disbursements were suspended twice for a total of 14 months. The Credit was fully disbursed. IDA

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disbursements were satisfactory, starting with greater momentum than planned for cumulative years 1996and 1997, but this slowed in line with the country's difficulties.

Table: IDA Disbursements (Actual vs Target)

Year 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 Total

SAR Planned (mil $) 5.00 6.00 5.00 5.00 1.00 0 22.00

Actual (mil $) 4.68 7.86 2.27 1.30 2.99 0.35 19.45

Cunm. Planned (mil. ) 5.00 11.00 16.00 21.00 22.00 22.00

Cumm. Actual (Mil $) 4.68 12.55 14.81 16.12 19.10 19.45

The Government was expected to provide a total of US$2.5 million by making 6 monthly installments ofUS$625,000 to the project account. Throughout the 5-year project implementation, the Government paidonly 36 percent, or US$901,300 of its obligations. No payments were made during the project's extensionto December 31, 2000. The Government, therefore, did not meet its commitments, as required by the DCA.

6. Sustainability

6.1 Rationale for sustainability rating:

Sustainability of this project is not likely for two major reasons.

First, the policy setting body, MSI, is unable to function effectively. Logistical equipment and vehiclesprocured under the project (on behalf of MSI) were destroyed by the civil war, which also destroyed theMSI building. While MSI operations have resumed in temporary facilities, logistical support is lacking andits ability to function in a meaningful way is therefore compromised. The country has asked for assistanceto rehabilitate some of the roads and facilities destroyed by the war.

Second, the Government's commitment to the Road Fund continues to be lacking. At appraisal, theGovernment agreed to a study to reorganize the Road Fund. The study recommended that a dedicatedaccount be set up and used solely for routine road maintenance. This has not been done and Road Fundrevenues are still being channeled into a general central Government account. It was agreed at the time ofproject appraisal to accrue a total of US$5.5 million (current US$) over the period 1995 to 2000; however,based on the information provided by the Government, only 16 percent (or US$0.9 million) was accrued inthe Road Fund. It is noted that the major portion (about 70 percent) of the physical investments was usedfor road rehabilitation and maintenance and necessary training to develop capacity for contractors andcommunities to play a role in roads and other social infrastructure maintenance. Sustainability of theseinvestments relies primarily on setting up proper mechanisms for channeling Road Fund revenues into roadmaintenance. Roads are already deteriorating and trained contractors are not being fully utilized.

6.2 Transition arrangement to regular operations:

AGEOPPE was-created to execute the project and carry out maintenance and other project infrastructureinvestments. As such, the project dealt with the agency in charge of regular operations. With respect to itscontinued operations, it appears that in spite of the effects of the war and limited recurrent financing,AGEOPPE continues to operate with some degree of success. AGEOPPE was able to resume work on theproject after the war ended (in spite of the Govemment's inability to provide needed funds). SinceAGEOPPE is improving its capacity to work in this area, it will continue to be a focal point for this

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investment and future projects in this sector. The Bank will no longer finance recurrent AGEOPPE costs.AGEOPPE will finance its operations from a percentage (or fee) of investment costs for projectcomponents it will be executing.

7. Bank and Borrower Performance

Bank7.] Lending:

Project preparation is rated unsatisfactory. On the one hand, the project design took into consideration theexperience of lessons learned from five previous operations in Guinea Bissau, which led to the project'sfocus on a limited number of strategic objectives and the inclusion of an AGETIP-type agency to enablemore efficient procurement, contracting and payment procedures. The project's objectives were closelyaligned with the Government's objectives and action plan, as detailed in the Government's Letter of SectorDevelopment Policy, and the Bank's project team worked closely with the Government's team to ensureproject readiness (see Section 7.4). On the other hand, some of the policy changes required by the projectwere overly ambitious and difficult to attain during project implementation (see Section 3.5). Additionally,the project team failed to confirmn donor funding by effectiveness, as intended in the SAR.

7.2 Supervision:

Project supervision is rated highly unsatisfactory because of the following: (i) procurement problems werenot addressed adequately and in a timely manner, even though the execution agency was very new andinexperienced. The Bank did not adequately provide assistance during supervision. This led to theidentification (by a technical audit) of cases of misprocurement, as discussed in Section 5.3 above.Normally, deviations picked up by the technical audit should have been addressed during the course of anormal supervision; (ii) supervision missions never included a Bank Procurement Specialist, even thoughthis was planned in the SAR; and (iii) the Bank gave no objections on civil works contracts, which were notprocured using the Bank's normal procurement procedures.

The mid-term review was initially scheduled for 1997, but had to be postponed by 12 months. It finallytook place in 1999, the year of the original credit closing date. Had the original date been kept, a fullreview of the country and project situation could have been done and corrective measures taken in a timelymanner with respect to the aforementioned procurement deviations.

On the other hand, the supervision team successfully addressed early implementation problems with respectto compliance with agreed policies, which led to increased exchanges with Government and finally todecisions to suspend the Credit twice. The support given to the country, especially immediately after thecivil war, is commendable as it ensured that the project was revived inmmediately following the war andcontinued to its completion.

In terms of supervision missions, the Bank could not follow the supervision plan in the SAR because ofcountry difficulties. Three missions were planned in 1998, but only one was done, most likely due to thewar; similarly, only one mission was done in 1997. The Credit closing date was extended by one year toDecember 2000, and four supervision missions were conducted during that year. The Bank showedleniency and sympathy by taking immediate action to support the re-activation of the project despite poorresponse in counterpart funding, perhaps in an attempt to support the country during a very difficultpost-conflict period.

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7.3 Overall Bankperformance:

On the basis of the above, the Bank's performance is rated as unsatisfactory.

Borrower7.4 Preparation:

The Borrower's performance during project preparation is rated as satisfactory as it articulated itsobjectives for the sector in a Letter of Sector Development Policy and also met needed conditions forproject effectiveness, including setting up a new agency (within a relatively short time) to expedite projectexecution.

7.5 Government implementation performance:

The Government's implementation performance is rated as unsatisfactory.

The Government started well by meeting the agreed conditions for project effectiveness within a short time.The Government also established a sector policy on transport and urban infrastructure, which helped theproject to a good start. However, within one year, the Government began defaulting on some DCAcovenants, which led to the first suspension of disbursement for a period of four months.

In order to support the Government's ability to provide counterpart funds, the project funded a study toeffectively set up a Road Fund mechanism. The Government also rehabilitated support facilities andtrained staff with the aim of strengthening operations and management of the Road Fund. In spite of theseinitial efforts, the Government persistently failed to comply with the project requirement that the RoadFund be earmarked for the project's counterpart fund and for road maintenance. As a result, theGovernment paid only 36 percent of its required contribution to total costs, and road maintenance is notbeing done. Future funding of road maintenance is also in jeopardy.

7.6 Implementing Agency:

AGEOPPE's overall performance is rated as satisfactory. It is noted that, in the context of Guinea-Bissau,AGEOPPE is an asset when compared to the capacity of other Government agencies. AlthoughAGEOPPE was a new and relatively inexperienced agency, it succeeded in disbursing all project funds asintended. AGEOPPE is expected to survive and continue functioning in an improved manner following itsrecent adoption (in January 2001) of a revised MOP. However, a procurement audit in September 2000,revealed major issues with respect to civil works and consultant contracts (see section 5.3), which were notmanaged appropriately by the new agency. The latter did not get the required quality assistance(supervision) to help it perform its duties adequately in this area.

7.7 Overall Borrower performance:

Overall Borrower performance is rated unsatisfactory.

8. Lessons Learned

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The following lessons are derived from the design and implementation of this project:

a) Donor funding: Commitment for the provision of donor funds was expected prior to projecteffectiveness. Donor funds were not secured and 30 percent of the project could not be implemented. Thisexperience reconfirms the importance of ensuring that firm commitments from all sources of fundingnecessary for successful completion of the project exist prior to signing or effectiveness.

b) The Road Fund: The Fund was created, but the Govemrnent did not put in place institutionalmechanisms to make it operate as it should. There was no adequate system for work planning, neither wasthere a system for transferring funds from the central Government. If collection procedures had been putinto place and effectively followed, the Fund would have been able to fully finance road maintenance. Theexperience suggests that: (i) necessary mechanisms and procedures should have been clearly accepted andput in place prior to Credit negotiations or effectiveness; and (ii) when a Government is not fully committedto following through, then the whole approach should be reconsidered.

c) AGEOPPE: AGEOPPE was created in a short timeframe just prior to Credit negotiations. Itworked relatively effectively, but it deviated from the MOP and World Bank procurement guidelines.Procurement is a central issue in the supervision of a project, but it was not treated as such. The lessonfrom this project's experience is that for new AGETIP-type agencies, Bank supervision teams need toremain close to the client during the first years of project execution in order to avoid problems, such asmisprocurement, which were caught by a technical audit toward the end of the project. At least oneprocurement audit should have been done after the first year for a newly created project implementationagency.

d) One general recommendation is that in a project such as this, with two suspensions followed by awar, the Bank should have done a re-appraisal of the project at the end of the conflict. Based on theevidence in the files, the project was just restarted without change. The project should have beenrestructured using an emergency approach, and instead of focussing on policy reforms, funding should havebeen moved to emergency maintenance. This approach could have put the country in a stronger position toseek follow-on sector funding and resume sector policy dialogue.

9. Partner Comments

(a) Borrower/implementing agency:A copy of the draft ICR was sent to the Borrower on May 9, 2001 for review and comment. Theircomments were received on May 23, 2001 and incorporated in the final ICR.

(b) Cofinanciers:Not applicable.

(c) Otlher partners (NGOs/private sector):Not applicable.

10. Additional Information

The Borrower submitted its own ICR, which essentially supports the findings of the Bank's ICR. It hasbeen included in the Project file (see Annex 7).

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Annex 1. Key Performance Indicators/Log Frame Matrix

Transport Component

Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year2000Indicators SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR Actual Actual

No. of delegated contract management agreementssigned 3 na 3 na 3 na 3 na .naNo. of works contracts signed 13 14 13 4 13 16 13 0 2No. of contracts completed (cumulative) 10 3 22 17 32 19 42 0 23

Percentage of contracts completed within budget 85 64 90 58 95 100 95 0 50Percentage of contracts completed on time 85 53 90 53 95 0 95 0 100Percentage of payments made within 1 0 days of_invoice receipt 100 70 100 70 100 90 100 40 87Percentage of contracts awarded within 30 workingdays from bid opening 95 27 100 27 100 100 100 0 100Percentage of invitations to bid for which the timetaken to prepare the bid is:Local call for bids (20-30 days) 100 40 100 43 100 100 100 0 100Intemational call for bids (45 days minimum) 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 naLabor ratio for highway projects higher than: 15 10 15 8 15 18 15 0 20No. of jobs created 9,000 206 12,700 2,870 8,000 120 5,000 0 643Average amount (in US$) of highway projects in thebatch of projects below 60,000 132,058 60,000 2,373,961 60,000 1,049,173 60,000 0 1,282,502Training and technical assistance: no. ofbeneficiaries 30 na 30 na 30 na 30 na naTraining and technical assistance: % of contractorsbenefitting 100 na 100 na 100 na 100 na naNo. of prequalified contractors for highwaymaintenance (cumulative) 10 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 15Percentage of prequalified contractors for highwaymaintenance having won at least one contract withthe Agency 90 na 100 na 90 na 90 na naNo. of km of highway rehabilitated 40 1.8 45 100 40 29 30 0 2,688No. of km of periodic road maintenance 110 0 40 34.4 75 0 20 0 0No. of km of routine road maintenance 530 0 530 2,627 600 0 600 0 229

na: data not available

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Annex I (continued)

Urban Component

Year I Yoar 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 2000Indicators SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR Actual SAR Actual Actual

No. of delegated contract management agreementssigned 10 1 10 na 10 na 4 1 1No. of works contracts signed 60 34 80 19 30 11 20 0 4No. of contracts completed (cumulative) 50 20 120 42 160 54 185 0 65

Percentage of contracts completed withl budget 85 40 90 68 95 83 95 0 55Percentage of contracts completed on time 85 95 90 73 95 75 95 0 36Percentage of payments made within 10 days ofInvoice receipt 100 70 100 70 100 90 100 62 92Percentage of contracts awarded within 15 workingdays from bid opening 95 na 100 na 100 na 100 na naPercentage of invitations to bid for which the timetaken to prepare the bid Is 20 to 30 days (bocalcompetitive bidding) 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 0 100

Labor ratio for overall porfollo is higher than: 20 16 25 11 25 24 25 0 25No. ofjobscreated 10000 3307 15000 4902 20000 1298 10000 0 2704

Operating ratio for the Agency is lower or equal to: 11 na 7 na 7 na 7 na naAverage amount of a sub-projed In a batch of sub-projects 60000 na 60000 na 60000 na 60000 na naTraining and technical assistance: no. of personsbenefitUng 240 na 240 na 240 na 240 na naTraining and technical assistance: % of contractorsbeneflftlng 50 na 60 na 60 na 60 na naNo. of prequalified contractors (cumulative) 100 62 150 71 180 74 200 74 74

Percentage of prequalifed contractors having wonat last one contract with the Agency 50 3 50 3 30 4 20 0 0

na: data not available

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Annex 2. Project Costs and Financing

Detailed Project Cost by Component (in US$ million equivalent)

PROJECT COMPONENTS Appraisal Actual (USS million) % of AppraisalEstimate

._(USS IDA Govt. Total Estimate

A. Transport Infrastructure Rehabilitation Program 14.64 8.55 0.49 9.04 61.7%1. Rehabilitation of roads 7.21 5.53 0.26 5.792. Periodic maintenance 2.27 0.24 0.01 0.253. Routine road maintenance 3.31 0.83 0.12 0.954. Ports (Bubague and Cacheu) 1.85 1.95 0.10 2.04B. Urban Infrastructure Rehabilitation Program 10.55 6.39 0.31 6.70 63.5%1. Water and sanitation 4.11 1.33 0.10 1.432. Street paving and drainage 4.89 4.53 0.18 4.713. Social infrastructure 1.55 0.53 0.03 0.56C. Capacity Building Program 4.06 3.91 0.10 4.01 98.7%1. Sector management and studies 1.36 1.12 0.00 1.122. Support to contractors/professionals/communities 0.64 0.37 0.00 0.373. AGEOPPE 2.06 1.74 0.03 1.7714. Goods 0.00 0.68 0.08 0.761D. PPF refinancing 0.90 0.61 0.00 0.61

TOTAL BASE COSTS | 30.151 19.451 0.90[ 20.351 67.5%Physical contingencies T 1.171 _ .___ o__o_ oPrice contingencies I _ I I I_I

Inflation 2.211 l 1 1TOTAL PROJECT COSTS T 33.53t 19.451 0.90[ 20.35| 60.7%

Project Cost by Expenditure Category (in US$ million equivalent)

Government'sEXPENDITURE CATEGORY IDA contribution contribution Total Cost

1 (a) Works (Except part A3) 14.28 0.68 14.961 (b) Works (Part A3) 0.65 0.12 0.762. Goods 0.68 0.10 0.783. Consultant's services 1.37 0.00 1.374. AGEOPPE services 1.87 0.00 1.875. PPF refinancing 0.61 0.00 0.616. Unallocated 0.00 0.00 0.00

TOTAL 19.45 0.90 20.35

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Annex 3: Economic Costs and Benefits

Not applicable. The database for recalculating the ERR for this project was destroyed during the civil war,which erupted in the midst of project implementation.

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Annex 4. Bank Inputs

a) Missions:Stage of Project Cycle No. of Persons and Specialty Performance Rating

(e.g. 2 Economists, 1 FMS, etc.) Implementation DevelopmentMonth/Year Count Specialty Progress Objective

Identification/Preparation05/1994 1 ITL07/1994 5 ITL,4 CONS02/1995 2 ITL, I CONS

Appraisal/Negotiation03/1995 8 Ico-TL/PROC, lco-TL/PO, I

HE, 1 URB, 2 ECON, IWSS, 1 PES

Supervision07/1995 2 1 TL/PO, I ECON10/1995 2 1 TL/PO, I CONS02/1996 2 1 TL/PO, 1 CONS HS HS07/1996 2 1 TL/PO, I CONS U U12/1996 3 I TL/PO, 2CONS U U08/1997 2 1 TL/PO, I CONS S S02/1998 1 1 TL/PO S S01/1999 1 1 TL/PO U U04/1999 1 1 TLPO U U10/1999 4 1 TL/PO, I INST, 1 FMS, I S S

CONS/ECON01/2000 4 1 TL/PO, 2 ENG, I FMS S S03/2000 4 1 TLIPO, 2 ENG, I FMS, U U07/2000 1 ITL/PO U u

10/2000 1 1 TL/PO U u

ICR01/2001 2 1 TL, I PROC U U02/2001 1 1 CONS

TL: Team Leader; PO: Projects Officer; PROC: Procurement Specialist; HE: Highway Engineer; URB: Urban Specialist;ECON: Economist; PES: Public Enterprise Specialist; WSS: Water Supply and Sanitation Specialist.

(b) Staff.

Stage of Project Cycle Actual/Latest Estimate_________________ ENo. Staff weeks US$ (VW00)

Identification/Preparation 48.0 91.6Appraisal/Negotiation 28.3 72.4Supervision 51.2 148.8ICR 7.0 23.3Total 134.5 336.1

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Annex 5. Ratings for Achievement of Objectives/Outputs of Components

(H=High, SU=Substantial, M=Modest, N=Negligible, NA=Not Applicable)

RatingEl Macro policies 0 H 0 SU O M 0 N * NAl Sector Policies 0 H 3 SU * M O N O NA

0 Physical O H OSU*M O N O NAO Financial O H OSUOM * N O NACL Institutional Development O H 0 SU 0 M 0 N 0 NAO Environmental C H 0 SU 0 M 0 N 0 NA

SocialLI Poverty Reduction O H O SU O M * N O NAEl Gender O H O SU O M O N * NAL Other (Please specify) 0 H 0 SU 0 M 0 N 0 NA

l Private sector development 0 H 0 SU O M 0 N 0 NAEl Public sector management ( H 0 SU 0 M 0 N * NAE Other (Please specify) Gi H O SU O M 0 N 0 NA

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Annex 6. Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance

(HS=Highly Satisfactory, S=Satisfactory, U=Unsatisfactory, HU=Highly Unsatisfactory)

6.1 Bank performance Rating

C Lending OHS OS *U OHUr Supervision OHS Os Ou *HUE Overall OHS OS * U O HU

6.2 Borrower performance Rating

O Preparation OHS OS O u O HUO Government implementation performance 0 HS 0 S 0 u 0 HUO Implementation agency performance O HS O S 0 U 0 HUO Overall OHS Os * u O HU

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Annex 7. List of Supporting Documents

1. Dirafi Evaluation of The Transport and Urban Infrastruchue Project, April 2001 (M. Iliyas,Consultant).2. Borrower's ICR dated April 2001.3. Procurement Audit Report (September 2000).4. Bank Mission's Final Aide Memoire (lanuary 26,2001).

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Additional Annex 8. Project Outputs by Components

Item Target at Achieved at Project Completion CommentsSAR (1995)

A. Transport and InfrastructureRehabilitation Program ($14.7 million -49%)Al. Al.1: Rehabilitation of 74 Rehabilitated 114 km of paved road Some roads in theRehabilitation km paved roads ($2.84 at the cost of $3.16 million. The original lists wereof about 150 million) including the slight over-expenditure was omitted and newKm of roads construction of necessary compensated with saving on the ones added.

engineering structures such rehabilitation of dirt roads as shownas service bays, inverts, below. The overallculverts and small bridges performance isfor the following: For details see Tablel A. highly satisfactory.Anchungo Bula, MansabaFarin, Mansoa Mansaba,Caio Canchungo, BafanaGabu.

A 1.2 Rehabilitation of 76 Rehabilitated 112 km of dirt roads atkm earth roads ($3.15 the cost of $2.84 million. The savingmillion) including the under the dirt road compensates theconstruction of necessary over-expenditure for paved roads. Highly satisfactoryengineering structures such Here too some original roads wereas service bays, inverts, substituted.culverts and small bridgesfor the following: For details see Table IA.(Binar Bissora, GuilegeCacine, Nova Sintra SJoao)

A2. Periodic A2.1 Periodic 17 km of the paved roads (coveringRoad maintenance of 68 km of two roads) were included amongMaintenance paved roads (through, inter those rehabilitated fully. The restof about 90 alia, the scarification of the were included in routine maintenance. Satisfactorykm of roads pavement, grading and

shoulder regravelling andsmall engineering See Table 1B - Periodic Maintenancestructures) by contracting of roads for details.out road rehabilitation toprivate enterprises and,where feasible, tocommunity group andusers.A2.2 Periodic Only 14.3 km from one of the roadsmaintenance of 24 km of (St. Domingo Varela) were done Unsatisfactorydirt roads (from two road),through, inter alia, the See Table I B: Dirt Roads Routinescarification of the Maintenance.pavement, grading andshoulder regravelling andsmall engineering structuresby contracting out roadrehabilitation to privateenterprises and, wherefeasible, to communitygroup and users.

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A3 Routine A3.1. Routine maintenance Carried out maintenance of 177 km ofMaintenance of 735 km paved roads for paved roads during 1996 to 1997 atof the priority fouryears (1996 to 1999) at the cost of $193,800.network roads the cost of $1,138,000 No routine maintenance for the year(about 1,042 through selective 1998 and first half of 1999 due tokm out of intervention, including the civil war. During that time, most of3,436 km). cleaning out of ditches, the the work done before were once again

filling of potholes, the destroyed.regravelling of dirt roads, CarTied out further maintenance ofthe grass clearance of 180 km length of the roads in the yearshoulders and the 2000 at the cost of $459,250. (This The performanceinstallation of wet set amount also covers the maintenance was unsatisfactorybarriers. of 49 km of dirt roads discussed mainly due to the

below). civil war.

A3.2 Routine maintenance Carried out maintenance of 86 km onof 307 km of dirt road (10 7 roads during 1996 - 97 at the costroads) for the period 1996 of $459,260to 1999 at an estimated cost No maintenance during 1998 and firstof $I,105,000 half of 1999 due to the reasons stated

above.Carried out further maintenance of 49km length (cost being included inA.3.1 above). Unsatisfactory.

A4: A4.1 Rehabilitation of the The work was started in July 1997,Improvement ports of Bubaque and delayed by the civil war and thenof two ports Cacheu, including the completed in September 1999. The(Bubaque and rehabilitation of the quay, total cost was $1,695,670. TheCacheu) berthing structures and low supervision cost was $271,000. Highly

cost storage facilities. The satisfactory.total estimated cost (incl.Contingencies) was$1,850,000

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Item I Tar et at SAR 1995 Achieved at Project Completion CommentsPart B: Urban InfrastructureRehabilitation and Maintenance - ($10.5million or 35% )B I Water S B 1.1: Rehabilitation of Not done. Instead, II water boreholes (a) The waterSanitation primary network of water were sunk (4 at Potavel B Centrum, I supply remains in a

distribution pipelines in at Bentem Gabao and 6 at Centrum 2 deplorable conditionBissau by replacement of Fase) at the total cost of $152,250, with dry taps in7.0 km of leaking main including studies and supervision. most parts ofwater pipes Bissau. Whenever

an appreciablequantity of water ispumped into the

B1.2: Rehabilitation of 4 distribution systems,existing water storage Not done pipe bursts andreservoirs. leakage are said to

be rampant.

(b) It wasexplained that thisaspect of the project

Bl.3: Network was notinterconnection and Not done implemented due toreconditioning in Bissau by inadequate fundingconnecting and extension of as a result of the2.4 km of new 200 - inability to find250mm water pipe (PVC) donors to contributedistribution pipeline in the $9.0 million. ItBisau. is expected that a

water componentBl.4: Reinforcement will be financed(Strengthening) of water Not done under the upcomingmains by laying 4.5 km Water and Energypiping (200 - 250 mm dia.) project.

Performance:Highly

I unsatisfactory.

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B I. Water / B 1.5: Rehabilitation of Rehabilitated about 3 km of outlets andSanitation - earth and concrete drainage 25 km of drains at the total cost of Mixed - The jobcontinued including the rehabilitation $677,000. The SAR expected 5 was done but the

of four outlets, 4.2 km of contracts but 42 contracts were procurementoutlets and about 986m of awarded (40 of them LCB and 2 sole method wassewers (as detailed on page selection) unsatisfactory.63 -66 of the SAR)estimated to cost $0.66million (excludinghontigciesj

B1.6 Clearing of existingand new construction ofessential earth and concretedrainage of over 2.2 kmlength

BI.7: Implementation of apilot program intended todevelop sustainablemethods for solid wastecollection and disposal inBissauBl.8: Implementationofapilot program intended todevelop sustainablemethods for solid wastecollection and disposal in 7secondary market towns ofBafana, Bissora, Buba,Canchungo, Catio, Farim

I and GabuB2: Street B2:1 Street improvement 14 km of drainageimprovement through street paving ofpaving and motorized and non-drainage motorized traffic and

related drainage.

B2.2 Sidewalks andculvert repairs

B2.3 Construction ofneighborhood access streetsand intersections

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B3. Social B3.1 Rehabilitation / A block of 2 classes in EBE de Belem Mixed(Small Urban) construction of small was rehabilitatedInfrastructure economic and social

infrastructures - schools

B3.2 Rehabilitation / Three health centers were consideredconstruction of small for rehabilitation / construction (ineconomic and social Bairro Militar, Hafia and Centreinfrastructures - health Refine) studies were conducted at acenters cost of $1074 each, totaling $3,222. Unsaffsfactory

However, the construction contractswere not awarded hence no work wasdone.

Two contracts were executed for therepairs of septic tanks at SimaoMendes hospital at the total sum of$37,299

The library of Hospital Simao Mendeswas rehabilitated

B3.3 Rehabilitation / Two markets were considered Unsatisfactory.construction of small (Mercado Centrum and Mercadoeconomic and social Quelele) a sum of $7,000 was spent toinfrastructures - carry out studies for the rehabilitationneighborhood markets. - total 4$14,000. The work was split

into 8 contracts (Lot I to 4 for eachmarket) and awarded under LCBs.However, the work was not done andno payment was made except for thestudies stated above.

B3.4 Rehabilitation / Not done.construction of small Unsatisfactoryeconomic and socialinfrastructures - slaughterhousesB3.5 Rehabilitation / Not done.construction of small Unsatisfactoryeconomic and socialinfrastructures - smallterminals for inter-citytransport.

B3.6 Rehabilitation / The following rehabilitation worksconstruction of small were carried out:economic and social (a) A block of public toilets in Bissauinfrastructures - others. at the cost of $37,151, including

study and supervision(b) Center for Traditional Music and

Dance studies only ($450.00)

B3.7 Carry out strategicstudies to improveinvestment planning andmaintenance of socialinfrastructure in urbanareas.

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Item I Target at SAR (1995) Achieved at Project CompletionC. Capacity Building in SectorManagement and Planning ($4.1 million-1I3%)Cl. Carry out studies on traffic Successfully done in late 1995Strengthening Highlythe capacity satisfactoryof policy Carry out studies on the Carried out in 1995making, road fund administration Highlysector and management satisfactorymanagement,planning and Carry out studies on future Carried out in 1996regulation. sectoral operations

Carry out in-service Carried out in 1996, 97 and 1999training for MES

Carry out short-termtraining abroad for MESstaff

Provision of technicaladvisory services

Acquisition of office Both AGEOPPE and MES wereequipment including provided with adequate office Highlycomputers and materials equipment, including computers, satisfactory

printers, fax machines, etc.

Acquisition of vehicles 3 vehicles were purchased for Satisfactory.AGEOPPE and 4 for the MES.

Rehabilitation of existing Rehabilitation of the following werefacilities of MES carried out Satisfactory

(a) MOPCU (MIS) - studies only(b) MTT - works without studies(c) Ministrio Asuntos Sociais -

studies +workThe total cost was $130,467.

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C2. Support Strengthening the capacity 22 workshops, semiinars and coursesto contractors, of the contractors, were conducted for the consultants,professionals architects and engineers contractors and AGEOPPE and MES Highlyand taking part in the project staff. A total of 202 days were spent Satisfactory.communities execution by carrying out on this and 510 participants benefited.

short-termn workshops onbusiness administration,financial management,workshop organization,and labor intensivetechniques.

Strengthening the capacityof the municipalities,neighborhood and userassociations to secureminimum funding orparticipation for themaintenance of existingurban infrastructurethrough informationprograms and technical

I advisory servicesC3. Institutional strengthening Construction of office Annex for SatisfactoryAGEOPPE of AGEOPPE through, AGEOPPE; acquisition of vehicles,

inter alia, the acquisition and other logistical supplies.of goods (including officeequipment, computers,vehicles) and provision oftechnical advisoryservices.

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TABLE IA: ROAD REHABILITATIONSAR Actual Dates

Length Difference in(km) Cost Length (km) Cost cost Started Completed

Paved Road (74 km)1 Canchungo- Bula 6 192,000 32.30 385,220 -193,220 Feb-97 Jun-972 Mansaba- Farn 9 287,000 10.40 225,735 61,265 Nov-96 Apr-973 Mansoa- Mamsaba" 4 128,000 Not done4 Canchango-Cacheu 3 96,000 Not done5 Bafata- Gabu 52 2,138,000 52.00 1,725,874 412,126 Jun-96_ Jun-97

Sub-total (Paved) 74 2,841,000 94.70 2,336,829 412,126

Dirt Roads (76 km)6 Binar - Bissora 24 1,200,000 Not done7 Guilege -Cacine (-Mampata) 39 1,950,000 69.38 2,086,659 -136,659 Jun-96 Jul-976 Nova Sintra -S.Joao'* 13 Not done

Sub-total (Dirt) 76 3,150,000 69.38 2,086,659 -136,659GRAND TOTAL (REHAB) 150 5,991,000 4,423,488 275,467

New I Additional Paved Roads (not In the SAR)9 Bula - S. Vincent 0 0 7.02 443,880 -443,880 Mar-97 Jul-97

10 Joao Landim - Bula 01 0 12.60 380,289 -380,289 Feb-97 Jun-97a 19.62 624,169 -824,169

New I Additional Dirt Roads (not in the SAR)11 Canchungo - Calesquisse 24.00 586,774 -586,774 Mar-97 Sep-9712 Canchungo - Caio (terra) I 0 18.20 171,435 May-98 Aug-00

I New (not in orginal SAR) I 42.20 758,209 -586,7741Grand Total (additional) I 0 i 61.82 1,582,378 -1,410,9431

SUMMARYSAR Actual

____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ ____ _ FLengtr _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

(kim) SAR ($) Length km Actual ($)Total paved roads rehabilitated 74 2,841,000 114.32 3,160,998Total dirt road rehabilitated 76 3,150,000 111.58 2,844,868

r 1 5 225.90' 6005,6SAR Estimate including contingencies: ; 7,212,000

TABLE 1 B: PERIODIC MAINTENANCE OF ROADS_ ____________________ _____ SAR Actual Dates

Length TRoad (km) Cost Length (km) | Cost cost Started Completed

Paved oad (68 km) I I1 iBula S .- Vicente 6 192,000 induded under rehabilitation2Jao Landin- Bula 11 351,000 induded under rehabilRation33Bub- Binar 5 319,000 Not done I4|Gabu- Rio Caium 46 1,468,000 Not done|

Sub-total (Paved) 68 2,330,000 _ 0 0

Dirt Roads (23 km) _ _5 S. Domingo Varela 13 187,000 14.30 189,364 -2,364 Mar-97 Jul-976 Mamiata Guuilege 10 1,950,000 Not done I

Sub-total Dirt 23 2,137,000 14.30 189,364 -2,3641GRAND TOTAL (PER. MAINT.) 91 4,4671,00C 189,364 -2,364

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