Public Distribution System of Essential Commodities as a Social Safety Net

A Study of Uttar Pradesh

Final Report

Submitted to

The Planning Commission Government of India

Govind Ballabh Pant Social Science Institute Allahabad - 211 019

Phone: 0532-2569214, 2569206; Fax: 0532-2569207 E-mail:majumderb@rediffmail.com

Contents Study Team ii Preface iii Chapter Contents iv-vii List of Tables viii-xvii List of Boxes xvii-xix Executive Summary xx-xliv Chapter I Public Distribution System in India: An Overview 1-20 Chapter II Public Distribution System in India and Uttar Pradesh: The Strength and the

Weaknesses 21-50

Chapter III Objectives, Coverage, Methodology and Study Region 52-70 Chapter IV Public Distribution in Uttar Pradesh: The Facts 71-181 Chapter V Role of Panchayats and Functionary in PDS 182-242 Chapter VI Field Diary: Qualitative Observations 243-305 Chapter VII Findings and Recommendations 306-330 References 331-333

i

Study Team

Project Director Dr. Bhaskar Majumder Research Supervisors Sri Madan Gopal Gupta Sri Gyan Nath Jha Research Assistants Sri Om Ji Mishra Sri Diva Nath Mishra Computer Assistant Sri Sandip Kumar Jaiswal

ii

Preface The report that we are going to submit to the Planning Commission, Government of India, is on ‘Public Distribution System of Essential Commodities as a Social Safety Net : A Study of Uttar Pradesh’. We submitted a research proposal in this regard on June 16, 2005 and got the approval of grant-in-aid on 13th March 2006, with the mandate to complete the study by 31 December 2006. We could really start the study with the appointment of necessary staff for the project since April 10, 2006. We had to cover eight districts in the state of U.P. for this elaborate study within this short span of time. We tried our best to complete it by the planned time period. However, because of a number of problems and constraints, both internal and external, we are delayed in submission of the report by more than a month. We apologize for that to the competent authority in the Planning Commission, India. We believe the study had been really challenging in the sense of unearthing the facts latent in food insecurity of people in U.P. in a general condition of food self sufficiency. We came across many paradoxes while in field and hence incorporated a section in the report centered on Field Diary or the qualitative information that would have been impossible to encapsulate by quantitative data. We strongly believe that the findings and recommendations that follow will help the Planning Commission to adopt appropriate policies and implement steps for ensuring objectives behind public distribution system of essential commodities in India. I wholeheartedly thank Sri. A.S. Ahluwalia, adviser (SP-NE/SER) in Planning Commission, Sri Harminder Singh, Dy. Secretary to the Government of India, Sri Anil Malhotra, Dy. Secretary to the Government of India and Mr. S.A. Rahim, under secretary to the Government of India for providing support for the study. I also thank Sri Ashish Kumar, PEO, Regional Evaluation Office (REO) at Lucknow, U.P. I thank the Secretary, Food and Civil Supplies, Government of U.P., all the DMs, CDOs, DSOs and Supply Inspectors for providing support. I thank the representatives from Panchayats, the local FPS dealers, the in-charge of godown and depot for cooperating in the study. The highest support we received from the deprived households who unfolded the problems before the study team. I also thank Prof. Jean Dreze, Prof. Ravi Srivastava, Prof. Kripa Shankar for providing me insight that supported the study. Particularly, Dreze asked me some questions on the issue that really helped me and my team to come up with answers as far as possible. I shall fail in my duty it I forget the support provided by the Director, Prof. R.C. Tripathi, of my Institute. I got help from Ms. Mousumi Majumder who provided love’s labour in translating the whole matter in English from Hindi. I remember her help. On behalf of the project team, I submit the report to the Planning Commission for its acceptance. Allahabad – Bhaskar Majumder March, 2007

iii

Chapter Contents Chapter I Public Distribution System in India: An Overview 1-20

1.1 Introduction 11.2 PDS in India: The History 11.3 Evolution of Public Distribution System in India 51.4 Public Distribution System: The Rationale 51.5 Revamped Public Distribution System: Some Features 101.6 Targeted Public Distribution System: Features 101.7 Rationale of Targeted PDS 121.8 Public Intervention in the Foodgrains Market 121.9 Arguments against Government Intervention in the Foodgrains Market 131.10 Family Budget, the Poor and PDS: Arguments for PDS 161.11 Prices, Poverty and Public Distribution System 181.12 Quality of Items in PDS 201.13 Summary Facts on Public Distribution System in the Indian Economy 20

Chapter II Public Distribution System in India and Uttar Pradesh: The Strength and the Weaknesses

21-50

2.1 India’s Agriculture: Growth of Output, Availability, and Imports 212.2 Availability, Consumption, Procurement of Foodgrains in India 262.3 Procurement of Wheat and Rice from Selected States 302.4 Allocation and Off-take of Foodgrains under Different Schemes: U.P. and India 312.5 Off-take of Foodgrains from Central Pool under Different Schemes 362.6 Food Stocks, Allocation, and Off-take: Purpose and Position 372.7 Release of Surplus Stocks through Non-FPS Measures 402.8 Economic Cost and PDS Issue Price of Foodgrains 402.9 Subsidy on Foodgrains: A Trend 412.10 Subsidy on Essential Commodities Distributed through the PDS 432.11 Subsidy on Food and Sugar 442.12 Households by Consumption Expenditure Brackets based on NSS 58th Round

Report 46

2.13 Consumption Mix 50Chapter III Objectives, Coverage, Methodology and Study Region 52-70

3.1 Objectives of the Study 523.2 Selected Programmes for the Study 533.3 Methodology and Sample 543.4 Sample Structure 553.5 Study Tools, Major Objectives and Coverage 56

iv

3.6 Demographic Profile: Selected Districts, U.P. and India 573.6 Distribution of Population by Working Category: Selected Districts, U.P. and

India 58

3.7 Regional Variations in Uttar Pradesh 593.8 Target of Ration Cards for Distribution and Year-wise Variation 603.8.1 Ration Cards under BPL and APL Category 613.9. Gap between Number of Ration Cards Distributed and Households as per

Census 2001 62

3.10 Allocation, Lifting and Distribution of Commodities 633.10.1 Demand and Availability of Foodgrains & Kerosene and its Supply 643.11 Supply of Foodgrains under Different Schemes 663.12 Location of Selected Villages 663.13 Availability of Electricity in Rural Area 673.14 Availability of Basic Amenities in Selected Villages 673.14.1 Education and Health Services Available in Selected Villages 683.15 Existence of Households under BPL and APL Category 69

Chapter IV Public Distribution in Uttar Pradesh: The Facts 71-181Section 1 Beneficiary Households 71-144

4.1 Sample Profile 714.2 Demographic Profile of Beneficiary Population 744.3 Educational Status 784.4 Occupational Structure 804.4.1 Ownership over Productive Assets 884.5 Living Condition of Beneficiary Households 894.6 PDS at the Level of Beneficiary Households 744.7 Routes of Fulfillment of Essential Commodities 1014.8 Benefits Derived through PDS 1124.9 Effect of Withdrawal of Sugar and Kerosene from PDS 1214.10 Role of Local Bodies 1234.11 Consumer Rights, Awareness and Complaints 1244.12 Performance of PDS Based on Some Selected Indicators 1264.12 Satisfaction Level of Beneficiary Households 1284.13 Weaknesses and Strength of PDS 1294.14 Annapurna Yojana 1314.15 Antyodaya Yojana 138

Section 2 Non-Beneficiary Households 145-1814.16 Sample Profile of Households 1454.17 Educational Level of Non-Beneficiary Households 1484.17.1 Occupational Structure of Households 1514.18 Income Level of Households 1564.19 Living Condition of Non-Beneficiary Households 1644.20 Public Distribution System and Non-Beneficiary Households 1754.21 Requirement of PDS Commodities 177

v

4.22 Role of Gram Panchayats 1804.22.1 Factors Responsible for Inefficiency of PDS: Catalysts and Suggestions 180

Chapter V Role of Panchayats and Functionary in PDS 182-242Section 1 Role of Gram Panchayats in PDS 182-190

5.1 Profile of Panchayat Members by Age, Caste, Designation and Education 1825.2 Eligibility Criteria for Selection of Fair Price Shop Dealers 1835.3 Eligibility for Selection of Households under Different Schemes 1835.4 Comparison of Annapurna Yojana and Pension Scheme by Benefits 1845.5 How Panchayats Verified Eligibility of Beneficiary Households 1855.6 Existence of Non-Beneficiary Households under Different Categories 1865.6.1 Reasons for Existence of Card-less Households 1865.7 Persistent Hunger among People and its Reasons 1875.8 Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SGRY): An Assessment 1875.9 Problems in PDS at Different Levels and Its Reasons 1885.10 Virtues and Vices of Panchayats 190

Section 2 Functions of Fair Price Shops in Selected Areas 191-2205.11 Selected FPS Dealers by Area, Caste, Education, Age and Experience 1915.12 Problems of FPS Dealers in Getting Dealership 1935.13 Average Number of Households Attached with FPS 1945.14 Rate of Change of Ration Cards by Number per Annum 1955.15 Requirement, Availability and Distribution of Commodities 1965.16 Lifting of Items from Godown 2015.17 Quantity Distributed per Household by FPS Dealers 2045.18 Actual Sale Price of Commodities Distributed to Households by Cardholding

and Costs Involved 204

5.181 Price Hike by FPS Dealers Because of Enhanced Cost in Logistics 2085.19 Sale Price of Commodities Reported by FPS Dealers 2085.20 Quality of Commodities Reported by FPS dealers 2105.21 Working Period of FPSs per Month 2115.22 FPSs Checked by Officials during Last Quarter (End 2006) 2115.23 Relationship of FPS Dealers with Consumers and Supply Department 2125.24 Role of Panchayats as Viewed by FPS Dealers 2135.25 Problems and Suggestions Reported by PFS Dealers 216

Section 3 Functions of Food-grains Godowns and Kerosene Depots 221-2335.26 Profile of Kerosene Depots and Food-grains Godowns by Ownership,

Experience and Residency 221

5.27 Storage Capacity of Food-grains Godowns and Kerosene Depots 2235.18 Sources of the Regional Godowns and Depots to Lift Items 2245.29 FPS Dealers Attached with Food-grains Godowns and Kerosene Depots 2245.30 Authorization of Food-grains Godowns and Kerosene Depots regarding Areas 2265.31 Management of the stock post-distribution of items to FPS dealers 2265.32 Corrective Measures if the FPS dealers not satisfied with quality of Items 2275.33 Loss of Foodgrains and Kerosene per Year due to Management Inadequacy 228

vi

5.34 Kerosene Depots and Foodgrains Godowns inspected by Government officials 2295.35 Coordination among Supply Department, FPS Dealers and Godown-In-charge 2305.36 Problems and Suggestions of Food-grains Godowns and Kerosene Depots In-

charge 231

Section 4 Role of Government Functionaries 234-2425.37 Profile of Functionaries by Area and Designation 2345.38 Norms Fixed by the Government for Allotment of FPSs and Suggested

Amendments in Selection of Norms 235

5.39 Eligibility Criteria for Selection of Beneficiary under Different Schemes 2365.40 Items Distributed and Requirement Fulfilled through PDS 2385.41 Monitoring Methods Adopted for Betterment of PDS 2395.42 Number of Ration Cards Cancelled During Verification 2395.43 Problems of Functionaries 2405.44 Suggestions of Functionaries 240

Chapter VI Field Diary: Qualitative Observations 243-3056.1 District: Bareily 2436.2 District: Badaun 2506.3 District: Lakhimpur Kheri 2566.4 District: Lucknow 2656.5 District Lalitpur 2766.6 District Jhansi 2826.7 District: Gorakhpur 2916.8 District: Varanasi 299

Chapter VII Findings and Recommendations 306-330 Major Facts on PDS in UP 306

I. Facts based on Information Provided by Beneficiary Households 306II. Facts Based on Information provided by Non-Beneficiary Households 312III. Facts Based on Information Provided by Panchayats 313IV. Requirement, Availability and Distribution of Commodities as Reported by FPS

Dealers 313

V. Facts Based on Information provided by Godown-in-Charge and Depot-in-Charge

317

VI. Facts Based on Information Provided by Government Functionaries 318VII. Administrative Set up, Local Power Structure and Delivery System 319VIII. Recommendations 324

Suggestions for Improved Performance of FPS Dealers 325 Suggestions for Improved Performance of Supply Inspectors 326 Suggestions for Execution by Godown-in-charge and Depot-in-charge 326 Steps to be Executed by Panchayats 326 Suggestions for Implementation by State Level Functionaries 327

vii

List of Tables Table 1.1 Pre-Independence Famines in British (Colonial) India, 1770-1943 2

Table 1.2 Committees formed by GOI, Pre-Green Revolution Period 3

Table 2.1 Net Availability, Procurement and Public Distribution of Foodgrains 21

Table 2.2 Production of Rice and Wheat in Uttar Pradesh and Major States, 2003-04 23

Table 2.3 Exports of Rice from India, 1970 – 2004 24

Table 2.4 India’s Output of Rice, Wheat and Sugar, 1970-1989 25

Table 2.5 Control of MNCs over Rice, Wheat and Sugar, 1983 25

Table 2.6 Production of Food-grains in India 26

Table 2.7 Per Capita Net Availability of Foodgrains in India: Trend 27

Table 2.8 Per Capita Net Consumption of Cereals in India: Trend 28

Table 2.9 Per Capita Availability of Foodgrains, Consumption and Gap 29

Table 2.10 Procurement of Wheat and Rice from Selected States 30

Table 2.11 Procurement of Wheat and Rice, 1980 - 2005 (Central Pool Stocks) 31

Table 2.12 Allocation and Off-take of Foodgrains in India under PDS, 1991-2002 32

Table 2.13 Allocation of Wheat and Rice under TPDS, 2003-06 33

Table 2.14 Off-take of Wheat and Rice under TPDS, 2003-06 34

Table 2.15 Off take of Food-grains as Percentage of Allocation under TPDS 35

Table 2.16 Allocation and Off-take of Wheat & Rice under Annapurna and MDM Yojana, Year 2005-06

36

Table 2.17 Off-take of Food-grains (Wheat +Rice) from Central Pool 37

Table 2.18 Procurement of Wheat, 2002-2005 40

Table 2.19 Procurement of Rice, 2002-2005 40

Table 2.20 Economic Cost and PDS Issue Price of Wheat and Rice 41

Table 2.21 Subsidy Released on Food-grains to FCI & States for Operating the Decentralized Procurement Schemes (1997-2005)

42

Table 2.22 Growth of Food Subsidy in India (1990-2003) 42

Table 2.23 Subsidy on Food and Sugar, 1991-2002 46

Table 2.24 Regional Distribution of Households on the Basis of MPCE Classes 47

Table 2.25 Average per Capita Annual Consumption of Cereals in Selected States 48

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Table 2.26 Per Capita Annual Consumption of Cereals in Rural India 49

Table 2.27 Per Capita Annual Consumption of Cereals in Urban India 50

Table 2.28 Share of Agriculture and Non-Food, 1973-2000 50

Table 3.1 Coverage of the Study 57

Table 3.2 Demographic Profile: Selected Districts of U.P. & India 58

Table 3.3 Distribution of Working & Non-Working Population: Selected Districts, U.P. and India

59

Table 3.4 Regional Variations in Uttar Pradesh: Selected Development Indicators 60

Table 3.5 Target of the Ration Cards for the Districts under Different Schemes (As Reported by the Functionaries)

61

Table 3.6 Average Number of Different Types of Ration Cards, 2005-06 and 2006-07 (As Reported by the Functionaries)

62

Table 3.7 Deviation in Number of Ration Cards from the Number of Households as per Census 2001

63

Table 3.8 Commodities Allotted, Lifted and Distributed for the Districts in 2005-06 64

Table 3.9 Demand, Stock and Supply of Food-grains in Godowns (2005-06) (As Reported by Foodgrains Godown-in-charge)

65

Table 3.10 Demand, Stock and Supply of Kerosene Oil by Oil Depot (2005-06) (As Reported by kerosene depot-in-charge)

65

Table 3.11 Average Supply of Food-grains under different schemes (2005-06) (As Reported by Godown in-charge and Depot-in-Charge)

66

Table 3.12 Location of the Sample Villages 67

Table 3.13 Electricity Available per day in Rural Areas 67

Table 3.14 Basic Amenities Available in Sample Villages (As Reported by Panchayats) 68

Table 3.15 Education and Health Services Available in Sample Villages 69

Table 3.16 Number of BPL and APL Beneficiary Households Estimated by the Gram Panchayats

70

Table 4.1 Sample Beneficiary Households by Blocks, Towns and Sample Units 71

Table 4.2 Profile of Beneficiary Households by Different Types of Ration Cards 72

Table 4.3 Distribution of Beneficiary Households by Region and Age 73

Table 4.4 Distribution of Beneficiary Households by Region and Gender 73

Table 4.5 Educational Level of Beneficiary Households 74

Table 4.6 Classification of Population in Beneficiary Households (By Caste and Gender)

75

Table 4.7 Classification of Population in Beneficiary Households (By Card-Holding and Gender)

76

ix

Table 4.8 Classification of Population in Beneficiary Households (By Age and Gender) 77

Table 4.9 Educational Level of Beneficiary Households 78

Table 4.10 Literacy Level of Beneficiary Households (By Caste and Gender) 79

Table 4.11 Literacy Level of Beneficiary Households (By Card-Holding) 79

Table 4.12 Main Occupations of Beneficiary Households by Ration Cards 80

Table 4.13 Annual Income (Rs.) of Households by Districts 81

Table 4.14 Distribution of Beneficiary Households by Income Brackets and Average Income

82

Table 4.15 Annual Income (Rs.) per Household (As Reported by Households) 82

Table 4.16 Distribution of Beneficiary Households by Income, Poverty and Region 83

Table 4.17 Occupational Structure of Beneficiary Households 84

Table 4.18 Distribution of Population in Beneficiary Households (By Income) 85

Table 4.19 Earning Population in Beneficiary Households (By Caste and Gender) 85

Table 4.20 Earning Members in Beneficiary Households (By Card-Holding) 86

Table 4.21a Per Capita Annual Income (Rs.) of Beneficiary Households (By Castes) 87

Table 4.21b Per Capita Annual Income of Beneficiary Households (By Card-Holding) 87

Table 4.22 Per Capita Annual Income of Beneficiary Households (By Income Brackets) 88

Table 4.23 Ownership over Agricultural Items for Life Support of Beneficiary Households

88

Table 4.24 Income Generating items Owned by the Beneficiary Households 89

Table 4.25 Productive Animals owned by the Beneficiary Households 89

Table 4.26a Migration of People by Age and Cardholding 89

Table 4.26b Reasons for Migration 90

Table 4.27 Distribution of Beneficiary Households by Area, Cardholding and Housing Condition

90

Table 4.28 Dependence of Beneficiary Households for Light at Night by Types of Card-holding

91

Table 4.29 Fuels Used by Different Types of Ration Card Holders 91

Table 4.30 Distribution of Beneficiary Households by total Land holding by Districts 92

Table 4.31 Distribution of Beneficiary Households by Landholding by Types of Ration Cards

92

Table 4.32 Beneficiary Households as Borrowers by Types of Ration Cards 93

Table 4.33 Households without two square meals a day (Year of Reference 2006) 93

x

Table 4.34 Base for Issuing Different Types of Ration Cards 94

Table 4.35 Persons who helped in Preparing Ration Cards 95

Table 4.36 Households’ Knowledge about its being listed in BPL 95

Table 4.37 Number of Households having More than One Ration Card by District 96

Table 4.38 Number of Households having More than One Ration Card By Region 96

Table 4.39 Fake Ration Cards Possessed by Households by Card Holding 97

Table 4.40 Duration (Years) of Holding Fake Ration Cards by Households by Cardholding

97

Table 4.41 Average Bribe Paid for Issuing Ration Cards 98

Table 4.42 Households Paying Bribe to Agencies for Issuing Ration Cards 98

Table 4.43 Distance of FPS from Houses of Households 99

Table 4.44 Frequency of Households Visiting FPSs for Purchasing Items 99

Table 4.45 Visibility of Price Board on the Wall of FPSs 100

Table 4.46 Visibility of Price Chart on the Price Board on the Wall of FPSs 101

Table 4.47 Average Number of Days and Hours per Day FPS Dealers Keep their Shop Open

101

Table 4.48 Average Annual Requirement of Commodities: Routes of Fulfillment (By Card Holding)

102

Table 4.49 Average Annual Requirement of Commodities: Routes of Fulfillment (By Region)

103

Table 4.50 Per Capita Average Annual Requirement of Commodities: Routes of fulfillment (in Kg./lt).

104

Table 4.51 Average Annual Requirement of Commodities: Routes of Fulfillment (By Districts)

105

Table 4.52 Per Capita Average Annual Requirement and their fulfillment from Different Sources (In Kg./lt. District-wise)

106

Table 4.53 Average Annual Requirement of Commodities: Fulfillment from Different Routes (By Income Brackets, In Rs.)

107

Table 4.54 Per Capita Average Annual Requirement of Commodities: Fulfillment from Different Routes (By Region, in Kg.)

108

Table 4.55 Households’ Propensity to Purchase food-grains from market 109

Table 4.56 Households’ Timing/Need to Purchase food-grains from market (By Card Holding)

109

Table 4.57 Purchase of Food-grains by Households from Open Market on Credit Basis, 2006

110

Table 4.58 Households’ Credit-based Purchase of food-grains from Open Market (Alternative Sources)

110

xi

Table 4.59 Number of Population Benefited by Receiving Wage and Food-grains under SGRY (Food for Work)

111

Table 4.60 Mid-Day Meal Scheme by Availability, Regularity and Quality (Perception of Beneficiary Households)

111

Table 4.61 Food-grains Received from FPSs by Quantity, Price Paid and Frequency of Visit per Household on Average under BPL scheme (Reference period: six months ending 2006)

112

Table 4.62 Food-grains Received from FPSs by Quantity, Price Paid and Frequency of Visit per Household on Average under ANT scheme (Reference period: six months ending 2006)

113

Table 4.63 Food-grains and Kerosene Oil Received from FPSs by Quantity, Price Paid and Frequency of Visit per Household on Average under ANP scheme (Reference period: six months ending 2006)

114

Table 4.64 Kerosene Oil Received from FPSs by Quantity, Price Paid and Frequency of Visit per Household on Average under APL scheme (Reference period: six months ending 2006)

115

Table 4.65 Projection of Actual Quantity of Food-grains on the Basis of last six months’ lifting by Beneficiary Households under BPL and ANT schemes

116

Table 4.66 Number of Households who did not receive anything from FPSs (Reference period: six months ending 2006)

117

Table 4.67 Consumption Habit of Sugar in Households 119

Table 4.68 Adequacy of Quantity of Kerosene Oil for Household Consumption 120

Table 4.69 Average Price of Kerosene Purchased by Households from Open Market 120

Table 4.70 Average Price of Kerosene Purchased by Households from Different Sources

121

Table 4.71 Effects if distribution of sugar and kerosene would be withdrawn from PDS 121

Table 4.72 Extent of satisfaction if the PDS provide only food-grains 122

Table 4.73 Initiatives of Gram /Nagar Panchayat for betterment of distribution system (Perception of Households)

123

Table 4.74 Rights of the Consumers to check the records of FPS dealers 125

Table 4.75 Formation of Local Vigilance Committee for proper functioning of PDS 125

Table 4.76 Registration of Complaints against FPS Dealers 126

Table 4.77 Performance of Public Distribution System Based on some Selected Indicators

127

Table 4.78 Performance Index of Public Distribution System Based on some Selected Perception- based responses and District Rank

128

Table 4.79 Satisfaction of Beneficiary Households regarding Commodities Distributed under PDS

128

Table 4.80 Satisfaction of the Households Regarding Quantity of Commodities 129

xii

Table 4.81 Perceived Weaknesses in Public Distribution System (As opined by beneficiary households)

130

Table 4.82 Households Perceived Weaknesses in Public Distribution System at Different Levels

130

Table 4.83 Distribution of Households as Annapurna Yojana Beneficiary (By Region and Gender)

132

Table 4.84 Catalysts for Selection of Households as Annapurna Yojana Beneficiaries (By Region and Catalysts)

133

Table 4.85 Distribution of Households as Annapurna Yojana Beneficiary (By Region and Age)

134

Table 4.86 Selection Procedure under Annapurna Yojana (Perception of Households) 135

Table 4.87 Efforts of Annapurna Yojana by Beneficiary for Receiving Pension 136

Table 4.88 Eligible Households not getting benefits of Annapurna Yojana (Perception of Beneficiary Households)

136

Table 4.89 Non-Eligible Households getting Benefits of Annapurna Yojana (Perception of Households)

137

Table 4.90 Problems in Survival if Annapurna Yojana is Stopped 138

Table 4.91 Effect of Non-Availability of Antyodaya Yojana on Livelihood (Perception of the Households)

139

Table 4.92 Reasons of non-effect of non-availability of Antyodaya Yojana on Livelihood 139

Table 4.93 Catalysts for Selection of Households as Antyodaya Yojana Beneficiaries (By Region)

141

Table 4.94 Eligible Households not getting benefits of Antyodaya Yojana (Perception of Beneficiary Households)

142

Table 4.95 Non-Eligible Households getting Benefits of Antyodaya Yojana (Perception of Households)

143

Table 4.96 Bribe given to get Antyodaya Yojana Benefits (Perception of the Households)

144

Table 4.97 Distribution of Non-Beneficiary Households by Caste and Region 145

Table 4.98 Population in Selected Households by Caste and Gender 146

Table 4.99 Distribution of Population by Age and Gender 147

Table 4.100 Educational Level of Non-Beneficiary Households by Castes 148

Table 4.101 Educational Level of Non-Beneficiary Households by Area 149

Table 4.102 Educational level of Population in Households 150

Table 4.103 Literacy Rate of Population in Households by Caste and Gender 151

Table 4.104 Main Occupations of Non-Beneficiary Households by Area 152

Table 4.105 Main Occupations of Non-Beneficiary Households by Castes 153

xiii

Table 4.106 Supplementary Occupations of Non-Beneficiary Households by Castes 155

Table 4.107 Occupational Structure of Population from Households 156

Table 4.108 Annual Income of Non-Beneficiary Households by Area 157

Table 4.109 Annual Income of Non-Beneficiary Households by Castes 158

Table 4.110 Distribution of Population in Households by Caste and Annual Income 159

Table 4.111 Annual Income of Earning Population from Households by Region 160

Table 4.112 Earning Population in total Population from Households by Castes 161

Table 4.113 Earning Population in total Population from Households by Gender 162

Table 4.114 Earning Population in total Population from Households by Gender 163

Table 4.115 Per Capita Annual Income in Selected Households by Castes and Income 164

Table 4.116 Housing Status of Non-Beneficiary Households by Region 165

Table 4.117 Housing Condition of Non-Beneficiary Households by Castes 166

Table 4.118 Sources of Light in Houses of Non-Beneficiary Households by Castes 167

Table 4.119 Sources of Light in Houses of Non-Beneficiary Households by Area 168

Table 4.120 Households Having Income Generating Productive Assets by Region 169

Table 4.121 Households Having Productive Animals by Region 170

Table 4.122 Land Ownership of Non-Beneficiary Households by Castes 171

Table 4.123 Land Ownership of Non-Beneficiary Households by Region 172

Table 4.124 Non-Beneficiary Households having Loans by Castes 172

Table 4.125 Households having Loans by Region 173

Table 4.126 Average Outstanding Loan by Caste and Region 173

Table 4.127 Migration of Households by Caste and Region 174

Table 4.128 Households having No Ration Card by Region 175

Table 4.129 Requirement of Wheat (Kg.) Per Month Per Household by Caste and Region

177

Table 4.130 Requirement of Rice (Kg.) Per Month Per Household by Caste and Region 178

Table 4.131 Requirement of Sugar (Kg.) Per Month per Household by Caste and Region 178

Table 4.132 Requirement of Kerosene (Lt.) Per Month Per Household by Caste and Region

179

Table 4.133 Market Price (Rs.) of Wheat per Kg. (As reported by Households by Caste and Region)

179

Table 4.134 Market Price (Rs.) of Rice per Kg. (As reported by Households by Caste and Region)

180

xiv

Table 5.1 Distribution of Panchayat Members by Age, Caste and Designation 182

Table 5.2 Education of the Panchayat Members 183

Table 5.3 Verification of Eligibility of Beneficiary (Opinion of Gram Panchayats) 185

Table 5.4 Number of Card-less Households Eligible for Different Types of Ration Cards (Opinion of Gram Panchayats)

186

Table 5.5 People who suffer from Hunger (Opinion of Panchayats) 187

Table 5.6 Per Day Wage Paid under SGRY by Gram Panchayats 188

Table 5.7 Reasons for Problems in PDS at Different Levels (As Reported by Panchayats)

189

Table 5.8 Profile of FPS Dealers 191

Table 5.9 Classification of FPS Dealers by Caste and Education 192

Table 5.10 Distribution of FPS Dealers by Age and Experience 193

Table 5.11 Problems Faced by FPS Dealers in Getting Dealership 194

Table 5.12 Average number of ration cards served per FPS 195

Table 5.13 Rate of Change of Ration Cards by Number per Annum 196

Table 5.14 Requirement, Availability and Distribution of Rice and Wheat per FPS Dealer under BPL Scheme

197

Table 5.15 Requirement, Availability and Distribution of Rice and Wheat per FPS Dealer under Antyodaya Scheme

198

Table 5.16 Requirement, Availability and Distribution of Wheat per FPS Dealer under Annapurna Yojana

199

Table 5.17 Requirement, Availability and Distribution of Sugar per FPS Dealer 200

Table 5.18 Requirement, Availability and Distribution of Kerosene per FPS Dealer 201

Table 5.19 Lifting of items every month from concerned Godown (Opinion of FPS Dealers)

202

Table 5.20 Problems Faced by FPS Dealers during Lifting the Items on Regular Basis (Per Month)

202

Table 5.21 Days Spent for Commodities Received after Deposit of Money Each Month 203

Table 5.22 Quantity of Commodities Distributed Per Month by FPS Dealers to Different Categories of Ration Card Holders

204

Table 5.24 Actual Sale Price of Rice under BPL and Antyodaya Yojana 205

Table 5.24 Actual Sale Price of Wheat under BPL and Antyodaya Yojana 206

Table 5.25 Actual Sale Price of Sugar 207

Table 5.26 Actual Sale Price of Kerosene 207

xv

Table 5.27 Price Hike by FPS Dealers Because of Enhanced Cost in Logistics 208

Table 5.28a Sale Price of Items Distributed by FPS Dealers (As Reported by the FPS Dealers)

209

Table 5.28b Price Gap in Commodities 209

Table 5.29 Utilization of Post-Distribution Balance Items (Response of FPS Dealers) 210

Table 5.30 Quality of Commodities (Opinion of FPS Dealers) 210

Table 5.31 Working Period of Fair Price Shops per Month (Report by FPS Dealers) 211

Table 5.32 Average Number of Checking of FPSs by Officials during Quarter ending 2006

212

Table 5.33 Relationship of FPS Dealers with the Consumers 212

Table 5.34 Relationship of FPS Dealers with the Supply Department 213

Table 5.35 Control over the PDS by the local Panchayats by Activities (Opinion of FPS Dealers)

214

Table 5.36 Control of PDS by the local Panchayats (Opinion of FPS Dealers) 215

Table 5.37 Present Power of local Panchayats in Controlling the Public 215

Table 5.38 Paying Bribe to Supply Department's officials for continuing dealership in future (Opinion of FPS Dealers)

217

Table 5.39 Bribe Paid Per FPS Dealer, Duration and the Receivers (Report by FPS Dealers)

217

Table 5.40 Difficulties faced by the FPS Dealers in running FPS (Reported by FPS Dealers)

218

Table 5.41 Complaints Reported by FPS Dealers during the Lifting of Commodities from Food-grain Godown/ Kerosene Depot

219

Table 5.42 Suggestions of FPS Dealers for Implementation 220

Table 5.43 Profile of Kerosene Depot and Food-grains Godown 221

Table 5.44 Job Experience (in years) of the Present Godown-in-Charge and Depot-in-Charge

222

Table 5.45 Residency of the Respondents 223

Table 5.46 Storage Capacity of Regional Food-grain Godown (As Reported by Godown in-charge and Depot-in-Charge)

223

Table 5.47 Storage Capacity of Kerosene Oil Depots (As Reported by Depot-in- 224

Table 5.48 Sources of the Regional Godowns and Depots to Lift Items (As Reported by Godown in-Charge and Depot-in-Charge)

224

Table 5.49 Average Number of FPSs Attached (Perception of Godown In-charge and Depot In-charge regarding the Number of FPSs Attached)

225

Table 5.50 Godown and Depot Authorized to Supply Items (As Reported by Godown in-charge and Depot-in-Charge)

226

xvi

Table 5.51 Utilization/Management of the stock post-distribution of items to FPS dealers (As Reported by Godown in-charge and Depot-in-Charge)

227

Table 5.52 Corrective Measures initiated if the FPS dealers not satisfied with quality of items (Perception of Godown-in-charge)

227

Table 5.53 Loss of food-grains and Kerosene per Year due to Management Inadequacy (As Reported by Godown in-charge and Depot-in-Charge)

228

Table 5.54 Reasons for Loss of Foodgrains and Kerosene (As Reported by Godown in-Charge and Depot-in-Charge)

228

Table 5.55 Kerosene Depots and Food-grains Godowns inspected by high level officials, During Quarter ending 2006

229

Table 5.56 Inspection of the Food-grain Godown/Kerosene Depot by Officials (As Reported by Godown in-Charge and Depot-in-Charge)

230

Table 5.57 Coordination among Supply Department, FPS Dealers and Godown-In-charge

231

Table 5.58 Problems while Performing Duty at Godown/Depot (As Reported by Godown in-charge and Depot-in-Charge)

232

Table 5.59 Suggestions by Godown in-charge and Depot-in-charge for Improvement 233

Table 5.60 Suggestions for Improvement of PDS (As Reported by Godown in-Charge and Depot-in-Charge)

233

Table 5.61 Profile of Functionaries 234

Table 5.62 Number of FPSs at District and Tehsil Levels 235

Table 5.63 Procedures and Norms fixed by the Government for Allotment of a Fair Price Shop (Opinion of Functionaries)

235

Table 5.64 Suggested Amendments in Selection of Norms for FPS Dealer (Opinion of Functionaries)

236

Table 5.65 Norms for Issuing BPL Ration Cards to Households (As opined by the Functionaries)

236

Table 5.66 Eligibility Criteria of Beneficiary under Antyodaya Yojana (As opined by the Functionaries)

237

Table 5.67 Eligibility Criteria of Beneficiary under Annapurna Yojana 237

Table 5.68 Average Quantity of Items Distributed under Different Types of Ration Cards 238

Table-5.69 Requirement of Households Fulfilled by PDS (Opinion of Functionaries) 238

Table 5.70 Monitoring Methods Adopted for Betterment of Public Distribution System in the District

239

Table 5.71 Number of Ration Cards Cancelled during 2004-05 and 2005-06 240

Table 5.72 Methods to improve PDS if the consumer's requirement not fulfilled (Suggestions of Functionaries)

241

xvii

List of Boxes Box 4.1 Reasons for Hunger 94

Box 4.2 Reasons for Households not visiting FPSs on a Regular Basis 100

Box 4.3 Reasons for Non-Purchase of any Item on a Regular Basis (Reference period: six months ending 2006)

117

Box 4.4 Reasons Related to FPS Dealers for Households’ non-purchase of any Items on a regular basis during last six months

118

Box 4.5 Reasons for not Purchasing Sugar from FPSs 119

Box 4.6 Reasons for satisfaction of households for providing only food-grains as per Household Requirement

122

Box 4.7 Reasons for Non-satisfaction of households for providing only food-grains as per Household Requirement

122

Box 4.8 Contributions of Gram Panchayats as Reported by Beneficiary Households 123

Box 4.9 Reasons why the Gram Panchayats do not initiate any efforts for betterment of PDS

124

Box 4.10 Follow Up Action Post-Complaint against FPS Dealers 126

Box 4.11 Reasons for Households Not Satisfied with Quantity of Items Distributed 129

Box 4.12 Reasons for Perceived Weaknesses in PDS 131

Box 4.13 Suggestions for Better Implementation of Antyodaya Yojana 131

Box 4.14 Types of Problems in Survival in case Annapurna Yojana is stopped 138

Box 4.15 Selection of Households under Antyodaya Yojana 140

Box 4.16 Perception about Eligible Beneficiary not getting benefits of Antyodaya Yojana

142

Box 4.17 Non-Eligible Beneficiary getting benefits of Antyodaya Yojana (Perception of Beneficiary Households)

144

Box 4.18 Sources of Fuel for Kitchen of Non-Beneficiary Households by Regions 168

Box 4.19 Reasons of Migration by Region 174

Box 4.20 Reasons of Non-making of Ration Cards (As Reported by Panchayat/Supply Department)

176

Box 4.21 Reasons for Ration Cards Needed in Households by Caste and Region 176

Box 4.22 Catalysts Responsible for Non-making of Ration Cards (Perception of the Households)

176

Box 4.23 Reasons for Non-making of Ration Cards (Perception of the Households) 177

Box 4.24 Role/Tasks of Panchayats in PDS (Perception of the Households) 180

Box 4.25 Catalysts Responsible for Inefficiency in PDS (Perception of Households) 180

xviii

Box 4.26 Measures to Make PDS Function Better (Suggestions from Households) 181

Box 5.1 Eligibility Criteria adopted for Selection of Fair Price Shop Dealers (Opinion of Gram Panchayats)

183

Box 5.2 Eligibility for Selection of BPL Ration Card Beneficiary (Opinion of Gram Panchayats)

184

Box 5.3 Eligibility for Selection of Antyodaya Ration Card Beneficiary (Opinion of Gram Panchayats)

184

Box 5.4 Methods adopted for Selection of Beneficiary under Annapurna Yojana (Opinions of Panchayats)

184

Box 5.5 Comparison between Annapurna Yojana and Pension Scheme by Benefits 185

Box 5.6 Eligible Households remaining Card-less (Reasons Reported by Gram Panchayats)

186

Box 5.7 Persistence of Poverty at the level of Village, 2001-06 (Opinion of Gram Panchayats)

187

Box 5.8 Methods of Selection of Beneficiary Households under SGRY by the Gram Panchayats (Perception of Gram Panchayats)

188

Box 5.9 Problems in PDS at Different Levels (As Reported by Panchayats) 189

Box 5.10 Virtues and Vices of Panchayats in Village Governance (Opinion of Panchayats)

190

Box 5.11 Non-Lifting of Items every month (Reasons Reported by FPS Dealers) 203

Box 5.12 Problems in Quality in Different Commodities (Observations of FPS Dealers)

210

Box 5.13 Reasons for Non-satisfaction of FPS dealers with the Consumers 212

Box 5.14 Reasons for Partial Satisfaction with the Supply Department (Response of FPS dealers)

213

Box 5.15 Local Panchayat-Controlled PDS Considered Good (Reasons Reported by FPS Dealers)

216

Box 5.16 Local Panchayat-Controlled PDS considered ‘Bad’ (Reasons Reported by FPS Dealers)

216

Box 5.17 Problems Faced by the Officials in Conducting Duties (As reported by the Functionaries)

240

Box 5.18 Suggestions for Improvement of PDS (As perceived by the Functionaries) 241

xix

Executive Summery

The objectives of the Government of India's food security policy are (i) ensuring

adequacy or sufficiency in supply of foodgrains, and (ii) distributing foodgrains at an

affordable price. The Public Distribution System (PDS), which continues to exist in

India since the Second World War, attempts to meet these twin objectives.

I. Public Distribution System: The Rationale The public distribution system as a social safety net can be appreciated by

the fact that aggregate availability of foodgrains per se is not enough to ensure the

ability of cross-sections of people to buy foodgrains. National food self-sufficiency by

the presence of food in the economy, or in the market, does not automatically ensure

food security. Even the ability to buy may not guarantee food security, unless there is

an efficient distribution system. Food security may be viewed from a number of

angles like spatial (regional, national, international) and cross-sectional. We consider

in this study cross-sectional (of the poor section in society) security.

We offer, in brief, the facts on the public distribution system of essential

commodities in India. The empirical base of the study is the selected eight districts in

Uttar Pradesh that covers both the rural and urban regions. The conclusions and

recommendations follow from the facts.

II. Objectives of the Study We have studied the extent to which the PDS has succeeded in providing

essential commodities to the people living below poverty line (BPL). The specific

objectives of the study were to examine:

(i) The extent to which PDS protects the poor in terms of their access to

essential commodities distributed through FPSs;

(ii) The likely impact of restricting the coverage of PDS to only the population

below poverty line; (iii) How does the delivery system work (Centre – State – FCI Godowns – Local

FPSs – Target Groups); (iv) Variations in prices per unit of commodities, like issue price, FPS (sale) price,

and (local) market price; (v) The role that the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) have been playing in

ensuring the smooth delivery system and in ensuring food security of the

poor;

xx

(vi) If the existing distributive set up is efficient to run the PDS.

III. Sample Size We covered 960 beneficiary households and 241 non-beneficiary households,

46 FPSs, 33 representatives of Gram Panchayats, 48 foodgrains godowns, 27

kerosene depots and 26 functionaries from eight selected districts of the state of

Uttar Pradesh (UP). We selected two districts from each of the four regions in UP,

namely, east, west, central, and Bundelkhand. We covered a total of 28 blocks, 14

towns and 60 villages.

The 960 beneficiary households in the sample are equally distributed over all

the four regions in UP. Of the total households, 68.4 per cent are rural and 31.6 per

cent are urban. Of the 241 non-beneficiary households, 79.2 per cent are from the

rural region and the rest urban.

We have followed the latest GO of UP where a household (with a size of five

members) earning income per annum up to Rs. 19,000 in rural region and Rs. 25,000

in urban region comes under the BPL category.

IV Major Facts on PDS in UP We collected data on the average number of ration cards by types, that is,

APL, BPL, ANP and ANT for two years, 2005-06 and 2006-07. The last three types

may be clubbed as the ‘poor’.

We present below the facts collected from the households (beneficiary and

non-beneficiary), FPS dealers, Godown-in-charge and Depot-in-charge, Panchayat

representatives, and Government functionaries.

I. Facts based on Information Provided by Beneficiary Households In principle, each household under BPL and ANT is entitled to 35 kg. of rice and

wheat taken together per month. If each household really receives it, then 45.4

per cent of total consumption requirement will be fulfilled. Based on what each

household had been receiving, 18.6 per cent of requirement of foodgrains were

fulfilled. Hence, 26.8 per cent of provision was the estimated leakage. Routes of Fulfillment of Consumption Requirements of Essential Commodities Meant for Distribution through FPSs

Per capita requirement per annum of wheat was estimated to be 121.8 kg,

which were 120.9 kg. in rural and 122.6 kg. in urban region. Per capita

requirement per annum of rice was estimated to be 62.2 kg, which were 54.4

kg. in rural and 70.1 kg. in urban region. Per capita requirement per annum of

sugar was estimated to be 8.3 kg, which were 6.9 kg. in rural and 9.6 kg. in

urban region. Per capita requirement per annum of kerosene was estimated

to be 8.6 lt., which were 7.6 lt. in rural and 9.7 lt. in urban region.

xxi

Except kerosene, the fulfillment of requirement of all the other essential items

like rice, wheat and sugar were mostly met from the market. For wheat,

market satisfied 67.8 per cent of total requirement, which was 55.6 per cent in

case of rice and 78.8 per cent in case of sugar. In case of kerosene, only 12.4

per cent of the requirements were met by the market.

Self-production is a major factor for both rice and wheat in meeting the

requirement. For wheat it was 18.3 per cent while for rice it was 11.4 per cent.

FPSs met only 11.5 per cent of requirement of wheat, which was 33.2 per

cent in case of rice. FPSs met 18.6 per cent of requirement of sugar. 82.6 per

cent of the requirement of kerosene was met by the FPSs. There is no self-

production of kerosene and generally market response to supply of kerosene

is rare in rural areas so that the role of FPSs is most prominent in case of this

commodity.

Self-production determines to some extent the fulfillment of total consumption

requirements in case of rice and wheat, which is more so in case of APL.

Consumption requirements of rice, wheat and sugar were met more by self-

production in rural region than in urban region. FPSs fulfilled 11.0 per cent of

requirement of wheat in rural region, which was 33.4 per cent for rice, 19.2 for

sugar and 80.5 for kerosene. The respective percentages of requirement for

urban region were 12.2, 32.7, 17.5 and 86.7. Most of the requirements of

commodities excepting kerosene were met by market in each of rural and

urban regions and in each district. Self-production, even when positive, was

not at all a significant factor in explaining fulfillment of consumption

requirements excepting rice to some extent.

Consumption Gap in Essential Commodities (Per Household per month in kg.)

Commodities Requirement (Total in kg.)

Fulfilled through PDS (%)

Gap (%)

Wheat 52.1 11.5 88.5 Rice 25.3 33.2 66.8 Sugar 3.3 18.6 81.4 Kerosene (lt.) 3.5 82.6 17.4

Note: Gap = Requirement – Fulfillment through PDS.

The fulfillment of per capita annual average requirement of essential

commodities from alternative routes shows both surplus and deficit relative to

consumption requirement by items. The supply points cover self-production,

market supply (including wage labour and kind payment) and supply by FPSs.

There was general deficit (requirement > supply) for kerosene, but the fact

remained that for all households across income brackets, requirement of

xxii

kerosene was met mostly by FPSs. If income brackets are considered in an

ascending order, we find increasing requirement of kerosene per annum for

higher income brackets and increasing quantity requirement met by FPSs,

excepting the highest income bracket.

For wheat, if we consider the beneficiary households by income in an

ascending order, we generally find that a lower percentage is met by FPSs at

the highest income brackets (above Rs. 50,000 per annum). For the

households in the income bracket between Rs. 50,000 and Rs. One Lakh, the

percentage requirement fulfilled by the FPSs was 4.9 for wheat, which was

11.8 for rice, 7.8 for sugar and 86.5 for kerosene. For the households in the

lower income bracket between Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 19,000 p.a., the fulfillment

supplied by FPSs as a percentage of requirement for wheat was 12.5, for rice

40.0, for sugar 19.4 and for kerosene 84.3.

The contribution (supply) of FPSs in fulfillment of consumption requirements

of essential commodities of the beneficiary households was more in lower

income brackets relative to what it was in higher income brackets. In the rural

region, FPSs fulfilled 11.1 per cent of the requirement of wheat while the

corresponding figures were 33.4 per cent for rice, 18.8 per cent for sugar and

80.3 per cent for kerosene. In the urban region, FPSs fulfilled 12.6 per cent of

the requirement of wheat which was 32.6 per cent for rice, 17.7 per cent for

sugar and 86.6 per cent for kerosene.

While the contribution of FPSs in fulfillment of requirement of all the essential

items excepting kerosene was very low, its support role was beyond doubt.

Food as Wage For fulfillment of consumption requirement of workers under the SGRY (Food

for Work) from wages in kind, only rice and wheat were offered, that too

insignificantly. Households’ Propensity to Purchase Foodgrains from Market

A combination of need and purchasing power (availability of money) mostly

explained the propensity of the households to buy essential commodities from

the market to fulfill consumption requirement.

Benefits Derived by Households through PDS Each BPL household received kerosene 3.2 lt. per month at the price of Rs.

11.20 per unit. There was not much difference by quantity and price between

rural and urban regions so far as availability of kerosene from FPSs was

concerned. Each BPL household received 10.4 kg. wheat on average at the

price of Rs. 5.45 per kg. Each BPL household received rice on average 17.3

xxiii

kg. at a price of Rs. 6.66 per kg. For sugar for BPL households, the average

quantity drawn was 1.4 kg. at a price of Rs. 14.65 per kg..

The ANT households received wheat per household on average 12.3 kg. at a

price of Rs. 2.32 per kg. They received rice on average 22.3 kg. at a price per

kg Rs. 3.30, sugar 1.4 kg. per month at a price per kg. Rs.14.65, kerosene

3.1 lt. per month at a price of Rs. 11.05 per lt. There was not much difference

between rural and urban regions by quantity and price so far as availability of

kerosene from FPSs was concerned.

The ANP households got wheat and kerosene, the former on average 6.8 kg.

per month and the latter 0.6 lt. at an average price of Rs. 11.30.

Each APL household received kerosene 3.0 lt. on average per month at the

price of Rs. 11.0 per unit. There was not much difference between rural and

urban regions by quantity and price so far as availability of kerosene from

FPSs was concerned.

Households who did not receive anything from FPSs Most of the households under BPL and ANT who did not receive any items

distributed through FPSs, based on a reference period of second half of 2006,

cited non-availability of money (purchasing power) as the major reason. The

other reasons cited by the households included long distance of the FPS from

the residence, non-information about distribution, absence of the households’

members, bad quality of items and non-requirement.

Reasons Related to FPS Dealers Cited by Households for Non-purchase of any Items on a regular basis during six months ending 2006

The reasons cited by the households for non-purchase of items from the

FPSs during the second half of 2006 relating to the FPS dealers covered non-

distribution of items, non-arrival of items for distribution, distance of the FPSs,

short period of distribution, non-preparation (non-availability) of ration cards,

absence of the household in the village while items were distributed/cards

were issued, and post-distribution non-availability.

Consumption Habit of Sugar Most of the beneficiary households from both rural and urban regions by

cardholding confirmed regular consumption habit of sugar.

Price and Quantity of Kerosene Oil distributed through FPSs and Open Market

The average price of kerosene oil per lt. purchased from the open market was

reported to be Rs. 25.57. The gap between open market price and FPS

supplied price of kerosene was reported to be Rs. 9.47. The percentage price

gap was 58.82 between the two. However, the households paid more when

xxiv

they bought kerosene from other FPS dealer(s) relative to what they paid

when they bought the extra requirement from the dealer their cards were

attached to.

Effect of Withdrawal of Distribution of Sugar and Kerosene If kerosene were withdrawn from the PDS, 92.8 per cent of the households

would be adversely affected. This percentage was 26.3 for sugar. The

necessity of kerosene thus is felt much more by the households. In the rural

region 92.4 and in the urban region 93.7 per cent would be adversely affected

if kerosene were withdrawn from the PDS. In the rural region 26.3 and in the

urban region 26.1 per cent would be adversely affected if sugar were

withdrawn from the PDS. In case PDS is restricted to only distributing rice and

wheat, 86.1 per cent would remain unsatisfied.

Consumer Rights, Awareness and Complaints Ignorance of the beneficiary households was the most important factor when

the question was centered on their rights as consumers to check the records

of FPS dealers. So far as checking stock register was concerned, 87.3 per

cent were ignorant about any such rights, which were for 87.2 per cent of the

households when it was checking sale register, 87.4 per cent when it was

checking ration card or shop register and 87.5 per cent when it was checking

allotment and actual distribution. Less than one per cent in case of each

revealed that they knew the rights-based access to commodities under PDS.

Performance of PDS Based on Some Selected Indicators We got different responses on the indicators that we considered for performance of

PDS in UP from all the beneficiary households. These indicators were manipulation

in measurement of items during delivery, providing benefits to close persons, FPS

dealers keeping government officials in their favour, distributable items lifted but not

brought to villages where the FPS was located, FPS dealers involved in black

marketing, changing the quality of items, dealers involved in corruption with the help

of Panchayat.

The households’ report centered on the FPS dealers like the alliance of the

dealers for corruption with Panchayats, keeping government officials in

favour, manipulation in measurement of items for distribution and involvement

of the dealers in black marketing.

Based on the selected perception-based responses, we developed the

Performance Index of the PDS and ranked the selected districts in UP. Over

all, Lucknow in central UP (the capital city centered district) ranked first,

followed by Varanasi in east UP. Badaun in west UP ranked last. In rural UP

xxv

again Lucknow came first while the same district came third in urban UP so

far as performance of PDS from the viewpoint of the households concerned.

In urban UP, the district Jhansi came first followed by Varanasi. Thus, the

rank of Varanasi was uniformly second, over all the districts, and separately

for rural and urban regions. The districts showing performance below average

were Lakhimpur Kheri, Gorakhpur, Lalitpur and Badaun, considered over all

the districts, and separately for rural and urban regions. The districts that

showed performance above average were Lucknow, Varanasi, Jhansi and

Bareilly.

Strength and Weaknesses of PDS Most of the beneficiary households did not perceive any weakness in the

system. The rural BPL households mostly perceived weaknesses in the PDS

most of whom perceived it at the level of the FPS dealers. The perceived

weaknesses also centered on higher officials, all political-administrative

levels, Gram Pradhan, Panchayat Secretary, MLA, DM, Lekhpal and Supply

Department. Of those who perceived weaknesses in PDS, the most important

reason cited was corruption in issuing ration cards and sharing benefits in

bribe. The other reasons cited by the households were non-distribution of

items through FPSs, marketing in the open/black (market), cheating in weight

while distributing items, non-checking, poor quality, higher price charged than

what is fixed, availability less than requirement, and irregular distribution.

Antyodaya and Annapurna Yojana 84.6 per cent of the beneficiary households under Annapurna Yojana

reported that they would be facing problems in survival in case this scheme

was withdrawn.

91.3 per cent of the households reported that they would be adversely

affected in terms of livelihood if they were not covered by Antyodaya Yojana.

Most of the beneficiary households who reported to be adversely affected in

case the Yojana was closed focused on poverty, hunger, debt and

deteriorating economic condition.

II. Facts Based on Information provided by Non-Beneficiary Households Income Level of Non-Beneficiary Households

There was no reported ‘incomelessness’ among non-beneficiary households

in urban region which was present in rural region. The percentage of non-

beneficiary households earning less than Rs. 19,000 was 71.3. In the urban

xxvi

region 66.0 per cent of the non-beneficiary households earned income below

Rs. 19,000 per annum, which was 78.5 in the rural region. In the lowest

income brackets the percentage of households was higher in rural region

while in the higher income brackets the percentage was higher in urban

region.

Living Condition of Non-Beneficiary Households

In the urban region, 42.0 per cent of the households lived in kuccha houses,

which was for 47.6 per cent households in rural region. 6.0 per cent of the

households in urban region lived in ‘huts’ which was for 13.1 per cent

households in urban region.

Sources of Fuel

Kerosene as a means of fuel for cooking purposes was generally absent in

both rural and urban regions. Most of the households in both the regions used

multiple sources like wood and ‘kanda’ (cow dung cake) for cooking.

Productive and Non-Productive Assets

Of all non-beneficiary households, 79.7 per cent were landless. Excepting

very few, none of the non-beneficiary households had income-generating

productive assets. Overall, the non-beneficiary households owned no assets

that could have offered scope for income.

Need of Ration Cards for Households

Most of the non-beneficiary households did not have ration cards for a period

between two and ten years. They needed cards because of income poverty,

and landlessness in rural region. Necessity of kerosene oil was a major factor

for need of ration cards for both the urban and rural regions.

III. Facts Based on Information Provided by Panchayats How Panchayats Verify Eligibility of Beneficiary Households

The officials of Revenue Department (Lekhpal) were mostly engaged in

verification of eligibility of beneficiaries, followed by Block officials and Supply

Inspectors, the three covering two-thirds of total verification.

Existence of Non-Beneficiary Households under Different Categories

Of total households, a section eligible under different types of card holding

had remained cardless. The major reason for cardlessness of households

eligible for Antyodaya was ‘low target’ for each village and non-completion of

formalities.

xxvii

Existence of Problems in PDS at Different Levels and the Reasons

The major reasons cited for persistence of problems in PDS were low

allotment of items, low allotment of ration cards, corruption among

government officials, and non-receipt of full quota by FPS dealer.

Average Number of Households Attached with an FPS

One FPS dealer, on average, served a total of 741 cards, of which 179 are

BPL cards, 464 APL cards, 18 ANP cards and 81 ANT cards. We found a

monotonic increase in the average number of ration cards served by one FPS

dealer over 2004 to 2006.

Non-Preparation of Ration Cards

The reasons for non-making of ration cards for the households in both rural

and urban regions remaining as non-beneficiary were absence of the

representative of the household while the process of card-making was on,

name not included in BPL list, no new introduction of cards, and voting factor.

IV. Requirement, Availability and Distribution of Commodities as Reported by FPS Dealers

Rice and Wheat under BPL Scheme

99.5 per cent of requirement of rice under BPL was available in 2004-05,

which was 98.9 per cent in 2005-06. 98.9 per cent of requirement of wheat

was available in 2004-05 which was cent per cent in 2005-06. Distribution as

a percentage of availability of rice in 2004-05 was 99.5 over all the districts

which was 96.5 in 2005-06. Distribution of wheat as percentage of availability

shows cent per cent for all the districts, excepting Bareilly.

Rice and Wheat under Antayodaya Yojana

Availability as a percentage of requirement was cent per cent for rice in 2004-

05 and 99.3 per cent in 2005-06. The corresponding percentages for wheat

were 98.8 and 98.9.

Wheat under Annapurna Yojana

92.6 per cent of requirement of wheat in 2004-05 was made available of

which 99.4 per cent had been distributed. The corresponding figures for 2005-

06 were 92.8 and 99.9 per cent.

Distribution of Sugar

In 2004-05, considered over all the selected districts, 98.2 per cent of sugar

required was available. Of this available sugar, 99.5 per cent had been

distributed.

xxviii

Distribution of Kerosene

For 2004-05, considered over all the selected districts, 78.3 per cent of

kerosene required was available, of which 99.6 per cent had been distributed.

For 2005-06, 81.6 per cent of requirement had been available with the

dealers, of which 99.7 per cent had been distributed.

Quantity Distributed per Household by FPS Dealer The BPL and ANT cardholders are entitled to 35 kg. of rice and wheat

together per month. The ANP cardholders are not entitled to more than 10 kg

of either rice or wheat. The APL cardholders are not entitled to foodgrains and

sugar. Considered over all the selected districts, the BPL as well as ANT

cardholders received 34 kg. of wheat and rice. On average, each of the BPL

and ANT cardholder is entitled to 3 lt. kerosene per month.

Actual Sale Price of Commodities under Different Schemes

Rice under BPL and Antayodaya Yojana

Actual sale price charged by the FPS dealer is the purchase price that the

consumers pay. This price is the sum of purchase price from the Godown

plus costs on logistics plus compensating the quantity lost (price surrendered)

at the Godown.

For BPL Rice per Unit (kg.)

Actual Sale Price (Rs. 6.62) = Purchase Price from Godown (Rs. 6.09) + Cost

on Logistics (Rs. 0.41) + Cost compensated for Quantity loss at Godown (Rs.

0.11).

For ANT Rice per Unit (kg.)

Actual Sale Price (Rs. 3.41) = Purchase Price from Godown (Rs. 2.94) + Cost

on Logistics (Rs. 0.41) + Cost compensated for Quantity loss at Godown (Rs.

0.05).

The reported purchase price for each of BPL and ANT rice is fixed and lifted

at the fixed rate across all the selected districts.

Wheat under BPL and Antayodaya Yojana

For BPL Wheat per Unit (kg.)

Actual Sale Price (Rs. 5.07) = Purchase Price from Godown (Rs.4.59) + Cost

on Logistics (Rs.0.39) + Cost compensated for Quantity loss at Godown

(Rs.0.09).

For ANT Wheat per Unit (kg.)

Actual Sale Price(Rs.2.37) = Purchase Price from Godown (Rs.1.94) + Cost

on Logistics (Rs. 0.39) + Cost compensated for Quantity loss at Godown

(Rs.0.04).

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The reported purchase price for each of BPL and ANT wheat was fixed and

lifted at the fixed rate across all the selected districts. The reported (actual) sale price

of wheat for each of BPL and ANT varied across districts.

Sale Price of Sugar

For Sugar per Unit (kg.)

Actual Sale Price (Rs. 14.07) = Purchase Price from Godown (Rs.13.44) +

Cost on Logistics (Rs.0.3) + Cost compensated for Quantity loss at Godown

(Rs.0.2).

The reported purchase price of sugar was fixed and was lifted at the fixed rate

across all the selected districts. The reported (actual) sale price of sugar varied

across districts. The cost on logistics as well as cost on items lost varied across

districts.

Sale Price of Kerosene

For Kerosene per Unit (lt.)

Actual Sale Price (Rs. 10.56) = Purchase Price from Godown (Rs.9.82) +

Cost on Logistics (Rs.0.7) + Cost compensated for Quantity loss at Godown

(Rs.0.0).

The reported purchase price at the Depot level of Kerosene varied across

districts. The reported (actual) sale price of Kerosene also varied across districts.

There was no reported quantity lost at the Depot level. There was, however, loss on

account of logistics overall and across districts.

Price Hike by FPS Dealers Because of Enhanced Cost on Logistics

The FPS dealers reported that they felt compelled to fix the sale price higher

than the price fixed by the Government in the PDS, because of the costs that

they incur on logistics (loading/unloading, and transportation).

FPSs Checked by Officials during Last Quarter of 2006

The FPS dealers reported vigilance by Government officials during the last

quarter of 2006. Mostly it was the Gram Panchayat that worked as a catalyst

in checking. The role of Regional Food Controller was nearly absent. The role

of Administrative Officer, ADO, and Lekhpal was negligible as vigilance

catalyst for FPSs. Officials of Supply Department, excepting Lalitpur, did not

pay much attention towards the necessity of vigilance over FPSs.

Role of Panchayats as Viewed by FPS Dealers Panchayat was the major controller of PDS by verification of the stocks in

rural areas. This verification was absent in urban region. In the urban region,

the local administration was alleged to grab individual benefits which were

less in rural areas.

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Problems Reported by FPS Dealers

How FPS Dealer gets Dealership

The problems in getting dealership centered on political support and

connections, necessary payment of bribe to the Supply Department for

preparation of documents/file, payment of bribe to other officials, and frequent

visit of Government officials at different levels.

Paying Bribe to Supply Department

Most of the FPS dealers reportedly did not pay bribe (money) to the Supply

Department to continue dealership in future. The average bribe paid by an

FPS dealer was Rs. 1422. The person pointed out by the dealers who

received the bribe money was the Supply Inspector.

Problems Faced in running dealership

The major difficulties faced by the FPS dealers in running their shops

included the incompatibility between high demand and low allotment, illegal

demand by political party leaders, low commission fixed for the dealers,

cardless customers’ pressure and ‘loot’ by officials in the name of vigilance.

Complaints Reported Regarding Foodgrains Godown and Kerosene Depot

The major complaints included false measurement of items by quantity

delivered by the Godown and Depot and commission paid by the dealers on

the items lifted.

V. Facts Based on Information provided by Godown-in-Charge and Depot-in-Charge

Storage Capacity of Food-grains Godowns and Kerosene Depots

One-third of the Foodgrain Godowns had storage capacity between 23 and

50 Mt, while another one-third have capacity between 50 Mt. and 80 Mt. 95.5

per cent of the Foodgrain Godowns have storage capacity below 120 Mt.

As reported by the depot-in-charge, half of the depots had storage capacity

per depot between 15 and 20 kl. Lt.

FPS Dealers Attached with Food-grains Godown and Kerosene Depot

On average one Kerosene depot served 109 FPSs. On average, one

foodgrain Godown served 95 FPSs.

Authorization of Food-grains Godown and Kerosene Depot for Supply of Items

The foodgrain Godowns and the oil depots were authorized to supply items to

blocks, tehsils and directly to FPSs. One-third of the Kerosene oil depots

were authorized to supply oil to a ‘single block’, while another one-third was

authorized to supply to the FPSs of some identified blocks. One-fifth of the

depots were authorized to supply oil to the whole tehsil. More than three-fifths

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of the foodgrain Godowns were authorized to supply items to a ‘single block’,

while another one-fifth was authorized to supply to the whole tehsil. Only one-

twentieth of the Godowns were authorized to supply directly to the identified

FPSs.

Loss of Foodgrains and Kerosene due to Management Inadequacy

While most of the Godown-in-charge reported loss of foodgrains due to

inadequate management facility, half of the kerosene oil depot-in-charge

reported loss in kerosene for the same reason. Of the foodgrain Godown-in-

charge who reported loss in items, the major reasons cited were inadequate

capacity of the Godown and location of the Godowns at different places.

Of the depot-in-charge who reported loss in kerosene, the major reason cited

was the variation in temperature between the time of filling at the company

and the delivery at the depot. The other reasons include leakage at filling

point during delivery.

Coordination among Supply Department, FPS Dealers and Godown/Depot In-Charge

Three-fourths of the depots-in-charge opined that the coordination among the

Supply Department, FPS dealers and depot-in-charge was good, while the

rest argued for the necessity for improvement. Four-fifths of the Godowns

opined that the coordination among the Supply Department, FPS dealers and

Godown-in-charge was good, while the rest argued for the necessity for

improvement.

Problems of Godowns and Depots

The major problems reported in case of oil depots included pressures and

responsibilities imposed by government functionaries, higher level officials in

the government suspecting the depots staff of corruption, short duration fixed

for distribution of oil, and high price gap between kerosene oil and diesel

leading to black marketing of kerosene.

The major problems reported by the Godowns include high-level government

officials suspecting the Godowns staff, inadequate capacity of Godown, and

health (individual) problems.

VI. Facts Based on Information Provided by Government Functionaries Gap between Number of Ration Cards Distributed and Number of Households as per Census 2001

For the year 2005-06 the number of ration cards distributed less than the

number of households as per census 2001 for all the selected districts

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covered was 47.9 per cent. For 2006-07, the percentage deviation was 48.4.

The district wise deviation (percentage) was always positive for each district.

Allocation, Lifting and Distribution of Commodities

For kerosene the distribution was cent per cent of the amount lifted and the

lifting was cent per cent of allotment. Generally what was lifted was

distributed as reported by the functionaries in the Government of UP. This

was also reported in cases of BPL rice, BPL wheat, ANT rice, ANT wheat,

ANP wheat, and sugar. There were no major district wise variations in

distribution as percentages of lifting of the items under different types of

cardholding.

Demand and Availability and Supply of Foodgrains and Kerosene

As reported by the Godown-in-charge for 2005-06, the stock/availability on

average was higher than the estimated demand for each of rice, wheat and

sugar. Supply of these items was marginally less than demand in cases of

wheat and sugar. For rice, supply equaled estimated demand. Supply of each

item was less than its stock implying addition to stock for release for the next

year.

Supply of Foodgrains under Different Schemes

Based on the data on average supply of foodgrains to TPDS and welfare schemes

for 2005-06, we offer the following observations:

90.5 per cent of the supply of rice and wheat was distributed under TPDS.

The rest was distributed under the welfare schemes.

Of the supply for TPDS, the ratio for wheat and rice was 48:52.

Items Distributed and Requirement Fulfilled through PDS as Reported by Government Functionaries

On average a BPL cardholder gets 35 kg. of rice and wheat in total of which

distribution of wheat remains more in each of the selected districts. The same

is true for ANT cardholders except that for them the distribution of rice is more

than wheat for each of the districts. On average, a cardholder gets 4.1 lt. of

kerosene oil that varies over districts. On average, 700 grams of sugar is

distributed per unit which is the same for each district excepting Jhansi.

Monitoring Methods Adopted by the Functionaries for Betterment of PDS

The methods adopted by the functionaries, included inspection/control

covering consumers, FPS dealers, regional offices and regional

Godown/Depot. Most of the functionaries reported that they followed a three-

tier checking and monitoring system at all the levels mentioned. It was also

reported that the SDM, BDOs and tehsildar regularly monitored/verified at all

xxxiii

the levels under their respective jurisdictions. Excepting at the level of the

consumers, it is reported that the supply inspectors, ARO, DSO etc.

performed physical verification of items.

VII. Administrative Set up, Local Power Structure and Delivery System The facts that we collected through interviews, conversations and group discussions

are perception-based and hence subjective. Since most of these centers on the

administrative set up that is meant to manage the system and the local power/polity

structure that affect the system, we offer here the observations centered on

administrative set up and local power structure:

The number of BPL families at the village level was found to change often,

the reason being that the Pradhan kept adding people of his own choice to

the list.

The economic/family register of the BPL families was never found to be

updated.

The basis of selection of BPL families and the duration of time for their

remaining BPL was unclear.

In some villages, many lists of BPL families were found.

The educational level of most of the FPS dealers was very low, which

prevented them from maintaining correct accounts.

Most FPS dealers did not have adequate space in their shops to store the

allotted kerosene oil and the food grains.

The record of the amount allotted to the FPS dealers and collected by them

from the godowns and oil depots every month were not maintained properly.

No vigilance committee had been constituted by the Gram Panchayats in

many villages to ensure proper functioning of the PDS.

BPL and ANT cards were issued arbitrarily in many villages with the

connivance of the Panchayats.

The Panchayats had been given the authority by the district level office to

verify the distribution of commodities by the FPS dealers every month. The

Panchayats often misused power to extract money or favour from the FPS

dealers and gave false verification certificates.

The Panchayats have the power to recommend the cancellation of the ration

shops under special circumstances. This is the reason why the FPS dealers

cannot oppose the benefits demanded by the Panchayats. If the FPS dealers

was not in the same group as the Pradhan, the latter often got the license of

the FPS cancelled and merged the cardholders with anther ration shop. In

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return, the Pradhan got between Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 4,000 from the newly

selected FPS dealer.

The other departments of the PDS and the MPs and MLAs consider the

distributable commodities to be their own resources and manoeuvre with the

supplies and allotment, which prevents the Supply Department from taking

independent decisions.

The Supply Department did not have a master list of BPL families per village,

which made it difficult to judge the accuracy of ration cards.

The state had given a target of BPL, ANT and ANP cards to each district,

which is proportionately distributed among the various villages lying in the

districts. In this condition many regions, which did not have eligible families,

were also allotted these cards while the regions which had more BPL

households did not get the requisite number. The grassroots implementing

bodies also did not like to surrender the cards allotted in their villages.

In the absence of magisterial power, the District supply officer had to remain

dependent on the District Magistrate or the Tehsildars for action if he came

across any incident of irregularity. In such an event he had to forward it to the

administrative officers for necessary action. Often political pressure or bribery

at the administrative level helped the culprits to get away. Often the FPS dealers provided no information to the consumers regarding

the arrival of essential commodities in his shop.

Whenever the consumers reached the shop to buy commodities, they either

found the shop closed or that the commodities were not available.

In many places anomalies occurred, for example, the BPL ration card holders

were being issued APL cards instead.

In many places the old description of families were retained in the new ration

cards.

There was lack of coordination between the Supply Department, the Gram

Panchayat and the Block office, each blaming the other for delay.

There was no information in any of the supply departments of the selected

Tehsils about ration cards, collection of allotment by FPS dealers, distribution

of commodities, categorization of FPS dealers, information about cancelled

cards etc. The information available in some offices was obsolete.

Local Power Structure and PDS

The following qualitative observations regarding the local power structure may reveal

the current condition of the Public Distribution System in UP:

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FPS Dealers, Local Polity and Consumers: Relations in PDS

Very often there was a strong link between the FPS dealers and the village

Pradhan. Thus, even if the FPS dealers committed irregularities, the Pradhan

succeeded in influencing the Panchayat and the local leaders in favour of the

FPS dealers.

The major reason why poor people did not complain against the FPS dealers

was the prevailing strong nexus between the FPS dealers and the powerful

people of their village. The customers were afraid to complain against the

FPS dealers because of this nexus. Many households did not know where and to whom they would lodge their

complaint.

Some people knew where to lodge their complaints but could not do so

because of poverty and consequent inability to miss a day’s labour.

Social insecurity at the local level and desire to avoid conflict was another

reason cited for not lodging complaints against the dishonest FPS dealers.

Many people expressed fear, in case they complained against the FPS

dealers, by being excluded from the entitlement.

Many persons who had earlier complained reported that there was no

outcome of their complaints since the FPS dealers bribed the enquiry officials

to silence the voice of protest or to turn the report in favour of the FPS

dealers.

According to a system implemented recently, people will receive the reply to

their complaints only when it is accompanied by an affidavit. Because of this

complex formality, many people do not like to complain.

FPS Dealers, Sub-dealers of Kerosene, Wholesale Dealer, Oil Depots: Relations in PDS

The FPS dealers reported that the transportation charges for bringing back

the oil allotted to them had to be borne by them themselves whereas this

charge was adjusted per drum in the cost to the sub-dealer. This did not

happen when they used to collect the oil from the wholesale oil depot.

We observed no verification of the oil supplied or distributed at the level of

both the wholesale dealer and the sub-dealer.

Most of the drums in the custody of the sub-dealers and the FPS dealers did

not fulfill the standards set by the government in terms of size of drums and

the names of the people that had to be written on them. Additionally all the

drums with the sub-dealer belonged to the FPS dealers. The sub-dealers

themselves did not have the required number of drums.

xxxvi

Although all the sub-dealers were supposed to follow an FPS dealer’s roster

prepared by the District Administration, they rarely did so. Each of them

supplied oil to the FPS dealers following their own discretion.

At the levels of the wholesale dealer, the sub-dealer and the FPS dealers, no

fixed system was followed for supplying and carrying away oil. Although the

administration had established a definite norm, it was a mere formality. The

whole system was open to corruption and black marketeering in the absence

of strict vigilance and control.

In view of many wholesale dealers, if the kerosene oil was distributed by the

filler system then the leakage of oil would be higher than if it was distributed

by the meter system as done in petrol pumps.

Distribution of Kerosene Oil by Manipulation

Distribution of kerosene oil in all the selected villages was almost regular but the

quantity distributed was less than that decided upon by the administration. The

reasons for this are the following:

The quantity of kerosene oil allotted to the FPS dealer had not been

increased in proportion to the increase in the number of APL cards in the

villages.

Many cardless families were given kerosene oil under the instructions of the

Gram Panchayat.

The influential people of the village appropriated oil.

The FPS dealers were given five to ten liters oil less per drum than the

allotted quantity.

The representatives and staff of the Panchayat demanded more oil per

month.

Under these circumstances, the question centered on why kerosene oil was still

distributed regularly and not the same in case of food-grains. The main reasons for

this are the following:

In rural region, there is no alternative to kerosene oil for lighting up at night in

the absence of electricity.

A high difference in prices between the kerosene oil sold through PDS and

that sold in the open market exists.

Kerosene oil is generally not available in the open market.

Kerosene oil is used for other purposes like agriculture, irrigation.

The price of diesel is higher compared to kerosene oil.

Because demand for kerosene oil is much in rural region, there would chaos

in villages if the people were not given kerosene oil. This is why the FPS

xxxvii

dealers take care to ensure that the distribution of kerosene oil does not halt

under any circumstances. Distribution of Kerosene oil, thus, shows the

bottommost layer of functioning of PDS.

Jan Kerosene Scheme

We found the Jan Kerosene Scheme in operation. Under this scheme, ten sub-

dealers have been appointed in the entire district through whom the FPS dealers

have to be allotted kerosene oil every month. We observed the following in this

regard:

The appointment of sub-dealers and their location was not within the

perimeter of the village.

Almost all the sub-dealers are agents of the wholesale dealer who have no

objections to irregularities carried out by them.

The drums were not coloured as specified.

The oil did not reach the wholesale dealer’s godown from the oil company

within the stipulated period since the oil company has only one vehicle. In many villages the wholesale dealer supplies oil to the FPS dealers directly

in the oil company’s tanker with a capacity of 220 liters. Contradictions and Accommodation in PDS

If there is a narrow economic gap between the various communities living in

the village, then the social relations between them are cordial, leading to a

smooth functioning of the system.

If the number of supporters of two conflicting parties in the village, is equal

then the functioning of the PDS is smooth. This is because there is local

pressure from the village society, who maintains strict control to ensure

smooth functioning of the system.

If the village is inhabited by people of only one caste or if there is dominance

of one particular caste in the village, then the people belonging to the caste

constituting the majority remain more privileged so far as obtaining the

essential commodities are concerned.

In a village where the present and past Pradhans are in competition and there

is little difference in the number of supporters of each of them, PDS remains

efficient.

VIII. Recommendations While at the delivery points, FCI Godown to FPSs, we find responses that

show a well functioning PDS, at the final consumption point we find less than

a happy scenario. The final consumption point covers both the beneficiary (by

BPL, APL, Antyodaya and Annapurna) and non-beneficiary households. The

xxxviii

center or the ‘copula’ of the PDS is the FPS dealer who links the remote

delivery point and the local receiving point.

Leakage of foodgrains from Godowns, purchase of foodgrains from open

market, migration of people and hence their absence, subsidy grabbed by the

non-poor, private purchase of foodgrains by corporate firms from the field and

hence competition-cum-low price, bribe and other types of corruption in PDS

emanate from the weaknesses built-in and/or inserted in the system that need

to be eliminated rather than eliminating the system.

Self-production, even when it is positive, can not be considered as an

alternative to supply of essential commodities distributed through the FPSs.

Providing pension should not be seen as an alternative to providing

subsidized food.

Suggestions for Improved Performance of FPS Dealers

The existing rate of commission is 0.06 paise per kg. of rice and wheat and

0.15 paise per liter of kerosene sold by FPS dealer. The former rate should

be enhanced between 15 and 20 paise per kg. while the latter rate should be

raised to 25 paise per lt. This may reduce malpractices at the level of the FPS

dealers.

The FPS dealers do not get any return/incentive on the items that they draw

from generally a long distance for distribution under Mid-Day Meal (MDM).

This incentive has to be fixed in the form of a commission at the same rate as

under TPDS and ensured for the FPS dealers.

The FPS dealers may be given the additional responsibility/opportunity to sell

at market prices additional items like salt, edible oil, janata (cheap) saree,

pensil and note books. This will ensure livelihood security of the vulnerable

households as well as add to the incentives of the FPS dealers.

The FPS dealer has to be educated at least up to ten standards to read and

realize the duties and responsibilities and maintain records.

FPS dealer must have reasonable saving in his bank account.

FPS dealer must have completed 21 years of age.

The FPS dealer must not have criminal record.

To the extent possible, the FPS dealer with support from the supply inspector

has to ensure supply of items to the door/kitchen of the poor. The delivery has

to be authenticated by a representative of the PRI. The supply has to be

made in presence of the representative of the PRI.

xxxix

Village-level FPSs has to be a public building like community hall/Panchayat

Ghar etc. If this Hall/Ghar is not there they must be constructed under Food

for Work scheme/Rural Housing Scheme etc.

FPS Dealer must be a local resident.

There has to be training of FPS dealers for at least one week just after his

selection. The training has to cover the rules and regulations in PDS, the

responsibilities of the dealer, the economics and ethics in distribution etc.

Provide transportation facility and field allowance for FPS dealers.

An FPS dealer serves 741 cards on average which is unmanageable. An FPS

in rural area should serve no more than 200 households or 1000 population

as opposed is 2000 as per national target as planned by GOI. In the urban

region, this may vary depending on the urban concentration.

Suggestions for Improved Performance of Supply Inspectors

We suggest appointment of supply inspectors on the basis of the number of

FPS dealers in a development block.

There has to be time-cum-merit bound promotion of supply inspectors.

The supply inspectors must verify the distribution system by taking the

beneficiaries into confidence and report the same to the higher authority

immediately. The verification report must be displayed at the level of

consumers in village and block.

Suggestions for Execution by Godwon-in-charge and Deport-in-charge

Improve the transportation services and control the contractors involved in

carrying the commodities.

Period of lifting items by FPS dealers should be decided in advance and

informed.

Transportation cost of the dealer must be compensated in case the items are

not sent by the Godowns to the doorsteps of the FPS dealers.

Steps to be executed by Panchayats

The local Panchayat has to listen to the voice of the poor by pursuing the following:

Ensure regular meeting of Gram Sabha,

Assist in BPL survey, identify the needy and poor,

protect local Food Bank,

assist in estimating household income,

control local mafia,

avoid discriminatory protection of the non-poor,

represent the absentee/migrant household, the widow and the

physically/mentally challenged while making cards.

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Most of the beneficiary households reported problems experienced in PDS.

26.0 per cent of the beneficiaries reported corruption as the reason. But 92.5 per cent

of the total beneficiaries reported that none of them lodged any complaint anywhere.

73.3 per cent of the urban and 65.0 per cent of the rural beneficiaries also reported

that the local bodies did not play any role for improvement of PDS. 84.4 per cent of

the beneficiary households reported that no local vigilance committee was formed in

the memorable past.

The Panchayat has to play a positive role supported by immediate formation

of functioning vigilance committee and that should be monitored by local

NGOs or higher levels officials. Monthly and quarterly meetings should be

held where NGOs and government officials must participate.

Suggestions for Implementation by State Level Functionaries Allotment of kerosene oil should be increased per card/unit.

Identify local need and supply/distribute items accordingly.

Every household should have a ration card not only to get items but also as

an identity.

A single window (Department) at the level of the state must be assigned the

responsibility for the execution of the delivery mechanism, right from FCI

Godown to FPSs. This is to be a Government Department as different from

the autonomous Food Rights Commission.

Each Block should have one foodgrain Godown and one oil depot.

Kerosene Oil depot owners may be allowed to distribute LPG also.

Household income should be below Rs. 19,884 for rural and Rs. 25,546 for

urban area per annum for eligibility of BPL card, as per GO at present.

Occupations of members in the household should be in the unorganized

sector to be eligible for BPL card.

To the extent possible, state government has to shed the load of the FPS

dealer by ensuring supply at the door of the supply point in the village, rather

than the FPS dealer going a long way with cash to carry back distributable

items. This will save cost on transport-cum-transactions.

BPL and Antyodaya categories should be clubbed as BPL; these households

should be issued identical cards to avoid grass root level discrimination and

distributional inefficiency. Both BPL and Antyodaya live below poverty line

and hence belong to poor category. In the same way, the subsidy-related

extra cost on Antyodaya cards may be eliminated.

Distribution of items to households once a month is based on households

having accumulated money (saving or disposable money revealed in

xli

purchasing power) to buy those items. In reality, as our study shows, the

income-poor households lack ‘saved’ purchasing power; on the contrary, they

have day-based purchasing power. If available items are lifted by FPS

dealers for distribution to target households, it must be available with the FPS

holding and carrying forward a stock and hence the households must be

allowed to draw items any time (on any day) of their choice.

Items are distributed based on cards irrespective of family size. In reality, the

family size varies over a wide range. Hence, items should be distributed

based on units in the family. This will reduce the actual/fake division of family

in rural areas. This will also lead to enhanced per capita availability of

foodgrains.

There being no self-production of kerosene and no open market for kerosene,

households feel compelled to buy from black market at a much higher price.

Hence, whatever be the Government-determined source, a second source

has to be there for availability of kerosene for households at a price per unit,

marginally higher than PDS price.

There has to remain an emergency stock of foodgrains at the FPS level to

counter calamities and hunger. The ‘zero balance’ reported by the FPS

dealers thus may be converted to accumulated positive balance.

We accept that any failure in supply/distribution of items at grass root level is

an institutional failure and hence an institution has to be marked responsible

for this failure.

We did not find any significant outcome from the Jan Kerosene programme.

Hence, the programme should be stopped.

There has to be flexibility in FPS price as a reflection of prevailing market

price. A high gap between the two prices may lead to non-functioning PDS

and/or corrupt PDS. Hence, the gap between the two prices has to be

minimized. In case the BPL households are buying at a higher price from the

open market, the PDS price should be raised. This will reduce subsidy at the

same time.

Temporary ration cards should be provided for in-migration households as

workers in construction work, rituals and religious festivals etc. The proportion

target number in terms of size of Gram Sabha may be given to each Gram

Panchayats.

There has to be at least one-day campaign in the village about

awareness/rights of consumers in PDS every month. This campaign has to be

initiated by Government functionaries.

xlii

There has to be transparency in the system. The availability, allocation, lifting

and distribution of items per period per FPS should be on display. For this,

the block office and the local school building etc. may be the site.

The reservation category for FPS dealers often creates problems. The person

in reservation category by being poor borrows initial working capital and gets

trapped. Hence, ether the reservation category has to be abolished or

working capital has to be provided to the FPS dealer under reservation

category through bank loan etc.

Selection/appointment of FPS dealer has to be through a single authority,

either local Panchayat or Government administration, not both. This will

ensure accountability of the FPS dealer.

At present 18 districts in UP have State Food Corporations (SFCs). We found

these SFCs in poor condition by lack of staff, storage capacity, rented

Godown, poor documentation, high corruption, non-owning responsibility etc.

These SFCs need reorganization. The documentation format has to be

uniform for all the SFCs in the state.

The fixed target has to be flexible for distribution of cards by categories

among the eligible non-beneficiaries.

Identify at the level of village/block/district the food insecure households by

indicators which are observable and quantifiable like land ownership,

residential house, and number of days employed in wage-work in the past

one year. Involve the PRIs in the selection of such households through open

meeting and declaration of the list in public and maintenance of the list in

Panchayat Bhawan. The list has to be flexible for inclusion of representatives

of households absent in the meeting (s) and marginalized people who may

slip into the category of BPL any time for many reasons.

Launch a BPL survey with immediate effect for the whole state by an

autonomous institution with uninterrupted support from the state. The same

institution will be responsible for assessment and monitoring of steps initiated

and implemented by the state to ensure freedom from hunger and food

security of people at the bottom of social and economic ladder. This institution

may be called ‘Food Rights Commission’ in the line of Human Rights

Commission.

Cancel false cards (APL households having BPL cards) and de-link

cardholding from political affiliation.

Ensure state vigilance over stocks and release by FCI, Kothedars etc. A

double check/lock on food store may be executed, for example, one lock used

xliii

by FPS dealer and the other lock by Gram Panchayat when it is FPS. To

check collusion of both, the FPS dealer and the entrusted Panchayat

representative, a ‘food custodian’ from the locality may be appointed to

ensure checks and balances.

At present the Annapurna card holders have stopped getting foodgrains. They

are being given Rs. 150 per month which is not only inadequate but also often

does not help them to go to the market to use money to buy foodgrains. This

category has to be ensured foodgrains at the lowest price.

There should be no limit on the number of distributable cards. If BPL cards

can not be distributed (because of low price of items and hence subsidy

burden), at least APL card has to be ensured for all, so that there is no case

of cardlessness in the state. To assess the households for selection in the

BPL and Antyodaya category, the basis has to be ‘Arthik Register’ and

‘Revenue Register’.

The Gram Pradhans have to be trained about their duties and responsibilities

once every year in the line of the 73rd and 74th Amendments of the

Constitution.

There has to be a Food Bank at the level of the village (Panchayat) so that no

news of death from hunger comes. For this, a community hall has to be

constructed, if it is not there already, in each village having at least 50

households covering all hamlets. If the villages are small by number of

households, a cluster of neighbouring villages should be covered for having

such a community hall. The maintenance of the community hall will be the

responsibility of the PRIs.

The households must be allowed to draw quota/items in installments, and

hence pay in installments. In case these poor households can not pay for the

time being, food coupon has to be given to the households so that they can

buy at their time.

xliv

Chapter I

Public Distribution System in India: An Overview

1.1 Introduction Post-independence Indian agriculture followed the Bengal Famine of 1943 and food

scarcity during the Second World War (1939-45). By 1944, an official government

report conservatively estimated that one and a half million lives had been lost by the

1943 famine. The consequence had a deep root. ‘In 1943, Churchill ordered the

Indians and the thousands of British military in India to live off their own stocks when

Japanese conquest of Burma had cut off a main outside source of rice for Bengal

and all of India. But, despite all this, the colonial government allowed rice to flow out

of Bengal’ (Lappe and Collins, 1977, p. 69). Public intervention in Indian agriculture

was in fact connected with food scarcity. By 1947, about 54 million people in urban

India were covered by statutory rationing and an additional 19 million by other forms

of public distribution (Dantwala, 1993, p. 182). As reported by the 10th Planning

Commission, Government of India, ‘with a network of more than 4.62 lakh fair price

shops (FPS) distributing commodities worth more than Rs. 30,000 crore annually to

about 160 million families, the PDS in India is perhaps the largest distribution network

of its kind in the world. This huge network can play a more meaningful role only if it

ensures the availability of food to the poor households’ (Planning Commission, 2002-

07, Vol. II, p. 367). During post-independence period, agriculture came to depend

first on extension of net sown area and irrigation coverage at least up to the

emergence of Green Revolution. Technology came to determine the fate of Indian

agriculture after mid-1960s and up to the 1980s. Concentrated in a 'few high potential

region' the high-technology-led new agricultural strategy paid off (ibid., p. 173).

1.2 PDS in India: The History The root of food security through PDS goes to Kautilyan ‘Arthashastra’. In his

analysis on the methods of counteracting the effects of famine, he suggests the

following:

• Distribute to the public, on concessional terms, seeds and food from the royal stores;

• Undertake food-for-work programmes such as building forts or irrigation works;

• Share out the royal food stocks;

1

• Commandeer, for public distribution, private stocks of food; • Seek the help of friendly kings; • Shift the affected population to a different region; • Encourage (temporary) migration to another country; • Move the entire population (with the King and Court) to a region or country

with abundant harvest or near the sea, lakes or rivers; • Supplement the harvest with additional cultivation of grain, vegetables, roots

and fruits, by fishing and by hunting deer, cattle, birds and wild animals’ (Rangarajan, 1987, p. 130).

In Kautilya, ‘social security was both a private and a state matter. The primary

responsibility for maintaining the family – wife, children, parents, minor brothers and

unmarried or widowed sisters – lay with the head of the family; no one could become

an ascetic without first providing for his wife and children. …However, the state had

the obligation to provide a safety net and maintain children, the aged, childless

women and the helpless’ (Rangarajan, 1987, p. 92).

The history behind introduction of the PDS in India is rooted in famines and

food scarcities during the entire period of British colonial rule in India. The first one

was the Bengal famine of 1770. An estimated ten million people died in this famine

that was essentially the consequence of plunder by the colonists of the East India

Company. Between 1860 and 1910, there occurred twenty major famines and

scarcities. The last famine in British India was the Bengal famine of 1943 (Ghose,

1999, p. 355).

Table 1.1 Pre-Independence Famines in British (Colonial) India, 1770-1943

Year Event 1770 Formidable famine in Bengal 1770-1858 Frequent and severe famines 1861-80 Frequent and severe famines 1880-96 Very few famines 1896-97 Large-scale famine affecting large parts of India 1899-1900 Large-scale famine 1901-43 Very few famines 1943 Bengal famine Source: Dreze, Jean, 1990, ‘Famine Prevention in India’, in ‘The Political Economy of Hunger’, Ed. By

Dreze, Jean and Sen, Amartya, Vol. 2, p. 16.

The year 1858 marked the end of East India Company. There came a number

of committees and their reports in British India. These included Report of Baird Smith

on the 1860-61 famine, 1880 Famine Commission Report, followed by the

introduction of Famine Codes, Famine Commission Report on the 1896-97 famine,

Famine Commission Report on the 1899-1900 famine, 1945 Famine Commission

Report on the Bengal Famine (Dreze, 1990, p. 16). ‘The backbone of the famine

2

relief strategy embodied in the Famine Codes was the organization of massive public

works’ (Dreze, 1990, p. 26).

Post-independence Indian agriculture followed the Bengal Famine of 1943

and food scarcity during the Second World War. Public intervention in Indian

agriculture was, in fact, connected with food scarcity. By 1947, about 54 million

people in urban areas were covered by statutory rationing and another 19 million by

other forms of public distribution (Dantwala, 1993, p. 182). The measures that the

GOI adopts for intervention in the foodgrains market are through procurement, buffer

stocks, public distribution, imports, restrictions on internal movements of foodgrains,

controls on exports etc (Sharma, 1992, p. 343). All these measures are not

necessarily applied simultaneously.

Table 1.2 Committees formed by GOI, Pre-Green Revolution Period

Year Committees 1943 Foodgrains Policy Committee 1947 Foodgrains Policy Committee 1949 Foodgrains Investigation Committee 1950 Foodgrains Procurement Committee 1964 Foodgrains Prices Committee 1965 Agricultural Price Commission Source: Available Literature.

The first Foodgrains Policy Committee, 1943 recommended only informal

rationing in rural areas. By implication, free or open market in foodgrains was

permitted in the rural areas, that is, the producing areas (Dandekar, 1994, p. 209).

Since 1947, the government was expected to do away with controls on production,

distribution, and prices of foodgrains. The Foodgrains Policy Committee, 1947,

suggested progressive decontrol in the foodgrains sector following which a policy of

gradual decontrol was announced by the government in November 1947 (GOI, 1976,

Part I, p.145). "However, the expectation that decontrol would lead to dishoarding of

stocks, increase in procurement and stability in prices did not materialize and prices

began rising fast... A reversion to controls was, therefore, decided upon in

September, 1948... With the returns of controls, procurement of adequate stocks for

public distribution assumed crucial importance" (GOI, 1976, Part I, p. 145). By August

1949 the GOI started receiving complaints on quality of foodgrains distributed and

appointed the Foodgrains Investigation Committee that submitted its report on April

30, 1950 confirming the complaints (Dandekar, 1994, p. 212). In view of the

persisting gap between the commitments of public distribution and the procurement,

a Foodgrains Procurement Committee was appointed on February 08, 1950, in

pursuance of the recommendations of the All India Food Ministers' Conference held

3

in August 1949. The Foodgrains Procurement Committee of 1950 recommended

"monopoly procurement of foodgrains, abolition of the free market, imposition of

complete statutory rationing in towns with a population of 50,000 and above and

informal rationing elsewhere" (GOI, 1976, Part I, p. 145). Since it was admitted by the

GOI that any scheme of decontrol would involve risks, hence on 8th July, 1952, the

Government issued the Foodgrains (Licensing and Procurement) Order, 1952. This

Order prohibited any individual from engaging in any business which involved

purchase, sale or storage for sale of any foodgrains except under and in accordance

with a licence issued by the state governments (Dandekar, 1994, p. 216). The

Essential Commodities Act, 1955, entrusted the government with taking steps for

regulation of "production, supply, distribution and trade in essential commodities for

securing equitable distribution" (GOI, 1976, Part I, p. 167). Following the

recommendations of the Foodgrains Prices Committee set up in 1964, there came an

Agricultural Price Commission in January 1965. The important point is that the floor

or support prices for major foodgrains recommended by the Committee for 1964-65

were "generally higher than the average post-harvest prices during the preceding

three seasons" (GOI, 1976, Part I, p. 167). It is, thus, not an automatic fact that the

public distribution will depress the price against the producers-sellers. The National

Commission on Agriculture in fact recognized that "the minimum support price should

be fair to the farmer and should cover his cost of production and leave him a

reasonable margin of profit" (GOI, 1976, Part II, p. 83).

The Essential Commodities (EC) Act that came into force in 1955 was meant

to facilitate government regulation of trade and commerce. The EC Act, 1955

empowered the public officials in enforcing the public distribution system. The 1955

Act, however, was not the first one for imposition of controls on trade and distribution.

Of course, it was the first one in Independent India. The British Colonial Government

under the Defense of India Rules had implemented some control measures. Since

1946, there came legislation in the form of the Essential Supplies (Temporary

Powers) Act, which was in fact replaced by the EC Act of 1955 (Mooij, 1999, p. 193).

The number of commodities declared essential under the Act rapidly increased from

10 items in 1955 to 60 in 1992. In August 1992, it was decided to extend the EC

(Special Provisions) Act by another five years. The Ninth Planning Commission of

India thought to remove rice and wheat, the two most essential items, from the

purview of the EC, 1955 Act (The Hindu, Oct. 1, 2000, p. 8).

In India, availability of foodgrains is ensured through a network of Fair Price

Shops (FPSs) licensed by the State/UT administrations where each such shop is

envisaged to serve a population of 2000. From over 4 lakhs in March 1992, the

4

number of FPSs rose to over 4.33 lakhs as on 31 March, 1995. Most of these FPSs

are in rural areas. In 1995, the rural areas had the number of FPSs three times that

in the urban areas.

The procurement of foodgrains for distribution through PDS is maintained

through domestic procurement rather than through imports. Probably, this was

facilitated by the Green Revolution of the late 1960s. The PDS soon assumed the

status of being the centerpiece in the anti-poverty programme. The plentiful supplies

of foodgrains generated by the Green Revolution were matched by the ambitious

target of extending the PDS to cover the entire population - both rural and urban

(Rao, 2001, p. 82). Under this system, the price at which government procures

foodgrains determines the price at which consumers receive foodgrains through the

PDS. From the beginning, the GOI has made it clear that remunerative prices are to

be a central feature of its policy towards agriculture. The concept of state trading was

revived in January 1965 when, by an Act of Parliament, the GOI set up the Food

Corporation of India (FCI). For procurement and price setting respectively, there

came the FCI and the Agricultural Prices Commission (now Commission for

Agricultural Costs and Prices) in 1965. The post-1965 period, thus, brought about

institutionalized arrangements and procedure for procurement, stocks, pricing, and

distribution of foodgrains. Let us take a brief perusal of the on-going and changing

mode of operation in the domain of public distribution system.

1.3 Evolution of Public Distribution System in India The objective of the Government of India's Food Security Policy is to ensure

availability of foodgrains to the public at an affordable price. The objectives are thus

(i) ensuring adequacy or sufficiency in supply of foodgrains, and (ii) distributing

foodgrains at an affordable price. The Public Distribution System (PDS), which

continues to exist in the country since the Second World War, attempts to meet these

twin objectives (GOI, 1995-96, p. 88). In view of the GOI, "the PDS aims at insulating

the consumer from the impact of rising prices of these commodities and maintaining

the minimum nutritional status of our population. The PDS supplies have a stabilizing

effect on open market prices by increasing availability, removing scarcity psychosis

and deterring speculative tendencies" (GOI, 1991-92, Part II, p. 53).

1.4 Public Distribution System: The Rationale The public distribution system as a social safety net can be appreciated by the fact

that aggregate availability of foodgrains per se is not enough to ensure the ability to

acquire foodgrains. Production does not automatically guarantee consumption. The

beginning of initial production is an unknown world explorable to man. The urge for

5

survival or initial material existence compels him to transform nature (observable and

accessible to him) by application of his labour power. Initial output is produced by

man independent of his own choice and independent of the question of any

consensus. It is the individual compulsion which becomes a social phenomenon

because of (i) the inability of the individual to produce all the commodities he needs;

(ii) the choice-neutrality of any particular individual in the sense that if (i) holds good,

he will have to produce in excess for others and hence exchange. At the same time,

it is a fact that location of individuals in the production map shows the location of the

same individuals in the consumption map. The latter, namely, the relative command

of individuals over commodities produced may not satisfy all individuals equally.

Thus, there come command-differential over commodities produced. The command

differential is derived from resource differential: unequal resources owned and

transformed by the resource owners in the domain of production of commodities

(Majumder, 1998, p. 635-636). Concentrating on production of food, the corollary is

that the mere presence of food in the economy, or in the market, does not entitle a

person to consume it (Dreze and Sen, 1989, p. 9). The rural poor in developing

(income-poor) countries and the urban poor with inadequate purchasing power, both

the categories without having regular employment (paid work) or unemployment

benefits, are often denied the right to food. For such poor, the exercise of the right to

food and being free from hunger are synonymous (Zhou and Gandhi, 2002, p. 533).

Even the ability to buy may not guarantee food security, unless there is an efficient

distribution system (Suryanarayana, 2000, p. 80). Food security may be viewed from

a number of angles like spatial (regional, national, international) and cross-sectional.

We consider in this study cross-sectional (of the poor section in society) security. As

confessed by the 10th Planning Commission, Government of India, ‘the availability of

food grains is not a sufficient condition to ensure food security to the poor. It is also

necessary that the poor have sufficient means to purchase food. The capacity of the

poor to purchase food can be ensured in two ways – by raising the incomes or

supplying food grains at subsidized prices. While employment generation

programmes attempt the first solution, the PDS is the mechanism for the second

option’ (Planning Commission, 2002-07, Vol. II, p. 367). Colonial history of India also

confirms that 'the major famines and scarcities occurred during a period when India

was a food surplus country and was in fact exporting large quantities of foodgrains'.

At the national level at least, famines in British India 'were not precipitated by

absolute shortages of food caused by uncontrollable vagaries of nature' (Ghosh,

1999, p. 359). The command over food of different economic cross-sections of

population in an economy depends on many legal-institutional factors including

6

governance, political will and competence, target setting, ownership and control over

food etc. ‘The overall availability of food is thus a very poor guide to the fortunes of

different socio-economic groups’ (Dreze and Sen, 1989, p. 26). The Bangladesh food

famine of 1974 was delinked from reduced food availability as was the case of 1973

Ethiopian food famine (Dreze and Sen, 1989, p. 27-28). Historically, we find no one-

to-one causal relation between per capita availability of food and deprivation of a

section of population in terms of food consumption.

Food security and self-sufficiency in food are two different issues, though

linked in a national economy in the context of size of population, with different cross-

sections with and without purchasing power. Macro self-sufficiency in food (taking

food economy as the single unit) is no guarantee of food security. Many of the

countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America have large and increasing size of

population. Many of this increased size remain hungry and malnourished. For

example, in 1985 about 100 million people or about one-fourth of the settled

population in Africa, were estimated to have remained chronically hungry and

malnourished. In the mid-1980s, expenditure on food import came to be around 20.0

per cent of the total export earnings of Africa, compared to 16.0 per cent in 1980 and

much less in 1970 (Platteau, 1990, p. 280). An economy needs to import food

whenever domestic supply falls short of demand at the macro level, while hunger and

malnutrition may be because of absence of purchasing power of the bottom sections

of the population in the same economy (Platteau, 1990, p. 279). The task is to ensure

food security of the vulnerable sections of the economy, even if it is at the cost of

food imports. However, for a large economy like India with a population more than

1000 millions now the ability to import food is limited. For example, in 1989 India’s

rice production was five times world trade in rice and India’s wheat production was

half of world trade in wheat. In 1989 India produced 21.2 per cent of world output of

rice and 10.0 per cent of world output of wheat (Kashyap, 2002, p. 474). The better

solution for a large economy like India is not to depend on imports of food to ensure

food security because of the absolute consumption requirements of food which may

not be exported by the rest of the world taken together. This is because the

advanced countries have shifted away from production of food while the developing

countries produce food basically to ensure food-feed equilibrium within the national

economy. Hence, the rationale of intervention by the Government in the food

production-distribution frame comes.

At the all-India level, between 1972-73 and 1993-94, according to National

Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) data, per capita consumption of cereals

declined from 15.3 to 13.4 kg per month over the two decades. During these two

7

decades ending 1993-94, there occurred a steady decline in the food share from

about 73 per cent to 55 per cent at the all-India level. This decrease occurred in all

regions. As informed by the NSSO, food shares declined for all income groups,

including the first (poorest) quartile (Meenakshi, 2000, p. 34-35). This is in spite of

the fact that the poor people continue to spend most of their budget on food and

much higher than the percentage spent by the non-poor on food. This seems to

confirm Engel's Law, which says that economic development is accompanied by

declining food shares. We think, the converse is not necessarily true, namely that

declined and declining food share implies economic development. Even if it implies

economic development then the social base of that development is weak, so that it

becomes unsustainable. The flexibility in the consumption habit of the vulnerable

sections of the society may conceal the real reasons of reductions in food

consumption, sometimes occasionally. For example, 'the reduction of food

consumption may be an early response to the threat of entitlement failure, apparently

motivated, at least partly, by the preservation of productive assets' (Dreze and Sen,

1989, p. 77). The decline in per capita consumption of food per period may, however,

be attributable to changed inner composition of food. Bennett's Law argues that

consumers gradually switch to a more expensive diet, substituting quality for quantity.

This is confirmed in the Indian context as revealed by the NSSO data. During the

period, from 1972-73 to 1993-94, the decline in per capita consumption of cereals is

wholly attributable to a decline in coarse cereal consumption, down from 4.8 kg to 2

kg per capita per month. An increase in wheat consumption from 3.9 kg to 4.4 kg per

capita per month was not enough to compensate for the decline in total cereal

consumption. The consumption of rice remained virtually unchanged during this

period (Meenakshi, 2000, p. 35). Following NSSO data, the substitution away from

coarse cereals into rice was prominent in the lower income groups, and the non-poor

sections experienced almost no change in the consumption of rice and wheat. The

reason is likely to be that the non-poor section already has enough quantities of high

quality cereals to the extent of their satiety. The fact remains that before the income-

poor population shift from cereals to non-cereals, they shift from less expensive

cereals to more expensive cereals. In the Indian context, this implies a switch away

from the coarse cereals to either wheat or rice, or both.

The PDS has remained a major instrument to execute the Government of

India's economic policy to protect the poor. Public intervention in the foodgrains

market 'aim at procurement of foodgrains for public distribution and maintenance of

buffer stocks to give not only short-term but also long-term stability of prices of

essential commodities and safeguard the interest of the consumers. Procurement of

8

foodgrains also ensures remunerative returns to the farmers and provide them with

incentives to invest more on agriculture to raise its productivity and to ensure that in

the event of any glut or due to any other reason, the market prices do not fall below

the support prices' (GOI, 1991-92, p. 55).

The purpose of the Government of India, since the early 1970s when it

started following the policy of Minimum Support Price (MSP), was 'to ensure that

farmers get remunerative prices for their produce and there is no distress sale

particularly during the harvesting season' (GOI, 1998-99, p. 73). As declared by the

government, 'procurement prices are based on support prices announced by the

government. The procurement operations of wheat, paddy and coarse grains are

totally voluntary. The producers have the option to sell their produce to FCI/State

agencies at support prices or in the open market whichever is advantageous to them'

(GOI, 1998-99, p. 70). The PDS aims at ensuring stability in the foodgrains market

when open market prices of foodgrains fluctuate less because of steady availability in

the hands of the government. This removes scarcity psychosis and checks

speculative tendencies. The disadvantaged and vulnerable sections of the society

are the targets of this PDS. The government also pledges to pay attention to distress

areas like drought prone areas, desert areas, tribal areas, urban slum areas and

selected hilly areas. From June 1992, a special scheme to strengthen the PDS was

introduced by inclusion of additional items like tea, soap, iodized salt and pulses to

serve the tribal and hilly population in the backward and remote areas (GOI, 1994-95,

p. 78). The reasons of this special scheme seem to be both poor infrastructure and

income-poverty. The Integrated Tribal Development Project (ITDP) is an example of

the concern of the GOI to provide foodgrains (wheat and rice) at special subsidized

rates (below PDS rates) for tribal people (GOI, 1991-92, p. 54). On June 1, 1997, the

GOI introduced a revised scheme of distribution known as Targeted Public

Distribution System (TPDS). This showed a deviation from the earlier ones in the

sense that since 1997 the distribution of foodgrains would be operated under two-tier

system of delivery to households, those below poverty line (BPL) and those above

poverty line (APL). The BPL families were planned to receive foodgrains at heavily

subsidized prices (GOI, 1998-99, p. 69). To execute PDS and TPDS the government

had to procure foodgrains at the prices declared by the government. The government

believed that the procurement of foodgrains would serve the objective of providing

price security to the farmers, which would induce them to sustain production levels.

This was in addition to PDS working as 'an instrument to protect the vulnerable

sections against price volatility' (GOI, 1998-99, p. 70).

9

1.5 Revamped Public Distribution System: Some Features The Government initiated, in consultation with the State governments and the Union

Territory (UT) administrations, steps to revamp the PDS to improve its reach based

on an area approach (GOI, 1991-92, Part II, p. 53). Preference was planned to be

given in this revamped system to the population living in the most difficult areas of

the country. This included areas such as the drought prone areas, desert areas, tribal

areas, certain designated hilly areas and the urban slum areas (ibid.). A Revamped

Public Distribution System (RPDS) was, thus, launched in June 1992 in 1,700 blocks.

For the tribal, hill and arid area populations remotely located and having poor

infrastructure, additional items like tea, soap, pulses and iodized salt were made

available under the RPDS. It was decided by the GOI during mid-1990s that the

geographical coverage of RPDS would be extended to the entire 2,446 Employment

Assurance Scheme (EAS) Blocks (GOI, 1995-96, p. 84). Under the scheme of

RPDS, foodgrains (rice and wheat) are allocated to states and union territories for

RPDS blocks at lower prices; Rs. 50 per quintal lower than Central issue prices

(CIPs) for normal PDS blocks. The State Governments are required to ensure that

the retail prices of these commodities in these blocks are not higher than CIPs by

more than 25 paise per Kg. Sugar is also distributed at lower prices (GOI, 1992-93,

p. 90). The CIPs (ex-FCI godowns) are fixed by the Central Government for PDS as

well as RPDS. The retail end prices for PDS and RPDS are fixed by the State

Governments, taking into account the transportation cost and the dealer's

commission (GOI, 1995-96, p.87). The difference between the PDS and the RPDS in

terms of retail end prices is that for RPDS, a maximum ceiling of Rs. 25 per quintal

has been fixed by Central Government on account of transportation cost etc., which

can be built up by State Government in fixing retail prices for RPDS (GOI, 1995-96,

p. 87).

The Programme Evaluation Organization of the Planning Commission identified four

major weaknesses of the RPDS. These are (i) proliferation of bogus cards, (ii)

inadequate storage arrangements, (iii) ineffective functioning of vigilance committee,

and (iv) failure to issue ration cards to all eligible households (Dev and Ranade,

1997, p. 67).

1.6 Targeted Public Distribution System: Features Following the recommendations of the Chief Ministers' Conference held in July 1996,

an effort was made to streamline the PDS. Thus, the Targeted Public Distribution

System (TPDS) was launched in June 1997. This also coincided with the celebration

of completion of fifty years of India's independence. The PDS, as it was being

10

implemented earlier, had been criticized for its urban bias and its failure to serve

effectively the poorer sections of the population. It was also criticized for its negligible

coverage in the states with the highest concentration of the rural poor and lack of

transparent and accountable arrangements for delivery (Planning Commission, 2002-

2007, Vol. II, p. 368). The latent problem was that a sizeable number of marginalized

people, in the absence of cash income that can be transformed into purchasing

power are excluded from the planning process because they do not constitute

effective demand. This is true irrespective of the technological (green) revolution after

the mid-1960s in India. Thus, the TPDS came to replace the erstwhile PDS from

June 1997. This system divided the potential beneficiaries into families Below

Poverty Line (BPL) and those Above Poverty Line (APL). Under TPDS the

Government was committed to distribute 10 kgs of foodgrains per month per BPL

family at a price equal to half of the economic cost of FCI. Quantity of foodgrains

earmarked to meet BPL requirements was 72 lakh tonnes per annum benefiting an

estimated 6 crores population (GOI, 1999-2000, p.79-80). The Lakdawal Committee

of the Planning Commission defined the number of poor in each state. The

identification of the poor was to be done by the states. The emphasis was on

inclusion of only the poor and vulnerable sections of the society such as landless

agricultural labourers, marginal farmers, artisans/craftsmen in the rural areas and

slum dwellers and daily wagers in the informal sector in the urban areas (Planning

Commission, 2002-07, Vol. II, p. 368). The state governments were assigned the

task to streamline the PDS by issuing special cards to BPL families and distributing

essential items under TPDS to them at specially subsidized prices, with better

monitoring of the delivery system. The bifurcation of BPL and APL quotas of

foodgrains into rice and wheat had been left to the States. In case of those States,

which had not indicated the bifurcation, the average lifting of rice and wheat over the

last 10 years, had been adopted on provisional basis. Following the TPDS

guidelines, any requirement from states over and above TPDS quotas, could be met

subject to availability of foodgrains in the Central Pool and at the rates equal to FCI's

average economic cost (GOI, 1997-98, p. 72).

The essential features of the TPDS are the following:

States to identify families Below Poverty Line (BPL) who would be issued

10 kgs of foodgrains per month per family at prices less than the Central

Issue Price (CIP).

11

Population above the poverty line (non-poor) now under PDS would

continue to receive normal entitlement at the full CIP.

The Centre should guarantee supply of foodgrains for the BPL at 10 kgs

per month per family to States. Additional quantities required by states

would depend on the availability of stocks in the Central Pool.

States will be free to add to the quantum, coverage and the subsidy from

their own resources.

Subsidized foodgrains will also be issued to all beneficiaries under the

EAS/Jawahar Rojgar Yojana as per guidelines at the rate of 1 kg. per

man-day for which food coupons would be issued to beneficiaries for

exchanging at FPS (GOI, 1996-97, p. 77).

1.7 Rationale of Targeted PDS No one denies that "the safest and most obvious way of guaranteeing the universal

protection of entitlements is to provide direct and unconditional support to everyone

without distinction.... it does have the advantage of altogether bypassing the various

difficulties which any form of selectivity in the provision of relief is bound to entail.

...Universal support can be a simple expression of ...right to food" (Dreze and Sen,

1989, p. 104). The fact is that the strategy of universal support has several

disadvantages. It involves an administrative and logistic burden. In addition,

"universal support may require a commitment of resources that can be hard to

obtain" (ibid.). The PDS, as it was planned to be carried on in post-independence

India, can not today go to encompass all and offer benefits to all in terms of all

essential commodities. "The need for reducing government expenditure under the

stabilization programme calls for a discriminatory approach in providing PDS benefits

and hence should be targeted only to the vulnerable groups, since malnutrition is

caused by an unequal distribution of food and misplaced consumer choices rather

than inadequate supply" (Suryanarayana, 2000, p. 80). So the targeted system

comes. The targeted system has the advantage that it can ensure the greatest

economy of resources by withholding public support from less vulnerable groups. In

addition, the targeted system can promote the redistribution of resources by

concentrating public support exclusively on the most deprived groups. In India,

targeting should take care of not only exclusion of the non-poor but also covering all

the poor excluded so far from the PDS network.

1.8 Public Intervention in the Foodgrains Market Agricultural production is essentially land-centered. We use the term 'land' in the

loose sense to include 'physical soil area' covered by agricultural crops. The physical

12

soil input is privately owned, in addition to some other complementary inputs like

fertilizers, pump sets, tractors etc. Water, as the most important ingredient to keep

'physical soil input' cultivable, is provided as input by the government through

medium and major irrigation system. This is supported by private initiatives through

minor irrigation system. The point we would like to make clear here is that agricultural

production by its nature remains primarily in private hands. The physical volume of

output per period, thus, remains in private hands. How does the government then

intervene in the domain of agriculture?

One answer is since the government allows the individuals to own and use

physical soil which is a free gift of nature, in turn, allows the individuals to derive

benefits from universal nature by its transformation, hence the government can claim

a share out of it. Privatization, by sanction, by the government, allows the

government to have a share out of it. The second answer is activity-specific. Since

the government helps the production system through irrigation etc., water being

universal gift of nature, the government can intervene to get a return on it. Hence, the

government intervenes. The third answer is distribution of specific benefits. Some

individuals are producers of crops who are at the same time owners of physical soil.

Hence, some individuals who are not owners of soil, and hence do not have the

scope to transform it into crops after appropriate use of other inputs including labour,

have to get a share of that crop. This establishes not only production by social

cooperation but also consumption of crops by individuals who do not produce crops,

but produce some other commodities. Production of crops by sale of labour power, or

by owning and using marginal landholdings, may fetch little earnings for the

agricultural labourers and marginal farmers. This earning is likely to be insufficient for

them to buy foodgrains required for physical survival in the free market. The question

of price protection for the income-poor, thus, comes in when it centres on meeting

the food needs. It is, thus, not only a question of protecting the non-owners of land

but also the owners of land and income-poor who constitute the ground for public

intervention in the market for foodgrains. The poor, the vulnerable, the left-out

sections of the society provide the base for the PDS. We, thus, examine the scope of

the PDS as a social safety net.

1.9 Arguments against Government Intervention in the Foodgrains Market The arguments against government intervention in agriculture seem to be

synonymous with liberalization of agriculture. The disapproval of government

intervention in agricultural markets 'is part of a larger critique of development

strategies that promoted domestic industrialization behind trade barriers, which were

13

financed through the taxation of agriculture via pricing policies that depressed food

and agricultural commodity prices so that wages could be kept low... Not surprisingly,

the major policy implication is that to foster sustained growth of agricultural

productivity, output and exports the terms of trade should improve for farmers

through a reduction in the discrimination against agriculture. The major way of getting

the prices right for agriculture is by means of a thorough liberalization of the foreign

trade regime, reducing the tariff and quota protection of industry, eliminating the real

exchange rate misalignment and removing the anti-export bias in agriculture' (Storm,

1997, p. 68). We concentrate on the arguments restricted to government intervention

in Indian agriculture through procurement and distribution. It is a fact that the

government does not directly control agricultural production, other than creating

storage facilities to take care of bumper production and hence holding stocks, or

offering support price in the post-harvest period when price has a tendency to fall

below unit cost level. The addition to stocks by the government in case of bumper

production is also a measure against abrupt fall in price. These exceptions show that

the government is the ultimate protector of home producer, quantitatively through

checking downward flexibility in foodgrains prices. The questions come when the

government intervention restricts the freedom of the producers-cum-sellers through

imposition of restrictions on movement of goods and marketing. Such restrictions

keep the benefits of the products localized, and price of the final product faces a

downward flexibility. Such 'restrictions are usually defended on the ground that they

are not aimed at producers but at unscrupulous traders' (Ahluwalia, 1996, p. 421).

One example is the Essential Commodities Act of 1955 that restricts stocks held by

traders, the other is the Maharashtra Cotton Monopoly Procurement Scheme that

ensures institutional arrangement for government procurement of cotton.

The Government of India adopted, in 1991, the New Economic Policy (NEP),

a major component of which is liberalization of initiatives and enterprises in

production-investment-trade. It pledges for reducing role of the government in the

context of opening the economy in favour of competitive regime. The NEP aims a

"domestic price reforms that free agriculture from internal controls and raise prices of

agricultural output (that) are expected to have positive impact on agricultural growth"

(Bhalla, 1995, p. 8). It is known that since 1990s "there are no quotas of procurement

in surplus states for delivery to the central pool. The strictly centrally imposed zonal

restrictions on inter-state movement of commodities no longer exist" (Dantwala,

1993, p. 176). One argument against the public intervention in the foodgrains market

is that the groups whose interests are served include mainly the non-poor. This

includes richer farmers from 'Green Revolution' areas, government and public

14

bureaucracy, urban consumers and foodgrain traders and millers (Rao, 1996, p.

138). Hence, subsidized sale of foodgrains through Fir Price Shops (FPSs) or public

distribution system benefits mainly the already benefited socio-economic categories.

It is argued that the supplies through PDS 'have contained the vigour of

inflation but part of their impact has been offset by monetization of budgetary deficit

to meet food subsidies. Maintaining supplies to PDS involves continuation of food

procurement, grant of subsidies and reintroduction and perpetuation of some

controls. But several weaknesses have emerged in the distribution system, which

have diluted the essence of the system of benefit for the vulnerable sections. The

financial liabilities of the state governments in maintaining this system have

increased. Leakage and black marketing in PDS items have also reduced the full

impact of PDS in containing inflation' (GOI, 1992-93, p. 92). The policy of the

government, to keep both input and output prices low, leads to subsidized provision

of inputs like water, electricity, and fertilizer, and subsidy to consumers. It is argued

that most of this subsidy is realized by the final consumers of foodgrains. The

distribution of procured foodgrains through the PDS involves a consumer subsidy to

make good the losses incurred by the Food Corporation of India (FCI) (Rao, 1996, p.

138). The PDS, thus, is argued to be too expensive. The budgeted estimate to food

subsidy for 1995-96 was Rs. 5,250 crore, which was more than the total estimated

budget deficit of the Centre in the same year. The fixed cost component, in particular,

the operational cost of the FCI, is considered too high (Mooij, 1999, p. 241). The

huge subsidy explains a part of the fiscal deficit of the government of surrendering

the scope to save income earned elsewhere. It is also argued that were the farmers

be given international prices for the inputs, farm income would go up (Parikh, 1999,

p. 5). It is being argued now that meeting demand for food in national economy

should be seen as being realized by food production and supply on a world scale.

There is a realization that the PDS, as it has evolved by now, actually be

serving only a limited proportion of the poor and that there are large variations in the

coverage between that states. Thus, the target setting and subsidy question should

receive attention for solution. In view of the GOI, two major aspects of PDS that need

a national consensus are: (i) the norms of excluding the non-poor, and (ii) limiting the

open-ended subsidy because of FCI operations (GOI, 1993-9, p. 66). The study on

the PDS pursued by us at the level of eight districts of Uttar Pradesh aims at

unfolding these questions.

15

1.10 Family Budget and the Poor: Arguments for PDS We consider a general budget equation of the households where total

household income is spent on food and non-food. In Fig. 1 the budget line, with fixed

income, is shown in quadrant IV. The inverse relation between demand for food and

price per unit of food is shown in quadrant I and the inverse relation between demand

for non-food and price of non-food is shown in quadrant III. We ignore here the

relation between price of non-food and demand of food. Similarly, we ignore the

relation between price of food and demand for non-food. That is, we ignore cross-

elasticity. Hence, we derive the relation between the price of food and the price of

non-food. This shows terms of trade between agriculture and non-agriculture. The

relation we find to be inverse, presented in quadrant II.

Fig. 1

In Fig 2, we repeat the same in quadrant I. In quadrant IV we have the

relation between demand for food (actual by market/distribution access) and number

of poor population in an economy. Food being at the bottom of the consumption

ladder, and assuming that the price elasticity of demand for food being low and

probably less than one, we derive that a higher/lower demand for foodgrains means

a lower/higher number of the poor population included in the market for foodgrains.

The total household income that we talked about in Fig 1 now can be seen as total

(national) income distributed as income of the poor and income of the non-poor. If the

poor are supposed to be the sellers of foodgrains, then low price of foodgrains will

imply low income (absolute and relative) of the poor. While low price of foodgrains

shows the possibility for the poor to buy food, low income of the poor (derived from

sale of low-priced food) shows less access to food for them. Demand for non-food

remains a rare possibility when demand for food remains unfulfilled. We take an

16

identity between price of food and income of the poor. Hence, we derive the relation

between income of the poor and the number of the poor population in quadrant III.

The price-income method left to itself can not solve this dilemma, that is,

based on whether the price of food is to be kept low or high. There may also be

diversion/black marketeering of food whereby the poor may be deprived of the

produced food. Food-processing and better marketing of food-converted higher-order

good meant for the income-rich may deprive the poor of the food that was available

in the market. Hence, the Government should intervene in the market for food.

Fig. 2

17

1.11 Prices, Poverty and Public Distribution System Price per unit of a single commodity has a double face, one who pays and the other

who receives. The person who is in a position to produce/sell the product at a

positive price earns her income, while the person who buys the same product spends

from her family budget. Food being an inescapable commodity-mix, any individual

will have to consume it on a day-to-day basis and hence either will have to produce it

for consumption-cum-sale or will have to buy it. In case she produces non-food

items, the relative price has to enable him to buy food on a regular basis at least for

minimum necessity based survival. This is where the question of control over the

food producers comes in. However, it is not necessarily true that the food-producers

will be able to buy non-food items. The fact is that while non-food producers are

generally assured of consumption of food in any economy, food producers may be

deprived of even the food that they produce. Government intervention in the

foodgrains market, thus, has a double face/edge. On the one hand, it has to ensure

the elimination of vulnerability of the food producers by price-related measures

(minimum support price, procurement price etc), on the other it will have to ensure

the interests of the consumers at large. The level of food prices is one of the crucial

variables mediating the relationship between aggregate food availability and

individual entitlements. Generally, the successful containment of increases in food

prices helps in protecting the entitlements of vulnerable groups (Dreze and Sen,

1989, p. 88).

The specific command over food is not necessarily linked with absolute and

relative prices of food. In case of landlessness of the people settled in rural regions,

in case of marginalized and cardless urban slum dwellers, age-cum-ill health of the

individuals not being able to sell labour power, particularly in case of assetlessness,

the individuals may be deprived of food. Breakdown of the joint family system also

may lead to failure to food entitlement. Historically or through government policy,

poverty may be imposed on a region or section of population, particularly if it is

colonized, leading to failure of sections of population to have access to food. In many

such cases, often the failure is not questioned. The state authority or the government

policy is also often not questioned. For example, ‘… in the disastrous Irish famines of

the 1840s (in which about an eighth of the population died, and which led to the

emigration of a comparable number to North America), the law and order situation

was, in many respects, apparently “excellent”….In many famines people starve and

die in front of food shops, without attempting to seize law and order by the collar. It

18

would be particularly a mistake to relate the causation of famines to violations of

legality’ (Dreze and Sen, 1989, p. 22).

In India, the population in general and vulnerable population in particular feels

the prolonged impact of natural disasters, as and when they occur. If price increases

following deficits in output and supply of essential commodities, it is the landless

people, the land-poor farmers, the urban unemployed and the rural underemployed,

and the urban slum dwellers that will bear the brunt of it. In famines the victims

typically come from the bottom layers of the society (ibid., p. 48). The social objective

of sharing the regional deficit in food output on a national basis remains absent. The

PDS aims at protecting the vulnerable sections of the society by encompassing them

in the distribution network. One of the objectives of PDS, namely, ensuring price

stabilization of foodgrains, is executed through buffer stock operations as an

instrument. It is a fact that in an underdeveloped agricultural production system,

agricultural production varies not only between one year and another but also within

a year. This may lead to income destabilization if prices are rigidly fixed. For

example, in case of a fall in agricultural output, a fall in income is not compensated if

the prices of agricultural products are not allowed to rise. Price changes, thus, are

expected to provide a compensatory effect to changes in output (Khusro, 1973, p.

13). This output variation is not only inter-temporal but also spatial. In terms of

production, seasonal and annual, some of the states in India may show surplus,

while some other states may show deficit. This surplus or deficit is to be understood

in terms of consumption requirements per period vis-à-vis production. Surplus states

will have a tendency to exhibit lower prices relative to the deficit states. If surplus

foodgrain is transferred from the surplus states to the deficit states, prices will have a

tendency to equalize. Public intervention in the foodgrains market, thus, attempts to

ensure dynamic equilibrium in the foodgrains market (ibid., p. 9). A direct link

between food prices and income-poverty becomes an important issue sometimes. It

is argued that high foodgrains prices may accentuate poverty. From the buyers point

of view, ‘when there is limited amount of food, with the market dividing it among the

population according to their respective purchasing power and market pulls, a

worsening of the relative position of some groups in the scale of money incomes can

lead to an absolute decline in their ability to command food’ (Dreze and Sen, 1989, p.

49). From a sellers point of view, a high or a rise in foodgrain prices will have

different implications, for example for the marginal farmers it will have very little

impact by revenue gain while for the big farmer it leads to a big surplus. The fact

remains that the big farmer, by ownership over big plot of land, produces marketable

surplus much more than that of the marginal farmer.

19

It the Indian context, however, the problem is less acute because of

continuous monitoring in prices of foodgrains by government. In addition, the positive

aspect of the scenario in the Indian context is that producer and consumer price

interventions by government are determined somewhat independently. This relieves

the dilemma of foodgrain prices affecting different sections of population differently.

These dual interventions, however, occur at a high cost to the public exchequer. That

is the question of subsidy.

2.12 Quality of Items in PDS Any consumer, independent of his income, has the right to expect food safety in

terms of wholesomeness and quality in all the foods, he uses. The FCI, as the major

buyer of food items in bulk, has set up its own standards for wholesomeness. FCI

has its own laboratories manned by trained personnel to test for quality and

maintenance of standard (GOI, 1976, Part II, p 155).

1.13 Summary Facts on Public Distribution System in the Indian Economy

1. The root of food security through PDS in India goes back to the days of

Kautilya.

2. The Bengal famine of 1943 was the recent root for relying on PDS as a food

security measure.

3. For the first 50 years of India’s independence PDS was universal.

4. Total requirements of foodgrains in post-1947 India is more than the exports of

foodgrains by the rest of the world on a yearly basis. So India cannot afford to

be import-dependent to ensure home consumption of foodgrains.

5. Food is a daily requirement that is required a number of times depending on

and varying with individual labour, age etc.

6. TPDS (with BPL and APL) was introduced after 1997, with the aim of excluding

non-poor from subsidized distribution of essential commodities.

7. PDS or TPDS has no direct link with income generation. However, it can

enhance real income by ensuring access of the target population to essential

commodities distributed at prices lower than prevailing market prices.

8. Following the latest GO of UP, a household (with a size of five members)

earning income up to Rs. 19,000 (rural) and Rs. 25,000 (urban) p.a. comes

under the BPL category.

20

21

Chapter II

Public Distribution System in India and Uttar Pradesh: The Strength and the Weaknesses

2.1 India’s Agriculture: Growth of Output, Availability, and Imports The rate of growth of agricultural output is a summation of rate of area expansion and

rate of growth of yield. While pre-1966 growth of agricultural output (all crops) is

explained more by area expansion, post-1966 growth is explained more by

productivity (yield). While the decade following the emergence of new input package

in Indian agriculture witnessed growth rates in output of all crops marginally lower

than witnessed during the pre-1966 period, the productivity growth rates were higher

in each during the second period. Obviously reducing growth of area expansion could

not be compensated via increasing yield.

While the rate of area expansion in agriculture showed a monotonic decline

for all crops and separately for foodgrains and non-foodgrains, yield growth

maintained a steady acceleration for each during the successive medium-term time

lengths. The effect had been a moderately accelerating growth of output for all crops

during the forward-moving time-horizons. While foodgrains maintained accelerating

growth trend in production, non-foodgrains marginally decelerated afterwards

(Ghosh, 1988, p. 17).

Table 2.1 Net Availability, Procurement and Public Distribution of Foodgrains

Year Net Production

Net Imports

Net Availability

@

Procurement Public Distribution

#

Col. 3 as per cent of

col. 4

Col. 5 as per cent of

col. 2

Col. 6 as per cent of

col. 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

1951 48.1 4.8 52.4 3.8 8.0 9.2 7.9 15.31952 48.7 3.9 52.0 3.5 6.8 7.5 7.2 13.11953 54.1 2.0 56.6 2.1 4.6 3.5 3.9 8.11954 63.3 0.8 63.9 1.4 2.2 1.3 2.2 3.41955 61.9 0.5 63.2 1.3 1.6 0.8 2.1 2.51956 60.7 1.4 62.6 Negligible 2.1 2.2 Negligible 3.41957 63.4 3.6 66.2 0.3 3.1 5.4 0.5 4.71958 58.3 3.2 61.8 0.5 4.0 5.2 0.9 6.51959 69.0 3.9 72.3 1.8 5.2 5.4 2.6 7.21960 67.5 5.1 71.2 1.3 4.9 7.2 1.9 6.91961 72.0 3.5 75.7 0.5 4.0 4.6 0.7 5.31962 72.1 3.6 76.1 0.5 4.4 4.8 0.7 5.71963 70.3 4.5 74.8 0.8 5.2 6.1 1.1 6.91964 70.6 6.2 78.1 1.4 8.7 8.0 2.0 11.1

Contd...

22

Year Net

Production Net

Imports Net

Availability @

Procurement Public Distribution

#

Col. 3 as per cent of

col. 4

Col. 5 as per cent of

col. 2

Col. 6 as per cent of

col. 4 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9

1965 78.2 7.4 84.6 4.0 10.1 8.8 5.2 11.91966 63.3 10.3 73.5 4.0 14.1 14.0 6.3 19.21967 65.0 8.7 73.9 4.5 13.2 11.7 6.9 17.81968 83.2 5.7 86.8 6.8 10.2 6.5 8.2 11.81969 82.3 3.8 85.6 6.4 9.4 4.5 7.8 11.01970 87.1 3.6 89.5 6.7 8.8 4.0 7.7 9.91971 94.9 2.0 94.3 8.9 7.8 2.1 9.3 8.31972 92.0 (-) 0.5 96.2 7.7 10.5 (-) 0.5 8.3 10.91973 84.9 3.6 88.8 8.4 11.4 4.0 9.9 12.81974 91.6 5.2 97.1 5.6 10.8 5.3 6.2 11.11975 87.4 7.5 89.3 9.6 11.3 8.4 10.9 12.61976 105.9 0.7 95.8 12.8 9.2 0.7 12.1 9.61977 97.3 0.1 99.0 9.9 11.7 0.1 10.1 11.81978 110.6 (-) 0.6 110.2 11.1 10.2 (-) 0.5 10.0 9.21979 115.4 (-) 0.2 114.9 13.8 11.7 (-) 0.2 12.0 10.21980 96.0 (-) 0.3 101.4 11.2 15.0 (-) 0.3 11.6 14.81981 113.4 0.7 114.3 13.0 13.0 0.6 11.4 11.41982 116.6 1.6 116.9 15.4 14.8 1.4 13.2 12.61983 113.3 4.1 114.7 15.6 16.2 3.5 13.7 14.11984 133.3 2.4 128.6 18.7 13.3 1.8 14.0 10.41985 127.4 (-) 0.4 124.3 20.1 15.8 (-) 0.3 15.8 12.71986 131.6 0.5 133.8 19.7 17.3 0.4 15.0 12.91987 125.5 (-) 0.2 134.8 15.7 18.7 (-) 0.1 12.5 13.81988 122.8 3.8 130.8 14.1 18.6 2.9 11.5 14.21989 148.7 1.2 147.2 18.9 16.4 0.8 12.7 11.11990 149.7 1.3 144.8 24.0 16.0 0.9 16.0 11.01991 154.3 (-) 0.1 158.6 19.6 20.8 Negligible 12.7 13.11992 147.3 (-) 0.4 148.5 17.9 18.8 (-) 0.3 12.2 12.71993 157.5 3.1 149.8 28.1 16.4 2.1 17.9 10.91994 161.2 1.1 154.8 26.0 14.0 0.7 16.1 9.11995 167.6 (-) 2.6 166.7 22.6 15.3 (-) 1.6 13.5 9.01996 157.9 (-) 3.1 163.3 19.8 18.3 (-) 1.9 12.5 11.21997 174.5 (-) 0.1 176.2 23.6 17.8 Negligible 13.5 10.11998 168.2 (-) 2.5 159.6 26.3 18.6 (-) 1.6 15.6 11.11999 178.2 (-) 1.3 169.4 30.8 17.7 (-) 0.8 17.3 9.92000 183.6 (-) 1.4 168.3 35.6 13.0 (-) 0.8 19.4 7.72001 172.2 (-) 2.9 157.0 42.6 13.2 (-) 1.8 24.7 8.42002 186.1 (-) 6.7 189.5 40.3 18.1 (-) 3.5 21.7 9.6

2003(P) 152.4 (-) 5.5 170.1 34.5 22.5 (-) 2.8 22.6 13.2 (P) Provisional @ Net availability = Net production + Net imports – changes in Government stocks. # Includes quantities released under the Food for Work Programme during the year 1978 to

1990. Notes: Production figures relate to agricultural year: 1951 figures correspond to 1950-51 and so on. Figures for procurement and public distribution relate to calendar years.

Net imports from 1981 to 1994 are only on Government account and from 1995 onwards the Net imports are total Imports and Export of the Country.

Source: GOI, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, 2004-05, p. S-22. Public distribution of foodgrains as percentage of net availability year-wise

remained below 10.0 during the decade 1953-1963 and ascended to above 10.0

during 1964-1998 year-wise with a few years of exception. During the five years that

followed, the percentage declined a little below 10.0. The net availability of

foodgrains experienced monotonic increase from a low base at 52.4 million tonnes in

23

1951 to reach one and a half times in 1964 (pre-Green Revolution era) and became

twice in availability in 1994 relative to what it was in 1964. In the following decade,

net availability increased at a slower rate. This increasing net availability of

foodgrains was explained by increasing internal production of foodgrains and not by

net imports. For example, excepting a few years like 1960 to 1967, net imports as

percentage of net availability remained low and often negative (implying net exports).

Net production of foodgrains during 2000-2003 on average reached three and a half

times what it was in the beginning of India’s planning (Table 2.1). So was the net

availability of foodgrains inter-temporally. Relative to the rate of growth of population

in India’s economy, thus, neither internal production of foodgrains nor its availability

imposed any threat on the ‘food-based living’ of the population with the assumption of

unchanged per capita consumption requirement of foodgrains. If availability had been

a problem, it would have surfaced in the beginning which was not a fact by recorded

data on hunger in India’s economy.

Let us now look at the production conditions of distributable items regionally,

with a focus on major regions (Table 2.2).

Table 2.2 Production of Rice and Wheat in Uttar Pradesh and Major States, 2003-2004

(Production Million Tonnes) Foodgrains States Production Per cent share of

production to all-IndiaCumulative per cent

of Production Uttar Pradesh 13.01 14.96 31.87 West Bengal 14.71 16.91 16.91

Rice

Punjab 9.66 11.10 42.97 Uttar Pradesh 25.57 35.48 35.48 Punjab 14.42 20.00 55.48

Wheat

Haryana 9.13 12.68 68.16 Uttar Pradesh 44.18 20.83 20.83 Punjab 24.66 11.63 32.46

Total Foodgrains*

Rajasthan 18.05 8.51 40.97 Note: * Include rice, wheat, maize, coarse cereals, pulses. Source: GOI, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, 2004-05, p. S-19.

The major rice producing states in India are West Bengal, UP and Punjab.

For example, in 2003-04, these states contributed 42.97 per cent of total rice

production in India. The major wheat producing states in India happen to be UP,

Punjab and Haryana, which together contributed 68.16 per cent of total wheat

production in India in 2003-04. Most of the states (and people settled therein) are,

thus, non-producing but consuming states, so far as rice and wheat are concerned. If

other food items are included like maize, coarse cereals, pulses etc. the major

producing states are UP, Punjab and Rajasthan.

24

Before the mid-1960s, the food security system in India was in an embryonic

stage. Government policies and measures then aimed at solving localized scarcity in

the face of crop failure, famine, drought, etc. 'Until the mid-sixties access to

concessional imports of foodgrains (mainly wheat) was available under US Public

Law 480. Further, the domestic price of wheat was considerably higher than the

landed cost of imports. It is not surprising that the government as the sole legal

importer of foodgrains, used imports as a major source of supply for the public

distribution system. Indeed, until the late sixties, imports constituted over 60 per cent

of the grains distributed during thirteen of the seventeen years, 1951 to 1967'

(Narayana, Parikh and Srinivasan, 1991, p. 151). The situation changed radically

with the phenomenal growth in wheat output associated with Green Revolution.

Till the early 1960s India resembled a big ‘vulnerable spot’ with low

foodgrains output level and stagnating yield. The economy of India experienced two

successive droughts in 1965-66 and 1966-67 along with Indo-Pak War of 1965. A

famine was predicted. The GOI had to bow down to the US for import of wheat under

the US PL (Public Law) 480 programme. Along with this, the GOI introduced internal

‘zoning’ to facilitate procurement from surplus zones and supposedly transfer this

surplus to deficit zones (Dreze, 1990, p. 49).

The economy of India started exporting foodgrains (rice) since the 1970s and

it got enhanced subsequently (Table 2.3).

Table 2.3 Exports of Rice from India, 1970 – 2004

Year Value (Rs. Crs.) % of Total Exports 1970-71 5 0.32 1980-81 224 3.34 1990-91 462 1.42 1995-96 4568 4.29 2000-01 2943 1.44 2001-02 3174 1.52 2002-03 5831 2.28 2003-04 4708 1.60

Source: GOI, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, 2004-05, p. S-84 to S-86. During pre-1966 period, there were no exports of rice. In 1970-71, it came to

be only 0.32 per cent of total exports from India, which jumped to 3.34 per cent in

1980-81 and reached the peak in 1995-96 at 4.29 per cent. In other years of recent

past, exports of rice as per cent of total exports from India remained between 1.0 and

2.5. In value terms, the last decade (1995-2004) shows significant exports of rice as

percentage of total exports from India. For highly populated rice consumption-

dependent potential consumers, the exports of rice in a state of monotonically

25

increasing total imports by the economy of India shows a shift in the mindset of the

GOI from its earlier vulnerability.

While India became by 1989 a major producer of rice, wheat and sugar, the

three distributable items in her PDS, in the world economy, a policy of relying on

international trade in at least rice and wheat may not be advisable (Table 2.4).

Table 2.4 India’s Output of Rice, Wheat and Sugar, 1970-1989

(Selected Years) As Percentage of World

Output World Trade

(As % of world output)India’s Output

(As % of World Trade)

Crops 1970 1980 1989 1989 1989

Rice 20.0 20.1 21.2 4.1 512.5 Wheat 6.3 7.1 10.0 19.8 50.7 Sugar 6.4 5.0 9.7 10.2 94.7 Source: Kashyap, 2002, p. 474.

The very volume of India’s output that is a response to internal requirement of

particularly rice shows that India can not rely on ‘rice failure’ on internal production

front to ultimately rely on imports. A little less in gravity, but similar is the case for

sugar and wheat, where it can not rely on import to substitute internal production by

imports. It must be remembered that trade in rice is an insignificant part of world

output of rice so far.

The international trade of these commodities is also dominated by major

multinationals implying not only market control by dominant share but also price

control so that the TWCs like India relying on internal production to meet internal

consumption of cereals can not rely on these MNCs for trade-related benefits (Table

2.5).

Table 2.5 Control of MNCs over Rice, Wheat and Sugar, 1983

Commodity World Exports ($ million) % Marketed by 3-6 Largest MNCs Rice 3613 70 Wheat 17851 85-90 Sugar 10636 60 Source: Kashyap, 2002, p. 476.

A shift away from relying on production of cereals to production of cash crops

may not help such countries much because these are dominated more by the MNCs

in the domain of international trade relative to the cereals (Kashyap, 2002, p. 476).

Hence, for large (highly populated) countries like India there is no escape from

relying on internal production-cum-consumption of cereals. Trade can not be relied

upon in cereals much unless, however, the consumption pattern changes radically in

favour of non-cereals.

26

2.2 Availability, Consumption, Procurement of Foodgrains in India Production of foodgrains in 2000-01 was two and a half times what it was in 1960-61,

that is forty years ago. The corresponding multiples are more than six for wheat, two

and a half for rice, and more than two and a half for cereals over the forty-year span.

The possibility of acceleration in production and its realization was manifest more

during 1960-61 to 1990-91 after which it slowed down. For example, wheat

production in 1990-91 was five-times what it was in 1960-61, rice production more

than twice, cereals more than twice, and all foodgrains more than twice. During the

last decade, 1990-91 to 2000-01, production of foodgrains increased by 0.12 per

cent, cereals 0.14 per cent, wheat 0.26 per cent and rice 0.14 per cent. The growth

calculations are based on variables in real terms (Table 2.6).

Table 2.6

Production of Food-grains in India (Qty. in million Tonnes)

Wheat Rice Cereals All Food-grains Years Quantity Annual

Growth (%)

Quantity Annual Growth

(%)

Quantity Annual Growth

(%)

Quantity Annual Growth

(%) 1960-61 11.0 - 34.6 - 69.3 - 82.0 -1970-71 23.8 116.4 42.2 22.0 96.6 39.4 108.4 32.21980-81 36.3 52.5 53.6 27.0 119.0 23.2 129.6 19.61990-91 55.1 51.8 74.3 38.6 162.1 36.2 176.4 36.11997-98 66.3 20.3 82.5 11.0 179.3 10.6 192.3 9.01998-99 71.3 7.5 86.1 4.4 188.7 5.2 203.6 5.91999-00 76.4 7.2 89.7 4.2 196.4 4.1 209.8 3.02000-01 69.7 -8.8 85.0 -5.2 185.7 -5.4 196.8 -6.22001-02 72.8 4.4 93.3 9.8 198.5 6.9 211.9 7.72002-03 65.1 -10.6 72.7 -22.1 163.0 -17.9 174.2 -17.82003-04 72.1 10.8 87.0 19.7 196.8 20.7 212.0 21.7

Source: Economic Survey, 2004-05, GOI, Ministry of Finance. Per capita net availability of cereals, based on a five-yearly moving average,

reached its peak during 1991-95 compared to what it was during 1981-85 and 1986-

90. These moving averages also show monotonic increase, not only for cereals as a

whole but separately also for rice. Though the average for cereals, and separately for

rice, was lower during 1996-2000, the reduction was insignificant. For wheat the peak

average was attained during 1996-2000, that showed monotonic increase. The

overall mean (trend average) on a time span of twenty years (1981-2001) for cereals

showed steady and stable availability compared to what it was during earlier medium

(five year) periods. The same is true item-wise by rice and wheat. The mean

deviation in availability of cereals, what is actual availability year wise minus grand

mean, remained positive for most of the years in 1990s, while it remained negative

27

for most of the years in 1980s. The same is true for rice and wheat separately, but

not true for other cereals. As opposed to steady and stable availability of rice and

wheat, other cereals showed a declining trend in availability (Table 2.7).

Table 2.7

Per Capita Net Availability of Foodgrains in India: Trend (Kg/annum)

Rice Wheat Others Total Years Avail. Mean

Deviation Avail. Mean

Deviation Avail. Mean

Deviation Avail. Mean

Deviation 1981 72.2 -2.3 47.3 -8.1 32.8 5.5 152.3 -4.91982 70.5 -4.0 46.7 -8.7 34.6 7.3 151.8 -5.41983 62.0 -12.5 52.7 -2.7 30.4 3.1 145.1 -12.11984 72.2 -2.3 51.4 -4.0 36.1 8.8 159.7 2.51985 68.9 -5.6 50.6 -4.8 32.1 4.8 151.6 -5.6Mean (81-85) 69.16 -5.34 49.74 -5.66 33.2 5.9 152.1 -5.11986 77.4 2.9 55.1 -0.3 25.8 -1.5 158.3 1.11987 75.2 0.7 57.6 2.2 25.9 -1.4 158.7 1.51988 67.7 -6.8 56.3 0.9 25.1 -2.2 149.1 -8.11989 78.5 4.0 57.0 1.6 29.3 2.0 164.8 7.61990 77.4 2.9 48.4 -7.0 31.7 4.4 157.5 0.3Mean (86-90) 75.24 0.74 54.88 -0.52 27.56 0.26 157.68 0.481991 80.9 6.4 60.0 4.6 29.2 1.9 170.1 12.91992 79.2 4.7 57.9 2.5 21.5 -5.8 158.6 1.41993 73.4 -1.1 51.2 -4.2 31.6 4.3 156.2 -1.01994 75.7 1.2 58.2 2.8 24.5 -2.8 158.4 1.21995 80.3 5.8 63.0 7.6 23.7 -3.6 167.0 9.8Mean (91-95) 77.9 3.4 58.06 2.66 26.1 -1.2 162.06 4.861996 74.8 0.3 64.4 9.0 22.7 -4.6 161.9 4.71997 78.5 4.0 65.7 10.3 26.7 -0.6 170.9 13.71998 73.7 -0.8 55.7 0.3 22.9 -4.4 152.3 -4.91999 75.0 0.5 59.8 4.4 23.4 -3.9 158.2 1.02000 75.3 0.8 58.4 3.0 21.9 -5.4 155.6 -1.6Mean (96-00) 75.46 0.96 60.8 5.4 23.52 -3.78 159.78 2.582001 75.9 1.4 45.3 -10.1 21.3 -6.0 142.5 -14.7Overall Mean 74.5 0.0 55.4 0.0 27.3 0.0 157.2 0.0

Note: Mean Deviation = Actual Value – Overall Mean. Source: Directorate of Economics & Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, GOI. Per capita net consumption of cereals in India declined a little during 1990s

relative to what it was during 1980s. Considered over the whole period (1983-2000)

following several NSS rounds, the mean deviation (from mean) of per capita net

consumption of cereals remained positive during 1983-1992 and became negative

afterwards. Considered over the whole period (1983-2000), the peak per capita net

consumption of cereals (169.9) was in 1983 and the minimum was 144.9, implying

the average variation at 25.0, it being 15.9 per cent of the grand mean. Per capita net

consumption of rice experienced oscillation during the whole period (1983-2000),

with peak and higher consumption during the earlier decade relative to the latter one.

28

The range of variation in rice consumption was 4.7 (Maximum–Minimum). The mean

deviation in rice consumption varied between 2.8 in 1997 and 1.9 in 1992. Per capita

net consumption of wheat recorded its peak in 1988 and the minimum in 1996, with

the grand average (mean) around which the mean deviations are calculated showed

not much oscillations. Average (per capita) net consumption of wheat, however,

declined a little during 1990s relative to what it was during 1980s. The per capita net

consumption of other cereals remained much lower than rice and wheat. This type of

consumption also experienced sharp decline during late 1990s. All the calculations

are in real variables (Table 2.8).

Table 2.8 Per Capita Net Consumption of Cereals in India: Trend

(Kg/annum) Rice Wheat Others Total Years NSS

Rounds Cons. Mean Deviation

Cons. Mean Deviation

Cons. Mean Deviation

Cons. Mean Deviation

1983 38 76.9 -2.5 55.3 -0.7 37.7 16.3 169.9 13.11987 42 81.2 1.8 58.2 2.2 24.3 2.9 163.7 6.91988 43 80.5 1.1 60.2 4.2 25.3 3.9 166.0 9.21989 44 81.2 1.8 57.5 1.5 28.2 6.8 166.9 10.11990 45 79.6 0.2 57.5 1.5 23.9 2.5 161.0 4.2Mean 80.6 1.2 58.4 2.4 25.4 4.0 164.4 7.61991 47 80.4 1.0 56.9 0.9 20.8 -0.6 158.1 1.31992 48 81.3 1.9 56.0 0.0 20.8 -0.6 158.1 1.31994 50 79.8 0.4 54.6 -1.4 19.8 -1.6 154.2 -2.61995 51 79.4 0.0 54.3 -1.7 18.1 -3.3 151.8 -5.0Mean 80.2 0.8 55.5 -0.5 19.9 -1.5 155.6 -1.21996 52 79.7 0.3 53.0 -3.0 16.6 -4.8 149.3 -7.51997 53 76.6 -2.8 55.5 -0.5 15.5 -5.9 147.6 -9.21998 54 78.0 -1.4 53.4 -2.6 13.5 -7.9 144.9 -11.92000 55 77.3 -2.1 56.1 0.1 13.7 -7.7 147.1 -9.7Mean 77.9 -1.5 54.5 -1.5 14.8 -6.6 147.2 -9.6Overall Mean 79.4 0.0 56.0 0.0 21.4 0.0 156.8 0.0

Note: Mean Deviation = Actual Value – Overall Mean. Source: Directorate of Economic & Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, GOI

Following several rounds of NSS data on per capita availability and

consumption of foodgrains, we get the gap between the two. Availability of foodgrains

fell short of consumption during 1983-1990, and came to exceed consumption during

1991-2000, in a state of reducing consumption of all foodgrains that include rice,

wheat and others. The same is true separately for wheat, but here the decline in

consumption, if at all, is not significant, and availability maintained steady and stable

level. We find no significant decline in mean consumption of each of rice and wheat.

While the mean availability of wheat showed accelerating trend, for rice it showed

highly decelerating trend. We find a sharp decline in mean consumption of foodgrains

other than rice and wheat (Table 2.9).

29

Table 2.9

Per Capita Availability of Foodgrains, Consumption and Gap (Kg/annum)

Rice Wheat Others Total Foodgrains Years NSS Rounds Avail. Cons. Gap* Avail. Cons. Gap* Avail. Cons. Gap* Avail. Cons. Gap*

1983 38 62.0 76.9 -14.9 52.7 55.3 -2.6 30.4 37.7 -7.3 145.1 169.9 -24.8 1987 42 75.2 81.2 -6.0 57.6 58.2 -0.6 25.9 24.3 1.6 158.7 163.7 -5.0 1988 43 67.7 80.5 -12.8 56.3 60.2 -3.9 25.1 25.3 -0.2 149.1 166 -16.9 1989 44 78.5 81.2 -2.7 57.0 57.5 -0.5 29.3 28.2 1.1 164.8 166.9 -2.1 1990 45 77.4 79.6 -2.2 48.4 57.5 -9.1 31.7 23.9 7.8 157.5 161 -3.5 Mean (83-90) 74.7 80.6 -5.9 54.8 58.4 -3.5 28.0 25.4 2.6 157.5 164.4 -6.9 1991 47 80.9 80.4 0.5 60.0 56.9 3.1 29.2 20.8 8.4 170.1 158.1 12.0 1992 48 79.2 81.3 -2.1 57.9 56.0 1.9 21.5 20.8 0.7 158.6 158.1 0.5 1994 50 75.7 79.8 -4.1 58.2 54.6 3.6 24.5 19.8 4.7 158.4 154.2 4.2 1995 51 80.3 79.4 0.9 63.0 54.3 8.7 23.7 18.1 5.6 167.0 151.8 15.2 1996 52 74.8 79.7 -4.9 64.4 53.0 11.4 22.7 16.6 6.1 161.9 149.3 12.6 Mean (91-96) 79.0 80.2 -1.2 59.8 55.5 4.3 24.7 19.9 4.9 163.5 155.6 8.0 1997 53 78.5 76.6 1.9 65.7 55.5 10.2 26.7 15.5 11.2 170.9 147.6 23.3 1998 54 73.7 78.0 -4.3 55.7 53.4 2.3 22.9 13.5 9.4 152.3 144.9 7.4 2000 55 75.3 77.3 -2.0 58.4 56.1 2.3 21.9 13.7 8.2 155.6 147.1 8.5 Mean (97-00) 75.6 77.9 -2.3 61.1 54.5 6.6 23.6 14.8 8.7 160.2 147.2 13.0 Total Mean 75.3 79.4 -4.1 58.1 56.0 2.1 25.8 21.4 4.4 159.2 156.8 2.4

Note: * (Gap = Availability - Consumption) and only those years have been taken for which consumption data are available. Source: Directorate of Economics & Statistics, Ministry of Agriculture, GOI.

30

2.3 Procurement of Wheat and Rice from Selected States The states the GOI relies on for procurement of wheat are Punjab, Haryana

and Uttar Pradesh, in the order (ranking), all the three contributing around 95.0 per

cent of total procurement of wheat, considered over last three years (2002-05). The

states the GOI relies on for procurement of rice are Punjab, Andhra Pradesh, Uttar

Pradesh and Chattisgarh in order which together accounted for around 80.0 per cent

of total procurement of rice during 2002-05. We don't find much year-wise variation in

percentage contribution of wheat by each of the major states during this period. By

implication, those states remain a major buffer (surplus) zone so far as planned

procurement of wheat is concerned. Punjab remains the major contributor in each of

wheat and rice in procurement of GOI, contributing more than 50.0 per cent in wheat

and more than one-third in rice. We find year-wise variations in procurement of rice

from states, the magnitude of variation remaining very high for the major two

contributors, Punjab and Andhra Pradesh. Wheat procurement (all-India total) varied

between years, as did rice procurement. The similar variation is true for major

contributing states over years (Table 2.10).

Table 2.10 Procurement of Wheat and Rice from Selected States

(Quantity in lakh tonnes) 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 Food-

grains States Quantity % Share Quantity % Share Quantity % Share

Haryana 58.88 30.95 51.22 32.42 51.15 30.46Punjab 98.8 51.85 89.38 56.57 92.40 55.02Uttar Pradesh 21.10 11.07 12.13 7.68 17.41 10.37Total Share 178.78 93.83 152.73 96.67 160.96 95.85

Wheat

All-India 190.54 100.00 158.01 100.00 167.95 100.00Andhra Pradesh 64.26 29.04 26.35 16.04 42.30 18.53Chhattisgarh 19.21 8.68 12.91 7.86 23.74 10.40Haryana 14.84 6.71 13.24 8.06 13.34 5.84Punjab 72.83 32.91 79.40 48.35 86.62 37.94Uttar Pradesh 19.36 8.75 13.60 8.28 25.54 11.19Total Share 190.50 86.09 145.50 88.59 191.54 83.90

Rice

All-India 221.29 100.00 164.23 100.00 228.28 100.00Source: Economic Survey, 2004-05, GOI, Ministry of Finance, 99, 100.

For all-India, the allocation of wheat oscillated around 10 million tonnes during

1991-2000, while during the same period the allocation of rice varied between 10 and

15 million tonnes. Off-take of wheat as a percentage of allocation came to be below

50 per cent during 1994-95 and 1995-96 and again in 1999-2000. For the remaining

years of the 1990s, this ratio per year was around three-fourths. For rice also, off-

take as a ratio of allocation declined during 1994-95 and 1995-96 to around three-

31

fifths and for 1999-2000 to around half. For the rest of the 1990s, the ratio was more

than three-fourths (Table 2.11). Table 2.11

Procurement of Wheat and Rice, 1980 - 2005 (Central Pool Stocks)

(in million tonnes) Year Rice Wheat Total (Rice+Wheat)

1980 8.58 8.15 16.73 1981 6.21 4.91 11.12 1982 5.34 5.01 10.35 1983 4.77 6.99 11.76 1984 4.34 10.45 14.79 1985 6.74 14.54 21.28 Average of 1981-1985 5.48 8.38 13.86 1986 9.06 14.93 23.99 1987 8.50 13.93 22.43 1988 5.91 7.35 13.26 1989 4.09 4.44 8.53 1990 5.65 5.61 11.26 Average of 1986-1990 6.64 9.25 15.89 1991 8.66 9.24 17.90 1992 8.63 5.28 13.91 1993 8.52 3.28 11.80 1994 11.17 10.82 21.99 1995 17.42 12.88 30.12 Average of 1991-1995 10.88 8.30 19.18 1995-96 9.95 12.33 22.28 1996-97 12.22 8.16 20.38 1997-98 14.33 9.30 23.63 1998-99 11.79 12.65 24.44 1999-2000 17.27 14.14 31.41 Average of 1995-2000 13.11 11.31 24.42 2000-2001 21.28 16.35 37.63 2001-2002 22.13 20.63 42.76 2002-2003 16.42 19.05 35.47 2003-2004 22.83 15.80 38.63 2004-2005 14.34* 16.80 31.14 Average of 2000-2005 19.40 17.72 37.12 Note: Data for procurement of rice refer to October -September and that for wheat April - March, for 1995-2005. * As on January 14, 2005. Source: GOI, Ministry of Agriculture, Bulletin of Food Statistics (Several Years). GOI, 1999-2000, Economic Survey, P. 82. GOI, 2000-2001, Economic Survey, p. 93. GOI, 2001-2002, Economic Survey, p. 120. GOI, 2004-2005, Economic Survey, p. 99. 2.4 Allocation and Off-take of Foodgrains under Different Schemes: U.P. and India Of total allocation of wheat and rice considered over last three years (2003-06), at

the level of U.P., percentage of wheat (by quantity) remained higher to subsequently

decline to be more or less equal with allocation of rice. For all India, wheat allocation

was ahead of that of rice though the gap was not that significant as in case of U.P.

For 2005-06 for all-India, allocation of rice was much ahead of that of wheat. Of total

32

allocation of wheat and rice under BPL, percentage of wheat was much higher for

2003-04 and 2004-05 to decline in 2005-06, while that of rice remained low for the

first two years to reach high percentage in 2005-06. Allocation of wheat under APL

remained high (above that of rice) for all the three years at the level of U.P. The

same was true for all-India, excepting that in 2005-06 it declined but remained above

that of rice. Thus, the allocation of wheat by percentage was higher at both the

levels, U.P. and India, under both BPL and APL categories. The other scheme where

rice and what were allocated was Annapurna Anna Yojana (AAY), where the

percentage of wheat was higher at the U.P. level while rice had higher percentage at

the all-India level (Table 2.12).

Table 2.12 Allocation and Off-take of Foodgrains in India under PDS, 1991-2002

(in million tonnes) Wheat Rice

Year Allocation Off take Off take as % of

Allocation

Allocation Off take Off take as % of

Allocation 1991-92 10.36 8.83 85.23 11.36 10.17 89.52 1992-93 9.25 7.85 84.86 11.48 9.69 84.40 1993-94 9.56 5.91 61.82 12.41 8.87 71.47 1994-95 10.80 4.83 44.72 13.32 8.03 60.28 1995-96 11.31 5.29 46.77 14.62 9.46 64.70 1996-97 10.72 8.52 79.47 15.16 11.14 73.48 1997-98 10.11 7.08 70.02 12.81 9.90 77.16 1998-99 10.11 7.95 78.63 12.93 10.74 83.06 1999-00 10.37 5.00 48.21 13.84 10.95 79.12 2000-01 7.51 2.72* 36.21 10.96 5.75* 52.46

2001-02** 9.08 3.15 34.69 11.48 5.23 45.55 Note: * April - December 2000. ** Up to December. Source: GOI, 1996-1997, Economic Survey, P. 79. GOI, 1999-2000, Economic Survey, p. 81. GOI, 2000-2001, Economic Survey, p. 92. GOI, 2001-2002, Economic Survey, p. 123. Off-take of foodgrains (rice and wheat) in U.P. in 2003-04 under BPL was

72.18 per cent of total off-take, the rest covered by off-take under APL (0.36 per cent)

and Annapurna (AAY) (27.45). Off-take of foodgrains (rice & wheat) under BPL in

2004-05 was 71.0 per cent; in 2005-06 it was 63.39 per cent for U.P. The off-take of

foodgrains under BPL at all-India level was 66.03 in 2003-04, that reached 59.45 in

2004-05 and 50.28 in 2005-06. Off-take of each of wheat and rice at both the levels,

U.P. and all-India, under BPL was much ahead of not only off-take under APL but

both APL and AAY combined. By implication, TPDS aimed essentially at BPL

households (Table 2.13).

33

Table 2.13

Allocation of Wheat and Rice under TPDS, 2003-06 (In Tonnes)

Uttar Pradesh India 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06

Cereals Category of HHs.

Quantity % Quantity % Quantity % Quantity % Quantity % Quantity % BPL 2401402 65.7 2083245 62.8 1182038 40.1 9912871 43.9 9347412 43.9 7300479 38.0 APL 4314840 66.4 4314840 66.4 3603096 55.5 24976000 56.6 25267688 57.0 21253150 47.9 AAY 546012 65.7 726492 62.1 600994 39.0 2050368 45.0 2632656 43.4 3079026 5.8 Wheat

Total 7262254 66.1 7124577 64.9 5386128 49.1 36939240 51.8 37247756 51.9 31632660 27.1 BPL 1252893 34.3 1232797 37.2 1763068 59.9 12657440 56.1 11924845 56.1 11899270 62.0 APL 2179620 33.6 2179620 33.6 2891364 44.5 19150780 43.4 19099968 43.0 23100180 52.1 AAY 284873 34.3 442646 37.9 938692 61.0 2505544 55.0 3427155 56.6 49989410 94.2 Rice

Total 3717386 33.9 3855063 35.1 5593124 50.9 34313760 48.2 34451968 48.1 84988860 72.9 BPL 3654295 100.0 3316042 100.0 2945106 100.0 22570310 100.0 21272257 100.0 19199750 100.0 APL 6494460 100.0 6494460 100.0 6494460 100.0 44126770 100.0 44367656 100.0 44353330 100.0 AAY 830885 100.0 1169138 100.0 1539686 100.0 4555912 100.0 6059811 100.0 53068430 100.0 Total

Total 10979640 100.0 10979640 100.0 10979250 100.0 71253000 100.0 71699724 100.0 116621500 100.0 Note: AAY = Antyodaya Anna Yojana. Source: Ministry of Food and Consumer Affairs, Department of Food & Public Distribution, GOI.

34

Table 2.14 Off-take of Wheat and Rice under TPDS, 2003-06

(In Tonnes) Uttar Pradesh India

2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 Cereals Category

of HHs. Quantity % Quantity % Quantity % Quantity % Quantity % Quantity %

BPL 1483358 69.9 1628068 58.6 1025072 40.0 6774445 42.9 7423340 42.5 5962287 38.1 APL 9729 91.2 7087 91.3 37930 94.4 2106012 53.2 3202835 49.8 3356407 41.8 AAY 497724 61.7 605637 53.8 553388 38.5 1783416 42.8 2264189 41.4 2725590 36.6

Wheat

Total 1990811 67.7 2240792 57.3 1616390 40.0 10663870 44.6 12890360 43.9 12044280 38.7 BPL 638451 30.1 1149046 41.4 1535191 60.0 9029475 57.1 10028470 57.5 9680231 61.9 APL 0940 8.8 0676 8.7 2236 5.6 1855767 46.8 3229098 50.2 4664087 58.2 AAY 309111 38.3 520419 46.2 884901 61.5 2381831 57.2 3207102 58.6 4716745 63.4

Rice

Total 948502 32.3 1670141 42.7 2422328 60.0 13267070 55.4 16464670 56.1 19061060 61.3 BPL 2121809 100.0 2777114 100.0 2560263 100.0 15803920 100.0 17451810 100.0 15642520 100.0 APL 10669 100.0 7763 100.0 40166 100.0 3961779 100.0 6431933 100.0 8020494 100.0 AAY 806835 100.0 1126056 100.0 1438289 100.0 4165247 100.0 5471291 100.0 7442335 100.0

Total

Total 2939313 100.0 3910933 100.0 4038718 100.0 23930950 100.0 29355040 100.0 31105350 100.0 Source: Ministry of Food and Consumer Affairs, Department of Food & Public Distribution, GOI.

35

The off-take of foodgrains (rice & wheat) as a percentage of allocation under

TPDS for U.P. remained low during the last three years that we considered (2003-

06). The all India data reflect the same. The low off-take was because of low off-take

under APL that remained less than 1.0 per cent for each of these years in U.P. and

remained less than 20.0 per cent for all India. The off-take under Antyodaya Anna

Yojana (AAY) was more than 90.0 per cent during these years for U.P. for all

foodgrains, which remained high for wheat, and surprisingly more than 100.0 per

cent for rice for 2003-04 and 2004-05. Off-take under BPL category in U.P. for all

foodgrains accelerated during later years relative to 2003-04, the same being true for

each of rice and wheat. For all-India, off-take of wheat under BPL increased over

years while for rice it maintained steady and high percentage over those years. The

data show failure of off-take of each of rice and wheat for both U.P. and all India

under APL category. This may raise questions on dual system (Pricing etc.) in

distribution of foodgrains (Table 2.15).

Table 2.15 Off take of Food-grains as Percentage of Allocation under TPDS

(in %) UP India Cereals Category

of HHs. 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06 2003-04 2004-05 2005-06BPL 61.77 78.15 86.72 68.34 79.42 81.67APL 0.23 0.16 1.05 8.43 12.68 15.79AAY 91.16 83.36 92.08 86.98 86.00 88.52Wheat

Total 27.41 31.45 30.01 28.87 34.61 38.08BPL 50.96 93.21 87.07 71.34 84.10 81.35APL 0.04 0.03 0.08 9.69 16.91 20.19AAY 108.51 117.57 94.27 95.06 93.58 9.44Rice

Total 25.52 43.32 43.31 38.66 47.79 22.43BPL 58.06 83.75 86.93 70.02 82.04 81.47APL 0.16 0.12 0.62 8.98 14.50 18.08AAY 97.11 96.32 93.41 91.43 90.29 14.02Total

Total 26.77 35.62 36.79 33.59 40.94 26.67Source: Ministry of Food and Consumer Affairs, Department of Food & Public Distribution, GOI.

Concentrating only on 2005-06, off-take as percentage of allocation in U.P.

for wheat was 93.4 under Annapurna Yojana while for rice the off-take was 600

tonnes with no allocation for the specific year. For Mid-day Meal (MDM), off-take as

percentage of allocation for wheat in U.P. was 86.2, which was 84.6 for rice. The off-

take of wheat at the level of all-India under Annapurna Yojana was 91.1 per cent

which was 77.1 for rice. The corresponding percentages under MDM for wheat and

rice were respectively 76.9 and 76.7 (Table 2.16).

36

Table 2.16

Allocation and Off-take of Wheat & Rice under Annapurna and MDM Yojana, Year 2005-06

(Fig. in '000' tones) UP India Cereals Category

of Households Off-take Allocation Off-take as % of

Allocation

Off-take Allocation Off-take as % of

Allocation Annapurna 39.23 42.00 93.4 69.87 76.72 91.1Mid-day meal 95.61 110.87 86.2 363.28 472.45 76.9

Wheat

Total 134.84 152.87 88.2 433.15 549.17 78.9Annapurna 0.6 0.00 0.0 69.36 89.93 77.1Mid-day Meal 190.4 225.1 84.6 1364.38 1777.88 76.7

Rice

Total 191 225.1 84.9 1433.74 1867.81 76.8Annapurna 39.83 42.00 94.8 139.23 166.65 83.5Mid-day Meal 286.01 335.97 85.1 1727.66 2250.33 76.8

Total

Total 325.84 377.97 86.2 1866.89 2416.98 77.2Source: Ministry of Food and Consumer Affairs, Department of Food & Public Distribution, GOI. 2.5 Off-take of Foodgrains from Central Pool under Different Schemes Of total off-take of foodgrains (wheat and rice) from central pool under TPDS,

the percentage under BPL category remained high (above 60.0 per cent) since 2000-

01 up to 2003-04. On a span of five years (1999-2004), the percentage of off-take

under APL from total foodgrains under TPDS was high (59.04 per cent). The off-take

under Antyodaya Yojana that got launched since 2000-01, came to be significant

over the subsequent years. Total off-take from central pool covers TPDS plus open

market sale, welfare schemes and exports. TPDS as a percentage of total off-take,

covering all schemes, was major scheme during 1999-2000 that covered 74.07 per

cent of total off-take. This subsequently declined to 40.56 per cent to recover a little

bit in 2003-04 to reach 49.21 per cent. Open market sale, as percentage of total off-

take, had oscillations over years, between a minimum of 2.71 per cent in 2003-04

and a maximum of 19.74 per cent in 1999-2000. Off-take under welfare schemes

increased monotonically over years, from 6.19 per cent in 1999-2000 to reach 27.46

per cent in 2003-04. Exports as percentage of off-take had oscillations over years;

however, during initial years it showed increase. Thus, TPDS covered most of the

schemes that showed components of total off-take (Table 2.17).

37

Table 2.17 Off-take of Food-grains (Wheat +Rice) from Central Pool

(Quantity in lakh tonnes) 1999-00 2000-01 2001-02 2002-03 2003-04 Schemes/

Areas Qty. % Qty. % Qty. % Qty. % Qty. % BPL* 69.95 40.96 96.53 80.16 100.52 72.65 135.13 67.13 147.51 60.97APL* 100.82 59.04 23.65 19.64 21.06 15.22 30.78 15.29 42.17 17.43Antyodaya* 0 0.00 16.78 13.93 35.39 25.58 38.24 19.00 27.1 11.20TPDS 170.76 74.07 120.42 64.03 138.36 42.01 201.3 40.56 241.94 49.21Welfare Schemes 14.26 6.19 31.93 16.98 71.84 21.81 113.8 22.93 135 27.46Open Market Sale 45.51 19.74 14.88 7.91 55.98 17.00 56.61 11.41 13.3 2.71Exports - 0.00 20.85 11.09 63.15 19.18 124.64 25.11 101.4 20.62Total Off-take 230.53 100.00 188.08 100.00 329.33 100.00 496.35 100.00 491.64 100.00

Note: * The percentage calculated on TPDS. Source: Economic Survey, 2004-05, GOI, Ministry of Finance, P. 99 & 100.

2.6 Food Stocks, Allocation, and Off-take: Purpose and Position One of the basic features of agriculture is that while production occurs at discrete

points of time, consumption is continuous throughout the year. The gap between

production as a stock in agriculture and consumption as a flow in agricultural

commodities is bridged by storage or carrying forward the output (Balakrishnan and

Ramaswami, 2000, p.118). The main plank of Central Government's food security

operations lies in building up public stocks of foodgrains and its release each month

for distribution to the State Governments for supply through the PDS (GOI, 1994-95,

p. 78). Conceptually, foodgrains stocks can be regarded as divisible into three --

pipeline stocks, buffer stocks, and reserve stocks. Pipeline stock is interpreted to be

the stocks from current production destined for current consumption. These are also

thought to be operational stocks. Buffer stocks are seen to be counter-speculative.

Reserve stocks are held to bridge the gap between normal consumption and low

production of a bad contingency year (Khusro, 1973, p. 4). With the lesser frequency

of bad contingency years after technological transformation in agriculture of post-

1965 period, we find no reason why reserve stocks should be seen as an additional

category in public stocks of foodgrains. With respect to the same transformation, if

the inter-regional price equilibrium is maintained or readily restored by price

intervention in the foodgrains market, there will be lesser need for operational or

pipeline stocks. We, thus, concentrate on buffer stocks.

Food security takes public procurement of foodgrains as the first pre-

condition. It at first provides the producers the price security and scope for sale on a

voluntary basis by the producers. There is, thus, no fixed procurement over years.

Procurement prices of foodgrains are based on support prices announced by the

Department of Agriculture and Co-operation. The chances of distress sale are, thus,

38

reduced. Minimum support prices are the prices at which the government is willing to

buy any amount offered to ensure that the open market price does not fall to un-

remunerative levels in years of surplus. Procurement prices are the prices at which

the government secures a limited quantity for the distribution system. Both

procurement and support prices are policy-determined. The Government's

procurement operations, as an instrument of agricultural price policy, is intended to

provide a benchmark remunerative return to the farmer, and prevent a sharp fall in

prices at harvest time. In other words, procurement prices serve as a protective

shield against price uncertainty, which, in turn, provides a sustained incentive for the

farmer to improve productivity and rationally reallocate resources between various

crops. Minimum Support Prices (MSPs) thus ensure stability of market supply (GOI,

1994-95, p. 80-81). Food stocks are maintained by the Central Government (i) to

meet the prescribed Minimum Buffer Stock norms for food security, (ii) for monthly

release of foodgrains for supply through the PDS and (iii) for market intervention to

augment supply so as to help moderate the open market prices (GOI, 1996-97, p.78;

GOI, 1997-98, p.73; GOI, 1999-2000, p.81). Stocks are released each month for

distribution to the State Governments for supply through the PDS. Each state is

allocated a prescribed quantity based on past demand, off-take trends, relative need

and other related factors. Stocks are also released for open sale to augment supplies

and help moderate the open market prices (GOI, 1995-96, p.85).

"Under PDS, the Central Government bears the responsibility for the

procurement and supply of five commodities, viz., rice, wheat, sugar, imported edible

oils, and kerosene to the States and UTs. Some States add a few more commodities

for distribution under PDS" (GOI, 1998-99, p. 69). In the early 1990s, the

Government was supplying six essential commodities through the PDS, namely,

wheat, rice, sugar, edible oils, kerosene, and soft-coke (GOI, 1991-92, Part II, p. 53).

These commodities were supplied at reasonable (below market) prices to

consumers, the access to the system being universal. Given the occasional variation

in commodity coverage, rice and wheat constitute the bedrock of India's food security

through the PDS. At any given point of time, a minimum stock of rice and wheat is

maintained as a central buffer stock for meeting food security needs. In case there is

a shortfall, the stock is replenished through imports. If there is an excess of stocks,

they are released for open sale to improve supplies and moderate prices in the open

market (GOI, 1994-95, p. 78). Wheat and rice are the two major foodgrains used by

the Central Government for market price stabilization and for ensuring food security

through the PDS. Rice is mainly procured for the Central Pool from a levy imposed

on the rice millers/traders under the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 and the levy

39

orders issued by the State Governments. The foodgrains stock maintained in the

Central Pool by the government is utilized for distribution to states for the PDS. In the

years, when public stocks fall below the minimum buffer stock norms or when

production shortfalls are anticipated, the government takes recourse to imports for

augmenting the buffer stocks. However, depending on the behaviour of the open

market prices and the stock position in the Central Pool, the public stock of

foodgrains is also utilized for market intervention as an instrument of supply

management policy (GOI, 1996-97, p. 81).

The steady availability of foodgrains to the targeted population constitutes

food security for them. Among the steps initiated by the Government of India, the

setting up of the Food Corporation of India (FCI) in 1965 was a "big step forward in

the direction of food distribution and maintenance of quality" (GOI, 1976, Part II, p.

154). The FCI is assigned the responsibilities of sale, purchase and distribution of

foodgrains, maintain adequate buffer stock and quality of stored materials,

installation and modernization of rice and flourmills, manufacture and distribution of

processed foods. We are concerned only with public sector stocks and storage only,

which are held by FCI, the Central and State Governments and the State

Warehousing Corporations both on an ownership basis and on a rental basis

(Khusro, 1973, p. 3).

The average procurement for rice was 5.48 million tonnes during 1981-85.

This increased to 6.64 million tonnes on average during 1986-90 and further to 10.88

million tonnes during 1991-95 and 13.11 million tonnes during 1995-2000. For wheat,

the corresponding figures were 8.38, 9.25, 8.30, and 11.31 million tonnes

respectively. For rice and wheat together, the average procurement per year

increased from 13.86 during 1981-85 to 15.89 during 1986-90 and further to 16.36

million tonnes during 1991-95 (Table 2.18).

The procurement of foodgrains by the FCI is largely concentrated in a few

Green Revolution states likes Punjab and Haryana. These two states accounted for

more than 80.0 per cent of the procurement of wheat by the FCI in the years 2002-

2005. The states Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh and Andhra Pradesh accounted for

around 80.0 per cent of the rice procured by the FCI in the years 2001-2003 (Tables

2.18 and 2.19). This shows a long-term behaviour pattern of the FCI meant for

collection of foodgrains from the producer states.

40

Table 2.18 Procurement of Wheat, 2002-2005

Quantity (lakh tonnes) Percentage Share States 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05

Uttar Pradesh 21.10 12.13 17.41 11.07 7.68 10.37 Punjab 98.80 89.38 92.40 51.85 56.57 55.02 Haryana 58.88 51.22 51.15 30.95 32.42 30.46 Total 190.54 158.01 167.95 100.00 100.00 100.00

Source: GOI, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, 2004-05, p. 99.

Table 2.19

Procurement of Rice, 2002-2005 Quantity (lakh tonnes) Percentage Share States

2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 2002-03 2003-04 2004-05 Uttar Pradesh 19.36 13.60 25.54 8.75 8.28 11.19Punjab 72.83 79.40 86.62 32.91 48.35 37.94Haryana 14.84 13.24 13.34 6.71 8.06 5.84Chhattisgarh 19.21 12.91 23.74 8.68 7.86 10.40Andhra Pradesh 64.26 26.35 42.30 29.04 16.04 18.53Total 221.29 164.23 228.28 100.00 100.00 100.00

Source: GOI, Ministry of Finance, Economic Survey, 2004-05, p. 100.

2.7 Release of Surplus Stocks through Non-FPS Measures During 1992-93 to 1994-95, the actual off-take of wheat and rice by the States was

poor, leading to accumulation of stocks. Consequently, the Government of India in

August 1994 announced new schemes for utilization of surplus public stocks of

foodgrains. This included Supply of Subsidized Foodgrains to SC/ST/OBC Hostels,

Mid-Day Meal Schemes, Release of Subsidized Wheat to Modern Food Industries

India Ltd. (MFIL), release of surplus foodgrains (wheat and rice) for Employment

Generation Scheme, and Open Market Sale of Foodgrains by FCI (GOI, 1995-96,

p.85-86). The Employment Generation Scheme was meant for manufacture of food

products by families falling below poverty line. The Mid-Day Meal Scheme was

initially meant for the benefit of the students enrolled in primary schools in 2,368

RPDS/EAS blocks. During 1996-97, this scheme was proposed to be extended to

2006 Low Female Literacy (LFL) blocks. During 1997-98, the scheme was planned to

all primary schools in the country (828 blocks and 3,000 Nagar Palikas). "FCI was

authorised to sell wheat and rice in the open market to serve the twin objectives of

disposing of some of its surplus stock and to check the rise in their market prices as

a part of its market intervention function to moderate supply side effects on inflation"

(GOI, 1995-96, p. 86).

2.8 Economic Cost and PDS Issue Price of Foodgrains Procurement incidental cost of wheat per quintal increased monotonically over years,

while that of rice varied over years (1999-2005). Procurement cost of wheat per

41

quintal year-wise always remained higher than that of rice. Distribution cost of wheat

per quintal varied over years, as it did for rice. Excepting for wheat for 2001-02,

distribution cost for each of wheat and rice remained above procurement cost. The

economic cost of foodgrains to FCI was on the rise over years (1999-2005).

Procurement cost is explained by Minimum Support Price (MSP) and state-level

levies. Economic cost is explained by procurement cost (including incidentals) and

distribution cost. 'The economic cost of foodgrains to FCI is of strategic importance,

as it influences not only the food subsidy bill but also the country's competitiveness in

international markets for foodgrains' (GOI, ES, 2004-05, p. 102). APL issue price as

multiple of BPL issue price for wheat often was more than two, though the multiple of

BPL issue price was more than two initially (1999-01) and subsequently declined to

1.46 during 2001-03 (Table 2.20).

Table 2.20 Economic Cost and PDS Issue Price of Wheat and Rice

(Rs./Quintal) PDS Issue Price Food-

grains Years Procurement

Incidentals (Cost)

DistributionCost

EconomicCost# BPL APL APL as

multiple of BPL

1999-00 117.1 202.0 887.5 250 682 2.732000-01 128.2 166.15 883.78 415 830 2.002001-02 134.7 126.7 852.9 415 610 1.472002-03 137.6 145.6 884.0 415* 610* 1.472003-04 (P) 156.3 156.3 952.5 - - -

Wheat

2004-05 (P) 156.8 156.8 924.8 - - -1999-00 56.1 187.5 1074.8 350 905 2.582000-01 69.89 189.94 1137.07 565 1130 2.002001-02 66.8 119.6 1098.0 565 830 1.462002-03 61.7 157.7 1165.0 565* 830* 1.462003-04 (P) 74.9 207.5 1253.0 - - -

Rice

2004-05 (P) 76.4 192.9 1262.5 - - -Note: * As on July 2002-03, # Weighted average of common and grade-A rice taken together. Source: Economic Survey, 2004-05, GOI, Ministry of Finance, p. 103.

2.9 Subsidy on Foodgrains: A Trend The total subsidy released on foodgrains (FCI & States) monotonically increased

over years, subsidy to FCI explains almost the whole of total subsidy released by the

GOI operating the decentralized procurement schemes. The total (cumulative)

subsidy considered over 1997-2005 reached Rs. 1,26,370 crore of which FCI

accounted for 94.79 per cent. Subsidy to FCI, year-wise and not cumulative, as

percentage of total subsidy varied between 90.31 per cent at the minimum in 2004-

05 and 99.62 per cent as the maximum in 1997-98. By implication, the subsidy

provided to the states varied between less than 1.0 per cent and 10.0 per cent,

considered over the whole period 1997-98 to 2004-05. The rate of growth

42

(percentage change, year-wise) of subsidy remained positive over the years for each

of FCI and states, excepting that for states for 2003-04 (Table 2.21).

Table 2.21 Subsidy Released on Food-grains to FCI & States for Operating the

Decentralized Procurement Schemes (1997-2005) (Rs. in Crore)

FCI States Total Year Subsidy Cumulative

Value %

Annual Growth

Subsidy Cumulative Value

% AnnualGrowth

Subsidy Cumulative Value

% Annual Growth

Subsidy to FCI as % of

total subsidy (xi=ii/viii)

i ii iii iv v vi vii viii ix x xi 1997-98 7,472 7,472 - 28 28 - 7,500 7500 - 99.62

1998-99 8,646 16,118 15.7 54 82 92.9 8,700 16,200 16.0 99.37

1999-00 8,857 24,975 2.4 343 425 535.2 9,200 25,400 5.7 96.27

2000-01 11,462 36,437 29.4 548 973 59.8 12,010 37,410 30.5 95.43

2001-02 16,724 53,161 45.9 770 1743 40.5 17,494 54,904 45.7 95.59

2002-03 22,764 75,925 36.1 1,502 3245 95.1 24,176 79,080 38.2 94.15

2003-04 23,874 99,799 4.9 1,286 4531 -14.4 25,160 1,04,240 4.1 94.88

2004-05* 19,987 1,19,786 NC 2,143 6,674 66.6 22,130 1,26,370 NC 90.31

Note: * As on February 10, 2005, NC Not Calculated. Source: Annual Report, 2004-05, Ministry of Food and Civil Supply, GOI.

Food subsidy in India as a percentage of GDP rose over time though not

monotonically. The percentage reached the peak at 0.98 in 2002-03. Mean food

subsidy, on a five-year basis, increased from Rs. 3747.4 crores during 1990-95 to be

more than double during 1995-2000. The mean food subsidy for 2001-03 came to be

nearly five times what it was during 1990-95 and more than twice what it was during

1995-2000. The cumulative food subsidy accelerated over time to reach Rs. 92,850

crores in 2002-03. Taking 1990-91 as base year (Index=100), food subsidy index

reached 986.8 in 2002-03, that is nearly ten times the base. Excepting 1992-93 and

1994-95, the rate of change of food subsidy per annum was always positive (Table

2.22).

Table 2.22 Growth of Food Subsidy in India (1990-2003)

Years Food Subsidy

(In Crores)

Growth of Subsidy from

base Year 1990-91 (In %)

Cumulative Food Subsidy

(In Crores)

Annual Growth of Food

Subsidy (In %)

Food Subsidy as % of

GDP

1990-91 2450 100.0 2450 - 0.431991-92 2850 116.3 5300 16.33 0.441992-93 2800 114.3 8100 -1.75 0.371993-94 5537 226.0 13637 97.75 0.641994-95 5100 208.2 18737 -7.89 0.50Mean (90-95) 3747.4 153.0 - - -1995-96 5377 219.5 24114 5.43 0.451996-97 6066 247.6 30180 12.81 0.441997-98 7900 322.4 38080 30.23 0.52

Contd…

43

Years Food

Subsidy (In Crores)

Growth of Subsidy from

base Year 1990-91 (In %)

Cumulative Food Subsidy

(In Crores)

Annual Growth of Food

Subsidy (In %)

Food Subsidy as % of

GDP

1998-99 9100 371.4 47180 15.19 0.521999-00 9434 385.1 56614 3.67 0.49Mean (95-00) 7575.4 309.2 - - -2000-01 12060 492.2 68674 27.84 0.582001-02 17499 714.2 86173 45.10 0.772002-03 24176 986.8 92850 38.16 0.98Mean (01-03) 17911.7 731.1 - - -Overall Mean 8488.4 346.5 - - -

Source: PEO report No.189, Planning Commission, GOI, 2005.

2.10 Subsidy on Essential Commodities Distributed through the PDS In view of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the UN, food subsidy

schemes are oriented towards urban people partly because urban people can use

political system to subsidize food prices. In its view, the use of food subsidies for the

benefit of rural poor is a feasible policy option only when there are large numbers of

rural landless who must buy their food, as in South Asia (FAO, 1987, p. 79). While

food subsidies in general can have beneficial effects, their costs can become

extremely high to the income-poor countries. For example, food subsidies as a

percentage of government expenditure were 4 in India in 1978 as opposed to 1.6 for

Indonesia, 0.2 for Brazil, 2.2 for Mexico. For the countries in South Asia, like Pakistan

and Bangladesh, this percentage was high at around 5 during 1978-80. For China

also, this percentage was very high during the mid-1970s (ibid., p. 81). Food subsidy

as percentage of central Government expenditure in India remained low and varied

between 2 and 4 per cent during the whole of 1990s (Meenakshisundaram, 2001, p.

445). All the countries mentioned are the large economies by size of population and

are in the income-poor Third World.

In India, around 10.0 per cent of total output of selected essential

commodities is supplied through the PDS per year. As PDS supplies are made at

concessional rates, the central government had to spend over Rs. 2,000 crores on

subsidizing distribution of wheat and rice alone in the early 1990s (GOI, 1991-92,

Part II, p. 53). 'The gap between the economic cost incurred by the FCI towards

procurement, storage, distribution and wastage of foodgrains and its average

realization based on the issue prices under PDS has been widening over the years.

This gap is filled by the Central Government through consumer subsidy' (GOI, 1999-

2000, p. 82). Although the minimum support prices of wheat and paddy have been

raised each year and the procurement prices of levy rice have also been revised

44

upward consequent to the revision of the minimum support price, there has been no

corresponding revision in the CIP of rice and wheat since February 1994. Before that,

during the 1980s, the issue price of wheat was revised upward from Rs. 160 per

quintal in August 1982 to Rs. 234 in May 1990, that is, an increase of 46.25 per cent

over eight years. For rice, the issue price was revised upward from Rs. 188 in

October 1982 to Rs. 289 in June 1990, that is, an increase of 53.72 per cent. This

upward revision was monotonic over years (GOI, 1996-97, p.79). In spite of this

upward revision in issue prices, there occurred higher food subsidy burden on the

Government. The reason does not lie perhaps in changing issue prices but in the

level of these prices set. The Central Issue Prices of foodgrains for PDS/RPDS are

fixed deliberately much below the economic cost of foodgrains with a view to making

foodgrains available to PDS consumers at reasonable prices (GOI, 1995-96, p. 87).

Price setting on foodgrains for distribution through PDS is administered price. It is to

be known that while 'the Central Government issues foodgrains to states for PDS at a

uniform CIP, the consumer-end retail price fixed by State Governments for the PDS

varies considerable between states' (GOI, 1994-95, p. 80). When the consumer-end

PDS prices of foodgrains are lower than CIP, State Governments bear the burden of

additional subsidy. 'Depressing administered prices artificially by subsidization from

the exchequer only alters the source of price rise; it does not eradicate the possibility

of price rise. Subsidies reduce the incentives to producers to compete and reduce

costs. In fact, when accompanied by retention pricing, subsidies reward the least

efficient producers at the expense of the efficient ones' (GOI, 1992-93, p. 85).

2.11 Subsidy on Food Under the system of dual pricing of sugar in operation for some years, the

government, at pre-determined prices as levy sugar, acquires 45 per cent of the

sugar production. The remaining 55 per cent of the produce are released for sale in

the open market. This ratio of levy to free sale sugar has been maintained at 45:55

since 1988-89 (GOI, 1991-92, Part II, p. 56). The retail issue price of levy sugar

distributed through the PDS at Rs. 5.25 per kg. with effect from 1st January, 1989

was raised to Rs. 6.10 per kg. from 24th July, 1991 and further to Rs. 6.90 per kg.

from 21st January, 1992 to reduce the burden of subsidy on sugar distribution through

the PDS (GOI, 1991-92, Part II, p. 57). 'Levy sugar price supplied to PDS consumers

at Rs. 9.05 per kg. had remained unchanged for three years since February, 1994

despite periodic revisions in the statutory minimum price of cane paid to sugarcane

growers. Consequently, PDS supply of sugar was heavily subsidized and in order to

reduce part of the subsidy, the Government raised the issue price of sugar for PDS to

Rs. 10.50 per kg. in February, 1997. Even then, the PDS retail price was still cheaper

45

compared to the market price ranging between Rs. 15 to Rs. 16.50 per kg' (GOI,

1996-97, p. 77).

Sugar subsidy as a percentage of food subsidy declined during the end of the

1990s. Subsidy on sugar was more than one-tenth of total food subsidy in 1994-95

and declined to 5 percent in 1997-98 and below it during the following two years of

the 1990s (Table 2.23).

Table 2.23 Subsidy on Food and Sugar, 1991-2002

(Rs. in Crores) Year Food

Subsidy* Food Subsidy as % of GDP

Sugar Subsidy

Sugar Subsidy as % of Food Subsidy

Food Subsidy as % of Central Govt. Expenditure

1991-92 2850 - - 1992-93 2800 0.37 - - 2.27 1993-94 5537 0.64 - - 3.9 1994-95 5100 0.50 566 11.09 2.8 1995-96 5377 0.45 422 7.84 2.78 1996-97 6066 0.44 900 14.83 2.46 1997-98 7900 0.52 400 5.06 3.23 1998-99 9100 0.52 400 4.39 3.11

1999-2000 9434 0.49 360 3.76 3.03 2000-01 12060 0.58 NA NC 3.61 2001-02 17499 0.77 NA NC 4.83 2002-03 24176 0.98 5.17

2003-04 (RE) 25800 0.93 2004-05 17639

Note: * Other than that on Sugar. Sugar Subsidy refers to Sugar year, October- September; -: Not Available. Source: GOI, 1999-2000, Economic Survey, P. 82, 84. GOI, 2000-2001, Economic Survey, P. 96. GOI, 2001-2002, Economic Survey, P. 126. GOI, 2004-2005, Economic Survey, P. 104.

Planning Commission, GOI, Tenth Five Year Plan, Vol. II, p. 368.

Sugar subsidy, thus, can not explain the burden on account of subsidy as a

whole on food account. Still then, questions may come regarding confinement of

subsidy to a commodity even when it is not significantly consumed by the income-

poor.

In formulating agricultural policy, debates center around short-term welfare

gains for the income-poor via food subsidies at a public budget cost vis-à-vis more

public investment. This is primarily because the latter shows the possibilities of

higher growth and employment opportunities while the former shows cost or burden

on the public exchequer. Also, while providing subsidies, "eligibility is not determined

on the basis of a means test but applies to all households in the neighbourhoods

where stores are located; nor is there self-targeting by choice of commodities with

high income elasticities for the poor and low to the rich" (Janvry and Subbarao, 1986,

p. 78). The need to restrain the burden of subsidy on the central budget calls for a

46

judicious PDS including coverage of items to be distributed, the cross-section of

population to be served, and the pricing of the items to be distributed. Regarding

selection/exclusion of target groups, a number of measures have been considered.

These include exclusion of income tax payers, salaried employees in Government,

public and private sector, registered shop-owners, sales tax assessees, telephone

owning families, residents of posh housing colonies etc. (GOI, 1993-94, p. 66).

Subsidies arise from the difference between the issue price and the economic cost of

FCI. In addition, unwillingness or delay in making necessary correction in the Central

Issue Price (CIP) consequent to a rise in the Minimum Support Price (MSP) or

procurement price may cause the food subsidy budget to rise significantly. Given the

extent of poverty, and the necessity of procurement of food stocks for distribution

during calamities etc., withdrawal of food subsidy may be neither desirable nor

feasible, at least in the short and medium term. The task then is to impose an upper

limit on subsidy.

2.12 Households by Consumption Expenditure Brackets based on NSS 58th Round Report We have taken one surplus state (Punjab) and one deficit state (Kerala) in production

of foodgrains and juxtaposed U.P. vis-a-vis those two states. What we consider is the

distribution of households based on MPCE classes following 58th NSS round. While

in rural Punjab the MPCE bracketed households above Rs. 615 is 67.0 per cent of all

households, in rural Kerala it is 70.1 per cent. Vis-a-vis this, in rural U.P. it is only

24.4 per cent. In other words, three-quarter of the households in rural U.P. live in

MPCE bracket below Rs. 615. At the bottom of MPCE brackets (less than Rs. 300)

rural U.P. has 13.8 per cent as opposed to 0.9 per cent for Punjab. The regional

(state-wise) inequality in distribution of households by MPCE is obvious. When

compared with rural India, U.P. lags behind at the top end of MPCE brackets while

Kerala and Punjab are ahead of all-India. At the bottom end of MPCE brackets, U.P.

is ahead of rural India while Kerala and Punjab are behind. For the urban region

(states and all-India), the MPCE brackets are higher for higher estimated

income/consumption of the households vis-a-vis that for rural region. Considering top

three MPCE brackets, (above Rs. 1120), urban U.P. shows 29.7 per cent of

households that is far behind urban Kerala (47.2) and urban Punjab (38.0). At the

bottom end of MPCE brackets (less than Rs. 425), U.P. has 15.1 per cent while

Kerala has 6.9 per cent and Punjab 3.7 per cent. The urban inequality inter-state by

47

MPCE brackets is also obvious. In both the regions, rural and urban, the status by

MPCE of U.P. is far behind Kerala and Punjab, and behind all-India (Table 2.24).

Table 2.24 Regional Distribution of Households on the Basis of MPCE Classes

(in %)

Rural Urban MPCE

(Rs.) Kerala Panjab Uttar

PradeshAll-

India MPCE

(Rs.) Kerala Panjab Uttar

Pradesh All-

India0-225 0.3 0.2 2.6 2.9 0-300 0.9 0.3 2.6 1.9225-255 0.2 0.3 3.5 2.9 300-350 2.4 0.8 2.6 2.1255-300 0.8 0.4 7.7 6.2 350-425 3.6 2.6 9.9 5.6300-340 1.4 1.0 9.4 7.5 425-500 4.7 3.8 9.7 6.2340-380 1.8 3.3 9.7 8.3 500-575 6.0 5.6 10.7 8.9380-420 2.7 3.5 9.5 8.6 575-665 7.6 10.4 7.3 8.0420-470 5.2 5.5 11.2 10.2 665-775 4.7 11.9 7.0 8.8470-525 8.0 7.2 9.8 10.0 775-915 9.8 8.5 8.8 9.2525-615 9.4 11.6 12.1 12.5 915-1120 13.2 18.2 11.7 12.7615-775 18.8 20.3 11.1 13.3 1120-1500 16.2 16.5 12.8 14.3775-950 14.6 17.8 6.6 7.4 1500-1925 14.1 10.4 7 9.1950 & more 36.7 28.9 6.7 9.8 1925 more 16.9 11.1 9.9 13.2All 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Household Consumer Expenditure & Employment-Unemployment Situation in India, NSS 58th round report, 2003.

Following NSS data (58th Round), average per capita annual consumption of

cereals (in real terms) for U.P. stood above national average for both rural and urban

regions. Per capita annual consumption of cereals (real) of U.P. following same NSS

data stood above both surplus region (Punjab) and deficit region (Kerala). Wheat

consumption of U.P. was far ahead of all India average for both rural and urban

regions, while rice consumption was less for each of the regions. Wheat consumption

in Punjab was well ahead of U.P. while rice consumption of U.P. was much ahead of

that in Punjab. U.P. is also one of the surplus states in wheat production in India.

Cereals consumption in Kerala is characterized mainly by rice consumption for both

rural and urban regions which on per capita real terms was well ahead of not only all-

India average but also ahead of Punjab and U.P. (Table 2.25).

48

Table 2.25 Average Annual per Capita Consumption of Cereals in Selected States

(in Kg.) States Areas Rice Wheat Other/Cereals Total

Rural 104.52 10.56 0.00 115.08 Kerala Urban 87.60 14.16 0.00 101.76 Rural 8.88 106.56 1.32 116.64 Punjab Urban 10.08 94.08 0.84 104.88 Rural 42.84 104.88 2.40 150.24 Uttar

Pradesh Urban 31.80 92.28 0.12 129.84 Rural 78.24 52.08 14.64 144.96 All India Urban 56.88 55.08 6.00 117.96

Note: Others include Jowar, Bajra, Maize, Bareley, Small Millets and Ragi.

Source: Household Consumer Expenditure & Employment-Unemployment Situation in India, NSS 58th round report, 2003.

Based on monthly per capita expenditure (MPCE) brackets, we find per capita

annual consumption of cereals in rural India following NSS 58th round report (2003).

We observe a monotonic increase in per capita consumption of cereals in value

terms when the MPCE brackets are arranged in ascending order. In quantity terms

we find a little aberration in higher MPCE brackets where after reaching peak real

(quantity per capita) consumption for MPCE bracket (Rs. 5040 to Rs. 5640), the

consumption started declining a little. In value terms, per capita annual consumption

of rice showed monotonic increase with respect to high MPCE brackets, which is true

for wheat also excepting one aberration for MPCE bracket (Rs. 6300 to Rs. 7380). In

quantity terms, per capita annual consumption of rice showed monotonically higher

figures excepting a little decline for MPCE brackets like Rs. 6300 to Rs. 7380 and Rs.

7380 to Rs. 9300. We find a drastic decline in per capita annual consumption of other

items, excluding rice and wheat, in value terms for the top two MPCE brackets, Rs.

9300 to Rs. 11400 and above Rs. 11400. In quantity terms, this decline is not visible.

The implication may be that the prices that the higher MPCE brackets pay on other

items have got reduced much to lead to reduction in value terms, on the assumption

that it is money-based exchange. It is difficult to draw any firm conclusion from the

'quantity-value' comparisons what do the MPCE brackets do when they decide their

consumption-mix. It is, however, clear that higher MPCE brackets spend more on

total cereals relative to the lower brackets (Table 2.26).

49

Table 2.26 Per Capita Annual Consumption of Cereals in Rural India

Quantity (in Kg.) Value (in Rs.) MPCE (Rs.) Rice Wheat Other* Total Rice Wheat Other* Total

0-2700 73.69 26.11 17.69 117.49 539.97 158.23 91.62 789.832700-3060 76.49 37.09 17.32 130.91 588.77 228.75 92.84 910.363060-3600 77.35 44.29 14.64 136.27 612.81 280.36 81.25 974.413600-4080 78.81 46.97 15.74 141.52 662.22 301.83 90.40 1054.454080-4560 78.93 51.12 15.25 145.30 669.17 330.62 90.04 1089.834560-5040 79.91 51.61 15.25 146.77 697.47 339.28 90.52 1127.285040-5640 80.76 52.09 16.23 149.08 719.19 348.43 98.58 1166.205640-6300 80.52 58.32 15.25 154.09 747.37 397.84 91.87 1237.086300-7380 81.13 56.24 15.98 153.35 777.99 391.62 99.19 1268.807380-9300 81.13 57.83 14.40 153.35 803.61 423.22 95.04 1321.879300-11400 81.13 62.83 10.86 154.82 836.19 448.96 71.98 1357.1311400+ 77.71 67.59 8.91 154.21 896.70 524.48 58.32 1479.49All 79.54 52.95 14.88 147.38 727.97 363.19 89.06 1180.23Note: Others included Jowar, Bajra, Maize, Bareley, Small Millets and Ragi. Source: Household Consumer Expenditure & Employment-Unemployment Situation in India, NSS 58th

round report, 2003.

Following NSS data (58th round), per capita annual consumption of cereals in

urban India in real terms increased monotonically with reference to MPCE (Rs.)

brackets in ascending order excepting the bracket Rs. 6000 to Rs. 6900. We do not

find any monotonic increase in real consumption (Rs.) of wheat when seen in the

context of MPCE brackets in ascending order. For rice consumption in real terms per

capita for urban India, the monotonic increase is generally true excepting two MPCE

brackets, Rs. 3600 to Rs. 4200 and Rs. 7980 to Rs. 9300. Per capita real

consumption of other cereals showed oscillations with reference to MPCE brackets in

ascending order, with visible overall decline for high MPCE brackets. What is obvious

is that the low MPCE brackets spend more per capita on items like jowar, bajra,

maize, ragi etc. relative to the higher MPCE brackets. In quantity terms, per capita

annual consumption of cereals in urban India showed variations with respect to

MPCE brackets, with visible decline for higher MPCE brackets. The same quantity

per capita consumption of all cereals for the lowest MPCE bracket (less than Rs.

3600) and highest (more than Rs. 23100) does not reveal the same consumption mix

even within cereals. While the former bracket consumes more of 'more inferior items'

like jowar, bajra, maize etc. the latter consumes less of these items, and more of

wheat (less inferior items). We do not find any monotonic increase in consumption of

rice and wheat with respect to MPCE brackets seen in ascending order (Table 2.27).

50

Table 2.27 Per Capita Annual Consumption of Cereals in Urban India

Quantity (in Kg.) Value (in Rs.) MPCE (Rs.) Rice Wheat Other Total Rice Wheat Other Total

0-3600 53.44 43.68 13.05 110.17 454.94 301.22 82.72 838.873600-4200 51.85 66.00 6.71 124.56 439.32 497.64 43.31 980.274200-5100 53.68 60.88 9.39 123.95 496.17 451.40 60.02 1007.605100-6000 56.97 57.71 8.05 122.73 549.00 442.49 53.92 1045.426000-6900 58.56 53.44 9.03 121.02 610.98 429.56 64.78 1105.326900-7980 62.22 50.75 7.93 120.90 676.12 419.68 56.36 1152.177980-9300 56.36 59.90 5.86 122.12 651.11 508.13 43.68 1202.929300-10980 59.54 55.02 6.10 120.66 704.06 489.95 44.53 1238.5410980-13440 61.73 55.39 4.27 121.39 781.53 502.40 31.11 1315.0413440-18000 60.76 55.63 3.29 119.68 816.55 535.70 26.96 1379.2118000-23100 56.97 57.83 3.29 118.10 828.26 581.94 26.11 1436.3123100 more 51.61 55.27 2.44 109.31 854.73 626.47 22.81 1504.02All 57.83 56.00 6.10 119.93 689.91 494.59 43.31 1227.81Note: Others included Jowar, Bajra, Maize, Bareley, Small Millets and Ragi Source: Household Consumer Expenditure & Employment-Unemployment Situation in India, NSS 58th

round report, 2003. 2.13 Consumption Mix As observed by the Tenth Planning Commission, ‘dramatic changes in food

consumption patterns have taken place in India in the post-Green Revolution period.

Between 1972-73 and 1993-94, the food basket has become more diversified, with

the share of cereals seeing a dramatic decline (Planning Commission, 2002-07, Vol.

II, p. 365). The decline in percentage share of non-food in India’s rural total

expenditure during 1973-2000 is associated with sharply declining share of

agriculture in GDP (Table 2.28)

Table 2.28 Share of Agriculture and Non-Food, 1973-2000

Year Share of Agriculture in GDP Share of Non-Food in Rural Expenditure 1973-74 44.0 25.1 1983 38.7 34.4 1993-94 32.9 36.8 1999-2000 26.9 40.6 Source: Planning Commission, Tenth Five Year Plan, 2002-07, Vol. I, p. 28.

Generally, rising income is associated with rising expenditure on higher-order

(non-food) goods. Thus, the phenomena of reducing income in agriculture and

increasing non-food expenditure need cautious explanation, as opposed to the

hurried explanation by the Tenth Planning Commission that ‘this trend towards a

more diversified diet is also discernible among the poorest 25 per cent of the

population’ (Planning Commission, 2002-07, Vol. I, p. 365). The Commission also

hurriedly observed that ‘the growth of aggregate demand for cereals in the country

can be said to have been kept in check due to two factors – slowdown in the pace of

51

population growth and shift in consumer preference towards non-cereals’ (Planning

Commission, 2002-07, Vol. I, p. 366). What matters really is the income-categories of

the population rather than the ‘slowdown in the pace of population growth’ that

determines the relative requirement of food and non-food in consumption mix. What

is to be examined is the skewness in the distribution of income and productive assets

in rural India rather than suggesting at a macro level the preference of the

bottommost section of rural population for non-food. Even if there is preference, that

is yet to get revealed in the market.

52

Chapter III

Objectives, Coverage, Methodology and Study Region

As a concept, social safety is as old as the existence of human beings as a social

unit. In a broad sense, the purpose of social safety is to abolish want by guaranteeing

every citizen an adequate income at all times to meet his needs. The aim of social

safety is to guarantee for each person a minimum level of living through a number of

means (Savy, 1972, p. 2-3). These means include both supply-side and demand-side

instruments that cover economic and social interventions of the government.

3.1 Objectives of the Study We have studied the extent to which the PDS has succeeded in providing essential

commodities to the people living below poverty line (BPL). The specific objectives of

the study were to examine:

(i) The extent to which PDS protects the poor in terms of their access to

essential commodities distributed through FPSs;

(ii) The likely impact of restricting the coverage of PDS to only the population

below poverty line; (iii) How does the delivery system work (Centre – State – FCI Godowns – Local

FPSs – Target Groups); (iv) Variations in prices per unit of commodities, like issue price, FPS (sale) price,

and (local) market price; (v) The role that the Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) have been playing in

ensuring the smooth delivery system and in ensuring food security of the

poor; (vi) If the existing distributive set up is efficient to run the PDS. In (i) we have covered the non-beneficiary households, that is, those who are

left out from the social safety net. These excluded households were the cardless BPL

households, and the poor households not yet listed in BPL. In objectives (ii) and (v),

we examined how the PDS served the population linked with Annapurna Yojana,

Antyodaya Anna Yojana, Mid-Day Meal, and SGRY (Food for Work).

53

3.2 Selected Programmes for the Study

PDS Schemes & Food

Distribution Schemes

SELECTED PROGRAMMES FOR THE STUDY

Implementation Areas

Provision & Major Objectives.

Antyodaya Anna Yojana

(AAY)

The Government of India implemented in December 2000 and covers all districts in

the country

• Provide food-grains to the poorest of the poor at very low cost who does not get two square meals a day.

• Beneficiary gets Food-grains at a highly subsidized rate of Rs.2/ per kg. for wheat and Rs. 3/ per kg for rice. The kerosene and sugar are also available for them at subsidized cost.

• The scheme ensures 35 kg of food-grains per family per month since April 2002. • Eliminate hunger of the population through food security and ensure survival of BPL

households who live at the bottom most level.

Below Poverty Line (BPL

Ration Card)

The Government of India launched from

June 1997 and covers all districts in the

country

• Ensure full proof arrangements for distribution of food-grains to the identified BPL householdsat subsidized price.

• Beneficiary gets Food-grains at subsidized rate of Rs.4.65 per kg. for wheat and Rs. 6.15 per kg for rice. The kerosene and sugar are also available for them at subsidized price.

• The scheme ensures 35 kg of food-grains per family per month since April 2002. • Eliminate poverty of the weaker sections through food security.

Annapurna Anna Yojana

The Government of India launched this programme in April,

2000 and covered all States and Union

Territories

• Provide food security to senior citizens or 65 years of age or above who though eligible for old age pension under the National Old Age Pension Scheme (NOAPS), are not getting the pension covered under the Scheme.

• The scheme provides 10 kg. of food-grains per person per month supplied free of cost. Note: The scheme under Annapurna Anna Yojana has been stopped till the further order vide letter No.1033/200-6-06-390, dated 07.03.06, issued by Principal Secretary, Government of UP.

Above Poverty Line (APL

Ration Card)

The scheme implemented from very

beginning but it was reformulated in 1997 and implemented across the country

• Provide essential commodities to APL ration card holding households at low subsidized price. • Beneficiary gets Food-grains at subsidized rate of Rs.6.60 per kg. for wheat and Rs. 8.45 per

kg for rice. The kerosene is also available for them at subsidized cost. • The scheme ensures 35 kg of food-grains per family per month. • Ensure proper distribution of food-grains, Availability and accessibility of food-grains and

control the open market prices of essential commodities.

Mid-Day Meal Scheme

The Government of India started this

scheme from August 1995 through Primary schools in the country

• Provide cooked Mid-Day Meal to the children of the Government aided / Govt. primary schools and improve the nutritional health standard of the growing children.

• Increase enrolment, retention, attendance and reduce drop-out rate of children in Government aided / Govt. primary school.

• 100 gram per student per day food-grain supply through FPS free of cost for a duration of ten months.

Sampoorna Grameen

Rozgar Yojana (SGRY)

The Government of India launched in

September 2001 and implemented in

selected districts of the country

• Provide additional wage employment in all rural areas and thereby provide food security and improve nutritional levels

• Creation of durable community, social and economic assets and infrastructural development in rural areas

• Payment of wages is done partly in cash and partly in kind – 5 kg of food-grains and the balance in cash given to beneficiary.

54

3

Coverage at Different Levels

SAMPLE PROCEDURE

Sample Size Methodology

State Uttar Pradesh • Purposive Selection, because it is one of the ‘BIMARU’ States of India and the state produced high quantity of food-grains but existence of hunger is much. • There is no previous state level detailed study on public distribution system and food security.

Districts 8 Districts from all Regions of which 4 Developed and 4 Under Developed

• Classified all Districts based on per capita income above and below the State average income in each (4) regions. • Four Districts have been selected from above the State average and four from below the State average. • The two districts from each region in which one is developed and the other is under-developed.

Blocks 16 Blocks from all 8 Selected Districts of which 8 Developed

& 8 Under-Developed and two wards from selected

(urban) towns

• A composite development index is prepared for each district on the basis of percentage of electrified villages and availability of pakka road per lakh population based on equal weightage. • If the block is above district index, it is considered developed and if below district index, it is considered under-developed. • Both the categories arranged in alphabetical order. • One Block from each category has been randomly selected from every selected district. • For the urban areas, all the towns are arranged in alphabetical order and selected one randomly.

Villages 33 Villages from 16 Selected Blocks and

17 wards from 8 selected Towns

• Listed all villages/wards from each selected block/town where FPSs existed. • Arranged all villages in alphabetical order. • Randomly two villages and two wards have been selected from each selected block / town. • Some additional villages/wards selected to compensate sample loss.

Beneficiaries 960 Beneficiary

Households from all selected Villages /

Wards

• Taking list of benefited households from State Supply Department or FPS and listed them. • The selection is based on random basis. • Proportionate representation of all beneficiaries under PDS has been covered as per our proposal. • Some additional beneficiary households drawn into the sample to compensate sample loss. In case the target not been covered by the selected villages, some additional villages/wards had been visited.

Non-Beneficiaries

241 Non-Beneficiary eligible Households

from all Selected Villages/Wards

• Listed all non-benefited households, who were eligible for any schemes under PDS with the help of FPS, Panchayat, Local people, & self survey and listed them. • 05 non-benefited households have been selected on random basis, and some additional sample taken to compensate sample loss. • If the target had not been covered by the selected villages, additional villages were drawn, Incase it remains not covered, the loss is compensated at district or regional level.

Fair Price Shops

46 FPS dealers from all Selected

Villages/wards The FPS selected, where most of the sampled beneficiaries were availing PDS facilities. In case of Annpurnna Yojana, we covered those FPSs where the beneficiaries had taken their food-grains.

55

3.4 Sample Structure

SAMPLE STRUCTURE

Bundelkhand Eastern Central Western

District Jhansi

District Lalitpur

District Varanasi

District Gorakhpur

District Lakhimpur Kheri

District Lucknow

District Bareilly

District Badaun

Rural CD Blocks • Mauranipur • Moth

Selected Villages • Syawari • Nayagown • Amgawan • Madaura Khurd

Urban Towns

Mauranipur Ward No. 9 & 14

Fair Price Shops 46

Rural CD Blocks • Mahrauni • Bar

Selected Villages • Maiguwan • Chhapalchhol • Bamhauri

Kharait • Bastrawan

Urban Towns

Pali Ward No. 5 & 9

Rural CD Blocks • Chiraigawan • Sevapuri

Selected Villages • Nehiyan • Jathi • Kotwan • Seeyo

Urban Towns

Ramnagar Ward No. 4 & 7

Rural CD Blocks • Bhatahat • Bashgawan

Selected Villages • Vishunpur • Pali • Bargaghi • Gulhariya

Urban Towns

Barhalganj Ward No. 2 & 9

Rural CD Blocks • Palia • Nighasan

Selected Villages • Bamahanpur • Barautha • Vichitranagar • Ibrahimpur

Urban Towns

Mailani Ward No. 1 & 11

Rural CD Blocks • Malihabad • Kakori

Selected Villages • A. Kathauli • Mujasa • Badagawan • Mubarakpur

Urban Towns

Itauja Ward No. 3 & 4

Rural CD Blocks • Bahedi • Bhojipura

Selected Villages • Malpur • Girgharpur • Maksudanpur • Aadalpur • Ghunsa • Dalpatpur • Kalara

Urban Towns

Saithal Ward No. 1 & 6

Rural CD Blocks • Vajirganj • Rajpura

Selected Villages • Rota • Rahediya • Hirauni • Hardaspur

Urban Towns

Kunwargaon Ward No. 4 & 8

Beneficiary Households 960

Non-Beneficiary Households 241

Villages/Wards 33/17

REGIONS

56

3.5 Study Tools, Major Objectives and Coverage

Coverage of the Study

Study Tools Major Objectives Covered

Districts (Respondent: District

Supply Officer)

Questionnaire for District Level

Officers

• Size of consumers by ration card and units, Target, availability and achievement of allocated food grains under different programmes and accessibility of FPS during last two years in the districts.

• Awareness level about norms, government orders, rules & regulations etc. • Monitoring and Evaluation system for smooth functioning of the distribution system in the district. • Problems for conducting/functioning the PDS programmes at different levels. • Reasons for success and failure of different PDS schemes and perceptions about improvement of different

programmes & Role of Panchayati Raj Institutions

Tehsil (Respondent: Supply

Inspectors)

Questionnaire for Tehsil Level Official

• Target, availability and achievement of allocated food grains under different programmes and accessibility of FPS during last two years in the districts.

• Awareness level about norms, government orders, rules & regulations etc. • Monitoring and Evaluation system for smooth functioning of the distribution system in the Tehsil. • Problems for conducting/functioning the PDS programmes at different levels. • Reasons for success and failure of different PDS schemes and perceptions about improvement of different

programmes & Role of Panchayati Raj Institutions

Block (Respondent: In-

charge of Food-grain & Kerosene Godowan)

Questionnaire for Godown In-charge

• Demand, availability of food-grains & kerosene and their actual distribution under different programmes during last five years.

• Management system for Storage, Maintenance of current stock and wastage of items. • Delivery system of commodities from Godown to FPS and FPS to consumers and problems. • Perceptions of Godown in-charge/owner regarding current government policy for them. • Problems faced by Godown in-charge/owner and their suggestions.

Village (Respondent: Gram

Pradhan) Village Schedule

• Basic amenities of the village and Awareness of GP regarding different PDS & food security programmes. • The scenario of poverty and hunger in the village and initiatives taken by GP for their protection. • Justification of the eligibility norms for selection of beneficiaries under different PDS programmes and reasons for

existence of non-beneficiary. • Selection method of FPS dealer and their relationship. • Role of GP for conducting/functioning of the different PDS and other food security programmes and their future

strategy. • Strength and weakness of GP regarding PDS and other food security programmes. • Coordination of Gram Panchayats among FPS dealers, consumers and concerned departments. • Perception of the GP regarding improvement of PDS and other food security programmes.

Beneficiaries (Respondents: Head of the Households)

Beneficiary Schedule

• Socio-economic and educational status of the households under deferent categories.. • Requirement of essential commodities and availability, accessibility, regularity & price gaps of items purchased

from FPS and other sources. • Impact of food security and nutritional programme in terms of getting employment, food security/ hunger and

restricting the people towards outside migration for wage work. • Mode of selection, Selection basis, nature of benefit, duration of benefit availed by the households and their

satisfaction regarding the programme by economic category. • Strength, weaknesses and Performance of PDS programmes and Role of PRIs • Satisfaction of the beneficiaries regarding PDS price, quantity and duration of distribution from FPS. • Awareness of people regarding provision of PDS charter, consumer rights etc. • Suggestions of the beneficiaries for improvement of different PDS programmes

Non-Beneficiaries (Respondents: Head of the Households) Non-Beneficiary

Schedule

• Socio-economic and educational status of the households. • Requirement of essential commodities and availability, accessibility, source of fulfillment. • Impact of food security, wage and nutritional programme in terms of getting employment, food security/ hunger and

restricting the people towards outside migration for wage work. • Reasons for not getting benefit of PDS programme and their efforts for it. estimated number of households not

benefited from the programme. • Awareness of people regarding PDS programmes, selection criteria, selection process, consumer rights etc. • Strength and weaknesses of PDS programmes and Role of PRIs • Suggestions of the non-beneficiaries for improvement of different PDS programmes

Fair Price Shop (Respondents: Fair Price Shop Dealers)

Schedule for Fair Price Shop Dealers

• Selection method of FPS dealer and Social , Educational, age and duration of conducting FPS. • Number of ration card and units attached with FPS and demand, availability and distribution of food-grains under

different programmes during last two years. • Perception of the FPS dealer regarding off-take of food-grains & kerosene from godown/ depot, quality of items,

consumers demand, satisfaction from consumers, supply department & Panchayat. • Cost for carrying out the commodities from concerned godown and price of items for different categories of

beneficiaries. • Coordination of FPS dealers with Supply Department, godown, oil depot, consumers and Gram Panchayat. • Problems faced by the FPS dealers and suggestions for its improvement.

57

Thus, the study covered 960 beneficiary households and 241 non-beneficiary

households, 46 FPSs, 33 representatives of Gram Panchayats, 48 foodgrains

godowns and 27 kerosene depots, and 26 functionaries from eight selected districts

of the state (Table 3.1).

Table 3.1 Coverage of the Study

Sample Units

Households Godowns Government Functionaries

Regions Districts

Villa

ges

Urb

an

War

ds

Ben

efic

iary

H

ouse

hold

s

Non

- B

enef

icia

ry

Hou

seho

lds

Tota

l

Fair

Pric

e Sh

op

Dea

lers

Food

-gra

ins

Ker

osen

e D

epot

s

District Level

Tehsil Level

Bariely 6 2 118 18 136 7 3 3 1 3Badaun 4 2 120 42 162 5 3 3 1 3

Western

Total 10 4 238 60 298 12 6 6 2 6Lakhimpur 4 3 122 30 152 6 3 4 0 2Lucknow 3 2 120 31 151 5 3 3 1 3

Central

Total 7 5 242 61 303 11 6 7 1 5Lalitpur 4 2 120 27 147 6 3 4 1 3Jhansi 4 2 120 33 153 6 2 3 1 2

Bundelkhand

Total 8 4 240 60 300 12 5 7 2 5Gorakhpur 4 2 120 30 150 6 2 4 0 2Varanasi 4 2 120 30 150 5 2 3 1 2

Eastern

Total 8 4 240 60 300 11 4 7 1 4Grand Total 33 17 960 241 1201 46 21 27 6 20

3.6 Demographic Profile: Selected Districts, U.P. and India • In U.P., SC population as percentage of total population (21.1) is ahead of

that of India (16.2 per cent). ST population in U.P. (as per cent of total) is 0.1,

far behind that of all-India (8.1 per cent). Urban population in U.P. (20.8 per

cent) is far behind that of all-India (27.8 per cent). Size of households in U.P.

(6.5) is more than that of all-India (5.3). Sex ratio in U.P. is against women

more than it is in case of all-India. Literacy rate in U.P. (56.3 per cent) is

behind that of all-India (64.8). Density of population in U.P. (689) is far more

than that of all-India (324). Credit-deposit ratio in 2005 in U.P. at 36.98 was

far behind 66.04 for all-India. There are district-wise (selected sample)

variations in all those variables (Table 3.2).

58

Table 3.2

Demographic Profile: Selected Districts of U.P. & India Indicators Bareilly Budaun Kheri Lucknow Jhansi Lalitpur Gorakhpur Varanasi UP India

Area in Sq. Km. 5.168 4.120 7.680 2.528 5.024 5.039 3.3321 1.535 241.0 3287.0No. of Households 554761 471156 509388 644269 289863 166012 555775 430651 25757640 193204860Population 3618589 3069426 3207232 3647834 1744931 977734 3769456 3138671 166197921 1026443540

Male 1934119 1666669 1713908 1932317 932818 519413 1923197 1649187 87565369 531061138Female 1684470 1402757 1493324 1715517 812113 458321 1846259 1489484 78632552 495382402

Population (0-6 years) 719217 646756 636038 547950 280589 200349 694213 575882 31624628 163511029Male 377360 342215 327349 286063 148811 103762 358952 300040 16509033 84841521Female 341857 304541 308689 261887 131778 96587 335261 275842 15115595 78669508

% of SC Population 12.7 17.1 25.6 21.3 28.1 24.9 22.0 13.9 21.1 16.2% of ST Population 0.01 0.003 1.2 0.1 0.1 0.0002 0.02 0.02 0.1 8.1% of Urban Population 32.9 18.2 10.8 63.6 40.8 14.5 19.6 40.2 20.8 27.8Household Size 6.5 6.5 6.3 5.7 6.0 5.9 6.8 7.3 6.5 5.3Sex Ratio (per '000' male) 871 842 871 888 871 882 960 903 898 933Sex Ratio (0-6 years) 906 890 943 915 886 931 934 919 916 927Sex Ratio (SC) 860 843 877 893 874 892 972 904 900 936Literacy Rate 47.8 38.2 48.4 68.7 65.5 49.5 58.5 66.1 56.3 64.8

Male 58.7 49.0 59.5 76.0 78.8 63.8 73.6 77.9 68.8 75.2Female 35.2 25.1 35.4 60.5 50.2 33.0 42.9 53.0 42.2 53.6

Density of Population 594 873 417 1456 348 194 1140 1995 689 324Decadal Growth Rate (91-00) 26.96 25.36 32.28 33.25 23.23 29.98 23.44 25.51 25.80 21.34Credit Deposit Ratio (2005) 60.75 44.10 55.39 33.56 36.40 53.22 28.69 27.86 36.98 66.04

Source: Census of India, 2001 and Statistical Dairy, Uttar Pradesh, 2003.

3.6.1 Distribution of Population by Working Category: Selected Districts, U.P. and India

Cultivators as percentage of total workers in U.P. (41.1) is far ahead of that in India

(31.6). Agricultural labourers as percentage of total workers in U.P. (24.8) is similar to

that in India (26.6). Other workers as percentage of total workers in U.P. (28.5) is

much less than that in India (37.6). The rest is covered by workers in household

industries. Work participation rate in U.P. (32.5 per cent) is much less than that of all

India (39.3). Main workers as percentage of total workers in U.P. (23.7) is much less

than that of all-India (30.5). Non-workers in U.P. (67.5) is much ahead of that for all-

India (60.7). The rest (main workers and non-workers by percentage subtracted from

total workers) is explained by marginal workers. There is a striking similarity in all

these rates and percentages when sample (eight districts of U.P.) mean and U.P. as

a whole are compared, excepting those for agricultural labour and other workers.

There are, however, district-wise variations in all these rates and percentages (Table

3.3).

59

Table 3.3 Distribution of Working & Non-Working Population: Selected Districts,

U.P. and India

Indicators

Bar

eilly

Bud

aun

Khe

ri

Luck

now

Jhan

si

Lalit

pur

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Sam

ple

Mea

n Va

lue

Utta

r Pr

ades

h

Indi

a

Work Participation Rate 30.3 30.0 31.4 29.8 37.0 43.2 30.1 31.3 32.9 32.5 39.3Male 48.6 48.9 51.1 46.9 49.1 50.4 42.7 44.7 47.8 46.8 51.9Female 9.2 7.6 8.9 10.4 23.1 35.0 17.1 16.5 16.0 16.5 25.7

Percentage of Main Workers 23.8 25.1 26.1 24.7 26.8 29.6 18.4 24.6 24.9 23.7 30.5Male 41.9 43.8 45.4 41.2 42.2 46.2 30.8 39.5 41.4 39.2 45.3Female 3.1 2.7 4.0 6.0 9.1 10.8 5.4 8.0 6.1 6.4 14.7

Percentage of Marginal Workers 6.4 5.0 5.3 5.1 10.3 13.6 11.8 6.7 8.0 8.8 8.7Male 6.7 5.1 5.7 5.7 7.0 4.3 11.9 5.2 6.5 7.6 6.6Female 6.0 4.9 4.9 4.4 14.0 24.2 11.7 8.5 9.8 10.2 11.0

Percentage of Non-Workers 69.7 70.0 68.6 70.2 63.0 56.8 69.9 68.7 67.1 67.5 60.7Male 51.4 51.1 48.9 53.1 50.9 49.6 57.3 55.3 52.2 53.2 48.1Female 90.8 92.4 91.1 89.6 76.9 65.0 82.9 83.5 84.0 83.5 74.3

% of Cultivators to Total Workers 39.9 59.3 55.0 19.7 39.9 63.3 29.8 21.1 41.0 41.1 31.6% of Agricultural Labour to Total Workers 18.8 18.2 24.0 11.9 20.8 17.0 35.8 10.4 19.6 24.8 26.6% of household industries to Total Workers 4.8 2.9 3.4 5.0 5.9 3.0 3.9 22.6 6.4 5.6 4.2% of Other Workers to Total Workers 36.5 19.5 17.7 63.5 33.5 16.7 30.5 45.8 33.0 28.5 37.6

Source: Census of India, 2001. 3.7 Regional Variations in Uttar Pradesh We selected our sample (eight) districts from all the (four) regions of U.P. We find

regional variations in selected development indicators in U.P. The density of

population is very low in Bundelkhand, far behind east, west and central U.P. Urban

population is lowest in east U.P., far behind that in west, central and Bundelkhand in

that order as percentage of total population. East and west U.P. cover more than

three fourths of total population selected in U.P. Literacy rate in the entire four

regions show similar pattern, between 55.0 and 60.0 per cent. Main workers as

percentage of total population is lowest in east U.P. (22.0) and highest in

Bundelkhand (27.0). Main workers engaged in agriculture as percentage of total main

workers varied between 56.8 per cent for west U.P. and highest for Bundelkhand

(74.5). There is tremendous gap regionally in number of employees working in

registered factory per lakh population, 64 for Bundelkhand and 413 for west U.P. Per

capita net output (in value terms) from commodity production in 1997-98 was highest

for west U.P. (Rs. 9,882) and lowest for east U.P. (Rs. 6,269) (Table 3.4).

60

Table 3.4

Regional Variations in Uttar Pradesh: Selected Development Indicators

Indicators Eastern Western Central Bundelkhand Uttar Pradesh

Density of Population (per sq. km.) 776 765 658 280 689 % of Urban population (2001) 11.78 28.25 25.11 22.46 20.78 % Share in State Population 40.11 36.76 18.17 4.96 100.00 Total Literacy (%) 2001 55.22 58.44 59.04 60.32 57.36 Per Capita Power Consumption (kwh) 2002-03 159.7 195.3 201.4 129.7 178.9 % of Electrified Villages (1999-00) 76.78 88.81 71.71 68.37 79.08 Average Size of Holding (in Hect.) 1995-96 0.65 1.02 0.83 1.72 0.86 Net Sown Area per Capita Rural (in hect.) 1998-99 0.10 0.14 0.14 0.26 0.11 Per Capita Gross Value of Industrial Output (Rs) 1991-92

796 2845 1439 748 1663

% of Main Workers in Total Population (2001) 22.0 24.2 25.4 27.0 23.7 Main Workers Engaged in Agricultural to Total Main Workers (2001)

71.9 56.8 66.5 74.5 65.9

Employees Working in Registered Factory per Lakh Population (2001-02)

107 413 229 64 240

Credit Deposit Ratio (2005) 27.65 43.87 36.80 49.43 33.21 Per Rural Person Grass Value of Agricultural Produce (Rs. at current price) 1997-98

2435 4876 3543 3949 3594

Per Capita Net Output from Commodity Producing (Rs. at current price) 1997-98

6269 9882 7881 7910 8273

Source Statistical Dairy, Government of Uttar Pradesh, 2003 & 2005 3.8 Target of Ration Cards for Distribution and Year-wise Variation Target of the ration cards for distribution set for each district and over all declined in

2005 over 2004 and again declined in 2006 over 2005 for BPL type. For ANP type

cards, the target set for distribution declined over all that is explained by high decline

only in the district Varanasi. Otherwise, for all other districts the target number of

cards by ANP type increased in 2005 over 2004. For ANT type cards for distribution,

the target set increased in 2005 over 2004 and again in 2006 over 2005. There are

district wise variations in the targets set for cards by types for distribution (Table 3.5).

61

Table 3.5

Target of the Ration Cards for the Districts under Different Schemes (As Reported by the Functionaries)

BPL ANP* ANT Districts Figure in 2004 2005 2006 2004 2005 2004 2005 2006

Number 181061 160313 NA 7743 7754 78939 99687 NABareilly % Change 100.0 -12.9 NA 100.0 0.1 100.0 20.8 NA

Number 94604 83763 NA 5741 5752 41246 52087 NABadaun % Change 100.0 -12.9 NA 100.0 0.2 100.0 20.8 NA

Number 100639 91018 80588 7307 7318 30061 39682 50112Lucknow % Change 100.0 -10.6 -24.9 100.0 0.2 100.0 24.2 40.0

Number 54785 49547 43869 3058 3069 16365 21603 27281Lalitpur % Change 100.0 -10.6 -24.9 100.0 0.4 100.0 24.2 40.0

Number 92039 83240 74310 4909 4920 27493 36292 45831Jhansi % Change 100.0 -10.6 -23.9 100.0 0.2 100.0 24.2 40.0

Number 192577 89904 79602 11431 6524 57523 39196 49498Varanasi % Change 100.0 -114.2 -141.9 100.0 -75.2 100.0 -46.8 -16.2

Number 119367.5 92954.6 69592.3 6698.2 5889.5 41937.8 48091.2 43180.5Average Total % Change 100.0 -28.4 -71.5 100.0 -13.7 100.0 12.8 2.9

Note: The percentage change is calculated with respect to the preceding year. * Scheme is closed since 2006-07. NA : Data Not Available (Not provided by the district functionary). Source: Field Survey 3.8.1 Ration Cards under BPL and APL We collected data on average number of ration cards by types, BPL, APL, ANP and

ANT for two years, 2005-06 and 2006-07, as reported by the functionaries at the

district level. For 2005-06, 76.7 per cent of all cards were APL, the rest under BPL

(15.6 per cent), ANP (0.9 per cent) and ANT (6.8 per cent). For 2006-07, 76.9 per

cent of all cards were APL, the rest under BPL (13.7 per cent), ANP (0.8 per cent)

and ANT (8.5 per cent). The last three types may be considered under ‘poor’

category. There are district wise variations in the types of cards distributed. For

example, for each of 2005-06 and 2006-07, districts like Badaun, Lucknow and

Varanasi had cards by APL type more than 80.0. There was no cardholding by ANP

type in 2006-07 in Lalitpur, Jhansi and Varanasi. Excepting this, there was no null

entry by types of cards for any of these selected years. Cardholding by BPL type

declined in 2006-07 relative to that in 2005-06. There are district wise variations in

the types of cards distributed (Table 3.6).

62

Table 3.6

Average Number of Different Types of Ration Cards, 2005-06 and 2006-07 (As Reported by the Functionaries)

2005-06 Districts Figure

in BPL ANP ANT Under BPL

CategoryAPL Total

No. 181061 7743 78939 267743 591070 858813Bareilly % 21.1 0.9 9.2 31.2 68.8 100.0

No. 94604 5741 41246 141591 594155 735746Badaun % 12.9 0.8 5.6 19.2 80.8 100.0

No. 91018 7307 39682 138007 721699 859706Lucknow % 10.6 0.8 4.6 16.1 83.9 100.0

No. 49547 3069 21603 74219 142782 217001Lalitpur % 22.8 1.4 10.0 34.2 65.8 100.0

No. 83240 4920 36292 124452 272616 397068Jhansi % 21.0 1.2 9.1 31.3 68.7 100.0

No. 89904 6524 39196 135624 576388 712012Varanasi % 12.6 0.9 5.5 19.0 81.0 100.0

No. 98229 5884 42826 146939 483118 630058Total % 15.6 0.9 6.8 23.3 76.7 100.0

2006-07 No. 160313 7754 99687 267754 591347 859101Bareilly

% 18.7 0.9 11.6 31.2 68.8 100.0No. 83763 5752 52087 141602 594155 735757Badaun

% 11.4 0.8 7.1 19.2 80.8 100.0No. 80588 7318 50112 138018 723773 861791Lucknow

% 9.4 0.8 5.8 16.0 84.0 100.0No. 43869 0 27281 71150 144607 215757Lalitpur

% 20.3 0.0 12.6 33.0 67.0 100.0No. 73701 0 45831 119532 295700 415232Jhansi

% 17.7 0.0 11.0 28.8 71.2 100.0No. 79602 0 49498 129100 576680 705780Varanasi

% 11.3 0.0 7.0 18.3 81.7 100.0No. 86973 5206 54083 146261 487710 633972Total

% 13.7 0.8 8.5 23.1 76.9 100.0Note: Data not provided from the selected districts of Lakhimpur Kheri and Gorakhpur. Source: Field Survey.

3.9. Gap between Number of Ration Cards Distributed and Households as per Census 2001

We have calculated the percentage deviation in the number of ration cards

distributed/owned from the number of households as per census 2001. For the year

2005-06 the deviation was 47.9 per cent, that is, cards less from the census

households for all the selected districts covered. For 2006-07, the percentage was

48.4. The district wise deviation (percentage) was always positive for each district,

with as high as 65.3 per cent in 2005-06 and 63.9 in 2006-07 for Varanasi. Varanasi

63

showed the highest deviation for each of the years we studied. The lowest deviation

was for Lalitpur in each of the years 2005-06 and 2006-07 (Table 3.7). Table 3.7

Deviation in Number of Ration Cards from the Number of Households as per Census 2001

2005-06 2006-07 Deviation from

Census 2001

Deviation from Census

2001

HHs as per

Census 2001

Districts

Total No. of

Ration Cards No. %

Total No. of

Ration Cards No. %

Bareilly 858813 304052 54.8 859101 304340 54.9 554761Badaun 735746 264590 56.2 735757 264601 56.2 471156Lucknow 859706 215437 33.4 861791 217522 33.8 644269Lalitpur 217001 50989 30.7 215757 49745 30.0 166012Jhansi 397068 107205 37.0 415232 125369 43.3 289863Varanasi 712012 281361 65.3 705780 275129 63.9 430651Total 3780346 1223634 47.9 3793418 1236706 48.4 2556712

Source: Field Survey 3.10 Allocation, Lifting and Distribution of Commodities For kerosene it is cent per cent distribution as percentage of lifting and cent per cent

as percentage of allotment. Generally what is lifted is distributed as reported by the

functionaries. This remains a fact, as reported, in cases of BPL rice, BPL wheat, ANT

rice, ANT wheat, ANP wheat, and sugar. A little aberration is reported in case of

sugar in districts Badaun, Jhansi and Varanasi where lifting remains much less than

allotment. However, in these districts cent per cent of sugar is distributed of what is

allotted. Thus, generally there are no district wise variations in the lifting and

distribution data of the items under different types of cardholding (Table 3.8).

64

Table 3.8 Commodities Allotted, Lifted and Distributed for the Districts in 2005-06

(Figure in %)

Items Status

Bar

eilly

Bad

aun

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Vara

nasi

Total

Distributed 100.0 98.7 100.0 100.0 99.9 95.2 93.8Lifted 100.0 98.7 100.0 100.0 99.9 95.2 93.8

BPL Rice Allotment 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Distributed 100.0 97.9 100.0 100.0 98.4 89.8 99.2Lifted 100.0 97.9 100.0 100.0 99.0 89.8 99.3

BPL Wheat Allotment 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Distributed 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.9 99.9 94.3Lifted 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.9 99.9 94.3

ANT Rice Allotment 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Distributed 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.1 99.9 99.9Lifted 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.7 99.9 100.0

ANT Wheat Allotment 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Distributed 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Lifted 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

ANP Wheat Allotment 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Distributed 100.0 89.7 100.0 100.0 93.6 90.8 98.3Lifted 100.0 89.7 100.0 100.0 93.8 90.8 98.3

Sugar Allotment 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Distributed 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Lifted 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Kerosene Allotment 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Note: Data reported by functionary of concerned districts. Source: Field Survey. 3.10.1 Demand, Availability and Supply of Foodgrains and Kerosene As reported by the Godown-in-charge for 2005-06, the stock/availability on average

was higher than estimated demand for each of rice, wheat and sugar. Supply of

these items was marginally less than demand in cases of wheat and sugar. For rice,

supply equaled estimated demand. Supply of each item was less than stock for each

of the items, implying addition to stock for release for the next year. There are

district-wise differences in each of demand, stock and supply for each of these items.

Badaun is an exception to the general inequality between demand, stock and supply

of the items for distribution by the Godowns. It shows just an equality between each,

demand, supply and stock for each item in 2005-06. Taking demand as the base

(100.0) we find in all the districts, equality in supply and demand for wheat, excepting

Lalitpur and Bareilly, in the former supply exceeding demand marginally and in the

latter supply falling short of demand marginally. The reported supply of rice followed

the similar trend, excepting Lalitpur and Jhansi where supply was much less than

demand. The reported supply of sugar followed the similar trend, excepting Varanasi

65

and Jhansi where supply was much less than demand. There was no general dearth

of stock/availability relative to demand and what was to be supplied (Table 3.9). Table 3.9

Demand, Stock and Supply of Food-grains in Godowns (2005-06) (As Reported by Foodgrains Godown-in-charge)

(Quantity in Qtl) Wheat Rice Sugar Districts Figure in

Supply Stock Demand Supply Stock Demand Supply Stock DemandQuantity 553.0 562.2 555.3 615.3 628.0 616.0 52.6 52.6 53.1Bareilly

% 99.6 101.2 100.0 99.9 101.9 100.0 99.1 99.1 100.0Quantity 2135.9 2135.9 2135.9 2122.8 2122.8 2122.8 849.9 849.9 849.9Badaun

% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Quantity 311.5 383.6 311.5 514.4 594.5 514.4 67.9 72.7 67.9Lakhimpur

Kheri % 100.0 123.1 100.0 100.0 115.6 100.0 100.0 107.0 100.0Quantity 160.1 163.7 160.1 244.7 276.2 244.7 44.4 47.1 44.4Lucknow

% 100.0 102.3 100.0 100.0 112.8 100.0 100.0 106.1 100.0Quantity 244.8 254.0 244.4 248.3 261.4 249.7 38.1 38.5 38.2Lalitpur

% 100.2 103.9 100.0 99.5 104.7 100.0 99.9 101.0 100.0Quantity 327.0 399.9 342.3 316.2 349.2 332.7 56.4 60.5 58.4Jhansi

% 95.5 116.8 100.0 95.0 104.9 100.0 96.6 103.7 100.0Quantity 202.6 237.9 202.6 405.1 453.2 405.1 76.2 78.2 76.2Gorakhpur

% 100.0 117.4 100.0 100.0 111.9 100.0 100.0 102.7 100.0Quantity 220.9 220.9 262.2 448.3 476.5 448.3 64.1 64.1 75.6Varanasi

% 84.2 84.2 100.0 100.0 106.3 100.0 84.8 84.8 100.0Quantity 612.5 636.0 616.8 689.4 714.4 689.3 104.7 106.5 105.8Total

% 99.3 103.1 100.0 100.0 103.6 100.0 99.0 100.7 100.0Source: Field Survey. Stock of kerosene on average in oil depot in 2005-06 was higher than

demand, overall and for each district. For five districts, out of selected eight, supply

by depot equals demand from FPSs. For the remaining three districts, supply was a

little less than demand (Table 3.10). Table 3.10

Demand, Stock and Supply of Kerosene Oil by Oil Depots (2005-06) (As Reported by kerosene depot-in-charge)

(Quantity in KL) Supply Stock/Availability Demand District

Quantity % Quantity % Quantity % Bareilly 2159.7 100.0 2215.8 102.6 2159.7 100.0 Badaun 2656.0 100.0 2666.9 100.4 2656.0 100.0 Lakhimpur Kheri 759.0 100.0 846.7 111.6 759.0 100.0 Lucknow 1826.1 100.0 2005.9 109.8 1826.1 100.0 Lalitpur 1861.6 99.8 1938.2 103.9 1866.2 100.0 Jhansi 1750.5 98.7 1898.6 107.0 1774.0 100.0 Gorakhpur 2141.3 99.6 2191.4 101.9 2150.1 100.0 Varanasi 2113.7 100.0 2281.8 108.0 2113.7 100.0 Total 1863.5 99.7 1955.0 104.6 1868.3 100.0

Source: Field Survey.

66

3.11 Supply of Foodgrains under Different Schemes We found data on average supply of foodgrains to TPDS and welfare schemes for

2005-06 for six districts out of selected eight. Based on this, we offer the following

observations:

• Only one-tenth of the supply of foodgrains (rice and wheat) was distributed

under the welfare schemes. 90.5 per cent of these items were supplied under

TPDS.

• Of the supply for TPDS, the ratio for wheat and rice was 48:52. Of the supply

for welfare schemes, the ratio was 40:60. We find district-wise variations in

the ratios in which wheat and rice are supplied under TPDS and welfare

schemes. Wheat is supplied less than rice in half of the districts that sent

data, namely, Bareilly, Lakhimpur Kheri and Gorakhpur.

• For each of Lakhimpur Kheri and Gorakhpur, the supply of foodgrains for

TPDS was more than 95.0 per cent (Table 3.11). Table 3.11

Average Supply of Food-grains under different schemes (2005-06) (As Reported by Godown in-charge and Depot-in-Charge)

(Quantity in quintal) TPDS Welfare Schemes Districts

Figure

in Wheat Rice Total Wheat Rice Total Total

Quantity 53216.6 58475.4 111691.9 3167.2 5002.6 8169.8 119861.7Bareilly

% 44.4 48.8 93.2 2.6 4.2 6.8 100.0Quantity 214489.6 210501.7 424991.3 19461.4 35670.0 55131.4 480122.7Badaun

% 44.7 43.8 88.5 4.1 7.4 11.5 100.0Quantity 30151.7 49995.1 80146.8 998.5 2890.0 3888.4 84035.3Lakhimpur

Kheri % 35.9 59.5 95.4 1.2 3.4 4.6 100.0Quantity 22533.1 22214.5 44747.5 1930.7 2975.1 4905.8 49653.3Lalitpur

% 45.4 44.7 90.1 3.9 6.0 9.9 100.0Quantity 36512.7 35792.9 72305.6 1773.4 2437.9 4211.3 76516.9Jhansi

% 47.7 46.8 94.5 2.3 3.2 5.5 100.0Quantity 20313.5 39163.8 59477.3 1013.6 2058.3 3071.9 62549.3Gorakhpur

% 32.5 62.6 95.1 1.6 3.3 4.9 100.0Quantity 68270.1 74120.0 142390.1 5869.9 9065.0 14934.8 157324.9Total

% 43.4 47.1 90.5 3.7 5.8 9.5 100.0Source: Field Survey. 3.12 Location of Selected Villages 78.8 per cent of the selected villages have link roads, 6.1 per cent are connected with

main road, and 3.0 per cent have only kuchha roads. One district from each region

in the state of UP, as the sample has been selected, has only link roads, namely

Badaun from west UP, Lucknow from central UP, Jhansi from Bundelkhand and

Varanasi from east UP. Only villages in the sample in Gorakhpur in east UP have

67

links with main road. Only kuchha road was found in Lalitpur in the sample villages

(Table 3.12). Table 3.12

Location of the Sample Villages (no. of village in %)

Regions District Link Road

Main Road

Kuchha Road

Other Total

Bariely 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 100.0Western Badaun 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0Lakhimpur Kheri 75.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 100.0Central Lucknow 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0Lalitpur 75.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 100.0Bundelkhand Jhansi 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0Gorakhpur 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 100.0Eastern Varanasi 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0

Total 78.8 6.1 3.0 12.1 100.0Source: Field Survey 3.13 Availability of Electricity in Rural Area On average, electricity per day is available in the sample villages for 6.67 hours that

varies across districts from a minimum for 3.0 hours per day in Lalitpur district and

11.33 hours in Lucknow district. The average availability of electricity per day for

each district varies, showing minimum and maximum availability by hours per day.

The minimum availability is 0.0 (non-availability) for Jhansi district (Table 3.13). Table 3.13

Electricity Available per day in Rural Areas (in hours)

Regions District Mean Minimum Maximum Bariely 5.33 3.00 8.00

Western Badaun 5.75 3.00 10.00 Lakhimpur Kheri 6.25 4.00 10.00

Central Lucknow 11.33 8.00 16.00 Lalitpur 3.00 2.00 4.00

Bundelkhand Jhansi 6.00 0.00 20.00 Gorakhpur 8.75 5.00 12.00

Eastern Varanasi 8.75 6.00 14.00 Total 6.67 0.00 20.00

Source: Field Survey 3.14 Availability of Basic Amenities in Selected Villages As reported by the Panchayat representatives, electricity is available within 1 km. in

all the sample villages, public telephone is available within 1 km. in 31 of the total

(33) villages, FPS is available for 30 villages within 1 km. 66.6 per cent of the

foodgrain godowns are located beyond 10 km. from the selected villages; 93.9 per

cent of the foodgrain godowns are located beyond 5 km. 54.5 per cent of the oil

depots are located beyond 10 km; 93.9 per cent of the oil depots are located beyond

68

5 km. 51.5 per cent of the mandi samity/purchase centers are located beyond 10

km.; 78.8 per cent of the mandi samity/purchase centers are located beyond 5 km.

54.5 per cent of the weekly markets are located within 3 km. 45.4 per cent of the

permanent markets are available within 3 km., as reported (Table 3.14). Table 3.14

Basic Amenities Available in Sample Villages (As Reported by Panchayats)

Reg

ions

Dis

tanc

e

Bus

Sto

ps

Tele

phon

e

Elec

tric

ity

Nat

iona

lized

B

ank

Wea

kly

Mar

ket

Perm

anen

t M

arke

t

Reg

iona

l Sup

ply

Offi

ce

FPS

Shop

Food

-gra

ins

God

own

Ker

osen

e O

il D

epot

Polic

y St

atio

n/

Sub-

stat

ion

Man

di S

amiti

/ Pu

rcha

se C

entr

e

Blo

ck H

Q

Within 1 1 9 10 0 2 1 0 9 0 0 0 0 0 1-3 6 1 0 4 3 4 0 0 0 1 2 0 1 3-5 2 0 0 2 4 2 1 1 1 0 2 2 0 5-10 1 0 0 2 1 3 4 0 2 2 5 4 4

Wes

t

Above 10 0 0 0 2 0 0 5 0 7 7 1 4 5 Within 1 3 7 7 1 2 2 0 6 0 0 0 0 0 1-3 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 3-5 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 2 5-10 3 0 0 2 2 2 2 0 3 4 3 2 3 C

entra

l

Above 10 0 0 0 0 0 1 4 0 4 3 1 5 2 Within 1 2 7 8 0 2 0 0 7 0 0 0 0 0 1-3 2 1 0 2 3 2 1 0 0 0 2 1 1 3-5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 5-10 3 0 0 3 2 3 2 0 1 2 4 3 2

Bund

elkh

and

Above 10 0 0 0 3 1 3 5 0 7 6 2 4 5 Within 1 3 8 8 1 2 3 0 8 0 0 1 1 0 1-3 2 0 0 5 3 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 3-5 2 0 0 1 2 2 2 0 1 1 2 1 1 5-10 1 0 0 1 1 1 3 0 3 5 3 0 4

Eas

t

Above 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 4 2 0 4 1 Within 1 9 31 33 2 8 6 0 30 0 0 1 1 0 1-3 11 2 0 13 10 9 3 1 0 1 7 3 4 3-5 5 0 0 5 8 5 4 2 2 1 6 3 3 5-10 8 0 0 8 6 9 11 0 9 13 15 9 13

Tota

l

Above 10 0 0 0 5 1 4 15 0 22 18 4 17 13 Total Villages 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33

Source: Field Survey. 3.14.1 Education and Health Services Available in Selected Villages In all the villages, primary schools are located within a distance of 1 km. 90.9 per

cent of the villages have Anganwadi/Balwadi within 1 km. No PHC is available within

1 km. Unregistered medical practitioners (‘Jhola Chhap’ doctors) are available within

1 km. distance in 72.7 per cent of the selected villages.63.6 per cent of the PHCs are

available beyond 5 km. 39.3 per cent of the registered doctors/clinic are available

beyond 5 km. from the selected villages (Table 3.15).

69

Table 3.15 Education and Health Services Available in Sample Villages

Reg

ions

Distance Primary

School Upper

Primary Anganwadi/

Balwadi Sub-

health Centre

PHCPrivate Doctor/ Clinic

Jhola Chhap Doctor

Medical Shop

Within 1 10 7 8 3 0 0 7 2 1-3 0 1 1 1 3 4 2 4 3-5 0 1 0 3 0 4 1 2 5-10 0 1 1 1 3 2 0 2

Wes

t

Above 10 0 0 0 2 4 0 0 0 Within 1 7 5 6 2 0 2 5 2 1-3 0 2 0 1 0 1 2 3 3-5 0 0 0 0 2 1 0 0 5-10 0 0 1 3 3 1 0 1 C

entra

l

Above 10 0 0 0 1 2 2 0 1 Within 1 8 8 8 2 0 0 4 1 1-3 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 2 3-5 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 5-10 0 0 0 4 4 5 3 5

Bund

elkh

and

Above 10 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 Within 1 8 5 8 6 0 2 8 4 1-3 0 2 0 1 3 3 0 2 3-5 0 1 0 1 2 2 0 2 5-10 0 0 0 0 3 1 0 0

Eas

t

Above 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 Within 1 33 25 30 13 0 4 24 9 1-3 0 5 1 4 7 9 5 11 3-5 0 2 0 5 5 7 1 4 5-10 0 1 2 8 13 9 3 8

Tota

l

Above 10 0 0 0 3 8 4 0 1 Total Villages 33 33 33 33 33 33 33 33

Source: Field Survey 3.15 Existence of Households under BPL and APL Category As estimated by Gram Panchayats, of total households in the selected villages, 29.4

per cent are from SCs, which is 71.2 per cent from BPL and 28.8 per cent from APL.

The selected SC households as percentage of total households vary over districts,

for example,SC households as percentage is as high as 51.5 in District Jhansi and

as low as 15.8 in District Barielly. From BPL category, SCs contribute as high as 91.1

per cent for Varanasi, followed by 86.2 for Jhansi, and as low as 25.5 for Barielly.

From APL category, SCs are as high as 74.5 per cent for Barielly, followed by 73.1

for Badaun, and as low as 8.9 for Varanasi.

70

Table 3.16 Number of BPL and APL Beneficiary Households Estimated by the Gram Panchayats

BPL APL Total District SC Others Total SC Others Total SC Others Total

No. 84 238 322 246 1523 1769 330 1761 2091Bariely % 25.5 13.5 15.4 74.5 86.5 84.6 15.8 84.2 100.0No. 198 367 565 539 1528 1467 737 1895 2032Badaun % 26.9 19.4 27.8 73.1 80.6 72.2 36.3 93.3 100.0No. 460 485 945 357 2372 2729 817 2857 3674Lakhimpur Kheri % 56.3 17.0 25.7 43.7 83.0 74.3 22.2 77.8 100.0No. 160 180 340 120 258 378 280 438 718Lucknow % 57.1 41.1 47.4 42.9 58.9 52.6 39.0 61.0 100.0No. 231 54 285 100 399 499 331 453 784Lalitpur % 69.8 11.9 36.4 30.2 88.1 63.6 42.2 57.8 100.0No. 1090 670 1760 175 520 695 1265 1190 2455Jhansi % 86.2 56.3 71.7 13.8 43.7 28.3 51.5 48.5 100.0No. 379 385 764 221 615 836 600 1000 1600Gorakhpur % 63.2 38.5 47.8 36.8 61.5 52.3 37.5 62.5 100.0No. 2305 2940 5245 225 3980 4205 2530 6920 9450Varanasi % 91.1 42.5 55.5 8.9 57.5 44.5 26.8 73.2 100.0No. 4907 5319 10226 1983 11195 13178 6890 16514 23404Total % 71.2 32.2 43.7 28.8 67.8 56.3 29.4 70.6 100.0

Source: Field Survey

71

Chapter IV

Public Distribution in Uttar Pradesh: The Facts

Section 1: Beneficiary Households 4.1 Sample Profile We covered a total of 960 beneficiary households in the sample. It is equally

distributed over all the four regions in UP, east, west, central and Bundelkhand. This

has exception for west UP with two households less and central UP with two

households more than the average for each region in the sample. Each of the

selected eight districts has equal number of households in the sample excepting that

Bareilly has two less and Lakhimpur has two more. The adjustment district/region

wise was to compensate sample loss.

Of the total households, 68.4 per cent are rural and 31.6 per cent are urban.

Of the rural sample beneficiary households, the minimum is drawn from east UP

(66.25 per cent) and the maximum is from central UP (71.1 per cent). For the urban

beneficiary households, the minimum percentage is 28.9 for central UP and the

maximum is 33.7 for east UP. We do not have much difference district wise by

percentages of rural and urban households selected.

We covered a total of 28 blocks, 14 towns and 60 villages (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Sample Beneficiary Households by Blocks, Towns and Sample Units

Households Covered Rural Urban Total

Sample Units

Region

District No. % No. % No. %

Blocks Towns Villages Wards

Barielly 81 68.6 37 31.4 118 100.0 2 1 5 2Badaun 85 70.8 35 29.2 120 100.0 2 1 4 2

Western Total 166 69.7 72 30.3 238 100.0 4 2 9 4

Lakhimpur 82 67.2 40 32.8 122 100.0 2 1 4 2Lucknow 90 75.0 30 25.0 120 100.0 2 1 5 2

Central Total 172 71.1 70 28.9 242 100.0 4 2 9 4

Lalitpur 80 66.7 40 33.3 120 100.0 2 1 4 2Jhansi 80 66.7 40 33.3 120 100.0 2 1 4 2

Bundelkhand Total 160 66.7 80 33.3 240 100.0 4 2 8 4

Gorakhpur 79 65.8 41 34.2 120 100.0 2 1 4 2Varanasi 80 66.7 40 33.3 120 100.0 2 1 4 2

Eastern Total 159 66.25 81 33.75 240 100.0 4 2 8 4

Total Sample 657 68.4 303 31.6 960 100.0 16 8 34 16Source: Field Survey.

72

By the category of cardholding, namely, BPL, APL, ANP and ANT, the total

beneficiary households (960) are equally distributed (each category totaling 240). Of

all the rural beneficiary households, the beneficiaries are equally distributed (each

category totaling 160), excepting ANP (177). District wise each category of

households by cardholding is equally distributed, total (30) and rural (20) for each,

thus, adding up to a total of 120 for each district. This has exception to total ANP

households for Bareilly (two less) and Lakhimpur Kheri (two more), and Gorakhpur

(one less for ANP rural). Thus, we followed uniform distribution in selection of

beneficiary households by cardholding (Table 4.2). Table 4.2

Profile of Beneficiary Households by Different Types of Ration Cards BPL APL ANP ANT Total Districts

Rural Total Rural Total Rural Total Rural Total Rural Total No. 20 30 20 30 21 28 20 30 81 118Barielly % 24.7 37.0 24.7 37.0 25.9 34.6 24.7 37.0 25.4 100.0No. 20 30 20 30 25 30 20 30 85 120

Badaun % 23.5 35.3 23.5 35.3 29.4 35.3 23.5 35.3 25.0 100.0No. 20 30 20 30 22 32 20 30 82 122Lakhimpur

Kheri % 24.4 36.6 24.4 36.6 26.8 39.0 24.4 36.6 24.6 100.0No. 20 30 20 30 30 30 20 30 90 120

Lucknow % 22.2 33.3 22.2 33.3 33.3 33.3 22.2 33.3 25.0 100.0No. 20 30 20 30 20 30 20 30 80 120

Lalitpur % 25.0 37.5 25.0 37.5 25.0 37.5 25.0 37.5 25.0 100.0No. 20 30 20 30 20 30 20 30 80 120

Jhansi % 25.0 37.5 25.0 37.5 25.0 37.5 25.0 37.5 25.0 100.0No. 20 30 20 30 19 30 20 30 79 120

Gorakhpur % 25.3 38.0 25.3 38.0 24.1 38.0 25.3 38.0 25.0 100.0No. 20 30 20 30 20 30 20 30 80 120

Varanasi % 25.0 37.5 25.0 37.5 25.0 37.5 25.0 37.5 25.0 100.0No. 160 240 160 240 177 240 160 240 657 960

Total % 24.4 36.5 24.4 36.5 26.9 36.5 24.4 36.5 25.0 100.0Source: Field Survey. Profile of Beneficiary Households by Age

Of all the beneficiary households, 45.2 per cent are in the age bracket 35-60 and

69.0 per cent are in age bracket 18-60. For rural region, the respective percentages

are 44.6 and 70.3. For urban region, the respective percentages are 46.5 and 66.0.

The age distribution district wise, total and for each of rural and urban regions, show

variations (Table 4.3).

73

Table 4.3 Distribution of Beneficiary Households by Region and Age

(In %)

Areas Age Groups Barielly Badaun Lakhimpu

r Kheri Lucknow Lalitpur Jhansi Gorakhpur Varanasi Total

<18 1.2 2.4 2.4 2.2 1.3 0.0 1.3 0.0 1.418-35 24.7 21.2 28.0 23.3 28.8 35.0 17.7 27.5 25.735-60 40.7 52.9 45.1 38.9 47.5 36.3 45.6 50.0 44.660-75 28.4 22.4 24.4 33.3 21.3 27.5 35.4 22.5 26.9>75 4.9 1.2 0.0 2.2 1.3 1.3 0.0 0.0 1.4Total 81 85 82 90 80 80 79 80 657

Rural 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

<18 5.4 2.9 0.0 6.7 0.0 2.5 7.3 7.5 4.018-35 21.6 14.3 20.0 30.0 30.0 27.5 9.8 5.0 19.535-60 43.2 57.1 50.0 40.0 37.5 42.5 48.8 52.5 46.560-75 24.3 20.0 30.0 23.3 30.0 27.5 34.1 35.0 28.4>75 5.4 5.7 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7Total 37 35 40 30 40 40 41 40 303

Urban 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

<18 2.5 2.5 1.6 3.3 0.8 0.8 3.3 2.5 2.218-35 23.7 19.2 25.4 25.0 29.2 32.5 15.0 20.0 23.835-60 41.5 54.2 46.7 39.2 44.2 38.3 46.7 50.8 45.260-75 27.1 21.7 26.2 30.8 24.2 27.5 35.0 26.7 27.4>75 5.1 2.5 0.0 1.7 1.7 0.8 0.0 0.0 1.5Total 118 120 122 120 120 120 120 120 960

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey. Of all beneficiary households, the male: female was 59.9:40.1. Male rural:

urban ratio is 71.3: 28.7 and that of female 64.2:35.8. Thus, the selection of

households was not only rural-weighted but also male-weighted. There were district

wise variations in the ratios by gender and by rural-urban (Table 4.4). Table 4.4

Distribution of Beneficiary Households by Region and Gender Urban Rural Total Districts

Male Female Total Male Female Total Male Female Total 31 6 37 54 27 81 85 33 118 Barielly

36.5 18.2 31.4 63.5 81.8 68.6 100.0 100.0 100.0 20 15 35 56 29 85 76 44 120 Badaun

26.3 34.1 29.2 73.7 65.9 70.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 11 29 40 47 35 82 58 64 122 Lakhimpur Kheri

19.0 45.3 32.8 81.0 54.7 67.2 100.0 100.0 100.0 13 17 30 51 39 90 64 56 120 Lucknow

20.3 30.4 25.0 79.7 69.6 75.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 24 16 40 47 33 80 71 49 120 Lalitpur

33.8 32.7 33.3 66.2 67.3 66.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 24 16 40 60 20 80 84 36 120 Jhansi

28.6 44.4 33.3 71.4 55.6 66.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 19 22 41 35 44 79 54 66 120 Gorakhpur

35.2 33.3 34.2 64.8 66.7 65.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 23 17 40 60 20 80 83 37 120 Varanasi

27.7 45.9 33.3 72.3 54.1 66.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 165 138 303 410 247 657 575 385 960 Total

28.7 35.8 31.6 71.3 64.2 68.4 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Field Survey. 66.0 per cent of the beneficiary households are illiterate. 10.1 per cent have

education at the level of high school and above. Another 10.1 per cent have attained

primary level education. There are district wise variations in the distribution of

households by educational attainment (Table 4.5).

74

Table 4.5 Educational Level of Beneficiary Households

Education Level Barielly Badaun Lakhimpur Kheri Lucknow Lalitpur Jhansi Gorakhpur Varanasi Total

No. 77 86 90 82 88 58 88 65 634Illiterate % 65.3 71.7 73.8 68.3 73.3 48.3 73.3 54.2 66.0

No. 4 7 7 7 7 5 8 8 53Literate % 3.4 5.8 5.7 5.8 5.8 4.2 6.7 6.7 5.5

No. 10 11 10 3 18 17 9 19 97Primary % 8.5 9.2 8.2 2.5 15.0 14.2 7.5 15.8 10.1

No. 8 5 4 18 0 15 7 10 67Middle % 6.8 4.2 3.3 15.0 0.0 12.5 5.8 8.3 7.0

No. 13 6 7 5 6 14 4 7 62High School % 11.0 5.0 5.7 4.2 5.0 11.7 3.3 5.8 6.5

No. 4 3 1 5 1 6 4 8 32Inter % 3.4 2.5 0.8 4.2 0.8 5.0 3.3 6.7 3.3

No. 2 2 0 0 0 5 0 3 12Higher Education % 1.7 1.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.2 0.0 2.5 1.3

No. 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 3Technical Education % 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3

No. 118 120 122 120 120 120 120 120 960Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey. 4.2 Demographic Profile of Beneficiary Population Of all the population in the sample beneficiary households, male-female ratio was

52:48. In total population 52.3 per cent was SCs, 27.2 per cent OBCs, 16.9 per cent

minority and 2.8 per cent general castes. The range of district wise total population in

the sample households shows a minimum at 562 for Lalitpur and a maximum at 679

for Gorakhpur, by percentage the difference between minimum and maximum

population district wise is 2.46. There are district wise differences in gender ratios in

population intra- and inter-caste categories (Table 4.6).

75

Table 4.6 Classification of Population in Beneficiary Households

(By Caste and Gender) Caste Gender Barielly Badaun Lakhimpur Lucknow Lalitpur Jhansi Gorakhpur Varanasi Total

No. 89 178 166 184 230 223 141 131 1342Male

% 29.1 57.4 55.3 61.7 76.9 74.1 39.0 40.4 53.7No. 82 141 134 169 196 193 123 112 1150

Female % 27.0 55.7 48.7 60.8 74.5 69.7 38.8 37.3 50.7

No. 171 319 300 353 426 416 264 243 2492

SC

Total % 28.0 56.7 52.2 61.3 75.8 72.0 38.9 38.9 52.3

No. 73 60 95 54 53 64 161 116 676Male

% 23.9 19.4 31.7 18.1 17.7 21.3 44.5 35.8 27.0No. 62 50 103 55 49 66 125 112 622

Female % 20.4 19.8 37.5 19.8 18.6 23.8 39.4 37.3 27.4

No. 135 110 198 109 102 130 286 228 1298

OB

C

Total % 22.1 19.5 34.4 18.9 18.1 22.5 42.1 36.5 27.2

No. 108 65 20 54 10 9 54 70 390Male

% 35.3 21.0 6.7 18.1 3.3 3.0 14.9 21.6 15.6No. 140 57 23 51 9 11 62 65 418

Female % 46.1 22.5 8.4 18.3 3.4 4.0 19.6 21.7 18.4

No. 248 122 43 105 19 20 116 135 808

Min

ority

Total % 40.7 21.7 7.5 18.2 3.4 3.5 17.1 21.6 16.9

No. 14 7 17 6 6 5 6 7 68Male

% 4.6 2.3 5.7 2.0 2.0 1.7 1.7 2.2 2.7No. 9 5 13 3 9 7 7 11 64

Female % 3.0 2.0 4.7 1.1 3.4 2.5 2.2 3.7 2.8

No. 23 12 30 9 15 12 13 18 132

Gen

eral

Total % 3.8 2.1 5.2 1.6 2.7 2.1 1.9 2.9 2.8

No. 22 2 24Male

% 7.2 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0No. 11 2 13

Female % 3.6 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6

No. 33 4 37

Oth

er

Total % 5.4 0.0 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8

No. 306 310 300 298 299 301 362 324 2500Male

% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 304 253 275 278 263 277 317 300 2267

Female % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

No. 610 563 575 576 562 578 679 624 4767

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006 By economic categories by poverty indicator, 28.9 per cent are BPL, 26.3 per

cent are ANT, 16.9 per cent are ANP and 27.8 per cent are APL. Thus, in the

population from the sample households, 72.2 per cent are poor covered by BPL, ANT

and ANP. The distribution of BPL population by districts shows a range with minimum

at 140 for Lalitpur and maximum at 216 for Gorakhpur, the respective percentages

being 10.1 and 15.6. The distribution of APL population by districts shows a range

with minimum at 145 for Lucknow and maximum at 205 for Gorakhpur, the respective

76

percentages being 10.9 and 15.4. The distribution of ANP population by districts

shows a range with the minimum at 74 for Badaun and the maximum at 127 for

Varanasi, the respective percentages being 9.2 and 15.7. The distribution of ANT

population by districts shows a range with minimum at 130 for Lakhimpur and

maximum at 173 for Lucknow, the respective percentages being 10.4 and 13.8.

There are district wise differences in gender ratios in population from the sample by

intra- and inter-economic categories. We find well representation of all the districts by

inclusion of population in the economic categories by poor (BPL, ANT and ANP) and

non-poor (APL) (Table 4.7). Table 4.7

Classification of Population in Beneficiary Households (By Card-Holding and Gender)

Gen

der

Cat

egor

y

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

No. 93 94 82 84 80 95 126 104 758BPL % 53.1 55.3 52.2 52.8 57.1 54.6 58.3 55.0 54.9

No. 95 91 95 78 92 82 110 83 726APL % 56.9 59.5 54.3 53.8 55.8 49.7 53.7 54.6 54.7

No. 46 33 48 42 45 39 45 52 350ANP % 43.0 44.6 42.5 42.4 45.5 42.4 46.4 40.9 43.3

No. 72 92 75 94 82 85 81 85 666ANT % 44.7 55.4 57.7 54.3 51.9 57.8 50.3 54.5 53.2

No. 306 310 300 298 299 301 362 324 2500

Mal

e

Total % 50.2 55.1 52.2 51.7 53.2 52.1 53.3 51.9 52.4No. 82 76 75 75 60 79 90 85 622

BPL % 46.9 44.7 47.8 47.2 42.9 45.4 41.7 45.0 45.1No. 72 62 80 67 73 83 95 69 601

APL % 43.1 40.5 45.7 46.2 44.2 50.3 46.3 45.4 45.3No. 61 41 65 57 54 53 52 75 458

ANP % 57.0 55.4 57.5 57.6 54.5 57.6 53.6 59.1 56.7No. 89 74 55 79 76 62 80 71 586

ANT % 55.3 44.6 42.3 45.7 48.1 42.2 49.7 45.5 46.8No. 304 253 275 278 263 277 317 300 2267

Fem

ale

Total % 49.8 44.9 47.8 48.3 46.8 47.9 46.7 48.1 47.6No. 175 170 157 159 140 174 216 189 1380

BPL % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 167 153 175 145 165 165 205 152 1327

APL % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 107 74 113 99 99 92 97 127 808

ANP % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 161 166 130 173 158 147 161 156 1252

ANT % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 610 563 575 576 562 578 679 624 4767

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Source: Field Survey 2006

77

Of the total population in the sample, 53.4 per cent belong to the age bracket

between 15 and 60 years. 23.2 per cent in the age bracket between 7 and 14 years,

14.6 per cent below 6 years and 8.8 per cent above 60 years. There are district wise

variations in the percentages of population, including by gender, in the respective

age brackets (Table 4.8). Table 4.8

Classification of Population in Beneficiary Households (By Age and Gender)

Age Gender

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

No. 42 43 46 48 67 44 49 49 388Male % 13.7 13.9 15.3 16.1 22.4 14.6 13.5 15.1 15.5

No. 41 38 39 36 42 33 36 44 309Female % 13.5 15.0 14.2 12.9 16.0 11.9 11.4 14.7 13.6

No. 83 81 85 84 109 77 85 93 697

Up

to 6

Y

ears

Total % 13.6 14.4 14.8 14.6 19.4 13.3 12.5 14.9 14.6No. 81 74 74 65 64 61 100 77 596

Male % 26.5 23.9 24.7 21.8 21.4 20.3 27.6 23.8 23.8No. 79 51 59 65 53 59 73 72 511

Female % 26.0 20.2 21.5 23.4 20.2 21.3 23.0 24.0 22.5No. 160 125 133 130 117 120 173 149 11077

To 1

4 Y

ears

Total % 26.2 22.2 23.1 22.6 20.8 20.8 25.5 23.9 23.2No. 106 109 108 107 84 110 112 105 841

Male % 34.6 35.2 36.0 35.9 28.1 36.5 30.9 32.4 33.6No. 93 81 88 95 78 99 111 87 732

Female % 30.6 32.0 32.0 34.2 29.7 35.7 35.0 29.0 32.3No. 199 190 196 202 162 209 223 192 157315

To

35

Yea

rs

Total % 32.6 33.7 34.1 35.1 28.8 36.2 32.8 30.8 33.0No. 56 67 57 51 67 66 74 65 503

Male % 18.3 21.6 19.0 17.1 22.4 21.9 20.4 20.1 20.1No. 60 63 60 45 58 53 66 63 468

Female % 19.7 24.9 21.8 16.2 22.1 19.1 20.8 21.0 20.6No. 116 130 117 96 125 119 140 128 97136

To

60

Yea

rs

Total % 19.0 23.1 20.3 16.7 22.2 20.6 20.6 20.5 20.4No. 21 17 15 27 17 20 27 28 172

Male % 6.9 5.5 5.0 9.1 5.7 6.6 7.5 8.6 6.9No. 31 20 29 37 32 33 31 34 247

Female % 10.2 7.9 10.5 13.3 12.2 11.9 9.8 11.3 10.9No. 52 37 44 64 49 53 58 62 419A

bove

60

Yea

rs

Total % 8.5 6.6 7.7 11.1 8.7 9.2 8.5 9.9 8.8No. 306 310 300 298 299 301 362 324 2500Male

% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 304 253 275 278 263 277 317 300 2267Female

% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 610 563 575 576 562 578 679 624 4767

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006

78

4.3 Educational Status 40.7 per cent of the population in the beneficiary households is illiterate and 12.6 per

cent are below 6 years for whom formal education is not reachable. Hence, more

than half of the beneficiary population is less than literate. 25.3 per cent of the

population has got primary level education. 8.5 per cent of the population has got

education at the level of high school and above. There are district wise variations in

the level of education attained by the cross sections of population from the

households (Table 4.9). Table 4.9

Educational Level of Beneficiary Population from Sample Households Educational

Level Barielly Badaun Lakhimpur Lucknow Lalitpur Jhansi Gorakhpur Varanasi Total

No. 61 70 78 76 94 68 76 77 600Up to 6 Years % 10.0 12.4 13.6 13.2 16.7 11.8 11.2 12.3 12.6

No. 263 250 256 234 273 208 249 205 1938Illiterate % 43.1 44.4 44.5 40.6 48.6 36.0 36.7 32.9 40.7

No. 18 11 11 11 10 15 25 12 113Literate % 3.0 2.0 1.9 1.9 1.8 2.6 3.7 1.9 2.4

No. 172 149 137 126 146 117 193 164 1204Primary % 28.2 26.5 23.8 21.9 26.0 20.2 28.4 26.3 25.3

No. 46 40 57 87 24 92 86 75 507Middle % 7.5 7.1 9.9 15.1 4.3 15.9 12.7 12.0 10.6

No. 34 22 24 25 14 47 36 42 244High School % 5.6 3.9 4.2 4.3 2.5 8.1 5.3 6.7 5.1

No. 12 13 5 14 1 15 9 36 105Inter % 2.0 2.3 0.9 2.4 0.2 2.6 1.3 5.8 2.2

No. 4 8 7 3 0 16 5 13 56Higher Education % 0.7 1.4 1.2 0.5 0.0 2.8 0.7 2.1 1.2

No. 610 563 575 576 562 578 679 624 4767Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006 Given the total literacy rate at 53.5 per cent of the population from the

beneficiary households, there are caste and gender-wise variations in the rate of

literary. Of all SC population, 51.7 per cent are literate, which is 57.4 for the OBCs,

48.4 for the minority, 75.4 for the general caste. The male literacy rate as percentage

of male population is 64.5 and the female rate as percentage of female population is

41.6. There are district-wise variations in these rates (Table 4.10).

79

Table 4.10 Literacy Level of Beneficiary Households

(By Caste and Gender) Caste Gender Barielly Badaun Lakhimpur Lucknow Lalitpur Jhansi Gorakhpur Varanasi Total

Male 62.8 59.5 55.5 62.7 47.0 72.3 73.0 70.0 62.3Female 43.2 37.4 32.8 44.8 27.3 43.6 45.1 49.0 39.8SC Total 53.3 49.6 45.1 54.1 37.6 58.7 59.8 60.1 51.7Male 81.3 55.6 59.5 62.5 66.0 74.1 70.1 74.0 68.6Female 40.4 43.5 36.8 58.3 28.9 40.7 49.1 56.1 45.3OBC Total 62.9 50.0 48.0 60.4 47.8 57.3 60.7 65.2 57.4Male 54.9 66.1 72.2 48.9 87.5 88.9 54.2 65.1 60.2Female 30.6 29.2 31.8 31.3 55.6 40.0 44.6 54.1 37.3Minority Total 41.6 49.5 50.0 40.0 70.6 63.2 49.0 59.7 48.4Male 92.9 28.6 87.5 100.0 80.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 85.5Female 66.7 33.3 53.8 100.0 62.5 85.7 57.1 70.0 65.0General Total 82.6 30.0 72.4 100.0 69.2 90.9 76.9 82.4 75.4Male 71.4 - 100.0 - - - - - 73.9Female 36.4 - 100.0 - - - - - 46.2Other Total 59.4 - 100.0 - - - - - 63.9Male 66.3 59.3 60.3 60.5 52.7 73.7 69.4 71.1 64.5Female 37.4 36.8 35.8 45.5 30.0 44.0 46.9 53.6 41.6Total Total 52.1 49.3 48.5 53.2 41.7 59.2 58.7 62.5 53.5

Source: Field Survey 2006. 57.0 per cent of the BPL households are literate, which is 61.5 per cent of

APL households, 36.1 per cent of ANP households and 52.5 per cent of ANT

households. There are district-wise variations in the percentages of literacy by

gender by economic categories (Table 4.11). Table 4.11

Literacy Level of Beneficiary Households (By Card-Holding)

Households Gender

Bar

ielly

Bada

un

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Var

anas

i

Tota

l Male 79.5 59.0 63.8 66.2 56.9 82.7 68.2 69.1 68.7Female 39.7 37.7 34.8 49.2 37.0 45.7 45.1 55.1 43.4BPL Total 61.6 49.0 49.3 58.0 47.9 65.6 58.2 62.8 57.0Male 74.2 60.5 67.5 75.4 52.0 78.1 81.3 82.1 71.3Female 37.7 40.4 52.8 58.3 29.0 61.3 56.1 56.9 49.6APL Total 58.2 52.9 60.5 67.4 41.6 69.6 69.7 70.4 61.5Male 46.3 48.4 52.4 30.8 44.4 48.4 48.8 55.3 47.1Female 27.1 20.0 18.5 24.5 14.9 21.3 38.0 48.5 27.9ANP Total 35.0 33.3 33.3 27.3 27.7 32.1 42.9 51.3 36.1Male 51.5 62.8 53.0 57.5 53.8 70.1 67.1 73.6 61.5Female 43.2 42.2 31.1 45.8 35.9 37.5 44.4 54.0 42.4ANT Total 47.1 53.5 44.1 52.0 45.0 56.4 55.9 64.4 52.5Male 66.3 59.3 60.3 60.5 52.7 73.7 69.4 71.1 64.5Female 37.4 36.8 35.8 45.5 30.0 44.0 46.9 53.6 41.6Total Total 52.1 49.3 48.5 53.2 41.7 59.2 58.7 62.5 53.5

Source: Field Survey 2006

80

4.4 Occupational Structure The distribution of main occupations of the beneficiary households show most

engaged as non-agricultural labour (47.3 per cent), followed by cultivation (13.2 per

cent), small business (6.0 per cent) and agricultural labour (5.3 per cent). Of all the

BPL households, 43.8 per cent are non-agricultural labourers, which are 39.2 per

cent of the APL, 42.1 for the ANP and 64.2 for the ANT. Thus, non-agricultural labour

is the main occupation. For APL households, cultivation covers 25.8 per cent of them

that is higher than the other households by card holding category. Joblessness is

most for the ANP households (15.4 per cent). We found a number of diversified

activities the households are engaged in with variations by types of cardholding. We

also were reported of begging as the main occupation for a number of ANP

cardholders (Table 4.12). Table 4.12

Main Occupations of Beneficiary Households by Ration Cards BPL APL ANP ANT Total

Occupations No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % Agriculture 32 13.3 62 25.8 18 7.5 15 6.3 127 13.2Agricultural Labour 18 7.5 8 3.3 8 3.3 17 7.1 51 5.3Non-Ag Labour 105 43.8 94 39.2 101 42.1 154 64.2 454 47.3Skilled Labour 21 8.8 4 1.7 7 2.9 10 4.2 42 4.4Traditional Labour 8 3.3 6 2.5 10 4.2 7 2.9 31 3.2Government Service 2 0.8 8 3.3 1 0.4 1 0.4 12 1.3Private Service 19 7.9 15 6.3 13 5.4 8 3.3 55 5.7Small Business 2 0.8 2 0.8 0 0.0 3 1.3 7 0.7Pensioner 0 0.0 6 2.5 15 6.3 2 0.8 23 2.4Animal Husbandry 0 0.0 3 1.3 2 0.8 3 1.3 8 0.8Small Business 11 4.6 25 10.4 13 5.4 9 3.8 58 6.0Rickshaw/ Trolley Pulling/ Hawker

9 3.8 3 1.3 1 0.4 8 3.3 21 2.2

Bidi Making 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.8 1 0.4 3 0.3No Work 1 0.4 0 0.0 37 15.4 0 0.0 38 4.0Begging 0 0.0 0 0.0 9 3.8 0 0.0 9 0.9Weaving 12 5.0 4 1.7 3 1.3 2 0.8 21 2.2Total 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 960 100.0

Source: Field Survey.

Of all the beneficiary households, 4.0 per cent are ‘incomeless’. 66.6 per cent

of the sample beneficiary households earn income less than Rs. 19,000 per annum.

81.6 per cent of the households earn income below Rs. 25,000 per annum. 4.1 per

cent of the households earn above Rs. 50,000 per annum. Less than one-fifth of the

households earn more than Rs. 25,000 per annum. There are district wise variations

in the percentages of households in the respective income brackets (Table 4.13).

81

Table 4.13 Annual Income (Rs.) of Beneficiary Households by Districts

District

Figu

re in

No

Inco

me

Up

to

5000

.

5000

-10

000

1000

0-19

000

1900

0-25

000

2500

0-50

000

5000

0-1

Lakh

>1 L

akh

Total

No. 3 10 16 34 23 24 8 0 118Barielly % 2.5 8.5 13.6 28.8 19.5 20.3 6.8 0.0 100.0

No. 7 13 23 42 10 18 5 2 120Badaun % 5.8 10.8 19.2 35.0 8.3 15.0 4.2 1.7 100.0

No. 3 17 24 42 19 14 2 1 122Lakhimpur Kheri % 2.5 13.9 19.7 34.4 15.6 11.5 1.6 0.8 100.0

No. 3 12 26 46 16 13 3 1 120Lucknow % 2.5 10.0 21.7 38.3 13.3 10.8 2.5 0.8 100.0

No. 11 8 24 46 17 14 0 0 120Lalitpur % 9.2 6.7 20.0 38.3 14.2 11.7 0.0 0.0 100.0

No. 7 2 24 42 21 21 3 0 120Jhansi % 5.8 1.7 20.0 35.0 17.5 17.5 2.5 0.0 100.0

No. 1 11 22 37 22 17 6 4 120Gorakhpur % 0.8 9.2 18.3 30.8 18.3 14.2 5.0 3.3 100.0

No. 3 8 20 53 16 15 4 1 120Varanasi % 2.5 6.7 16.7 44.2 13.3 12.5 3.3 0.8 100.0

No. 38 81 179 342 144 136 31 9 960Total % 4.0 8.4 18.6 35.6 15.0 14.2 3.2 0.9 100.0Source: Field Survey.

Of the grand average income over all the districts for all the beneficiary

households covered, the average for the BPL is Rs. 24,320 which is the reported

maximum and the average for ANP is Rs. 10,758 which is the reported minimum.

Surprisingly the reported average income of the BPL households is more than that

reported by the APL households. This is explained by the higher percentage of BPL

households (46.3) reporting income in the bracket Rs. 19,000 to Rs. 50,000 relative

to that in APL (29.1). This average income of the BPL is higher in spite of the fact

that the higher percentage of APL households (9.6) reported income in the higher

income bracket (above Rs. 50,000) relative to that reported by BPL (5.1). There are

variations in the percentages of households by cardholding in different income

brackets and hence in estimated average income (Table 4.14).

82

Table 4.14 Distribution of Beneficiary Households by Income Brackets and Average Income

Income (Rs.) Particulars BPL APL ANP ANT Total No. of HHs 1 0 37 0 38No Income

% 0.4 0.0 15.4 0.0 4.0Average Income 4200 4371 3222 2914 3319No. HHs 2 7 65 7 81

Up to 5,000. % 0.8 2.9 27.1 2.9 8.4

Average Income 7642 8329 7575 8223 8018No. HHs 19 51 48 61 179

5,000-10,000 % 7.9 21.3 20.0 25.4 18.6

Average Income 15107 14562 13920 14133 14484No. HHs 95 89 50 108 342

10,000-19,000 % 39.6 37.1 20.8 45.0 35.6

Average Income 22400 22523 23325 21737 22375No. HHs 54 39 16 35 144

19,000-25,000 % 22.5 16.3 6.7 14.6 15.0

Average Income 33979 33755 32343 31733 33229No. HHs 57 31 21 27 136

25,000-50,000 % 23.8 12.9 8.8 11.3 14.2

Average Income 71200 66071 86800 53400 68748No. HHs 9 17 3 2 31

50,000-1 Lakh % 3.8 7.1 1.3 0.8 3.2

Average Income 153600 156200 0 0 155333No. HHs 3 6 0 0 9

>1 Lakh % 1.3 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.9

Average Income 24320 23903 10758 15720 18675No. HHs 240 240 240 240 960

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey.

Annual income per beneficiary household on average over all the districts

stood at Rs. 18,675, which is an weighted average of the income levels by brackets.

The district wise average income is reportedly highest for Gorakhpur (Rs. 23,805)

and lowest for Lalitpur (Rs. 13,955) which is an weighted average of the income

levels of different brackets. The grand average income per beneficiary household is

the weighted average of the average income levels by districts (Table 4.15). Table 4.15

Annual Income (Rs.) per Household (As Reported by Households)

District Up to 5000.

5000-10000

10000-19000

19000-25000

25000-50000

50000-1 Lakh

>1 Lakh

Total

Barielly 3240 7763 15459 22983 34000 70350 70350 21946Badaun 3462 8348 15443 23040 33667 60240 60240 19360Lakhimpur Kheri 3141 7925 14013 22105 35914 74400 74400 16529Lucknow 3650 8169 14100 21938 34615 64000 64000 16815Lalitpur 3375 7700 13943 21282 32829 0 0 13955Jhansi 3000 7625 14757 22257 32000 58800 58800 17705Gorakhpur 3055 8509 14157 22636 30988 71000 71000 23805Varanasi 3450 8070 14287 22800 32400 81000 81000 19375Total 3319 8018 14484 22375 33229 68748 68748 18675Source: Field Survey.

83

The average income of the rural households (Rs. 17,918) is less than that of

the urban households (Rs. 20,317). The average rural income of the BPL households

is reported to be more than that of the APL. The same is reported by the households

by the types of cardholding in urban area. The reasons are the same that is a higher

percentage of BPL households in both rural and urban areas in the income bracket

Rs. 19,000 to Rs. 50,000 which is not compensated by the higher percentage of

households in still higher income bracket (above Rs. 50,000) from the APL

households. There are variations in percentages of households by card categories by

income brackets and by average income (Table 4.16). Table 4.16

Distribution of Beneficiary Households by Income, Poverty and Region Rural Urban Income

Category (Rs.) BPL APL ANP ANT Total BPL APL ANP ANT Total

No. of HHs 0 0 27 0 27 1 0 10 0 11No Income % 0.0 0.0 15.3 0.0 4.1 1.3 0.0 15.9 0.0 3.6

Average Income 3600 4200 3235 2600 3259 4800 4800 3189 4800 3470No. Of HHs 1 5 46 6 58 1 2 19 1 23

Up to 5000 % 0.6 3.1 26.0 3.8 8.8 1.3 2.5 30.2 1.3 7.6

Average Income 7659 8255 7573 8361 8026 7500 8467 7582 7800 7996No. Of HHs 17 33 37 46 133 2 18 11 15 46

5000-10000 % 10.6 20.6 20.9 28.8 20.2 2.5 22.5 17.5 18.8 15.2

Average Income 14851 14586 13427 14096 14340 15660 14467 15323 14200 14832No. Of HHs 65 71 37 69 242 30 18 13 39 100

10000-19000 % 40.6 44.4 20.9 43.1 36.8 37.5 22.5 20.6 48.8 33.0

Average Income 22119 22560 23220 21700 22226 23012 22484 23500 21818 22630No. Of HHs 37 20 10 24 91 17 19 6 11 53

19000-25000 % 23.1 12.5 5.6 15.0 13.9 21.3 23.8 9.5 13.8 17.5

Average Income 33310 33540 32753 31846 33015 34777 34145 30600 31629 33545No. Of HHs 31 20 17 13 81 26 11 4 14 55

25000-50000 % 19.4 12.5 9.6 8.1 12.3 32.5 13.8 6.3 17.5 18.2

Average Income 69400 70114 86800 53400 70800 74800 63240 0 0 65908No. Of HHs 6 7 3 2 18 3 10 13

50000-1 Lakh % 3.8 4.4 1.7 1.3 2.7 3.8 12.5 0.0 0.0 4.3

Average Income 153600 153300 0 0 153429 0 162000 0 0 162000No. Of HHs 3 4 7 2 2

>1 Lakh % 1.9 2.5 0.0 0.0 1.1 0.0 2.5 0.0 0.0 0.7

Average Income 23921 22219 11159 15090 17918 25118 27270 9629 16980 20317No. Of HHs 160 160 177 160 657 80 80 63 80 303

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey. Of the population from the beneficiary households, 23.8 per cent are

students, 21.3 per cent are housewives, and none of them reportedly are engaged in

any economic occupations. Another 8.1 per cent reported to do nothing. 0.9 per cent

is involved in begging. 12.6 per cent were below 6 years, who are supposed not to be

in any economic occupations. Hence, a significant percentage (66.7) is outside

economic occupations. The rest are involved in a number of occupations like

84

cultivation (3.8 per cent of total population), labour (19.9 per cent), skilled labour (3.5

per cent), traditional labour (0.9 per cent), animal husbandry (0.4 per cent), service

(1.9 per cent), business (2.2 per cent) and pension (0.8 per cent). There are district

wise variations in the percentages of population engaged in diversified occupations

(Table 4.17). Table 4.17

Occupational Structure of Beneficiary Households

Occupations

Bar

ielly

Bada

un

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Var

anas

i

Tota

l

No. 61 70 79 76 94 68 76 77 601Below 6 Years % 10.0 12.4 13.7 13.2 16.7 11.8 11.2 12.3 12.6

No. 43 14 16 18 35 28 22 7 183Agriculture

% 7.0 2.5 2.8 3.1 6.2 4.8 3.2 1.1 3.8No. 85 115 139 134 160 127 129 60 949

Labour % 13.9 20.4 24.2 23.3 28.5 22.0 19.0 9.6 19.9

No. 24 17 8 15 1 24 24 55 168Skilled Labour % 3.9 3.0 1.4 2.6 0.2 4.2 3.5 8.8 3.5

No. 3 3 3 1 6 6 11 12 45Traditional Labour % 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 1.1 1.0 1.6 1.9 0.9

No. 11 9 13 7 0 7 25 17 89Service

% 1.8 1.6 2.3 1.2 0.0 1.2 3.7 2.7 1.9No. 9 9 12 12 12 9 23 19 105

Business % 1.5 1.6 2.1 2.1 2.1 1.6 3.4 3.0 2.2

No. 1 0 7 6 4 5 5 8 36Pensioner

% 0.2 0.0 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.9 0.7 1.3 0.8No. 2 8 1 2 2 1 1 0 17Animal

Husbandry % 0.3 1.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.2 0.1 0.0 0.4No. 157 137 121 133 116 131 168 172 1135

Students % 25.7 24.3 21.0 23.1 20.6 22.7 24.7 27.6 23.8

No. 153 120 131 121 92 123 145 128 1013House Wives % 25.1 21.3 22.8 21.0 16.4 21.3 21.4 20.5 21.3

No. 55 54 41 51 31 42 47 64 385Nothing

% 9.0 9.6 7.1 8.9 5.5 7.3 6.9 10.3 8.1No. 6 7 4 0 9 7 3 5 41

Begging % 1.0 1.2 0.7 0.0 1.6 1.2 0.4 0.8 0.9

No. 610 563 575 576 562 578 679 624 4767Total

% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Source: Field Survey 2006

54.4 per cent of the population in the sample lives below income per annum

per household Rs. 19,000. Another 19.3 per cent earn income per annum between

Rs. 19,001 and Rs. 25,000. Thus, 26.3 per cent of the population earn income per

annum per household above Rs. 25,000. There are district wise variations in the

percentages of population living below and above specified income brackets (Table 4.18).

85

Table 4.18 Distribution of Population in Beneficiary Households

(By Income)

Annual Income

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

Below Rs. 5000 24 29 26 25 30 14 12 15 175Rs. 5001 To Rs. 10,000 63 85 123 119 94 81 93 92 750Rs. 10,001 To Rs. 19,000 185 220 189 221 219 181 193 260 1668Rs. 19,001 To Rs. 25,000 135 67 106 104 124 126 149 108 919Rs. 25,001 To Rs. 50,000 142 113 100 85 95 150 116 117 918Rs. 50,001 To Rs. 1 Lac 61 41 16 15 0 26 77 28 264Above Rs. 1 Lac 0 8 15 7 0 0 39 4 73Total 610 563 575 576 562 578 679 624 4767

Source: Field Survey 2006. Of the earning population, most are male. Of the male population, 50.3 per

cent are earning which are 16.1 per cent for the female population. Of the SC

population, 36.4 per cent are earning, which is 31.5 per cent for OBCs, 31.2 for the

minority, 30.3 for the general caste population. Female earning population as a

percentage of total female population is higher in SCs (20.1), relative to such

percentages for OBCs (12.2), minority (11.7), general (10.9). There are district wise

differences in the percentages of earning population by gender (Table 4.19). Table 4.19

Earning Population in Beneficiary Households (By Caste and Gender)

Caste Gender

Bar

ielly

Bada

un

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Var

anas

i

Tota

l

Male 44.9 50.6 51.2 48.4 51.7 54.7 52.5 43.5 50.4Female 6.1 15.6 17.9 16.6 30.6 21.2 26.0 17.0 20.1SC Total 26.3 35.1 36.3 33.1 42.0 39.2 40.2 31.3 36.4Male 41.1 50.0 50.5 59.3 58.5 53.1 46.6 45.7 49.3Female 4.8 10.0 15.5 12.7 10.2 13.6 16.0 9.8 12.2OBC Total 24.4 31.8 32.3 35.8 35.3 33.1 33.2 28.1 31.5Male 55.6 40.0 65.0 57.4 30.0 44.4 59.3 48.6 52.1Female 12.9 7.0 13.0 13.7 0.0 9.1 12.9 12.3 11.7Minority Total 31.5 24.6 37.2 36.2 15.8 25.0 34.5 31.1 31.2Male 57.1 28.6 52.9 33.3 33.3 40.0 66.7 57.1 48.5Female 11.1 0.0 7.7 0.0 11.1 0.0 42.9 9.1 10.9General Total 39.1 16.7 33.3 22.2 20.0 16.7 53.8 27.8 30.3Male 54.5 - 0.0 - - - - - 50.0Female 18.2 - 50.0 - - - - - 23.1Other Total 42.4 - 25.0 - - - - - 40.5Male 49.0 47.7 51.7 51.7 51.8 53.8 51.1 45.7 50.3Female 9.5 12.3 16.4 15.1 25.1 18.4 19.9 13.0 16.1Total Total 29.3 31.8 34.8 34.0 39.3 36.9 36.5 30.0 34.0

Source: Field Survey 2006

86

Within BPL, 34.6 per cent constitute earning members, which is 30.4 per cent

for APL, 38.5 per cent for ANP and 34.3 per cent for ANT. There are district wise

variations in the percentages of earning population (Table 4.20). Table 4.20

Earning Members in Beneficiary Households (By Card-Holding)

Households Monthly Income

Bar

ielly

Bada

un

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Var

anas

i

Tota

l

No. 120 112 105 110 87 102 133 133 902Dependent Member % 68.6 65.9 66.9 69.2 62.1 58.6 61.6 70.4 65.4

No. 55 58 52 49 53 72 83 56 478Earning Member % 31.4 34.1 33.1 30.8 37.9 41.4 38.4 29.6 34.6

No. 175 170 157 159 140 174 216 189 1380

BPL

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 121 109 123 96 105 118 142 109 923Dependent

Member % 72.5 71.2 70.3 66.2 63.6 71.5 69.3 71.7 69.6No. 46 44 52 49 60 47 63 43 404Earning

Member % 27.5 28.8 29.7 33.8 36.4 28.5 30.7 28.3 30.4No. 167 153 175 145 165 165 205 152 1327

APL

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 76 46 68 60 55 51 60 81 497Dependent

Member % 71.0 62.2 60.2 60.6 55.6 55.4 61.9 63.8 61.5No. 31 28 45 39 44 41 37 46 311Earning

Member % 29.0 37.8 39.8 39.4 44.4 44.6 38.1 36.2 38.5No. 107 74 113 99 99 92 97 127 808

ANP

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 114 117 79 114 94 94 96 114 822Dependent

Member % 70.8 70.5 60.8 65.9 59.5 63.9 59.6 73.1 65.7No. 47 49 51 59 64 53 65 42 430Earning

Member % 29.2 29.5 39.2 34.1 40.5 36.1 40.4 26.9 34.3No. 161 166 130 173 158 147 161 156 1252

ANT

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 431 384 375 380 341 365 431 437 3144Dependent

Member % 70.7 68.2 65.2 66.0 60.7 63.1 63.5 70.0 66.0No. 179 179 200 196 221 213 248 187 1623Earning

Member % 29.3 31.8 34.8 34.0 39.3 36.9 36.5 30.0 34.0No. 610 563 575 576 562 578 679 624 4767

Total

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Source: Field Survey 2006

Per capita income per annum for all the beneficiary households is Rs. 3744,

with a minimum at Rs. 3012 in Lalitpur and Rs. 4249 for Bareilly. For SC households,

per capita annual income is Rs. 3587 while for general caste households, it is Rs.

4332. The lowest per capita annual income is reported to be that of the minority at

87

Rs. 3538. There are district-wise variations in the reported per capita annual income

of the beneficiary households (Table 4.21a). Table 4.21a

Per Capita Annual Income (Rs.) of Beneficiary Households (By Castes)

Caste B

arie

lly

Bada

un

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Var

anas

i

Tota

l

SC 4168 3482 3470 2913 3085 3780 4645 3837 3587 OBC 4333 6502 3382 4723 3153 3498 3323 4163 3976 Minority 3448 3600 3209 3823 2084 3300 4717 2756 3538 General 5948 3400 4200 8000 1160 3000 5677 3833 4332 Other 9164 - 4500 - - - - - 8659 Total 4249 4096 3465 3501 3012 3684 4120 3722 3744

Source: Field Survey 2006 The per capita annual income of each of APL and BPL households is above

the grand average at Rs. 3744, while that of each of ANT and ANP is below the

grand average. The reliability of reported income data is doubtful, for example, for

Lalitpur the per capita annual income of APL (Rs. 2462) is below each of the other

categories (BPL, ANP and ANT) and per capita reported income of each of BPL and

ANT is above the district average. Similarly, for Varanasi, reported per capita annual

income of ANP (Rs. 4030) is above district average and also much above BPL per

capita income. In Jhansi, reported per capita annual income for BPL is much higher

than that reported by the APL (Table 4.21b).

Table 4.21b Per Capita Annual Income of Beneficiary Households

(By Card-Holding)

Card Holding

Bar

ielly

Bada

un

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Var

anas

i

Tota

l

BPL 4989 3872 3902 3675 3656 4148 5444 3279 4172APL 4980 6494 3579 5454 2462 3593 4256 4863 4411ANP 2865 2651 3186 2594 2818 3039 3056 4030 3077ANT 3607 2759 3028 2223 3137 3641 2814 2896 2997Total 4249 4096 3465 3501 3012 3684 4120 3722 3744

Source: Field Survey 2006

The per capita annual income shows a monotonic increase as we put income

brackets in ascending order. For each income bracket there is one average income

for all the districts with district-wise variations. For example, for the households below

88

the annual income bracket, the lowest income is Rs. 750 in Bareilly and the highest is

Rs. 2088 in Lucknow. The similar trend holds good for all the districts (Table 4.22). Table 4.22

Per Capita Annual Income of Beneficiary Households (By Income Brackets)

Annual Income

Bar

ielly

Bada

un

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Var

anas

i

Tota

l

Below Rs. 5000 750 1572 1662 2088 980 686 1600 1680 1385Rs. 5001 To Rs. 10000 2181 2174 1454 1674 1902 1800 1819 1754 1807Rs. 10001 To Rs. 19000 2796 2911 3127 2756 2912 3438 2869 2898 2953Rs. 19001 To Rs. 25000 3916 3725 4008 3860 3121 3919 3246 3378 3627Rs. 25001 To Rs. 50000 5197 5172 4932 5209 4838 4544 4376 4185 4790Rs. 50001 To Rs. 1 Lac 10702 7346 9300 12800 - 6785 6748 11571 8768Above Rs. 1 Lac - 37500 7520 17143 - - 13969 51000 17556Total 4249 4096 3465 3501 3012 3684 4120 3722 3744

Source: Field Survey 2006 4.4.1 Ownership over Productive Assets Most of the beneficiary households do not have agricultural productive items for life

support. Only 6.1 per cent have pump sets, 3.5 per cent have plough. The ownership

over other items like cutting machine, buffalo/bull carts is rare (Table 4.23). Table 4.23

Ownership over Agricultural Items for Life Support of Beneficiary Households BPL APL ANP ANT Total Assets

No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % Pump set 14 5.8 36 10.6 2 0.6 7 2.1 59 6.1Buffalo bull Cart 1 0.4 1 0.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.2Plough 17 7.1 12 3.5 1 0.3 4 1.2 34 3.5Danlop 2 0.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.2Cutting Machine 3 1.3 4 1.2 0 0.0 1 0.3 8 0.8Chara* Machine 2 0.8 1 0.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 0.3Total 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 960 100.0

* Grass cutting Source: Field Survey. Of all the beneficiary households, only one per cent has hand driven carts,

while 0.8 per cent have tractors, 0.9 per cent have trolley/rickshaw, 0.7 per cent have

sewing machine. Thus, the households’ ownership over income generating items is

rare. None of the ANP and ANT households have any of these items like tractor and

sewing machine (Table 4.24).

89

Table 4.24 Income Generating items Owned by the Beneficiary Households

BPL APL ANP ANT Total Assets No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %

Tractor 1 0.4 5 1.5 0 0.0 0 0.0 8 0.8 Trolley/Rickshaw 1 0.4 3 0.9 2 0.6 1 0.3 9 0.9 Cart (Hand Driven) 2 0.8 2 0.6 0 0.0 4 1.2 9 1.0 Sewing Machine 1 0.4 0 0.0 4 1.2 0 0.0 7 0.7 Horse-driven Cart 1 0.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.1 Total 240 100.0 340 100.0 340 100.0 340 100.0 960 100.0

Source: Field Survey. As a life support system, the productive animals that the beneficiary

households own include cow (14.6 per cent), buffalo (13.9 per cent), goat (9.2 per

cent), ox (5.2 per cent) and some other animals owned by very small percentages of

households. These other animals include horse, hen, bull etc (Table 4.25a). Table 4.25a

Productive Animals owned by the Beneficiary Households BPL APL ANP ANT Total Animals

No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % Cow 34 14.2 47 19.6 13 5.4 46 19.2 140 14.6 Ox 17 7.1 23 9.6 1 0.4 9 3.8 50 5.2 Cow/Calf 9 3.8 7 2.9 3 1.3 8 3.3 27 2.8 Buffalo 34 14.2 58 24.2 14 5.8 27 11.3 133 13.9 Buffalo Bull 2 0.8 5 2.1 1 0.4 1 0.4 9 0.9 Buffalo Calf 18 7.5 32 13.3 2 0.8 17 7.1 69 7.2 Goat 27 11.3 20 8.3 20 8.3 21 8.8 88 9.2 Hen 1 0.4 1 0.4 3 1.3 3 1.3 8 0.8 Calf 2 0.8 2 0.8 1 0.4 6 2.5 11 1.1 Horse 1 0.4 1 0.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.2 Total 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 960 100.0

Source: Field Survey. 4.5 Living Condition of Beneficiary Households 11.3 per cent of the households reported migration that involves members

more than the number of households. Most of those who migrate are from the age

bracket 18 to 35 (39.4 per cent) (Table 4.25b). Table 4.25b

Migration of People by Age and Cardholding Member Migrated Age Sample No. of

HHs

Male Female Total <18 18-35 35-50 >50 Total

BPL 39 48 6 54 6 29 17 2 54 APL 20 25 0 25 3 16 6 0 25 ANP 18 24 2 26 1 21 4 0 26 ANT 32 39 1 40 7 25 7 1 40 Total 109 136 9 145 17 91 34 3 145 Source: Field Survey. It is the ‘push’ factor that mostly explains the migration of people. The other

major reasons are wage work in brick fields, support income, services etc. The

reasons vary over households by types of cardholding (Table 4.26).

90

Table 4.26 Reasons for Migration

Source: Field Survey. Housing Condition

Of the total beneficiary households, only two are shelterless, 23.2 per cent have

pucca houses. Of those who have pucca houses, BPL cardholders have 35.4 per

cent, APL cardholders have 27.4 per cent, ANP 23.3 per cent, and ANT 13.9 per

cent. 39.4 per cent of the households have kuccha houses. Of those having kuccha

houses, the maximum percentage (32.5) is that of ANT type households and the

minimum (20.3) is that of BPL type households. There are variations in the housing

conditions of households by cardholding (Table 4.27). Table 4.27

Distribution of Beneficiary Households by Area, Cardholding and Housing Condition

Rural Urban Total BPL APL ANP ANT Total BPL APL ANP ANT Total BPL APL ANP ANT Total

No. 51 31 31 18 131 28 30 21 13 92 79 61 52 31 223Pucca % 38.9 23.7 23.7 13.7 100.0 30.4 32.6 22.8 14.1 100.0 35.4 27.4 23.3 13.9 100.0

No. 14 18 11 12 55 13 12 8 9 42 27 30 19 21 97Semi-Pucca % 25.5 32.7 20.0 21.8 100.0 31.0 28.6 19.0 21.4 100.0 27.8 30.9 19.6 21.6 100.0

No. 54 64 72 78 268 23 21 22 45 111 77 85 94 123 379Kuccha % 20.1 23.9 26.9 29.1 100.0 20.7 18.9 19.8 40.5 100.0 20.3 22.4 24.8 32.5 100.0

No. 12 6 45 13 76 1 3 7 3 14 13 9 52 16 90Hut % 15.8 7.9 59.2 17.1 100.0 7.1 21.4 50.0 21.4 100.0 14.4 10.0 57.8 17.8 100.0

No. 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 2 1 0 1 0 2Houseless % 50.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 100.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 100.0

No. 1 9 1 4 15 1 3 0 1 5 2 12 1 5 20Pucca+ Semi-Pucca % 6.7 60.0 6.7 26.7 100.0 20.0 60.0 0.0 20.0 100.0 10.0 60.0 5.0 25.0 100.0

No. 13 7 6 14 40 3 2 1 4 10 16 9 7 18 50Pucca+Hut % 32.5 17.5 15.0 35.0 100.0 30.0 20.0 10.0 40.0 100.0 32.0 18.0 14.0 36.0 100.0

No. 13 15 8 14 50 10 8 3 4 25 23 23 11 18 75Semi-Pucca+ Kuccha % 26.0 30.0 16.0 28.0 100.0 40.0 32.0 12.0 16.0 100.0 30.7 30.7 14.7 24.0 100.0

No. 0 4 1 1 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 4 1 1 6Semi-Pucca+Hut % 0.0 66.7 16.7 16.7 100.0 0.0 66.7 16.7 16.7 100.0

No. 2 6 2 6 16 0 1 0 1 2 2 7 2 7 18Kuccha+ Hut % 12.5 37.5 12.5 37.5 100.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 100.0 11.1 38.9 11.1 38.9 100.0No. 160 160 177 160 657 80 80 63 80 303 240 240 240 240 960Total

% 24.4 24.4 26.9 24.4 100.0 26.4 26.4 20.8 26.4 100.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 25.0 100.0Source: Field Survey. 97.8 per cent of the beneficiary households depend on kerosene for light at

night followed by candle for 9.8 per cent. The other methods like gobar gas, solar

light, inverter, burning of wood etc. are insignificant. The ANT households depend

Figure in BPL APL ANP ANT Total No. 14 10 8 11 43 Job Search/Non-Availability

of Work in Village % 25.9 40.0 30.8 27.5 29.7 No. 8 3 3 3 17 Services

% 14.8 12.0 11.5 7.5 11.7 No. 18 11 8 14 51 Wage work in Brick Field

% 33.3 44.0 30.8 35.0 35.2 No. 13 3 5 5 26

Non-Availability of work in Village % 24.1 12.0 19.2 12.5 17.9 No. 6 3 3 7 19 Support Income

% 11.1 12.0 11.5 17.5 13.1 No. 54 25 26 40 145 Total

% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

91

almost wholly on kerosene (99.6 per cent) and candle and not on other methods.

This is generally true for other types of cardholders also (Table 4.28). Table 4.28

Dependence of Beneficiary Households for Light at Night by Types of Card-holding BPL APL ANP ANT Total Sources

No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % Gobar Gas 1 0.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.1Solar Light 1 0.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.1Battery 0 0.0 1 0.4 1 0.4 3 1.3 5 0.5Inverter 1 0.4 1 0.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.2Kerosene 234 97.5 240 100.0 226 94.2 239 99.6 939 97.8Candle 35 14.6 24 10.0 13 5.4 22 9.2 94 9.8Live in Darkness

1 0.4 0 0.0 13 5.4 0 0.0 14 1.5

Wood Burning 1 0.4 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.1Mustered Oil 1 0.4 0 0.0 3 1.3 2 0.8 6 0.6Total 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 960 100.0

Source: Field Survey. The major fuels that the beneficiary households use for cooking purposes are

wood (92.5 per cent) and ‘kanda’ (90.8 per cent). Kerosene is not a major fuel for

cooking. This is a reported fact for all the households by cardholding. The other types

of fuels like coal, electricity, LPG (Gas), leaf etc for cooking is insignificant by use by

the households (Table 4.29). Table 4.29

Fuels Used by Different Types of Ration Card Holders BPL APL ANP ANT Total

No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % Wood 226 94.2 211 87.9 223 92.9 228 95.0 888 92.5Kanda* 213 88.8 204 85.0 222 92.5 233 97.1 872 90.8Kerosene 5 2.1 6 2.5 2 0.8 3 1.3 16 1.7Stone Coal 9 3.8 3 1.3 5 2.1 2 0.8 19 2.0Wood Coal 1 0.4 3 1.3 4 1.7 3 1.3 11 1.1LPG 16 6.7 34 14.2 8 3.3 3 1.3 61 6.4Electricity 3 1.3 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 0.3Gobar Gas 0 0.0 2 0.8 0 0.0 2 0.8 4 0.4Leaf etc. 1 0.4 0 0.0 1 0.4 2 0.8 4 0.4Total 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 960 100.0

* Cow dung cake Source: Field Survey. Landholding

Of all the beneficiary households, 68.1 per cent are landless. By districts, 82.5 per

cent of the beneficiary households in Varanasi are landless at the maximum of

landlessness while 51.7 per cent in Bareilly are landless at the minimum. Thus, there

are district wise variations in the ownership over land (Table 4.30).

92

Table 4.30 Distribution of Beneficiary Households by total Land holding by Districts

(Land in acre) Total Land

Holding District

No. of HHs

Total Land

Landless Households

Total Households

No. 57 87.7 61 118 Barielly % 48.3 100.0 51.7 100.0

No. 34 28.2 86 120 Badaun % 28.3 100.0 71.7 100.0

No. 26 62.8 96 122 Lakhimpur Kheri % 21.3 100.0 78.7 100.0

No. 39 39.4 81 120 Lucknow % 32.5 100.0 67.5 100.0

No. 56 142.4 64 120 Lalitpur % 46.7 100.0 53.3 100.0

No. 41 68.4 79 120 Jhansi % 34.2 100.0 65.8 100.0

No. 32 15.9 88 120 Gorakhpur % 26.7 100.0 73.3 100.0

No. 21 7.7 99 120 Varanasi % 17.5 100.0 82.5 100.0

No. 306 452.5 654 960 Total % 31.9 100.0 68.1 100.0

Source: Field Survey. By the types of cardholding, landlessness is mostly reported in case of ANP

(78.8 per cent of all ANP households) followed by ANT (75.4 per cent of all ANT

households). Landlessness is reported by 62.1 per cent of the BPL households which

is 56.3 in case of APL households. The average landholding (ownership) for those

who own land is 1.5 acre that varies by cardholding like that for APL it is 2.1 at the

maximum and 1.05 for the ANP at the minimum (Table 4.31). Table 4.31

Distribution of Beneficiary Households by Landholding by Types of Ration Cards (Land in Acre)

Total Land Holding

Sample

HHs Total Land

Landless Households

Total Households

No. 91 112.6 149 240 BPL % 37.9 100.0 62.1 100.0

No. 105 220.2 135 240 APL % 43.8 100.0 56.3 100.0

No. 51 53.8 189 240 ANP % 21.3 100.0 78.8 100.0

No. 59 66.0 181 240 ANT % 24.6 100.0 75.4 100.0

No. 306 452.5 654 960 Total % 31.9 100.0 68.1 100.0 Source: Field Survey.

93

Households as Borrowers by Types of Ration Cards

Of all the beneficiary households, 21.1 per cent have outstanding loans. There are

district wise variations in the percentages of households as borrowers. Of the BPL

households, 33.8 per cent are borrowers followed by ANT type households (20.4 per

cent), APL (17.5 per cent) and ANP (12.9 per cent). Within each category of

households by cardholding, there are variations in the percentages of households as

borrowers by districts (Table 4.32). Table 4.32

Beneficiary Households as Borrowers by Types of Ration Cards BPL APL ANP ANT Total District

No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % Barielly 8 9.9 7 16.7 4 12.9 13 26.5 32 15.8Badaun 11 13.6 13 31.0 6 19.4 10 20.4 40 19.7Lakhimpur Kheri 5 6.2 6 14.3 5 16.1 6 12.2 22 10.8Lucknow 7 8.6 2 4.8 0 0.0 2 4.1 11 5.4Lalitpur 14 17.3 6 14.3 1 3.2 10 20.4 31 15.3Jhansi 12 14.8 4 9.5 2 6.5 5 10.2 23 11.3Gorakhpur 16 19.8 1 2.4 2 6.5 1 2.0 20 9.9Varanasi 8 9.9 3 7.1 11 35.5 2 4.1 24 11.8Loanee* 81 33.8 42 17.5 31 12.9 49 20.4 203 21.1Not Taken Loan* 159 66.3 198 82.5 209 87.1 191 79.6 757 78.9Total HHs 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 960 100.0

*Percentage calculated on total sample Source: Field Survey. Households without Two Square Meals a Day

8.0 per cent of the beneficiary households reported not to get two square meals a

day, the reference period being last one year (2006). Most of these belong to ANP by

cardholding, followed by ANT, APL and BPL. There are district wise variations in

these percentages (Table 4.33). Table 4.33

Households without two square meals a day (Year of Reference 2006) BPL APL ANP ANT Total Districts

No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % Barielly 2 13.3 1 6.7 9 60.0 3 20.0 15 100.0Badaun 3 13.0 9 39.1 9 39.1 2 8.7 23 100.0Lakhimpur Kheri 1 7.7 1 7.7 5 38.5 6 46.2 13 100.0Lucknow 4 36.4 0 0.0 6 54.5 1 9.1 11 100.0Lalitpur 0 0.0 1 16.7 4 66.7 1 16.7 6 100.0Jhansi 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 80.0 1 20.0 5 100.0Gorakhpur 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 100.0 0 0.0 2 100.0Varanasi 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 100.0 0 0.0 2 100.0Total 10 13.0 12 15.6 41 53.2 14 18.2 77 100.0

Note: Total sample households 960. Source: Field Survey.

94

The major reasons for hunger have been mentioned in the Box 4.1.

Box 4.1 Reasons for Hunger

Reasons Non-availability of wage work Non-availability of Credit Bheekh na mangna pare* Helpless Old age Illness

* Let them not go for begging. Source: Field Survey.

4.6 PDS at the Level of Beneficiary Households Most of the beneficiary households reported eligibility as the base for issuing different

types of ration cards. It is 94.5 per cent for rural and 95.0 per cent for the urban area.

Eligibility covers relatively less of households in rural ANP (83.6 per cent) and urban

ANT (80.0 per cent). The other factors for issuing different types of ration cards are

connections, pressure, paying bribe, personal relations and working as vote bank

(Table 4.34). Table 4.34

Base for Issuing Different Types of Ration Cards BPL APL ANP ANT Total

Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural Urban Rural UrbanNo. 153 75 162 74 148 75 158 64 621 288Eligibility

% 95.6 93.8 101.3 92.5 83.6 119.0 98.8 80.0 94.5 95.0No. 7 3 7 5 8 6 10 4 32 18Connections

% 4.4 3.8 4.4 6.3 4.5 9.5 6.3 5.0 4.9 5.9No. 0 0 3 0 2 1 5 3 10 4Pressure

% 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 1.1 1.6 3.1 3.8 1.5 1.3No. 9 13 17 3 10 4 19 8 55 28Bribe

% 5.6 16.3 10.6 3.8 5.6 6.3 11.9 10.0 8.4 9.2No. 7 3 2 3 9 3 2 1 20 10Personal

Relation % 4.4 3.8 1.3 3.8 5.1 4.8 1.3 1.3 3.0 3.3No. 6 1 3 0 7 0 8 1 24 2Vote Bank

% 3.8 1.3 1.9 0.0 4.0 0.0 5.0 1.3 3.7 0.7No. 160 80 160 80 177 63 160 80 657 303Total

% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Source: Field Survey. In the process of helping preparation/access to ration cards distributed across

households by cardholding, the major helpers are family members, Gram Pradhan,

Panchayat Secretary, and village development officer. The others who helped are

friends and neighbours, members of Nagar Panchayat, staff of Supply Department,

advocate etc. Across cardholding, there are differences in the percentages of

beneficiary households reporting help in the process of getting cards (Table 4.35).

95

Table 4.35 Persons who helped in Preparing Ration Cards

BPL APL ANP ANT Total No. % No. % No. % No. % No. %

Self or family members 28 11.7 123 51.3 38 15.8 64 26.7 253 26.4Friends 1 0.4 3 1.3 0 0.0 1 0.4 5 0.5Neighbours of village 2 0.8 3 1.3 4 1.7 3 1.3 12 1.3Advocate 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.4 0 0.0 1 0.1Supply Department 6 2.5 4 1.7 20 8.3 3 1.3 33 3.4Village Development Officer 26 10.8 33 13.8 32 13.3 32 13.3 123 12.8Gram Pradhan 87 36.3 28 11.7 71 29.6 43 17.9 229 23.9Member of Nagar Panchayat 34 14.2 9 3.8 15 6.3 27 11.3 85 8.9Self, family and Secretary 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.8 2 0.2Self, family and Gram Pradhan 1 0.4 7 2.9 14 5.8 21 8.8 43 4.5Both Secretary and Gram Pradhan 33 13.8 21 8.8 28 11.7 38 15.8 120 12.5Others 18 7.5 9 3.8 12 5.0 5 2.1 44 4.6NR 4 1.7 0 0.0 5 2.1 1 0.4 10 1.0Total 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 960 100.0

Source: Field Survey. Households' Knowledge about its being Listed in BPL

Ignorance is a major factor for the households to respond if they had knowledge

about being listed in BPL. Ignorance encompasses 75.7 per cent of all beneficiary

households. Here the question on listing of households as BPL is knowledge-linked

in the sense that either the households know it or it does not know it or that it is

ignorant about it. Ignorance about being listed in BPL is similar in each of urban and

rural regions for households over cardholding (Table 4.36). Table 4.36

Households’ Knowledge about its being listed in BPL BPL APL ANP ANT Total

No % No % No % No % No %

Listed 8 10.0 0 0.0 6 9.5 15 18.8 29 9.6Not listed 10 12.5 37 46.3 4 6.3 4 5.0 55 18.2Ignorance 62 77.5 43 53.8 53 84.1 61 76.3 219 72.3

Urban Total 80 100.0 80 100.0 63 100.0 80 100.0 303 100.0

Listed 15 9.4 1 0.6 16 9.0 23 14.4 55 8.4Not listed 14 8.8 64 40.0 5 2.8 11 6.9 94 14.3Ignorance 131 81.9 95 59.4 156 88.1 126 78.8 508 77.3

Rural Total 160 100.0 160 100.0 177 100.0 160 100.0 657 100.0

Listed Yes 23 9.6 1 0.4 22 9.2 38 15.8 84 8.8No listed 24 10.0 101 42.1 9 3.8 15 6.3 149 15.5Ignorance 193 80.4 138 57.5 209 87.1 187 77.9 727 75.7

Rural Total 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 960 100.0

Source: Field Survey. Households who have more than one Ration Card

17.2 per cent of the households reported possession of more than one ration card, of

which 70.3 per cent are in rural region and 29.7 in urban region. There are district

96

wise variations over regions, rural and urban, so far as possession of ration card of

more than one type is concerned (Table 4.37). Table 4.37

Number of Households having More than One Ration Card Districts Areas BPL APL ANP ANT Total

Urban 0 0 4 0 4 Rural 2 1 8 3 14

Barielly Total 2 1 12 3 18

Urban 0 1 3 1 5 Rural 3 0 4 1 8

Badaun Total 3 1 7 2 13

Urban 2 2 5 0 9 Rural 4 2 10 3 19

Lakhimpur Kheri

Total 6 4 15 3 28 Lucknow Rural 0 1 9 0 10

Urban 1 2 5 1 9 Rural 0 2 9 1 12

Lalitpur Total 1 4 14 2 21

Urban 0 2 3 0 5 Rural 3 1 12 3 19

Jhansi Total 3 3 15 3 24

Urban 0 0 11 0 11 Rural 1 2 8 1 12

Gorakhpur Total 1 2 19 1 23

Urban 1 0 5 0 6 Rural 0 3 17 2 22

Varanasi Total 1 3 22 2 28

Urban 4 7 36 2 49 Rural 13 12 77 14 116

Total Total 17 19 113 16 165

Source: Field Survey. Of total rural beneficiary households (657), 17.6 per cent have ration cards

more than one type. Of total urban beneficiary households (303), 16.2 per cent have

ration cards more than one type. Of the rural households having ration cards more

than one type (116), the maximum is for ANP (66.4 per cent) and the minimum is for

APL (10.34 per cent). Of the urban households having ration cards more than one

type (49), the maximum is for ANP (73.5 per cent) and the minimum is for ANT (4.1

per cent) (Table 4.38). Table 4.38

Number of Households having More than One Ration Card Urban Rural Total Households

No. % No. % No. % BPL 4 8.16 13 11.21 17 10.30 APL 7 14.29 12 10.34 19 11.52 ANP 36 73.47 77 66.38 113 68.48 ANT 2 4.08 14 12.07 16 9.70 Total* 49 16.17 116 17.66 165 17.19 Total HHs 303 100.00 657 100.00 960 100.00 * % based on total Households and others are Households having more than one Ration Card. Source: Field Survey.

97

Fake Ration Cards

Of all the beneficiary households, 19.7 per cent have fake cards, which is 19.8 per

cent in rural and 19.5 per cent in urban region. Of all the BPL households, fake

cardholding covers 9.2 per cent, which is 9.2 for APL, 52.9 for the ANP and 7.5 for

the ANT. There are variations in fake cardholding by region by cardholding (Table 4.39).

Table 4.39 Fake Ration Cards Possessed by Households by Card Holding

Ration Cards Households Region BPL APL ANP ANT Total Fake Cards

(%) Total

Urban 0 4 0 0 4 5.0 80Rural 3 11 0 4 18 11.3 160

BPL Total 3 15 0 4 22 9.2 240

Urban 1 5 1 0 7 8.8 80Rural 5 8 2 0 15 9.4 160

APL Total 6 13 3 0 22 9.2 240

Urban 20 19 0 7 46 73.0 63Rural 44 19 2 16 81 45.8 177

ANP Total 64 38 2 23 127 52.9 240

Urban 0 2 2 2.5 80Rural 6 6 2 2 16 10.0 160

ANT Total 6 8 2 2 18 7.5 240

Urban 21 30 1 7 59 19.5 303Rural 58 44 6 22 130 19.8 657

Total Total 79 74 7 29 189 19.7 960Source: Field Survey. The average duration of holding fake ration cards for the beneficiary

households is 3.2 years that varies over households by cardholding (Table 4.40). Table 4.40

Duration (Years) of Holding Fake Ration Cards by Households by Cardholding Households BPL APL ANP ANT

BPL 5.2 4.4 4.0 APL 3.8 7.6 6.0 ANP 3.9 10.0 4.0 3.3 ANT 4.0 5.1 4.5 0.8 Total 4.2 8.1 4.8 3.2

Source: Field Survey. Bribe Paid for Ration Cards

9.9 per cent of all beneficiary households paid bribe for getting ration cards, which is

8.9 per cent for rural and 12.0 per cent for urban region. This percentage varies

across households by cardholding. The percentage of households paying bribe is

22.5 in case of rural ANT and 19.8 in case of urban ANP. Paying bribe covers lowest

percentage in case of rural APL (1.5 per cent). Over all, for APL the coverage of

98

households paying bribe is least relative to the households of other categories by

cardholding (Table 4.41). Table 4.41

Average Bribe Paid for Issuing Ration Cards Households by

Cards Region Average of Households

who Pay Bribe Average of All Households

Urban 52.50 13.13 Rural 21.76 6.12

BPL Total 31.22 8.45

Urban 41.25 4.13 Rural 13.61 1.53

APL Total 22.12 2.40

Urban 96.15 19.84 Rural 47.32 5.88

ANP Total 65.46 9.55

Urban 168.33 12.63 Rural 94.92 22.54

ANT Total 104.93 19.24

Urban 77.45 12.01 Rural 47.74 8.94

Total Total 55.95 9.91

Source: Field Survey. More than 60.0 per cent of the beneficiary households reported to have paid

bribe to agencies/persons to get their ration cards issued. Of the receivers of bribe

paid, the most mentioned person is the Panchayat Secretary, followed by NP, Gram

Pradhan, teacher, and Supply Department. It seems all the catalysts in the process

of helping the eligible beneficiaries getting the cards are involved in getting share in

bribe. There are differences in reporting by households by cardholding about the

payment of bribe to catalysts/helpers (Table 4.42). Table 4.42

Households Paying Bribe to Agencies for Issuing Ration Cards BPL APL ANP ANT Total Persons/Agencies

No % No % No % No % No % Teacher 5 3.0 0 0.0 1 0.7 0 0.0 6 1.0Panchayat Secretary 37 22.2 4 3.0 9 6.5 22 15.0 72 12.3Gram Pradhan 6 3.6 5 3.7 7 5.0 6 4.1 24 4.1N.P. 8 4.8 9 6.7 5 3.6 10 6.8 32 5.5FPS Dealer 5 3.0 7 5.2 8 5.8 2 1.4 22 3.7Supply Department 3 1.8 0 0.0 2 1.4 0 0.0 4 0.7NR 2 1.2 1 0.7 2 1.4 3 2.0 8 1.4Total 167 69.6 134 55.8 139 57.9 147 61.3 587 61.1Not given any Bribe 101 42.1 108 45.0 105 43.8 104 43.3 418 43.5Total Households 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 960 100.0

Source: Field Survey.

99

Distance of FPS from Houses of Households

In case of most of the beneficiary households, the distance of the FPS from the

residence of the households is within 0.5 km. (63.3 per cent reporting). For 84.0 per

cent of the households, the FPS is within 1 km. For the urban area, for 84.5 per cent

of the households, the FPS is within 1 km. from the residence. There are variations in

the reported distance between the delivery point (FPS) and the residence for

households over cardholding by regions (Table 4.43). Table 4.43

Distance of FPS from Houses of Households BPL APL ANP ANT Total

Distance in

km. No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % <0.5 41 51.3 30 37.5 41 65.1 30 37.5 142 46.90.5-1.0 29 36.3 39 48.8 13 20.6 33 41.3 114 37.61.0-2.0 10 12.5 11 13.8 9 14.3 17 21.3 47 15.5

Urban Total 80 100.0 80 100.0 63 100.0 80 100.0 303 100.0

<0.5 121 75.6 80 50.0 106 59.9 109 68.1 416 63.30.5-1.0 19 11.9 55 34.4 36 20.3 26 16.3 136 20.71.0-2.0 14 8.8 17 10.6 16 9.0 15 9.4 62 9.42.0-3.0 6 3.8 5 3.1 11 6.2 9 5.6 31 4.73.0-4.0 0 0.0 3 1.9 7 4.0 1 0.6 11 1.7>4.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 0.6 0 0.0 1 0.2

Rural Total 160 100.0 160 100.0 177 100.0 160 100.0 657 100.0

Source: Field Survey. Households Visiting FPSs for Purchasing Items

Of all the beneficiary households (960), 54.7 per cent reported the frequency of

visiting the FPSs for drawing items. Most of those who reported on timing, 45.3 per

cent are from ANT, 33.9 per cent are from BPL, 19.6 per cent are from ANP and only

0.01 per cent from APL. Of those who reported on frequency of visits, most visit

monthly (89.0 per cent), very few reported need-based visit and visit based on

earning (Table 4.44). Table 4.44

Frequency of Households Visiting FPSs for Purchasing Items Figure in BPL APL ANP ANT Total

No. 157 4 88 218 467 Monthly % 88.2 66.7 85.4 91.6 89.0

No. 12 1 14 12 39 Bi-monthly % 6.7 16.7 13.6 5.0 7.4

No. 6 0 2 5 13 Quarterly % 3.4 0.0 1.9 2.1 2.5

No. 1 0 1 1 3 Need-based % 0.6 0.0 1.0 0.4 0.6

No. 2 2 1 0 5 On arrival of Materials % 1.1 33.3 1.0 0.0 1.0

No. 4 0 2 0 6 On availability of Money % 2.2 0.0 1.9 0.0 1.1

No. 178 6 103 238 525 Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey.

100

The reasons cited by the households for not visiting the FPSs on a regular basis

have been mentioned in the Box. Box 4.2

Reasons for Households not visiting FPSs on a Regular Basis Reasons

Items do not come every month FPSs do not distribute items FPS had been closed ANP had been closed No requirement of foodgrains Prices are increased by FPS Dealer No provision on APL ration Card Non-availability of Money

Source: Field Survey.

Price Board on the Wall of FPS

It is difficult to draw any conclusion if the price board is visible in the FPSs as

reported by the beneficiary households as one half of them reported visibility and the

other half reported invisibility. For ANP cardholders, invisibility is reported by 66.1 per

cent while for ANT cardholders, visibility is 65.4 per cent. For other types of

cardholders it reflects confusion by balance in visibility and invisibility of the same

price board on the unique location/FPS wall (Table 4.45). Table 4.45

Visibility of Price Board on the Wall of FPS Card

Category Figure

in Visible Not

VisibleIgnorance Non-

Response Total

No. 110 129 1 0 240 BPL % 45.8 53.8 0.4 0.0 100.0

No. 133 107 0 0 240 APL % 55.4 44.6 0.0 0.0 100.0

No. 78 158 1 2 239 ANP % 32.6 66.1 0.4 0.8 100.0

No. 157 82 0 1 240 ANT % 65.4 34.2 0.0 0.4 100.0

No. 478 476 2 3 959 Total % 49.8 49.6 0.2 0.3 100.0

Source: Field Survey. Regarding visibility of price chart on the price board, the report by the

households again create confusion as 34.3 per cent report visibility and 55.9 per cent

invisibility. 9.4 per cent reported illiteracy and hence reported irrelevance of price

chart for them. Half of the households have reported on the visibility of price chart on

the price board in the FPS. While 45.1 per cent (which is the maximum of those who

reported price chart visible) of APL households reported visibility of price chart, more

than 50.0 per cent in case of each category of households reported invisibility of price

chart (Table 4.46).

101

Table 4.46 Visibility of Price Chart on the Price Board on the wall of FPSs

Card Category

Figure in

Visible Not Visible

Illiterate Non- Response

Total

No. 24 64 22 0 110 BPL % 21.8 58.2 20.0 0.0 100.0

No. 60 70 3 0 133 APL % 45.1 52.6 2.3 0.0 100.0

No. 22 45 10 1 78 ANP % 28.2 57.7 12.8 1.3 100.0

No. 58 88 10 1 157 ANT % 36.9 56.1 6.4 0.6 100.0

No. 164 267 45 2 478 Total % 34.3 55.9 9.4 0.4 100.0

Source: Field Survey.

Number of Days and Hours per Day Dealers Keep Their Shops Open

The average number of days the FPSs remain open per month is five that varies

from a minimum at three for each of Gorakhpur and Lalitpur and maximum at 11 for

Bareilly. The number of hours per day the FPSs remain open, however, varies over

districts (Table 4.47). Table 4.47

Average Number of Days and Hours per Day FPS Dealers Keep their Shop Open Number of hours Districts

III IV V VI VII VIII Total

Barielly 7 7 11 7 14 11 Badaun 3 5 3 7 7 7 Lakhimpur Kheri 3 3 4 5 7 5 4 Lucknow 3 4 4 5 5 5 Lalitpur 2 2 2 2 3 3 Jhansi 7 7 6 6 5 5 Gorakhpur 1 3 3 Varanasi 7 3 2 5 4 4 Total 5 3 3 5 4 6 5

Source: Field Survey. 4.7 Routes of Fulfillment of Essential Commodities Excepting Kerosene, the fulfillment of requirement of all the other essential items like

rice, wheat and sugar are mostly met from the market. For wheat, market satisfies

67.8 per cent of total requirement which is 55.6 in case of rice, and 78.8 per cent in

case of sugar. 82.6 per cent of requirement of kerosene is met by the FPSs. In case

of kerosene only 12.4 per cent of the requirements are met by the market. Self -

production is a major factor for both rice and wheat in meeting the requirement, for

wheat it is 18.3 per cent while for rice it is 11.4 per cent. FPSs meet only 11.5 per

cent of requirement of wheat which is 33.2 per cent in case of rice. FPSs meet 18.6

per cent of requirement of sugar.

102

There are variations in percentages of consumption requirements of essential

items being met by alternative routes like market, FPSs, self-production by

categories of cardholding.

There is no self-production of kerosene and generally market response to

supply of kerosene is rare in rural areas so that the role of FPSs seems to be most

prominent in case of kerosene.

As percentage of average annual requirement of wheat, the percentage of

self-production is highest in case of APL (33.1 per cent) followed by that by BPL

(17.6 per cent). The same pattern is true for rice. Self-production of sugar is nil for

APL and ANP and negligible for BPL and ANT type households. Self-production,

thus, determines to some extent the fulfillment of total consumption requirement in

case of rice and wheat, more in case of APL (Table 4.48). Table 4.48

Average Annual Requirement of Commodities: Routes of Fulfillment (By Card Holding)

(Quantity In Kg.) BPL APL ANP ANT Total

Routes Qty. % Qty. % Qty. % Qty. % Qty. % Self-Production 114.9 17.6 231.3 33.1 41.5 9.3 69.2 9.9 114.2 18.3Purchase from Market

472.8 72.5 451.0 64.5 287.2 64.3 481.5 68.9 423.1 67.8

Fulfillment from Wage

12.4 1.9 17.9 2.6 6.8 1.5 20.0 2.9 14.3 2.3

FPS 90.0 13.8 1.8 0.3 66.1 14.8 129.4 18.5 71.8 11.5

Wheat

Requirement 652.3 100.0 699.0 100.0 446.8 100.0 699.3 100.0 624.3 100.0

Self-Production 34.7 11.6 79.4 21.6 9.5 4.8 15.3 4.3 34.7 11.4Purchase from Market

140.3 47.0 284.8 77.5 136.2 69.5 113.4 32.3 168.7 55.6

Fulfillment from Wage

3.5 1.2 5.6 1.5 3.5 1.8 9.1 2.6 5.5 1.8

FPS 132.1 44.3 3.9 1.1 47.1 24.0 215.5 61.3 100.6 33.2

Rice

Requirement 298.3 100.0 367.6 100.0 196.1 100.0 351.4 100.0 303.3 100.0

Self-Production 0.3 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 1.5 0.2 0.6Purchase from Market

27.1 68.9 54.5 96.9 16.6 80.7 25.8 62.6 31.3 78.8

Fulfillment from Wage

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.4 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1

FPS 10.5 26.8 1.2 2.1 3.8 18.5 13.6 33.1 7.4 18.6

Sugar

Requirements 39.3 100.0 56.3 100.0 20.6 100.0 41.2 100.0 39.7 100.0Purchase from Market

4.9 11.0 5.8 12.0 4.0 12.7 6.2 14.0 5.2 12.4

Fulfillment from Wage

0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1

FPS 37.7 84.8 38.2 80.0 26.0 82.8 36.9 83.2 34.8 82.6

Kerosene Oil

Requirement 44.4 100.0 47.8 100.0 31.4 100.0 44.4 100.0 42.2 100.0Source: Field Survey. The routes of fulfillment of requirements of essential commodities by regions for the

beneficiary households are as follows:

103

For wheat in the rural region 22.7 per cent is met from self-production which

is 7.8 per cent in urban region. The respective percentages are 13.5 and 7.7 for rice,

0.9 and nothing for sugar. There is no self-production of kerosene, the requirement of

kerosene has to be met either by market or by FPSs or remain unfulfilled. FPSs fulfill

11.0 per cent of requirement of wheat in rural region, which is 33.4 per cent for rice,

19.2 for sugar and 80.5 for kerosene. The respective percentages for urban region

are 12.2 (wheat requirement met by FPSs), 32.7, 17.5 and 86.7. Most of the

requirements of commodities excepting kerosene are met from market in each of

rural and urban regions (Table 4.49). Table 4.49

Average Annual Requirement of Commodities: Routes of Fulfillment (By Region)

Rural Urban Total Commodities

Routes Quantity % Quantity % Quantity %

Self-Production 145.8 22.7 45.7 7.8 114.2 18.3Purchase from Market 401.6 62.7 469.6 79.8 423.1 67.8Fulfillment from Wage 18.9 2.9 4.3 0.7 14.3 2.3FPS 70.8 11.0 74.0 12.6 71.8 11.5

Wheat

Annual Requirement 640.9 100.0 588.3 100.0 624.3 100.0Self-Production 38.8 13.5 25.7 7.7 34.7 11.4Purchase from Market 149.4 51.9 210.3 62.5 168.7 55.6Fulfillment from Wage 7.5 2.6 1.0 0.3 5.5 1.8FPS 96.3 33.4 110.1 32.7 100.6 33.2

Rice

Annual Requirement 288.1 100.0 336.4 100.0 303.3 100.0Self-Production 0.3 0.9 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6Purchase from Market 28.7 77.9 36.9 80.4 31.3 78.8Fulfillment from Wage 0.0 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1FPS 7.1 19.2 8.0 17.5 7.4 18.6

Sugar

Annual Requirement 36.8 100.0 45.9 100.0 39.7 100.0Purchase from Market 5.6 14.0 4.3 9.3 5.2 12.4Fulfillment from Wage 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1FPS 32.4 80.5 40.3 86.7 34.8 82.6

Kerosene Oil

Annual Requirement 40.2 100.0 46.5 100.0 42.2 100.0Source: Field Survey. Fulfillment of the per capita requirement of essential commodities by different routes

by cardholding in quantity (kg./lt.) terms shows the following:

For all the households by cardholding, market satisfied requirement remains

dominant route for all types of cardholders for each of rice, wheat and sugar.

Reported per capita requirement of wheat for BPL households is less than

that of APL, APL requirement less than that of ANP and ANP less than that of ANT.

The per capita reported requirement of rice is most for ANT, and least in case of BPL

as in case of wheat.

As usual, market is an insignificant player in satisfying kerosene requirement

over households by cardholding (Table 4.50).

104

Table 4.50 Per Capita Average Annual Requirement of Commodities: Routes of fulfillment

(in Kg./lt) Commodities Routes BPL APL ANP ANT Total

Self-Production 20.0 41.8 12.3 13.3 23.0 Purchase from Market 82.2 81.6 85.3 92.3 85.2 Fulfillment from Wage 2.2 3.2 2.0 3.8 2.9 FPS 15.7 0.3 19.6 24.8 14.5

Wheat

Requirement 113.4 126.4 132.7 134.1 125.7 Self- Production 6.0 14.4 2.8 2.9 7.0 Purchase from Market 24.4 51.5 40.5 21.7 34.0 Fulfillment from Wage 0.6 1.0 1.1 1.7 1.1 FPS 23.0 0.7 14.0 41.3 20.3

Rice

Requirement 51.9 66.5 58.2 67.4 61.1 Self-Production 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 Purchase from Market 4.7 9.9 4.9 4.9 6.3 Fulfillment from Wage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 FPS 1.8 0.2 1.1 2.6 1.5

Sugar

Requirement 6.8 10.2 6.1 7.9 8.0 Purchase from Market 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.2 1.1 Fulfillment from Wage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 FPS 6.6 6.9 7.7 7.1 7.0

Kerosene Requirement 7.7 8.6 9.3 8.5 8.5

Source: Field Survey. The average annual requirement of essential commodities and its fulfillment by

districts show the following:

For wheat, FPSs supplied fulfillment of total requirement is at the minimum

(8.9 per cent) for Lakhimpur Kheri and highest (16.5 per cent) for Varanasi. For rice,

the minimum and maximum percentages of requirements met by FPSs are Bareilly

(20.7 per cent) and Jhansi (50.6 per cent). For sugar, the FPSs fulfilled requirements

at the minimum and maximum are Badaun (6.0 per cent) and Varanasi (31.9 per

cent). The minimum and maximum percentages fulfilled by FPSs for kerosene are

Badaun and Lakhimpur Kheri (75.5 per cent for each) and Gorakhpur (85.4 per cent).

There are district wise variations in the percentages of commodity requirements

fulfilled by FPSs and alternative sources. However, for each district, market satisfies

most of the requirements excepting kerosene. Self-production, though positive, is not

at all a significant factor in explaining fulfillment of consumption requirements

excepting to some extent rice (Table 4.51).

105

Table 4.51

Average Annual Requirement of Commodities: Routes of Fulfillment (By Districts)

Barielly

Badaun

Lakhimpur Kheri

Lucknow

Lalitpur

Jhansi

Gorakhpur

Varanasi

Total

Routes

Qty. % Qty. % Qty. % Qty. % Qty. % Qty. % Qty. % Qty. % Qty. % Self Production 203.1 33.4 169.6 25.0 75.3 12.6 43.7 7.9 183.1 22.9 165.7 20.7 64.8 12.2 10.6 2.5 114.2 18.3 Purchase from Market 276.2 45.5 472.7 69.7 432.4 72.6 425.9 77.4 535.6 66.9 531.1 66.4 382.2 71.8 326.2 75.8 423.1 67.8 Fulfillment from Wage 7.0 1.2 8.8 1.3 33.1 5.6 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.3 17.5 2.2 26.1 4.9 18.8 4.4 14.3 2.3 FPS 81.3 13.4 79.7 11.7 52.8 8.9 69.7 12.7 78.5 9.8 82.6 10.3 59.3 11.1 71.1 16.5 71.8 11.5

Wheat

Requirement 607.4 100.0 678.5 100.0 595.7 100.0 550.0 100.0 801.2 100.0 799.6 100.0 532.3 100.0 430.3 100.0 624.3 100.0 Self Production 135.9 35.9 17.9 5.7 48.9 14.9 31.1 10.9 2.5 0.9 0.0 0.0 36.5 9.5 6.3 2.2 34.7 11.4 Purchase from Market 175.9 46.5 211.4 67.7 165.5 50.4 149.3 52.3 181.1 64.1 88.4 52.4 248.2 64.4 129.8 45.3 168.7 55.6 Fulfillment from Wage 9.3 2.5 0.0 0.0 14.3 4.3 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.0 0.0 11.3 2.9 7.8 2.7 5.5 1.8 FPS 78.2 20.7 82.2 26.3 110.0 33.5 109.0 38.2 106.5 37.7 85.4 50.6 90.5 23.5 142.1 49.6 100.6 33.2

Rice

Requirement 378.2 100.0 312.1 100.0 328.2 100.0 285.4 100.0 282.5 100.0 168.8 100.0 385.6 100.0 286.7 100.0 303.3 100.0 Self Production 1.8 3.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.6 Purchase from Market 45.1 76.5 48.5 93.1 32.6 75.8 27.1 82.6 25.7 84.4 22.5 69.4 26.2 82.6 21.6 61.8 31.3 78.8 Fulfillment from Wage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.8 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1 FPS 9.6 16.3 3.1 6.0 10.3 24.0 5.1 15.5 4.5 14.6 9.9 30.6 5.1 16.2 11.2 31.9 7.4 18.6

Sugar

Requirement 59.0 100.0 52.2 100.0 43.0 100.0 32.8 100.0 30.4 100.0 32.4 100.0 31.8 100.0 35.0 100.0 39.7 100.0 Purchase from Market 7.4 19.3 5.6 14.1 10.5 23.6 5.9 13.1 6.3 14.4 2.8 5.8 1.4 3.3 1.8 4.7 5.2 12.4 Fulfillment from Wage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.1 FPS 30.5 79.3 30.0 75.5 33.6 75.5 38.2 84.5 37.0 84.8 43.4 90.5 34.7 85.4 31.9 85.0 34.8 82.6

Kerosene Oil

Requirement 38.5 100.0 39.7 100.0 44.6 100.0 45.1 100.0 43.7 100.0 48.0 100.0 40.6 100.0 37.5 100.0 42.2 100.0 Source: Field Survey.

106

The fulfillment of per capita annual average requirement of essential

commodities from alternative routes shows both surplus and deficit relative to

consumption requirement by items. The supply points cover self-production, market

supply (including wage labour and kind payment) and FPSs supply.

Thus, in the frame of analysis, our balance equation is:

Supply>= Demand (Requirement),

where, Supply = Self-production + Market Supply + FPSs Supply.

In self-production, rice and wheat are important items, which is zero for

kerosene and sugar for each of the districts covered excepting insignificant self-

production of sugar in Bareilly. Thus, FPSs supplied kerosene determines

consumption of the same when the market response to requirement of kerosene at

the lowest end of consumption (village and Wards in towns) is either non-existent or

negligible. In fulfillment of consumption requirements from wages in kind, only rice

and wheat are paid. In fact, this component is zero for rice for the districts Badaun,

Lucknow and Jhansi (Table 4.52). Table 4.52

Per Capita Average Annual Requirement and their fulfillment from Different Sources (In Kg./lt. District-wise)

Routes Barielly Badaun Lakhimpur Kheri

Lucknow Lalitpur Jhansi Gorakhpur Varanasi Total

Self-Production 39.3 36.2 16.0 9.1 39.1 34.4 11.4 2.0 23.0Purchase from Market 53.4 100.7 91.7 88.7 114.4 110.3 67.5 62.7 85.2Fulfillment from Wage 1.4 1.9 7.0 0.0 0.5 3.6 4.6 3.6 2.9FPS 15.7 17.0 11.2 14.5 16.8 17.1 10.5 13.7 14.5W

heat

Requirement 117.5 144.6 126.4 114.6 171.1 166.0 94.1 82.7 125.7Self-Production 26.3 3.8 10.4 6.5 0.5 0.0 6.5 1.2 7.0Purchase from Market 34.0 45.0 35.1 31.1 38.7 18.3 43.9 25.0 34.0Fulfillment from Wage 1.8 0.0 3.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 2.0 1.5 1.1FPS 15.1 17.5 23.3 22.7 22.7 17.7 16.0 27.3 20.3

Ric

e

Requirement 73.2 66.5 69.6 59.5 60.3 35.0 68.2 55.1 61.1Self-Production 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0Purchase from Market 8.7 10.3 6.9 5.6 5.5 4.7 4.6 4.2 6.3Fulfillment from Wage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0FPS 1.9 0.7 2.2 1.1 1.0 2.1 0.9 2.1 1.5Su

gar

Requirement 11.4 11.1 9.1 6.8 6.5 6.7 5.6 6.7 8.0Purchase from Market 1.4 1.2 2.2 1.2 1.3 0.6 0.2 0.3 1.1Fulfillment from Wage 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0FPS 5.9 6.4 7.1 8.0 7.9 9.0 6.1 6.1 7.0

Kero

sene

O

il

Requirement 7.4 8.5 9.5 9.4 9.3 10.0 7.2 7.2 8.5Source: Field Survey.

There remains general deficit (requirement>supply) for kerosene, but the fact

remains that across income brackets requirement of kerosene is met mostly by

FPSs. As income brackets are considered in an ascending order, we find increasing

107

requirement of kerosene per annum and increasing quantity met by FPSs, excepting

the highest income bracket (above Rs. One lakh) for whom market purchase covers

19.8 per cent of the requirement.

For wheat, as we consider the beneficiary households by income in an

ascending order, we find generally lower percentage met by FPSs at the highest

income brackets (above Rs. 50,000 per annum) and very low percentage at the level

of incomeless households. For the households in the income bracket between Rs.

50,000 and Rs. One Lakh, the percentage requirement fulfilled by the FPSs is 4.9 for

wheat, which is 11.8 for rice, 7.8 for sugar, 86.5 for kerosene. It remains, however,

surprising how the incomeless households manage to get priced items from the

FPSs. As opposed to this, for the households in the lower income bracket between

Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 19,000, the FPSs supplied fulfillment of requirement for wheat is

12.5, for rice 40.0, for sugar 19.4 and for kerosene 84.3.

Considered the beneficiary households by income brackets, it is clear that the

contribution (supply) of FPSs in fulfillment of consumption requirements of essential

commodities is more in lower income brackets relative to what it is in higher income

brackets (Table 4.53). Table 4.53

Average Annual Requirement of Commodities: Fulfillment from Different Routes (By Income Brackets, In Rs.)

Routes No Income

Up to 5000

5000-10000

10000-19000

19000-25000

25000-50000

50000-1 Lakh

>1 Lakh

Total

Self-Production 0.0 5.7 23.0 129.0 199.5 150.0 191.0 655.6 114.2Purchase from Market 60.3 162.0 409.7 412.1 519.9 566.1 668.7 435.6 423.1Fulfillment from Wage 5.8 11.9 11.9 12.3 10.8 30.4 9.7 22.2 14.3FPS 25.5 54.8 76.7 79.3 69.2 79.5 44.5 55.6 71.8

Wheat Requirement 139.2 260.1 524.2 631.9 781.3 827.9 913.9 1068.9 624.3

Self-Production 0.0 0.0 6.2 33.2 58.3 41.0 93.5 444.4 34.7Purchase from Market 20.4 70.2 164.5 145.5 214.4 223.5 402.4 277.8 168.7Fulfillment from Wage 2.6 10.3 7.6 2.9 4.9 5.5 12.9 11.1 5.5FPS 20.0 25.4 110.4 118.5 97.5 113.2 68.4 72.2 100.6

Rice Requirement 46.3 108.9 288.4 296.2 356.3 381.7 577.3 733.3 303.3

Self-Production 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2Purchase from Market 3.5 9.8 29.1 29.4 35.9 36.4 64.1 143.6 31.3Fulfillment from Wage 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0FPS 1.5 1.9 6.9 7.5 8.1 10.3 5.4 24.2 7.4

Sugar Requirement 5.5 11.5 36.6 38.7 44.1 48.1 69.2 174.4 39.7

Purchase from Market 1.3 0.9 4.4 5.1 6.5 8.2 3.6 14.4 5.2Fulfillment from Wage 1.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0FPS 11.9 20.6 34.4 36.1 38.0 39.6 42.5 35.1 34.8

Kerosene Requirement 18.1 22.9 39.8 42.8 46.8 50.9 49.1 72.7 42.2

Quantity in Kg. Source: Field Survey.

108

In the rural region, FPSs fulfill 11.1 per cent of the requirement of wheat

which is 33.4 per cent for rice, 18.8 per cent for sugar and 80.3 per cent for

kerosene. In the urban region, FPSs fulfill 12.6 per cent of the requirement of wheat

which is 32.6 per cent for rice, 17.7 per cent for sugar and 86.6 per cent for

kerosene. While the contribution of FPSs in fulfillment of requirement of all the

essential items excepting kerosene is very low, its support role is significant (Table

4.54).

Table 4.54 Per Capita Average Annual Requirement of Commodities: Fulfillment from

Different Routes (By Region, in Kg.) Commodities Routes Rural Urban Total

Self-Production 27.5 9.5 18.5Purchase from Market 75.8 97.8 86.8Fulfillment from Wage 3.6 0.9 2.2FPS 13.4 15.4 14.4

Wheat Annual Requirement 120.9 122.6 121.8

Self-Production 7.3 5.4 6.3Purchase from Market 28.2 43.8 36.0Fulfillment from Wage 1.4 0.2 0.8FPS 18.2 22.9 20.6

Rice Annual Requirement 54.4 70.1 62.2

Self-Production 0.1 0.0 0.0Purchase from Market 5.4 7.7 6.6Fulfillment from Wage 0.0 0.0 0.0FPS 1.3 1.7 1.5

Sugar Annual Requirement 6.9 9.6 8.3

Purchase from Market 1.1 0.9 1.0Fulfillment from Wage 0.0 0.0 0.0FPS 6.1 8.4 7.3

Kerosene Oil Annual Requirement 7.6 9.7 8.6Source: Field Survey. Households’ Propensity to Purchase Foodgrains from Market

Households take the decision to get essential commodities mainly based on

availability of money (earning/purchasing power) at a particular point of time. This

factor explains 70.3 per cent at the minimum for the district Bareilly to 93.3 per cent

at the maximum for the district Varanasi. The other factors behind purchase from

market include seasons and need (Table 4.55).

109

Table 4.55 Households’ Propensity to Purchase food-grains from market

District Seasonal Depend on Need

Both Season and Need

Availability of Money

Others Total

No. 3 38 14 83 0 118Barielly % 2.5 32.2 11.9 70.3 0.0 100.0

No. 4 40 8 105 0 120Badaun % 3.3 33.3 6.7 87.5 0.0 100.0

No. 1 54 18 82 1 122Lakhimpur Kheri % 0.8 44.3 14.8 67.2 0.8 100.0

No. 0 53 6 97 0 120Lucknow % 0.0 44.2 5.0 80.8 0.0 100.0

No. 1 60 0 94 0 120Lalitpur % 0.8 50.0 0.0 78.3 0.0 100.0

No. 7 70 0 90 0 120Jhansi % 5.8 58.3 0.0 75.0 0.0 100.0

No. 16 46 4 106 1 120Gorakhpur % 13.3 38.3 3.3 88.3 0.8 100.0

No. 3 50 14 112 0 120Varanasi % 2.5 41.7 11.7 93.3 0.0 100.0

No. 35 411 64 769 2 960Total % 3.6 42.8 6.7 80.1 0.2 100.0Source: Field Survey. The purchasing power (availability of money) based propensity to purchase

from the market explains the dominant role of the market-led fulfillment of

requirements across households by card holdings. For the ANT type households, it

explains the maximum (90.8 per cent) of the total components/factors that explain the

propensity to buy from the market, while for ANP it explains the minimum (72.1 per

cent). Need-based purchase is another major factor behind purchase of essential

items from the market across households by cardholding, the lowest need-based

coverage being that for ANT. Actually it is a combination of need and purchasing

power that mostly explains the propensity of the households by cardholding to buy

from the market (Table 4.56). Table 4.56

Households’ Timing/Need to Purchase food-grains from market (By Card Holding)

BPL APL ANP ANT Total No. 6 8 15 6 35 Seasonal

% 2.5 3.3 6.3 2.5 3.6 No. 128 104 98 81 411 Need-based

% 53.3 43.3 40.8 33.8 42.8 No. 24 15 13 12 64 Both Seasonal

and Need-based % 10.0 6.3 5.4 5.0 6.7 No. 193 185 173 218 769 Availability of Money

(Purchasing Power) % 80.4 77.1 72.1 90.8 80.1 No. 0 0 2 0 2 Other Reasons

% 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.2 No. 240 240 240 240 960 Total

% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Field Survey.

110

Foodgrains Purchased by Households from Open Market (on Credit Basis) 58.2 per cent of the sample beneficiary households purchased foodgrains from the

open market on credit basis, which is 67.5 for BPL, 65.4 for ANT, 58.3 for the ANP

and 41.7 for the APL. There are district wise variations in the percentages of

households purchasing foodgrains from the open market with the assistance of loans

(Table 4.57). Table 4.57

Purchase of Food-grains by Households from Open Market on Credit Basis, 2006 BPL APL ANP ANT Total District

No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % Barielly 15 9.3 8 8.0 19 13.6 20 12.7 62 11.1Badaun 20 12.3 28 28.0 23 16.4 22 14.0 93 16.6Lakhimpur Kheri 17 10.5 15 15.0 18 12.9 20 12.7 70 12.5Lucknow 21 13.0 4 4.0 13 9.3 20 12.7 58 10.4Lalitpur 23 14.2 11 11.0 17 12.1 22 14.0 73 13.1Jhansi 15 9.3 8 8.0 12 8.6 17 10.8 52 9.3Gorakhpur 26 16.0 11 11.0 16 11.4 18 11.5 71 12.7Varanasi 25 15.4 15 15.0 22 15.7 18 11.5 80 14.3Purchased on Credit 162 67.5 100 41.7 140 58.3 157 65.4 559 58.2Not Purchased on Credit 78 32.5 140 58.3 100 41.7 83 34.6 401 41.8Total Sample 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 960 100.0

Note: * % calculated on total sample and district % on households whose have purchased food-grains on credit

Source: Field Survey. Of all the households reporting credit-based purchase of foodgrains from

alternative sources (559), most (97.5 per cent) depend on local shopkeeper, 25.9 per

cent depend on community and 4.5 per cent depend on FPS dealers. Thus, the

households reported multiple sources of dependence for credit-based purchase of

foodgrains from open market (Table 4.58). Table 4.58

Households’ Credit-based Purchase of food-grains from Open Market (Alternative Sources)

Local Shopkeeper FPS Dealer Local Community Total District No. % No. % No. % No. %

Barielly 63 11.6 4 16.0 11 7.6 62 11.1Badaun 92 16.9 1 4.0 13 9.0 93 16.6Lakhimpur Kheri 73 13.4 4 16.0 2 1.4 70 12.5Lucknow 57 10.5 2 8.0 16 11.0 58 10.4Lalitpur 69 12.7 2 8.0 25 17.2 73 13.1Jhansi 49 9.0 1 4.0 22 15.2 52 9.3Gorakhpur 66 12.1 5 20.0 36 24.8 71 12.7Varanasi 76 13.9 6 24.0 20 13.8 80 14.3Total 545 100.0 25 100.0 145 100.0 559 100.0

Source: Field Survey.

111

Number of Population Benefited from Money Wage and Foodgrians under SGRY (Food for Work) Very few population from the sample beneficiary households reported deriving

benefits from employment under SGRY (food for work), very few reported to have

received payment at site and still fewer reported to have received foodgrains (Table

4.59). Table 4.59

Number of Population Benefited by Receiving Wage and Food-grains under SGRY (Food for Work)

Male Persons Payment at Site Those who received Food-grainsDistricts BPL APL ANP ANT Done Not Done Total Yes No Total

Barielly 0 1 0 3 3 1 4 2 2 4Badaun 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1Lakhimpur Kheri 1 0 0 4 3 2 5 0 5 3Lucknow 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 1 1 2Lalitpur 24 7 3 9 5 38 43 0 34 20Gorakhpur 0 0 0 2 0 2 2 0 2 2Varanasi 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1Total 27 8 3 20 13 45 58 4 29 33

Source: Field Survey. A total of 344 households of the total sample of 960 reported on the efficacy

of mid-day meal (MDM) scheme. Of them, 86.6 per cent reported to be getting the

cooked MDM. Of those who are reportedly getting MDM, 51.0 per cent reported to be

getting it irregularly, while 48.3 per cent regularly. There are district wise variations in

the reported availability, period and quality of MDM (Table 4.60). Table 4.60

Mid-Day Meal Scheme by Availability, Regularity and Quality (Perception of Beneficiary Households)

Cooked Meal Period of receiving MDM District Figure in Getting Not

GettingTotal Regular Irregular Never Total

No. 34 5 39 16 18 0 34Barielly % 87.2 12.8 100.0 47.1 52.9 0.0 100.0

No. 41 2 43 12 29 0 41Badaun % 95.3 4.7 100.0 29.3 70.7 0.0 100.0

No. 34 7 41 19 13 2 34Lakhimpur Kheri % 82.9 17.1 100.0 55.9 38.2 5.9 100.0

No. 41 2 43 25 16 0 41Lucknow % 95.3 4.7 100.0 61.0 39.0 0.0 100.0

No. 26 22 48 9 17 0 26Lalitpur % 54.2 45.8 100.0 34.6 65.4 0.0 100.0

No. 36 1 37 8 28 0 36Jhansi % 97.3 2.7 100.0 22.2 77.8 0.0 100.0

No. 41 7 48 18 23 0 41Gorakhpur % 85.4 14.6 100.0 43.9 56.1 0.0 100.0

No. 45 0 45 37 8 0 45Varanasi % 100.0 0.0 100.0 82.2 17.8 0.0 100.0

No. 298 46 344 144 152 2 298Total % 86.6 13.4 100.0 48.3 51.0 0.7 100.0

Source: Field Survey.

112

4.8 Benefits Derived through PDS

The best performance of PDS by coverage of BPL households is revealed in case of

kerosene where on average each household receives 3.2 lt. per month at the price per lt

Rs. 11.20. The frequency of visit to FPSs for kerosene by BPL households is five that is

more or less uniform over districts. There is not much difference between rural and urban

regions so far as availability of kerosene is concerned from FPSs by quantity, price and

frequency of visit to FPSs. The performance of PDS in case of distribution of wheat for

BPL households reveals average quantity drawn at 10.4 kg. at a price per kg Rs. 5.45

with a frequency of visit of households three (number of times the households visit the

FPSs). The frequency varies over districts from lowest at two to highest at six. The price

of wheat per kg. is lowest in rural Lakhimpur Kheri (Rs. 5.19) and highest (Rs. 5.75) in

urban Gorakhpur. The performance of PDS in case of distribution of rice for BPL

households reveals average quantity drawn at 17.3 kg. at a price per kg Rs. 6.66 with a

frequency of visit of households three (number of times the households visit the FPSs).

The frequency varies over districts from lowest at two to highest at six. The price of rice

per kg. is lowest in urban Lakhimpur Kheri (Rs. 6.25) and highest (Rs. 7.17) for rural

Lalitpur. For sugar for BPL households the average quantity drawn is 1.4 kg. at a price

per kg. Rs. 14.65 with a frequency of two. The price range for sugar shows minimum at

Rs. 14.07 for rural Bareilly and maximum at Rs.15.50 for urban Jhansi. The frequency of

visit to FPSs by BPL households for sugar varies between one and six (Table 4.61). Table 4.61

Food-grains Received from FPSs by Quantity, Price Paid and Frequency of Visit per Household on Average under BPL scheme (Reference period: six months ending 2006)

Wheat Rice Sugar Kerosene District Region Qty. Price Frequency of

Visit Qty. Price No. of

Time Qty. Price Frequency of

Visit Qty. Price Frequency of

Visit Urban 10.5 5.43 3 14.0 6.61 3 1.2 14.75 2 3.0 11.20 4 Rural 10.6 5.43 2 14.8 6.68 2 1.7 14.07 2 3.1 11.60 5

Barielly Total 10.5 5.43 3 14.5 6.65 3 1.5 14.22 2 3.1 11.47 5

Urban 6.0 5.50 2 10.5 6.50 3 0.4 14.50 1 3.7 11.10 5 Rural 12.9 5.35 3 12.4 6.44 3 0.8 14.33 2 2.7 11.79 5

Badaun Total 10.6 5.38 3 11.7 6.46 3 0.7 14.36 1 3.0 11.55 5

Urban 10.0 5.40 5 25.0 6.25 4 1.9 13.56 4 4.7 10.65 5 Rural 9.0 5.19 2 22.5 6.26 2 1.7 14.38 1 2.5 11.13 5

Lakhimpur Kheri Total 9.3 5.27 3 23.3 6.26 2 1.8 14.10 2 3.2 10.97 5

Urban 10.0 5.80 4 10.0 6.80 4 1.7 14.80 0 3.0 10.30 5 Rural 9.0 5.65 3 22.5 6.72 3 1.6 14.53 2 4.0 11.00 4

Lucknow Total 9.3 5.71 3 18.3 6.75 3 1.6 14.64 1 3.6 10.77 5

Urban 15.0 5.30 4 16.3 7.00 4 1.1 14.90 2 3.9 11.45 5 Rural 9.3 5.63 4 13.5 7.17 4 0.8 14.93 2 2.7 11.88 5

Lalitpur Total 11.2 5.50 4 14.4 7.11 4 0.9 14.93 2 3.1 11.73 5

Urban 15.0 5.25 6 15.0 6.47 6 2.8 15.50 6 4.7 10.85 6 Rural 13.5 5.31 2 17.5 6.99 2 1.1 14.44 3 3.5 11.20 5

Jhansi Total 14.0 5.29 4 16.7 6.80 3 1.7 14.82 4 3.9 11.08 6

Urban 4.0 5.75 1 10.0 6.75 1 1.4 14.89 0 3.1 11.00 6 Rural 10.5 5.50 3 17.0 6.68 3 1.4 15.05 1 2.7 11.08 5

Gorakhpur Total 8.3 5.54 2 14.7 6.69 2 1.4 15.00 1 2.8 11.05 6

Urban 10.0 5.45 5 25.0 6.50 5 2.7 14.15 5 3.0 11.00 6 Rural 10.0 5.50 5 25.0 6.55 5 1.6 15.05 4 2.8 11.00 5

Varanasi Total 10.0 5.48 5 25.0 6.53 5 1.9 14.75 4 2.8 11.00 6

Urban 10.1 5.46 4 15.7 6.60 4 1.6 14.65 2 3.6 10.94 5 Rural 10.6 5.45 3 18.1 6.69 3 1.3 14.65 2 3.0 11.33 5

Total Total 10.4 5.45 3 17.3 6.66 3 1.4 14.65 2 3.2 11.20 5

Source: Field Survey.

113

The best performance of PDS by coverage of ANT households is revealed in

case of kerosene where on average each household receives 3.1 lt. per month at

price per unit Rs. 11.05. The frequency of visit to FPSs for kerosene by ANT

households is 5.5 that is more or less uniform over districts (ranging from 4 to 6).

There is not much difference between rural and urban regions so far as availability of

kerosene is concerned from FPSs by quantity, price and frequency of visit to FPSs.

The performance of PDS in case of distribution of wheat for ANT households reveals

average quantity drawn at 12.3 kg. at a price per kg Rs. 2.32 with a frequency of visit

of households five (number of times the households visit the FPSs). The frequency

varies over districts from lowest at three to highest at six. The price of wheat per kg.

is lowest in urban Jhansi (Rs. 2.08) and highest (Rs. 2.51) in rural Lucknow. The

performance of PDS in case of distribution of rice for ANT households reveals

average quantity drawn at 22.3 kg. at a price per kg Rs. 3.30 with a frequency of visit

of households five (number of times the households visit the FPSs). The frequency

varies over districts from lowest at three to highest at six. The price of rice per kg. is

lowest in urban Jhansi (Rs. 3.08) and highest (Rs. 3.48) in rural Lucknow. For sugar

for ANT households the average quantity drawn is 1.4 kg. at a price per kg. Rs. 14.65

with a frequency of visit of three. The price range for sugar shows minimum at Rs.

13.50 for urban Bareilly and Badaun and maximum at Rs. 15.00 for rural Lalitpur,

Gorakhpur and Varanasi. The frequency of visit to FPSs by ANT households for

sugar varies between one and five (Table 4.62). Table 4.62

Food-grains Received from FPSs by Quantity, Price Paid and Frequency of Visit per Household on Average under ANT scheme (Reference period: six months ending 2006)

Wheat Rice Sugar Kerosene District Region Qty. Price Frequency

of Visit Qty. Price No. of

Time Qty. Price Frequency

of Visit Qty. Price Frequency

of Visit Urban 15.0 2.25 6 20.0 3.15 5 3.5 13.50 5 2.8 11.20 6 Rural 15.5 2.44 5 19.8 3.38 5 2.0 14.05 4 2.8 11.35 5

Barielly Total 15.3 2.38 5 19.8 3.30 5 2.5 13.88 4 2.8 11.30 5

Urban 15.0 2.18 4 20.0 3.18 4 0.1 13.50 0 4.0 10.90 5 Rural 13.3 2.24 3 18.8 3.22 3 0.6 13.80 0 2.8 11.63 4

Badaun Total 13.8 2.21 4 19.2 3.21 3 0.4 13.75 0 3.2 11.38 4

Urban 10.0 2.50 5 25.0 3.50 5 2.8 13.85 5 4.8 11.10 6 Rural 9.8 2.40 3 24.8 3.41 3 1.7 14.03 2 2.2 10.98 5

Lakhimpur Kheri Total 9.8 2.44 3 24.8 3.44 4 2.1 13.96 3 3.1 11.02 5

Urban 10.0 2.25 6 25.0 3.25 6 0.0 0 3.0 10.00 6 Rural 10.0 2.51 5 25.0 3.48 5 1.5 14.50 2 4.0 10.88 6

Lucknow Total 10.0 2.43 5 25.0 3.40 5 1.0 14.50 1 3.6 10.58 6

Urban 15.0 2.40 5 20.0 3.40 5 0.8 14.13 2 4.0 11.00 6 Rural 14.8 2.29 6 19.8 3.29 6 0.3 15.00 1 2.7 11.65 6

Lalitpur Total 14.8 2.33 6 19.8 3.33 6 0.5 14.68 1 3.1 11.43 6

Urban 15.0 2.08 6 20.0 3.08 6 1.9 13.67 5 4.5 10.20 6 Rural 15.0 2.13 5 20.0 3.13 5 1.3 14.32 4 3.4 11.08 5

Jhansi Total 15.0 2.11 5 20.0 3.11 5 1.5 14.10 4 3.7 10.78 5

Contd…

114

Wheat Rice Sugar Kerosene District Region

Qty. Price Frequency of Visit

Qty. Price No. of Time

Qty. Price Frequency of Visit

Qty. Price Frequency of Visit

Urban 10.0 2.20 6 25.0 3.20 6 2.4 13.85 1 3.4 10.85 6 Rural 10.0 2.39 5 25.0 3.36 5 1.2 15.00 3 2.5 11.00 6

Gorakhpur Total 10.0 2.33 6 25.0 3.31 6 1.6 14.48 2 2.8 10.95 6

Urban 10.0 2.25 6 25.0 3.25 6 2.5 14.00 5 3.0 11.00 6 Rural 10.0 2.38 6 25.0 3.38 6 1.8 15.00 5 2.8 11.00 6

Varanasi Total 10.0 2.33 6 25.0 3.33 6 2.0 14.67 5 2.8 11.00 6

Urban 12.5 2.26 5 22.5 3.25 5 1.7 13.80 3 3.7 10.78 6 Rural 12.3 2.35 5 22.3 3.33 5 1.3 14.48 3 2.9 11.19 5

Total Total 12.3 2.32 5 22.3 3.30 5 1.4 14.25 3 3.1 11.05 5.5

Source: Field Survey.

The ANP households get wheat and kerosene, the former on average 6.8 kg.

per month and the latter 0.6 lt. at an average price of Rs. 11.30.

The rural average quantity of wheat drawn by ANP households is 7.1 kg. while the

urban average quantity is 5.9 kg. The respective percentages for kerosene are 11.40

lt. and 10.75 lt. There are district wise minor variations in the reported quantity of

wheat and kerosene drawn by ANP households over districts and regions by rural

and urban within each district (Table 4.63). Table 4.63

Food-grains and Kerosene Oil Received from FPSs by Quantity, Price Paid and Frequency of Visit per Household on Average under ANP scheme (Reference period:

six months ending 2006) Wheat Kerosene District Region

Quantity Quantity Price Frequency

of Visit Urban 7.8 0.0 0.00 0 Rural 7.1 0.6 13.80 1

Barielly Total 7.3 0.4 13.80 1

Urban 8.0 0.0 0 Rural 4.0 0.9 11.90 1

Badaun Total 4.7 0.8 11.90 1

Urban 9.0 0.6 10.50 1 Rural 7.7 0.4 11.00 1

Lakhimpur Kheri

Total 8.1 0.4 10.79 1 Rural 10.0 1.3 10.87 3 Lucknow

Total 10.0 1.3 10.87 3 Urban 4.8 0.6 11.33 2 Rural 0.5 0.1 12.00 0

Lalitpur Total 1.9 0.3 11.50 1

Urban 3.0 1.1 10.33 2 Rural 6.5 0.5 10.88 1

Jhansi Total 5.3 0.7 10.64 1

Urban 0.8 0.0 0 Rural 10.0 1.4 11.00 4

Gorakhpur Total 6.6 0.9 11.00 2

Urban 10.0 0.2 11.00 0 Rural 10.0 0.2 11.00 1

Varanasi Total 10.0 0.2 11.00 0

Urban 5.9 0.4 10.75 1 Rural 7.1 0.7 11.40 2

Total Total 6.8 0.6 11.30 1

Source: Field Survey.

115

The performance of PDS by coverage of APL households in case of kerosene shows

on average each household receiving 3.0 lt. per month at price per unit Rs. 11.0. The

frequency of visit of FPS for kerosene by APL households is 4.7 that is 3.8 for urban

and 5.1 for rural region. There is not much differences between rural and urban

regions so far as availability of kerosene is concerned from FPSs by quantity, price

and frequency of visit of FPSs (Table 4.64). Table 4.64

Kerosene Oil Received from FPSs by Quantity, Price Paid and Frequency of Visit per Household on Average under APL scheme (Reference period: six months ending 2006)

Kerosene Oil District Region Quantity Price Frequency

of Visit Urban 3.2 11.1 5.2 Rural 3.5 11.5 5.0

Barielly Total 3.4 11.4 5.1

Urban 3.8 11.5 4.0 Rural 2.1 11.7 2.8

Badaun Total 2.7 11.6 3.2

Urban 5.5 10.3 5.5 Rural 2.7 11.1 4.9

Lakhimpur Kheri Total 3.7 10.8 5.1

Urban 3.0 10.0 3.9 Rural 4.3 10.7 5.5

Lucknow Total 3.8 10.5 4.9

Urban NR NR 0.0 Rural 3.0 11.6 5.7

Lalitpur Total 2.0 11.6 3.8

Urban 4.7 10.0 6.0 Rural 3.1 11.2 5.1

Jhansi Total 3.6 10.8 5.4

Urban NR NR 0.0 Rural 2.8 11.0 6.0

Gorakhpur Total 1.9 11.0 4.0

Urban 3.0 11.0 6.0 Rural 3.0 11.0 5.9

Varanasi Total 3.0 11.0 5.9

Urban 2.9 10.7 3.8 Rural 3.1 11.2 5.1

Total Total 3.0 11.0 4.7

Source: Field Survey.

Based on actual quantity available during last six months to the beneficiary

households under BPL and ANT schemes, we derive the gap between actual

available quantity of foodgrains and provision. Under BPL the gap is 57.5 per cent,

which is 53.2 per cent for the urban and 60.1 per cent for the rural region so far as

provision and actual availability of foodgrains over last six months (end 2006) is

concerned. Under Antyodaya the gap is 18.2 per cent, which is 9.6 per cent for the

urban and 22.4 per cent for the rural region so far as provision and actual availability

of foodgrains over last six months (end 2006) is concerned. There are district wise

116

variations in the percentages in the gap between provision and availability calculated

over last six months. For BPL, the percentage gap is most for Gorakhpur (75.2 per

cent). For Antyodaya, the percentage gap is most for Badaun (45.9 per cent). Thre

are also rural-urban variations in the gap between provision and availability (Table

4.65). Table 4.65

Projection of Actual Quantity of Food-grains on the Basis of last six months’ lifting by Beneficiary Households under BPL and ANT schemes

BPL Scheme Antyodya scheme Gap Gap

Districts

Area

Wheat

Rice Total

Foodgrains Quantity %

Wheat

Rice Total

Foodgrains Quantity % Urban 35.7 47.6 83.3 126.7 60.3 84.0 104.0 188.0 22.0 10.5Rural 23.7 32.5 56.2 153.8 73.2 77.3 98.8 176.0 34.0 16.2

Barielly Total 27.7 37.7 65.4 144.6 68.8 79.6 100.5 180.0 30.0 14.3

Urban 10.2 30.5 40.7 169.4 80.6 66.0 88.0 154.0 56.0 26.7Rural 43.9 34.6 78.4 131.6 62.6 40.4 54.4 94.8 115.2 54.9

Badaun Total 30.0 33.2 63.3 146.7 69.9 48.4 65.2 113.6 96.4 45.9

Urban 46.0 110.0 156.0 54.0 25.7 45.0 115.0 160.0 50.0 23.8Rural 13.5 33.8 47.3 162.8 77.5 27.8 79.2 107.0 103.0 49.1

Lakhimpur Kheri Total 23.6 57.6 81.2 128.8 61.3 33.4 91.1 124.5 85.5 40.7

Urban 38.0 39.0 77.0 133.0 63.3 60.0 150.0 210.0 0.0 0.0Rural 26.9 67.5 94.4 115.7 55.1 47.8 123.8 171.5 38.5 18.3

Lucknow Total 30.4 60.5 90.9 119.1 56.7 51.8 132.5 184.3 25.7 12.2

Urban 63.0 58.7 121.7 88.3 42.1 79.5 106.0 185.5 24.5 11.7Rural 32.4 51.3 83.7 126.3 60.2 86.3 115.5 201.8 8.2 3.9

Lalitpur Total 41.7 53.9 95.6 114.4 54.5 84.1 112.4 196.4 13.6 6.5

Urban 90.0 87.0 177.0 33.0 15.7 88.5 118.0 206.5 3.5 1.7Rural 31.1 31.5 62.6 147.5 70.2 75.8 101.0 176.8 33.3 15.8

Jhansi Total 49.5 52.2 101.7 108.3 51.6 80.0 106.7 186.7 23.3 11.1

Urban 4.8 12.0 16.8 193.2 92.0 59.0 147.5 206.5 3.5 1.7Rural 29.4 47.6 77.0 133.0 63.3 54.0 132.5 186.5 23.5 11.2

Gorakhpur Total 18.9 33.2 52.1 157.9 75.2 55.7 137.5 193.2 16.8 8.0

Urban 54.0 135.0 189.0 21.0 10.0 60.0 150.0 210.0 0.0 0.0Rural 51.5 128.8 180.3 29.8 14.2 56.0 140.0 196.0 14.0 6.7

Varanasi Total 52.3 130.8 183.2 26.8 12.8 57.3 143.3 200.7 9.3 4.4

Urban 38.1 60.1 98.3 111.7 53.2 68.1 121.8 189.9 20.1 9.6Rural 31.6 52.3 83.9 126.1 60.1 57.7 105.3 162.9 47.1 22.4

Total Total 33.9 55.4 89.3 120.7 57.5 61.1 110.7 171.8 38.2 18.2

Note: We calculated the actual distribution gap based on the quantity of food-grains lifted by beneficiary during last six months. The quantity of foodgrains is 210 kg (per period) which should be given to beneficiary.

Source: Field Survey. Households who did not receive anything from FPSs

15.0 per cent of all the BPL households did not receive wheat, 14.2 per cent did not

receive rice, 23.8 per cent did not receive sugar and 0.4 per cent did not receive

kerosene based on a reference period of second half of 2006. Of all the ANT

households, 1.7 per cent did not receive wheat, 0.8 per cent did not receive rice, 34.2

per cent did not receive sugar, and 0.4 per cent did not receive kerosene. Of all the

117

ANP households, 32.5 per cent did not receive wheat and 73.3 per cent did not

receive kerosene. 9.6 per cent of APL households did not receive kerosene. Some of

the same households were deprived of a number of items (Table 4.66). Table 4.66

Number of Households who did not receive anything from FPSs (Reference period: six months ending 2006)

ANT BPL ANP District Wheat Rice Sugar Kerosene Wheat Rice Sugar Kerosene Wheat Kerosene

APL Kerosene

0 0 2 0 9 9 12 0 8 23 0Barielly 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 3.8 3.8 5.0 0.0 3.3 9.6 0.0

2 1 24 1 11 11 19 1 16 20 3Badaun 0.8 0.4 10.0 0.4 4.6 4.6 7.9 0.4 6.7 8.3 1.3

2 1 4 0 2 2 6 0 6 25 0Lakhimpur Kheri 0.8 0.4 1.7 0.0 0.8 0.8 2.5 0.0 2.5 10.4 0.0

0 0 20 0 2 2 7 0 0 15 0Lucknow 0.0 0.0 8.3 0.0 0.8 0.8 2.9 0.0 0.0 6.3 0.0

0 0 20 0 4 2 10 0 24 26 10Lalitpur 0.0 0.0 8.3 0.0 1.7 0.8 4.2 0.0 10.0 10.8 4.2

0 0 4 0 2 2 2 0 14 23 0Jhansi 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.0 5.8 9.6 0.0

0 0 8 0 6 6 1 0 10 17 10Gorakhpur 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 2.5 2.5 0.4 0.0 4.2 7.1 4.2

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 0Varanasi 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.3 0.0

4 2 82 1 36 34 57 1 78 176 23Total 1.7 0.8 34.2 0.4 15.0 14.2 23.8 0.4 32.5 73.3 9.6Total Households 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240

Source: Field Survey. 82.6 per cent of the beneficiary households reported no problems in purchase

of items from the FPSs. Most of those who reported problems cited non-availability of

money (purchasing power) as the major reason. The other reasons cited by the

households include long distance of the FPS from the residence, non-information

about distribution, absence of the households’ members, bad quality of items and

non-requirement. There are variations in the reported reasons for non-purchase by

cardholding (Box 4.3). Box 4.3

Reasons for Non-Purchase of any Item on a Regular Basis (Reference period: six months ending 2006)

Reasons Non-availability of Money Long distance of FPS Shop No information of distribution No Requirement Absence in village Not receiving New Ration Card Bad quality items

Source: Field Survey.

118

Reasons Related to FPS Dealers for Households' Not Purchasing Any Items on a Regular Basis during Six Months ending 2006 The reasons cited by the households for non-purchase of items from the FPSs during

the latest period of six months (end 2006) that relate to the FPS and the dealer

include mostly non-distribution of items (38.9 per cent reporting). The other reasons

include non-arrival of items for distribution, non-distribution of rice and wheat,

distance of the FPSs, short period of distribution, non-preparation (non-availability) of

ration cards, absence of the household in the village while items were

distributed/card were issued, post-distribution non-availability etc. There are

differences in the reasons cited by the households over the category of households

by cardholding. 52.8 per cent of the households reported no problems related to the

FPSs so far as their non-lifting of items were concerned during the latest six months

(Box 4.4). Box 4.4

Reasons Related to FPS Dealers for Households’ non-purchase of any Items on a regular basis during last six months

Reasons Non-distribution of materials Yojana Stopped Items never come Items do not come every month/items do not come from Godown Rice & Wheat never distributed Change of FPS Dealer Long distance of FPS/FPS in other village Loss of materials (‘Khatam ho jane ke karan’) Sugar is distributed only during festivals Short period distribution (1 or 2 days per month) No information about distribution Non-availability of Ration Card (‘nahi bana tha’) Absence from village during distribution

Source: Field Survey. Consumption Habit of Sugar

78.23 per cent of the rural and 89.11 per cent of the urban beneficiary households

consume sugar on a regular basis. In the urban region, 98.8 per cent of the ANT,

97.5 per cent of the APL, 92.5 per cent of the BPL and 61.9 per cent of the ANP

consume sugar on a regular basis. These percentages of households for rural region

are 83.1 per cent of the ANT, 90.6 per cent of the APL, 86.2 per cent of the BPL and

55.4 per cent of the ANP (Table 4.67).

119

Table 4.67

Consumption Habit of Sugar in Households Urban Rural

Figure

in Regular Not Regular

Total Regular Not Regular

Total

No. 74 6 80 138 22 160 BPL % 92.50 7.50 100.00 86.25 13.75 100.00

No. 78 2 80 145 15 160 APL % 97.50 2.50 100.00 90.63 9.38 100.00

No. 39 24 63 98 79 177 ANP % 61.90 38.10 100.00 55.37 44.63 100.00

No. 79 1 80 133 27 160 ANT % 98.75 1.25 100.00 83.13 16.88 100.00

No. 270 33 303 514 143 657 Total % 89.11 10.89 100.00 78.23 21.77 100.00

Source: Field Survey.

The reasons for not purchasing sugar from FPSs have been mentioned in the Box. Box 4.5

Reasons for not Purchasing Sugar from FPSs Reasons

Item never comes Non-distribution every month Never distributed in any month Not received due to non-availability of Money Distributed during only festivals Dealer opines ineligibility of item-seekers Not needed Source: Field Survey.

Adequacy of Quantity of Kerosene Oil Distributed

Around 70.0 per cent of the beneficiary households reported adequacy of quantity of

kerosene oil that they receive from FPSs for household consumption. For BPL

households, 75.8 per cent reported adequacy which is 72.5 for ANP households,

69.2 per cent for ANT households and 62.1 per cent for APL households. 77.6 per

cent of the rural and 66.4 per cent of the urban households reported adequacy of

kerosene oil so far as requirement is concerned. These percentages vary for

households considered over cardholding (Table 4.68).

120

Table 4.68 Adequacy of Quantity of Kerosene Oil for Household Consumption

Rural Urban Total

Figure in Adequate Not

Adequate Total Adequate Not

Adequate Total Adequate Not

Adequate Total

No. 64 16 80 118 42 160 182 58 240BPL % 80.0 20.0 100.0 73.75 26.25 100 75.8 24.2 100.0

No. 58 22 80 91 69 160 149 91 240APL % 72.5 27.5 100.0 56.875 43.125 100 62.1 37.9 100.0

No. 47 16 63 127 50 177 174 66 240ANP % 74.6 25.4 100.0 71.751 28.249 100 72.5 27.5 100.0

No. 66 14 80 100 60 160 166 74 240ANT % 82.5 17.5 100.0 62.5 37.5 100 69.2 30.8 100.0

No. 235 68 303 436 221 657 671 289 960Total 77.6 22.4 100.0 66.362 33.638 100 69.9 30.1 100.0

Source: Field Survey. The average price of kerosene oil per lt. purchased from the open market is

reported to be Rs. 25.57 that varies from a minimum at Rs. 22.55 for Jhansi and

maximum at Rs. 27.61 for Lakhimpur Kheri. For households by cardholding, BPL

reported to pay Rs. 25.27 per lt. and APL Rs. 26.06. The ANP households pay Rs.

26.54 and ANT Rs. 24.74. Thus, the reported price per unit for kerosene per lt. from

the open market does not vary much, the range of variation being Rs. 1.80 per lt.

There are little district wise variations in the reported price per lt. of kerosene oil

purchased from the open market (Table 4.69). Table 4.69

Average Price of Kerosene Purchased by Households from Open Market District BPL APL ANP ANT Total

Barielly 17.67 25.75 26.17 22.17 23.87 Badaun 24.11 26.62 22.50 24.17 24.94 Lakhimpur Kheri 27.82 28.00 28.00 27.06 27.61 Lucknow 20.00 22.75 25.00 23.33 22.76 Lalitpur 28.33 30.20 25.00 22.29 26.23 Jhansi 24.00 22.00 25.00 21.00 22.55 Gorakhpur 23.00 24.38 0.00 28.00 25.07 Varanasi 26.25 27.50 30.00 25.00 27.25 Total 25.27 26.06 26.54 24.74 25.57

Source: Field Survey.

The gap between open market price and FPS supplied price of kerosene is

reported to be Rs. 9.47 per lt. that shows a percentage price gap of 58.82 between

open market and FPS. In this case, the absolute price gap is Rs. 3.40. There is not

much difference in the price paid by households across cardholding so far as

purchase from open market is concerned. In case when the cardholders go to other

dealers where they are not attached to, they pay at higher varying prices, for

example, paying Rs. 17.5 by ANT type while paying Rs. 22.0 in case of ANP (Table

4.70).

121

Table 4.70 Average Price of Kerosene Purchased by Households from Different Sources

Open Market Own FPS Dealer Other FPS Dealer Total BPL 25.27 - - 25.27 APL 26.06 15.60 20.00 24.79 ANP 26.54 16.33 22.00 25.44 ANT 24.74 17.00 17.50 24.21 Total 25.57 16.10 19.50 24.84

Source: Field Survey. 4.9 Effect of Withdrawal of Sugar and Kerosene from PDS In case sugar and kerosene are withdrawn from the PDS, most of the households

reported that they would be adversely affected. This percentage is 92.8 for kerosene

and 26.3 for sugar. The necessity of kerosene, thus, is felt much more by the

households. In the rural region 92.4 per cent and in the urban region 93.7 per cent

would be adversely affected if kerosene is withdrawn from the PDS. Considered over

both rural and urban regions combined, this percentage for BPL is 97.5, for APL

93.8, for ANP 81.7 and for ANT 98.3. Separately for each of rural and urban regions

these percentages show the same pattern. In the rural region 26.3 per cent and in

the urban region 26.1 per cent would be adversely affected if sugar is withdrawn from

the PDS. Considered over both rural and urban regions combined, this percentage

for BPL is 30.4, for APL 5.8, for ANP 22.1 and for ANT 46.7. For rural APL,

withdrawal of sugar does not have much adverse effect (7.5 per cent) which is true

for urban APL where only 2.5 per cent reported to be adversely affected if sugar is

withdrawn (Table 4.71). Table 4.71

Effects if distribution of sugar and kerosene would be withdrawn from PDS Urban Rural Total Items Card

Category

No effect Adverse effect

Total No effect Adverse effect

Total No effect Adverse effect

Total

No. 50 30 80 117 43 160 167 73 240BPL % 62.5 37.5 100.0 73.1 26.9 100.0 69.6 30.4 100.0

No. 78 2 80 148 12 160 226 14 240APL % 97.5 2.5 100.0 92.5 7.5 100.0 94.2 5.8 100.0

No. 53 10 63 134 43 177 187 53 240ANP % 84.1 15.9 100.0 75.7 24.3 100.0 77.9 22.1 100.0

No. 43 37 80 85 75 160 128 112 240ANT % 53.8 46.3 100.0 53.1 46.9 100.0 53.3 46.7 100.0

No. 224 79 303 484 173 657 708 252 960

Sugar Total

% 73.9 26.1 100.0 73.7 26.3 100.0 73.8 26.3 100.0No. 1 79 80 5 155 160 6 234 240BPL

% 1.3 98.8 100.0 3.1 96.9 100.0 2.5 97.5 100.0No. 7 73 80 8 152 160 15 225 240APL

% 8.8 91.3 100.0 5.0 95.0 100.0 6.3 93.8 100.0No. 10 53 63 34 143 177 44 196 240ANP

% 15.9 84.1 100.0 19.2 80.8 100.0 18.3 81.7 100.0No. 1 79 80 3 157 160 4 236 240ANT

% 1.3 98.8 100.0 1.9 98.1 100.0 1.7 98.3 100.0No. 19 284 303 50 607 657 69 891 960

Kerosene Total

% 6.3 93.7 100.0 7.6 92.4 100.0 7.2 92.8 100.0Note: The issues have been asked to all types of sampled respondents. Source: Field Survey.

122

In case PDS is restricted to only distributing rice and wheat, 86.1 per cent

would remain unsatisfied, which will be 87.1 per cent in urban and 85.7 per cent in

rural region. Of those who still would remain satisfied, the maximum percentage is

reported from rural ANP (29.4 per cent), followed by urban ANP (20.6 per cent) and

urban APL (20.0 per cent). There are variations in the reported extent of satisfaction

by cardholding in case the items other than rice and wheat are withdrawn (Table

4.72). Table 4.72

Extent of satisfaction if the PDS provide only food-grains Urban Rural Total

Satisfied Not Satisfied

Total Satisfied Not Satisfied

Total Satisfied Not Satisfied

Total

No. 3 77 80 13 147 160 16 224 240BPL % 3.8 96.3 100.0 8.1 91.9 100.0 6.7 93.3 100.0

No. 16 64 80 17 143 160 33 207 240APL % 20.0 80.0 100.0 10.6 89.4 100.0 13.8 86.3 100.0

No. 13 50 63 52 125 177 65 175 240ANP % 20.6 79.4 100.0 29.4 70.6 100.0 27.1 72.9 100.0

No. 7 73 80 12 148 160 19 221 240ANT % 8.8 91.3 100.0 7.5 92.5 100.0 7.9 92.1 100.0

No. 39 264 303 94 563 657 133 827 960Total % 12.9 87.1 100.0 14.3 85.7 100.0 13.9 86.1 100.0

Source: Field Survey.

The reasons for satisfaction of households for providing only food-grains as

per household requirement have been mentioned in the Box 4.6. Box 4.6

Reasons for satisfaction of households for providing only food-grains as per Household Requirement

Reasons Actual requirement is based on food-grains Reduce hunger Improve economic condition Something would be available and received Got food-grains at low price and lesser from market

Source: Field Survey.

The reasons for non-satisfaction of households for providing only food-grains

through PDS have been mentioned in the Box 4.7. Box 4.7

Reasons for Non-satisfaction of households for providing only food-grains as per Household Requirement

Reasons Price of kerosene is very high in open market Kerosene is not available at other places Kerosene is inescapable for family Compulsion to use Diesel for light at night, if kerosene would be withdrawn Living in darkness if Kerosene would be withdrawn Increased family expenses if kerosene will be withdrawn Foodgrains self-produced

Source: Field Survey.

123

4.10 Role of Local Bodies Of the rural beneficiary households (657), 65.0 per cent opined that the Gram/Nagar

Panchayats do not take any initiatives for the improvement of the PDS, the

percentage being 73.3 for the urban households (303). While 25.4 per cent of the

households in rural region reported positive initiatives by Panchayats, 11.6 per cent

households in urban region reported the same. There are rural-urban variations in

the perception on the initiatives by the Panchayats as reported/opined by households

by cardholding (Table 4.73). Table 4.73

Initiatives of Gram /Nagar Panchayat for betterment of distribution system (Perception of Households)

Urban Rural

Figures in

Yes No Ignorance NR Total Yes No Ignorance Total

No 8 51 21 0 80 34 100 26 160BPL % 10.0 63.8 26.3 0.0 100.0 21.3 62.5 16.3 100.0

No 5 70 5 0 80 32 121 7 160APL % 6.3 87.5 6.3 0.0 100.0 20.0 75.6 4.4 100.0

No 8 44 10 1 63 42 109 26 177ANP % 12.7 69.8 15.9 1.6 100.0 23.7 61.6 14.7 100.0

No 14 57 8 1 80 59 97 4 160ANT % 17.5 71.3 10.0 1.3 100.0 36.9 60.6 2.5 100.0

No 35 222 44 2 303 167 427 63 657Total % 11.6 73.3 14.5 0.7 100.0 25.4 65.0 9.6 100.0

Source: Field Survey. 21.0 per cent of the beneficiary households reported contributions of Gram

Panchayats. The contributions focused on issue of ration cards, followed by checking

FPSs every month, helping the consumers at the time of distribution, informing the

households about arrival of items and others. There are variations in the percentages

of households by cardholding reporting on the contributions of Panchayats in the

distribution process (Box 4.8).

Box 4.8 Contributions of Gram Panchayats as Reported by Beneficiary Households

Contributions Issued the Ration Cards Opened the FPS within village Checked FPS every month Informed the beneficiary about arrival of items Inspected the arrival of items at FPS FPS Dealership was allotted through a committee Help the consumers during distribution

Source: Field Survey 67.6 per cent of the beneficiary households reported reasons why the Gram

Panchayats do not initiate any efforts for betterment of PDS. The non-report included

124

ignorance and non-response. Thus, effectively 46.5 per cent remain outside the

purview of respondents revealing reasons. Of those reporting, the focus is on FPS

dealers’ involvement in corruption with the help of Gram Pradhan or Gram

Panchayat, Panchayats having no problems from the FPSs, Panchayats taking bribe

from the FPS dealer every month. Thus, effectively the major reasons boil down to

the nexus between the FPS dealer and the Panchayat (Gram Pradhan). The other

reasons include local power structure, the use of poor as vote bank etc. (Box ).

Box 4.9 Reasons why the Gram Panchayats do not initiate any efforts for betterment of PDS

Reasons Do not live in village FPS dealer involved in corruption with the help of Gram Pradhan or Gram Panchayat All are engaged in leadership Only interest in the Vote Bank In case the GP performs right duty, extra income of GP is stopped Panchayats have no problems with FPS Distribution is good Panchayats have no time to do public work Panchayats take bribe each month Discarded by Gram Pradhan because of not casting vote in his favour Ignorance Panchayats give more benefits to their own persons Source: Field Survey

4.11 Consumer Rights, Awareness and Complaints Ignorance of the beneficiary households is the most important factor when the

question is centered on the rights of them as consumers to check the records of FPS

dealers. So far as checking stock register is concerned, 87.3 per cent are ignorant

about any such rights, which are for 87.2 per cent of the households when it is

checking sale register, 87.4 per cent when it is checking ration card or shop register

and 87.5 per cent when it is checking allotment and actual distribution.

Less than one per cent in case of each revealed that they know the rights-

based access to commodities under PDS. More than 10.0 per cent in case of each

type of register and distribution do not know the rights-based approach. There are

variations in these percentages for households over cardholding reporting on the

question, with somewhat more consciousness in case of APL households though at a

very low level (Table 4.74).

125

Table 4.74

Rights of the Consumers to check the records of FPS dealers Yes No Ignorance Total

Category

No. % No. % No. % No. % BPL 0 0.0 46 19.2 194 80.8 240 100.0APL 4 1.7 17 7.1 219 91.3 240 100.0ANP 0 0.0 17 7.1 223 92.9 240 100.0ANT 2 0.8 36 15.0 202 84.2 240 100.0

Stock Register Total 6 0.6 116 12.1 838 87.3 960 100.0

BPL 0 0.0 47 19.6 193 80.4 240 100.0APL 3 1.3 18 7.5 219 91.3 240 100.0ANP 0 0.0 17 7.1 223 92.9 240 100.0ANT 2 0.8 36 15.0 202 84.2 240 100.0

Sale Register Total 5 0.5 118 12.3 837 87.2 960 100.0

BPL 0 0.0 46 19.2 194 80.8 240 100.0APL 4 1.7 17 7.1 219 91.3 240 100.0ANP 0 0.0 17 7.1 223 92.9 240 100.0ANT 2 0.8 35 14.6 203 84.6 240 100.0

Ration Card or Shop Register Total 6 0.6 115 12.0 839 87.4 960 100.0

BPL 0 0.0 45 18.8 195 81.3 240 100.0APL 3 1.3 18 7.5 219 91.3 240 100.0ANP 0 0.0 17 7.1 223 92.9 240 100.0ANT 2 0.8 35 14.6 203 84.6 240 100.0

Allotment and Actual Distribution Total 5 0.5 115 12.0 840 87.5 960 100.0

Source: Field Survey Formation of Local Vigilance Committee for Proper Functioning of PDS

Of all the beneficiary households, 85.4 per cent reported that no local vigilance

committee has been formed in the memorable past, the percentage of such

households being 85.8 for BPL, 88.8 for APL, 82.5 for ANP and 84.6 for ANT. Of the

urban households, 87.1 per cent reported that no such committees has been formed

which is reported by 84.6 per cent of the rural households. There are differences in

the existence of local vigilance committee as reported by households by cardholding

(Table 4.75). Table 4.75

Formation of Local Vigilance Committee for proper functioning of PDS Urban Rural Total Households

No Ignorance Total Yes No Ignorance Total Yes No Ignorance Total No. 67 13 80 0 139 21 160 0 206 34 240BPL

% 83.8 16.3 100.0 0.0 86.9 13.1 100.0 0.0 85.8 14.2 100.0No. 74 6 80 1 139 20 160 1 213 26 240APL

% 92.5 7.5 100.0 0.6 86.9 12.5 100.0 0.4 88.8 10.8 100.0No. 50 13 63 0 148 29 177 0 198 42 240ANP

% 79.4 20.6 100.0 0.0 83.6 16.4 100.0 0.0 82.5 17.5 100.0No. 73 7 80 0 130 30 160 0 203 37 240ANT

% 91.3 8.8 100.0 0.0 81.3 18.8 100.0 0.0 84.6 15.4 100.0No. 264 39 303 1 556 100 657 1 820 139 960Total

% 87.1 12.9 100.0 0.2 84.6 15.2 100.0 0.1 85.4 14.5 100.0Source: Field Survey

126

Registration of Complaint against FPS Dealer

96.4 per cent of the complaints against the FPS dealers have remained non-

registered, which is 96.7 per cent in rural and 95.7 per cent in urban areas. These

percentages do not vary much over households by the types of cardholding (Table

4.76). Table 4.76

Registration of Complaints against FPS Dealers Urban Rural Total Card

Category Figure

in Yes No Total Yes No Total Yes No Total No. 5 75 80 5 155 160 10 230 240BPL

% 6.3 93.8 100.0 3.1 96.9 100.0 4.2 95.8 100.0No. 3 77 80 7 153 160 10 230 240APL

% 3.8 96.3 100.0 4.4 95.6 100.0 4.2 95.8 100.0No. 1 62 63 3 174 177 4 236 240ANP

% 1.6 98.4 100.0 1.7 98.3 100.0 1.7 98.3 100.0No. 4 76 80 7 153 160 11 229 240ANT

% 5.0 95.0 100.0 4.4 95.6 100.0 4.6 95.4 100.0No. 13 290 303 22 635 657 35 925 960Total

% 4.3 95.7 100.0 3.3 96.7 100.0 3.6 96.4 100.0Source: Field Survey The follow-up actions after complaints made against FPS dealers have been

recorded in Box 4.10. Box 4.10

Follow Up Action Post-Complaint against FPS Dealers Officials visited and left with no action (recording complaints) Supply Inspector came for inspection No action after complaint

Source: Field Survey 4.12 Performance of PDS Based on Some Selected Indicators Of all the beneficiary households, we got varying responses on the indicators that we

considered for evaluation/performance of PDS in UP. These indicators include

manipulation in measurement of items during delivery, providing benefits to close

persons, FPS dealers keeping government officials in their favour, distributable items

lifted but not brought to villages where the FPS is located, FPS dealers involved in

black marketing, changing the quality of items, dealers involved in corruption with the

help of Panchayat.

One-third of the beneficiary households denied involvement of dealers in

corruption in alliance with Panchayat which is affirmed by half of the households,

reporting involvement in such corruption regularly and occasionally. One-sixth of the

households reported ignorance. Ignorance is a major factor in cases of dealers

keeping government officials in favour (22.8 per cent reporting) and involvement in

127

black marketing (21.6 per cent reporting). From the viewpoint of the beneficiaries, the

factors that were reported most are manipulation in measurement (71.3 per cent

reporting), pretension in delivery (61.7 per cent reporting). Thus, the factors that are

visible/understood and that affect the beneficiary households most had been reported

most (Table 4.77). Table 4.77

Performance of Public Distribution System Based on some Selected Indicators Indicators Regularly Occasionally Never Ignorance NR Total

No. 380 304 248 27 1 960Short measurement during delivery % 39.6 31.7 25.8 2.8 0.1 100.0

No. 253 339 342 25 1 960Pretended for delivery % 26.4 35.3 35.6 2.6 0.1 100.0No. 401 251 223 84 1 960Give more benefits to close

persons % 41.8 26.1 23.2 8.8 0.1 100.0No. 383 196 161 219 1 960Dealers keep officials in

their favour % 39.9 20.4 16.8 22.8 0.1 100.0No. 66 210 447 236 1 960Lift items without bringing in

village % 6.9 21.9 46.6 24.6 0.1 100.0No. 225 234 293 207 1 960Involved in black marketing % 23.4 24.4 30.5 21.6 0.1 100.0No. 21 159 640 139 1 960Change the quality of items % 2.2 16.6 66.7 14.5 0.1 100.0No. 21 132 672 134 1 960Mixed other thing in food-

grains % 2.2 13.8 70.0 14.0 0.1 100.0No. 260 213 324 162 1 960Involved in corruption with

the help of Panchayat % 27.1 22.2 33.8 16.9 0.1 100.0Source: Field Survey Based on the selected perception-based responses we developed the performance

index of the PDS and arranged the rank of the selected districts in UP. Over all,

Lucknow in central UP (the capital city centered district) ranks first, followed by

Varanasi in east UP. From the bottommost rank, Badaun in west UP ranks last

(eighth). In rural UP Lucknow comes first while the same district comes third in urban

UP so far as performance of PDS in view of the Households is concerned. In urban

UP, the district Jhansi comes first followed by Varanasi. Thus, the rank of Varanasi is

uniformly second, over all, rural and urban. The districts below average performance

are Lakhimpur Kheri, Gorakhpur, Lalitpur and Badaun, over all, rural and urban. The

districts above average performance are Lucknow, Varanasi, Jhansi and Bareilly

(Table 4.78).

128

Table 4.78 Performance Index of Public Distribution System Based on some Selected Perception-

based responses and District Rank Urban Rural Overall

District Value Rank District Value Rank District Value Rank Jhansi 20.58 1 Lucknow 19.59 1 Lucknow 19.21 1Varanasi 19.30 2 Varanasi 18.83 2 Varanasi 18.98 2Lucknow 18.07 3

Above Average Barielly 18.35 3 Barielly 18.16 3

Above Average Barielly 17.76 4 Lakhimpur Kheri 16.85 4

Above Average

Jhansi 17.45 4

Lakhimpur Kheri 16.28 5 Lalitpur 16.38 5 Lakhimpur

Kheri 16.66 5

Gorakhpur 14.12 6 Gorakhpur 16.33 6 Gorakhpur 15.58 6Lalitpur 12.93 7 Jhansi 15.89 7 Lalitpur 15.23 7

Below Average Badaun 11.29 8

Below Average

Badaun 14.02 8

Below Average

Badaun 13.23 8Average All 16.29 - Average All 17.05 - Average All 16.81 -

Source: Field Survey 4.12.1 Satisfaction Level of Beneficiary Households Most of the households reported satisfaction regarding distribution of items through

FPSs under PDS. In case of distribution of kerosene the extent of satisfaction (by the

percentages of households reporting) is most for all the categories, BPL, APL and

ANT. For the districts, Lucknow, Jhansi, Gorakhpur and Varanasi it is cent per cent

satisfaction as expressed by households over all the categories by cardholding. For

APL households, some other districts also revealed cent per cent satisfaction like

Bareilly, Lakhimpur Kheri and Lalitpur. The extent of revealed satisfaction is low in

case of sugar distributed for ANT households. Generally the BPL households are

less satisfied with the distribution of items relative to that by ANT. There are district

wise differences in the extent of satisfaction (Table 4.79).

Table 4.79 Satisfaction of Beneficiary Households regarding Commodities Distributed

under PDS BPL ANT Districts

Wheat Rice Sugar Kerosene Wheat Rice Sugar Kerosene APL

kerosene No. 17 18 21 28 30 30 29 30 30Barielly

% 56.7 60.0 70.0 93.3 100.0 100.0 96.7 100.0 100.0No. 16 17 10 27 29 30 8 29 9Badaun

% 53.3 56.7 33.3 90.0 96.7 100.0 26.7 96.7 30.0No. 23 23 25 28 28 28 26 30 30Lakhimpur Kheri

% 76.7 76.7 83.3 93.3 93.3 93.3 86.7 100.0 100.0No. 25 25 15 30 30 30 10 30 30Lucknow

% 83.3 83.3 50.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 33.3 100.0 100.0No. 19 20 17 29 30 30 11 30 30Lalitpur

% 63.3 66.7 56.7 96.7 100.0 100.0 36.7 100.0 100.0No. 23 23 27 30 30 30 26 30 30Jhansi

% 76.7 76.7 90.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 86.7 100.0 100.0No. 25 25 29 30 30 30 19 30 30Gorakhpur

% 83.3 83.3 96.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 63.3 100.0 100.0No. 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30Varanasi

% 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 178 181 174 232 237 238 159 239 219Total Satisfied

HHs. % 74.2 75.4 72.5 96.7 98.8 99.2 66.3 99.6 91.3Total Households No. 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240 240

Source: Field Survey.

129

Excepting kerosene, the extent of satisfaction of the beneficiary households

so far as quantity of items distributed by the FPSs is very low across households by

cardholding (Table 4.80). Table 4.80

Satisfaction of the Households Regarding Quantity of Commodities BPL APL ANP ANT Total Commodities

Region

No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % Rural 52 32.5 0 0.0 73 41.2 102 63.8 230 35.0Urban 28 35.0 0 0.0 14 22.2 43 53.8 85 28.1

Wheat Total 80 33.3 0 0.0 87 36.3 145 60.4 315 32.8

Rural 86 53.8 0 0.0 38 21.5 131 81.9 259 39.4Urban 49 61.3 0 0.0 7 11.1 63 78.8 119 39.3

Rice Total 135 56.3 0 0.0 45 18.8 194 80.8 378 39.4

Rural 61 38.1 0 0.0 28 15.8 80 50.0 178 27.1Urban 33 41.3 0 0.0 4 6.3 43 53.8 80 26.4

Sugar Total 94 39.2 0 0.0 32 13.3 123 51.3 258 26.9

Rural 123 76.9 100 62.5 127 71.8 119 74.4 469 71.4Urban 65 81.3 66 82.5 46 73.0 73 91.3 250 82.5

Kerosene Total 188 78.3 166 69.2 173 72.1 192 80.0 719 74.9

Rural 160 100.0 160 100.0 177 100.0 160 100.0 657 100.0Urban 80 100.0 80 100.0 63 100.0 80 100.0 303 100.0

Total Households Total 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 240 100.0 960 100.0

Source: Field Survey.

The reasons for households not satisfied with quantity of items distributed

have been mentioned in the Box 4.11. Box 4.11

Reasons for Households Not Satisfied with Quantity of Items Distributed Reasons

Quantity distributed less than requirement High prices Less quantity given by FPS Dealer Nothing is received for a long time (many months) Items not received regularly Not lifted due to lack of money Only one item (Rice or Wheat) distributed by the Dealer Having ANP or APL Card

Source: Field Survey. 4.13 Weaknesses and Strength of PDS 35.6 per cent of the beneficiary households perceive weakness in the PDS which is

30.4 for urban and 38.1 for the rural region. Most of the households, thus, do not

perceive any weakness in the system. There are variations in the perceived

weaknesses for households by cardholding in rural and urban region. The maximum

percentage of households that perceive weakness in the PDS is 50.0 that is the rural

BPL (Table 4.81).

130

Table 4.81 Perceived Weaknesses in Public Distribution System

(As opined by beneficiary households) Urban Rural Total Sample

Categories Yes No Total Yes No Total Yes No Total No. 34 46 80 80 80 160 114 126 240BPL

% 42.5 57.5 100 50.0 50.0 100.0 47.5 52.5 100No. 17 63 80 70 90 160 87 153 240APL

% 21.25 78.75 100 43.8 56.3 100.0 36.25 63.75 100No. 29 34 63 57 120 177 86 154 240ANP

% 46.032 53.9683 100 32.2 67.8 100.0 35.8333 64.167 100No. 12 68 80 43 117 160 55 185 240ANT

% 15 85 100 26.9 73.1 100.0 22.9167 77.083 100No. 92 211 303 250 407 657 342 618 960Total

% 30.363 69.637 100 38.1 61.9 100.0 35.625 64.375 100Source: Field Survey

The perceived weaknesses in PDS center on the FPS dealer (47.7 per cent of

those perceive), followed by higher officials (18.4 per cent), at all (political-

administrative) levels (15.5 per cent), Gram Pradhan (9.9 per cent). The weaknesses

are also inherent in the role of Panchayat Secretary, MLA, DM, Lekhpal and Supply

Department. There are variations in the percentages of households by cardholding

that revealed opinion on the weaknesses in PDS (Table 4.82). Table 4.82

Households Perceived Weaknesses in Public Distribution System at Different Levels BPL APL ANP ANT Total

No. % No. % No. % No. % No. % At all levels 32 28.1 13 14.9 17 19.8 7 12.7 53 15.5Pradhan + FPS Dealer 22 19.3 3 3.4 12 14.0 2 3.6 8 2.3FPS Dealer 41 36.0 35 40.2 35 40.7 52 94.5 163 47.7Pradhan 14 12.3 6 6.9 5 5.8 9 16.4 34 9.9Higher Officials 14 12.3 28 32.2 13 15.1 8 14.5 63 18.4Panchayat 1 0.9 3 3.4 2 2.3 2 3.6 8 2.3Government 1 0.9 3 3.4 9 10.5 4 7.3 17 5.0Secretary 2 1.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.6‘Sabhasad’ (MLA) 0 0.0 1 1.1 2 2.3 0 0.0 3 0.9D.M. 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 1 1.8 1 0.3Lekhpal 1 0.9 1 1.1 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 0.6Supply Department 2 1.8 6 6.9 0 0.0 3 5.5 11 3.2Total 114 100.0 87 100.0 86 100.0 55 100.0 342 100.0

Source: Field Survey

Of those who perceive weaknesses in PDS, the most important reason cited

is corruption. If we consider sharing benefits in bribe and corruption in issuing ration

cards, then effective extent of corruption will be much higher. The other reasons cited

by the households include non-distributing items through FPSs, marketing in the

open/black (market), fault/cheating in weight while distributing items, non-checking,

poor quality, higher price than what is fixed, availability less than requirement,

131

irregular distribution etc. There are differences in the reasons mentioned by the

households over cardholding (Box 4.12).

Box 4.12

Reasons for Perceived Weaknesses in PDS Reasons

Corruption Black marketing with the help of officials Do not give food-grains in each month Less measurement by FPS dealers No FPS in the village due to non-initiative of GP Actual checking not done Discrimination among poor households Corruption in issuing Ration Cards Rich households take food-grains Did not get food-grains as per requirement High price of commodities Quality of food-grains poor Sugar was black marketed All take benefits of bribe Give quantity of items less than the prescribed quantity

Source: Field Survey The suggestions for better implementation of Antyodaya Yojana are cited in Box 4.13.

Box 4.13

Suggestions for Better Implementation of Antyodaya Yojana Suggestions

All Poor should be Benefited Ensure Distribution of Items every month Increase Foodgrains Quantity Increase Distribution Period All Items should be Distributed Items should be distributed through Credit Distribution of Items should be according to Units Stop Bribing Increase Quantity of Wheat Ensure Regular Distribution of Sugar Ensure Inspection of FPS at Distribution Period Ensure Transparency in Selection of Poor Distribution of Items should be by Parts

Source: Field Survey 2006. 4.14 Annapurna Yojana 69.2 per cent of the beneficiary households under Annapurna Yojana are female,

which is 7.2 per cent in rural and 66.7 per cent in the urban region. In the district

Jhansi, in urban region, female beneficiary covers 100.0 per cent, which is 90.0 per

cent in each of Varanasi, Lakhimpur Kheri. Female beneficiary covers 85.0 per cent

in rural Jhansi. There are variations in the percentages of households as

beneficiaries under Annapurna Yojana by region/districts and by gender (Table 4.83).

132

Table 4.83

Distribution of Households as Annapurna Yojana Beneficiary (By Region and Gender)

Reg

ion

Gender

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

No. 3 2 1 - 2 0 6 1 15Male % 42.9 40.0 10.0 - 20.0 0.0 54.5 10.0 23.8No. 4 3 9 - 8 10 5 9 48Female % 57.1 60.0 90.0 - 80.0 100.0 45.5 90.0 76.2No. 7 5 10 - 10 10 11 10 63

Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 5 6 5 14 5 3 4 17 59Male % 23.8 24.0 22.7 46.7 25.0 15.0 21.1 85.0 33.3No. 16 19 17 16 15 17 15 3 118Female % 76.2 76.0 77.3 53.3 75.0 85.0 78.9 15.0 66.7No. 21 25 22 30 20 20 19 20 177

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 8 8 6 14 7 3 10 18 74Male % 28.6 26.7 18.8 46.7 23.3 10.0 33.3 60.0 30.8No. 20 22 26 16 23 27 20 12 166Female % 71.4 73.3 81.3 53.3 76.7 90.0 66.7 40.0 69.2No. 28 30 32 30 30 30 30 30 240

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Source: Field Survey 2006 The most prominent catalyst for selection of households as beneficiaries

under Annapurna Yojana is the Panchayat (74.2 per cent reporting) which is 93.8 in

the rural and 19.0 in the urban region. In the urban region, the most prominent

catalyst is the supply department. In case of the rural region 17.9 per cent of the

beneficiary households reported the role of supply department. In the rural region,

excepting Badaun and Bareilly, the role of the Panchayat for selection as Annapurna

households is reported by cent per cent in all the districts. The role of the supply

department is cent per cent in urban region for the districts, Lalitpur, Jhansi,

Gorakhpur and Varanasi. The other catalysts are Lekhpal and FPS dealer. The role

of the supply department is reportedly absent in the rural region as the selector of

households as beneficiaries as Annapurna (Table 4.84).

133

Table 4.84 Catalysts for Selection of Households as Annapurna Yojana Beneficiaries

(By Region and Catalysts) R

egio

n

Selection Body/Catalysts

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

No. 3 5 4 - - - - - 12Panchayat % 42.9 100.

040.0 - - - - - 19.0

No. 4 - 1 - - - - - 5Lekhpal % 57.1 - 10.0 - - - - - 7.9No. 1 - 4 - - - - - 5FPS Dealer % 14.3 - 40.0 - - - - - 7.9No. 0 - 2 - 10 10 11 10 43

Supply Dept. % 0.0 - 20.0 - 100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

68.3

No. 7 5 10 - 10 10 11 10 63

Urb

an

Total % 100.0

100.0

100.0

- 100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

No. 14 21 22 30 20 20 19 20 166Panchayat % 66.7 84.0 100.

0100.

0100.

0100.

0100.

0 100.

0 93.8

No. 14 2 1 1 - - - 5 23Lekhpal % 66.7 8.0 4.5 3.3 - - - 25.0 13.0No. 1 2 - - - - - 0 3FPS Dealer % 4.8 8.0 - - - - - 0.0 1.7No. 21 25 22 30 20 20 19 20 177

Rur

al

Total % 100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

No. 17 26 26 30 20 20 19 20 178Panchayat % 60.7 86.7 81.3 100.

066.7 66.7 63.3 66.7 74.2

No. 18 2 2 1 - - - 5 28Lekhpal % 64.3 6.7 6.3 3.3 - - - 16.7 11.7No. 2 2 4 - - - - - 8FPS Dealer % 7.1 6.7 12.5 - - - - - 3.3No. - - 2 - 10 10 11 10 43Supply Dept. % - - 6.3 - 33.3 33.3 36.7 33.3 17.9No. 28 30 32 30 30 30 30 30 240

Tota

l

Total % 100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006 Of all the Annapurna beneficiary households, 54.2 per cent have attained age

above 65 years, which is 52.5 per cent in rural and 58.7 per cent in urban region. For

the districts, Lucknow, Lalitpur, Jhansi, Gorakhpur and Varanasi, this percentage of

households above age 65 crosses 60.0. The same districts with more than 60.0 per

cent coverage by households above age 65 are true for rural region excepting

Lalitpur. A significant percentage of households in Annapurna Yojana are below age

65 and above 50. In total, the percentage is 38.3 which is 40.1 for rural and 33.3 for

134

urban region. There are district wise differences in the distribution of households

covered by Annapurna Yojana by age brackets (Table 4.85). Table 4.85

Distribution of Households as Annapurna Yojana Beneficiary (By Region and Age)

Area

Age

Bar

ielly

Bada

un

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Var

anas

i

Tota

l

No. - - - - - - 3 2 5Below 50 Years % - - - - - - 27.3 20.0 7.9No. 3 2 4 - 2 4 3 3 2150 Years To 65 Years % 42.9 40.0 40.0 - 20.0 40.0 27.3 30.0 33.3No. 4 3 6 - 8 6 5 5 37Above 65 Years % 57.1 60.0 60.0 - 80.0 60.0 45.5 50.0 58.7No. 7 5 10 - 10 10 11 10 63

Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 1 3 2 1 5 0 1 0 13Below 50 Years % 4.8 12.0 9.1 3.3 25.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 7.3No. 12 12 13 10 5 8 5 6 7150 Years To 65 Years % 57.1 48.0 59.1 33.3 25.0 40.0 26.3 30.0 40.1No. 8 10 7 19 10 12 13 14 93Above 65 Years % 38.1 40.0 31.8 63.3 50.0 60.0 68.4 70.0 52.5No. 21 25 22 30 20 20 19 20 177

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 1 3 2 1 5 0 4 2 18Below 50 Years % 3.6 10.0 6.3 3.3 16.7 0.0 13.3 6.7 7.5No. 15 14 17 10 7 12 8 9 9250 Years To 65 Years % 53.6 46.7 53.1 33.3 23.3 40.0 26.7 30.0 38.3No. 12 13 13 19 18 18 18 19 130Above 65 Years % 42.9 43.3 40.6 63.3 60.0 60.0 60.0 63.3 54.2No. 28 30 32 30 30 30 30 30 240

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Source: Field Survey 2006 Of all the beneficiary households, eligibility is the most important factor in

determining the inclusion under Annapurna Yojana, as opined by 73.8 per cent of the

households followed by support of Panchayats (40.8 per cent). The other factors,

though negligible, include approach, local pressure, bribing, vote bank in Panchayat

elections etc. Eligibility as a factor is reported by 85.7 per cent of the beneficiaries in

urban and 69.5 per cent in the rural region. Support of Panchayat is reported by 50.8

per cent in rural region which is 12.7 per cent in the urban region. There are district

wise differences in the percentages of households reporting the procedure of being

selected under Annapurna (Table 4.86).

135

Table 4.86 Selection Procedure under Annapurna Yojana

(Perception of Households)

Are

a

Base of Selection

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

Eligibility 57.1 60.0 100.0 - 70.0 100.0 90.9 100.0 85.7Support of Panchayat 28.6 80.0 0.0 - 10.0 - 0.0 10.0 12.7Approach 14.3 - 10.0 - 30.0 - 18.2 - 11.1Local pressure - - 10.0 - - - - - 1.6Bribe - - - - 30.0 - - - 4.8

No. 7 5 10 - 10 10 11 10 63

Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Not Applicable 9.5 - - - - - - - 1.1Eligibility 33.3 72.0 68.2 76.7 25.0 100.0 100.0 80.0 69.5Support of Panchayat 38.1 56.0 40.9 46.7 70.0 45.0 63.2 50.0 50.8Approach 9.5 - 4.5 6.7 5.0 - - 20.0 5.6Local pressure - - 4.5 - - - - - 0.6Vote Bank in Panchayat 4.8 - - - - - - 20.0 2.8No Response 23.8 - - - - - - - 2.8

No. 21 25 22 30 20 20 19 20 177

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Not Applicable 7.1 - - - - - - - 0.8Eligibility 39.3 70.0 78.1 76.7 40.0 100.0 96.7 86.7 73.8Support of Panchayat 35.7 60.0 28.1 46.7 50.0 30.0 40.0 36.7 40.8Approach 10.7 - 6.3 6.7 13.3 - 6.7 13.3 7.1Local pressure - - 6.3 - - - - - 0.8Bribe - - - - - - - - 1.3Vote Bank in Panchayat 3.6 - - - - - - 13.3 2.1No Response 17.9 - - - - - - - 2.1

No. 28 30 32 30 30 30 30 30 240

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006 Of all the Annapurna beneficiaries, 53.3 per cent did not attempt to get

pension while 46.7 per cent did. Absence of any such attempt is high in Lalitpur (80.0

per cent reporting) followed by Lucknow (76.7 per cent) and Badaun (73.3 per cent).

In rural Lalitpur, non-attempt covers cent per cent of the households. In urban

Gorakhpur, non-attempt covers 90.9 per cent. Over all, 60.3 per cent in urban and

50.8 per cent in rural region did not attempt getting any pension (Table 4.87).

136

Table 4.87 Efforts of Annapurna Yojana by Beneficiary for Receiving Pension

Barielly Badaun Lakhimpur Lucknow Lalitpur Jhansi Gorakhpur Varanasi Total No. 1 2 5 - 6 3 1 7 25Yes % 14.3 40.0 50.0 - 60.0 30.0 9.1 70.0 39.7No. 6 3 5 - 4 7 10 3 38No % 85.7 60.0 50.0 - 40.0 70.0 90.9 30.0 60.3No. 7 5 10 - 10 10 11 10 63

Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 11 6 14 7 - 13 18 18 87Yes % 52.4 24.0 63.6 23.3 - 65.0 94.7 90.0 49.2No. 10 19 8 23 20 7 1 2 90No % 47.6 76.0 36.4 76.7 100.0 35.0 5.3 10.0 50.8No. 21 25 22 30 20 20 19 20 177

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 12 8 19 7 6 16 19 25 112Yes % 42.9 26.7 59.4 23.3 20.0 53.3 63.3 83.3 46.7No. 16 22 13 23 24 14 11 5 128No % 57.1 73.3 40.6 76.7 80.0 46.7 36.7 16.7 53.3No. 28 30 32 30 30 30 30 30 240

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006 Most of the beneficiary households denied that the eligible households are

not getting benefits under Annapurna Yojana (78.3 per cent reporting) which is 81.4

per cent in rural and 69.8 per cent in the urban region. However, 12.7 per cent in

urban and 11.9 per cent of the beneficiary households reported that some of the

eligible households have remained excluded from the net of Annapurna. There are

district wise differences in the percentages of households reporting on the

exclusion/inclusion of the eligible households in the net of Annapurna (Table 4.88). Table 4.88

Eligible Households not getting benefits of Annapurna Yojana (Perception of Beneficiary Households)

Barielly Badaun Lakhimpur Lucknow Lalitpur Jhansi Gorakhpur Varanasi Total No. - 1 2 - 3 1 1 - 8Yes % - 20.0 20.0 - 30.0 10.0 9.1 - 12.7No. 6 2 6 - 5 9 10 6 44No % 85.7 40.0 60.0 - 50.0 90.0 90.9 60.0 69.8No. 1 2 2 - 2 - - 4 11Ignorance % 14.3 40.0 20.0 - 20.0 - - 40.0 17.5No. 7 5 10 - 10 10 11 10 63

Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 5 1 3 1 - 2 3 6 21Yes % 23.8 4.0 13.6 3.3 - 10.0 15.8 30.0 11.9No. 15 21 19 28 20 17 16 8 144No % 71.4 84.0 86.4 93.3 100.0 85.0 84.2 40.0 81.4No. 1 3 0 1 - 1 - 6 12Ignorance % 4.8 12.0 0.0 3.3 - 5.0 - 30.0 6.8No. 21 25 22 30 20 20 19 20 177

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 5 2 5 1 3 3 4 6 29Yes % 17.9 6.7 15.6 3.3 10.0 10.0 13.3 20.0 12.1No. 21 23 25 28 25 26 26 14 188No % 75.0 76.7 78.1 93.3 83.3 86.7 86.7 46.7 78.3No. 2 5 2 1 2 1 - 10 23Ignorance % 7.1 16.7 6.3 3.3 6.7 3.3 - 33.3 9.6No. 28 30 32 30 30 30 30 30 240

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006

137

85.0 per cent of the beneficiary households denied inclusion of non-eligible

households in the net of Annapurna, which is 73.0 per cent for urban region and 89.3

for the rural region. Ignorance covers 12.7 per cent of the urban and 4.5 per cent of

the rural beneficiary households under Annapurna. There are district wise differences

in the reports from the households on the question of inclusion of non-eligible

households in the net of Annapurna (Table 4.89). Table 4.89

Non-Eligible Households getting Benefits of Annapurna Yojana (Perception of Households)

Barielly Badaun Lakhimpur Lucknow Lalitpur Jhansi Gorakhpur Varanasi Total No. - 1 3 - 2 2 - 1 9Getting % - 20.0 30.0 - 20.0 20.0 - 10.0 14.3No. 7 1 3 - 8 8 11 8 46Not Getting % 100.0 20.0 30.0 - 80.0 80.0 100.0 80.0 73.0No. - 3 4 - - - - 1 8Ignorance % - 60.0 40.0 - - - - 10.0 12.7No. 7 5 10 - 10 10 11 10 63

Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. - 1 3 1 - 1 4 1 11Getting % - 4.0 13.6 3.3 - 5.0 21.1 5.0 6.2No. 20 23 18 27 20 17 15 18 158Not Getting % 95.2 92.0 81.8 90.0 100.0 85.0 78.9 90.0 89.3No. 1 1 1 2 - 2 - 1 8Ignorance % 4.8 4.0 4.5 6.7 - 10.0 - 5.0 4.5No. 21 25 22 30 20 20 19 20 177

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. - 2 6 1 2 3 4 2 20Getting % - 6.7 18.8 3.3 6.7 10.0 13.3 6.7 8.3No. 27 24 21 27 28 25 26 26 204Not Getting % 96.4 80.0 65.6 90.0 93.3 83.3 86.7 86.7 85.0No. 1 4 5 2 0 2 - 2 16Ignorance % 3.6 13.3 15.6 6.7 0.0 6.7 - 6.7 6.7No. 28 30 32 30 30 30 30 30 240

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006

84.6 per cent of the beneficiary households reported that they would be facing

problems in survival in case Annapurna Yojana is stopped. This is reported by 88.9

per cent in urban and 83.1 per cent of the rural region. There are district wise

differences in the perceived stress of the households if the Yojana is stopped (Table

4.90).

138

Table 4.90

Problems in Survival if An napurna Yojana is Stopped Barielly Badaun Lakhimpur Lucknow Lalitpur Jhansi Gorakhpur Varanasi Total

No. 7 4 8 - 7 9 11 10 56Yes % 100.0 80.0 80.0 - 70.0 90.0 100.0 100.0 88.9No. - 1 2 - 3 1 - - 7No % - 20.0 20.0 - 30.0 10.0 - - 11.1No. 7 5 10 - 10 10 11 10 63

Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 18 16 20 29 20 15 14 15 147Yes % 85.7 64.0 90.9 96.7 100.0 75.0 73.7 75.0 83.1No. 3 9 2 1 - 5 5 5 30No % 14.3 36.0 9.1 3.3 - 25.0 26.3 25.0 16.9No. 21 25 22 30 20 20 19 20 177

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 25 20 28 29 27 24 25 25 203Yes % 89.3 66.7 87.5 96.7 90.0 80.0 83.3 83.3 84.6No. 3 10 4 1 3 6 5 5 37No % 10.7 33.3 12.5 3.3 10.0 20.0 16.7 16.7 15.4No. 28 30 32 30 30 30 30 30 240

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006 The types of problems common for each of rural and urban regions in survival in case

Annapurna Yojana is stopped have been mentioned in the Box 4.14.

Box 4.14 Types of Problems in Survival in case Annapurna Yojana is stopped

Area Reasons Depend on Others Face Hunger Depend on Loans Depend on Wage work in Old Age Items will be purchased from Market

Rural

Begging Depend on Others Face Hunger Depend on Loans Depend on Wage work in Old Age Items will be purchased from Market

Urban

Begging Source: Field Survey 2006

4.15 Antyodaya Yojana 91.3 per cent of the households reported that they would be adversely affected in

terms of livelihood if not covered by Antyodaya Yojana. The percentage is 91.3 for

urban and the same for rural region. There are district wise differences in the

responses (Table 4.91).

139

Table 4.91 Effect of Non-Availability of Antyodaya Yojana on Livelihood

(Perception of the Households) Barielly Badaun Lakhimpur Lucknow Lalitpur Jhansi Gorakhpur Varanasi Total

No. 8 9 10 10 8 9 9 10 73Adverse Effect % 80.0 90.0 100.0 100.0 80.0 90.0 90.0 100.0 91.3

No. 0 1 0 0 2 1 1 0 5No any Effect % 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 10.0 10.0 0.0 6.3

No. 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2No Response % 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5

No. 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 80

Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 20 19 18 19 16 16 18 20 146Adverse

Effect % 100.0 95.0 90.0 95.0 80.0 80.0 90.0 100.0 91.3No. 0 1 2 1 4 4 2 0 14No any

Effect % 0.0 5.0 10.0 5.0 20.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 8.8No. 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 160

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 28 28 28 29 24 25 27 30 219Adverse

Effect % 93.3 93.3 93.3 96.7 80.0 83.3 90.0 100.0 91.3No. 0 2 2 1 6 5 3 0 19No any

Effect % 0.0 6.7 6.7 3.3 20.0 16.7 10.0 0.0 7.9No. 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2No

Response % 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8No. 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 240

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006 The reasons of non-effect of non-availability of Antyodaya Yojana on

livelihood cover self-production (47.4 per cent reporting) in addition to prevailing

irregular distribution (31.6 per cent reporting). For urban region these factors explain

respectively 60.0 and 40.0 per cent while in rural region these factors cover 42.9 and

28.6 per cent. There are district wise differences in the factors mentioned as reasons

why the households think to remain unaffected in case the Yojana is closed. The

report covers only 7.9 per cent of all beneficiary households under Antyodaya (Table

4.92). Table 4.92

Reasons of non-effect of non-availability of Antyodaya Yojana on Livelihood Barielly Badaun Lakhimpur Lucknow Lalitpur Jhansi Gorakhpur Varanasi Total

No. - 0 - - 2 0 1 - 3Self- Production % - 0.0 - - 100.0 0.0 100.0 - 60.0

No. - 1 - - 0 1 0 - 2Irregular Distribution % - 100.0 - - 0.0 100.0 0.0 - 40.0

No. - 1 - - 2 1 1 - 5Urb

an

Total % - 100.0 - - 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0No. - 0 0 0 3 2 1 - 6Self-

Production % - 0.0 0.0 0.0 75.0 50.0 50.0 - 42.9No. - 0 1 0 1 1 1 - 4Irregular

Distribution % - 0.0 50.0 0.0 25.0 25.0 50.0 - 28.6No. - 1 1 1 0 1 0 - 4No

Response % - 100.0 50.0 100.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 - 28.6No. - 1 2 1 4 4 2 - 14

Rur

al

Total % - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0No. - 0 0 0 5 2 2 - 9Self-

Production % - 0.0 0.0 0.0 83.3 40.0 66.7 - 47.4No. - 1 1 0 1 2 1 - 6Irregular

Distribution % - 50.0 50.0 0.0 16.7 40.0 33.3 - 31.6No. - 1 1 1 0 1 0 - 4No

Response % - 50.0 50.0 100.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 - 21.1No. - 2 2 1 6 5 3 - 19

Tota

l

Total % - 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0

140

The types of adverse effect on livelihood for each of rural and urban region in

case Antyodaya Yojana is closed include increased hunger, increased poverty, debt

and poor economic condition (Box 4.15).

Box 4.15 Types of Adverse Effect of Non-Availability of Antyodaya Yojana on Livelihood

Area Types of Adverse Effect Under Debt Poor Economic Condition Purchase at High Market Price Increased Poverty

Urban

Increased Hunger Under Debt Poor Economic Condition Purchase at High Market Price Increased Poverty

Rural

Increased Hunger Source: Field Survey 2006

Selection of Households under Antyodaya Yojana

The most prominent catalyst for selection of households as beneficiaries under

Antyodaya Yojana is the Panchayat (65.4 per cent reporting) which is 92.5 per cent

in the rural and 11.3 per cent in the urban region. In the urban region, the most

prominent catalyst is the supply department (62.5 per cent reporting). In the rural

region, 1.9 per cent of the beneficiary households reported the role of supply

department. In the rural region, excepting Bareilly, Lakhimpur and Lalitpur, the role of

the Panchayat for selection as Antyodaya households is reported by cent per cent in

all the districts. The role of the supply department is cent per cent in urban region for

the districts, Lalitpur and Varanasi. The other catalysts are Lekhpal and FPS dealer.

The role of the supply department is reportedly absent in the rural region as the

selector of households as beneficiaries as Antyodaya (Table 4.93).

141

Table 4.93 Catalysts for Selection of Households as Antyodaya Yojana Beneficiaries

(By Region)

Are

a

Selection body

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

Gram Panchayat 30.0 30.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 11.3 Lekhpal 90.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.3 Block office 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 Supply Department 0.0 0.0 40.0 90.0 100.0 80.0 90.0 100.0 62.5 FPS Dealer 0.0 80.0 50.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 18.8

No. 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 80

Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Gram Panchayat 50.0 100.0 95.0 100.0 95.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 92.5 Lekhpal 70.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.4 Supply Department 5.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 FPS Dealer 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6

No. 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 160

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Gram Panchayat 43.3 76.7 70.0 66.7 63.3 70.0 66.7 66.7 65.4 Lekhpal 76.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 Block office 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.4 Supply Department 3.3 3.3 13.3 30.0 36.7 26.7 30.0 33.3 22.1 FPS Dealer 0.0 26.7 20.0 3.3 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 6.7

No. 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 240

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006 More than half of the beneficiary households denied that the eligible

households are not getting benefits under Antyodaya Yojana (51.7 per cent

reporting) which is 48.1 per cent in rural and 58.8 per cent in the urban region.

However, 45.6 per cent of rural and 30.0 per cent of the urban beneficiary

households reported that some of the eligible households have remained excluded

from the net of Antyodaya. There are district wise differences in the percentages of

households reporting on the exclusion/inclusion of the eligible households in the net

of Antyodaya (Table 4.94).

142

Table 4.94 Eligible Households not getting benefits of Antyodaya Yojana

(Perception of Beneficiary Households)

Area

Bar

ielly

Bada

un

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Var

anas

i

Tota

l

No. 1 3 3 1 6 2 6 2 24Yes % 10.0 30.0 30.0 10.0 60.0 20.0 60.0 20.0 30.0No. 7 7 6 9 3 8 3 4 47No % 70.0 70.0 60.0 90.0 30.0 80.0 30.0 40.0 58.8No. 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 4 8Ignorance % 10.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 40.0 10.0No. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1No

Response % 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3No. 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 80

Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 10 10 8 3 9 15 13 5 73Yes % 50.0 50.0 40.0 15.0 45.0 75.0 65.0 25.0 45.6No. 10 9 11 17 11 4 5 10 77No % 50.0 45.0 55.0 85.0 55.0 20.0 25.0 50.0 48.1No. 0 0 1 0 0 1 2 5 9Ignorance % 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 25.0 5.6No. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1No

Response % 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6No. 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 160

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 11 13 11 4 15 17 19 7 97Yes % 36.7 43.3 36.7 13.3 50.0 56.7 63.3 23.3 40.4No. 17 16 17 26 14 12 8 14 124No % 56.7 53.3 56.7 86.7 46.7 40.0 26.7 46.7 51.7No. 1 0 2 0 1 1 3 9 17Ignorance % 3.3 0.0 6.7 0.0 3.3 3.3 10.0 30.0 7.1No. 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 2No

Response % 3.3 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8No. 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 240

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Source: Field Survey 2006

The reasons behind the eligible households not getting the benefits of Antyodaya

cards have been mentioned in the Box 4.16. Box 4.16

Perception about Eligible Beneficiary not getting benefits of Antyodaya Yojana Area Perception

Poverty Low Allotment of Cards Physically Absent during issuing Cards Lack of Approach Do not give Bribe

Rural

Ignorance Poverty Personal Relation Low Allotment of Cards Physically Absent during issuing Cards Lack of Approach Do not give Bribe Groupism

Urban

Ignorance Source: Field Survey 2006

143

Table 4.95

Non-Eligible Households getting Benefits of Antyodaya Yojana (Perception of Households)

Are

a

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

No. 1 3 4 5 6 4 9 2 34Yes % 10.0 30.0 40.0 50.0 60.0 40.0 90.0 20.0 42.5No. 7 7 5 5 3 6 0 7 40No % 70.0 70.0 50.0 50.0 30.0 60.0 0.0 70.0 50.0No. 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 5Ignorance % 10.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 10.0 6.3No. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1No

Response % 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3No. 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 80

Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 7 9 12 4 11 17 8 5 73Yes % 35.0 45.0 60.0 20.0 55.0 85.0 40.0 25.0 45.6No. 13 11 7 16 9 1 8 12 77No % 65.0 55.0 35.0 80.0 45.0 5.0 40.0 60.0 48.1No. 0 0 1 0 0 2 4 3 10Ignorance % 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 20.0 15.0 6.3No. 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 160

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 8 12 16 9 17 21 17 7 107Yes % 26.7 40.0 53.3 30.0 56.7 70.0 56.7 23.3 44.6No. 20 18 12 21 12 7 8 19 117No % 66.7 60.0 40.0 70.0 40.0 23.3 26.7 63.3 48.8No. 1 0 2 0 1 2 5 4 15Ignorance % 3.3 0.0 6.7 0.0 3.3 6.7 16.7 13.3 6.3No. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1No

Response % 3.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.4No. 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 240

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Source: Field Survey 2006

87.9 per cent of the beneficiary households denied inclusion of non-eligible

households in the net of Antyodaya, which is 91.3 per cent for urban region and 86.3

for the rural region. These are the percentages of households who opined that

eligibility was there in selection of households as Antyodaya (Table 4.95). There are

district wise differences in the reports from the households on the question of

inclusion of non-eligible households in the net of Antyodaya. These include personal

connections, local pressure, bribe, pressure from officials etc. (Box 4.17).

144

Box 4.17 Non-Eligible Beneficiary getting benefits of Antyodaya Yojana

(Perception of Beneficiary Households) Area Perception

Eligibility Support of panchayat Personal source Local pressure Bribe

Urban

Pressure of Officials Eligibility Support of panchayat Personal source Local pressure Bribe Pressure of Officials

Rural

Vote Bank in panchayat Source: Field Survey 2006

20.0 per cent paid bribe to get benefits under Antyodaya Yojana which is 12.5

per cent for urban and 23.8 for the rural region. Of those who paid, most are from

Lalitpur (66.7 per cent of households reporting) for each of rural (70.0 per cent) and

urban (60.0 per cent) region. There are district wise variations in the reported

reasons (Table 4.96). Table 4.96

Bribe given to get Antyodaya Yojana Benefits (Perception of the Households)

Barielly Badaun Lakhimpur Lucknow Lalitpur Jhansi Gorakhpur Varanasi Total No. 0 3 0 0 6 1 0 0 10Yes % 0.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 60.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 12.5No. 8 7 10 10 4 9 10 10 68No % 80.0 70.0 100.0 100.0 40.0 90.0 100.0 100.0 85.0No. 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2No

Response % 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.5No. 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 80

Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 1 4 4 4 14 8 3 0 38Yes % 5.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 70.0 40.0 15.0 0.0 23.8No. 19 16 16 14 6 12 17 20 120No % 95.0 80.0 80.0 70.0 30.0 60.0 85.0 100.0 75.0No. 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 2No

Response % 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3No. 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 160

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 1 7 4 4 20 9 3 0 48Yes % 3.3 23.3 13.3 13.3 66.7 30.0 10.0 0.0 20.0No. 27 23 26 24 10 21 27 30 188No % 90.0 76.7 86.7 80.0 33.3 70.0 90.0 100.0 78.3No. 2 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 4No

Response % 6.7 0.0 0.0 6.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.7No. 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 240

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006

145

Section 2: Non-Beneficiary Households 4.16 Sample Profile of Households Of all the non-beneficiary households, 79.2 per cent are from the rural region and the

rest urban. There are district-wise variations in the percentages by rural and urban.

Of all the non-beneficiary households, 56.4 per cent are SCs, 20.7 per cent are

OBCs, 15.4 per cent are minority and 7.5 per cent are general castes. There are

district-wise variations in these percentages by caste category and by rural-urban

origin (Table 4.97).

Table 4.97 Distribution of Non-Beneficiary Households by Caste and Region

Caste Region

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

No. - 5 9 3 4 - - - 21Urban % - 33.3 90.0 30.0 66.7 - - - 42.0

No. 8 15 7 11 14 24 25 11 115Rural % 53.3 55.6 35.0 52.4 66.7 88.9 83.3 36.7 60.2

No. 8 20 16 14 18 24 25 11 136

SC

Total % 44.4 47.6 53.3 45.2 66.7 72.7 83.3 36.7 56.4

No. - 2 1 2 1 4 - - 10Urban % - 13.3 10.0 20.0 16.7 66.7 - - 20.0

No. 2 8 5 4 7 2 5 7 40Rural % 13.3 29.6 25.0 19.0 33.3 7.4 16.7 23.3 20.9

No. 2 10 6 6 8 6 5 7 50

OBC

Total % 11.1 23.8 20.0 19.4 29.6 18.2 16.7 23.3 20.7

No. 3 5 0 0 1 2 - - 11Urban % 100.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 16.7 33.3 - - 22.0

No. 5 4 7 6 - - - 4 26Rural % 33.3 14.8 35.0 28.6 - - - 13.3 13.6

No. 8 9 7 6 1 2 - 4 37

Minority

Total % 44.4 21.4 23.3 19.4 3.7 6.1 - 13.3 15.4

No. 0 3 0 5 - - - - 8Urban % 0.0 20.0 0.0 50.0 - - - - 16.0

No. 0 0 1 0 - 1 0 8 10Rural % 0.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 - 3.7 0.0 26.7 5.2

No. 0 3 1 5 - 1 0 8 18

General

Total % 0.0 7.1 3.3 16.1 - 3.0 0.0 26.7 7.5

No. 3 15 10 10 6 6 0 0 50Urban % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

No. 15 27 20 21 21 27 30 30 191Rural % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

No. 18 42 30 31 27 33 30 30 241

Total

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006

146

Coverage of Population

Of total population in the sample households, 52.4 per cent are male and the rest

female. There are district-wise variations in the gender ratio in population from the

sample. Of total population from the sample households, 55.6 per cent are SCs, 19.4

per cent are OBCs, 17.2 per cent are minorities and the rest 7.8 per cent are from

general castes. There are district-wise variations in all these percentages. Overall,

the household size comes to be 5 for all the districts taken together. The average

size remains the same for each of rural and urban regions. Also, the household size

remains the same for all the caste categories excepting the OBCs in the sample.

There are district-wise variations in the size of households across castes (Tables

4.98). Table 4.98

Population in Selected Households by Caste and Gender

Gen

der

Cas

te

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Var

anas

i

Tota

l

No. 12 40 40 40 34 65 54 24 309 SC % 52.17 47.62 54.79 57.14 43.04 52.85 46.15 53.33 50.33

No. 5 14 21 15 20 12 17 21 125 OBC % 71.43 45.16 55.26 65.22 58.82 66.67 58.62 60.00 58.14

No. 23 23 20 20 4 5 0 8 103 Minority % 52.27 50.00 55.56 60.61 57.14 62.50 0.00 50.00 54.21

No. 0 5 1 14 0 1 0 21 42 General % 0.00 55.56 50.00 50.00 0.00 20.00 0.00 50.00 48.84

No. 40 82 82 89 58 83 71 74 579

Mal

e

Total % 54.05 48.24 55.03 57.79 48.33 53.90 48.63 53.62 52.40

No. 11 44 33 30 45 58 63 21 305 SC % 47.83 52.38 45.21 42.86 56.96 47.15 53.85 46.67 49.67

No. 2 17 17 8 14 6 12 14 90 OBC % 28.57 54.84 44.74 34.78 41.18 33.33 41.38 40.00 41.86

No. 21 23 16 13 3 3 0 8 87 Minority % 47.73 50.00 44.44 39.39 42.86 37.50 0.00 50.00 45.79

No. 0 4 1 14 0 4 0 21 44 General % 0.00 44.44 50.00 50.00 0.00 80.00 0.00 50.00 51.16

No. 34 88 67 65 62 71 75 64 526

Fem

ale

Total % 45.95 51.76 44.97 42.21 51.67 46.10 51.37 46.38 47.60

No. 23 84 73 70 79 123 117 45 614 SC % 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

No. 7 31 38 23 34 18 29 35 215 OBC % 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

No. 44 46 36 33 7 8 0 16 190 Minority % 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

No. 0 9 2 28 0 5 0 42 86 General % 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

No. 74 170 149 154 120 154 146 138 1105

Tota

l

Total % 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00

Source: Field Survey 2006

The age group that covers most of the population in the sample households is

15 to 35 years (40.0 per cent covered). The age group between 36 and 60 covers

13.3 per cent of the population. Thus, a little more than half of the total population

147

from the sample constitutes the productive (earning) age group. There are gender-

wise and district-wise variations in the age brackets that constitute the population

from the sample (Table 4.99). Table 4.99

Distribution of Population by Age and Gender

Age Gender

Bar

ielly

Bada

un

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Var

anas

i

Tota

l

No. 6 20 22 24 19 23 18 14 146Male % 15.0 24.4 26.8 27.0 32.8 27.7 25.4 18.9 25.2

No. 11 20 12 11 24 17 20 10 125Female % 32.4 22.7 17.9 16.9 38.7 23.9 26.7 15.6 23.8

No. 17 40 34 35 43 40 38 24 271

Up to 6 Years

Total % 23.0 23.5 22.8 22.7 35.8 26.0 26.0 17.4 24.5No. 10 9 17 23 10 15 13 18 115

Male % 25.0 11.0 20.7 25.8 17.2 18.1 18.3 24.3 19.9No. 4 19 15 15 9 13 14 16 105

Female % 11.8 21.6 22.4 23.1 14.5 18.3 18.7 25.0 20.0No. 14 28 32 38 19 28 27 34 220

7 To 14 Years

Total % 18.9 16.5 21.5 24.7 15.8 18.2 18.5 24.6 19.9No. 17 39 31 31 20 32 30 32 232

Male % 42.5 47.6 37.8 34.8 34.5 38.6 42.3 43.2 40.1No. 13 32 27 27 22 31 30 28 210

Female % 38.2 36.4 40.3 41.5 35.5 43.7 40.0 43.8 39.9No. 30 71 58 58 42 63 60 60 442

15 To 35 Years

Total % 40.5 41.8 38.9 37.7 35.0 40.9 41.1 43.5 40.0No. 5 12 10 11 8 11 8 10 75

Male % 12.5 14.6 12.2 12.4 13.8 13.3 11.3 13.5 13.0No. 5 15 11 6 7 9 11 8 72

Female % 14.7 17.0 16.4 9.2 11.3 12.7 14.7 12.5 13.7No. 10 27 21 17 15 20 19 18 147

36 To 60 Years

Total % 13.5 15.9 14.1 11.0 12.5 13.0 13.0 13.0 13.3No. 2 2 2 0 1 2 2 0 11

Male % 5.0 2.4 2.4 0.0 1.7 2.4 2.8 0.0 1.9No. 1 2 2 6 0 1 0 2 14

Female % 2.9 2.3 3.0 9.2 0.0 1.4 0.0 3.1 2.7No. 3 4 4 6 1 3 2 2 25

Above 60 Years

Total % 4.1 2.4 2.7 3.9 0.8 1.9 1.4 1.4 2.3No. 40 82 82 89 58 83 71 74 579

Male % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 34 88 67 65 62 71 75 64 526

Female % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 74 170 149 154 120 154 146 138 1105

Total

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Source: Field Survey 2006.

148

4.17 Educational Level of Non-Beneficiary Households Of all the non-beneficiary households (241), 56.4 per cent are illiterate, and 15.8 per

cent have education at the level of high school and above. Of all the SC households,

58.8 per cent are illiterate, which is 64.0 for OBCs, 64.9 for minority and zero

illiteracy for the general castes. There are district-wise variations in these

percentages over the relative educational attainment (Table 4.100). Table 4.100

Educational Level of Non-Beneficiary Households by Castes

Caste Educational Level

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

imp

ur

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

Illiterate 25.0 75.0 87.5 57.1 50.0 54.2 48.0 63.6 58.8Literate 12.5 - - 7.1 16.7 - 4.0 0.0 4.4Primary 0.0 - - 7.1 16.7 25.0 20.0 27.3 13.2Middle 50.0 20.0 6.3 14.3 11.1 4.2 8.0 - 11.8High School 0.0 0.0 6.3 7.1 5.6 16.7 16.0 - 8.1Inter 12.5 5.0 - 7.1 - - 0.0 9.1 2.9Higher Education 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 - - 4.0 0.0 0.7

No. 8 20 16 14 18 24 25 11 136

SC

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Illiterate 100.0 60.0 66.7 33.3 75.0 50.0 80.0 71.4 64.0Literate - - - 16.7 - 16.7 - 14.3 6.0

Primary - - - 33.3 25.0 16.7 - 14.3 12.0

Middle - 30.0 33.3 - - - 20.0 - 12.0

High School - - - 16.7 - 16.7 - - 4.0

Inter - 10.0 - - - - - - 2.0

No. 2 10 6 6 8 6 5 7 50

OBC

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Illiterate 62.5 88.9 57.1 83.3 100.0 - - 25.0 64.9

Literate 12.5 - - 16.7 - - - 25.0 8.1

Primary - 11.1 14.3 - - - - 25.0 8.1

Middle 12.5 - 14.3 - - 50.0 - 25.0 10.8

High School - - 14.3 - - - - - 2.7

Higher Education 12.5 - 0.0 - - 50.0 - - 5.4

No. 8 9 7 6 1 2 - 4 37

Minority

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0

Literate - - - - - - - 12.5 5.6Primary - - 100.0 - - - - 0.0 5.6High School - - - 20.0 - 100.0 - 25.0 22.2Inter - - - 40.0 - - - 25.0 22.2Higher Education - 100.0 - 40.0 - - - 37.5 44.4

No. - 3 1 5 - 1 - 8 18

General

Total % - 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 100.0

Illiterate 50.0 69.0 73.3 48.4 59.3 48.5 53.3 43.3 56.4Literate 11.1 - - 9.7 11.1 3.0 3.3 10.0 5.4Primary - 2.4 3.3 9.7 18.5 21.2 16.7 16.7 11.2Middle 27.8 16.7 16.7 6.5 7.4 6.1 10.0 3.3 11.2High School - - 6.7 9.7 3.7 18.2 13.3 6.7 7.5Inter 5.6 4.8 - 9.7 - - - 10.0 3.7Higher Education 5.6 7.1 - 6.5 - 3.0 3.3 10.0 4.6

No. 18 42 30 31 27 33 30 30 241

Total

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006

Of all the urban non-beneficiary households, 58.0 per cent are illiterate. The

rural counterpart is 56.0. There are district-wise variations in these percentages. In

149

the urban region, education at the level of high school and above covers 28.0 per

cent of the households which covers 12.4 per cent in the rural region (Table 4.101). Table 4.101

Educational Level of Non-Beneficiary Households by Area

Are

a

Educational Level

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

Illiterate 66.7 66.7 100.0 20.0 66.7 16.7 - - 58.0Literate - - - - - 16.7 - - 2.0Primary - - - 10.0 16.7 16.7 - - 6.0Middle - 13.3 - - - 16.7 - - 6.0High School - - - 20.0 16.7 16.7 - - 8.0Inter - - - 30.0 - - - - 6.0Higher Education 33.3 20.0 - 20.0 - 16.7 - - 14.0

No. 3 15 10 10 6 6 - - 50

Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - - 100.0

Illiterate 46.7 70.4 60.0 61.9 57.1 55.6 53.3 43.3 56.0Literate 13.3 - - 14.3 14.3 - 3.3 10.0 6.3Primary - 3.7 10.0 9.5 19.0 22.2 16.7 16.7 13.1Middle 33.3 18.5 20.0 9.5 9.5 3.7 10.0 3.3 12.0High School - - 10.0 4.8 - 18.5 13.3 6.7 7.3Inter 6.7 7.4 - - - - - 10.0 3.1Higher Education - - - - - - 3.3 10.0 2.1

No. 15 27 20 21 21 27 30 30 191

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Illiterate 50.0 69.0 73.3 48.4 59.3 48.5 53.3 43.3 56.4Literate 11.1 - - 9.7 11.1 3.0 3.3 10.0 5.4Primary 0.0 2.4 6.7 9.7 18.5 21.2 16.7 16.7 11.6Middle 27.8 16.7 13.3 6.5 7.4 6.1 10.0 3.3 10.8High School - - 6.7 9.7 3.7 18.2 13.3 6.7 7.5Inter 5.6 4.8 - 9.7 - - - 10.0 3.7Higher Education 5.6 7.1 - 6.5 - 3.0 3.3 10.0 4.6

No. 18 42 30 31 27 33 30 30 241

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006 Educational Level of Population

38.7 per cent of the population from the sample is illiterate. Another 22.4 per

cent are in the age bracket below 6 years, for whom formal education is beyond

reach. Only 9.0 per cent of the population has education at the level of high school

certificate and above. Only 0.1 per cent of the population has technical education.

We found in the population from the sample as high as 53.5 per cent illiterate in

district Badaun and as low as 22.5 per cent in district Varanasi. There are district-

wise variations in the percentages of population in different educational brackets

(Table 4.102).

150

Table 4.102 Educational level of Population in Households

Educational Level

Bar

ielly

Bada

un

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Var

anas

i

Tota

l

No. 13 38 32 34 39 38 34 20 248Up to 6 Years % 17.6 22.4 21.5 22.1 32.5 24.7 23.3 14.5 22.4

No. 33 91 66 63 43 50 51 31 428Illiterate % 44.6 53.5 44.3 40.9 35.8 32.5 34.9 22.5 38.7

No. 1 0 1 2 3 4 4 5 20Literate % 1.4 0.0 0.7 1.3 2.5 2.6 2.7 3.6 1.8

No. 14 17 29 27 31 37 33 45 233Primary % 18.9 10.0 19.5 17.5 25.8 24.0 22.6 32.6 21.1

No. 10 14 13 9 3 10 6 11 76Middle % 13.5 8.2 8.7 5.8 2.5 6.5 4.1 8.0 6.9

No. 0 3 6 9 1 12 11 11 53High School % 0.0 1.8 4.0 5.8 0.8 7.8 7.5 8.0 4.8

No. 1 5 1 5 0 2 1 11 26Inter % 1.4 2.9 0.7 3.2 0.0 1.3 0.7 8.0 2.4

No. 2 1 1 5 0 1 6 4 20Higher Education % 2.7 0.6 0.7 3.2 0.0 0.6 4.1 2.9 1.8

No. 1 0 0 0 0 1Technical Education % 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1

No. 74 170 149 154 120 154 146 138 1105Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006

Of all the literate population from the sample, male female ratio is 60:40. For

each of the caste categories, male literacy is higher than female literacy. The highest

literacy is reported for the general caste population (97.5 per cent). Of all the

population in the SCs, 45.6 per cent is literate, which is 52.5 for the OBCs, 35.6 for

the minority. There are district-wise variations in all these percentages (Table 4.103).

151

Table 4.103 Literacy Rate of Population in Households by Caste and Gender

Caste Gender

Bar

ielly

Bada

un

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Var

anas

i

Tota

l

Male 77.8 31.3 39.3 44.4 66.7 68.8 75.6 75.0 58.7Female 25.0 30.3 22.2 25.0 32.0 41.3 34.1 38.9 32.4SC Total 52.9 30.8 30.9 35.3 49.0 55.3 54.1 55.9 45.6Male 60.0 44.4 52.6 83.3 56.3 60.0 60.0 78.9 62.9Female 50.0 27.3 40.0 33.3 18.2 60.0 50.0 41.7 37.8OBC Total 57.1 35.0 47.1 66.7 40.7 60.0 55.6 64.5 52.5Male 47.6 15.8 69.2 - 66.7 100.0 - 83.3 40.3Female 31.3 19.0 53.8 - 50.0 66.7 - 50.0 30.6Minority Total 40.5 17.5 61.5 - 60.0 80.0 - 66.7 35.6Male - 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 100.0Female - 100.0 100.0 100.0 - - - 95.0 95.0General Total - 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 50.0 - 97.6 97.5Male 57.1 31.7 50.8 53.8 62.8 68.9 71.4 85.5 60.1Female 30.8 30.4 35.7 40.0 28.9 43.6 37.5 60.7 39.2Total Total 45.9 31.1 43.6 47.5 46.9 56.9 54.5 73.7 50.1

Source: Field Survey 2006 4.17.1 Occupational Structure of Households Of all the urban non-beneficiary households, 54.0 per cent constitute non-agricultural

labourers, which is 69.6 per cent for the rural region. Cultivation covers 7.9 per cent

of the rural households which is 4.0 per cent for the urban households. Agricultural

labour covers 4.7 per cent of rural households which is 4.0 per cent for urban

households. There is not much difference in the types of occupations for non-

beneficiary households in rural and urban areas. There are district-wise differences in

the types of occupations the households are engaged in (Table 4.104).

152

Table 4.104 Main Occupations of Non-Beneficiary Households by Area

A

rea

Occupations

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

Agriculture 33.3 6.7 - - - - - - 4.0Agri. Labour - 6.7 - 10.0 - - - - 4.0Non-Agri. Labour 66.7 40.0 90.0 10.0 66.7 83.3 - - 54.0Traditional Labour - 20.0 - - - - - - 6.0Service - 6.7 10.0 20.0 - 16.7 - - 10.0Animal Husbandry - - - 10.0 16.7 - - - 4.0Small Business - 20.0 - 50.0 16.7 - - - 18.0

No. 3 15 10 10 6 6 - - 50

Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - - 100.0

Agriculture 13.3 25.9 10.0 - 4.8 7.4 3.3 - 7.9Agri. Labour 13.3 11.1 5.0 14.3 - - - - 4.7Non-Agri. Labour 60.0 48.1 65.0 76.2 90.5 85.2 76.7 56.7 69.6Traditional Labour - - - 4.8 4.8 - - - 1.0Service - 3.7 - - - - 16.7 26.7 7.3Pensioner - 3.7 - - - - - 3.3 1.0Animal Husbandry - - - - - 3.7 3.3 0.0 1.0Small Business 6.7 7.4 20.0 - - - - 3.3 4.2Weaving/ Sewing - - - - - - - 6.7 1.0Begging 6.7 - - 4.8 0.0 3.7 - 3.3 2.1

No. 15 27 20 21 21 27 30 30 191

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Agriculture 16.7 19.0 6.7 - 3.7 6.1 3.3 - 7.1Agri. Labour 11.1 9.5 3.3 12.9 - - - - 4.6Non-Agri. Labour 61.1 45.2 73.3 54.8 85.2 84.8 76.7 56.7 66.4Traditional Labour - 7.1 0.0 3.2 3.7 - - - 2.1Service - 4.8 3.3 6.5 - 3.0 16.7 26.7 7.9Pensioner - 2.4 - - - - - 3.3 0.8Animal Husbandry - - - 3.2 3.7 3.0 3.3 0.0 1.7Small Business 5.6 11.9 13.3 16.1 3.7 - - 3.3 7.1Weaving/ Sewing - - - - - - - 6.7 0.8Begging 5.6 - - 3.2 - 3.0 - 3.3 1.7

No. 18 42 30 31 27 33 30 30 241

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006 Of all the non-beneficiary households, 66.4 per cent are engaged as non-

agricultural labourer, while only 4.6 per cent as agricultural labourer, and 7.1 per cent

as cultivator. The other occupations like traditional labour, animal husbandry,

weaving/sewing, small business etc. encompass very small percentage of total

households. There are district-wise variations in these percentages. Of all the SC

non-beneficiary households, 77.2 per cent are engaged as non-agricultural labourers,

the corresponding percentages for OBCs are 62.0, for minority 59.5 and for general

153

castes 11.1. There are district-wise variations in the percentages of households

engaged in diversified and multiple jobs (Table 4.105). Table 4.105

Main Occupations of Non-Beneficiary Households by Castes

Cas

te

Main Occupations

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

Agriculture - 15.0 12.5 - - 8.3 4.0 - 5.9Agri. Labour 12.5 10.0 - 28.6 - - - - 5.1Non-Agri. Labour 87.5 55.0 81.3 57.1 100.0 91.7 72.0 72.7 77.2Traditional Labour - 5.0 - 7.1 - - - - 1.5Service - 5.0 6.3 7.1 - - 20.0 - 5.9Pensioner - 5.0 - - - - - 9.1 1.5Animal Husbandry - - - - - - 4.0 - 0.7Small Business - 5.0 - - - - - - 0.7Weaving/ Sewing - - - - - - - 9.1 0.7Begging - - - - - - - 9.1 0.7

No. 8 20 16 14 18 24 25 11.0 136.0

SC

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Agriculture 100.0 40.0 - - 12.5 - - - 14.0Agri. Labour - 20.0 16.7 - - - - - 6.0Non-Agri. Labour - 30.0 66.7 66.7 62.5 66.7 100.0 85.7 62.0Traditional Labour - - - - 12.5 - - 0.0 2.0Service - - - 16.7 - - - 14.3 4.0Animal Husbandry - - - 16.7 12.5 16.7 - - 6.0Small Business - 10.0 16.7 - - - - - 4.0Begging - - - - - 16.7 - - 2.0

No. 2 10 6 6 8 6.0 5 7 50.0

OB

C

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Agriculture 12.5 11.1 - - - - - - 5.4Agri. Labour 12.5 0.0 - - - - - - 2.7Non-Agri. Labour 50.0 55.6 57.1 83.3 - 50.0 - 75.0 59.5Traditional Labour - 22.2 - - - - - - 5.4Service - - - - - 50.0 - - 2.7Small Business 12.5 11.1 42.9 - 100.0 - - - 16.2Weaving/ Sewing - - - - - - - 25.0 2.7Begging 12.5 - - 16.7 - - - - 5.4

No. 8.0 9.0 7.0 6.0 1.0 2.0 - 4.0 37.0

Min

ority

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0Non-Agri. Labour - - 100.0 - - 100.0 - - 11.1Service - 33.3 - - - - - 87.5 44.4Small Business - 66.7 - 100.0 - - - 12.5 44.4

No. - 3.0 1.0 5.0 - 1.0 - 8.0 18.0Gen

eral

Total % - 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 100.0Agriculture 16.7 19.0 6.7 0.0 3.7 6.1 3.3 - 7.1Agri. Labour 11.1 9.5 3.3 12.9 - - - - 4.6Non-Agri. Labour 61.1 45.2 73.3 54.8 85.2 84.8 76.7 56.7 66.4Traditional Labour - 7.1 - 3.2 3.7 0.0 - - 2.1Service - 4.8 3.3 6.5 - 3.0 16.7 26.7 7.9Pensioner - 2.4 - - - - - 3.3 0.8Animal Husbandry - - - 3.2 3.7 3.0 3.3 - 1.7Small Business 5.6 11.9 13.3 16.1 3.7 - - 3.3 7.1Weaving/ Sewing - - - - - - - 6.7 0.8Begging 5.6 - - 3.2 - 3.0 - 3.3 1.7

No. 18.0 42.0 30.0 31.0 27.0 33.0 30.0 30.0 241.0

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Source: Field Survey 2006

154

Most of the non-beneficiary households (61.4 per cent) do not have supplementary

occupations. Among those who have supplementary occupations, the major are

agricultural labour (18.7 per cent), non-agricultural labour (7.9 per cent) and

cultivation (7.9 per cent). Of all SC non-beneficiary households, 64.0 per cent have

no supplementary occupations, the percentage being 60.0 for the OBCs, 56.8 for the

minority and 55.6 for the general caste households. Excepting households in general

castes, supplementary occupations cover a large number of activities like animal

husbandry, weaving/sewing, small business, agricultural and non-agricultural labour

which are absent in general castes. There are district wise variations in all the

percentages showing the households engaged in diversified supplementary

occupations (Table 4.106).

155

Table 4.106 Supplementary Occupations of Non-Beneficiary Households by Castes

Cas

te

Occupation

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

Agriculture - 15.0 - - 5.6 12.5 8.0 - 6.6Agri. Labour 37.5 20.0 12.5 - 22.2 25.0 8.0 54.5 19.9Non-Agri. Labour - 10.0 12.5 14.3 0.0 8.3 8.0 - 7.4Animal Husbandry - 5.0 - - - - - - 0.7Small Business - - - 7.1 - - - - 0.7Weaving/ Sewing - - - - - - - 9.1 0.7Nothing 62.5 50.0 75.0 78.6 72.2 54.2 76.0 36.4 64.0

No. 8 20 16 14 18 24 25 11 136

SC

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Agriculture - 10.0 - - - - - - 2.0Agri. Labour - 10.0 33.3 - 50.0 - 40.0 71.4 28.0Non-Agri. Labour 50.0 - 33.3 - - 16.7 - - 8.0Small Business - - - 16.7 - - - - 2.0Nothing 50.0 80.0 33.3 83.3 50.0 83.3 60.0 28.6 60.0

No. 2 10 6 6 8 6 5 7 50

OB

C

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Agriculture 12.5 0.0 14.3 - - - - - 5.4Agri. Labour 25.0 11.1 0.0 - - - - 25.0 10.8Non-Agri. Labour 12.5 22.2 14.3 - - - - 25.0 13.5Service 12.5 - - - - - - - 2.7Animal Husbandry - 11.1 - - - - - - 2.7Small Business - 11.1 - - - - - - 2.7Weaving/ Sewing - - - - 100.0 - - 25.0 5.4Nothing 37.5 44.4 71.4 100.0 - 100.0 - 25.0 56.8

No. 8.0 9.0 7.0 6.0 1.0 2.0 - 4.0 37.0

Min

ority

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0

Agriculture - - - 20.0 - 100.0 - 62.5 38.9Pensioner - - - 20.0 - - - - 5.6Nothing - 100.0 100.0 60.0 - - - 37.5 55.6

No. - 3 1 5 - 1 - 8 18Gen

eral

Total % - 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 100.0

Agriculture 5.6 9.5 3.3 3.2 3.7 12.1 6.7 16.7 7.9Agri. Labour 27.8 14.3 13.3 - 29.6 18.2 13.3 40.0 18.7Non-Agri. Labour 11.1 9.5 16.7 6.5 - 9.1 6.7 3.3 7.9Service 5.6 0.0 - - - - - - 0.4Animal Husbandry - 4.8 - - - - - - 0.8Small Business - 2.4 - 6.5 - - - - 1.2Weaving/ Sewing - - - - 3.7 - - 6.7 1.2Pensioner - - - 3.2 - - - - 0.4Nothing 50.0 59.5 66.7 80.6 63.0 60.6 73.3 33.3 61.4

No. 18.0 42.0 30.0 31.0 27.0 33.0 30.0 30.0 241

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006 Occupations of the Population 40.0 per cent of the population from the sample constitutes housewives and students

(non-earning in an economic sense). Another 28.3 per cent are dependent (because

of age). Hence, 31.7 per cent constitute earning population engaged in a number

156

of activities. Of those who are engaged in economic activities, most are in non-

agricultural labour (20.1 per cent). The reported occupations include traditional

labour, agricultural labour, cultivation, animal husbandry, small business,

rickshaw/trolley pulling, hawking etc (Table 4.107). Table 4.107

Occupational Structure of Population from Households Main

Occupations

Bar

ielly

Bada

un

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Var

anas

i

Tota

l

No. 17 49 41 56 40 44 40 26 313Dependent % 23.0 28.8 27.5 36.4 33.3 28.6 27.4 18.8 28.3No. 4 9 1 0 2 3 3 2 24Agriculture % 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0No. 2 4 2 4 4 4 3 4 27Agri.

Labour % 2.7 2.4 1.3 2.6 3.3 2.6 2.1 2.9 2.4No. 10 29 33 23 31 43 36 17 222Non-Agri.

Labour % 13.5 17.1 22.1 14.9 25.8 27.9 24.7 12.3 20.1No. 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 4 8Skilled

Labour % 1.4 1.2 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 0.0 2.9 0.7No. 0 4 0 6 1 0 0 0 11Traditional

Labour % 0.0 2.4 0.0 3.9 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.0No. 1 2 1 2 0 1 5 8 20Service % 1.4 1.2 0.7 1.3 0.0 0.6 3.4 5.8 1.8No. 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 3Pensioner % 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.3No. 0 1 0 1 2 1 2 0 7Animal

Husbandry % 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.6 1.7 0.6 1.4 0.0 0.6No. 3 5 7 7 1 0 0 1 24Small

Business % 4.1 2.9 4.7 4.5 0.8 0.0 0.0 0.7 2.2No. 0 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 4Rickshaw/Trolley

Pulling/Hawkers % 0.0 0.6 1.3 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.4No. 16 14 29 29 22 36 34 51 231Students % 21.6 8.2 19.5 18.8 18.3 23.4 23.3 37.0 20.9No. 20 49 33 25 16 21 23 24 211House Wives % 27.0 28.8 22.1 16.2 13.3 13.6 15.8 17.4 19.1No. 74 170 149 154 120 154 146 138 1105Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006 4.18 Income Level of Households There is reported no ‘incomelessness’ in urban region which is present in rural

region. In the urban region 66.0 per cent of the non-beneficiary households earn

income below Rs. 19,000 per annum, which is 78.5 per cent in the rural region. In the

lowest income brackets the percentage of households is higher in rural region while

in the higher income brackets the percentage is higher in urban region. There are

district-wise variations in these percentages of households living below specified

income brackets in rural and urban regions (Table 4.108).

157

Table 4.108 Annual Income of Non-Beneficiary Households by Area

Annual Income Barielly Badaun Lakhimpur Lucknow Lalitpur Jhansi Gorakhpur Varanasi Total Upto Rs. 5000 - - 10.0 - - - - - 2.0Rs. 5001 To Rs. 10000 - 13.3 10.0 - 83.3 16.7 - - 18.0Rs. 10001 To Rs. 19000 33.3 53.3 70.0 50.0 16.7 16.7 - - 46.0Rs. 19001 To Rs. 25000 33.3 20.0 10.0 30.0 - 50.0 - - 22.0Rs. 25001 To Rs. 50000 33.3 6.7 - - - 16.7 - - 6.0Rs. 50001 To Rs. 1 Lac - 6.7 - 10.0 - - - - 4.0Above Rs. 1 Lac - - - 10.0 - - - - 2.0

No. 3 15 10 10 6 6 - - 50

Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - - 100.0

Incomeless 6.7 - - - - 3.7 - - 1.0Upto Rs. 5000 6.7 7.4 5.0 4.8 9.5 - - 6.7 4.7Rs. 5001 To Rs. 10000 26.7 29.6 30.0 42.9 33.3 29.6 6.7 0.0 23.0Rs. 10001 To Rs. 19000 53.3 37.0 30.0 38.1 47.6 51.9 80.0 56.7 50.8Rs. 19001 To Rs. 25000 - 14.8 5.0 9.5 4.8 7.4 - 6.7 6.3Rs. 25001 To Rs. 50000 - 11.1 25.0 - 4.8 7.4 6.7 26.7 11.0Rs. 50001 To Rs. 1 Lac 6.7 - - - - - 6.7 - 1.6Above Rs. 1 Lac - - 5.0 4.8 - - - 3.3 1.6

No. 15 27 20 21 21 27 30 30 191

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Incomeless 5.6 - - - - 3.0 - - 0.8Upto Rs. 5000 5.6 4.8 6.7 3.2 7.4 - - 6.7 4.1Rs. 5001 To Rs. 10000 22.2 23.8 23.3 29.0 44.4 27.3 6.7 - 22.0Rs. 10001 To Rs. 19000 50.0 42.9 43.3 41.9 40.7 45.5 80.0 56.7 49.8Rs. 19001 To Rs. 25000 5.6 16.7 6.7 16.1 3.7 15.2 - 6.7 9.5Rs. 25001 To Rs. 50000 5.6 9.5 16.7 - 3.7 9.1 6.7 26.7 10.0Rs. 50001 To Rs. 1 Lac 5.6 2.4 - 3.2 - - 6.7 - 2.1Above Rs. 1 Lac - - 3.3 6.5 - - - 3.3 1.7

No. 18 42 30 31 27 33 30 30 241

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006 Of all the non-beneficiary households, 0.8 per cent are incomeless which is covered

by OBCs and minority. Half of all the households fall in the annual income bracket

between Rs. 10,001 and Rs. 19,000. More than three-fourth of the households have

annual income below Rs. 19,000. 55.9 per cent of the households from the SCs are

covered in the income bracket Rs. 10,001 and Rs. 19,000. This is 85.3 per cent for

SC households living below Rs. 19,000. 42.0 per cent of the households from the

OBCs are covered in the income bracket Rs. 10,001 and Rs. 19,000. This is 70.0 per

cent for OBC households living below Rs. 19,000. 48.6 per cent of the households

from the minority are covered in the income bracket Rs. 10,001 and Rs. 19,000. This

is 70.2 per cent for minority households living below Rs. 19,000. For households in

general castes, there is no household earning less than Rs. 5,000 per annum. Thus,

for households living below Rs. 19,000 per annum for the general castes is 33.4.

There are district-wise variations in all these percentages showing the coverage of

households living below a specified income bracket (Table 4.109).

158

Table 4.109 Annual Income of Non-Beneficiary Households by Castes

Annual Income Barielly Badaun Lakhimpur Lucknow Lalitpur Jhansi Gorakhpur Varanasi Total Upto Rs. 5000 12.5 - 12.5 - 11.1 - - 18.2 5.1 Rs. 5001 To Rs. 10000 50.0 20.0 25.0 42.9 38.9 29.2 4.0 - 24.3 Rs. 10001 To Rs. 19000 37.5 50.0 50.0 35.7 38.9 58.3 80.0 81.8 55.9 Rs. 19001 To Rs. 25000 - 15.0 6.3 14.3 5.6 4.2 - - 5.9 Rs. 25001 To Rs. 50000 - 15.0 6.3 - 5.6 8.3 8.0 - 6.6 Rs. 50001 To Rs. 1 Lac - - - - - - 8.0 - 1.5 Above Rs. 1 Lac - - - 7.1 - - - - 0.7

No. 8 20 16 14 18 24 25 11 136

SC

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Incomeless - - - - - 16.7 - - 2.0 Upto Rs. 5000 - 20.0 - - - - - - 4.0 Rs. 5001 To Rs. 10000 - 30.0 - 33.3 62.5 16.7 20.0 - 24.0 Rs. 10001 To Rs. 19000 100.0 20.0 33.3 50.0 37.5 16.7 80.0 57.1 42.0 Rs. 19001 To Rs. 25000 - 20.0 16.7 - - 33.3 - 28.6 14.0 Rs. 25001 To Rs. 50000 - 10.0 50.0 - - 16.7 - 14.3 12.0 Rs. 50001 To Rs. 1 Lac - - - 16.7 - - - - 2.0

No. 2 10 6 6 8 6 5 7 50

OB

C

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Incomeless 12.5 - - - - - - - 2.7 Upto Rs. 5000 - - - 16.7 - - - - 2.7 Rs. 5001 To Rs. 10000 - 22.2 42.9 16.7 - 50.0 - - 18.9 Rs. 10001 To Rs. 19000 50.0 44.4 28.6 50.0 100.0 - - 100.0 48.6 Rs. 19001 To Rs. 25000 12.5 22.2 - 16.7 - 50.0 - - 13.5 Rs. 25001 To Rs. 50000 12.5 - 14.3 - - - - - 5.4 Rs. 50001 To Rs. 1 Lac 12.5 11.1 0.0 - - - - - 5.4 Above Rs. 1 Lac - - 14.3 - - - - - 2.7

No. 8 9 7 6 1 2 - 4 37

Min

ority

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0

Rs. 5001 To Rs. 10000 - 33.3 - - - - - - 5.6 Rs. 10001 To Rs. 19000 - 66.7 100.0 40.0 - - - - 27.8 Rs. 19001 To Rs. 25000 - - - 40.0 - 100.0 - - 16.7 Rs. 25001 To Rs. 50000 - - - - - - - 87.5 38.9 Above Rs. 1 Lac - - - 20.0 - - - 12.5 11.1

No. - 3 1 5 - 1 - 8 18

Gen

eral

Total % - 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 100.0

Incomeless 5.6 - - - - 3.0 - - 0.8 Upto Rs. 5000 5.6 4.8 6.7 3.2 7.4 - - 6.7 4.1 Rs. 5001 To Rs. 10000 22.2 23.8 23.3 29.0 44.4 27.3 6.7 - 22.0 Rs. 10001 To Rs. 19000 50.0 42.9 43.3 41.9 40.7 45.5 80.0 56.7 49.8 Rs. 19001 To Rs. 25000 5.6 16.7 6.7 16.1 3.7 15.2 - 6.7 9.5 Rs. 25001 To Rs. 50000 5.6 9.5 16.7 - 3.7 9.1 6.7 26.7 10.0 Rs. 50001 To Rs. 1 Lac 5.6 2.4 - 3.2 - - 6.7 - 2.1 Above Rs. 1 Lac - - 3.3 6.5 - - - 3.3 1.7

No. 18.0 42.0 30.0 31.0 27.0 33.0 30.0 30.0 241

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006 The percentage of population earning less than Rs. 19,000 is 71.3. Half of the

population from the sample households fall in the annual income bracket between

Rs.10,001 and Rs. 19,000. One-fifth of the population earns income between Rs.

5,001 and Rs. 10,000. There are district-wise variations in the percentages of

population in the respective income brackets. 55.0 per cent of the population from

SCs fall in the income bracket between Rs. 10,001 and Rs. 19,000. Percentage of

SC population earning below Rs. 19,000 is 77.8, which is above the grand

average/percentage of population below the identified income level. The

corresponding percentages for OBCs are 69.8, minority 73.7 and 23.3 for the general

caste. There are district-wise variations in all the relevant percentages (Table 4.110).

159

Table 4.110 Distribution of Population in Households by Caste and Annual Income

Caste Annual Income Barielly Badaun Lakhimpur Lucknow Lalitpur Jhansi Gorakhpur Varanasi Total Below Rs. 5000 8.7 - 4.1 - 6.3 0.8 - 4.4 2.1 Rs. 5001 To Rs. 10000 47.8 17.9 27.4 31.4 35.4 23.6 1.7 0.0 20.7 Rs. 10001 To Rs. 19000 43.5 41.7 54.8 31.4 40.5 57.7 72.6 95.6 55.0 Rs. 19001 To Rs. 25000 - 22.6 9.6 14.3 8.9 5.7 5.1 0.0 9.1 Rs. 25001 To Rs. 50000 - 17.9 4.1 0.0 8.9 12.2 5.1 0.0 7.5 Rs. 50001 To Rs. 1 Lac - - 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 15.4 0.0 2.9 Above Rs. 1 Lac - - 0.0 22.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 Total No. 23 84 73 70 79 123 117 45 614

SC

% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Below Rs. 5000 - 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.9 Rs. 5001 To Rs. 10000 - 41.9 0.0 43.5 67.6 5.6 17.2 0.0 24.2 Rs. 10001 To Rs. 19000 100.0 9.7 39.5 39.1 32.4 33.3 82.8 60.0 44.7 Rs. 19001 To Rs. 25000 - 22.6 13.2 0.0 0.0 22.2 0.0 28.6 12.1 Rs. 25001 To Rs. 50000 - 19.4 47.4 0.0 0.0 38.9 0.0 11.4 16.3 Rs. 50001 To Rs. 1 Lac - - - 17.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.9 Total No. 7 31 38 23 34 18 29 35 215

OB

C

% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Below Rs. 5000 4.5 4.3 - 3.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 2.6 Rs. 5001 To Rs. 10000 - 13.0 36.1 30.3 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 15.3 Rs. 10001 To Rs. 19000 56.8 52.2 19.4 66.7 100.0 62.5 - 100.0 55.8 Rs. 19001 To Rs. 25000 18.2 6.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 37.5 - 0.0 7.4 Rs. 25001 To Rs. 50000 6.8 0.0 11.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 3.7 Rs. 50001 To Rs. 1 Lac 13.6 23.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 8.9 Above Rs. 1 Lac - - 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 6.3 Total No. 44 46 36 33 7 8 0 16 190

Min

ority

% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Rs. 5001 To Rs. 10000 - 33.3 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 - 0.0 3.5 Rs. 10001 To Rs. 19000 - 66.7 100.0 32.1 - 0.0 - 0.0 19.8 Rs. 19001 To Rs. 25000 - - 0.0 42.9 - 100.0 - 0.0 19.8 Rs. 25001 To Rs. 50000 - 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 - 83.3 40.7 Above Rs. 1 Lac - 0.0 0.0 25.0 - 0.0 - 16.7 16.3 Total No. 0 9 2 28 0 5 0 42 86

Gen

eral

% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Below Rs. 5000 5.4 2.4 2.0 0.6 4.2 0.6 0.0 1.4 1.8 Rs. 5001 To Rs. 10000 14.9 21.8 22.1 27.3 42.5 19.5 4.8 0.0 19.1 Rs. 10001 To Rs. 19000 56.8 40.0 43.0 40.3 41.7 53.2 74.7 58.0 50.4 Rs. 19001 To Rs. 25000 10.8 17.1 8.1 14.3 5.8 12.3 4.1 7.2 10.2 Rs. 25001 To Rs. 50000 4.1 12.4 16.8 0.0 5.8 14.3 4.1 28.3 11.1 Rs. 50001 To Rs. 1 Lac 8.1 6.5 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 12.3 0.0 3.5 Above Rs. 1 Lac 0.0 0.0 8.1 14.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 3.8 Total No. 74 170 149 154 120 154 146 138 1105

Tota

l

% 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 Source: Field Survey 2006.

Of all the earning population, only 0.5 per cent earns annual income above

Rs. One lac, 1.6 per cent between Rs. 50,000 and Rs. 1 lac, 5.7 per cent between

Rs. 25,001 and Rs. 50,000. Excepting one in Lucknow and one in Varanasi, we did

not find in the population from the sample any household earning more than Rs. One

lac per annum. In the whole population, 23.6 per cent earn income per annum below

Rs. 5,000. As high as 87.6 per cent earn income per annum below Rs. 19,000

that shows the eligibility of most of the non-beneficiaries in PDS. There are district-

wise variations in the percentages of population in the respective income brackets

(Table 4.111).

160

Table 4.111 Annual Income of Earning Population from Households by Region

Annual Income

Bar

ielly

Bada

un

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Var

anas

i

Tota

l

No. 1 7 9 7 20 16 15 12 87Below Rs. 5,000 % 4.5 11.7 19.6 14.6 43.5 29.6 29.4 28.6 23.6

No. 6 27 14 17 19 21 13 7 124Rs. 5,001 To Rs. 10,000 % 27.3 45.0 30.4 35.4 41.3 38.9 25.5 16.7 33.6

No. 12 20 16 11 7 13 19 14 112Rs. 10,001 To Rs. 19,000

% 54.5 33.3 34.8 22.9 15.2 24.1 37.3 33.3 30.4

No. 3 1 1 8 0 3 0 1 17Rs. 19,001 To Rs. 25,000

% 13.6 1.7 2.2 16.7 0.0 5.6 0.0 2.4 4.6

No. 0 5 3 2 0 1 3 7 21Rs. 25,001 To Rs. 50,000

% 0.0 8.3 6.5 4.2 0.0 1.9 5.9 16.7 5.7

No. 0 0 3 2 0 0 1 0 6Rs. 50,001 To Rs. 1 Lac

% 0.0 0.0 6.5 4.2 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 1.6

No. 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2Above Rs. 1 Lac % 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.5

No. 22 60 46 48 46 54 51 42 369Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006

Of total SC population from the households, 34.4 per cent are earning, which

from respective caste-based population sizes are 36.3 from OBCs, 31.1 from minority

and 24.4 from the general castes. There are district-wise variations in the

percentages of earning population from the size of caste-based population from the

respective households (Table 4.112).

161

Table 4.112 Earning Population in total Population from Households by Castes

Caste

Bar

ielly

Bada

un

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Var

anas

i

Tota

l

No. 15 56 52 45 48 80 77 30 403SC % 65.2 66.7 71.2 64.3 60.8 65.0 65.8 66.7 65.6

No. 5 20 24 15 21 10 18 24 137OBC % 71.4 64.5 63.2 65.2 61.8 55.6 62.1 68.6 63.7

No. 32 28 26 24 5 6 - 10 131Minority % 72.7 60.9 72.2 72.7 71.4 75.0 - 62.5 68.9

No. - 6 1 22 - 4 - 32 65General % - 66.7 50.0 78.6 - 80.0 - 76.2 75.6

No. 52 110 103 106 74 100 95 96 736

Dep

ende

nt

Pop

ulat

ion

Total % 70.3 64.7 69.1 68.8 61.7 64.9 65.1 69.6 66.6No. 8 28 21 25 31 43 40 15 211

SC % 34.8 33.3 28.8 35.7 39.2 35.0 34.2 33.3 34.4No. 2 11 14 8 13 8 11 11 78

OBC % 28.6 35.5 36.8 34.8 38.2 44.4 37.9 31.4 36.3No. 12 18 10 9 2 2 - 6 59

Minority % 27.3 39.1 27.8 27.3 28.6 25.0 - 37.5 31.1No. - 3 1 6 - 1 - 10 21

General % - 33.3 50.0 21.4 - 20.0 - 23.8 24.4No. 22 60 46 48 46 54 51 42 369

Ear

ning

P

opul

atio

n

Total % 29.7 35.3 30.9 31.2 38.3 35.1 34.9 30.4 33.4No. 23 84 73 70 79 123 117 45 614

SC % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 7 31 38 23 34 18 29 35 215

OBC % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 44 46 36 33 7 8 0 16 190

Minority % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 0 9 2 28 0 5 0 42 86

General % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 74 170 149 154 120 154 146 138 1105

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Source: Field Survey 2006

Of all the earning population from the sample, earning male population

constitute 25.6 per cent and earning female population constitute 7.8 per cent. There

are district-wise variations in the percentages of earning and dependent population

(Table 4.113).

162

Table 4.113 Earning Population in total Population from Households by Gender

Population Gender

Bar

ielly

Bada

un

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Var

anas

i

Tota

l

No. 20 30 43 52 30 43 34 44 296Male % 50.0 36.6 52.4 58.4 51.7 51.8 47.9 59.5 51.1

No. 32 80 60 54 44 57 61 52 440Female % 94.1 90.9 89.6 83.1 71.0 80.3 81.3 81.3 83.7

No. 52 110 103 106 74 100 95 96 736

Dependent Population

Total % 70.3 64.7 69.1 68.8 61.7 64.9 65.1 69.6 66.6No. 20 52 39 37 28 40 37 30 283

Male % 50.0 63.4 47.6 41.6 48.3 48.2 52.1 40.5 48.9No. 2 8 7 11 18 14 14 12 86

Female % 5.9 9.1 10.4 16.9 29.0 19.7 18.7 18.8 16.3No. 22 60 46 48 46 54 51 42 369

Earning Population

Total % 29.7 35.3 30.9 31.2 38.3 35.1 34.9 30.4 33.4No. 40 82 82 89 58 83 71 74 579

Male % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 34 88 67 65 62 71 75 64 526

Female % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 74 170 149 154 120 154 146 138 1105

Total

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Source: Field Survey 2006

Of all the earning population from the sample, earning male population

constitute 25.6 per cent and earning female population constitute 7.8 per cent. There

are district-wise variations in the percentages of earning and dependent population

(Table 4.114).

163

Table 4.114 Earning Population in total Population from Households by Gender

Population Gender

Bar

ielly

Bada

un

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Var

anas

i

Tota

l

No. 20 30 43 52 30 43 34 44 296Male % 50.0 36.6 52.4 58.4 51.7 51.8 47.9 59.5 51.1

No. 32 80 60 54 44 57 61 52 440Female % 94.1 90.9 89.6 83.1 71.0 80.3 81.3 81.3 83.7

No. 52 110 103 106 74 100 95 96 736

Dependent Population

Total % 70.3 64.7 69.1 68.8 61.7 64.9 65.1 69.6 66.6No. 20 52 39 37 28 40 37 30 283

Male % 50.0 63.4 47.6 41.6 48.3 48.2 52.1 40.5 48.9No. 2 8 7 11 18 14 14 12 86

Female % 5.9 9.1 10.4 16.9 29.0 19.7 18.7 18.8 16.3No. 22 60 46 48 46 54 51 42 369

Earning Population

Total % 29.7 35.3 30.9 31.2 38.3 35.1 34.9 30.4 33.4No. 40 82 82 89 58 83 71 74 579

Male % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 34 88 67 65 62 71 75 64 526

Female % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 74 170 149 154 120 154 146 138 1105

Total

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Source: Field Survey 2006

164

Table 4.115 Per Capita Annual Income in Selected Households by Castes and Income

Caste Annual

Income Group

Bar

ielly

Bada

un

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Var

anas

i

Tota

l

Below Rs. 5000 2400 - 2800 - 1680 0 - 1800 1938Rs. 5001 To Rs. 10000 2727 1840 1440 2073 1971 1862 3600 - 1956Rs. 10001 To Rs. 19000 4680 4903 2730 3273 3038 2975 3205 2819 3259Rs. 19001 To Rs. 25000 - 3379 2743 4320 3086 3429 2800 - 3375Rs. 25001 To Rs. 50000 - 6880 8600 - 3771 4000 11000 - 6117Rs. 50001 To Rs. 1 Lac - - - - - - 8000 - 8000Above Rs. 1 Lac - - - 10875 - - - - 10875

SC

Total 3548 4364 2622 4783 2643 2839 4328 2773 3524Below Rs. 5000 - 4800 - - - - - - 4800Rs. 5001 To Rs. 10000 - 1985 - 2364 1774 6000 1920 - 2035Rs. 10001 To Rs. 19000 3771 6000 1920 3200 3709 7000 2525 2686 3144Rs. 19001 To Rs. 25000 - 6857 4320 - - 5400 - 3840 4985Rs. 25001 To Rs. 50000 - 5600 5533 - - 4286 - 9000 5691Rs. 50001 To Rs. 1 Lac - - - 24000 - - - - 24000

OB

C

Total 3771 4355 3947 6454 2400 5533 2421 3737 3916Below Rs. 5000 0 0 - 1800 - - - - 360Rs. 5001 To Rs. 10000 - 3100 1569 960 - - - - 1676Rs. 10001 To Rs. 19000 2880 3325 3771 2400 2400 1440 - 3375 2915Rs. 19001 To Rs. 25000 3000 8000 - - - 7200 - - 4971Rs. 25001 To Rs. 50000 10000 - 7500 - - - - - 8571Rs. 50001 To Rs. 1 Lac 11400 7636 - - - - - - 8965Above Rs. 1 Lac - - 20000 - - - - - 20000

Min

ority

Total 4418 4487 8800 1945 2400 3600 - 3375 4639Rs. 5001 To Rs. 10000 - 2800 - - - - - - 2800Rs. 10001 To Rs. 19000 - 4000 6000 4000 - - - - 4235Rs. 19001 To Rs. 25000 - - - 4000 - 4800 - - 4235Rs. 25001 To Rs. 50000 - - - - - - - 8160 8160Above Rs. 1 Lac - - - 25714 - - - 17143 21429

Gen

eral

Total - 3600 6000 9429 - 4800 - 9657 8581Below Rs. 5000 1200 2400 2800 1800 1680 0 - 1800 1830Rs. 5001 To Rs. 10000 2727 2173 1491 1877 1882 2000 2400 - 1949Rs. 10001 To Rs. 19000 3457 4315 2756 3058 3096 3176 3055 2895 3204Rs. 19001 To Rs. 25000 3000 4697 3400 4145 3086 4800 2800 3840 4073Rs. 25001 To Rs. 50000 10000 6514 6216 - 3771 4091 11000 8246 6717Rs. 50001 To Rs. 1 Lac 11400 7636 - 24000 - - 8000 - 10062Above Rs. 1 Lac - - 20000 15391 - - - 17143 17000

Tota

l

Total 4086 4355 4498 5269 2560 3257 3949 5183 4186Source: Field Survey 2006 4.19 Living Condition of Non-Beneficiary Households In the urban region, 42.0 per cent of the households live in kuccha houses, which is

for 47.6 per cent households in rural region. 6.0 per cent of the households in urban

region live in ‘huts’ which is for 13.1 per cent households in urban region. There are

165

district-wise variations in the percentages of households living in different types of

houses in rural and urban regions (Table 4.116). Table 4.116

Housing Status of Non-Beneficiary Households by Region

Reg

ion

Status

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

Pucca 100.0 20.0 - 70.0 16.7 50.0 - - 34.0Semi-Pucca - 20.0 - 10.0 50.0 33.3 - - 18.0Kuccha - 60.0 70.0 20.0 33.3 16.7 - - 42.0Hut - - 30.0 - - - - - 6.0

No. 3 15 10 10 6 6 - - 50

Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - - 100.0

Pucca 20.0 22.2 15.0 9.5 9.5 11.1 46.7 23.3 20.9Semi-Pucca 40.0 29.6 5.0 4.8 19.0 18.5 10.0 23.3 18.3Kuccha 33.3 33.3 40.0 52.4 61.9 66.7 36.7 53.3 47.6Hut 6.7 14.8 40.0 33.3 9.5 3.7 6.7 - 13.1

No. 15 27 20 21 21 27 30 30 191

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Pucca 33.3 21.4 10.0 29.0 11.1 18.2 46.7 23.3 23.7Semi-Pucca 33.3 26.2 3.3 6.5 25.9 21.2 10.0 23.3 18.3Kuccha 27.8 42.9 50.0 41.9 55.6 57.6 36.7 53.3 46.5Hut 5.6 9.5 36.7 22.6 7.4 3.0 6.7 - 11.6

No. 18 42 30 31 27 33 30 30 241

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006 Of all the non-beneficiary households, 46.5 per cent have kuccha houses, which is

55.9 per cent of the SC households, 42.0 per cent of the OBC households, 37.8 per

cent of the minority and 5.6 per cent of the general caste households. 66.7 per cent

of the general caste households have pucca houses. 11.6 per cent of the total non-

beneficiary households have ‘hut’ (cottage), which is 13.2 per cent for the SCS, 8.0

per cent for the OBCs, 16.2 for the minority. The households in general castes do not

live in ‘huts’. There are district-wise variations in the percentages of non-beneficiary

households by castes having types of residential houses like pucca, semi-pucca and

kuccha and ‘huts’ (Table 4.117).

166

Table 4.117 Housing Condition of Non-Beneficiary Households by Castes

Cas

te

Housing Status

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

Pucca - 25.0 - 7.1 5.6 12.5 40.0 9.1 15.4Semi-Pucca 37.5 20.0 - 14.3 27.8 16.7 8.0 9.1 15.4Kuccha 50.0 45.0 43.8 64.3 55.6 70.8 44.0 81.8 55.9Hut 12.5 10.0 56.3 14.3 11.1 - 8.0 - 13.2

No. 8 20 16 14 18 24 25 11 136

SC

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Pucca 100.0 20.0 - 50.0 12.5 16.7 80.0 14.3 28.0Semi-Pucca - 30.0 16.7 - 25.0 33.3 20.0 28.6 22.0Kuccha - 30.0 66.7 50.0 62.5 33.3 - 57.1 42.0Hut - 20.0 16.7 - - 16.7 - - 8.0

No. 2 10 6 6 8 6 5 7 50

OB

C

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Pucca 50.0 11.1 28.6 - 100.0 100.0 - - 27.0Semi-Pucca 37.5 33.3 - - - - - 25.0 18.9Kuccha 12.5 55.6 57.1 16.7 - - - 75.0 37.8Hut 0.0 0.0 14.3 83.3 - - - - 16.2

No. 8 9 7 6 1 2 - 4 37Min

ority

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0

Pucca - 33.3 100.0 100.0 - - - 62.5 66.7Semi-Pucca - 33.3 - - - 100.0 - 37.5 27.8Kuccha - 33.3 - - - - - - 5.6

No. - 3 1 5 - 1 - 8 18Gen

eral

Total % - 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 100.0

Pucca 33.3 21.4 10.0 29.0 11.1 18.2 46.7 23.3 23.7Semi-Pucca 33.3 26.2 3.3 6.5 25.9 21.2 10.0 23.3 18.3Kuccha 27.8 42.9 50.0 41.9 55.6 57.6 36.7 53.3 46.5Hut 5.6 9.5 36.7 22.6 7.4 3.0 6.7 - 11.6

No. 18 42 30 31 27 33 30 30 241

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006 Facilities Available Inside the Houses

Of all the non-beneficiary households, 98.8 per cent use kerosene for lighting at

home. This percentage is 99.3 for the households in SCs, 96.0 for the OBCs, cent

per cent for each of minority and general castes. The other sources of lighting at

home are candle, battery and mustard oil. There are district-wise variations in the

coverage of households by castes in using the alternative sources of light at home;

the majority across castes is, however, covered by use of kerosene (Table 4.118).

167

Table 4.118 Sources of Light in Houses of Non-Beneficiary Households by Castes

Cas

te

Sources of Light

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

Kerosene 100.0 100.0 93.8 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.3Candle - - 6.3 7.1 5.6 16.7 8.0 27.3 8.8

No. 8 20 16 14 18 24 25 11 136SC

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Battery 50.0 - - - - - - - 2.0Kerosene 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 66.7 100.0 100.0 96.0Candle - - 33.3 33.3 - - - 57.1 16.0Live in Darkness - - - - - 33.3 - - 4.0

No. 2 10 6 6 8 6 5 7 50

OB

C

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Kerosene 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0Candle 12.5 - 14.3 - - - - 50.0 10.8

No. 8 9 7 6 1 2 - 4 37

Min

ority

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0

Battery - - - 40.0 - 0.0 - 25.0 22.2Kerosene - 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 100.0Candle - - - 40.0 - 0.0 - 62.5 38.9Mustered Oil - - 100.0 0.0 - 0.0 - - 5.6

No. - 3 1 5 - 1 - 8 18Gen

eral

Total % - 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 100.0

Battery 5.6 - - 6.5 - - - 6.7 2.1Kerosene 100.0 100.0 96.7 100.0 100.0 93.9 100.0 100.0 98.8Candle 5.6 - 13.3 16.1 3.7 12.1 6.7 46.7 12.9Mustered Oil - - 3.3 - - - - - 0.4Live in Darkness - - - - - 6.1 - - 0.8

No. 18 42 30 31 27 33 30 30 241

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006

98.0 per cent of the urban households and 99.0 per cent of the rural

households use kerosene for light at night. The phenomenon of living in darkness

exists in rural region which is absent in urban region. There are district-wise

variations in use of alternative sources of energy in rural and urban regions (Table

4.119).

168

Table 4.119 Sources of Light in Houses of Non-Beneficiary Households by Area

Are

a

Sources of Light

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

Battery - - - 20.0 - - - - 4.0Kerosene 100.0 100.0 90.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - - 98.0Candle - - 10.0 40.0 - - - - 10.0

No. 3 15 10 10 6 6 - - 50

Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - - 100.0

Battery 6.7 - - - - - - 6.7 1.6Kerosene 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 92.6 100.0 100.0 99.0Candle 6.7 - 15.0 4.8 4.8 14.8 6.7 46.7 13.6Mustered Oil - - 5.0 - - - - - 0.5Live in Dark - - - - - 7.4 - - 1.0

No. 15 27 20 21 21 27 30 30 191

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Battery 5.6 - - 6.5 - - - 6.7 2.1Kerosene 5.6 2.4 3.3 3.2 3.7 3.0 3.3 3.3 0.4Candle 5.6 - 13.3 16.1 3.7 12.1 6.7 46.7 12.9Mustered Oil - - 3.3 - - - - - 0.4Live in Dark - - - - - 6.1 - - 0.8

No. 18 42 30 31 27 33 30 30 241

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006 Sources of Fuel Kerosene as a means of fuel for cooking purposes is generally absent in both rural

and urban regions. Most of the households in both the regions use multiple sources

like wood and ‘kanda’ (cow dung cake) for cooking. There are district-wise variations

in the percentages of households using the alternative means of fuel in rural and

urban regions (Box 4.18).

Box 4.18 Sources of Fuel for Kitchen of Non-Beneficiary Households by Regions

Area Types of Fuel Wood Kanda Kerosene

Urban

LPG Wood Kanda Kerosene Leaf Wood Coal

Rural

LPG Source: Field Survey 2006

169

5.4 Productive and Non-Productive Assets Owned Excepting very few households in districts Lakhimpur Kheri and Lalitpur, none of the

non-beneficiary households have income-generating productive assets like tractor,

‘atta chakki’, pump set, thresher, trolley etc. The only asset that the non-beneficiary

households have in the urban region is rickshaw, that too for only one household in

Lakhimpur Kheri. Overall, the non-beneficiary households are assetless that could

have offered scope for income (Table 4.120). Table 4.120

Households Having Income Generating Productive Assets by Region

Region Assets

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

Rickshaw - - 10.0 - - - - - 2.0No. 3 15 10 10 6 6 - - 50Urban Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Tractor - - 5.0 - - - - - 0.5‘Atta’ Chakki

- - 5.0 - - - - - 0.5

Pump set - - - - 4.8 - - - 0.5Thresher - - 5.0 - - - - - 0.5Trolley - - 5.0 - - - - - 0.5

No. 15 27 20 21 21 27 30 30 191

Rural

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Tractor - - 3.3 - - - - - 0.4‘Atta’ Chakki

- - 3.3 - - - - - 0.4

Pump set - - - - 3.7 - - - 0.4Thresher - - 3.3 - - - - - 0.4Trolley - - 3.3 - - - - - 0.4Rickshaw - - 3.3 - - - - - 0.4

No. 18 42 30 31 27 33 30 30 241

Total

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Source: Field Survey 2006

The non-beneficiary households own some productive animals like cow, ox,

calf, buffalo, hen, goat etc. In the rural region the major animals owned are cow (13.6

per cent owning), calf (11.0 per cent owning), buffalo (9.4 per cent owning). In the

rural region, the respective percentages of households owning these are 12.0, 4.0,

and 10.0 (Table 4.121).

170

Table 4.121 Households Having Productive Animals by Region

Reg

ion

Animals

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

Cow - 13.3 10.0 20.0 - 16.7 - - 12.0Buffalo 33.3 13.3 - 10.0 - 16.7 - - 10.0Goat 100.0 13.3 - - 16.7 - - - 12.0Calf - - 10.0 10.0 - - - - 4.0

No. 3 15 10 10 6 6 - - 50

Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - - 100.0Cow 6.7 - 10.0 9.5 28.6 22.2 6.7 23.3 13.6Ox - 7.4 5.0 - 14.3 7.4 3.3 - 4.7Calf 6.7 14.8 15.0 4.8 19.0 7.4 3.3 16.7 11.0Buffalo 6.7 22.2 5.0 4.8 14.3 11.1 3.3 6.7 9.4Buffalo Bull 20.0 3.7 10.0 - - - - - 3.1Hen - - - 4.8 - - - - 0.5Goat - 3.7 10.0 0.0 9.5 7.4 6.7 23.3 8.4

No. 15 27 20 21 21 27 30 30 191

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Cow 5.6 4.8 10.0 12.9 22.2 21.2 6.7 23.3 13.3Ox - 4.8 3.3 - 11.1 6.1 3.3 0.0 3.7Calf 5.6 9.5 13.3 6.5 14.8 6.1 3.3 16.7 9.5Buffalo 11.1 19.0 3.3 6.5 11.1 12.1 3.3 6.7 9.5Buffalo Bull 16.7 2.4 6.7 - - - - - 2.5Hen - - - 3.2 - - - - 0.4Goat - 2.4 6.7 0.0 7.4 6.1 6.7 23.3 6.6

No. 18 42 30 31 27 33 30 30 241

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Source: Field Survey 2006

Of all non-beneficiary households, 79.7 per cent are landless, which is 81.6

per cent for the SCs, 72.0 per cent for the OBCs, 86.5 per cent for the minority and

72.2 per cent for general castes. There are district-wise differences in the

percentages of households remaining landless. Of the remaining households having

land, most are in possession of land less than one acre per household, the

percentage for SCs being 8.1, for OBCs 16.0, for minority 5.4 and for general castes

16.7. Excepting one household in district Bareilly, nobody is reported to have land

more than 5.0 acres. There are district-wise variations in the ownership of land for

households across castes (Table 4.122).

171

Table 4.122 Land Ownership of Non-Beneficiary Households by Castes

Cas

te

Land Ownership in Acre

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

Landless 100.0 65.0 87.5 100.0 77.8 70.8 80.0 100.0 81.6Below 1 Acre - 25.0 - - 5.6 4.2 16.0 - 8.11 Acre To 2.5 Acre - 5.0 12.5 - 16.7 16.7 4.0 - 8.12.5 Acre To 5.0 Acre - 5.0 - - - 8.3 - - 2.2

No. 8 20 16 14 18 24 25 11 136

SC

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Landless - 40.0 100.0 100.0 75.0 100.0 40.0 85.7 72.0Below 1 Acre - 40.0 - - - - 60.0 14.3 16.01 Acre To 2.5 Acre 50.0 20.0 - - 25.0 - - - 10.0Above 5.0 Acre 50.0 - - - - - - - 2.0

No. 2 10 6 6 8 6 5 7 50

OB

C

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Landless 62.5 88.9 85.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 86.5Below 1 Acre 12.5 11.1 - - - - - - 5.41 Acre To 2.5 Acre 25.0 - - - - - - - 5.42.5 Acre To 5.0 Acre - - 14.3 - - - - - 2.7

No. 8 9 7 6 1 2 - 4 37Min

ority

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0Landless - 100.0 100.0 100.0 - - - 50.0 72.2Below 1 Acre - - - - - - - 37.5 16.71 Acre To 2.5 Acre - - - - - 100.0 - 12.5 11.1

No. - 3 1 5 - 1 - 8 18Gen

eral

Total % - 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 100.0Landless 72.2 66.7 90.0 100.0 77.8 75.8 73.3 83.3 79.7Below 1 Acre 5.6 23.8 - - 3.7 3.0 23.3 13.3 10.01 Acre To 2.5 Acre 16.7 7.1 6.7 - 18.5 15.2 3.3 3.3 8.32.5 Acre To 5.0 Acre - 2.4 3.3 - - 6.1 - - 1.7Above 5.0 Acre 5.6 - - - - - - - 0.4

No. 18 42 30 31 27 33 30 30 241

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Source: Field Survey 2006

In the urban region, 92.0 per cent of the non-beneficiary households are

landless, which is true for 76.4 per cent of their counterparts in the rural region. The

ownership over land in urban region does not cross 2.5 acres, whereas in the rural

region the range of land ownership is from landlessness to more than 5.0 acres.

There are district-wise variations in this ownership (Table 4.123).

172

Table 4.123 Land Ownership of Non-Beneficiary Households by Region

Reg

ion

Land Ownership (in Acre)

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

Landless 33.3 86.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - - 92.0Below 1 Acre 33.3 6.7 - - - - - - 4.01 Acre To 2.5 Acre 33.3 6.7 - - - - - - 4.0

No. 3 15 10 10 6 6 - - 50Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - - 100.0Landless 80.0 55.6 85.0 100.0 71.4 70.4 73.3 83.3 76.4Below 1 Acre - 33.3 - - 4.8 3.7 23.3 13.3 11.51 Acre To 2.5 Acre 13.3 7.4 10.0 - 23.8 18.5 3.3 3.3 9.42.5 Acre To 5.0 Acre - 3.7 5.0 - - 7.4 - - 2.1Above 5.0 Acre 6.7 - - - - - - - 0.5

No. 15 27 20 21 21 27 30 30 191

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Landless 72.2 66.7 90.0 100.0 77.8 75.8 73.3 83.3 79.7Below 1 Acre 5.6 23.8 - - 3.7 3.0 23.3 13.3 10.01 Acre To 2.5 Acre 16.7 7.1 6.7 - 18.5 15.2 3.3 3.3 8.32.5 Acre To 5.0 Acre - 2.4 3.3 - - 6.1 - - 1.7Above 5.0 Acre 5.6 - - - - - - - 0.4

No. 18 42 30 31 27 33 30 30 241

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Source: Field Survey 2006

Of all non-beneficiary households, 16.6 per cent have outstanding loans,

which are 16.9 per cent for SCs, 16.0 per cent for OBCs, 18.9 per cent for minority

and 11.1 per cent for the general castes. There are district-wise variations in the

percentages of households by castes having loans (Table 4.124). Table 4.124

Non-Beneficiary Households having Loans by Castes

Caste

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

% of Loan HHs 12.5 35.0 12.5 - 22.2 12.5 8.0 36.4 16.9No. of Total HHs 8 20 16 14 18 24 25 11 136SC %. of Total HHs 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0% of Loan HHs 50.0 30.0 - - 12.5 - 20.0 28.6 16.0

No. of Total HHs 2 10 6 6 8 6 5 7 50OBC %. of Total HHs 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0% of Loan HHs 12.5 55.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 25.0 18.9

No. of Total HHs 8 9 7 6 1 2 - 4 37Minority %. of Total HHs 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0% of Loan HHs - - 100.0 - - - - 12.5 11.1

No. of Total HHs - 3 1 5 - 1 - 8 18General %. of Total HHs 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0% of Loan HHs 16.7 35.7 10.0 - 18.5 9.1 10.0 26.7 16.6

No. of Total HHs 18 42 30 31 27 33 30 30 241Total %. of Total HHs 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006

173

Of all non-beneficiary households in urban region, 8.0 per cent have

outstanding loans, which is 18.8 per cent for the rural region. There are district-wise

variations by region, rural and urban, covering households having outstanding loans

(Table 4.125). Table 4.125

Households having Loans by Region Area

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

% of Loan HHs - 20.0 10.0 - - - - - 8.0No. of Total HHs 3 15 10 10 6 6 - - 50Urban %. of Total HHs 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - - 100.0% of Loan HHs 20.0 44.4 10.0 0.0 23.8 11.1 10.0 26.7 18.8

No. of Total HHs 15 27 20 21 21 27 30 30 191Rural %. of Total HHs 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0% of Loan HHs 16.7 35.7 10.0 0.0 18.5 9.1 10.0 26.7 16.6

No. of Total HHs 18 42 30 31 27 33 30 30 241Total %. of Total HHs 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006

The average (per household) outstanding loan over all the non-beneficiary

households as borrowers as on date was Rs. 14,838, which was Rs.15,014 for rural

region and Rs. 13,250 for urban region. The average outstanding loan for the SC

households was Rs. 13,913, which was Rs. 8688 for the OBCs, Rs. 25,429 for the

minority and Rs.13,000 for the general castes. There were district-wise variations in

the average outstanding loan over castes and regions (Table 4.126). Table 4.126

Average Outstanding Loan by Caste and Region Caste Barielly Badaun Lakhimpur Lucknow Lalitpur Jhansi Gorakhpur Varanasi Total

(Rs.) SC 5000 15429 15000 - 12250 13667 15000 14250 13913OBC 15000 8000 - - 7500 - 3000 10000 8688Minority 20000 30600 - - - - - 5000 25429General - - 6000 - - - - 20000 13000Urban - 16000 5000 - - - - - 13250Rural 13333 19750 15500 - 11300 13667 11000 12750 15014Total (Rs.) 13333 19000 12000 - 11300 13667 11000 12750 14838

Source: Field Survey 2006 Migration of Households

Of all non-beneficiary households, 12.0 per cent reported migration, which is 14.1 per

cent from the rural region and 4.0 per cent from the urban region. Of all SC

households, 16.9 per cent reported migration, which is 4.0 per cent for OBCs, 8.1 per

cent for minority and 5.6 per cent for general castes. There are district-wise

174

variations in the percentages of households reporting migration over regions and

across castes (Table 4.127). Table 4.127

Migration of Households by Caste and Region

Cas

te

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

Migration - 25.0 - - 16.7 41.7 20.0 - 16.9No. 8 20 16 14 18 24 25 11 136S

C

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Migration - - 16.7 - 12.5 - 0.0 0.0 4.0No. 2 10 6 6 8 6 5 7 50

OB

C

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Migration 25.0 11.1 - - - - - 0.0 8.1No. 8 9 7 6 1 2 - 4 37

Min

ority

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 100.0

Migration - - - - - - - 12.5 5.6

No. - 3 1 5 - 1 - 8 18

Gen

eral

Total % - 100.0 100.0 100.0 - 100.0 - 100.0 100.0

Migration - 13.3 - - - - - - 4.0No. 3 15 10 10 6 6 - - 50

Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - - 100.0

Migration 13.3 14.8 5.0 - 19.0 37.0 16.7 3.3 14.1No. 15 27 20 21 21 27 30 30 191

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Migration 11.1 14.3 3.3 - 14.8 30.3 16.7 3.3 12.0No. 18 42 30 31 27 33 30 30 241

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 2006

Of the non-beneficiary households reporting migration, non-availability of

work in the locality was the major cause. This is the push factor. The pull factors for

migration from rural region include wage work in brick field, service, searching for

enhanced income, accompanying contractor (for paid work elsewhere) and business.

For urban region, there is no reported push factor. We found, however, very

insignificant number of migrants from urban region. Migration, thus, is dominantly a

rural phenomenon and that too because of deruralization (push factors) (Box 4.19). Box 4.19

Reasons of Migration by Region Area Types of Fuel Urban Non Availability of work in Village

Non Availability of work in Village Service Wage work in Brick Field With Contractor For Increasing Income

Rural

Business Source: Field Survey 2006

175

4.20 Public Distribution System and Non-Beneficiary Households Non-Holding of Ration Cards and Reasons

The non-beneficiary households do not have ration cards for different periods. More

than one-tenth of these households do not have cards for more than ten years, the

percentage of such households being 11.5 in rural region and 12.0 in urban region.

Most of the households (79.2 per cent) do not have ration cards for a period between

two and ten years. This is for 79.0 per cent of the households in rural and 80.0 per

cent of the households in urban region. 42.9 per cent of the households in rural

region have no ration cards for a period 6 and 10 years, which is true for 16.0 per

cent of the households in urban region. There are district-wise variations in the

percentages of households having no ration cards for different lengths of years

(Table 4.128). Table – 4.128

Households having No Ration Card by Region

Reg

ion

Year

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

Up to 1 Year - 20.0 10.0 - - - - - 8.02 To 5 Years 100.0 40.0 60.0 70.0 100.0 66.7 - - 64.06 To 10 Years - 20.0 20.0 20.0 - 16.7 - - 16.0Above 10 Years - 20.0 10.0 10.0 - 16.7 - - 12.0

No. 3 15 10 10 6 6 - - 50

Urb

an

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 - - 100.0Up to 1 Year 13.3 3.7 5.0 9.5 - 3.7 6.7 30.0 9.42 To 5 Years 40.0 33.3 65.0 14.3 33.3 55.6 26.7 26.7 36.16 To 10 Years 40.0 51.9 25.0 71.4 42.9 29.6 50.0 33.3 42.9Above 10 Years 6.7 11.1 5.0 4.8 23.8 11.1 16.7 10.0 11.5

No. 15 27 20 21 21 27 30 30 191

Rur

al

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Up to 1 Year 11.1 9.5 6.7 6.5 - 3.0 6.7 30.0 9.12 To 5 Years 50.0 35.7 63.3 32.3 48.1 57.6 26.7 26.7 41.96 To 10 Years 33.3 40.5 23.3 54.8 33.3 27.3 50.0 33.3 37.3Above 10 Years 5.6 14.3 6.7 6.5 18.5 12.1 16.7 10.0 11.6

No. 18 42 30 31 27 33 30 30 241

Tota

l

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Source: Field Survey 2006

As reported by the Panchayat/Supply Department, the reasons for non-

making of ration cards for the households include absence of the representative of

the household while the process of card-making was on, name not included in BPL

list, no new introduction of cards, voting factor etc. New card not being issued

explains a high percentage of exclusion of households in both rural and urban

regions. Voting as an explanatory factor is insignificant in both the rural and urban

176

regions. There are district-wise variations in the factors that explain exclusion of the

households (Box 4.20). Box 4.20

Reasons of Non-making of Ration Cards (As Reported by Panchayat/Supply Department)

Area Types of Fuel Voting Factor New Card not Issued Alleged non-resident of the Village

Urban

Bribe Only One Card Issue for a Family Absent during Issuing Cards Voting Factor New Card not Issued Name not in BPL List

Rural

Bribe Source: Field Survey 2006

Most of the non-beneficiary households need ration cards because of poverty.

The other major factor that explains the need of ration cards in rural region is

landlessness Necessity of kerosene oil is a major factor for need of ration cards in

urban region. There are district-wise differences in the factors that explain the need

of ration cards of non-beneficiary households (Box 4.21). Box 4.21

Reasons for Ration Cards Needed in Households by Caste and Region Area Types of Fuel

Poverty Low price of items Requirement of kerosene Landlessness

Urban

Big family Poverty Low price of items Requirement of kerosene Landlessness Widow

Rural

Big family Source: Field Survey 2006

Catalysts and Reasons for Non-Making of Ration Cards The catalysts responsible for non-making of ration cards have been mentioned in Box 4.22.

Box 4.22 Catalysts Responsible for Non-making of Ration Cards

(Perception of the Households) Area Catalysts

Elected Panchayat Member Secretary/Lekhpal FPS Dealer Urban

Supply Department Elected Panchayat Member Secretary/Lekhpal Self FPS Dealer

Rural

Supply Department Source: Field Survey 2006

177

The reasons for non-making of ration cards have been mentioned in Box 4.23.

Box 4.23 Reasons for Non-making of Ration Cards

(Perception of the Households) Area Reasons

Lack of Approach The voice of poor not heard Low allotment of Cards Don’t give Bribe No Permanent house in Village

Urban

Voting system Non-initiative of Pradhan Lack of Approach The voice of poor not heard Process is going on Low allotment of Card Don’t give Bribe No Permanent house in Village Groupism Absent during Card making Period Only One Card Issue in a Family

Rural

Voting system Source: Field Survey 2006 Types of Ration Cards Needed in Households As reported by the non-beneficiary households, there is need for all types of cards.

There are district-wise variations in the types of cards required by households across

castes (Table 26). 4.21 Requirement of PDS Commodities The average consumption requirement of wheat per month per household is reported

to be 47 kg. which is 48 kg. for rural region and 43 for urban region, as reported by

the non-beneficiary households. For the SC households the average requirement of

wheat per month per household is 48 kg., which is 44 kg. for the OBCs, 54 for the

minority and 36 kg. for the general caste households. There are district-wise

variations in the reported requirement of wheat (Table 4.129). Table 4.129

Requirement of Wheat (Kg.) Per Month Per Household by Caste and Region

Caste/Region

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

SC 29 60 43 47 56 76 22 31 48 OBC 28 41 66 29 61 38 16 54 44 Minority 49 66 48 64 90 40 - 34 54 General - 23 21 36 - 58 - 41 36 Urban 75 46 35 35 47 46 - - 43 Rural 31 58 55 50 62 71 21 39 48 Total 38 54 48 45 58 67 21 39 47

Source: Field Survey 2006

178

The average consumption requirement of rice per month per household is

reported to be 21 kg., which is the same for each of rural and urban regions, as

reported by the non-beneficiary households. For the SC households the average

requirement of rice per month per household is 20 kg., which is 20 kg. for the OBCs,

25 for the minority and 19 kg. for the general caste households. The households thus

require more of wheat relative to rice in their consumption basket. There are district-

wise variations in the reported requirement of rice (Table 4.130). Table 4.130

Requirement of Rice (Kg.) Per Month Per Household by Caste and Region

Caste/Region

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

SC 14 12 31 25 13 10 32 21 20 OBC 25 14 33 20 12 13 31 26 20 Minority 39 17 26 23 55 13 - 19 25 General - 4 8 22 - 4 - 26 19 Urban 64 12 29 17 21 16 - - 21 Rural 19 14 30 26 12 9 32 23 21 Total 27 13 29 23 14 10 32 23 21

urce: Field Survey 2006

The average consumption requirement of sugar per month per household is

reported to be 3 kg. which is 3 kg. for rural region and 4 for urban region, as reported

by the non-beneficiary households. For the SC households the average requirement

of sugar per month per household is 3 kg., which is 3 kg. for the OBCs, 4 for the

minority and 6 kg. for the general caste households. There are district-wise variations

in the reported requirement of sugar (Table 4.131). Table 1.131

Requirement of Sugar (Kg.) Per Month per Household by Caste and Region

Caste/Region

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

SC 3 5 4 2 3 2 2 2 3 OBC 5 5 5 3 2 2 2 4 3 Minority 4 3 5 2 5 4 - 4 4 General - 9 3 7 - 2 - 5 6 Urban 6 5 4 5 3 4 - - 4 Rural 3 4 4 2 2 2 2 3 3 Total 4 5 4 3 3 2 2 3 3

Source: Field Survey 2006

The average consumption requirement of kerosene per month per household

is reported to be 3 lt. which is 3 lt. for rural region and 4 lt. for urban region, as

179

reported by the non-beneficiary households. For the SC households the average

requirement of kerosene per month per household is 3 lt., which is 3 lt. for the OBCs,

3 lt. for the minority and 4 lt. for the general caste households. There are district-wise

variations in the reported requirement of kerosene (Table 4.132). Table 4.132

Requirement of Kerosene (Lt.) Per Month Per Household by Caste and Region

Caste/Region

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

SC 3 4 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 OBC 2 3 4 3 3 3 3 4 3 Minority 4 3 4 2 4 5 - 4 3 General - 5 3 3 - 3 - 4 4 Urban 4 4 4 3 3 4 - - 4 Rural 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 Total 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3

Source: Field Survey 2006 The market price of wheat per kg. as reported by the households (buyers) is Rs. 8.7

which is the same for rural region and Rs. 8.8 for the urban region. The purchase

price varies between Rs. 8.7 and 8.8 across households by castes and regions.

There are minor variations in the market price over districts (Table 4.133).

Table 4.133 Market Price (Rs.) of Wheat per Kg.

(As reported by Households by Caste and Region)

Caste

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

SC 9.3 8.6 9.2 9.0 8.7 8.5 7.7 9.9 8.7 OBC - 9.7 8.9 9.0 8.8 8.5 7.4 8.6 8.8 Minority 7.8 9.4 9.1 8.6 9.0 8.0 - 9.0 8.8 General - 7.7 8.5 9.0 - 8.5 - 9.2 8.7 Urban 7.5 8.5 9.6 8.9 8.7 8.3 - - 8.8 Rural 8.7 9.2 8.8 8.9 8.8 8.5 7.7 9.3 8.7 Total 8.6 8.9 9.1 8.9 8.7 8.5 7.7 9.3 8.7

Source: Field Survey 2006 The market price of rice per kg. as reported by the households (buyers) is Rs. 9.6

which is Rs. 9.4 for rural region and Rs. 10.5 for the urban region. The purchase

price as reported varies between Rs. 9.3 for the SCs and Rs. 11.3 for the general

caste households. The market price per kg. of rice also varies over regions, rural and

urban, and over districts, though the reported price gap is not significant (Table

4.134).

180

Table 4.134

Market Price (Rs.) of Rice per Kg. (As reported by Households by Caste and Region)

Caste

Bar

ielly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Tota

l

SC 8.6 10.6 10.4 10.7 9.6 8.1 7.7 9.6 9.3 OBC - 11.0 10.9 10.8 9.5 8.9 7.6 9.2 9.7 Minority 9.8 11.5 9.4 10.3 9.0 8.0 - 9.0 10.0 General - 11.7 10.0 12.6 - 11.0 - 9.5 11.3 Urban 9.0 11.3 10.5 11.7 9.3 8.5 - - 10.5 Rural 9.2 10.9 10.1 10.6 9.6 8.3 7.7 9.3 9.4 Total 9.1 11.0 10.2 11.0 9.5 8.4 7.7 9.3 9.6

Source: Field Survey 2006 4.22 Role of Gram Panchayats The role of Gram Panchayats in PDS has been mentioned in Box 4.24.

Box 4.24 Role/Tasks of Panchayats in PDS (Perception of the Households)

Region Role/Tasks Urban Card Making

Card Making Distribute Oil Watching Distribution Cooperate in Distribution Circulate Information of Distribution

Rural

Items also for Cardless Persons Source: Field Survey 2006 4.22.1 Factors Responsible for Inefficiency of PDS: Catalysts and Suggestions The catalysts responsible for inefficiency in PDS have been mentioned in Box 4.25.

Box 4.25 Catalysts Responsible for Inefficiency in PDS

(Perception of Households) Area Catalysts Responsible

FPS Dealer Higher Officials Elected Member On all levels Supply Dept. Secretary/Lekhpal

Urban

FPS Dealer Higher Officials Elected Member On all levels Supply Dept.

Rural

Secretary/Lekhpal Source: Field Survey 2006

181

The measures suggested by the households to ensure better PDS have been mentioned in Box 4.26.

Box 4.26 Measures to Make PDS Function Better

(Suggestions from Households) Measures

Every Family should have a Card All poor should have Red Card Stop Bribe Actual Beneficiary Identified Withdraw Responsibility of Card Making to Pradhans Proper Inspection of All Card Ensure Every Month Distribution of items Proper care for the voice of the Poor No bias in Card Making One price of one item for all Cardholders All should be given Foodgrains Proper Inspection of FPS Dealers FPSs in each Village

Source: Field Survey 2006

182

Chapter V

Role of Panchayats and Functionary in PDS

Section 1: Role of Gram Panchayats in PDS The recent policy of Government of India has provided adequate rights for the

Panchayats in managing the PDS. This aims at strengthening the Panchayats to

solve the problems at the grassroots level with the participation of local people. The

Government of India has empowered the Panchayats for formation of vigilance

committee at local level, appointment of FPS dealer, selection of beneficiary,

verification of distribution of items and implementation of welfare schemes in their

own area. Keeping this in view we have tried to assess the actual role of Gram

Panchayats in selected villages so far as the functioning of PDS is concerned.

5.1 Profile of Panchayat Members by Age, Caste, Designation and Education We have interviewed 33 members from Panchayats in selected 33 villages. By age

distribution, 60.6 per cent of them are between 35 and 50. By caste, 18.2 per cent

are SCs, 42.4 are OBCs, 12.1 are minority and the rest from general castes. By

designation, 36.4 per cent are Pradhans, 27.3 per cent are 'Pradhanpatis', and the

rest are members of Panchayats and others. The category ‘others’ include member

of BDC, ex-Pradhan etc. (Table 5.1). Table 5.1

Distribution of Panchayat Members by Age, Caste and Designation Age Caste Designation

Regions Districts

Up

to 3

5

35 -

49

>=50

SC

OB

C

Min

ority

Gen

eral

Prad

han

Panc

haya

t M

embe

r

Prad

han

Pati

Oth

ers*

Total Villages

Bariely 0 4 2 2 1 3 0 2 1 3 0 6 West Badaun 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 1 0 3 0 4

Lakhimpur Kheri 0 4 0 1 2 0 1 1 1 2 0 4 Central Lucknow 1 2 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 2 3

Lalitpur 1 1 2 2 1 0 1 3 0 0 1 4 Bundelkhand Jhansi 2 1 1 1 3 0 0 2 1 0 1 4

Gorakhpur 1 2 1 0 2 0 2 2 0 0 2 4 Eastern Varanasi 0 4 0 0 2 0 2 1 2 1 0 4

Total 7 20 6 6 14 4 9 12 6 9 6 33 Note: * Others included Member of BDC, Ex-Gram Pradhan/Sub- Gram Pradhan etc. Source: Field Survey

183

Excepting one respondent from the Panchayat from Lucknow, there is no

illiterate in the sample respondents. However, 12.1 per cent are just literate, that is,

those who can just put their signature. 66.6 per cent of the respondents have

education at the level of high school certificate and above. There are district-wise

differences in the level of education of the respondents from the Panchayats (Table

5.2).

Table 5.2 Education of the Panchayat Members

Districts Ill

itera

te

Lite

rate

Prim

ary

Upp

er

Prim

ary

Hig

h Sc

hool

Inte

rmed

iat

e

Hig

her

Educ

atio

n

Total

Bariely 0 0 1 2 0 2 1 6 Badaun 0 1 1 0 0 0 2 4 Lakhimpur Kheri 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 4 Lucknow 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 3 Lalitpur 0 1 0 1 0 2 0 4 Jhansi 0 1 0 0 1 2 0 4 Gorakhpur 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 4 Varanasi 0 0 0 0 1 2 1 4 Total 1 4 2 4 5 10 7 33

Source: Field Survey 5.2 Eligibility Criteria for Selection of Fair Price Shop Dealers As opined by the representatives of Gram Panchayats, the selection of the

FPS dealers should be based on indicators mentioned in Box 5.1. Box 5.1

Eligibility Criteria adopted for Selection of Fair Price Shop Dealers (Opinion of Gram Panchayats)

Source: Field Survey

5.3 Eligibility for Selection of Households under Different Schemes As opined by the representatives of Gram Panchayats, the criteria for eligibility for

selection of households in BPL (ration card) category are mentioned in Box 5.2.

• General Acceptance to people • Good financial status • Reliable for regular distribution • Having education of minimum eighth standard • Honest Person • Local person • Not a Criminal • Person from supporting group

184

Box 5.2

Eligibility for Selection of BPL Ration Card Beneficiary (Opinion of Gram Panchayats)

Source: Field Survey As opined by the representatives of Gram Panchayats, the eligibility criteria

for being selected as an Antyodaya beneficiary are mentioned in Box 5.3. Box 5.3

Eligibility for Selection of Antyodaya Ration Card Beneficiary (Opinion of Gram Panchayats)

Source: Field Survey As perceived by the representatives of Gram Panchayats, the methods

adopted for selection of beneficiary households under Annapurna Yojana are cited in

Box 5.4. Box 5.4

Methods adopted for Selection of Beneficiary under Annapurna Yojana (Opinions of Panchayats)

Source: Field Survey

5.4 Comparison of Annapurna Yojana and Pension Scheme by Benefits We asked the panchayat, which scheme is better between Annapurna Yojana

and Old Age Pension Scheme. The reported opinions are given in Box. 5.5.

• Should be a poor family • Having land below 0.5 acre • Have kachha house • Landless household • Limited source of income • Household’s name should be in BPL list • Have no two wheeler (machine-run) • Annual income should be below Rs 8,500

• Self-assessment • Helpless aged people • Helpless people aged above 65 years • Aged people from own group • Income-less people

• Household must be Poorest of the poor • Have no dependable member in family • Annual income below Rs. 5,000 • Landless • Have land below one acre

185

Box 5.5 Comparison between Annapurna Yojana and Pension Scheme by Benefits

Annapurna Yojana Pension Scheme • Food is managed by all who can

not move physically anywhere • Monthly benefit, but pension

payment is delayed • Benefit directly received by the

beneficiary • Available at local level

• Have freedom to spend money on their own requirement

• Food-grains not received in time • More items could be purchased

by the pension (Rs.) money

Source: Field Survey 5.5 How Panchayats Verified Eligibility of Beneficiary Households As reported by the representatives of Gram Panchayats, the officials of Revenue

Department (Lekhpal) are mostly (36.4 per cent reporting) engaged in verification of

eligibility of beneficiaries, followed by Block officials (18.2 per cent reporting) and

Supply Inspectors (9.1 per cent reporting), the three covering two-thirds of total

verification. There are district-wise variations in the percentage of verification by

officials and departments (Table 5.3). Table 5.3

Verification of Eligibility of Beneficiary (Opinion of Gram Panchayats)

Verification by

Figu

res

in

Bar

iely

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r Khe

ri

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Total

No. 0 0 0 0 2 1 3 0 6Block officials % 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 25.0 75.0 0.0 18.2

No. 3 3 2 0 2 1 0 1 12Officials of Revenue Dept. (Lekhpal) % 50.0 75.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 25.0 0.0 25.0 36.4

No. 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2Gram Panchayat Secretary % 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 6.1

No. 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 3Supply Inspector % 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 9.1

No. 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 4Self/Physical verification % 16.7 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 25.0 12.1

No. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1Card issued before checking % 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0

No. 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2Panchayat Members % 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.1

No. 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 3Self-Assessment % 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 9.1

No. 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1No Verification % 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0

No. 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1Non-Response % 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.0

No. 6 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 33Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey

186

5.6 Existence of Non-Beneficiary Households under Different Categories Of total households, as opined by representatives of Gram Panchayats, 6.5 per cent

have remained cardless who are eligible for BPL cards, while 3.7 per cent have

remained cardless who are eligible for APL cards, 4.6 per cent cardless who are

eligible for Antyodaya, and 0.1 per cent cardless eligible for Annapurna. There are

district-wise variations in the percentages of cardless households who are eligible for

these categories, namely, BPL, APL, Annapurna and Antyodaya (Table 5.4). Table 5.4

Number of Card-less Households Eligible for Different Types of Ration Cards (Opinion of Gram Panchayats)

Districts Figures in

BPL APL Annapurna Antyodaya Total

No. 117 40 30 35 2091 Bariely % 5.6 1.9 1.4 1.7 100.0

No. 4 0 0 25 2032 Badaun % 0.2 0.0 0.0 1.2 100.0

No. 145 100 0 90 3674 Lakhimpur Kheri % 3.9 2.7 0.0 2.4 100.0

No. 35 0 0 718 Lucknow % 4.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0

No. 210 0 0 230 2455 Jhansi % 8.6 0.0 0.0 9.4 100.0

No. 199 400 0 174 1600 Gorakhpur % 12.4 25.0 0.0 10.9 100.0

No. 720 275 0 450 9450 Varanasi % 7.6 2.9 0.0 4.8 100.0

No. 1430 815 30 1004 22020 Total % 6.5 3.7 0.1 4.6 100.0

Source: Field Survey 5.6.1 Reasons for Existence of Card-less Households As reported by the representatives of Gram Panchayats, the major reasons for

cardlessness of eligible households have been mentioned in Box 5.6. Box 5.6

Eligible Households remaining Card-less (Reasons Reported by Gram Panchayats)

Reasons Did not complete formalities Village got low target Ration cards not issued Division of family Remained Absent in the village Name was not in BPL list Discrimination within Panchayat

Source: Field Survey

187

5.7 Persistent Hunger among People and its Reasons 45.0 per cent of all the representatives from Panchayats acknowledged existence of

people who suffer from hunger on a daily basis. The starving people cover, as

opined, both households and individuals. 48.5 per cent of the representatives did not

acknowledge any such existence of starvation. There are district-wise variations in

the coverage of households and individuals suffering from hunger, as opined by the

representatives (Table 5.5). Table 5.5

People who suffer from Hunger (Opinion of Panchayats)

Existed Not Existed NR Total Districts No. % No. % No. % No. %

No. of HHs

No. of Persons

Bariely 1 16.7 5 83.3 0 0.0 6 100.0 10 50Badaun 3 75.0 1 25.0 0 0.0 4 100.0 63 265Lakhimpur Kheri 1 25.0 3 75.0 0 0.0 4 100.0 100 500Lucknow 1 33.3 2 66.7 0 0.0 3 100.0 15 40Lalitpur 4 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 4 100.0 52 181Jhansi 2 50.0 0 0.0 2 50.0 4 100.0 24 90Gorakhpur 1 25.0 3 75.0 0 0.0 4 100.0 10 40Varanasi 2 50.0 2 50.0 0 0.0 4 100.0 50 50Total 15 45.5 16 48.5 2 6.1 33 100.0 324 1216

Source: Field Survey As opined by the representatives of Gram Panchayats, the reasons for

persistence of poverty in the selected villages during the last five years (2001-06)

have been mentioned in Box 5.7. Box 5.7

Persistence of Poverty at the level of Village, 2001-06 (Opinion of Gram Panchayats)

Source: Field Survey 5.8 Sampoorna Grameen Rozgar Yojana (SGRY): An Assessment The government has insured food security through some employment generating

schemes like SGRY. In this study we have tried to find out some facts regarding this

programme. We have assessed the programme on two major points (i) selection of

beneficiary, and (ii) benefits of poor section.

• Division of Family/Property • Low income/increased prices • Big size of family/increased population • Low awareness • Illiteracy • Wrong implementation of schemes • Low productivity of land • High dependence on wage labour

188

As perceived by the representatives of Gram Panchayats, the methods for

selection of beneficiary households under SGRY (Food for Work) are cited in Box

5.8. Box 5.8

Methods of Selection of Beneficiary Households under SGRY by the Gram Panchayats (Perception of Gram Panchayats)

Source: Field Survey

The wages paid under SGRY (Food for Work) are mostly in cash, and not in

terms of distribution of wheat and rice, which is free for all the sample villages.

Hence, the question of diversion of food from PDS (meant mainly for BPL)

cannot be explained by other routes like food distribution through SGRY etc. (Table

5.6). Table 5.6

Per Day Wage Paid under SGRY by Gram Panchayats

2004-05 2005-06 Per Day Local Wage Rate (in Rs.)

Districts

Cas

h

Whe

at

Ric

e

Cas

h

Whe

at

Ric

e

Wage paid after days Male Female

Bariely 58.0 0.0 0.0 51.2 2.2 0.0 3 58.3 55.0Badaun 28.0 5.0 0.0 52.0 2.5 0.0 10 64.3 57.3Lakhimpur Kheri 0.0 0.0 0.0 43.0 2.5 0.0 5 62.3 57.3Lucknow 58.0 0.0 0.0 58.0 0.0 0.0 0 50.0 38.3Lalitpur 0.0 0.0 0.0 39.0 2.5 0.0 1 45.0 35.0Jhansi 50.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0 86.8 83.0Gorakhpur 0 0.0 0.0 58.0 0.0 0.0 50 55.0 37.5Varanasi 23.0 5.0 0.0 18.3 1.3 2.5 32 67.3 59.8Total 40.8 2.5 0.0 43.7 1.6 0.6 14 61.3 53.5Source: Field Survey 5.9 Problems in PDS at Different Levels and Its Reasons The catalysts/agencies responsible for persisting problems in PDS at different

levels, as reported by representatives of Panchayats, are listed in Box 5.9. Half of the

representatives, however, abstained from mentioning any such catalysts and

agencies.

• Food-grains must be available in time (before work). • A monitoring committee should be constituted. • Political and administrative interference must be

stopped. • System of lifting 50 Kg bag should be stopped. • The wage rate of labour should be increased. • Completed works should be verified.

189

Box 5.9 Problems in PDS at Different Levels

(As Reported by Panchayats)

Source: Field Survey Based on the reports from the Panchayat representatives, the major reasons

cited for persistence of problems in PDS are 'low allotment of items' (47.1 per cent of

those reporting), 'low allotment of ration cards' (41.2 per cent), corruption among

government officials (23.5 per cent), non-receipt of full quota by FPS dealer (17.6 per

cent). The representatives cited often multiple reasons. There are district-wise

variations in the reasons cited (Table 5.7). Table 5.7

Reasons for Problems in PDS at Different Levels (As Reported by Panchayats)

Reasons

Figu

res

in

Bar

iely

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r K

heri

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Total

No. 1 3 0 0 1 1 2 8Low allotment of items % 33.3 75.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 25.0 100.0 47.1

No. 1 0 1 0 1 4 0 7Low allotment of Ration Cards at village level % 33.3 0.0 50.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 41.2

No. 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1Distribution of items from FPS on a single day % 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9

No. 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 3Black marketing % 33.3 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 17.6

No. 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 4Corruption among govt. officials % 0.0 25.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 25.0 0.0 23.5

No. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1Non-distribution of items by FPSs % 0.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9

No. 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 3FPS dealer not received full quantity/quota items % 33.3 25.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 17.6

No. 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1Individuals as benefit-seekers % 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.9

No. 3 4 2 1 1 4 2 17Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey

• Government • FPS dealer • Higher level officials • Kerosene Oil depot • Food-grains Godown • Public/ Political representatives

190

5.10 Virtues and Vices of Panchayats The virtues and vices of Panchayats, as reported by they themselves, in

village governance have been cited in Box 5.10. Box 5.10

Virtues and Vices of Panchayats in Village Governance (Opinion of Panchayats)

Source: Field Survey

• Good relationship among people • Good relation among people of all religions • Most of the settled people are happy • Most of the problems solved at village level • Increased literacy of settled people of the village • Good sanitation • Good infrastructure facilities

191

Section 2: Functions of Fair Price Shops in Selected Areas The FPS is at the centre of the functioning of the distribution system. We covered 46

FPSs for assessing their functions, role and responsibility, and problems.

5.11 Selected FPS Dealers by Area, Caste, Education, Age and Experience

We interviewed a total of 46 FPS dealers who are more or less equally distributed

across districts, with minimum number at 11 for each of east and central UP and

maximum at 12 for each of west UP and Bundelkhand. The district-wise distribution

of FPS dealers interviewed shows equal representation with minimum at 5 and

maximum at 7. Of total FPS dealers interviewed, one-third is from urban areas and

the rest for rural areas. The selection of FPS dealers by rural-urban ratio varies

between 3:1 for west UP and 7:4 for each of east and central UP (Table 5.8). Table 5.8

Profile of FPS Dealers Urban Rural Total Regions

Districts

No. % No. % No. % Bareilly 2 28.6 5 71.4 7 100.0 Badaun 1 20.0 4 80.0 5 100.0

Western Total 3 25.0 9 75.0 12 100.0

Lakhimpur Kheri 3 50.0 3 50.0 6 100.0 Lucknow 1 20.0 4 80.0 5 100.0

Central Total 4 36.4 7 63.6 11 100.0

Lalitpur 2 33.3 4 66.7 6 100.0 Jhansi 2 33.3 4 66.7 6 100.0

Bundelkhand Total 4 33.3 8 66.7 12 100.0

Gorakhpur 2 33.3 4 66.7 6 100.0 Varanasi 2 40.0 3 60.0 5 100.0

Eastern Total 4 36.4 7 63.6 11 100.0

Grand Total 15 32.6 31 67.4 46 100.0 Source: Field Survey Most of the selected FPS dealers belong to SCs and backward castes, in total

64.3 per cent. The minority category FPS dealers are well represented by 13.0 per

cent. District-wise SC FPS dealers are not there in Lucknow and Varanasi so far as

the sample is concerned, while Lalitpur and Jhansi are well represented. Backward

caste FPS dealers are well represented in districts Badaun and Varanasi and less

represented in Jhansi. Minority FPS dealers are well represented in Bareilly. All the

sample FPS dealers are literate, with as high as 23.9 per cent having higher

education (above intermediate level). Another 23.9 per cent have education up to

primary level (Table 5.9).

192

Table 5.9 Classification of FPS Dealers by Caste and Education

By Caste By Education

Districts Fi

gure

in

Sche

dule

d C

aste

Bac

kwar

d C

aste

Min

ority

Gen

eral

Prim

ary

Mid

dle

Hig

h sc

hool

Inte

rmed

iate

Hig

her

Educ

atio

n

Total

No. 1 3 3 0 2 3 1 0 1 7Bareilly % 14.3 42.9 42.9 0.0 28.6 42.9 14.3 0.0 14.3 100.0

No. 1 3 0 1 1 1 0 1 2 5Badaun % 20.0 60.0 0.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 0.0 20.0 40.0 100.0

No. 1 3 1 1 1 0 3 2 0 6Lakhimpur Kheri % 16.7 50.0 16.7 16.7 16.7 0.0 50.0 33.3 0.0 100.0

No. 0 2 1 2 0 0 1 3 1 5Lucknow % 0.0 40.0 20.0 40.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 60.0 20.0 100.0

No. 3 2 0 1 2 1 1 2 0 6Lalitpur % 50.0 33.3 0.0 16.7 33.3 16.7 16.7 33.3 0.0 100.0

No. 3 1 0 2 3 1 0 0 2 6Jhansi % 50.0 16.7 0.0 33.3 50.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 33.3 100.0

No. 2 2 1 1 1 2 1 0 2 6Gorakhpur % 33.3 33.3 16.7 16.7 16.7 33.3 16.7 0.0 33.3 100.0

No. 0 3 0 2 1 0 0 1 3 5Varanasi % 0.0 60.0 0.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 60.0 100.0

No. 11 19 6 10 11 8 7 9 11 46Total % 23.9 41.3 13.0 21.7 23.9 17.4 15.2 19.6 23.9 100.0

Source: Field Survey. Most of the FPS dealers have age below 60. More than two-thirds of the

dealers are between 35 and 60 by age. Of the FPS dealers in the age bracket 35-60,

more than one-third are running shops for a period between 10 and 15 years. More

than one-fourth of the FPS dealers are in the age bracket 21-35, half of whom are

running the shops between one and five years. In this age bracket, there are dealers

who have been running shops between 15 and 20 years, implying for some dealers

either underreporting of age or over reporting of job experience. Excepting two

districts, Bareilly and Varanasi, there are no FPS dealers above age 60. There are

district-wise variations in the distribution of FPS dealers by age and experience. Of

all FPS dealers, one-sixth has experience more than 20 years, evenly distributed

across districts, with the exception of absence of such category in Bareilly and

Lalitpur (Table 5.10).

193

Table 5.10

Distribution of FPS Dealers by Age and Experience Age Experience Districts Figure

in 21-35 35-50 50-60 >60 1-5 5-10 10-15 15-20 >20 Total

No. 2 2 1 2 2 1 2 2 0 7Bareilly % 28.6 28.6 14.3 28.6 28.6 14.3 28.6 28.6 0.0 100.0

No. 3 1 1 0 3 1 0 0 1 5Badaun % 60.0 20.0 20.0 0.0 60.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 100.0

No. 1 5 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 6Lakhimpur Kheri % 16.7 83.3 0.0 0.0 33.3 33.3 16.7 0.0 16.7 100.0

No. 3 2 0 0 0 2 1 1 1 5Lucknow % 60.0 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 100.0

No. 2 2 2 0 1 1 3 1 0 6Lalitpur % 33.3 33.3 33.3 0.0 16.7 16.7 50.0 16.7 0.0 100.0

No. 0 4 2 0 1 0 1 2 2 6Jhansi % 0.0 66.7 33.3 0.0 16.7 0.0 16.7 33.3 33.3 100.0

No. 0 3 3 0 0 1 2 1 2 6Gorakhpur % 0.0 50.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 33.3 16.7 33.3 100.0

No. 1 3 0 1 1 0 2 1 1 5Varanasi % 20.0 60.0 0.0 20.0 20.0 0.0 40.0 20.0 20.0 100.0

No. 12 22 9 3 10 8 12 8 8 46Total % 26.1 47.8 19.6 6.5 21.7 17.4 26.1 17.4 17.4 100.0

Note: Experience means number of years running the FPS. Source: Field Survey

5.12 Problems of FPS Dealers in Getting Dealership The problems cited by the FPS dealers in getting dealership focus mainly on political

support and connections (28.3 per cent of the dealers reporting), ‘necessary payment

of bribe to the Supply Department’ for preparation of documents/File (21.7 per cent of

the dealers reporting) and payment of bribe to other officials (21.7 per cent of dealers

reporting). The other problems include frequent visit of Government officials at

different levels. Nearly one-third of the dealers reported absence of any problems.

There are district-wise variations in the problems reported by the FPS dealers.

‘Paying bribe to Supply Department’ and ‘political support’ are cited most in the

district Lucknow. The district Lakhimpur Kheri, from the viewpoint of FPS dealers,

focuses more on ‘multiple visits of offices by dealers’ and ‘political support’. ‘Absence

of any problem’ is focused more in the district Varanasi (Table 5.11).

194

Table 5.11 Problems Faced by FPS Dealers in Getting Dealership

Problems

Figu

re in

Bar

eilly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r K

heri

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Total

No. 1 1 2 3 1 1 2 2 13Essential to have political support % 14.3 20.0 33.3 60.0 16.7 16.7 33.3 40.0 28.3

No. 0 2 0 3 1 1 2 1 10Paid bribe to Supply Department % 0.0 40.0 0.0 60.0 16.7 16.7 33.3 20.0 21.7

No. 2 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 6Visited different levels of offices many times % 28.6 20.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 13.0

No. 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 3Got benefit due to reservation

% 0.0 0.0 16.7 20.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.5No. 2 1 1 0 2 2 2 0 10

Paid bribe to Officials % 28.6 20.0 16.7 0.0 33.3 33.3 33.3 0.0 21.7

No. 2 1 1 2 2 2 1 3 14No Problems

% 28.6 20.0 16.7 40.0 33.3 33.3 16.7 60.0 30.4No. 7 5 6 5 6 6 6 5 46

Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey 5.13 Average Number of Households Attached with FPS We have considered three years, 2004 to 2006, taking April as the reference point, to

see the number and types of cardholding by the FPS dealer. One FPS dealer, on

average, manages (serves) a total of 741 cards, that varies across districts from a

minimum at 435 in Lalitpur and maximum at 1003 in Lucknow. One FPS dealer, on

average, manages (serves) 179 BPL cards, 464 APL cards, 18 ANP cards and 81

ANT cards. These numbers vary across districts, from a minimum at 85 BPL cards in

Badaun to a maximum at 244 in Lucknow. So far as APL cards are concerned, the

minimum is 216 for Lalitpur and maximum 725 for Varanasi. In ANP cards in the

sample, 7 is minimum at Bareilly and the maximum is 32 in Varanasi. For ANT cards,

minimum is 30 in Bareilly and maximum is 112 for each of Lakhimpur Kheri and

Lucknow. For the FPS dealer serving minimum (total) average in Lalitpur, half are

APL cards, while for the FPS dealer serving maximum (total) average in Lucknow,

two-thirds are APL cards. In all the selected districts, APL cards served by an FPS

dealer far exceeds BPL cards on average, the absolute as well as percentage gap

between these two types of cards being highest in Varanasi. We find monotonic

increase in average number of ration cards served by one FPS dealer over 2004 to

2006. The same is true for types APL, ANP and ANT, with the exception of BPL. The

number of BPL cards served per dealer increased in April 2005 over 2004 but

195

declined a little in 2006. There are inter-district variations in the average number of

each type of cards served. There are intra-district variations in average number of

cards by types (Table 5.12).

Table 5.12 Average number of ration cards served per FPS

Time Point/Year

Category of Ration

Cards Bar

eilly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r K

heri

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Total

BPL 160 138 92 207 157 261 226 88 171APL 382 501 498 528 235 353 287 598 412ANP 10 12 12 15 15 11 22 34 16ANT 33 40 68 47 43 65 82 39 51

Apr-2004

Total 586 690 670 797 451 690 618 758 651 BPL 143 118 251 272 147 179 200 152 183APL 362 516 680 668 221 291 290 788 471ANP 10 12 14 15 14 24 23 32 18ANT 37 60 134 133 58 72 105 72 84

Apr-2005

Total 552 705 1080 1089 440 566 618 1045 755 BPL 296 0 211 252 136 157 180 139 182APL 525 0 680 702 193 410 281 788 508ANP 0 0 15 14 15 11 28 29 21ANT 20 0 133 154 70 107 113 85 107

Apr-2006

Total 841 0 1039 1122 413 685 602 1042 818 BPL 199 85 185 244 147 199 202 126 179APL 423 339 619 633 216 351 286 725 464ANP 7 8 14 15 14 15 24 32 18ANT 30 33 112 112 57 81 100 66 81

Average on Total

Total 660 465 929 1003 435 647 613 948 741Source: Field Survey 5.14 Rate of Change of Ration Cards by Number per Annum The rate of change in average number of ration cards by types, served by one FPS

dealer, is presented in Table 6. In 2005 there has occurred 16.0 per cent increase in

total number of cards served on average relative to that in 2004. In 2006, the

percentage increase was 8.1 over 2005. For BPL cards, it was increase by 7.2 per

cent in 2005 over 2004, while reduction by 0.5 per cent in 2006 over 2005. The

highest increase, over the last three years considered, is visible in case of ANT in

2005 over 2004 by 63.2 per cent, which was 27.7 per cent in 2006 over 2005. For

other types, the increase was modest for each of the years 2005 and 2006.

We find reduction in BPL cards served by a dealer in 2005 over 2004 in

districts Jhansi (31.3 per cent), Badaun (14.5 per cent), Gorakhpur (11.2 per cent),

and Bareilly (10.7 per cent). The decline in serving BPL type cards was significant

196

(100.0 per cent) in Badaun in 2006 over 2005, and this decline occurred in all the

selected districts in 2006 over 2005, excepting Bareilly (Table 5.13).

Table 5.13 Rate of Change of Ration Cards by Number per Annum

2005 over 2004* 2006 over 2005* Districts BPL APL ANP ANT Total BPL APL ANT Total Bareilly -10.7 -5.2 0.0 10.3 -5.7 107.7 44.9 -45.7 55.2Badaun -14.5 2.9 0.0 51.0 2.2 -100.0 -100.0 -100.0 -100.0Lakhimpur Kheri 174.3 36.5 19.4 97.5 61.2 -15.9 0.0 -1.1 -3.9Lucknow 31.8 26.5 0.0 182.2 36.6 -7.5 5.0 15.8 3.1Lalitpur -6.4 -6.0 -8.5 34.4 -2.3 -7.8 -12.8 19.4 -6.7Jhansi -31.3 -17.4 118.2 9.6 -18.0 -12.4 41.0 49.4 24.5Gorakhpur -11.2 1.0 2.7 27.3 0.1 -10.2 -3.0 7.6 -3.6Varanasi 73.7 31.8 -5.0 86.8 37.8 -8.9 0.0 18.0 -0.1Total 7.2 14.1 6.3 63.2 16.0 -0.5 7.9 27.7 8.1

Note: The Annpurnna Yojana has been stopped since March 2006. * The annual rate calculated on existing number of ration cards in the month of April over the previous year. Source: Field Survey.

5.15 Requirement, Availability and Distribution of Commodities Rice and Wheat under BPL Scheme

Based on the report by the FPS dealers on requirement, availability and distribution

of rice and wheat under BPL, 99.5 per cent of requirement of rice was available in

2004-05, which was 98.9 in 2005-06. 98.9 per cent of requirement of wheat was

available in 2004-05 which was cent per cent in 2005-06. Requirement of rice in

2005-06 was nearly double of that in 2004-05; requirement of wheat in 2005-06 was

12.1 per cent more than what it was in 2004-05. Distribution as a percentage of

availability of rice in 2004-05 was 99.5 over all the districts which was 96.5 per cent

in 2005-06. For five districts in 2004-05 the FPS dealers reported cent per cent

distribution of available items. For 2005-06 also, five districts out of selected eight

showed cent per cent distribution of available items, though the set of districts is not

identical. Distribution of wheat as percentage of availability in 2004-05 shows cent

per cent for five districts and more than cent per cent for district Jhansi. Distribution

of wheat is much less than availability only in district Bareilly in 2004-05. Distribution

of wheat as percentage of availability shows cent per cent for all the districts,

excepting Bareilly, where it is a little surplus post-distribution.

197

Table 5.14 Requirement, Availability and Distribution of Rice and Wheat per FPS Dealer

under BPL Scheme (Quantity in Kg.)

Year 2004-05 Year 2005-06 Rice Wheat Rice Wheat

Districts

Figu

re in

Dis

trib

uted

Ava

ilabl

e

Req

uire

d

Dis

trib

uted

Ava

ilabl

e

Req

uire

d

Dis

trib

uted

Ava

ilabl

e

Req

uire

d

Dis

trib

uted

Ava

ilabl

e

Req

uire

d

No. 11158 18159 18987 17493 26733 27691 18887 29789 30727 35176 35788 35788 Bareilly % 58.8 95.6 100.0 63.2 96.5 100.0 61.5 96.9 100.0 98.3 100.0 100.0

No. 19816 19816 19816 25750 25750 25750 23294 23294 23294 38708 38708 38708 Badaun % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

No. NA NA NA 37562 37562 39410 54790 54790 57250 NA NA NA Lakhimpur Kheri % NA NA NA 95.3 95.3 100.0 95.7 95.7 100.0 NA NA NA

No. 35209 35209 35209 48567 48567 48567 63441 63441 63441 74179 74179 74179 Lucknow % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

No. 23523 23523 23523 29784 29784 29784 28946 28946 28946 40473 40473 40473 Lalitpur % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

No. 24187 24214 24214 36633 36631 36631 34314 34325 34325 51417 51417 51417 Jhansi % 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

No. 24753 24753 24753 24239 24306 24306 43444 43490 43490 29328 29328 29328 Gorakhpur % 100.0 100.0 100.0 99.7 100.0 100.0 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

No. 16790 16790 16790 22020 22020 22020 40020 40020 40020 15045 15045 15045 Varanasi % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

No. 19437 20308 20411 27504 31419 31770 38392 39762 40187 35553 35630 35630 Total % 95.2 99.5 100.0 86.6 98.9 100.0 95.5 98.9 100.0 99.8 100.0 100.0

Note: Availability and Distribution each is calculated as per cent of Requirement. NA= Not Available Source: Field Survey. Rice and Wheat under Antyodaya Yojana

Based on the report by FPS dealers on requirement, availability and distribution of

rice and wheat under Antyodaya Yojana availability as a percentage of requirement

was cent per cent for rice in 2004-05 and 99.3 per cent in 2005-06. The

corresponding percentages for wheat were 98.8 and 98.9. Requirement of rice under

Antyodaya in 2005-06 was 2.5 times what it was in 2004-05, while of wheat it was

nearly double. For all the selected districts, requirement of rice under Antyodaya in

2005-06 was much more than that in 2004-05. For all the selected districts,

requirement of wheat under Antyodaya in 2005-06 was much higher than what it was

in 2004-05. Distribution as percentage of availability of rice for 2004-05 was cent per

cent for four districts, out of eight selected. Excepting Bareilly, the distribution of rice

converged to its availability for all the other districts. For 2005-06, six districts showed

cent per cent distribution, seen as percentage of availability. Distribution as

198

percentage of availability was cent per cent for wheat for five districts, out of eight, in

2005-06, and more than cent per cent for Jhansi. For Bareilly, distribution was less

than availability by 52.8 per cent in 2005-06 (Table 5.15).

Table 5.15 Requirement, Availability and Distribution of Rice and Wheat per FPS Dealer

under Antyodaya Scheme (Quantity in Kg.)

Year 2004-05 Year 2005-06 Rice Wheat Rice Wheat

Districts

Figu

re in

Dis

trib

uted

Ava

ilabl

e

Req

uire

d

Dis

trib

uted

Ava

ilabl

e

Req

uire

d

Dis

trib

uted

Ava

ilabl

e

Req

uire

d

Dis

trib

uted

Ava

ilabl

e

Req

uire

d

No. 3146 4040 4040 6968 7858 7950 7032 8135 8137 17493 26733 27691 Bareilly % 77.9 100.0 100.0 87.7 98.8 100.0 86.4 100.0 100.0 63.2 96.5 100.0 No. 7706 7706 7706 13251 13251 13251 12486 12486 12486 25750 25750 25750 Badaun % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 No. NA NA NA 26566 26566 28060 35384 35384 36540 37562 37562 39410 Lakhimpur

Kheri % NA NA NA 94.7 94.7 100.0 96.8 96.8 100.0 95.3 95.3 100.0 No. 14050 14050 14050 23309 23309 23309 32379 32379 32379 48567 48567 48567 Lucknow % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 No. 7982 7982 7982 12750 12750 12750 12214 12214 12214 29784 29784 29784 Lalitpur % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 No. 8809 8832 8832 20006 20006 20006 18823 18823 18823 36633 36631 36631 Jhansi % 99.7 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 No. 16264 16568 16568 14244 13863 13863 27185 27910 27910 24239 24306 24306 Gorakhpur % 98.2 100.0 100.0 102.7 100.0 100.0 97.4 100.0 100.0 99.7 100.0 100.0 No. 6520 6520 6520 10588 10588 10588 20449 20449 20449 22020 22020 22020 Varanasi % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 No. 8060 8212 8212 15960 16024 16222 20744 20973 21117 30256 31419 31770 Total % 98.1 100.0 100.0 98.4 98.8 100.0 98.2 99.3 100.0 95.2 98.9 100.0

Note: Availability and Distribution each is calculated as per cent of Requirement. NA= Not Available Source: Field Survey. Wheat under Annapurna Yojana

Based on the information provided by the FPS dealers regarding requirement,

availability and distribution of wheat under Annapurna Yajana, 92.6 per cent of

requirement of wheat in 2004-05 was made available of which 99.4 per cent had

been distributed. The corresponding figures for 2005-06 were 92.8 and 99.9 per cent.

Over all the districts covered, requirement of wheat in 2005-06 was higher by 31.8

per cent relative to 2004-05. While for some districts we find marginal reduction in

requirement in 2005-06, for districts like Jhansi we find enhanced requirement by

nearly four times. Distribution of wheat under Annapurna Yojana was cent per cent of

availability in 2004-05 for five districts out of eight selected. As reported, the gap

between availability and distribution was not much for any remaining districts in 2004-

199

05. Excepting Gorakhpur, distribution was cent per cent of availability in 2005-06

under Annapurna Yojana (Table 5.16).

Table 5.16 Requirement, Availability and Distribution of Wheat per FPS Dealer under

Annapurna Yojana (Quantity in Kg.)

2004-05 2005-06 Districts Figure in Distributed Available Required Distributed Available Required

No. 483 483 483 488 488 488Bareilly % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

No. 1334 1380 1380 1308 1308 1354Badaun % 96.7 100.0 100.0 96.6 96.6 100.0

No. NA NA NA 1596 1596 1884Lakhimpur Kheri % NA NA NA 84.7 84.7 100.0

No. 1900 1900 1830 1725 1725 1830Lucknow % 103.8 103.8 100.0 94.3 94.3 100.0

No. 1675 1675 2595 1677 1677 2330Lalitpur % 64.5 64.5 100.0 72.0 72.0 100.0

No. 860 860 860 3140 3140 3140Jhansi % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

No. 2795 2818 2818 2730 2740 2740Gorakhpur % 99.2 100.0 100.0 99.6 100.0 100.0

No. 1560 1560 1560 1430 1430 1430Varanasi % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

No. 1326 1334 1441 1762 1763 1899Total % 92.0 92.6 100.0 92.7 92.8 100.0

Note: Availability and Distribution each is calculated as per cent of requirement. NA= Not Available Source: Field Survey. Distribution of Sugar

Based on the number of cards, on average, served (maintained) by one FPS dealer

and quota per card, the requirement of items has been reported by the dealers.

In year 2004-05, considered over all the selected districts, 98.2 per cent of

sugar required has been available. Of the available sugar, 99.5 per cent has been

distributed. There are district-wise variations in availability of sugar as percentage of

requirement. However, excepting two districts, all reported 100.0 per cent availability

as percentage of requirement. Excepting two districts, distribution of sugar is 10.0 per

cent of availability as reported by FPS dealers.

In year 2005-06, 98.6 per cent of sugar required has been available,

considered over all the districts. Distribution as percentage of availability is 99.6. The

districts Lucknow, Varanasi and Lalitpur show 100.0 per cent distribution of

availability and Jhansi shows 99.9 per cent distribution as percentage of availability.

For Bareilly, distribution is more than availability.

200

We find inter-district variations in average requirement of sugar, maximum

being for Lucknow, and minimum being for Varanasi for 2004-05. For 2005-06, the

maximum requirement remained for Lucknow and minimum came to be for Bareilly.

The average requirement in 2005-06 for sugar to be distributed by an FPS dealer

reportedly increased for each district relative to that in 2004-05 (Table 5.17).

Table 5.17 Requirement, Availability and Distribution of Sugar per FPS Dealer

(quantity in Kg.) 2004-05 2005-06 Districts Figure

in Distributed Available Required Distributed Available RequiredNo. 2072 2218 2576 2097 2087 2796

Bareilly % 80.4 86.1 100.0 75.0 74.6 100.0No. 6829 6829 7097 NA NA NA

Badaun % 96.2 96.2 100.0 NA NA NANo. 8405 8405 8405 17026 17026 17026

Lucknow % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 5958 5958 5958 7078 7078 7078

Lalitpur % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 5814 5822 5822 8972 8976 8976

Jhansi % 99.9 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 4338 4338 4338 8189 8389 8389

Gorakhpur % 100.0 100.0 100.0 97.6 100.0 100.0No. 1167 1167 1167 6897 6897 6897

Varanasi % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0No. 4323 4342 4420 6282 6307 6395

Total % 97.8 98.2 100.0 98.2 98.6 100.0Note: The data from Lakhimpur Keri were not available from the selected FPS dealers. This problem

was also found in district Badaun in year 2005-06. Availability and Distribution each is calculated as per cent of Requirement. NA= Not Available. Source: Field Survey. Distribution of Kerosene

Based on the number of cards served on average multiplied by the entitlement per

card, we find the requirement of the item per period, as conveyed by the FPS dealer.

For 2004-05, considered over all the selected districts, 78.3 per cent required was

available, of which 99.6 per cent had been distributed. For 2005-06, 81.6 per cent of

requirement had been available with the dealers, of which 99.7 per cent had been

distributed. We find inter-district variations in availability of kerosene as percentage of

requirement; for 2004-05, the minimum percentage was for Lucknow (67.3) and the

maximum percentage for Varanasi (92.2). By percentage distribution, all the districts

showed cent per cent, excepting Bareilly in 2004-05, as reported by the dealers of

kerosene.

Inter-district variations for 2005-06 show availability as percentage of

requirement best in Varanasi and worst in Gorakhpur. Distribution as percentage of

availability was cent per cent for all the districts, excepting Bareilly. As reported by

201

the dealers, only in Bareilly, we find an insignificant per cent of available kerosene

undistributed. While total requirement of kerosene has increased in 2005-06 over

2004-05, it is not true for all the districts. For example, the revealed requirement of

kerosene for Lucknow is much less in 2005-06 relative to that in 2004-05 (Table

5.18).

Table 5.18 Requirement, Availability and Distribution of Kerosene per FPS Dealer

2004-05 2005-06 Districts Figure in Distributed Available Required Distributed Available Required

No. 15729 16440 21970 17465 18195 24969Bareilly % 71.6 74.8 100.0 69.9 72.9 100.0No. 29387 29387 40728 30311 30311 41628Badaun % 72.2 72.2 100.0 72.8 72.8 100.0No. NA NA NA 55605 55605 68484Lakhimpur

Kheri % NA NA NA 81.2 81.2 100.0No. 48480 48480 72000 48480 48480 56000Lucknow % 67.3 67.3 100.0 86.6 86.6 100.0No. 15837 15837 19837 15837 15837 19837Lalitpur % 79.8 79.8 100.0 79.8 79.8 100.0No. 30180 30180 34180 30180 30180 35180Jhansi % 88.3 88.3 100.0 85.8 85.8 100.0No. 20879 20879 23879 20879 20879 28790Gorakhpur % 87.4 87.4 100.0 72.5 72.5 100.0No. 35455 35455 38455 35455 35455 37455Varanasi % 92.2 92.2 100.0 94.7 94.7 100.0No. 24493 24582 31381 31776 31868 39043Total % 78.1 78.3 100.0 81.4 81.6 100.0

Note: Availability and Distribution each is calculated as per cent of Requirement. NA= Not Available Source: Field Survey. 5.16 Lifting of Items from Godown Of the total FPS dealers (46) in the sample, two-thirds reported to have received

items for distribution from the concerned Godown. Of those who reported not to have

received regularly (every month) from the concerned Godown, most are in district

Gorakhpur (one-third of those reporting non-availability). All the FPS dealers in

Gorakhpur reported regular non-availability. Lalitpur and Jhansi reported absence of

non-availability from Godown. The FPS dealers (in the sample) in these two districts

thus were satisfied so far as regular (per month) availability of items from Godown is

concerned. In Varanasi, 80.0 per cent of the dealers are satisfied by this criterion of

regular availability of items from Godown (Table 5.19).

202

Table 5.19 Lifting of items every month from concerned Godown

(Opinion of FPS Dealers) Lifted Not Lifted Total

Districts No. % No. % No. % Bareilly 6 85.7 1 14.3 7 100.0 Badaun 3 60.0 2 40.0 5 100.0 Lakhimpur Kheri 3 50.0 3 50.0 6 100.0 Lucknow 2 40.0 3 60.0 5 100.0 Lalitpur 6 100.0 0 0.0 6 100.0 Jhansi 6 100.0 0 0.0 6 100.0 Gorakhpur 0 0.0 6 100.0 6 100.0 Varanasi 4 80.0 1 20.0 5 100.0 Total 30 65.2 16 34.8 46 100.0

Source: Field Survey. Problems Faced by FPS Dealers during Lifting of Items

Of those FPS dealers in the selected districts who reported problems in regular

availability of items from the concerned Godown, four districts reported no problems

in availability of Kerosene. These are Bareilly, Lalitpur, Jhansi and Varanasi. In

Badaun, problems only in availability of only Kerosene are reported by FPS dealers.

In Lakhimpur Kheri, problems have been mentioned for all the items excepting rice.

In Varanasi, problems have been reported only in availability of sugar and Kerosene.

FPS dealers in Lalitpur and Jhansi reported no problem in availability of items from

the concerned Godowns (Table 5.20).

Table 5.20 Problems Faced by FPS Dealers during Lifting the Items on Regular

Basis (Per Month)

No. of FPS Dealers Districts Rice Wheat Sugar Kerosene Total

Bareilly 1 1 0 0 1 Badaun 0 0 0 2 2 Lakhimpur Kheri 0 1 1 1 3 Lucknow 1 2 1 1 3 Lalitpur 0 0 0 0 0 Jhansi 0 0 0 0 0 Gorakhpur 5 5 5 1 6 Varanasi 1 1 0 0 1 Total 8 10 7 5 16

Source: Field Survey. The reasons for non-receipt of items regularly (every month) by the FPS

dealers are mentioned in Box 5.11

203

Box 5.11 Non-Lifting of Items every month

(Reasons Reported by FPS Dealers) Reasons

Stock finished at concerned Godown Depot/Food Godown often closed Godown in-charge often pretended/ threatened to cancel the license One month per year Kerosene oil not given by Depot Visited the Godown/Depot frequently for lifting of allotment Sugar not received during last two years

Source: Field Survey. Days Spent by FPS Dealers for Commodities to be Received after Deposit of Money There are district-wise variations in the delay (number of days spent between money

deposited and items received). On average, the delay is lowest for Kerosene in

Bareilly and Badaun (one day each), highest in Gorakhpur (9 days). On average, the

delay is least in case of rice and wheat each for districts Bareilly, Badaun, and

Lakhimpur Kheri (6 days each by each item), as reported by the dealers. For wheat,

the delay is most in Lalitpur. For rice, the delay is most in each of Lalitpur, Jhansi and

Gorakhpur (9 days each) (Table 5.21). Table 5.21

Days Spent for Commodities Received after Deposit of Money Each Month (Report by FPS Dealers)

Commodities Last Months

Bar

eilly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r K

heri

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Total

Ist 6 7 7 8 9 9 9 8 8Iind 7 6 6 7 10 9 9 8 8IIIrd 7 6 6 9 9 9 10 8 8

Rice

Average days 6 6 6 8 9 9 9 8 8Ist 6 7 7 8 10 9 9 8 8Iind 7 6 6 7 10 9 9 8 8IIIrd 7 6 6 9 10 9 10 8 8

Wheat

Average days 6 6 6 8 10 9 9 8 8Ist 6 7 7 8 10 9 9 8 8Iind 7 6 6 7 10 9 9 8 8IIIrd 7 6 6 9 10 9 10 8 8

Sugar

Average days 6 6 6 8 10 9 9 8 8Ist 1 3 7 8 7 2 9 3 5Iind 1 1 7 8 7 2 9 3 5IIIrd 1 1 7 8 7 2 8 3 5

Kerosone

Average days 1 1 7 8 7 2 9 3 5Source: Field Survey.

204

5.17 Quantity Distributed per Household by FPS Dealers The BPL and ANT cardholders are entitled to 35 kg. of rice and wheat together per

month. The ANP cardholders are entitled to either rice or wheat by 10 kg. The APL

cardholders are not entitled to sugar. Considered over all the selected districts, as

reported by the FPS dealers, the BPL categories received 34 kg. of wheat and rice

taken together and the ANT categories received the exact amount, that is, 35 kg. of

these items. Surprisingly, in three districts, the APL categories (probably dominant

people) also received sugar. The BPL and ANT categories got one-third of a kg. of

sugar per month. On average, each of the BPL, ANT and ANP cardholders received

kerosene by 3 lt. per month. There is not much variation in total availability of rice

and wheat by BPL category across districts, rice distributed being always more than

wheat for each district. The same is true for ANT category. For ANP category,

excepting Lakhimpur Kheri, the beneficiaries had been provided only wheat by 10 kg.

per month (Table 5.22).

Table 5.22 Quantity of Commodities Distributed Per Month by FPS Dealers to Different

Categories of Ration Card Holders (Rice and Wheat in Kg., Sugar in Gram and Kerosene in Lt.)

Ration Cards

By Categories C

omm

oditi

es

Bar

eilly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r K

heri

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Total

Rice 20 20 25 22 19 20 23 25 22Wheat 15 15 10 10 14 15 10 10 12Sugar 219 538 467 311 375 520 202 381 367BPL

Kerosene 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 3Rice 20 20 25 22 19 20 23 25 22Wheat 15 15 10 13 16 15 10 10 13Sugar 219 538 467 311 375 520 202 381 367ANT

Kerosene 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 3Rice - - 10 - - - - - 10Wheat 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10 10ANP Kerosene 3 - - - - - - - 3Kerosene 3 3 4 4 3 4 3 3 4

APL Sugar 2 1 4 2Source: Field Survey. 5.18 Actual Sale Price of Commodities Distributed to Households by

Cardholding and Costs Involved Rice under BPL and Antayodaya Yojana

Actual sale price charged by the FPS dealer is the purchase price that the

consumers pay. This price is the sum of purchase price from the Godown plus costs

205

on logistics plus compensating the quantity lost (price surrendered) at the Godown

(because of a number of reasons).

For BPL rice per unit (kg.)

Actual Sale Price (Rs. 6.62) = Purchase Price from Godown (Rs. 6.09) + Cost on

Logistics (Rs. 0.41) + Cost compensated for Quantity loss at Godown (Rs. 0.11).

For ANT rice per unit (kg.)

Actual Sale Price (Rs. 3.41) = Purchase Price from Godown (Rs. 2.94) + Cost on

Logistics (Rs. 0.41) + Cost compensated for Quantity loss at Godown (Rs. 0.05). The reported purchase price for each of BPL and ANT rice is fixed and lifted

at the fixed rate across all the selected districts.

Cost on logistics includes items like loading/unloading, transportation,

weighing and other expenses like paying bribe etc. The Godown level deduction in

quantity means the FPS dealer had to pay a portion to some of the officials/operators

for smooth lifting of items (Table 5.23).

Table 5.23 Actual Sale Price of Rice under BPL and Antyodaya Yojana

(On per kg. item in Rs.)

Purchase Price from Godown Expenditure on Logistics

Items Lost at Godown (Quantity

and Cost)

Actual Sale Price

Districts

AN

T R

ice

BPL

Ric

e

load

ing

/unl

oadi

ng

tran

spor

tati

on

wei

ghin

g

Oth

er

expe

nses

Qua

ntity

AN

T C

ost

BPL

Cos

t

AN

T R

ice

BPL

Ric

e

Bareilly 2.94 6.09 0.03 0.16 0.08 0.40 0.03 0.08 0.16 3.69 6.92

Badaun 2.94 6.09 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.12 3.16 6.37

Lakhimpur Kheri 2.94 6.09 0.03 0.14 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.10 3.28 6.48

Lucknow 2.94 6.09 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.23 0.04 0.11 0.22 3.45 6.72

Lalitpur 2.94 6.09 0.05 0.16 0.01 0.43 0.01 0.03 0.06 3.61 6.79

Jhansi 2.94 6.09 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.07 3.15 6.34

Gorakhpur 2.94 6.09 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.15 0.02 0.06 0.12 3.32 6.54

Varanasi 2.94 6.09 0.05 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.04 3.21 6.38

Total 2.94 6.09 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.20 0.02 0.05 0.11 3.41 6.62

Source: Field Survey. Wheat under BPL and Antayodaya Yojana

For BPL wheat per unit (kg.)

Actual Sale Price (Rs. 5.07) = Purchase Price from Godown (Rs.4.59) + Cost on

Logistics (Rs.0.39) + Cost compensated for Quantity loss at Godown (Rs.0.09).

For ANT wheat per unit (kg.)

Actual Sale Price(Rs.2.37) = Purchase Price from Godown (Rs.1.94) + Cost on

Logistics (Rs. 0.39) + Cost compensated for Quantity loss at Godown (Rs.0.04).

206

The reported purchase price for each of BPL and ANT wheat is fixed and

lifted at the fixed rate across all the selected districts. The reported (actual) sale price

of wheat for each of BPL and ANT varies across districts (Table 5.24).

Table 5.24 Actual Sale Price of Wheat under BPL and Antyodaya Yojana

( per kg. in Rs.)

Purchase Price from Godown Expenditure on Logistics

Items Lost at Godown (Quantity

and Cost)

Actual Sale

Price

Districts

AN

T W

heat

BPL

Whe

at

load

ing

/unl

oadi

ng

tran

spor

tati

on

wei

ghin

g

Oth

er

expe

nses

Qua

ntity

AN

T C

ost

BPL

Cos

t

AN

T W

heat

BPL

Whe

at

Bareilly 1.94 4.59 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.40 0.03 0.05 0.12 2.61 5.33Badaun 1.94 4.59 0.05 0.10 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.04 0.09 2.14 4.84Lakhimpur Kheri 1.94 4.59 0.03 0.14 0.02 0.10 0.02 0.03 0.07 2.26 4.95Lucknow 1.94 4.59 0.06 0.12 0.00 0.23 0.04 0.07 0.17 2.42 5.17Lalitpur 1.94 4.59 0.05 0.16 0.01 0.43 0.02 0.03 0.07 2.61 5.30Jhansi 1.94 4.59 0.03 0.10 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.07 2.14 4.83Gorakhpur 1.94 4.59 0.05 0.10 0.03 0.15 0.02 0.04 0.10 2.31 5.01Varanasi 1.94 4.59 0.05 0.15 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 0.01 2.19 4.85Total 1.94 4.59 0.04 0.13 0.02 0.20 0.02 0.04 0.09 2.37 5.07

Source: Field Survey.

Sale Price of Sugar

For Sugar per unit (kg.)

Actual Sale Price (Rs. 14.07 ) = Purchase Price from Godown (Rs.13.44) +

Cost on Logistics (Rs.0.3) + Cost compensated for Quantity loss at Godown (Rs.0.2).

The reported purchase price of sugar is fixed and lifted at the fixed rate

across all the selected districts. The reported (actual) sale price of sugar varies

across districts. The cost on logistics as well as cost on items lost varies across

districts (Table 5.25).

207

Table 5.25 Actual Sale Price of Sugar

(On per kg. item in Rs.)

Expenditure on Logistics Items Lost at Godown (Quantity and Cost)

Districts Purchase Price from

Godown load

ing/

un

load

ing

tran

spor

tatio

n

wei

ghin

g

Oth

er

expe

nses

Qua

ntity

Cos

t

Actual Sale Price

Bareilly 13.44 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.2 0.02 0.3 14.18Badaun 13.44 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.02 0.3 13.87Lakhimpur Kheri 13.44 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.00 0.0 13.77Lucknow 13.44 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.04 0.5 14.40Lalitpur 13.44 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.4 0.01 0.2 14.26Jhansi 13.44 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.0 13.66Gorakhpur 13.44 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.3 0.03 0.4 14.29Varanasi 13.44 0.1 0.2 0.0 0.1 0.00 0.0 13.72Total 13.44 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.2 0.02 0.2 14.07

Source: Field Survey.

Sale Price of Kerosene

For Kerosene per unit (lt.)

Actual Sale Price (Rs. 10.56) = Purchase Price from Depot (Rs.9.82) + Cost on

Logistics (Rs.0.7) + Cost compensated for Quantity loss at Depot (Rs. 0.0).

The reported purchase price at the Depot level of Kerosene varies across

districts. The reported (actual) sale price of Kerosene also varies across districts.

There is no reported quantity lost at the Depot level. There is, however, loss on

account of logistics overall and across districts (Table 5.26).

Table 5.26 Actual Sale Price of Kerosene

(Per Liter in Rs.)

Expenditure on Logistics Deducted

Quantity at Depot

Districts Purchase Price from

Deport load

ing/

un

load

ing

tran

spor

tatio

n

wei

ghtin

g

Oth

er

expe

nses

Qua

ntity

Valu

e

Actual Sale Price

Bareilly 9.81 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 10.59Badaun 9.75 0.1 0.9 0.1 0.0 0.00 0.00 10.82Lakhimpur Kheri 9.85 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 10.32Lucknow 9.78 0.1 0.4 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 10.31Lalitpur 9.78 0.1 0.7 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 10.55Jhansi 9.85 0.1 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 10.21Gorakhpur 9.80 0.1 0.5 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 10.41Varanasi 9.90 0.1 0.6 0.0 0.0 0.00 0.00 10.58Total 9.82 0.1 0.5 0.1 0.0 0.00 0.00 10.56

Source: Field Survey.

208

5.18.1 Price Hike by FPS Dealers Because of Enhanced Cost in Logistics The FPS dealers reported that they felt compelled to fix sale price more than the

price fixed by the Government in the PDS, because of the costs that they incur on

loading/unloading, transportation etc. 78.3 per cent of the FPS dealers reported sale

by price hike because of additional cost on logistics. All the dealers in Lalitpur and

Gorakhpur confirmed price hike; all the dealers, excepting one, in each of Lucknow,

Jhansi, Varanasi and Lakhimpur Kheri reported price hike. In Bereilly, price hike was

reported by a few dealers (Table 5.27). Table 5.27

Price Hike by FPS Dealers Because of Enhanced Cost in Logistics

Price Hiked Price Not Hiked NR Total Districts

No. % No. % No. % No. % Bareilly 2 28.6 5 71.4 0 0.0 7 100.0 Badaun 4 80.0 1 20.0 0 0.0 5 100.0 Lakhimpur Kheri 5 83.3 1 16.7 0 0.0 6 100.0 Lucknow 4 80.0 1 20.0 0 0.0 5 100.0 Lalitpur 6 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 6 100.0 Jhansi 5 83.3 0 0.0 1 16.7 6 100.0 Gorakhpur 6 100.0 0 0.0 0 0.0 6 100.0 Varanasi 4 80.0 1 20.0 0 0.0 5 100.0 Total 36 78.3 9 19.6 1 2.2 46 100.0

Source: Field Survey. 5.19 Sale Price of Commodities Reported by FPS Dealers The actual sale price charged by the FPS dealers on all the items distributed for the

BPL and ANT cardholders exceeded the Government announced price per unit of the

items, as reported by the dealers. There are district-wise variations in the prices per

unit of the items. Surprisingly for Varanasi, reported actual sale price of BPL rice was

marginally less than the Government announced price. Otherwise, for all the items

for all the districts, BPL actual price is higher than the Government announced price.

In Lalitpur and Varanasi, actual sale price of ANT rice per unit is marginally less than

the Government announced price. Otherwise, for all the items for all the districts,

ANT actual price is higher than the Government announced price. As opposed to the

Government announced price of Kerosene per lt. across all the card categories, the

actual sale price remained higher on average and separately for all the districts,

covering APL (Tables 5.28A & 5.28B).

209

Table 5.28a

Sale Price of Items Distributed by FPS Dealers (As Reported by the FPS Dealers) BPL ANT APL

District R

ice

Whe

at

Suga

r

Ker

osen

e

Ric

e

Whe

at

Suga

r

Ker

osen

e

Ker

osen

e

Suga

r

Bareilly 6.48 4.90 13.67 10.39 3.17 2.17 13.58 10.39 10.39 14.00Badaun 6.19 4.76 13.56 10.54 3.00 2.00 13.56 10.54 10.54 NRLakhimpur Kheri 6.17 4.73 13.58 10.28 3.03 2.19 13.58 10.28 10.28 NRLucknow 6.29 4.84 13.70 10.20 3.15 2.15 13.70 10.20 10.20 NRLalitpur 6.67 5.14 14.43 11.23 2.96 2.29 14.43 11.23 11.07 15.00Jhansi 6.48 4.86 13.70 10.50 3.10 2.10 13.60 10.40 10.50 NRGorakhpur 6.46 5.00 14.08 10.83 3.04 2.04 14.08 10.83 10.83 13.50Varanasi 6.13 5.49 13.90 11.00 2.80 2.25 13.90 11.00 11.00 NRTotal 6.37 4.97 13.85 10.62 3.03 2.15 13.82 10.61 10.59 14.17

Source: Field Survey

Table 5.28b Price Gap in Commodities

BPL ANT Items Govt. Price

(Rs.) Actual Sale Price

(Average) Govt. Price

(Rs.) Actual Sale Price

(Average) Rice 6.15 6.37 3.00 3.03Wheat 4.65 4.97 2.00 2.15Sugar 13.50 13.85 13.50 13.82Kerosene 10.00 10.62 10.00 10.61

Utilization of Post-Distribution Balance Items For 84.8 per cent of the FPS dealers, the stock (post-availability) is released (stock

exhausted with no balance) in case of Kerosene. For sugar, it is 71.7 per cent, wheat

58.7 per cent and rice 39.1 per cent. FPS, thus, functions well for Kerosene, and

extremely poor for rice. FPS dealers reportedly distribute balance rice among poor

households (32.6 per cent reporting). The report of sale in the open (black) market is

least in case of Kerosene (2.2 per cent of dealers reporting) and highest in case of

rice (8.7 per cent reporting). In case of Kerosene, there is no carry forward for the

next month, which happens in case of other items (Table 5.29).

210

Table 5.29

Utilization of Post-Distribution Balance Items (Response of FPS Dealers)

Rice Wheat Sugar Kerosene Response No. % No. % No. % No. %

No Balance 18 39.1 27 58.7 33 71.7 39 84.8Give the poor households

15 32.6 8 17.4 4 8.7 1 2.2

Sell in the open market 4 8.7 2 4.3 2 4.3 1 2.2Distribute the next month

3 6.5 3 6.5 2 4.3 0 0.0

Sell at Godowm/depot 0 0.0 2 4.3 0 0.0 1 2.2Show balance 6 13.0 6 13.0 5 10.9 0 0.0Total 46 100.0 46 100.0 46 100.0 46 100.0

Source: Field Survey. 5.20 Quality of Commodities Reported by FPS Dealers 89.1 per cent of the dealers reported quality ‘good’ for Kerosene, which is reported by

69.6 per cent for wheat, 58.7 per cent for sugar and 37.0 per cent for rice. ‘Bad’

quality is non-reported in case of Kerosene and reported most in case of rice (26.1

per cent reporting). All the items are reported to be good, general and bad in varying

degrees, excepting Kerosene (Table 5.30).

Table 5.30 Quality of Commodities (Opinion of FPS Dealers)

Rice Wheat Sugar Kerosone Opinion No. % No. % No. % No. %

Bad 12 26.1 3 6.5 7 15.2 0 0.0General 15 32.6 9 19.6 10 21.7 4 8.7Good 17 37.0 32 69.6 27 58.7 41 89.1Not Applicable 1 2.2 1 2.2 1 2.2 0.0NR 1 2.2 1 2.2 1 2.2 1 2.2Total 46 100.0 46 100.0 46 100.0 46 100.0

Source: Field Survey. The problems in quality of items, excepting Kerosene, as reported by FPS

dealers, are mentioned in Box 5.12. Box 5.12

Problems in Quality in Different Commodities (Observations of FPS Dealers)

Problems Mixed stone chips and soil Too much broken (Khuddi) Too much dirty

Source: Field Survey.

211

5.21 Working Period of FPSs per Month Two-thirds of the FPS dealers reported opening of FPS just on arrival of items; one-

fourth of the dealers reported to open the shop every day; one-sixth of the dealers

reported to open the shop on arrival of customers. We found multiple responses from

the dealers. Opening the shop daily is non-reported in Badaun and Lakhimpur Kheri.

In districts like Badaun, Lakhimpur Kheri and Jhansi, the focus is on arrival of items

when the dealers open the shop. More than one-third of the dealers reported opening

the shop on some days in a month. This is mostly reported by the dealers in Jhansi,

Lakhimpur Kheri and Gorakhpur (Table 5.31).

Table 5.31 Working Period of Fair Price Shops per Month

(Report by FPS Dealers)

Districts

Dai

ly

Dai

ly e

xcep

t w

eekl

y ho

liday

On

arriv

al o

f Ite

ms

On

arriv

al o

f cu

stom

ers

Som

e da

ys in

a

mon

th

NR

Total

Bareilly 4 0 2 4 0 0 7 Badaun 0 0 5 1 2 0 5 Lakhimpur Kheri 0 0 5 2 4 0 6 Lucknow 2 2 3 0 0 0 5 Lalitpur 1 1 3 0 3 0 6 Jhansi 1 0 5 0 4 1 6 Gorakhpur 2 0 4 1 4 0 6 Varanasi 2 0 3 0 0 0 5 Total 12 3 30 8 17 1 46

Source: Field Survey. 5.22 FPSs Checked by Officials during Last Quarter (End 2006) As reported by the FPS dealers, there occurred a total of 17 checking by

Government officials on FPS during the last quarter from the date of survey. Mostly it

was the Gram Panchayat that worked as a catalyst in checking; on average, it was

10 times out of the total 17. There are district-wise variations in number of checking,

with minimum for Gorakhpur at 1 and maximum for Lucknow at 21, considered over

all the selected districts. In case of vigilance by Panchayats, the maximum number

was in Lucknow (15) and minimum number (0) in three districts (Jhansi, Gorakhpur

and Varanasi). The role of Regional Food Controller was nearly absent. Similarly, the

role of Administrative Officer, ADO, Lekhpal was negligible as vigilance catalyst over

FPS. Officials of Supply Department, excepting Lalitpur, did not pay much attention

towards the necessity of vigilance over FPS (Table 5.32).

212

Table 5.32 Average Number of Checking of FPSs by Officials during Quarter ending 2006

Districts Gram Panchayat

Supply Department

Administrative Officer

ADO/ Lekhpal Others*

Total Checking

in Quarter

Bareilly 7 1 1 2 0 10Badaun 12 1 2 0 1 16Lakhimpur Kheri 8 3 1 0 0 12Lucknow 15 2 2 2 0 21Lalitpur 11 5 1 1 0 18Jhansi 0 1 0 0 1 2Gorakhpur 0 1 0 0 0 1Varanasi 0 2 0 0 0 2Total 10 3 1 2 2 17Note: *Others included Doctor, RFC Source: Field Survey 5.23 Relationship of FPS Dealers with Consumers and Supply

Department Most of the FPS dealers are completely satisfied with the consumers of all types.

One-tenth of the dealers are not satisfied with the consumers. For BPL, 89.1 per cent

of the dealers are completely satisfied, which is 87.0 per cent in case of ANT and

84.8 per cent in case of APL customers. For ANT customers, generally the dealers

are partially satisfied (82.6 per cent reporting) (Table 5.33). Table 5.33

Relationship of FPS Dealers with the Consumers BPL ANT ANT APL Relation

NO. % NO. % NO. % NO. % Completely satisfied 41 89.1 40 87.0 3 6.5 39 84.8Partially satisfied 2 4.3 1 2.2 38 82.6 1 2.2Not satisfied 1 2.2 3 6.5 3 6.5 5 10.9NR 2 4.3 2 4.3 2 4.3 1 2.2Total 46 100.0 46 100.0 46 100.0 46 100.0

Source: Field Survey The reasons for non-satisfaction of the FPS dealers regarding different

types of consumers are cited in Box 5.13. Box 5.13

Reasons for Non-satisfaction of FPS dealers with the Consumers Reasons

Abuse the dealers Consumers do not come timely for lifting the items Demand more quantity of all items Do not believe that ANP Yojana has been closed

Source: Field Survey

More than four-fifths of FPS dealers are completely satisfied with Supply

Department. Only 1.2 per cent of the dealers are not satisfied with the Department.

213

Cent per cent of the FPS dealers in Varanasi and Lakhimpur Kheri are completely

satisfied with the Department. There are district-wise variations in the extent of

satisfaction of the dealers vis-à-vis the Department (Table 5.34).

Table 5.34 Relationship of FPS Dealers with the Supply Department

Districts Completely satisfied

Partially satisfied

Not satisfied NR Total

Bareilly 5 0 2 0 7 Badaun 4 0 1 0 5 Lakhimpur Kheri 6 0 0 0 6 Lucknow 2 2 1 0 5 Lalitpur 5 0 1 0 6 Jhansi 5 0 0 1 6 Gorakhpur 6 0 0 0 6 Varanasi 4 1 0 0 5 Total 37 3 5 1 46

Source: Field Survey

The reasons for partial satisfaction of the FPS dealers with the Supply

Department have been cited in Box 5.14.

Box 5.14 Reasons for Partial Satisfaction with the Supply Department

(Response of FPS dealers) Reasons

Have to pay money for each work The department collects money in the name of checking Department takes bribe on monthly basis Cut allotted kerosene if bribe not paid

Source: Field Survey

5.24 Role of Panchayats as Viewed by FPS Dealers Panchayat is reportedly the major controller of PDS. We offer below the opinion of

the FPS dealers on the quality of this control by local Panchayats:

One-third of the FPS dealers opined that the local Panchayat monitors the

distribution system. One-sixth opined that the Panchayat verifies the stocks of FPS

every month. One-fifth of the dealers alleged that the Panchayat pressurizes to give

more Kerosene oil to the ‘close’ people. One-tenth of the dealers opined that the

local Panchayat realizes personal benefits from FPS in cash or kind; another one-

third opined that the Panchayat imposes unnecessary pressure on the dealers. A

significant percentage of dealers (13.0 per cent) opined that local Panchayat controls

dominant sections and criminals, and also cooperate at the time of distribution. Thus,

in view of the FPS dealers, it is the Panchayats that play the key role in regulating

FPS (Table 5.35).

214

Table 5.35

Control over the PDS by the local Panchayats by Activities (Opinion of FPS Dealers)

Opinion Fi

gure

in

Bar

eilly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r K

heri

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Total

No. 2 0 0 2 2 1 0 1 8Verify the stock each month % 28.6 0.0 0.0 40.0 33.3 16.7 0.0 20.0 17.4

No. 0 1 3 0 1 1 1 2 9Pressurize to give more kerosene oil to their closer people

% 0.0 20.0 50.0 0.0 16.7 16.7 16.7 40.0 19.6

No. 3 2 1 3 3 1 3 0 16Monitor the distribution system % 42.9 40.0 16.7 60.0 50.0 16.7 50.0 0.0 34.8

No. 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1Take 20 kg sugar for each PRIs member % 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2

No. 0 0 3 0 1 0 0 1 5Take individual benefits in cash or kind % 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 20.0 10.9

No. 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 5Impose unnecessary pressure on the dealer % 14.3 0.0 16.7 0.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 40.0 10.9

No. 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 6Cooperate at the time of distribution of items % 14.3 20.0 33.3 20.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 13.0

No. 2 3 0 0 0 0 1 0 6Control the demand of dominant people / criminals

% 28.6 60.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 13.0

No. 1 0 0 0 1 2 2 1 7Do Nothing % 14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 33.3 33.3 20.0 15.2

No. 7 5 6 5 6 6 6 5 46Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey

On a comparative frame, rural and urban, regarding the control of PDS by the

local Panchayats, we find the following:

25.8 per cent of the FPS dealers reported Panchayats verifying the stocks in

rural areas, which is reportedly absent in urban areas. As high as 45.2 per cent of the

dealers in rural areas reported presence of monitoring by the Panchayats over the

distribution system, this is reported by as low as 13.3 per cent of the urban dealers.

In the urban areas, the FPS dealers (20.0 per cent) reported local

administration/Panchayat grabbing individual benefits which is reported less in rural

areas (6.5 per cent of the dealers reporting). 40.0 per cent of the urban FPS dealers

reported inactive local administration, whereas in urban areas Panchayats are

reportedly very active (Table 5.36).

215

Table 5.36

Control of PDS by the local Panchayats (Opinion of FPS Dealers)

Urban Rural Total Opinion

No. % No. % No. % Verify the stocks 0 0.0 8 25.8 8 17.4Pressurize to give more kerosene oil to the closer people

4 26.7 5 16.1 9 19.6

Monitor the distribution system 2 13.3 14 45.2 16 34.8Take 20 kg sugar to each PRI member 1 6.7 0 0.0 1 2.2Take individual benefits in cash or kind 3 20.0 2 6.5 5 10.9Impose unnecessary pressure on the dealer 1 6.7 4 12.9 5 10.9Cooperate at the time of distribution of items 1 6.7 5 16.1 6 13.0Control the dominant people / criminals 1 6.7 5 16.1 6 13.0Do Nothing 6 40.0 1 3.2 7 15.2Total 15 100.0 31 100.0 46 100.0

Source: Field Survey

As high as half of the FPS dealers opined that the present power of the local

Panchayats in controlling the PDS is bad. There are regional variations in this

perception, with maximum at Lucknow (80.0 per cent perceiving power bad) and

minimum at Gorakhpur (33.3 per cent perceiving bad). 43.5 per cent of the dealers,

over all the selected districts, perceive the present power of Panchayats as good,

with maximum dealers (66.7 per cent) perceiving this in Gorahkpur and minimum

(20.0 per cent) in Lucknow (Table 5.37).

Table 5.37 Present Power of local Panchayats in Controlling the Public Distribution

System (Perception of FPS Dealers)

Good Bad NR Total Districts No. % No. % No. % No. %

Bareilly 3 42.9 3 42.9 1 14.3 7 100.0Badaun 2 40.0 3 60.0 0 0.0 5 100.0Lakhimpur Kheri 3 50.0 3 50.0 0 0.0 6 100.0Lucknow 1 20.0 4 80.0 0 0.0 5 100.0Lalitpur 3 50.0 3 50.0 0 0.0 6 100.0Jhansi 2 33.3 3 50.0 1 16.7 6 100.0Gorakhpur 4 66.7 2 33.3 0 0.0 6 100.0Varanasi 2 40.0 3 60.0 0 0.0 5 100.0Total 20 43.5 24 52.2 2 4.3 46 100.0

Source: Field Survey The reasons reported by the FPS dealers why they consider local Panchayat-

controlled PDS ‘good’ are cited in Box 5.15.

216

Box 5.15

Local Panchayat-Controlled PDS Considered Good (Reasons Reported by FPS Dealers)

Reasons Individual security Understanding local people Cooperating in distribution of items Defending from Punishment by government officials Controlling dominant people/ criminals

Source: Field Survey The reasons reported by the FPS dealers why they consider local Panchayat-

controlled PDS ‘bad’ are cited in Box 5.16. Box 5.16

Local Panchayat-Controlled PDS considered ‘Bad’ (Reasons Reported by FPS Dealers)

Reasons Take individual benefit in cash or kind Create interruption in distribution of items Impose unnecessary pressures Take money for verification Issue token for getting items to own people Create Factions in village Threaten to cancel the dealership

Source: Field Survey

5.25 Problems and Suggestions Reported by PFS Dealers Paying Bribe to Supply Department

It is interesting to note that 58.7 per cent of the FPS dealers reportedly did not pay

bribe (money) to the officials of Supply Department to continue dealership in future.

The reported non-payment of bribe is lowest in Lucknow (20.0 per cent reporting)

and highest in Bareilly (85.7 per cent reporting). 80.0 per cent in Lucknow reported

they are used to pay bribe money to the officials of Supply Department. Over all the

districts, 37.0 per cent of the dealers reportedly pay bribe to the officials for

continuation of dealership (Table 5.38).

217

Table 5.38

Paying Bribe to Supply Department's officials for continuing dealership in future

(Opinion of FPS Dealers) Paid Not Paid NR Total

Districts No. % No. % No. % No. % Bareilly 1 14.3 6 85.7 0 0.0 7 100.0Badaun 1 20.0 4 80.0 0 0.0 5 100.0Lakhimpur Kheri 3 50.0 2 33.3 1 16.7 6 100.0Lucknow 4 80.0 1 20.0 0 0.0 5 100.0Lalitpur 1 16.7 5 83.3 0 0.0 6 100.0Jhansi 3 50.0 2 33.3 1 16.7 6 100.0Gorakhpur 2 33.3 4 66.7 0 0.0 6 100.0Varanasi 2 40.0 3 60.0 0 0.0 5 100.0Total 17 37.0 27 58.7 2 4.3 46 100.0

Source: Field Survey 16 FPS dealers reported quantification, duration and receiver of bribe paid by the

dealers of the 46 dealers interviewed in all the selected districts. The average money

paid stood at Rs. 1422, with highest for Lucknow (Rs. 3950) and lowest for

Gorakhpur (Rs. 500). In Lucknow, the bribe payment occurs every month (as

reported by 4 dealers), while 3 dealers reported it occurs every month in Jhansi and

Lakhimpur Kheri. The person pointed out by the dealers who receive the bribe money

is the Supply Inspector. The number of FPS dealers mentioning payment of bribe

every month and the number of dealers identifying the supply inspector are identical

(Table 5.39).

Table 5.39 Bribe Paid Per FPS Dealer, Duration and the Receivers

(Report by FPS Dealers) Duration of

Payment Amount Given to

Whom Districts

AverageAmount

Paid* Every Month NR Supply

Inspector NR

Bareilly 860 1 0 1 0 Badaun 700 1 0 1 0 Lakhimpur Kheri 800 3 0 3 0 Lucknow 3950 4 0 4 0 Lalitpur 1500 1 0 1 0 Jhansi 533 3 0 3 0 Gorakhpur 500 2 0 2 0 Varanasi 500 1 1 1 1 Total 1422 16 1 16 1

* It depends on allotment of commodities to FPS dealer. Source: Field Survey

218

Problems Faced in Running Dealership

The major difficulties faced by the FPS dealers in running the shop include the

incompatibility between high demand and low allotment (23.9 per cent reporting),

illegal demand of political party leaders (21.7 per cent reporting), low commission

(19.6 per cent reporting), cardless customers’ pressure (17.4 per cent reporting).

Around one-fifth of the dealers reported no difficulties. One-tenth of the dealers

reported ‘loot’ by officials in the name of vigilance. There are multiple reasons

(difficulties) cited by the dealers in running the shop. There are inter-district variations

in the difficulties cited by the dealers in running the shop (Table 5.40). Table 5.40

Difficulties faced by the FPS Dealers in running FPS (Reported by FPS Dealers)

Problems

Figu

re in

Bar

eilly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r K

heri

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Total

No. 2 0 1 1 0 2 1 2 9Low commission % 28.6 0.0 16.7 20.0 0.0 33.3 16.7 40.0 19.6

No. 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 3High cost for lifting and carrying of items % 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 16.7 0.0 16.7 0.0 6.5

No. 2 2 3 0 0 2 1 0 10Illegal demand from political (ruling) leaders % 28.6 40.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 16.7 0.0 21.7

No. 2 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 4Inner-fighting during the distribution of Items % 28.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 16.7 0.0 0.0 8.7

No. 1 0 2 2 1 0 0 0 6Given bribe in cash and kind to local Panchayat members and officials

% 14.3 0.0 33.3 40.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.0

No. 1 0 1 2 1 0 0 0 5Officials robbed in the name of checking % 14.3 0.0 16.7 40.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.9

No. 1 2 2 3 0 0 1 2 11Problems in distribution due to high demand and low allotment

% 14.3 40.0 33.3 60.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 40.0 23.9

No. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1No incentive on MDM and Annapurna items % 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.2

No. 0 1 1 0 2 1 0 3 8Card-less (non-beneficiary) pressurized to take items % 0.0 20.0 16.7 0.0 33.3 16.7 0.0 60.0 17.4

No. 1 1 1 0 2 0 3 1 9No difficulty % 14.3 20.0 16.7 0.0 33.3 0.0 50.0 20.0 19.6

No. 7 5 6 5 6 6 6 5 46Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey Complaints Reported Regarding Foodgrains Godown and Kerosene Depot

71.7 per cent of the FPS dealers did not complain against food grains godown and

Kerosene depot. It is cent per cent for Varanasi and Jhansi. The complaints of the

FPS dealers against the Godown and the Depot are most in Gorakhpur (66.7 per

219

cent of the dealers complaining), followed by Lucknow and Badaun (60.0 per cent

reporting each). Based on total number of cards (as reported by the dealers), the

major complains include false measurement of items by quantity delivered by the

Godown and Depot, commission paid by the dealers on the items lifted etc (Table

5.41). Table 5.41

Complaints Reported by FPS Dealers during the Lifting of Commodities from Food-grain Godown/ Kerosene Depot

Complaints

Figu

re in

Bar

eilly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r Khe

ri

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Total

No. 1 0 0 0 1 0 2 0 4Taken commission on each unit of items % 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 - 50.0 - 30.8

No. 1 3 1 3 0 0 2 0 7False measurement of items by quantity/weight % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 - 50.0 - 53.8

No. 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1Kerosene for a month not given per year % 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 0.0 - 7.7

No. 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1Food-grain of poor quality delivered intentionally % 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 25.0 - 7.7

No. 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 1FPS pays Rs. 30 per quintal of BPL rice and wheat for transportation Cost

% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 - 50.0 - 7.7

No. 1 3 1 3 1 0 4 0 13Total FPS Reported Complaints* % 14.3 60.0 16.7 60.0 16.7 0.0 66.7 0.0 28.3

No. 6 2 5 2 5 6 2 5 33No Complaint* % 85.7 40.0 83.3 40.0 83.3 100.0 33.3 100.0 71.7

No. 7 5 6 5 6 6 6 5 46Total FPS % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Note: *Per cent calculated on total number and complaint cases calculated on total number of FPS reported complaints.

Source: Field Survey. Suggestions of FPS Dealers

The FPS dealers suggested a number of measures for implementation by the

Government. The major measures include raising the rate of commission, ensuring

commission on Mid-day Meal, ensuring allotment based on consumers’ demand,

enhanced allotment of Kerosene oil, covering transportation cost of the dealer,

stopping bribes paid to the officials, adding new items to be distributed along with the

existing ones through the FPS (Table 5.42).

220

Table 5.42

Suggestions of FPS Dealers for Implementation (Figure in %)

Suggestions

Bar

eilly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r K

heri

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Total

Rate of commission for FPS dealer should be increased

42.9 20.0 33.3 60.0 50.0 33.3 83.3 100.0 52.2

Provision for monthly honorarium for FPS dealer should be made

14.3 40.0 50.0 20.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 19.6

Allotment of kerosene oil should be Increased

14.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 16.7 33.3 0.0 10.9

Transportation cost of the dealer should be compensated

14.3 20.0 33.3 20.0 33.3 16.7 0.0 0.0 17.4

Commission on MDM should be fixed

0.0 0.0 16.7 40.0 0.0 16.7 16.7 20.0 13.0

Special fund to FPS dealer should be provided by Government

0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 16.7 16.7 0.0 6.5

Bribe must be stopped at each level

14.3 0.0 0.0 20.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.5

Distribution of additional items should be entrusted with the FPS shop

0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 6.5

Provision should be developed for home delivery of PDS commodities

0.0 20.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.7

Allotment must be based on consumers’ demand

0.0 40.0 33.3 20.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 15.2

Political interference should be stopped

0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 20.0 6.5

Ration cards should be issued to all households

0.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 4.3

Cut allotted foodgrains and kerosene from godown/depot must be stopped

0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 4.3

Proper quality and measurement should be ensured at each level

28.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 20.0 8.7

Checking/verification should not be biased

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7 0.0 16.7 0.0 4.3

NR 0.0 0.0 66.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.7Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey.

221

Section 3: Functions of Food-grains Godowns and Kerosene Depots 5.26 Profile of Kerosene Depots and Food-grains Godowns by

Ownership, Experience and Residency We covered 27 Kerosene oil depots and 21 foodgrains Godowns covering all the

selected districts.

• In case of oil depots we got responses from a number of categories of

respondents like partners in business, proprietorship, and

manager/accountant. The types of respondents are well distributed by

categories and across districts.

• In case of foodgrain Godowns we got responses from a number of categories

of respondents like Godown-in-Charge, senior marketing inspector and

supply inspector. The types of respondents are well distributed by categories

and across districts (Table 5.43). Table 5.43

Profile of Kerosene Depot and Food-grains Godown

Kerosene Depot# Food-grain Godown*

Districts

Figu

re in

Part

ner

Prop

rieto

r

Man

ager

/A

ccou

ntan

t

Tota

l

God

own

In-

char

ge

Seni

or

Mar

ketin

g In

spec

tor

Supp

ly

Insp

ecto

r Total

No 2 1 0 3 3 0 0 3 Bareilly % 66.7 33.3 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0

No 0 1 2 3 3 0 0 3 Badaun % 0.0 33.3 66.7 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0

No 0 1 3 4 1 2 0 3 Lakhimpur Kheri % 0.0 25.0 75.0 100.0 33.3 66.7 0.0 100.0

No 0 2 1 3 3 0 0 3 Lucknow % 0.0 66.7 33.3 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0

No 3 1 0 4 2 1 0 3 Lalitpur % 75.0 25.0 0.0 100.0 66.7 33.3 0.0 100.0

No 1 1 1 3 2 0 0 2 Jhansi % 33.3 33.3 33.3 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0

No 3 0 1 4 2 0 0 2 Gorakhpur % 75.0 0.0 25.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 100.0

No 2 0 1 3 1 0 1 2 Varanasi % 66.7 0.0 33.3 100.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 100.0

No 11 7 9 27 17 3 1 21 Total % 40.7 25.9 33.3 100.0 81.0 14.3 4.8 100.0 # Category of Responsdents (Private); * Category of Respondents (Government) Source: Field Survey.

222

About depot-in-charge • More than one-third have work/job experience for a period more than 12

years at a stretch. In Jhansi, it is cent per cent for the depot-in-charge.

• A little less than one-fifth have experience less than one year.

• There is no depot-in-charge in Lalitpur and Jhansi with job experience less

than six years.

• Most of the depot-in-charge, in the sample, have job experience more than

three years.

About Godown-in-charge

• No Godown-in-charge in the sample has job experience more than three years.

• The differences in job experience between the two categories are natural

because while the oil depot-in-charge are privately managed, the Godown-in-

charge are managed by Government personnel subject to transfer by

location (Table 5.44). Table 5.44

Job Experience (in years) of the Present Godown-in-Charge and Depot-in-Charge (Figure in %)

Kerosene Depot Foodgrain Godown

Districts <1

1 to

3

3 to

6

6 to

12

>12 Total <1

1 to

3

Total

Bareilly 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 66.7 100.0 33.3 66.7 100.0Badaun 0.0 0.0 33.3 33.3 33.3 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0Lakhimpur Kheri 50.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 25.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0Lucknow 33.3 0.0 33.3 0.0 33.3 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0Lalitpur 0.0 0.0 0.0 75.0 25.0 100.0 33.3 66.7 100.0Jhansi 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 50.0 50.0 100.0Gorakhpur 25.0 25.0 25.0 0.0 25.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0Varanasi 33.3 66.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 50.0 50.0 100.0Total 18.5 14.8 14.8 14.8 37.0 100.0 42.9 57.1 100.0Source: Field Survey. Most of the respondents as oil-depot-in-charge (85.2 per cent) live within

commissionary, which is very rare (33.3 per cent) in case of Godown-in-charge. No

Godown-in-charge lives within the district of location of the Godown, which is more

than one-tenth for the depot-in-charge (Table 5.45).

223

Table 5.45 Residency of the Respondents

Kerosene Depot Foodgrain Godown Residency (By Area) No. % No. %

Within Commissionary# 23 85.2 7 33.3 Outside of Commissionary 1 3.7 14 66.7 Within District 3 11.1 0.0 Total 27 100.0 21 100.0

# covers a set of districts. Source: Field Survey

5.27 Storage Capacity of Food-grains Godowns and Kerosene Depots One-third of the Foodgrain Godowns have storage capacity between 23 and 50 Mt,

while another one-third have capacity between 50 and 80 Mt. 95.5 per cent of the

Foodgrain Godowns have storage capacity below 120 Mt. The Foodgrain Godowns

in Varanasi and Gorakhpur have storage capacity cent per cent between 50 and 80

Mt. The Foodgrain Godowns in Lalitpur have storage capacity cent per cent between

23 and 50 Mt. Excepting Bareilly and Jhansi, no district in the sample has storage

capacity more than 120 Mt. (Table 5.46). Table 5.46

Storage Capacity of Regional Food-grain Godown (As Reported by Godown in-charge and Depot-in-Charge)

Storage (Capacity in

MT)

Figu

re in

Bar

eilly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r K

heri

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Total

No. 0 2 0 2 3 0 0 0 723-50 % 0.0 66.7 0.0 66.7 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3

No. 1 0 1 1 0 0 2 2 750-80 % 33.3 0.0 33.3 33.3 0.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 33.3

No. 1 1 2 0 0 1 0 0 580-120 % 33.3 33.3 66.7 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 23.8

No. 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2>120 % 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 9.5

No. 3 3 3 3 3 2 2 2 21Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Source: Field Survey. As reported by the depot-in-charge, half of the depots have storage capacity

per depot between 15 and 20 kl. Lt. This storage capacity is for cent per cent of the

sample depot in Jhansi. The sample oil depot in districts, Lalitpur, Jhansi, Gorakhpur

and Varanasi do not have storage capacity more than 40 kl. lt. Excepting Varanasi,

the remaining three districts do not even have storage capacity more than 30 kl. lt. A

224

storage capacity more than 50 kl. lt. is rare for each of the selected depots. The three

districts have this capacity, namely, Bareilly, Badaun and Lucknow (Table 5.47). Table 5.47

Storage Capacity of Kerosene Oil Depots (As Reported by Depot-in-Charge)

Storage Capacity (in Kl lit.) Fi

gure

in

Bar

eilly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r K

heri

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Total

No. 1 0 1 0 3 3 3 2 1315-20 % 33.3 - 25.0 - 75.0 100.0 75.0 66.7 48.1 No. 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 420-30

% - - 25.0 33.3 25.0 - 25.0 - 14.8No. 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 230-40 % - - 25.0 - - - - 33.3 7.4No. 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 440-50 % 33.. 33.3 25.0 33.3 - - - - 14.8No. 1 2 0 1 0 0 0 0 4>50 % 33.3 66.7 - 33.3 - - - - 14.8No. 3 3 4 3 4 3 4 3 27Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey. 5.28 Sources of the Regional Godowns and Depots to Lift Items The Kerosene oil depots in the sample lift oil from IOC (66.7 per cent), BPCL (25.9

per cent) and HPCL (7.4 per cent). There is no multiple sources for the Depots. The

foodgrain Godowns lift items mainly from FCI (66.7 per cent), RFC (57.1 per cent),

PCF (47.6 per cent) and SFC (4.8 per cent). Thus, there are multiple sources for

lifting items, as reported by the in-charge of Godowns. In total, for Godowns, 52.4 per

cent is lifted from SWC (state pool) and 28.6 from CWC (central pool) (Table 5.48). Table 5.48

Sources of the Regional Godowns and Depots to Lift Items (As Reported by Godown in-Charge and Depot-in-Charge)

Kerosene Depot

Food-grains Godown

Sources No. % Sources No. % IOC 18 66.7 RFC 12 57.1 BPCL 7 25.9 FCI 14 66.7 HPCL 2 7.4 SFC 1 4.8 Total 27 100.0 PCF 10 47.6

SWC (State pool) 11 52.4 CWC (Central pool) 6 28.6

Total 21 100.0

Source: Field Survey.

225

5.29 FPS Dealers Attached with Food-grains Godowns and Kerosene

Depots Based on the reports of all the oil depots (27) and foodgrain-in-charge (21) on

the average number of FPSs attached (to be served), we offer the following

observations:

• On average one depot serves 109 FPSs, that varies between 25 at the

minimum in Lakhimpur Kheri and 163 at the maximum in Badaun. Generally

the depot owners/managers perceive that the number of FPSs that each

serve is normal. This is with exception for one depot serving 112 FPSs in

Bareilly perceiving the number less (perhaps relative to capacity), one in

Lucknow serving 76 FPSs perceiving the number less and one in Goraphpur

perceiving the number (139) less. One depot in Lalitpur perceiving the

number of FPSs served (119) more relative to its capacity, while one in

Varanasi perceiving the number served (133) more.

• On average one foodgrain Godown serves 95 FPSs, that varies between 64

at the minimum in Lalitpur and 153 at the maximum in Bareilly. Generally the

Godown-in-charge perceive that the number of FPSs that each serve is

normal. This is with exception for one Godown-in-charge serving 71 FPSs in

Lakhimpur Kheri perceiving the number less (perhaps relative to capacity)

and one in Jhansi perceiving the number of FPSs served (88) more relative to

its capacity (Table 5.49). Table 5.49

Average Number of FPSs Attached (Perception of Godown In-charge and Depot In-charge regarding the Number of FPSs

Attached) (Figure in Numbers)

Kerosene Food-grains

Districts

Average No. of FPSs

Attached per

Depot

Mor

e

Less

Nor

mal

Total

Average No.

FPSs Attached

per Godown

Mor

e

Less

Nor

mal

Total

Bareilly 112 0 1 2 3 153 0 0 3 3Badaun 163 0 0 3 3 110 0 0 3 3Lakhimpur Kheri 25 0 0 4 4 71 0 1 2 3Lucknow 76 0 1 2 3 77 0 0 3 3Lalitpur 119 1 0 3 4 64 0 0 3 3Jhansi 62 0 0 3 3 88 1 0 1 2Gorakhpur 139 0 1 3 4 80 0 0 2 2Varanasi 133 1 0 2 3 105 0 0 2 2Total 109 2 3 22 27 95 1 1 19 21

Source: Field Survey.

226

5.30 Authorization of Foodgrains Godowns and Kerosene Depots Regarding

Areas The foodgrain Godown and the oil depot are authorized to supply items to blocks,

tehsils and directly to FPSs. One-third of the Kerosene oil depots are authorized to

supply oil to ‘single block’, while another one-third of the depots are authorized to

supply to the FPSs of some identified blocks. One-fifth of the depots are authorized

to supply oil to the whole tehsil. More than three-fifths of the foodgrain Godowns are

authorized to supply items to a ‘single block’, while another one-fifth are authorized to

supply to the whole tehsil. Only one-twentieth of the Godowns are authorized to

supply directly to the identified FPSs (Table 5.50). Table 5.50

Godown and Depot Authorized to Supply Items (As Reported by Godown in-charge and Depot-in-Charge)

(Figure in %)

Item

s

Areas

Bar

eilly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r K

heri

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Total

Single Block 0.0 0.0 25.0 66.7 25.0 100.0 0.0 66.7 33.3Some Blocks 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 11.1Whole Tehsil 100.0 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 22.2Allotted FPSs of some Blocks

0.0 0.0 25.0 33.3 75.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 33.3

Kero

sene

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Single Block 33.3 66.7 100.0 66.7 0.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 61.9Some Blocks 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 66.7 50.0 0.0 0.0 14.3Whole Tehsil 66.7 33.3 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 19.0Allotted FPSs of some Blocks

0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.8

Food

-gra

in

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0Source: Field Survey.

5.31 Management of the stock post-distribution of items to FPS dealers For 44.4 per cent of the depots, no balance remains post-allotment. For one-fourth of

the depots, the post-allotment balance remains in stock and is sold on order. It is

surprising that nearly one-fifth of the depot-in-charge do not know how they

utilize/manage the balance. The ignorance factor is absent in five districts, and

present through response in the districts, namely, Varanasi, Lalitpur and Gorakhpur.

For 42.9 per cent of the Godowns, no balance remains post-allotment. For one-third

of the Godowns, the post-allotment balance remains in stock and is sold on order.

Nearly one-tenth of the Godown-in-charge do not know how they utilize/manage the

balance. In the district Varanasi, cent per cent of the balance is reported to be

227

adjusted next month, which is for one-third of the Godowns in Lucknow. The

ignorance factor is absent in six districts, and present through response in the

districts, namely, Bareilly and Gorakhpur. Table 5.51

Utilization/Management of the stock post-distribution of items to FPS dealers (As Reported by Godown in-charge and Depot-in-Charge)

(Figure in Numbers)

Type

of

Item

s

Utilization/Management B

arei

lly

Bad

aun

Lakh

impu

r K

heri

Luck

now

Lalit

pur

Jhan

si

Gor

akhp

ur

Vara

nasi

Total

Remain balance in stock and initiate sale on order

33.3 33.3 25.0 66.7 0.0 33.3 0.0 33.3 25.9

Remain in balance 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 Ignorance 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 50.0 66.7 18.5 No Balance against allotment 66.7 66.7 25.0 33.3 50.0 66.7 50.0 0.0 44.4 K

eros

ene

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Remain balance in stock and initiate sale on order

33.3 33.3 0.0 0.0 66.7 100.0 50.0 0.0 33.3

Adjusted in next month 0.0 0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 100.0 14.3 Ignorance 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 9.5 No Balance against allotment 33.3 66.7 100.0 66.7 33.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 42.9 Fo

od G

rain

s

Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 Source: Field Survey.

5.32 Corrective Measures if the FPS Dealers not satisfied with Quality of Items In the context that the FPS dealers are often not satisfied with the quality of items to

be lifted by them, the responsibility of the Godown-in-charge is either to change the

item by quality or to convince them about the quality. Two-thirds of the Godown-in-

charge opined that the distributable items are not poor, as alleged. 28.6 per cent of

the Godowns reported that they change the items if available. Only one Godown

reported that the FPS dealers refuse to lift the items in case they perceive the quality

is poor (Table 5.52). Table 5.52

Corrective Measures initiated if the FPS dealers not satisfied with quality of items (Perception of Godown-in-charge)

Items Changed if Available

Dealers refuse to take the Items

Items are not Poor by

quantity

Total Districts

No. % No. % No. % No. % Bareilly 2 66.7 0 0.0 1 33.3 3 100.0

Badaun 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 100.0 3 100.0

Lakhimpur Kheri 0 0.0 0 0.0 3 100.0 3 100.0

Lucknow 1 33.3 0 0.0 2 66.7 3 100.0

Lalitpur 1 33.3 0 0.0 2 66.7 3 100.0

Jhansi 0 0.0 0 0.0 2 100.0 2 100.0

Gorakhpur 1 50.0 0 0.0 1 50.0 2 100.0

Varanasi 1 50.0 1 50.0 0 0.0 2 100.0

Total 6 28.6 1 4.8 14 66.7 21 100.0

Source: Field Survey.

228

5.33 Loss of Foodgrains and Kerosene per Year due to Management Inadequacy

While most of the Godown-in-charge (95.2) reported loss of foodgrains due to

inadequate management facility, half of the kerosene oil depot owners/managers

reported loss in kerose for the same cause. Jhansi is the exception where all the

depots confirmed ‘no loss’ in kerosene and Lucknow is the exception where all the

depots confirmed ‘loss’ in the item. In case of kerosene, no district excepting Lalitput

reported loss in items due to inadequate management Table 5.53

Loss of food-grains and Kerosene per Year due to Management Inadequacy (As Reported by Godown in-charge and Depot-in-Charge)

(Figure in %) Depot-in-Charge Godown-in-charge

Districts Loss No Loss

Total Loss No Loss

Total

Bareilly 66.7 33.3 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0

Badaun 33.3 66.7 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0

Lakhimpur Kheri 25.0 75.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0

Lucknow 100.0 0.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0

Lalitpur 50.0 50.0 100.0 33.3 66.7 100.0

Jhansi 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0

Gorakhpur 50.0 50.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0

Varanasi 66.7 33.3 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0

Total 48.1 51.9 100.0 4.8 95.2 100.0

Source: Field Survey.

Of the depot owners/managers who reported loss in kerosene, the major

reason cited (69.2 per cent reporting) is the variation in temperature between the

time of filling (in the company) and the delivery at depot. Another 23.1 per cent

reported leakage problem at filling point during delivery. Of the foodgrain Godown-in-

charge who reported loss in items, the major reasons cited are inadequate capacity

of the Godown and location of the Godown at different places (cent per cent reporting

in each case). For loss of foodgrains, from the Godown-in-charge there is no other

reason (Table 5.54) Table 5.54

Reasons for Loss of Foodgrains and Kerosene (As Reported by Godown in-Charge and Depot-in-Charge)

Kerosene Depot Food-grain Godown Reasons No. % No. %

Temperature variation between the time of Filling (company) and delivery (depot)

969.2

0 0.0

Leakage problem at filling point during delivery 3 23.1 0 0.0Density variation between company and depot 1 7.7 0 0.0Inadequate capacity of Godown 0 0.0 1 100.0Godown situated at different places 0 0.0 1 100.0NR 2 15.4 0 0.0Total 13 100.0 1 100.0Source: Field Survey.

229

5.34 Kerosene Depots and Foodgrains Godowns inspected by

Government officials Cent per cent of the kerosene oil depots in districts Bareilly, Badaun, Lakhimpur

Kheri and Gorakhpur reported that the high-level officials inspected the depots during

the last quarter of 2006. Excepting Lucknow and Lakhimpur Kheri, cent per cent of

the Godown-in-charge reported the same for their Godowns. The district-wise

variations in reporting led to differences in response on average. While one-fourth of

the depot owners/managers on average over all the districts reported non-inspection,

one-fifth of the Godown-in-charge reported non response of the Godowns (Table

5.55). Table 5.55

Kerosene Depots and Food-grains Godowns inspected by high level officials During Quarter ending 2006

(Figure in %) Kerosene Food-grains Districts

Yes No Total Yes No Total Bareilly 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 Badaun 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 Lakhimpur Kheri 100.0 0.0 100.0 33.3 66.7 100.0 Lucknow 33.3 66.7 100.0 33.3 66.7 100.0 Lalitpur 50.0 50.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 Jhansi 66.7 33.3 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 Gorakhpur 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 Varanasi 33.3 66.7 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0 Total 74.1 25.9 100.0 81.0 19.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey. A total of 20 representatives of oil depot and 17 representatives of Godown-

in-charge reported whether the authorities assigned to inspect the Godowns and

depot really inspected or not. None of the regional manager, accountant-in-

charge/district-in-charge, district supply officer, regional food controller and DFMO

ever inspected the kerosene oil depot as reported by the depot-in-charge. All the

identified catalysts assigned to inspect the foodgrains Godowns inspected, with the

highest inspection reported in case of the SDM (Table 5.56).

230

Table 5.56 Inspection of the Food-grain Godown/Kerosene Depot by Officials

(As Reported by Godown in-Charge and Depot-in-Charge) Kerosene Food-grains Officials

No. % No. % Sub-Divisional Magistrate 8 40.0 6 35.3 Tehsildar / Nayab Tehsildar 4 20.0 1 5.9 Block Development Officer/Supply Inspector 3 15.0 1 5.9 Regional Manager (SFC) 0 0.0 2 11.8 Accountant in-charge/District in-charge 0 0.0 1 5.9 District Supply Officer 0 0.0 1 5.9 Regional Food Controller 0 0.0 1 5.9 Assistant Manager Sales (IOC) 3 15.0 0.0 DFMO 0 0.0 1 5.9 NR 2 10.0 3 17.6 Total 20 100.0 17 100.0

Source: Field Survey. 5.35 Coordination among Supply Department, FPS Dealers and

Godown-In-charge Three-fourths of the depots opined that the coordination among the Supply

Department, FPS dealers and depot-in-charge is good, while the rest argued for the

necessity for improvement. Cent per cent of the depots revealed the coordination

‘good’ in the districts Badaun, Lucknow, Jhansi and Gorakhpur. The depots

suggesting for improvement most are from the district Lakhimpur Kheri. Four-fifths of

the Godowns opined that the coordination among the Supply Department, FPS

dealers and Godown-in-charge is good, while the rest argued for the necessity for

improvement. Cent per cent of the depots in all the districts revealed the coordination

‘good’ excepting Lalitpur, Varanasi and Gorakhpur. Cent per cent of the Godowns

suggesting for improvement are from the district Varanasi (Table 5.57).

231

Table 5.57 Coordination among Supply Department, FPS Dealers and Godown-In-charge

Kerosene Food-grains

Districts Figure

in Good Need for improvement

Total Good Need for improvement

Total

No. 2 1 3 3 0 3 Bareilly % 66.7 33.3 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0

No. 3 0 3 3 0 3 Badaun % 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0

No. 1 3 4 3 0 3 Lakhimpur Kheri % 25.0 75.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0

No. 3 0 3 3 0 3 Lucknow % 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0

No. 2 2 4 2 1 3 Lalitpur % 50.0 50.0 100.0 66.7 33.3 100.0

No. 3 0 3 2 0 2 Jhansi % 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0 0.0 100.0

No. 4 0 4 1 1 2 Gorakhpur % 100.0 0.0 100.0 50.0 50.0 100.0

No. 2 1 3 0 2 2 Varanasi % 66.7 33.3 100.0 0.0 100.0 100.0

No. 20 7 27 17 4 21 Total % 74.1 25.9 100.0 81.0 19.0 100.0

Source: Field Survey. 5.36 Problems and Suggestions of Food-grains Godowns and

Kerosene Depots In-charge Excepting one, all the depots reported problems in performing duty in the depots

while 61.9 per cent of the Godown-in-charge reported problems in performing duties.

The major problems reported in case of depots include pressures and responsibilities

imposed by government functionaries, higher level officials in the government

suspecting the depots staff, short duration fixed for distribution of oil, high price gap

between kerosene oil and diesel leading to black marketing of kerosene etc. The

major problems reported by the Godowns include high level government officials

suspecting the Godowns staff, inadequate capacity of Godown, health (individual)

problems etc (Table 5.58).

232

Table 5.58 Problems while Performing Duty at Godown/Depot (As Reported by Godown in-charge and Depot-in-Charge)

Kerosene Food-grains Problems No % No. %

Faced problems due to non-availability of contractors 0 0.0 2 9.5 Items loss due to inadequate capacity of godown 0 0.0 2 9.5 Inadequate availability of stationary from owner 1 3.7 0 0.0 Individual health problems 1 3.7 2 9.5 Family liability 0 0.0 1 4.8 Higher level officers always suspect 6 22.2 7 33.3 Various types of pressures and responsibilities fixed by government functionary and owner

11 40.7 0 0.0

Very short duration fixed for distribution of items by the district administration

5 18.5 0 0.0

Individual Insecurity 3 11.1 0 0.0 High price gap between kerosene and diesel create black-marketing of kerosene

5 18.5 0 0.0

Fear of contractors involved in transportation 0 0.0 1 4.8 No Problems 1 3.7 8 38.1 Total 27 100.0 21 100.0

Source: Field Survey. The Godown-in-charge (4) as well as depot-in-charge (7) suggested a

number of measures for improvement of the delivery system of depots and Godowns.

The major suggestion by the depots was centered on the role of the higher level

officials who had to understand the problems of the staff (71.4 per cent of the depots

reporting). The other suggestions included decision on fixing a date for FPS dealers

to lift oil (28.6 per cent suggesting), controlling those FPS dealers who derive illegal

benefits (28.6 per cent suggesting), reducing Government control over the FPS

dealers etc.

The major suggestion for improvement of Godowns was controlling the FPS

dealers who derived illegal benefits. In case of foodgrains, the suggestion on

enhanced delivery limit and prompt transportation services came which was

reportedly not suggested by the depots (Table 5.59).

233

Table 5.59 Suggestions by Godown in-charge and Depot-in-charge for Improvement

Kerosene Food-grains Suggestions No. % No. % Lifting date for FPS dealer should be decided 2 28.6 1 25.0Higher level officer must understand problems of staff 5 71.4 0 0.0Needed clear communication among all functionaries 1 14.3 1 25.0Needed reduced government formality for execution by FPS dealers 1 14.3 0 0.0Increased delivery limit of food-grains /Prompt transportation services 0 0.0 1 25.0Controlling those FPS dealers who take illegal benefits 2 28.6 2 50.0Distributing items through creation of government depot 0.0 1 25.0Total 7 100.0 4 100.0

Source: Field Survey.

As reported by Depot-in-Charge, which by itself is a small number, the major

suggestion for improvement of distribution of kerosene oil under PDS centers on

enhanced incentives to the FPS dealers, fixing quota for the wholesale dealer,

provision of distribution of LPG along with kerosene from the depot, increased

incentives of the depot owners, establishing depot at block level etc.

As reported by Godown-in-Charge, which by itself is a small number, the

major suggestion for improvement of distribution of kerosene oil under PDS centers

on enhanced incentives to the FPS dealers, increased incentives of the Godown

staff, establishing Godown at block level, ensuring supply of foodgrains within the

district, improving the transportation services and controlling the contractors involved

in carrying the items etc (Table 5.60). Table 5.60

Suggestions for Improvement of PDS (As Reported by Godown in-Charge and Depot-in-Charge)

Kerosene Food-grains Suggestions No. % No. %

Increase the incentives of FPS Dealers 2 28.6 2 33.3Provision should be made for distribution of LPG along with kerosene Oil to depot owners 1 14.3 0 0.0Allotment/quota should be fully fixed for wholesale dealer 2 28.6 0 0.0Provision should be made for home delivery of items to FPS dealers 1 14.3 0 0.0Increase the incentives of oil depot owner 1 14.3 1 16.7Kerosene should be distributed only to BPL households 1 14.3 0 0.0Establish depot/Godown at block level 1 14.3 1 16.7Increase the allotment of items 1 14.3 0 0.0Supply of food-grains & kerosene should be within the district 0 0.0 2 33.3Issue the BPL & ANT Ration Cards to actual beneficiaries 0 0.0 1 16.7Improve the transportation services and control the contractors involved in carrying the commodities 0 0.0 1 16.7Total Respondents given suggestions 7 25.9 6 28.6Respondents with no suggestions 20 74.1 15 71.4Total Sample 27 100.0 21 100.0

Note: The suggestions calculated on total Respondents given the suggestions and other percentage calculated on total sample.

Source: Field Survey.

234

Section 4: Role of Government Functionaries 5.37 Profile of Functionaries by Area and Designation In all, we could collect information about PDS in the selected districts from 26

functionaries of which 20 are supply inspectors and 6 are district supply officers

(DSOs). Excepting Lakhimpur Kheri and Gorakhpur, we could collect information

from the rest of the DSOs in the other six districts. All the districts were represented

by supply inspectors while we sought information (Table 5.61). Table 5.61

Profile of Functionaries Designation District

Tehsil

Total

Region District

No. % No. % DSOs* Supply

Inspector No. % Bareilly 1 25.0 3 75.0 1 3 4 100.0Badaun 1 25.0 3 75.0 1 3 4 100.0

Western Total 2 25.0 6 75.0 2 6 8 100.0

Lakhimpur Kheri - - 2 100.0 - 2 2 100.0Lucknow 1 25.0 3 75.0 1 3 4 100.0

Central Total 1 16.7 5 83.3 1 5 6 100.0

Lalitpur 1 25.0 3 75.0 1 3 4 100.0Jhansi 1 33.3 2 66.7 1 2 3 100.0

Bundelkhand Total 2 28.6 5 71.4 2 5 7 100.0

Gorakhpur - - 2 100.0 - 2 2 100.0Varanasi 1 33.3 2 66.7 1 2 3 100.0

Eastern Total 1 20.0 4 80.0 1 4 5 100.0 Total Sample

6 23.1 20 76.9 6 20 26 100.0

Note: *District Supply Officer - Data not available (We could not receive district level data from Lakhimpur Kheri

and Gorakhpur). Source: Field Survey. Considered over three years, 2004, 2005 and 2006, the number of FPSs in the six

districts from where we got information is like the following:

Over all the six districts, the average number of FPSs at the district level

increased in 2005 over 2004 by 4.1 per cent, which got reduced a little in 2006,

the reference point being April for all the selected years.

Over all the six districts, the average number of FPSs at the tehsil level got

reduced in 2005 over 2004 by only one and further got reduced in 2006 by 9.1

per cent over 2005, the reference point being April for all the selected years.

We do not have district level data on number of FPSs for Bareilly and Badaun for

2004. For 2004, Varanasi shows maximum number of FPSs at district level, while

for 2005 it was Bareilly and for 2006 it was Badaun. The minimum number of

FPSs at the district level in each of the years, 2004-06, was that of Lalitpur. Thus,

235

there are variations in the number of functioning FPSs at the district level. At the

tehsil level, in each of 2004 and 2005, we find maximum number of FPSs for

Badaun. For 2006, the maximum number of FPSs is that of Varanasi. For 2006

we do not have data on number of FPSs at the tehsil level for Bareilly and

Badaun (Table 5.62). Table 5.62

Number of FPSs at District and Tehsil Levels District Level Tehsil Level

District April 04 April 05 April 06 April 04 April 05 April 06 Bareilly 0 1645 1622 223 222 0 Badaun 0 1636 1636 287 279 0 Lucknow 1175 1192 1218 123 121 121 Lalitpur 488 500 484 136 143 143 Jhansi 747 756 752 183 185 187 Varanasi* 2100 1317 1318 255 250 300 Total 1128 1174 1172 205 204 187

*The district Chandauli was included in year 2004 within Varanasi. Source: Field Survey.

5.38 Norms Fixed by the Government for Allotment of FPSs and

Suggested Amendments in Selection of Norms We got a number of views from the officials (DSOs and supply inspectors) that show

the norms and procedures for allotment of a fair price shop. Most of them opined that

the name of the dealer should be proposed by Gram Sabha, followed by the criterion

of education and minimum saving in bank, no criminal allegation, must complete 21

years (adult), having an FPS in a rural area with a population minimum 4000, and

that FPS should be set up in a location and dealer appointed following Government

Order (Table 5.63). Table 5.63

Procedures and Norms fixed by the Government for Allotment of a Fair Price Shop (Opinion of Functionaries)

District Tehsil Total Norms No. % No. % No. %

Dealer must be local 1 16.7 6 30.0 7 26.9Must be educated having Rs. 40,000 as saving in his bank account

2 33.3 8 40.0 10 38.5

Completed 21 years of age 3 50.0 2 10.0 5 19.2Having good social character 2 33.3 4 20.0 6 23.1Must not be criminal 0 0.0 7 35.0 7 26.9There is no other dealership in his family 1 16.7 2 10.0 3 11.5His name should be proposed by Gram Sabha 2 33.3 16 80.0 18 69.2Only random method used for urban area 2 33.3 2 10.0 4 15.4Deputed an FPS in rural area on 4000 population 0 0.0 4 20.0 4 15.4As per prescribed government orders 1 16.7 7 35.0 8 30.8No Response 1 16.7 0 0.0 1 3.8Total 6 100.0 20 100.0 26 100.0

Source: Field Survey.

236

Of 26 functionaries, 21 did not suggest amendments in selection of norms for

FPS dealer. This may imply that in view of the majority of the functionaries, the

prevailing norms were all right. This may also imply inertia in suggesting

amendments. Of those who suggested amendments, the aspects included

withdrawing the prevailing rights of the PRIs regarding FPS dealers, making

minimum qualification for the dealer high school standard and above, making

reservation policy easier etc. Suggestions were forwarded at both the levels, district

(DSOs) and tehsil (supply inspectors) (Table 5.64). Table 5.64

Suggested Amendments in Selection of Norms for FPS Dealer (Opinion of Functionaries) Suggestions District Tehsil Total

Rights of PRIs regarding FPS Dealer should be withdrawn 2 2 4 Reservation policy should be easy for selection of FPS dealer 2 2 4 Minimum qualification must be defined and should be high school and above 0 2 2 Total who wanted amendment 2 3 5 Total who did not want amendment 4 17 21 Total functionaries 6 20 26

Source: Field Survey. 5.39 Eligibility Criteria for Selection of Beneficiary under Different

Schemes

Of the total 26 functionaries, one in rural and five in urban region did not suggest norms for issuing BPL type cards to the households. Most of those who suggested,

the major criterion/norm revolves around household income, that has to be below Rs.

19,884 in rural and Rs. 25,564 in urban region. One major suggestion also centered

on BPL survey. The other suggestions/norms include issuing BPL cards to

households who are in unorganized/informal sector and GO (Table 5.65). Table 5.65

Norms for Issuing BPL Ration Cards to Households (As opined by the Functionaries)

Rural Urban Norms No. % No. %

Household income should be below Rs. 19,884 for Rural and Rs.25,546 for Urban area per annum

12 46.2 11 42.3

Income of household should not be above Rs. 19,000 per annum 1 3.8 1 3.8As per BPL survey 8 30.8 7 26.9Occupations of members in the household should be in the unorganized sector

2 7.7 1 3.8

As per Government Order 2 7.7 0 0.0Household income not exceeding Rs. 11,000 per annum 1 3.8 1 3.8No Response 1 3.8 5 19.2Total 26 100.0 26 100.0Source: Field Survey.

237

Excepting one supply inspector at the tehsil level all the DSOs and supply

inspectors opined on the eligibility criteria of beneficiary under Antyodaya Yajana.

Most of them opined in favour of setting the criteria based on landlessness, no pakka

house and no income generating assets. Some opined in favour of fixing the criteria

based on households headed by widow, no permanent occupation or no income

support etc. Many opined to set the criteria based on Government order. A few

others opined in favour of households who receive no pension and no loan from

formal sector (Table 5.66). Table 5.66

Eligibility Criteria of Beneficiary under Antyodaya Yojana (As opined by the Functionaries)

District Tehsil Total Eligibility No. % No. % No. %

Household has not received any pension/ loan from any government department

1 16.7 2 10.0 3 11.5

Household should not have own land, pakka house or income generating assets

2 33.3 11 55.0 9 34.6

Occupation of the household should not be permanent

1 16.7 1 5.0 1 3.8

Covered all Tribal (‘Adiwasi) households 1 16.7 2 10.0 1 3.8Household headed by widow 1 16.7 4 20.0 3 11.5Helpless or have no income support 0 0.0 5 25.0 1 3.8As per Government order 4 66.7 12 60.0 9 34.6No Response 0 0.0 1 5.0 1 3.8Total 6 100.0 20 100.0 26 100.0

Source: Field Survey. Excepting one supply inspector at the tehsil level all the DSOs and supply inspectors

opined on the eligibility criteria of beneficiary under Annapurna Yojana. Most of the

functionaries opined in favour of entitlement of persons who have attained 65 years.

Many others opined in favour of persons who do not get any pension from any other

scheme. Most of the functionaries opined in favour of those who have no income

support and who are helpless. Some others opined in favour of fixing eligibility of

households for Annapurna Yojana as per Government Order (Table 5.67). Table 5.67

Eligibility Criteria of Beneficiary under Annapurna Yojana District Tehsil Total Eligibility

No. % No. % No. % Pensioner must have attained 65 years 4 66.7 15 75.0 19 73.1Programme was suspended 2 33.3 2 10.0 4 15.4Person not getting any pension from any other scheme

3 50.0 10 50.0 13 50.0

Helpless or have no income support 4 66.7 15 75.0 19 73.1As per Government Order 1 16.7 1 5.0 2 7.7No Response 0 0.0 1 5.0 1 3.8Total 6 100.0 20 100.0 26 100.0

Source: Field Survey.

238

5.40 Items Distributed and Requirement Fulfilled through PDS On average a BPL cardholder gets 35 kg. of rice of which distribution of wheat

remains more in each of the selected districts. The same is true for ANT cardholders

excepting that for them distribution of rice remains more than wheat for each of the

districts. On average, a cardholder gets 4.1 lt. of kerosene oil that varies over districts

from a minimum at 3.3 lt. for Lalitpur and maximum at 5.0 for Lakhimpur Kheri. On

average, sugar is distributed per unit 700 grams that is reported to be the same for

each district excepting Jhansi (Table 5.68). Table 5.68

Average Quantity of Items Distributed under Different Types of Ration Cards BPL2 ANT2 Districts

Rice Wheat Total Rice Wheat Total

Sugar1

Kerosene2

Bareilly 20 15 35 20 15 35 700 3.6Badaun 20 15 35 20 15 35 700 3.5Lakhimpur Kheri 25 10 35 25 10 35 700 5.0Lucknow 25 10 35 25 10 35 700 4.5Lalitpur 20 15 35 20 15 35 700 3.3Jhansi 20 15 35 20 15 35 633 4.3Gorakhpur 25 10 35 25 10 35 700 4.3Varanasi 25 10 35 25 10 35 700 4.1

Note: 1: Per unit quantity (gram) and 2: Per Ration Card Source: Field Survey. There is a difference in reports at the levels of district and tehsil so far as

requirements of households for distributed items are concerned. For BPL rice, wheat

and sugar the average requirement for each at the district level is higher than that at

the tehsil level. For kerosene, the tehsil level reported requirement of households is a

little more than that reported at the district level. The same pattern is true so far as

report on households’ requirement for items under Antyodaya is concerned. For APL

households, tehsil level reported requirement is more than that of district level

requirement (Table 5.69). Table-5.69

Requirement of Households Fulfilled by PDS (Opinion of Functionaries)

Ration Cards

Items District Tehsil Total

Rice 96.7 77.2 82.0 Wheat 90.0 60.6 68.0 Sugar 91.7 76.5 80.8 BPL

Kerosene 85.0 88.3 87.4 Rice 96.7 76.3 81.4 Wheat 90.0 60.3 68.0 Sugar 91.7 75.3 80.0

Anatyodaya Yojana

Kerosene 85.0 88.3 87.4 Sugar 0.0 40.0 40.0 APL Kerosene 72.0 85.1 82.1

Source: Field Survey.

239

5.41 Monitoring Methods Adopted for Betterment of PDS The methods adopted by the functionaries, as reported by them excepting one non-

response, include different levels of inspection/control. These levels cover

consumers, FPS dealers, regional offices and regional Godown/Depot. Most of the

functionaries reported that they follow three-tier checking and monitoring system at

all the levels mentioned. It is also reported that the SDM, BDOs and tehsildar

regularly monitor/verify at all the levels under their respective jurisdictions. The action

against FPS dealer is reported by three functionaries based on complaints. Excepting

at the level of the consumers, it is reported that the supply inspectors, ARO, DSO

etc. perform physical verification of items (Table 5.70). Table 5.70

Monitoring Methods Adopted for Betterment of Public Distribution System in the District

(As Reported by the Functionaries)

Consumers

FPS Dealers

Regional Offices

Regional Godown/Depot

Methods

No. % No. % No. % No. % Distribution system verified by asking consumers about it

10 38.5 2 7.7 0 0.0 1 3.8

Followed the government order strictly 0 0.0 2 7.7 1 3.8 3 11.5Physical verification by supply inspector, Lekhpal, ARO, DSO etc.

0 0.0 1 3.8 4 15.4 1 3.8

Follow three-tier checking and monitoring system

14 53.8 19 73.1 17 65.4 20 76.9

Verified by the SDM, BDOs, Tehsildar, etc. 3 11.5 3 11.5 4 15.4 4 15.4Monitoring through vigilance committee 2 7.7 2 7.7 2 7.7 1 3.8Steps taken regarding complaint against FPS Dealer through FIR, Cancellation, Suspension of Shop etc.

0 0.0 3 11.5 0 0.0 0 0.0

No Response 1 3.8 0 0.0 0 0.0 0 0.0Total 26 100.0 26 100.0 26 100.0 26 100.0

Source: Field Survey. 5.42 Number of Ration Cards Cancelled During Verification Regarding cancellation of cards, we did not get data for 2004-05 for Bareilly and

Badaun. For 2005-06, we did not get data regarding cancellation of cards for APL

only. Of total cancellation of cards in 2004-05, APL cancellation was 79.6 per cent,

which was 13.2 per cent for BPL, 0.4 for ANP and 6.8 for ANT. Of total cancellation

of cards in 2005-06, APL cancellation was 35.9 per cent, which was 37.5 per cent for

BPL, 2.3 for ANP and 24.2 for ANT. There are district wise variations in the

percentages of cards by types cancelled during the past two years (Table 5.71).

240

Table 5.71 Number of Ration Cards Cancelled during 2004-05 and 2005-06

2004-05 2005-06 District

APL BPL ANP ANT Total APL BPL ANP ANT Total

No. - - - - - - 2887 194 1373 4454Bareilly % - - - - - - 64.8 4.4 30.8 100.0

No. - - - - - - 2259 120 1930 4309Badaun % - - - - - - 52.4 2.8 44.8 100.0

No. 9807 798 0 312 10917 8966 801 0 398 10165Lucknow % 89.8 7.3 0.0 2.9 100.0 88.2 7.9 0.0 3.9 100.0

No. 267 230 17 91 605 403 319 35 197 954Lalitpur % 44.1 38.0 2.8 15.0 100.0 42.2 33.4 3.7 20.6 100.0

No. 289 688 39 476 1492 311 1563 0 929 2803Jhansi % 19.4 46.1 2.6 31.9 100.0 11.1 55.8 0.0 33.1 100.0

No. - - - - - - 2282 273 1698 4253Varanasi % - - - - - - 53.7 6.4 39.9 100.0

No. 10363 1716 56 879 13014 9680 10111 622 6525 26938Total % 79.6 13.2 0.4 6.8 100.0 35.9 37.5 2.3 24.2 100.0

Note: - Means there is no cancellation of Ration Card. Source: Field Survey. 5.43 Problems of Functionaries The problems faced by the functionaries in conducting necessary duties, as reported

by them, are mentioned in Box 5.17. Box 5.17

Problems Faced by the Officials in Conducting Duties (As reported by the Functionaries)

Problems

It is difficult to do duty due to political interference Shortage of staff in the supply department Staff Demoralized due to non-promotion in the department Subordinates dominate over the higher level officials of the department No active support from other departments Variation in salary of the staff Others ( Insecurity, and deprivation from service benefits)

Source: Field Survey.

5.44 Suggestions of Functionaries Excepting one at the district level, we got suggestions from all the functionaries for

improvement of the PDS. Most of these suggestions focused on increased allotment

and hence fulfilling the requirements of the consumers. Suggestions have also been

offered on increasing the target of ANT and BPL ration cards for each district,

increased quantity of wheat to be distributed at the level of consumers, creation of

awareness among consumers based on ‘rights’, increased allotment of kerosene for

distribution etc (Table 5.72).

241

Table 5.72

Methods to improve PDS if the consumer's requirement not fulfilled (Suggestions of Functionaries)

District Tehsil Total Suggestions

No. % No. % No. % Increase the allotment and fulfilled the requirement of consumers 4 66.7 12 60.0 16 61.5cent per cent BPL and ANT should be covered under the programme 3 50.0 6 30.0 9 34.6Increase the quantity of wheat at household level 0 0.0 4 20.0 4 15.4Increase the allotment of kerosene for the district 4 66.7 7 35.0 11 42.3Increase the quantity of sugar at household level 0 0.0 2 10.0 2 7.7Create awareness among consumers regarding their rights 1 16.7 4 20.0 5 19.2Increase the target of ANT and BPL ration cards for the district 3 50.0 9 45.0 12 46.2No Response 1 16.7 0 0.0 1 3.8Total 6 100.0 20 100.0 26 100.0

Source: Field Survey. Suggestions for improvement of PDS as perceived by the functionaries have been

cited in Box 5.18. Box 5.18

Suggestions for Improvement of PDS (As perceived by the Functionaries)

Suggestions Entrust all the responsibility with a single department Ensure Allotment based on local needs Increase the incentive of FPS dealers Withdraw the ANT scheme and launch single BPL Ration Card to all poor households Stop the unnecessary interference of Gram Pradhans and Politicians Provide transportation facility and field allowance for FPS dealers Give the honorarium to FPS dealers

Source: Field Survey.

242

Principal Secretary, Food &

Civil Supply STATE

District

Tehsil Area Rationing

Officer Senior Supply

Inspector Senior Clerks/

Clerks Accountant

CD Block

Gram Panchayat

Gram Pradhan & committee

Gram Panchayat Officer/

Lekhpal

Commissioner, Food & Civil

Supply

Additional Commissioner, Food & Civil

Supply

Deputy Commissioner, Food & Civil

Supply

Assistant Commissioner, Food & Civil

Supply

District Magistrate

Additional District

Magistrate

District Supply Officer

Senior Clerks/ Clerks

Accountant

Supply Inspector

One single supply inspector monitors approximately 70 to 80 fair price shops and responsible for proper

distribution

There is no village level worker of supply departmental at this level and generally all the works conducted by

other dept. workers

Village Fair Price Shop

ADMINISTRATIVE STRUCTURE OF SUPPLY DEPARTMENT IN U.P.

Sub-District Magistrate

Chapter VI

Field Diary: Qualitative Observations

This chapter is a documentation of the observations we made while conducting the

study in the eight districts of Uttar Pradesh, two from each of the four regions by

geographic-administrative division of the state. The observations constitute the

qualitative data that we could not capture quantitatively. We offer in this chapter

district-wise information on the distribution system. These observations were based

on interviews with beneficiary, non- beneficiary, representatives of Gram Panchayat,

Fair Price Shop dealers, government functionary, concerned food-grains godown/

kerosene depot and many events which happened during our visit of selected

districts. Here we try to avoid the names of the respondents who reported various

facts to us but some names have been mentioned in streamed cases.

6.1 District: Bareily In the Bareilly district, we observed no standard criteria for categorizing families living

Above Poverty Line (APL) or Below Poverty Line (BPL). The Village Development

Department had decided that families whose income was less than Rs. 11,500 per

annum would be identified as BPL. The Supply Department, however, does not

consider families with income per annum between Rs. 9,001 and Rs. 11,500 as

being BPL. The Village Development Department, grants these families all the

benefits of welfare schemes on the other hand launched by the government.

We noticed that while issuing BPL and Antyodaya ration cards, the list of BPL

families in the village was not followed but an arbitrary criterion for identification was

used. In fact, in none of the selected villages did the Gram Panchayat have a final list

of BPL families based on some definite criteria. The tentative lists that were found

with some Gram Panchayats had the following shortcomings:

The number of BPL families was found to change often, the reason being that

the Pradhan kept adding people of his own choice to the list.

The economic/family register of the BPL families was never found to be

updated.

The basis of selection of BPL families and the duration of time for their

remaining BPL was unclear.

In some villages, many lists of BPL families were found.

243

In some villages, instead of a complete description of all the family members,

only the name of the head of the family and the number of members in his

family was mentioned in the list.

In all the selected villages, the number of ration cards of various kinds

mentioned in the records was much more than the actual number of people having

ration cards. Investigation at the local level revealed that the responsibility of getting

ration cards made was given to the Lekhpal/Patwari of the Revenue Department.

These officers took bribes of Rs. 100 to Rs. 500 per card and got ration cards made

without judging the economic status of the persons. These ration cards were not

mentioned in the records of the FPS dealers, Supply Department or the Gram

Panchayat. When the consumer went to the ration shop with the cards, he was given

items according to his actual status. The pressure of the powerful people and of the

elected representatives of the village (on the Lekhpal/Patwari) also compelled them

to issue these cards.

In the selected village the items are distributed only during a period of one to

seven days. After that the items are sold by the FPS dealers in the open market at

market prices. According to the FPS dealers, information regarding the arrival of

essential commodities and the period till when they will be supplied, is given to the

cardholders by posting notices at temples, mosques etc., and also by making

announcements on loudspeakers. The villagers, however, reported that no such

information is provided. Either they themselves go to the shop to find out when the

supplies will be coming or they get the information when they see other people of

their colonies bringing back their supplies.

The supply of provisions for such a short duration arbitrarily decided by the

FPS dealers deprives many poor people of the facilities of the PDS. Many of them

are unable to buy their share during that period because of work pressure that

prevents them from taking leave, illness in the family, or non-availability of cash to

buy the commodities. We also observed the commodities being sold to the

cardholders at prices higher than that fixed by the government. This fact is known to

the officials at all levels.

We found a high discrepancy between the actual stock and the amount

mentioned in the stock register of the Fair Price Shops. The following are some

observations made about the shops and the dealers:

The educational level of most of the FPS dealers is very low, which prevents

them from making proper entries or maintaining correct accounts.

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Most FPS dealers do not have adequate space in their shops to store the

allotted kerosene oil and the food grains.

The old age (around 65 years) of the FPS dealers also kept them from

carrying out their duties efficiently.

At most places the record of the amount allotted to the FPS dealers and

collected by them from the godowns and oil depots every month were not

maintained properly.

The image of the FPS dealers among the local community was found to be

very bad.

Most of the FPS dealers had been holding the dealership for such a long time

that they had acquired a monopoly.

We found that in most villages the Panchayats were not playing proper role in

facilitating the PDS. The following observations may show the role of the Panchayats

in this District so far as the functioning of PDS is concerned:

No vigilance committee had been constituted by the Gram Panchayats in any

village to ensure proper functioning of the PDS.

BPL and ANT cards were being issued arbitrarily in the villages with the

connivance of the Panchayats.

The Panchayats had been given the authority by the district level office to

verify the distribution of commodities by the FPS dealers every month. What

we understood is that the Panchayats were taking advantage of this power to

extract money or favour from the FPS dealers and giving false verification

certificates.

The Panchayats have been given the power to cancel the ration shops under

special circumstances. This is the reason why the FPS dealers cannot

oppose the benefits demanded by the Panchayats. At many places the

people informed that if the FPS dealer is not in the same group as the

Pradhan, the latter often gets the license of the shop cancelled and merges

the cardholders with another ration shop whose FPS dealer is known to or

close to the Pradhan. In return, the Pradhan gets between Rs. 2,000 and Rs.

4,000 from the newly selected FPS dealer.

The Pradhans had very little knowledge about the welfare schemes or

policies of the government that were in practice. Neither were they aware of

the functions and duties of the Panchayats.

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Case Study Name: Jashoda Devi Age: 80 years Caste: Kashyap (BC) Development Block: Bhojipura Village: Dalpatpur Jashoda devi’s son works as a Chowkidar earning Rs. 1,500 per month. There are seven members in the family. Jashoda devi’s family has an Annapurna card and one Antyodaya card. The Annapurna card is issued in Jashoda devi’s name and she has been using the card since the last four years. In addition, she has been getting an old age pension of Rs. 1,800 per year since 1992. The family also owns 0.70 acres of land which has been leased out for seven years at Rs. 10,000. According the policy of the government, a person can get the benefit of only one scheme- either the old age pension scheme or the Annapurna scheme. But the family’s close relationship with the Pradhan, who belongs to the same caste, enabled Jashoda devi to get both the benefits. It is interesting that there has been no verification of any of the two schemes in the last so many years.

In urban areas, the

entire responsibility of the

PDS, from issuing ration cards

to ensuring proper distribution

of the commodities, lay with

the Supply Department.

However, in practice the

Supply Department passed on

its responsibilities to the FPS

dealers and did not bother to

check whether the FPS

dealers were performing their

duties properly or not. In the

Bareilly district, there are 12

wards and 5 FPS dealers, of which 4 are only responsible for distributing kerosene

oil. Only one FPS dealer distributes both food-grains and kerosene oil. This caused

great difficulty to the cardholders since this shop was quite far from most of the

villages. Often they did not receive any information regarding the arrival of the

commodities. This obstructed them from obtaining their entitlements. This fact greatly

facilitated the FPS dealers to supply some of the commodities to his close people

and siphon off the rest.

We found that an officer in the District, Mr. Santosh Kumar Yadav, (in order to

make the PDS more efficient and transparent), had implemented a three-level

vigilance system. In the first level, the top officials of the Revenue Department had to

verify all the quantities that were supplied to the godowns and the oil depots. In the

second level, an officer had to verify the commodities collected by the FPS dealers

from the godowns and oil depots. In the third level, the Lekhpal or Patwari had to

verify that the commodities had reached the FPS dealers shop and the Gram

Pradhan had to verify that the commodities had been distributed properly. This plan

of imposing a three-level check on the system to prevent corruption and

malfunctioning, in practice paved the way for a nexus between the Lekhpal, Gram

Pradhan and the FPS dealers. These helped the FPS dealers to black market a large

portion of the commodities and divide the profits between the three.

In the villages Malahpur, Girdharpur, Makmudpur and Adalpur in the Baheri

Tehsil, none of the BPL cardholders had received wheat, rice or sugar for the last

many months. The FPS dealers revealed under conditions of anonymity that the

246

henchmen of the local MLA take away all the commodities meant for the BPL

cardholders. After that they ask the FPS dealers for the register and fill it up with

false entries to show that the commodities had been distributed. They also give each

FPS dealer Rs. 50 per quintal to keep their mouth shut. According to the FPS

dealers, the top officials of the district and the Department are aware of this but

cannot take any action. In order to authenticate the report we interviewed the

Godown in-charge and the staff members of the Supply Department and they too

admitted that it was true. Thus, we found ‘economic rigging’ in the domain of PDS in

the district.

The Godown in-charge of the Bareilly Sadar district alleged that the men of

the local MP and MLA visit the Godown and pressurize him to give them occasionally

Rs. one lakh to Rs. two lakhs. The money paid is then compensated by the workers

in the Godown by selling the food-grains, meant for the cardholders, in the open

market. The officers at all levels, from the Tehsil to the district, know this fact but are

unable to stop it.

Both the BPL and ANT card holders in both villages and urban areas were

unsatisfied with the PDS because they got the same commodities at different prices.

The BPL card holders questioned why the government should discriminate in the

pricing of the same commodities when both types of cardholders were equally poor.

The FPS dealers reported that this difference often led the BPL card holders to insist

that they were charged at the same rate as the ANT card holders.

In the district, we found no fixed quantity of PDS commodities allotted to the

FPS dealers every month by the Supply Department. The amount allotted varied

under special circumstances like festivals or drought. The district supply officer

mentioned a number of problems regarding allotment. Some of them are the

following:

The other departments of the PDS and the MPs and MLAs consider the

distributable commodities to be their own resources and do politics with the

supplies and allotment, which prevents the Supply Department from taking

independent decisions.

There is a big difference between the number of sanctioned posts in the

district level supply office and the actual number of people employed which

affects the smooth functioning of the Department. For example, while there

are 20 posts of supply inspectors, only eight posts have been filled. The post

of A.R.O is also vacant and the responsibilities of this post are being carried

out by the senior inspectors.

247

The main responsibility for the implementation and functioning of the PDS lies

with the Supply Department but the main Officer of the District Office entrusts

other departments like the Revenue Development, Village Development or

any other department with the duties that the Supply Department is supposed

to perform. This often leads to mistakes, for which the Supply Department is

held responsible. In order to make the PDS more efficient, the high level officers of the district

have created a number of check points at various levels, which is causing a

number of practical problems for the Supply Department.

The Department has not been given complete freedom by the administration

to perform its duties like issuing cards, identifying BPL families, verification of

commodities and amount distributed and so on. This results in

inconsistencies at the village level which are difficult to correct.

In the absence of magisterial power, the District supply officer has to remain

dependent on the District Magistrate or the Tehsildars for action if he comes

across any incident of irregularity. In such an event he has to forward it to the

administrative officers for necessary action. Often political pressure or bribery

at the administrative level helps the culprits to get away. According to a new Government Order, the families whose income was less

than Rs. 18,500 per annum in rural areas and less than Rs. 28,000 in urban

areas should be considered to be below poverty level. If this order is

implemented, the number of BPL families will increase considerably;

however, there is no order or possibility for increasing the allocation of

commodities at the district level.

The DSO informed that the administration has fixed the target number of BPL

and ANT families while raising the income level below which families should

be considered BPL or Antyodaya. This has brought many more families to

come under the net of BPL card holders. This situation has led to a

divergence between the number of BPL families and the number of cards that

can be issued, which was beyond the jurisdiction of the DSO office to resolve.

Earlier the administration used to provide travel allowance of Rs. 400 per

month to the supply inspectors for inspection. For the last four years this grant

is not being given. This has affected the regular inspection by the supply

inspectors to ensure proper functioning of PDS.

The Supply Department did not have a master list of BPL families per village,

which made it difficult to judge the accuracy of ration cards.

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The state has given a target of BPL, ANT and ANP cards to each district,

which is proportionately distributed among the various villages lying in the

districts. In this condition many regions which do not have eligible families are

also allotted these cards while the regions which have more BPL households

do not get the requisite number. The grassroots implementing bodies also do

not like to surrender the cards allotted in their villages.

It is alleged that the supply inspectors never visit any godown to verify the

amount allotted to FPS dealers but announce their work completed sitting in

the Tehsil office.

In the Girdharpur village in the Behri district, the local people informed that

since the last four years they had not received any essential commodities

under PDS except kerosene oil which they received after every two months.

Sugar was distributed only during festivals like Holi, Diwali, Dussehra, Id etc.

At present the ANP consumers get one kg wheat per card for a period of only

three to four months in a year. Similarly, the ANT consumers get food grains

three to four times.

In the Bareilly Tehsil the supplier of kerosene oil, Mr. Atul Khanna, told us that

the administration always suspect them of being involved in malpractices. He

informed that the rise and fall of temperature causes wastage of oil since it is stored

and supplied in drums which are affected by changing temperature. This wastage is

not compensated for by the quota provided to them since only 60 liters of leakage is

permissible limit in the total 12,000 liters.

Most of the FPS dealers could not provide an accurate estimate of their

income per month. Each FPS dealer was regularly allotted the exact amount of

commodities that he was supposed to distribute, except for kerosene oil. This implies

that there was no irregularity in the supply of essential commodities from the side of

the administration. However, the problem gets started post-allotment when the FPS

dealers, irrespective of political pressure on them, diverted the supplies. We found

that there was adequate supply of commodities in the open market at prices much

higher than that fixed by the government. For example, wheat was being sold at Rs.

8.50 per kg., rice at Rs.11 to Rs. 15 per kg, sugar at Rs. 22 to Rs.23 per kg and

kerosene oil at Rs. 24 to Rs. 30 per liter. These high prices made these commodities

unaffordable for poor people, most of who work as informal labourers in the

unorganized sector. Most of them had to resort to buying cheap quality rice at Rs. 8

to Rs.9 per kg and low quality atta mixed with maize wheat at a cheap rate. In spite

of there being plenty of food grains and kerosene available in the market, poor

economic condition of the people prevents them from having access to these

249

commodities. Many of these families were found to buy the essential commodities on

credit from the grocer, borrow money at high rates from money lenders to sustain

their families, or mortgage themselves to the big farmers by working for long hours at

low wage rates till their loans were repaid.

We found that there were very few families that did not have ration cards.

This was because in the year 2005, between July and September, the Lekhpal and

activists of political parties made the administration issue cards to all the people

either by bribing them or by applying political pressure. Thus, all families had ration

cards but there was no record of these cards with the Supply Department.

Sometimes these card holders put pressure on the FPS dealers to supply them

essential commodities at PDS rates, who then gave them a little kerosene oil and

some food grains. This situation was found in all the villages selected for the study.

6.2 District: Badaun In the Badaun district it was observed that because of the large size of the district,

the posts of 15 supply inspectors had been sanctioned by the government to look

after the PDS, but only eight posts had been filled so far. In this situation many

inspectors are in charge of two or more development blocks and districts. This results

in a number of mistakes in the implementation of the PDS at the village level. The

system also often faces snags because of the ignorance and negligence of these

officers.

We observed that the food grains to be distributed under the Mid-day Meal

scheme, were supplied to schools from the godowns that stored food grains meant

for distribution under PDS through the FPSs, under the supervision of the Gram/

Nagar Panchayats. The FPS dealers, thus, had to transport a lot of extra food grains

from the godowns although there was no connection with the Supply Department.

Neither were they paid anything to cover the extra transportation cost.

We observed that an alternative system parallel to the PDS for collecting the

allotted quota of essential commodities and distribution of this quota by the FPS

dealer was in operation at the level of the district, Tehsil and development block. The

MPs, MLAs, Block Pramukh and the leaders of various political parties were involved

in the running of this parallel system. The aim of this group was to extort money at

each stage of the distribution of kerosene oil and food grains in order to strengthen

their own people financially. The members of this group were so powerful that no

officer could protest against their activities, the main reasons being the feeling of

social insecurity and the fear of transfer to another place.

We found that the supply of kerosene oil and food grains was quite regular at

the district and regional level depots and godowns. The chain from the godowns to

250

the FPS dealers and ultimately to the consumers, however, was filled with corruption

and irregularities in which a large number of people including government officials,

political leaders and Gram Pradhans were deeply involved. We observed no

vigilance committees and no consumer committees at any level of the distribution

system like district level, village level, and hamlet level to make it work efficiently. The

committees found at one or two places were totally inactive. At the selected villages,

we found most of the FPSs being run either by local power elite or having

connections with remote power elite. The FPS dealers were on good terms with the

Pradhans who had to verify regularly that the distribution was being done correctly.

This system facilitated their misconduct in distribution. The poor, illiterate and ‘right-

unconscious’ card holders remained victims for the FPS dealers and the village

Pradhans.

In some Wards of the Kuargaon block of the district (Ward No. 4 and 8) we

were told by the beneficiaries that the land holding, size and type of the house and

the economic condition, i.e., income less than Rs. 15,000 per annum for BPL

families, were considered as the basis for issuing BPL or APL cards. However, the

village Panchayat had no list of BPL families in the village or any other kind of

information regarding the APL or BPL status of the villagers.

Although town Kuargaon is divided into ten Wards, there is only one ration

shop catering to them for the last twenty five years. This shop is run by the Badaun

Kendriya Upbhokta Sahakari Bhandar Ltd, Badaun, which is a non- governmental

organization. This organization has been entrusted with 17 shops in various regions

of the district. The president of this organization is an influential leader of a political

party. He has appointed a person, Sri Indrapal Singh, at the rate of Rs. 4,500 per

month to look after the functioning of the shop. A scrutiny of this shop revealed the

following facts:

Each month this shop is allotted 170 quintals of food-grains and 6,000 liters

kerosene oil. The shop is in a room of size 10' X 12' that has been rented

from the Sadhan Sahakari Samiti. It is surprising how the shop keeper can

stock such a large quantity of commodities in such a tiny room and also serve

so many customers.

Only the stock register was found in the shop. There was no record of the

distribution of commodities for any month.

The FPS dealer said that the elected members of the Nagar Panchayat send

small chits of paper through their special people, directing the shopkeeper to

give them extra quantities of food grains and Kerosene oil. The shopkeeper is

forced to comply with their wishes out of fear.

251

The FPS dealer said that he himself lived in Badaun and every month when

the allotments come, he stays in the village for 4 or 5 days till they are

distributed.

In Ward no. 8 of town Kuargaon most of the consumers said that the ANT

card holders are never allotted sugar and the BPL card holders are never allotted

sugar and wheat. Apart from kerosene oil, they are given only 15 kg of rice at the rate

of Rs. 6.50 per kg. They are also told that the commodities will be distributed only on

two to three particular days. Most of the people of this village are poor working on

daily wages. This makes it difficult for them to take a day’s leave to collect their quota

of commodities. In addition, they often do not have ready money on the days the FPS

dealer announces he will distribute the goods. Thus, almost every month they have

to forgo the ration that they are entitled to.

In the Rahedia village in Wazirganj development block, the Fair Price Shop

was located in a 10' X 10' tin shed. The FPS dealer had an allotment of 93 quintals

food grains and 5,000 liters kerosene. It is difficult to manage the stock in the tiny

space. The FPS dealer reportedly managed it by paying Rs.500 to Rs. 1,000 as bribe

every month when the Lekhpal and Kanungo visited the shop for checking. The

powerful people of the village often take away nearly 20 liters of kerosene free of cost

every month, thus depriving eligible card holders from getting their entitlement.

In some of the villages like Rota and Rahedia in the district, the FPS dealer

had taken away the ration cards of almost all the people through the Pradhan many

years ago, ostensibly for renewal. He used to give whatever he liked to the people as

and when he felt like. It was reported that the ration cards were returned to the

consumers just before our arrival was reported. In all the cards, entries were properly

made against all the commodities that were meant to be distributed. The consumers,

however, reported to have received none of those commodities at any time during

that period.

It was reported to us that the Supply Department had shifted the consumers

of the whole village to the Fair Price Shop in the adjoining village apparently because

the number of consumers was too large for the shop in that village. However, the

main reason, according to the consumers, was that the FPS dealer of that village

was not a part of the village Pradhan’s coterie, following which the Pradhan was not

getting any share of the profits earned by the FPS dealer. The Pradhan, thus,

manufactured the opinion of a few consumers to complain against the FPS dealer to

the Supply Department which led to the cancellation of his license. The FPS dealer of

the shop to which the consumers are now attached, is closely associated with the

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Pradhan. The Pradhan is, thus, assured of a regular share of the surplus. Our study

of these villages revealed the following facts:

The FPS dealer provides no information to the consumers regarding the

arrival of essential commodities in his shop.

Whenever the consumers go to the shop to buy their share of commodities,

they either find the shop closed or that the commodities are not available.

The harried consumers gradually give up hope of obtaining the commodities

at lower prices and stop going to the shop.

This situation is highly welcome to the FPS dealer, the Pradhan and the

people in their coterie since the FPS dealer will now be able to sell all the

commodities allotted to him in the open market, which will ensure a regular

share to the others.

In the rural areas we observed that the majority of the card holders had got

their cards issued with the help of the village Pradhan. He charged each of them Rs.

100 to Rs. 200 per card but after the cards were ready, the Pradhan handed them

over to the influential people of the village rather than to those for whom they were

meant. We found a lot of discrimination in the making of ration cards. While the

people belonging to the Pradhan’s group were issued ANT cards, the others were

issued APL or BPL cards. In the selected villages any new candidate elected as the

Gram Pradhan changed all the existing ration cards by categories according to his

own wishes. The desire that motivated him was to give maximum benefit to his own

people. If the FPS dealer happened to belong to the new Pradhan’s group, his shop

was allowed to run; but if he did not support the new Pradhan, circumstances were

created to get his license cancelled. An example of such a situation was seen in the

Malin Godia Tola in Rahedia village. Before the Panchayat election held in 2003 the

hamlet had a separate ration shop. After the elections, the new Pradhan guided

people close to him to complain against the FPS dealer to the Tehsildar. The

Tehsildar, in turn, cancelled the FPS dealer's license and merged the ration cards of

all the people of that hamlet with the FPS in Rahedia. The residents of this hamlet

reported that no one had received any item from the new shop for the last six to

seven months. The distance of the new shop from their hamlet was also nearly three

kilometers while the earlier shop was inside the hamlet.

In the villages Hiraini and Hardaspur, both located in the Rajpuri development

block in the Gugar Tehsil in the district, we observed no permanent FPSs. We

observed much factionalism in the village, which might be one reason for the

absence of such shops there. In some other villages, according to the ‘Kutumb’

(guest) register available at the Gram Panchayat’s office, the families living below the

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Case StudyVillage: Rota, Gram Panchayat: Rota Development Block: Wazirganj, Tehsil: Bisauli Fifteen years back a Dalit, Sri Ramlal Jatav, had a quota. At that time the Brahmins, Thakurs and other powerful people had full control over him, but even then the poor people were being given kerosene oil and other commodities. Subsequently, a Thakur, Arvind Pal Singh, was elected as the Pradhan. He guided the people to complain against the FPS dealer and got his license cancelled. Arvind Pal Singh appointed another Thakur, Devender Singh, as the FPS dealer. All the powerful upper castes started siphoning off the ration items from this Thakur’s quota while the poor people started getting only a little oil and small quantities of other items. The village slowly started getting divided into two parts, the main reason for which was the Pradhan’s elections. Following the next election, the next Pradhan came to be a Brahmin, who got Devender Singh removed from the job of FPS dealer and merged this village with the Quota of the adjoining village, Dharmapur. The villagers could not get anything from the new ration shop except a little kerosene oil, and that too at intervals of two or three months. The powerful people, however, obtained all the commodities at the quantities required by them. The present Pradhan has sent a fresh proposal for appointing a FPS dealer in the village to the Block Development Officer. The office is, however, reportedly demanding bribe for processing the request. The local people told us that the poor and vulnerable sections are discriminated against because they cannot raise their voice against injustice. The main reason for this was the absence of social security in the villages where the powerful people rule the roost. The powerful people and the FPS dealer prevent any complaints of the people from affecting the running of the shop. According to the local people, the present system is benefiting the FPS dealers, administrative staff and the political parties. In addition, the middlemen are also thriving. The people reported that at the time of issuing the ration cards, the family’s economic condition was not verified. Thus, the poor people were issued APL cards while the rich people were issued BPL and ANT cards. Forty one such BPL families, who had been issued APL and ANT cards, visited the BDO and supply office many times to get BPL cards but they did not succeed. When we asked why they were concerned to get their ration cards changed when they did not get any item, they replied the following: • They need the card as identification for opening a bank

account. • This was the only identification for casting vote. • In the event of any dispute, ration cards were the only

identification for filing a legal case. • The hope of getting future benefits from the government

based on the BPL card. • Some people believe that the family gets an identity

through the card. Source: Local people (Interview).

poverty line were not issued any ration cards. In village Hiraini, the guest register

contained a detailed list of the BPL families in the village but these families did not

exist in reality. In the villages

Rota and Hardaspur, no

guest registers were

available.

In the Hardaspur

village in Rajpura

development block, following

the death of a beneficiary of

the Annapurna card, the

Pradhan, instead of

canceling the card, changed

the name in favour of

another person irrespective

of his/her entitlement to the

Annapurna card. The new

beneficiary (40-year old)

owned farmland.

In this same village

the people belonging to the

Jatav caste informed that for

the last five years none of

them had received any item

since the license of the Fair

Price shop in their village

had been cancelled and they

had been merged with the

shop in the neighbouring

village called Mukutpur which

is at a distance of nearly four

kilometers from their hamlet.

Earlier they used to get two

liters of kerosene oil but after

the shop changed, the

people got only one liter oil every two or three months. Kerosene oil was sold in the

market for Rs.28 to Rs.30 per liter, making it beyond the reach of the poor people.

254

The village is the stronghold of Yadavs who take all the advantages depriving the

others. The deprived people reportedly had complained to the Pradhan, District

Magistrate and the Block Development Officer but no action was taken. They alleged

that right from the top, each person in the chain is involved in the process of

corruption and each ensures his own personal benefit.

In this village the present FPS dealer is a female relative of the Pradhan

whose brother is an ex-Chairman of Block Development Committee. The FPS dealer

had collected her allotted share of food grains and kerosene oil from the godowns

both in April and May 2006 but the villagers did not receive any of the items. At the

time of physical verification only two or three sacks of food-grains and a little amount

of kerosene oil was found in the FPS dealer's house. The local people told us that

the relatives of the FPS dealers are criminals and so the consumers are afraid to

report against her.

In the selected regions, in addition to low level of education, there is

unemployment. Lack of education and lack of awareness go parallel. The ones who

are a little aware and the unemployed youth are soon absorbed by the political

parties in the region. These people are facilitated to reap benefits of the loopholes in

the PDS. Because of their political support the administration is too scared to take

action against them. Instead they too join hands with them and ensure their personal

gains.

In the Hardaspur village in the Rajpura Development Block, the Gram

Pradhan was a guest inhabitant. The FPS dealer, Rajendra Singh, also lived in

another village. The FPS dealer reported that he is used to bring all the food grains

and kerosene oil allotted to him to the village and complete the distribution process in

one day. On the other hand, the villagers reported that for the last five years they did

not receive any essential commodities except kerosene oil. This too was distributed

once in two months and each person was given only one or two liters. They also

reported that a year back a primary school teacher had been murdered on the issue

of ration card. In January 2006 they were all issued ration cards but those cards were

not handed over to the people they were meant for. Interestingly, three days before

we visited the village, the ration cards were distributed to the people with all the

entries ‘correctly’ filled in.

In this village the FPS dealer did not have any records of the commodities

distributed. The FPS dealer informed that all the records were with the village

Pradhan. Very often the FPS dealer sells the kerosene oil and food grains allotted to

him at the depot and godown itself rather than distributing them among the targeted

255

people. Like most other FPS dealers, he too fills in his own pocket at the expense of

the poor and needy for whom the commodities were meant.

We found that the Supply Department prepares a schedule of the quotas

allotted to each FPS dealer in the Tehsil every month but a record of the actual

amount collected by them is not maintained at the office. This record is available at

the district level supply office. In the Gunnor Tehsil, while taking a record of the ration

cards and the units of commodities supplied to the consumers, we observed that the

concerned staff member multiplied the total number of ration cards with five to give

an estimate of the units supplied. No record of the units distributed was found at the

office of the Gunnor supply inspector.

In the Rajpur development block the staff members, in order to ensure their

personal gains and also to protect their jobs, did not oppose any visible irregularities

in the PDS. We found that the workers of the Supply Department had connections

with the political leaders, the in-charge of the godowns and owners of the oil depots.

They never visited the villages to find out the real situation there. All the formalities in

terms of maintaining records were carried out at the godowns, oil depots or in special

meetings of the concerned people. The PDS was being run under the orders of

political leaders and powerful people of the region.

We observed that the very poor people of the village with no food and wage-

employment were obtaining cereals on credit from farmers. The condition was that

they had to return 150 kgs of grain for every 100 Kgs borrowed. In the agricultural

season they expect to get wage-work to return the cereals borrowed. Many families

were found in the village who used to borrow grain from the big farmers on condition

that they would work in their farms for a very low wage rate till their loans were

repaid. They were thus bonded to these farmers till they freed themselves of the

loan. Some poor families also borrowed money, cereals and essential commodities

from the local grocers at a rate of interest 5.0 per cent per month. Thus, most of the

poor people were forced to work as bonded labourers till their loans were paid back,

which was a very long and slow process since the money lenders took full advantage

of their illiteracy, vulnerability and helpless condition.

6.3 District: Lakhimpur Kheri We found that the migrants from east UP settled in the district Lakhimpur Kheri still

retain ties with their root and bring labourers from the root to work in their new

settlement. Following the break up of joint family system and the consequent

fragmentation of land holdings, many people in the district find economic non-

feasibility in farming. These people now work as labourers in big farms whose

owners entrap them by lending them money and then exploit their inability to repay

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the loan by bonding them to their farms and making them work for long hours at a

very low wage rate till their loans are repaid. The basic food-cum-fuel needs of these

bonded families like cereals and pulses are provided by the owner of the farm. These

poor families require only kerosene oil from the Fair Price Shops since they hardly

have money for the other essential commodities supplied at these shops. Along with

these workers who live permanently in the region, there are some labourers who

come to the district from villages to work for a certain period of time during the

agricultural season. The owner of a particular farm employs these labourers along

with providing ration cards for them. However, the cards are utilized by the owners

themselves for buying kerosene oil for their machines. These rich landowners have a

lot of power in the region because of their connections with the political parties and

also with the administration. At the time of election they not only supply money to

political parties but also assure them of the vote of the labourers working on their

farms. The patron-client relation, thus, gets deeply rooted.

Three years back, a scam involving the supply of food grains through the

PDS was unearthed in the district. Wheat, rice and sugar that were meant for

distribution under the BPL and Antyodaya schemes were being siphoned off. The

rice was being sold to owners of rice mills and in the open markets in the district and

its neighbouring districts while the wheat was being supplied to seven suji factories in

Shahjahanpur. Sugar was being sold directly in the open market. It was also alleged

that some of these food grains were smuggled into the bordering state of Nepal. It

appears that this scam had been going on for many years and the benefits were

being shared by a large number of people beginning with people at the bottom of the

hierarchy of the Supply Department to the top officials and also the ministers and

other representatives of the people. The staff in-charge of the godowns used to

falsely fill up the stock registers of the FPS dealers at the godowns themselves to

show that the food grains had been supplied, and in return the FPS dealers were

given some ‘consolation money’. The FPS dealers in their turn used to console the

customers that they had not received any supply. We offer the following observations

about the PDS in this district:

1. All the records at the district office, Tehsil offices, food godowns, oil depots

and with the FPS dealers since October 2004 had been sealed by the enquiry

committee. Thus, we got no documents for examination.

2. While the scam was on, many FPS dealers had deposited money at the food

godowns and oil depots for their allotted share of food grains and kerosene oil

for distribution. However, as soon as the enquiry committee sealed all the

godowns and oil depots, these records were taken away and no trace

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remained of them. Thus, many FPS dealers lost their money, which they are

yet to recover.

3. Post-exposition of the scam, the FPS dealers were found to be happier

because by then the supply of food-grains was regular, as compared to

earlier times when the supply was erratic. The eligible beneficiaries also

started getting a few items post-scam.

4. Even after such a large-scale scam was exposed, we found the distribution

system to remain inefficient in the district. The only difference between the

two periods, scam and post-scam, was the occurrence of black marketeering

at the godown point (before the commodities reached the FPS dealers), and

at the FPS point post-scan.

5. The common people as the eligible beneficiaries attained a high level of

awareness about the public distribution system after the scam.

The list of BPL families of the village, who had been selected in accordance

with the criteria decided by the administration, was not available either at the Tehsil

office or at the block development office or at the village level. The list of BPL families

that the Panchayats of the selected villages provided too did not fit into the criteria.

There was a great deal of discrepancy in the source of information and the year of

collection of data. At the district level, no record of BPL families was available for

scrutiny. It appeared to us that the village Panchayat was categorizing families into

APL and BPL according to the whims and fancies of the Nagar Panchayat which was

based on the influence of the families, their contribution in supplying a vote bank

during the elections, their income level and their social status. Thus, in the absence

of proper identification of genuinely needy families, the PDS in the village seemed to

be directionless and beyond the reach of poor families.

We found a gross discrepancy in the number of BPL families identified by the

village Panchayats and the number of ration cards (BPL + ANT + APL) issued in

these villages. The reason for this was that the representatives of the Panchayats

followed their own wishes while preparing ration cards for the people of their villages.

The Supply Department informed that one year ago nearly 68,000 BPL ration

cards were cancelled. These cards had been issued by the local agencies to

undeserving families at the behest of Gram Panchayats and Nagar Panchayats. But

a survey of the region by the administration revealed that although these BPL cards

had been cancelled in their records, the families still continued to claim quota from

the FPS dealers, causing inconvenience to them. The concerned officials opined that

the cards had been cancelled while conducting physical verification of the card

holders. But the cancellations had been done only at the level of the FPS dealers and

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not at the level of the households. Thus they demanded their supply as usual but

were not given by the dealer.

Much control is maintained on the PDS at the various levels of the Supply

Department like the Tehsil, Godown, FPS dealer, Panchayat etc., but at the level of

the beneficiaries there is hardly any control to ensure smooth functioning of the

system. The reason is that a large percentage of the target population is poor,

vulnerable, illiterate and unaware about their rights as consumers. That is why they

unquestioningly accept whatever the FPS dealer tells them in terms of quantity, price,

and supply. Neither the FPS dealers nor the consumers had any knowledge about

the rights, duties and other relevant information about the PDS that are chalked out

in the PDS charter. Not a single FPS dealer was found to have a copy of the charter. No roster was maintained by any higher official when the allotted quota of

essential commodities was collected by FPS dealers from the godowns. Neither is

any inspection carried out when the commodities are distributed by them. Only the

Gram Panchayats and local bodies at the village level look after the PDS, resulting in

large scale malfunctioning of the system and also providing enough space for

corruption and black marketeering. The FPS dealer of village Bahamanpur in the Nidhasan Development Block

informed that they were often forced to sell the essential commodities allotted to

them in the black market, in order to recover the money spent by them to obtain their

quota of commodities every month. He narrated that he had to pay as bribe Rs. 10

per quintal at the godowns for collecting the food-grains and Rs. 100 per drum of

kerosene oil at the oil depots, in addition to Rs. 50 per drum and Rs. 30 per quintal of

cereals at the supply office. The FPS dealers were also often given less than the

allotted quantity by the godown owners and oil depot owners who often manipulated

the weighing machines. Along with the abovementioned money which had to be paid

every month, they had to pay around Rs. 5,000 to Rs. 7,000 every four or five

months to the staff of the Supply Department to be paid to the SDM and other high

level administrative officers. The FPS dealer further said that the local level

Panchayat workers and the influential people of the village had also to be kept happy

from time to time. In spite of this, he claimed that all FPS dealers distribute some of

the allotted commodities among the target population.

At Bahamanpur village both men and women of the Pasi and other castes at

the bottom of the caste hierarchy were under the influence of drinks and gambling for

which they required a regular supply of cash. This made them easy prey for the local

grocers from whom they bought their items of basic needs, usually on credit. These

grocers mortgaged their BPL ration cards for Rs. 50 to Rs. 60 and then procured the

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essential commodities from the FPS dealers under their names. These commodities

were then sold in the open market leaving the target population deprived of essential

commodities at subsidized rates.

The local people of Bahamanpur told us that the distribution of food-grains in

the village was done at intervals of two months while only one to two liters of

kerosene oil was distributed every month to each card holder. The FPS dealers

insisted on distributing oil only on one or two particular days of the month; no

kerosene oil was distributed under the PDS the rest of the days. A certain quantity of

the kerosene oil that was left over was sold in the open market while the rest was

offered to the card holders at Rs. 20 to Rs. 24 per liter.

We found that the infrastructure of the Nighasan Tehsil office of the Supply

Department was very poor.

The demand for allotment of kerosene oil was made by the district office to

the Tehsil office and from there it was sent to the oil depot owners. The role of the

Supply Department in the distribution system seemed to be totally absent. In

practice, the allotment of food grains was being done by godown owners. The issuing

of ration cards was being done by Gram and Nagar Panchayats. The verification of

food-grains that had been allotted to FPS dealers was being done by Panchayats or

state government workers. The verification of the food-grains distributed by FPS

dealers was done by village Panchayats and state government workers. It remains a

question what remained the duty of the office of the Supply Department at the Tehsil

level.

The FPS dealers of the Nighasan Development Block told us that the

kerosene oil depot owners supplied oil less by 100 to 150 liters to them every month.

The FPS dealers did not protest against this irregularity since the oil depot owners

were powerful enough to get their quota allotment cancelled by the Supply

Department.

The Panchayat of village Bahamanpur in the Nidhasan Development Block

told us that no new cards had been issued in the past six years and neither has the

territory of the BPL and Antyodaya scheme been expanded. That is why nearly 125

families in the village remained deprived of this benefit. On the other hand, the poor

dalit and Muslim families of the village informed us that the Panchayat had issued

BPL cards to people of its own coterie. Rather than cancelling the ration cards of

beneficiaries who had died, the Panchayat passed them on to their known people.

We observed that none of the FPS dealers of each of the selected villages

possessed shop registers, card details, unit details or old distribution registers. The

information regarding the number of cards was calculated on the basis of the earlier

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allotment and the unit detail was calculated by multiplying by four or five. When the

Supply Inspector, Mr. Pujarilal Rawat was questioned about this, he opined that the

number of units is measured all over the state in this manner.

Many poor families were found to consume ‘Atta’ directly rather than buying

wheat from the ration shops and then grinding it in mills. It appears that these

families gave their cards to the mill owner who collected wheat and supplied ground

Atta to the beneficiaries after keeping a certain portion for himself. Thus, the mill

owner benefited in two ways – first, they get the grinding charges from the buyers

and second, they get wheat at a lower price than in the open market. Most of the poor families in the selected villages worked as labourers in the

farm houses in the district. These people often did not have money in cash to buy the

essential commodities that were usually distributed only on one or two days in the

month. These people even could not collect the kerosene oil that they were entitled

to, since it was distributed at intervals of one to two months and that too, only one or

two liters per card. In order to light up their houses at night, they buy 100 grams of oil

for Rs. 4 from the market. If they did not have even that much money, they burn

rubber tyres and firewood in a common place in the colony which lit up a few of the

houses.

In the villages, Bahamanpur and Ibrahimpur, many beneficiaries of the

Annapurna scheme were found in the age group 35 to 45 years. In the Ibrahimpur

village, block Palia, a total of eleven such families were found out of which seven

were also receiving old age pension. We also unearthed the fact that the Panchayat

issued the ration card of a beneficiary who had passed away to a new person rather

than getting the card cancelled. Many of these new card holders were not eligible to

these schemes.

The FPS dealers of many villages told us that after the allotment and

distribution of food grains every month when they got the verification certificate from

the Gram Pradhan, they had to pay Rs, 1000 to Rs. 2000 for this purpose. If they

declined, the Pradhans threatened to get their license cancelled.

The people of the Barotha village are reported to have complained against

the present system of public distribution to the Block Development Officer and to the

SDM. A supply inspector, Sri Rawat, had been appointed to look into their

complaints. During his visit to the village, the inspector reportedly accepted a bribe of

Rs. 3,000 from the FPS dealer for giving the report in favour of the latter. The

consequence was that the FPS dealer could suppress the complainants and stop

giving them whatever little benefits they were earlier getting.

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In the urban areas of Mailani in Tehsil Gola, the supply inspector, Sri Shahi,

reported that they had no record of the APL card holders in their office. The reason

was that during the investigation of the scam all the records had been seized. The

allotment of food-grains to the FPS dealers continued to be done by the godown

owners while the owners of oil depots allotted oil on the orders of the district office.

The Mailani region is divided into eleven Wards having three FPS dealers serving

them. The total population of the region is more than 20,000. We found that the

distance of the FPS from many houses was 2 to 3 kilometers but none of the

selected households had ration cards. The local people told us that the Nagar

Panchayat had asked them to deposit their ration cards so that they could be

renewed. The acknowledgement receipt that was given in exchange was a 1”X12”

plain paper on which was written the card number, the name of the beneficiary, the

Ward number and the kind of card, i.e., APL or BPL. The receipt was used by the

people to buy kerosene oil. However, we came across a few families who had lost

the piece of paper. As a result, the FPS dealer stopped providing them kerosene oil.

On the other hand, the FPS dealers had no record of the card holders except the

stock register. According to the FPS dealers, the distribution register had to be

deposited at the Tehsil supply office every month. They were allotted the next

month’s supply on the basis of the record maintained in the register. However, none

of the FPS dealers had any receipt acknowledging that their registers were at the

Tehsil supply office. We observed that the majority of the ANT, ANP and BPL households pawned

their ration cards to the ‘atta’ mill owners for Rs. 100 to Rs. 150 every month since

they obtained only one or two commodities on their cards. These commodities were

also distributed on only one or two particular days when the poor people did not have

cash to buy their quota. The FPS dealers did not stock their shops with the full

quantities of the commodities allotted to them. Kerosene oil is allotted twice in a

month to FPS dealers, most of whom sell the second lot in the open market. This is

facilitated by the fact that none of the poor families have any money to buy kerosene

oil when it is supplied the second time. In addition, most of them are busy the whole

day working as farm labourers, leaving them no spare time to collect their quota. In each region of the district, we found that the number of ANT, BPL and ANP

cards remained constant every year. In the case of ANT and BPL, the names of the

families were changed frequently while this was done only for the dead beneficiaries

in the case of ANP card holders. No record or information about card holders was

sent to the FPS office that could be verified with the people actually existing. We

found that at each region the ration cards were asked to be deposited every 1.5 or

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2.5 years to be renewed. These were kept with the authorities for nearly two years.

The consumers were not enlightened enough to suspect anything foul. In urban

areas we found that the only basis for issuing new BPL, APL and ANT was the

recommendation by the members of the local bodies. The Nagar Panchayat had

neither the list of BPL population nor any other basis for issuing cards.

In the Mailani Nagar region, the godowns and oil depots from where the FPS

dealers had to collect their allotted supplies were nearly 30 kms away from the

village. The transportation cost for fetching these supplies had to be borne by the

FPS dealers. This distance also increased the possibilities of corruption. The FPS

dealers used to change their oil depots and food godowns from where they collected

their monthly allotment every four to six months. The Supply Department officials

opined that it was because of the decrease in the stock at the godowns and oil

depots. But the reason cited did not seem to be correct since no oil depot owner had

reported any such problem. It is possible that it was being done to ensure that no

clues could be found in case a scam or corruption was exposed. The local officers informed us that after the scam in food-grains came to light,

an S.P (Food Supply), Jasbinder Singh, was posted in this district. He took into

custody all the records of the PDS at each level since October 2004. Thus, there

remained no method of ascertaining the number of cards in the district, the

allotments made to the FPS dealers and other relevant information. The earlier FPS

dealers were asked to submit a rough estimate of this kind of information in order to

allot the quota of commodities to the present FPS dealers. Many FPS dealers

refused to collect their allotted quota saying that they would not be able to distribute

the commodities now when they had never done it earlier. They were also doubtful

that the consumers might not buy their commodities. The FPS dealers had to be

motivated at each level and were told to collect only 70.0 per cent of their allotted

share. They took back that much quantity of their share and distributed it. Since then

it became a tradition to collect only 70.0 per cent of the allotted share. The earlier

DSO, Mr. B.K. Srivastava, arbitrarily surrendered 30.0 per cent of the total ration

cards in the district to the state authority. But these cards were not cancelled at the

level of households. Thus the demand remained the same but the supply of food-

grains had been reduced at the FPS dealer’s level.

At Tehsil Palia, the inspector of the Supply Department and the in-charge of

the food godown were hardly ever present in their offices. The work at the godown

was being carried out by the house keepers of the in-charge. A large crowd of

middlemen and black marketers were observed in these offices and the staff was

working under their directions.

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At village Vichitranagar in the Palia district, some people had complained

against the non-resident FPS dealer to the SDM. However, when the SDM visited the

village for inspection, he allegedly took a bribe of Rs. 10,000 from the FPS dealer

and gave him a clean chit. After the enquiry was over, the FPS dealer threatened and

abused the complainants.

We found a large population of poor labourers in Vichitranagar and

Ibrahimpur engaged as wage labourers in the farmhouses in the district. The owners

often gave them loans. This situation forced many of them to become bonded to the

owners who made them work for 14 to 15 hours a day. Often their ration cards were

mortgaged by them.

The people of Vichitranagar and Ibrahimpur informed that often the FPS

dealers visit the village to announce that he would distribute kerosene only the next

day. This situation puts the poor people into great difficulty since many times they do

not have ready cash to buy their share. Secondly, they all work on daily wages, so

going to the FPS to collect one or two liters of oil that they are supplied by the FPS

dealer, will imply losing a whole day’s wages. The people, thus, very often forfeit their

share of kerosene oil.

In village Vichitranagar the ration cards of almost the entire population had

been deposited in the block office for renewal six or seven months ago but they had

not yet got them back. Some of the people had deliberately not deposited their ration

cards for fear that they would not get them back.

The BPL and ANT card holders had no idea how much food grains they were

entitled to or who they should complain to in case they did not get their allotted quota.

Some people suggested that a list of commodities that they were entitled to and the

various levels at which they could lodge their complaints should be mentioned in the

ration cards.

Some people of the Vichitranagar village opined that the location of the village

by distance from the district headquarter and the poor condition of the approach road

made it difficult for high level officers to visit their village for inspection. In case of the

rare visit of any such person, notice was given to the FPS dealers and the block and

district offices much in advance. This enabled them to be prepared with a

camouflaging environment in their favour. According to the local people, most of the

commodities meant for distribution under PDS went straight from the godowns to the

open markets either in the adjoining region or in Nepal. The commissions of the

people involved at each step of this transaction are decided in advance and they

perform their duties in the process of black marketing very efficiently.

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In the village Ibrahimpur, the FPS was housed in a 10’X10’ kutcha cottage

that was totally exposed to all the seasons. The records maintained in this shop were

not verified by the Supply Department. In front of the column showing commodities

distributed, there were seals by the village Pradhan and the supply inspector but

there were no signatures. The vigilance committee of the village included family

members of the FPS dealer and the Pradhan who always submitted their report in

favour of the FPS dealer. The signatures of these members were also discovered to

be false. We found that there were only seven beneficiaries in the village under the

Annapurna scheme. Of these two had died a year ago and one had left the village

but the names of these persons were still in the stock register and they were shown

to have regularly bought the commodities that they were entitled to every month.

There were no records of APL card holders in the village. The supply office also did

not maintain records of the BPL, APL, ANT and ANP card holders in their office. Sri Gama, son of Sri Ramjag, a resident of Ibrahimpur village belonging to the

Bhar caste, told us that he had an ANT card on which he used to obtain 35 kgs of

commodities at Rs. 115 every alternate month. The distribution of these commodities

is done only on one or two special days and if anyone cannot collect their supplies on

these days they will have to wait one or two months more to do so. Kerosene oil is

also supplied every alternate month and only 2 liters are allotted to each person. BPL

card holders are given only kerosene oil. Sometimes the FPS dealer practices ‘mercy

sale’ of food grains at a higher price. We understood that the staff of the Supply Department, the in-charge of the

godowns, the Gram Pradhan and the FPS dealers had a tacit collusion between

themselves. On the surface these people appeared to be detached from each other

but they were all bonded by ties of corruption.

6.4 District: Lucknow The Supply Department in the district has adequate number of employees. The state

level Headquarter, Secretariat and Assembly being located in this city, the

distribution system in Lucknow is somewhat better than in the remote inaccessible

regions. The schedule of the state level officers is announced in advance to the

district level officers who, in turn, can create an environment of efficiency to satisfy

the former. In the selected region, we found that the wholesale distributors of

kerosene oil are powerful because of political connections. They are able to sell most

of the kerosene oil in the black market in collusion with the FPS dealers. The oil

siphoned off is usually diverted to petrol pumps, sellers of generators, agricultural

sector and other places that require kerosene oil.

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The high officials prepare rosters for allotment of all the commodities meant

for distribution. According to this roster, the FPS dealers can collect their allotments

thrice in a month depending on his capacity for storage. This is in the ratio 50:35: 15.

But most FPS dealers collect only the first 50.0 per cent and sell off the rest at the

depot itself. We observed the same situation in the case of food grains also. After

collecting the first lot they announce in the villages that they had received only that

much amount in that month. The cardholders are unaware that the FPS dealer is

allotted his quota in installments.

We found that the FPS dealers of various regions in the district distribute

kerosene oil according to their wishes and not according to the amount the

cardholder was entitled to. The chief reason for this was that the number of ration

cards issued in the villages has been increased but not the amount allotted to the

FPS dealers. Where the number of ration cards has increased, the amount allotted

per person has decreased proportionately and where the number has not increased,

the amount allotted is five liters as directed by the authorities. The FPS dealers

seemed to be unsatisfied with this situation.

We found that the allotment of kerosene oil and food grains to the FPS

dealers of each block was being done from the district. According to the FPS dealers,

the allotment reaches the concerned godowns without any information at the Tehsil

level. Thus, the Tehsil office gets no prior information about the quantity being

allotted to the FPS dealers and the quantity that is being actually collected.

The staff of the PDS told us that there are 6 working days in a week, out of

which three consecutive days they are busy with Tehsil Diwas, Thana Diwas and

Janata Diwas. The other three days are used up in redressing the grievances

received on those three days. This is the reason why the departmental activities

remain pending.

It was observed that the ration cards of all the families in the district were

being renewed. The Block Development Officer had been given a fixed target of the

number of cards of each category that he had to fulfill. The Panchayats of each

village had to collect blank cards according to the target allotted to them from the

Block office. This process caused a number of problems.

We enlisted the following problems in this process:

The posts of Gram Panchayat Officer of many development blocks were

vacant which affected the work of renewal of cards.

The new ration cards reached the blocks very late, which led to a delay in

issuing the cards.

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Many Gram Panchayat Officers in the district had been authorized to look

after the renewal process of three village Panchayats together. This work load

led to a delay in the process.

In many places the card holders had not been given new ration cards in place

of the old ration cards deposited for renewal.

In many places anomalies occurred, for example, the BPL ration card holders

were being issued APL cards instead.

In many places the old description of families were retained in the new ration

cards.

There was lack of coordination between the Supply Department, the Gram

Panchayat and the Block office, each blaming the other for delay.

There was no information in any of the supply departments of the selected

Tehsils about ration cards, collection of allotment by FPS dealers, distribution of

commodities, categorization of FPS dealers, information about cancelled cards etc.

Even if they were present in some offices, most of them were obsolete.

When we visited the District Manager, State Food Corporation Godown

(Rajya Khadya evam Bhandar Nigam) to collect information about the records

available with them, we found that the Deputy Managing Director was in a meeting

with the Godam Prabharis. When a Godown In-Charge came out from the on-going

meeting, he was asked what was being discussed in the meeting. He replied, ‘What

else, give the ‘lifafa’ (envelope containing money share), say a few words and come

back’. The high level officers also support this kind of corruption. In all the selected

development blocks, a study of the records of allotment and collection of

commodities by the FPS dealers revealed that in many places there was obvious

overwriting. This implies that the quantity had been changed but the overwriting was

not attested by the concerned officials. From the selected regions what we observed is presented below:

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Note: * Awareness of Right to Food' etc., ** By Food Inspectors, and # Centered on FPS Dealer

Initial Condition

IMPACT

High Gap in Prices between Market

and PDS

Create More Demand among

Consumers of PDS

Create More Corruption in Functionary

Low Awareness among PDS

Beneficiaries*

Low Demand for PDS Items

High Corruption among

Functionary

Frequent Checking of Dealers (FPS)**

High Cutoff or High Leakage & High Corruption#

Low Distribution of Items to PDS

Beneficiaries

High Awareness among PDS Beneficiary

High Demand of PDS Commodities

Low Corruption

The high gap in the prices of the commodities distributed through PDS and

those sold in the open market, the lack of awareness among the consumers and the

multiple check points and frequency of checking in the Supply Department, were

affecting the smooth functioning of the PDS.

In the village Ahmadbad Katauni in the Malihabad development block, we

found that except for a few dalit castes, the distribution of essential commodities

under the PDS was running smoothly. Due to the lack of awareness among the

dalits, they were given only kerosene oil by the FPS dealer. In this village BPL rice

was being sold at Rs. 17 per kg and BPL wheat at Rs. 6 per kg, while ANT rice was

being sold at Rs. 3.50 per kg and wheat at Rs. 2.50 kg.

We found that the beneficiaries under the Annapurna scheme had been given

wheat for March 2006 in June 2006 because the administration had delayed the

allotment of wheat to the FPS dealers. Many Annapurna families had to suffer

268

adversely because they had lost the death certificate or their ration cards. The local

Panchayat election-led inter-village conflicts also led to cancellation of license of one

FPS dealer in one village, and attachment of beneficiaries to the one in the adjoining

village.

At the local level it was alleged that the Pradhans did not want the distribution

system to be smooth and efficient since that would decrease the popularity of the

Pradhans and increase the popularity of the FPS dealers. This would affect his

chances of winning the next Panchayat elections. In parallel, the money flow from the

FPS dealers to the Pradhan every month would stop. Thus the real intention of all the

Pradhans was to run the PDS according to their own wishes.

We observed in the Mulama village in the Malihabad development block that

the village was divided into four hamlets. The hamlet in which the Fair Price Shop

was located was getting the benefit of the PDS since the FPS dealer kept the people

of the hamlet happy. The underlying motive was that they give a good report in case

of enquiry about him by the administration, who usually questioned people living

nearby. Among the beneficiaries of the Annapurna scheme of the Mujasa village, we

found that three out of five beneficiaries were also getting old age pension. One was

getting widow pension while the other two were getting old age pension. We also

observed that at the time of renewal of old ration cards, the Antyodaya and APL

cards had got interchanged. The BPL and Antyodaya families in the village had got

ration cards but none of the APL families had ration cards for the last seven months.

In the Mujasa village in the Malihabad development block it was observed

that the APL, ANT and BPL cards had been deposited with the Panchayat for

renewal in January 2006. The new cards had been made in April 2006 but were

distributed only in June. Thus, the majority of the BPL and Antyodaya families did not

receive any ration in April, May and June. Additionally the old BPL and ANT families

having ration cards were also not given items during these three months.

The FPS dealer of the Mujasa village told us that every month he received

kerosene oil less by seven liters from the oil godowns. In addition, they were forced

to pay Rs. 30 to Rs. 40 to the Munshiji at the depot as bribe. They also had to pay

Rs. 20 per quintal as bribe at the food grain godown and Rs. 70 per drum at the oil

depots at the time of allotment. Additionally they had to supply items free of cost to

the members of the Gram Panchayat and the Pradhan in order to ensure that they

did not oppose the certificate that had to be submitted verifying that the distribution

system was done as per schedule.

In the Mujasa village of the Malihabad district we found around 20 to 25

migrant Nat families squatting on the Gram Sabha land or on land owned by a

269

mango orchard owner for the last 12 to 14 years. These people had approached the

Gram Panchayats and other officials many times for ration cards but were denied

since their names were not on the voter’s list.

There were many families in the Mujasa village who survived one or two

months every year without meal or take only one meal a day. Particularly in the

autumn when no work is available in agriculture, people starve. These families could

not benefit from the PDS either because they did not have money to buy the

commodities or the supply was irregular or the period of distribution of commodities

was so short that they were unable to visit the ration shops during that time.

In almost all the villages the FPS dealers distributed the commodities only for

a period of one to seven days. In such a situation most of the very poor families and

the ones working in the unorganized sector found it difficult to benefit from the PDS

since they often did not have disposable money during that period. If some of them

had any savings, they preferred to buy kerosene oil since there was a huge

difference between the PDS price and the open market price. Thus, the section of the

population that needs PDS the most is deprived of its benefits because of lack of

buying capacity and because of the short duration for its distribution.

Almost all the FPS dealers in the selected villages reportedly had no means

of influencing the amount that was allotted to them at the food godowns and the oil

depots. They also opined that running the Quota shop now has become troublesome.

The reasons cited by them were first, they had to invest more for collecting their

allotted commodities; second, the types of ration cards had increased which entailed

more paper work; and third, the expenses for running the ration shop had multiplied.

However, the commission that they were being given 20 years back had not been

increased by the administration. Most of them perceived that they would like to leave

this work but it had become the source of livelihood for them, making it difficult for

them to leave without an alternative. They also said that they had become a part of

the corruption against their wishes since the system forced them to do so. According

to them, the large number of formalities and rules at different levels and layers made

the implementation of the system difficult.

We felt that the PDS in this district was better than in the other districts for the

reasons mentioned below:

Because of its proximity to the headquarters of the state government the high

level officers often conducted random checks to ensure that the system was

working well.

270

The involvement and cooperation of the political leaders and their pressure on

local elected leaders like the Gram Pradhan kept the system running

smoothly.

Because of the physical proximity to the state government offices, it was vital

for the district to present a good image of its functioning. Hence, they tried

hard to keep the machinery run smoothly.

The early implementation of new rules by the district administration made

PDS more efficient.

The good infrastructural facility in the district makes it easy for the officers and

inspectors to travel for vigilance.

Telecommunication network works well in the district.

A section of the beneficiaries is aware.

We observed formation of vigilance committees in all the regions, but they

exist only on paper. The Supply Department cited many examples in which the Gram

Panchayats used their authority to cancel the license of ration shops in spite of their

good performance. The Department remained helpless to take any step since the

power of cancellation lay with the Gram Panchayats.

The local people and a few FPS dealers told us that often the officers of the

Supply Department demand money from FPS dealers and owners of godowns and

oil departments if they come across any irregularity at the time of verification. If they

are not given the sum demanded, the FPS dealers and the Godown/depot owners

are penalized either financially or by imposing sanctions on them. In such situations,

the irregularities remain in tact.

The village Baragaon in the development block Kakori is divided into four

parts by the FPS dealer and each part is covered by a single day when the essential

commodities are distributed. If a cardholder goes on any day other than the fixed one

to buy commodities, he is denied the quota. The FPS dealer opined that if he ran the

shop honestly, he would become a pauper. That is why the FPS dealers were

compelled to sell items in the open (black) market. He usually distributed 50.0 per

cent of his allotted quantity and sold the rest at the godown and depot itself. In this

village all the APL cards are deposited at the Panchayat office. The households are

given only 2 to 3 liters of kerosene oil each month. In this same village many BPL

families had lost ration cards for various reasons. The Panchayat had refused to

issue them new cards, excepting one, but the FPS dealer showed in his register that

he had supplied them their quota.

271

In many villages people got ration cards made not in the expectation of the

commodities that would be supplied to them but as identification for various

governmental requirements.

The population of Itaunja town was 20,000 divided into 10 Wards. There was

only one FPS dealer serving this large population. People from the neighbouring

urban region were also attached to this shop. People visited the shop from as far off

distances as seven to eight kilometers to buy their goods. This caused irregularities

in the functioning of the shop. While studying the BPL cards (No. 058118 and

058304) we found that both the cards belonged to the same family and the names of

many members were recorded in both the cards.

The people of the Mubarakpur village in block Kakori told us that oil and food

grains are distributed on only one day each month. Most of the people are unable to

buy the goods because of poverty. Many cardholders said that they did not even

know the process of buying goods under PDS. People were afraid to complain

because of absence of social security. The Tehsil office was nearly 30 kms away

making it difficult to visit. They also said that the powerful people of the village took

away around 10 to 12 liters of kerosene oil each while the poor people were given

according to their family size.

An official of the Supply Department in the Malihabad Tehsil informed that the

license of the FPS dealer of the Mandoli village, Sri Shakeel Ahmad, was cancelled

because he was also a teacher in a school in the village. He was accused of doing

two jobs together. In his defense the FPS dealer said that he was not getting any

profit from the Quota shop but was doing it for social service. What he said is

presented in the following Table 6.1:

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Table 6.1 Revenue and Expenditure of an FPS dealer (Per Month)

Revenue from Distribution of Items Expenditure Items by Name-cum-price Revenue

Earned (Rs).Heads Expenditure

Sugar 04 Qntl. 5400.00 Sugar 04 Qntl. 5378.80 BPL Wheat 6.10 Qntl. 2826.50 BPL Wheat 6.10 Qntl. 2799.00BPL Rice 15.25 Qntl. 9378.78 BPL Rice 15.25 Qntl. 9828.25ANT Wheat 14.0 Qntl. 1120.00 ANT Wheat 5.60 Qntl. 1086.60ANT Rice 14.0 Qntl. 4200.00 ANT Rice 14.0 Qntl. 4116.00Kerosene Oil 1600 litre 158400.00 Commission to prepare Bank Draft 51.00Empty Sack 04 of Sugar 60.00 Transport costs R. 12.00 per qntl. 540.00Empty Sack 82 of Foodgrains 410.00 Weighing Rs. 4 Qntl. 180.00Total 39,389.25 Register and Photo copy 30.00

Kerosene Oil 1600 liter 15,162.58Transport Cost for carrying Kerosene Rs. 30 per 200 liter

400.00

Labour Cost for Carrying, Weighing etc.

360.00

Total 39,984.00Net Benefit = Rs. 39,389 – Rs. 39, 384 = Rs. 5.25 Source: An FPS dealer’s report to the Tehsil office of Malihabad.

Case study Tehsil BKT Kasba- Itoja Name of FPS dealer- Rani/Ajit Pandey There are a total of 10 wards in the Itoja Kasba. According to the 2001 census the

population was 6500. At present the population is nearly 10,000 because of in-

migration to this region. There is only one ration shop for this whole region run by a

lady called Rani Pandey. The shop, however, is run by her son Ajit Pandey. In the

last 1.5 years the ration cards of all the people in the Modhna kasba were attached to

this shop. The shop now caters to a population of 3000 ration card holders. The

allotment given to this shop every month is as follows:

Table 6.2 Allotment of Distributable Items (in Physical quantity) of FPS Dealer

Commodities BPL ANT Total Wheat 92.70 57.70 150.40Rice 231.75 144.25 376.00Sugar - - 53.00Kerosene oil - - 10,000

Source: Interview with FPS dealer

Ajit Pandey opined that at present it was very difficult to run a Quota shop. No rules

and regulations work and only the power of money help FPS dealers to run their

shops safely. He gave a list of the money that he had spent last year to keep his

shop functioning (Table 6.3).

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Table 6.3 Corruption/Bribe Money Paid by FPS Dealer for Keeping FPS functioning

Department Designation/Name of the Person paid

Period of payment Bribe Money (Rs)

spend/paid

Items given (free of cost)

Godown Foodgrains Godown-in-charge Per month 2,000.00 - Supply Department Raman Mishra (Sup.

Inspector) Per month 10,000.00 -

Supply Department Senior Clerk Per month 2,000.00 - Revenue Department Driver of SDM Per month 500.00 Sugar 10 Kg.Revenue Department Lekhpal Per month 1,000.00 - Revenue Department Kanungo Per month - Sugar 10 Kg.Local Panchayat President, Nagar

Panchayat Per month - Sugar 20 Kg.

Food-grains 50 Kg.

Local Panchayat All Members (10) Per month - Sugar 2 Kg.Local Panchayat President, Nagar

Panchayat (Donation) Per Annum 4,000.00 -

Health Department Food Inspector Following Inspection once a Year

15,000.00 -

Supply Department Z.S. Zedi, ARO Once a Year 8,000.00 - Supply Department Supply Inspector and

Staff Following Inspection after every three months

4,000.00 -

Source: Interview with an FPS dealer

On the condition of anonymity he told us that till 1.5 years back the SDM had

to be paid Rs. 6,000 per month. He made the point that the new SDM does not take

anything. As he reported, FPS dealers were involved in transactions (black

marketing) worth Rs. 2 to Rs.3 lakhs regularly, in order to save Rs. 10,000 per

month. He gave the following description of the black marketing of commodities done

by him (Table 6.4).

Table 6.4 Extent of Black Marketing by a FPS dealer

(As Reported by the FPS dealer) Items Distributable

Quantity, Qntl./lt Quantity Black

Marketed Profit per

Qntl./per drumTotal Profit Venue of Black

Marketing Wheat 150.40 40.00 150.00 3000.00 FPSRice 376.00 100.00 50.00 5000.00 FPSSugar 53.00 40.00 200.00 8000.00 FPSKerosene Oil 10,000 6,000 250.00 7500.00 Kerosene DepotSource: Interview with FPS dealer

The FPS dealer informed that even while black marketing they could not sell

the commodities at the market rates, since the buyers knew that they were PDS

commodities. He informed that the Kerosene oil was used by the owner of depot

himself or sent to a petrol pump to be mixed in petrol. Sugar, wheat and rice were

274

sold in the open/free markets. We observed that the FPS dealer did not have enough

space in his shop to store the quantity allotted to him each month.

The overall story shows following picture:

CENTRAL POOL SUPPLY COLLECTION

State Pool

Food Godowm at commissionary or District

Level

Food Godowm at Block Level

Fair Price Shop Dealers

State Pool

Food Godowm at commissionary or

District Level

Mandi Samiti/ Government purchase

Centers

Farmers/ Producers Village (Producers and

Consumers both exist)

DELIVERY & COLLECTION SYSTEM OF FOOD-GRAINS

FROM PRODUCERS TO CONSUMERS

PRICES OF FOOD-GRAINS

Pric

e G

ap B

etw

een

Pro

duce

rs to

Con

sum

ers

275

6.5 District Lalitpur In Lalitpur district we observed that the poor families also owned one to four acre

land but practiced traditional farming. These people restricted themselves to

production of pulses and some inferior crops. Rice and wheat were being cultivated

only by the rich/big farmers. The output of each of rice and wheat per acre in the

village was between 6 quintals and 9 quintals. This productivity being low, the

demand for rice and wheat distributed through the PDS is higher here than in other

districts.

Because of the close proximity of this district with Madhya Pradesh (MP) a

number of people belonging to urban tribes of MP migrated to this district in search of

wage-work. These people were given one to two acres of land on lease by the

administration nearly 10 years ago. Because of their poverty and also low fertility of

the land, most of them also work as labourers in brick kilns for three to eight months

a year.

The godowns storing food grains for distribution under the PDS are under the

Marketing Department. All the food grains are supplied to the godowns under the

supervision of the Marketing inspectors. All the godowns in the district are controlled

by the District Marketing Officer. We found the PDS in this district, including both urban and rural areas,

functioning better as compared to the other selected districts. The existence of

cordial relations between all the communities in the village is probably the reason for

this. The reason for cordial relations is that most of the people settled in the village,

were economically homogeneous. Thus, we infer that the PDS works better in case

of strong social relation based on mutual accommodation, transparency, and hence

low corruption.

This can also be put in the following ways:

If there exists low economic gap among the village communities, then there is

good inter-community relationship, leading to high sympathetic cooperation,

low corruption and good distribution.

High dependency on market for food grains creates more demand for FPS

items, leading to high pressure on FPS dealers. This leads to low corruption

and good distribution.

In the village Bamhouri Kharait in the Bar Development Block in the district,

the FPS dealer, Sri Har Charan, informed that he distributed all the commodities

regularly to the card holders each month. However, the associates of the new

Pradhan from an opponent group complained against the FPS dealer. The Assistant

276

Development Officer (Panchayat), while investigating the complaint, asked the

cardholders to reveal the truth. The ADO (Panchayat) submitted his report in FPS

dealer’s favour. Subsequently, when the Supply Officer came to verify the report, he

was given a bribe of Rs. 4,000 to get the license of the FPS dealer cancelled. After a

month the shop was closed and all the ration card holders were attached to the shop

in the adjoining village Dhamna. The FPS dealer alleged that he had to pay Rs.

1,500 to the supply inspector and Rs. 4,000 to the Godown in-charge while collecting

his allotment every month. He also alleged that he had paid Rs. 25,000 for getting

the shop 16 months earlier. When we asked him how he earned profit from this

system, he replied that many families of this village migrate out of the village for four

to six months every year. Since they did not buy their commodities during their

absence, he sells the equivalent quantity in the open market. In addition, many poor

families could not afford to buy sugar, which he sold in the market. This was the

source of his profit.

We found that all the Annapurna card holders in the Bamheri Khadet village,

except one, were less than 50 years. When the Panchayat was asked how it had

happened, it replied that the earlier Pradhan had filled up the target number of

Annapurna beneficiaries with people who were known to him although there were

many genuinely needy people in the village.

In the same village we observed that the oil depot was nearly 37 kilometers

away from the village. The FPS dealer had to pay a large sum extra as transportation

charge for bringing back his allotted quota every month. Since the cardholders of the

village were aware of this fact, they did not mind paying 30 to 35 paise extra per liter

to cover the transportation cost of the FPS dealer. We found that the BPL and ANT

card holders were being given the amount entitled to them at the right prices. The

APL cardholders were found to be given 1kg sugar on their card although they were

not entitled to it. The FPS dealer told us that the illiterate people did not know that

they were not entitled to sugar but when they demanded it, he gave 1 kg to each of

them.

The village Meguan in the Mehrauni development block was located at a

distance of 33 kms from the Tehsil office, of which 7 kms remained inaccessible for

four or five months during and after the rainy season. Thus, no vehicle except

tractors and small van could reach the village during that period. Given the distance

of this village from the food grains godown (33 kms) and the distance to the oil depot

(62 kms), the FPS dealer had to face a tough situation while bringing back the

allotted commodities each month. In the absence of local vehicles, he had to hire

tractors and paid the transport cost from his own pocket.

277

In this village we found 50 to 60 dalit families who migrate to various parts of

M.P. for four to eight months in a year. The FPS dealer benefited from this situation

by selling the commodities meant for them in the open market and filling false entries

in the registers. Simultaneously, we observed that 10 kg rice, 6 kg wheat and

sometimes 1 kg sugar were being sold at 50 to 60 paise extra on BPL ration cards.

Except for the ANT cards, the distribution in this village was quite good. The

Annapurna card holders were getting 9 kg wheat as they were entitled to.

Most of the BPL and ANT card holders in the Megua village did not know how

much and what commodities they were entitled to. They accepted whatever

quantities and whatever goods the FPS dealer gave them as the grace of God. Some

people opined that when they did not know what they were entitled to, how they

could ask for them.

In almost all the regions in the district, the actual BPL and ANT families had

little money to buy goods from the Quota shop. Most of them worked in the

unorganized sector as casual labourers. The FPS dealer distributes the commodities

only on one to six days per month. Not having disposable money most of the time,

these poor families remained deprived of the benefits of the PDS.

We found the administration busy in renewing the cards of all the card

holders. The Pradhan was found to be taking advantage of this situation by issuing

BPL and ANT cards to people of his group and also to those who would support him

during the next Panchayat election. Simultaneously, many APL families were found

to be getting many ration cards issued under different names to buy adequate

kerosene oil. In the urban areas also many irregularities were found during the

issuing of ration cards.

The records of many FPS dealers in the selected regions showed much

discrepancy between the stock and distribution registers. The distribution registers

were signed without any goods being distributed. Study of the supply of kerosene oil

at the depots in the district showed that the storage capacity at each godown was

much less than the amount meant for allotment. The tank storage capacity for

supplying 1.3 lakh liters of oil was only 6 to 20 thousand liters, which is even less

than the storage capacity of a tractor which can store 24,000 liters. This implies that if

the collection by the FPS dealers was as per schedule then they would not be able to

supply more than one tractor per day. In parallel, if the collections did not take place

as per schedule then there was no capacity for storing the oil at the depots. In some

depots we saw that the oil tanks were above the ground level which resulted in less

leakage.

278

Most of the villages were far from the oil depots (between 30 and 65 kms). In

some blocks, there were no depots at the regional level. The reason is that the

planned allotment by oil companies like Indian Oil, Bharat Petroleum and Hindustan

Petroleum had been decided at the administrative level, which had their depots in

only a few places in the district. In this situation, while planning out the allotment to

the FPS dealers, they were attached to far off depots if the depot close by did not

have adequate supplies. This caused much difficulty to the FPS dealers.

In the Virgha block in the district there was no notice of the stock available at

the godowns for allotment to FPS dealers. The records showed the balance stock

much higher than the actual stock. The senior Marketing inspector could not give any

satisfactory reply. The allotment for this block from the godown every month is 4,700

quintals while the capacity is only of 3,500 quintals. Every month a notice is put up at

an open space in the animal pound (Kani House) about the extra 1,200 quintals.

Some quantity of food grains is wasted every month, which the godown in-charge

reported had informed to the higher authority with no follow up action. He also

informed that the space for the godown has been taken on rent. The unorganized

way in which the food grains are stored causes problems at the time of verification.

Since one year the godown in-charge has been asking the Supply Department to

provide him a tent to cover the uncovered food grains with no effect.

We observed that most of the depots had a storage capacity of only 15 to 20

kiloliters while they had to allot nearly 120 liters each month. One tractor can carry a

capacity of 120 kiloliters of oil, so that most depots can store only 1 tractor load. If the

FPS dealers delay in picking up their allotted quantity and on the other side the oil

companies send a fresh supply, it causes a great panic in the depot. No roster is

prepared in the district for the order in which the FPS dealers should collect their

allotted quota. In this situation, each FPS dealer prefers to collect their quota at the

end of the month so that he has to invest his money for a short time.

279

Case StudyBlock Bar, Village Bastravan The majority of the population residing in this village lives below the poverty line. The FPS in the village is a good support system for these people. The primary occupation of the people is farming and the main crops grown are wheat and corn. The ANT cardholders undoubtedly benefit from the FPS in the village but we found that the BPL cardholders underwent a number of irregularities. The people who complained the most against the FPS dealer for cheating them in weighing the goods were the ones living in the Dhadhli Tola. The ANT beneficiaries were given the goods at the right rates but they were grossly under weighed. The FPS dealer, Sri Parvat, though present, did not appear before us. According to the supply inspector, there are many complaints against this dealer. The major problem facing the villagers is that they do not get the wage rate in the village that they are entitled to. This forces many of them to migrate out of the village in search of work for six to eight months in a year to places like Indore, Gwalior, Bhopal etc. in MP to work mainly as labourers in brick kilns.

Many urban dalits in the Vichitranagar village in the Bar block leave the

village with their families for

five to six months to work as

labourers in brick kilns. The

FPS dealers use this

opportunity to sell off the

quantities meant for them.

The people of the village

alleged that the FPS dealer

gives them the scheduled

amount but cheats them

while weighing. The FPS

dealer defended himself by

alleging that he too is given

items less in weight than the actual one at the godown. Post-distribution items are

sold in the open market at the market rate.

There were about 15 to 16 urban-linked families living in the village who live

below poverty. These families work in brick kilns as labourers. In the village, they

were given land by the administration on lease whose productivity was lower than

what could sustain them. No one in the village had ration cards since they had all

been deposited with the Pradhan for renewal. The relationship between the FPS

dealer on the one hand and the BPL and ANT card holders and the dalits on the

other was bad. Some dalits told that they did not dare to complain against the FPS

dealer since both the Pradhan and the FPS dealer were leaders of a dominant

political party. In case of any complaints, the defendants would go scot-free and the

complainants (dalits) would be punished by being excluded. The poor dalit BPL card

holders had no knowledge about the commodities they were entitled to and the

quantities and prices. For example, Shivpal, a man belonging to the Dhobi caste who

has had a BPL card for the last 10 years, was not aware that they were also entitled

to wheat and rice.

When we reached the village, we found the FPS dealer absent and shop

closed. The inspector of the Supply Department who had accompanied us seemed to

be aware of the activities of the FPS dealer but had not taken any action against him.

It appeared that he had deliberately sent away the FPS dealer.

280

Case StudyBlock Bar, village Bamhauri Khadait This village is located in a highly remote area in the middle of mountains. The land of this village is very stony and has low water content. Consequently the productivity of this land is very low. Thus most people of this village migrate for seven to eight months to neighbouring places to earn their livelihood. The PDS in the village was found to be comparatively good. The FPS dealer has been running the shop for the last 16 months and all the card holders were found to receive all the goods that they are entitled to. 1 kg of sugar was also distributed to each card holder every month.

The FPS dealers of all the selected villages did not have adequate space in

their shops to store the food-grains and sugar allotted to them each month. Only 80.0

per cent of the total amount allotted to them could be stored. It is possible that the

commodities are stored somewhere else apart from the godowns unknown to the

consumers. This may be the

reason why the FPS dealers

can tell the cardholders that

the goods are sold out when

actually only the lot stored in

his own shop is sold. In this

village too, the distribution is

done only for one or two

days per month.

The Bamhauri Khadait village in the Bar block is divided into three hamlets or

tolas called Mukhya Tola, Maurya Tola and Pal Basti. The Quota shop is located in

the Mukhya Tola. The village is also divided into two factions. One is the ex-

Pradhan’s group and the other one is the new Pradhan’s group. The FPS dealer is a

supporter of the old Pradhan and an opponent of the new Pradhan. The FPS dealer

is almost totally illiterate and all his work is carried out by his son who is a little more

educated. These two have little knowledge about the formalities involved in the

distribution process but their distribution is good. The FPS dealer told that he gave 1

kg of sugar to the APL card holders also to avoid quarrels. These people do not

understand that they are not entitled to sugar and even if they do, they insist that they

are given some amount.

We found advance entries in many ration cards. The FPS dealer defended

himself by acknowledging the mistake. The people, however, said that they received

the items on time.

We offer the following observations about the village with reference to PDS:

Low economic gap leading to good relationship, high sympathy for each

other, more transparency, low corruption, good distribution.

In the Pali nagar region in the Virgha block, Sadar Tehsil, as soon as we

reached the village all the four FPS dealersof the village had shut their shops

and disappeared. The family members, on being questioned, replied that the

staff of the Supply department had asked them to do so.

281

Case Study Nanhi Bai, Age 26 years, Widow, Caste-Harijan, Non beneficiary Nanhi bai’s husband died in 2001 after a prolonged illness. She has three children. She works as a daily labourer. Nanhi bai received a widow’s pension for one year which fetched her Rs. 550 per month. Of this she got only Rs. 500 since she had to give the rest as commission. The next year when she went to renew it, she was told that it was cancelled. She alleged that the Pradhan and a few villagers had complained against her. When her widow pension was stopped, she asked the Pradhan to issue her a ration card but he told her that widows were not entitled to ration cards. Nanhi bai is bringing up her children in extreme poverty and hopes the administration will renew her widow pension and give her a ration card.

Many poor families of the Pali Kasba had been issued APL cards while the

well-off families had been given BPL cards. The local people told that the charges for

issuing ration cards by the Gram Panchayat were the following: ANP Rs. 150 to Rs.

300, BPL Rs.10 to Rs. 15, ANT Rs. 20 to Rs. 100, and APL Rs. 10 to Rs. 25. The

people who could not afford the money were given the cards many months later.

Many families were found who

were benefiting from BPL, ANT

and ANP cards although they

did not deserve them. Some

people were also found who

were enjoying both ANP cards

and old age pension.

Ward No. 3 of the Pali

Kasba is inhabited by very

poor people like the Sahariyas,

Harijans, Bajdarhi etc. These

people informed that often they do not get kerosene oil. They also reported that the

FPS dealer, Rakesh, has two ration shops, one in the village and the other in the Pali

Kasba. He also runs a grocers shop through which he sells the commodities allotted

to him under the PDS (black marketing).

The workers of the Supply Department in the district told that the amount that

is sent to the supply office by the administration is distributed proportionately among

the poor families in the district. He further said that the amount of kerosene oil that

was being distributed in the district over the last many years was much less than the

number of ration cards there. Both these statements were however found to be false

when they were cross checked at the village level. We did not find an exact number

of poor families in the village. The number of ration cards recorded in the FPS

dealer’s records, especially the APL cards was not the same as the number recorded

with the Supply Department.

6.6 District Jhansi We observed the system for distribution of essential commodities in the

Jhansi district to be highly inefficient. Some segments of the district are politically

sensitive. In the Moth Tehsil, which is the citadel of the leaders of the ruling party, the

distribution of cards was biased in favour of the people who constituted the vote bank

of the party. It seems there is a direct link between the leaders of the constituencies

and the powerful people who openly influence the Pradhan and the contractors.

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We offer the following observations regarding the condition of the Public

Distribution System in this district:

If there is a narrow economic gap between the various communities living in

the village, then the social relations between them are cordial, leading to a

smooth functioning of the system.

If there are an equal number of supporters of two conflicting parties in the

village, then the functioning of the PDS is smooth. This is because there is

local pressure from the village society, who maintains strict control to ensure

smooth functioning of the system. The political presence in the village also

leads to more awareness among the villagers regarding their right to

obtaining essential commodities regularly.

If the village is inhabited by people of only one caste or if there is dominance

of one particular caste in the village, then the people belonging to the caste

constituting the majority remain more privileged so far as obtaining the

essential commodities are concerned.

In a village where the present and past Pradhans are in competition and there

is little difference in the number of supporters of each of them, PDS remains

efficient. If a village is divided into a large number of caste based hamlets lying at

distances between ½ and 1 kilometer from each other, a few hamlets are

deprived from the facility of obtaining essential commodities under PDS. Each year in each of the districts, the quantity of kerosene oil allotted to the

FPS dealers was higher by 3 litres to 5 litres per ration card. When the Supply

Department was asked the reason for this, the officials pointed out that this was the

procedure of allotment being followed since the past many years. According to them,

over time, the number of APL ration card holders had increased substantially, which

was why the FPS dealers were being allotted more per ration card. The supply

inspectors opined that there was need to revise the system of allotment so that there

was no discrepancy between the number of card holders and the quantity of

kerosene oil allotted to each FPS dealer.

Sugar per ration card was also being allotted in varying quantity. The District

Supply Officer explained the allotment-differential for keeping a safe quantity margin

for the FPS dealers in view of the increase in the number of ration card holders.

In Tehsil Moth, we observed that the officers of the Supply Department on

duty were afraid of the powerful political leaders of the region. The power wielded by

the leaders compelled the workers of the Department to carry out any imperatives

even if they were illegal. The staff of the Department reported that the National

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Chairman of a wing of the ruling Party, who was a resident in that Tehsil, often

altered the implementation procedures of the Department according to his own

discretion.

Most of the inspectors, officers and staff members performed their duties only

on the Tehsil, Janata and Police days. They visited the shops in the villages or

districts only when they had to make enquiries regarding a complaint. The matter

gets settled only when money (bribe) is given to them depending on the level of

allotment of the FPS dealer. The Gram Pradhans and the Lekhpals are given the

authority at the level of the FPS dealers to verify the honesty of the latter. These

people certify only after ensuring rent.

In the district we observed that there was no particular day fixed for wholesale

dealers of kerosene oil to collect their quota. They could collect it on any day

between the 1st and 20th of the month. Most of the FPS dealers preferred to collect

their quota at the end of the period since they would then have to block their money

for a shorter period of time. Also, there is no verification at the depots when the retail

dealers collect their allotted quota of oil. The possibility of the occurrence of

irregularities, thus, increases manifold.

According to the instructions of the Regional Food Controller, all the FPS

dealers of the region had to deposit money at the food grain godown for the next

month’s allotment of essential commodities for distribution to card holders by the 15th

of each month and lift the items allotted to them between the 23rd and 30th as per the

roster. The commodities can be verified between 1st and 5th. After getting the

verifications done at the village level, the distribution can begin. If one probes deeper

into the system, one can perceive that the actual duration for distribution of the

essential commodities at the village level is only nine days. Based on one holiday per

week, only eight days will be available for distribution. Since all the FPS dealers of a

district have only one source of income with which they run their shops and since

they have to deposit the money for the next month’s supply by the 14th, they try to

clear their stock within one to three days out of the eight days available for

distribution. Often poor families cannot save the money needed by them to buy their

quota in this short period.

In many godowns considered as store of food-grains for delivery to the FPS

dealers, we observed that the distribution of food grains to the FPS dealers by the

district administration was not done according to the roster prepared for this purpose.

The reasons for this were reported to be the weather condition, lack of transport

facilities, personal problems of the FPS dealers, festivals etc. These reasons often

make the roster system unsuccessful. We also observed that very often when the

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FPS dealers lift their allotted food grains, no external officer is present at that time to

verify the amount being carried away. The verification of all the allotted commodities

lifted throughout the day is done in evening when the concerned officer come to

check.

We found that the majority of the poor families settled in the villages were

unaware of the benefits that they were entitled to under PDS. We found many BPL

card holders who even did not know which commodities they could obtain from the

FPSs, what quantities of these commodities they were entitled to and the prices at

which they could buy them. In such a situation they accepted whatever the FPS

dealers offered to them as an expression of his benevolence. We also found many

BPL families who were familiar with the system and thought of complaining against

any irregularities practiced by the FPS dealers. However, they claimed that they

could not do so because of the following reasons:

Many did not know where and to whom they should lodge their complaint.

Some people knew where to lodge their complaints but could not do so

because of poverty and consequent inability to miss a day’s labour.

Social insecurity at the local level and desire to avoid conflict was another

reason cited for not lodging complaints against the dishonest FPS dealers.

Many people expressed fear, in case they complained against the FPS

dealers, by being excluded from the entitlement.

Many persons who had earlier complained reported that there was no

outcome of their complaints since the FPS dealers bribed the enquiry officials

to silence the voice of protest or to turn the report in favour of the FPS

dealers.

Very often there is a strong link between the FPS dealers and the village

Pradhan. Thus, even if the FPS dealers commit irregularities, the Pradhan

succeeds in influencing the Panchayat and the local leaders in favour of the

FPS dealers. The customers are afraid to complain against the FPS dealers

because of this nexus.

In some villages the FPS dealers announce that they will distribute items only

on one particular day. The customers blame themselves for being deprived of

that period’s quota if they fail to arrive in time.

The absence of an objective evaluation system at the village level for

ensuring smooth functioning of the PDS is often the reason why unsatisfied

customers cannot complain.

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According to a system implemented recently, people will receive the reply to

their complaints only when it is accompanied by a affidavit. Because of this

complex formality, many people do not like to complain.

The major reason why poor people do not complain against the FPS dealers

is the prevailing strong nexus between the FPS dealers and the powerful

people of their village.

In many villages people reportedly tap electricity illegally in the absence of

electricity connection at home. In these villages the people save the kerosene oil

procured from the ration shops, which they later sell during the agricultural season or

utilize in future when the need is acute.

The settled people in many villages said that very few people consume rice,

and prefer to consume wheat. In the FPSs, however, the quota of wheat per capita is

less and rice is more, relative to what is required by taste-pattern. The majority of the

people do not take their share of rice, but often the FPS dealer imposes the condition

that he will not give them wheat unless they also take some rice. This compels them

to buy a little quantity of rice in order to get their share of wheat. In some villages the

people reported that in the past two years wheat production had not been as

expected. This adversely affected many marginal farmers who had to borrow money

from private lenders at the time of sowing, which they had to return with a high rate of

interest after selling their produce. Because of the poor wheat output in the past few

years, they were unable to repay their loans, steeping them badly in debt. These

marginal farmers said that although rice was not in the consumption habit of most of

them, because of their inability to buy wheat from the open market to fulfill the food

need, they bought their share of both rice and wheat from the ration shop and made

‘rotis’ (indigenous bread) after grinding them into powder together. In the district the godowns for storing food grains are looked after by the

Marketing Department. The in-charge of one of these godowns, a senior Marketing

officer, informed that each month the high level officers demand money (bribe). The

godown in-charge is forced to make arrangements for paying the money. He also

reported that the situation had been worse when the godown was a part of the

Corporation (Nigam). At that time the food grains never reached the godown; now

things are much better since the stock reaches the godowns.

At almost each village people informed that there is high demand for

kerosene oil during the agricultural season (between October and December and

between April and May). This is because there is a large difference in the prices of

kerosene oil and diesel, which is used for running pump sets and other machines.

Many farmers prefer using kerosene oil in place of diesel since it is cheaper. Also,

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the demand for kerosene oil for cooking purposes is always there. In order to take

advantage of this high demand many people seek the help of the administration or

political leaders to procure kerosene oil and sell in the open market.

Most of the Fair Price Shops had the capacity to store only 75.0 per cent to

80.0 per cent of the quantity allotted to them for distribution per period. Many of them,

thus, stored their commodities in various places in the village, making it a

cumbersome arrangement for the purpose of distribution. What we observed is that

in most of the villages people were not aware of their rights under the charter of PDS.

Although many customers, especially the poor and Dalits, had complaints against the

FPS dealers about underweighting the food grains supplied, they were unable to

protest because of the power wielded by the FPS dealers in collusion with the

influential upper castes of the village.

In the Mauranipur Tehsil, one officer of the Supply Department informed that

there was great pressure on this Department to carry out illegal and irregular

activities. The chief reason for this was that the top brass of this Department had to

face a lot of high level political pressure, which was passed on to the staff members.

He opined that ultimately it would be the poor ration card holders who would be

deprived of their entitlement.

Kerosene Distribution Scheme In order to make the system of distribution of kerosene oil under the PDS

more efficient and to stop black marketing, the government launched a pilot project in

51 development blocks of the state on 2nd October 2005. Under this scheme, in each

identified block a wholesale distributor would be selected by the oil companies who

would own an underground tank that could store 20 kiloliters of oil, adequate number

of barrels, and dispensing units to fill these barrels. This distributor would then select

2 to 10 sub-distributors with the advice of the district administration. These sub-

distributors would be given a license during the period of the project and also enough

barrels to store 2,500 liters of oil by the oil companies, which would have the names

of the people concerned with the project. Based on the number of card holders in the

district, the district Supply Department would supply a quota of oil in multiples of 200

liters for each village, 52 kiloliters for each wholesale distributor and 200 liters for

each sub distributor and FPS dealer. Each month the sub-distributor would be given

200 liters of oil as quota for distribution. These would be filled in each barrel having

the names of the oil companies. The FPS owners could obtain their allotted share

from there each month, according to the specified roster. This system would be

supervised at the district level by a six-member committee presided by the District

Panchayat President of which at least three would be women. At the level of the

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development block a five-member committee would be constituted under the

president-ship of the Regional Panchayat President, of which two would be

nominated and three would be elected. At the village level, the system would be

monitored by a six-member committee under the chairmanship of the village

Pradhan. The system was found to be in operation in the development block of

Mausnipur in the Mauranipur Tehsil. We offer the following observations regarding

the system:

The godown of the sub-distributor was nearly 8 kilometers away and the

wholesale distributor’s godown was nearly 10 kilometers away from the

sample villages. Thus, the locations of these godowns were not proper.

The FPS dealers informed that each month the sub-distributor supplied

kerosene oil less by 8 to 10 liters.

The wholesale distributor at Mauranipur informed that the administration had

told them that they had to pass on their commission to the sub-dealer and

also spend their own money to deliver the oil to the sub-distributor in drums.

This money would be reimbursed by the oil companies. As reported, although

nine months have passed, no reimbursement had been received by them.

The owners of the oil companies opined that the government seemed to be

encouraging black marketeering rather than trying to eradicate it. The FPS

dealers do not receive the amount allotted to them from the sub-dealers.

There is no administrative pressure on the sub-dealers to ensure

transparency and neither is there any committee to maintain smooth

functioning the level of the sub-dealers. At the administration level also, it is

not confirmed whether the owners of oil depots are getting their commission

or not.

The FPS dealers reported that the transportation charges for bringing back

the oil allotted to them had to be borne by them themselves whereas this

charge was adjusted per drum in the cost to the sub-dealer. This did not

happen when they used to collect the oil from the wholesale oil depot.

At the level of the development block, the influential leaders and the

representatives of the Panchayat pressurized the sub-dealers to supply them

8 to 10 liters of oil at the subsidized rate. Since the sub-dealers could not dare

to refuse, they adjusted this amount by giving less oil to each of the FPS

dealers. The sub-dealers also benefited economically since they received the

full payment (money) from the FPS dealers. The sub-dealer also said that

between October and December when there is heavy demand of kerosene oil

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because of the peak agricultural season, there was great political and

administrative pressure on the Supply Department for supplying kerosene oil.

The Department passed down this order to the sub-dealers which they had to

fulfill.

We observed no verification of the oil supplied or distributed at the level of

both the wholesale dealer and the sub-dealer.

Most of the drums in the custody of the sub-dealers and the FPS dealers did

not fulfill the standards set by the government in terms of colour and the

names of the people that had to be written on them. Additionally all the drums

with the sub-dealer belonged to the FPS dealers. The sub-dealers

themselves did not have the required number of drums.

Although all the sub-dealers were supposed to follow a FPS dealer’s roster

prepared by the District Administration, they rarely did so. Each of them

supplied oil to the FPS dealers following their own discretion.

At the levels of the wholesale dealer, the sub-dealer and the FPS dealers, no

fixed system was followed for supplying and carrying away oil. Although the

administration had established a definite norm, it was a mere formality. The

whole system was open to corruption and black marketeering in the absence

of strict vigilance and control.

The wholesale dealer said that if the kerosene was distributed by the filler

system the leakage of oil was higher than if it is distributed by the meter

system as done in petrol pumps.

A rule had recently been floated by the administration whereby the Gram

Pradhan of the concerned village is empowered to use his discretion for the selection

of a FPS dealer. However, there was no guideline regarding the appointment of a

second fair price shop in a village. The officials of the Supply Department said that

the minimum educational qualification of a FPS dealer was to be ‘literate’, where

literacy means being able to write one’s own name. We found many FPS dealers in

different villages who were barely able to write their names. All their work was carried

out by other literate people of the village. The Supply Department had no provision

for the training of the inspectors before they assumed charge and for the FPS

dealers after being selected. They started functioning immediately after being

appointed, without having any knowledge of the rules, regulations, formalities and the

various schemes implemented by the government. This made them dependent on

others who had better knowledge about the PDS, thereby reducing the level of

efficiency of the FPS dealers.

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Many names of beneficiaries were enlisted in the record in Mauranipur Tehsil

who did not exist in reality. It appeared that the FPS dealer had retained a few cards

secretly for himself under false names. The FPS dealer had space in his shop to

stock 70.0 per cent to 75.0 per cent of his allotted quota of cereals, sugar and

kerosene oil. Both the FPS dealers were found to have number of drums much less

than were needed to store the total amount of kerosene oil allotted to them.

The ration card holders living in the urban areas told us that the people living

close to the ration shops were able to get an assured supply than those living far

away. This was because they could get regular information regarding the arrival of

stock in the shop and purchase them accordingly. This information was denied to

people living at some distance from the shops, which deprived them from getting the

commodities they were entitled to. The village Shyavari in the Mauranipur

Development Block had four FPS dealers, each having nearly 600 card holders.

Thus, the total number of card holders in the village came to be 2400, which was

more than the population of the village.

The majority of the people in the Shyavari village informed that they got a

regular supply of essential commodities but the quantity given was less by 10.0 per

cent to 15.0 per cent. As informed, the distribution is done on only one or two

particular days of a month. If one goes to the shop after that, he is denied the items.

The FPS dealers, however, defended themselves by saying that they had to pay Rs.

1,100 every month to the supply inspector, Rs. 400 to the Godown in-charge and

also frequently pay donations to people at various levels. In this situation they were

compelled to distribute the commodities under PDS on only two days and sell the

rest of the supply in the open market. Unless they did this, they would not recover the

extra money they paid.

Some of the economically more weak FPS dealers revealed that the relatives

of the Gram Pradhan used to collect the quota allotted for the FPS dealers from the

godowns with their own money, and the records of the distribution were maintained

by somebody else. The FPS dealers only weighed and measured the quantities for

distribution. Only a certain percentage of the profit in the chain of corruption reached

them. However, the FPS dealers were held responsible if any irregularity came to

light. This situation was found in both Moth and Mauranipur villages.

In the village Baruamaf we found that there was only one Fair Price Shop

catering to the entire Gram Panchayat whereas the Panchayat itself had two villages.

The people living in the hamlet where the FPS shop was located, received a regular

supply of essential commodities while in the other hamlet Nayagaon only a few

selected people used to receive their share of essential commodities. The two

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hamlets were at a distance of 6 kilometers from each other by road and 2.5

kilometers by short cut.

In almost each village the FPS dealers did not maintain shop registers. This

implies that they were unable to determine whether the card brought by a particular

customer had been allotted to him or whether he had borrowed it from someone else.

They had to simply measure out the quantities of the commodities demanded by him.

The FPS dealer in the village Baruamaf informed that the sub-dealer of

kerosene oil was at a distance of 10 kilometers from the village. The kerosene dealer

does not provide home delivery of kerosene to the FPS dealer so that the latter has

to fetch the kerosene oil himself every month. The FPS dealer reported that each

month he receives kerosene oil less by 8 to 10 liters and also had to pay some

money per drum as transportation charges to the sub-dealer for bringing kerosene

from the wholesale dealer. He felt that fetching his quota of kerosene oil from the

wholesale dealer entailed fewer difficulties.

In the village Amgaona in the Moth Development Block, we found that the

ration cards of all the people had been deposited with the Pradhan two or three

months back for renewal. During that period they were only supplied kerosene oil.

Only a few selected people were provided the other commodities.

In the same village the upper castes, especially Thakur, constituted the

majority while the FPS dealer belonged to the SC community. The local people

narrated that as soon as the FPS dealer fetches his quota from the godowns to the

FPS each month, the powerful men of castes forcibly take a portion of wheat, sugar

and kerosene oil. The FPS dealer could supply only a portion of the left over

commodities to the needy eligible people. The FPS dealer alleged that these upper

caste people had strong connections with the ruling political party. That is why none

of the PDS officials could take them to task although they were aware of their

activities. No supply inspectors or other officials ever visited the Moth Tehsil for

inspection. We felt that the FPS dealer was only a puppet since his economic

condition was poor and all his allotted quotas were paid for and collected by the

relatives of the upper caste Pradhan. The people of the Amgaona village told us that

the BPL card holders had never received cereals or sugar and the ANT card holders

received these once in two or three months. Kerosene oil was supplied regularly

although they were given only one to three liters. Even this quantity was not supplied

during the agricultural season.

6.7 District: Gorakhpur In the Gorakhpur district we observed that the stock register and the distribution

register at all the FPS dealers’ shops were different from those in the other districts.

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In many shops, the registers were not verified by the Supply Department. As reported

by some FPS dealers, in case of any problem with the authorities, the Supply

Department would be given Rs. 200 to Rs. 500 as bribe to change the registers.

The amount of kerosene oil supplied to the wholesale distributors from the oil

companies is not verified. Also, no verification is done even when the wholesale

distributors supply oil to the FPS dealers. Neither does the administration prepare

any roster for the FPS dealers to collect oil from the oil depots every month. Many

ordinary FPS dealers complained that they often had to return empty hand from the

oil depots while the powerful FPS dealers were able to collect their quota soon. The

stock register at the oil depots were found to be verified by the administrative officer

but they were done as a formality on any single day of the month.

Many wholesale distributors supplied oil to the FPS dealers with the help of

quite old numbering machines. The administration had issued instructions that the

wholesale distributors should supply oil from a 200 liter filler machine; however, as

we found, the instruction had not been complied with. We found that the drums used

by the FPS dealers to carry oil back to the shops from the wholesale distributors

were not coloured according to the specifications of the administration and neither

were their names written on them. It was, thus, not known what the drums were for,

where they were going and whose drums they were.

For the last six months, we were told, all the cards of the district were in the

process of being renewed. The concerned staff had also been told to verify whether

the card holders deserved the cards that had been issued to them and to correct

them if there was any irregularity. Many households complained that they had been

issued the wrong cards. Many BPL families had been converted to APL and ANT to

BPL. The APL households had not received their cards by then, although their old

cards had been deposited. We also observed that after the stopping of the

Annapurna scheme, the cardholders were not issued any alternative ration cards.

None of the Gram Panchayats had any authentic information about the BPL

cardholders in their villages. The Panchayat representatives informed that in practical

terms the size of landholding, ownership of a house and income were the basis for

issuing BPL and ANT cards. Often the pressure of the local Gram Sabha forced them

to modify the names from time to time.

In most villages we saw that the number of BPL households fixed by the

Gram Panchayat was only a rough estimate and not an authentic figure. The Gram

Panchayat, however, passed on the responsibility for issuing wrong ration cards to

the Village Secretary and Lekhpal while the latter two passed it on to the Panchayat

and Supply Department.

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Instead of taking the actual number of BPL households in the village into

consideration, the district administration had fixed a target number of BPL

households which the block and village administration had to fulfill. This number fixed

by the district was not a representative one but the Panchayats had no option but to

fulfill it whether the families deserved to be categorized as BPL or not. They used this

opportunity to distribute BPL cards to their caste members, to supporters and

sympathizers and to people whom they wanted to appease. In this process the

actually needy BPL families remained deprived of the PDS facility.

Information about the allocation of various commodities was available at all

levels beginning from the district down to the level of the FPS dealers but information

about how much of these had been actually distributed to the consumers was

available only with the FPS dealers. Any left over quantity of the items were not

adjusted with the next month’s allotment and neither was any enquiry made at the

godowns about them.

All the FPS dealers are issued a card by the administration for collecting the

commodities allotted to them from the godowns and oil depots. In these cards the in-

charge of the godowns and depots mention the commodities and the quantities

collected by the FPS dealers but not the amount distributed by them the previous

month. The appropriation of the left over commodities by the FPS dealers can be

checked if the card mentions the amount of items distributed in the previous month.

Both the godown in-charge and the FPS dealers informed that the

transportation of food-grains from the wholesale godowns in the districts to the block

godowns is done by contractors who have powerful political connections. These

contractors convey the cereals under the Antyodaya scheme easily but create

problems in the case of cereals meant for BPL cardholders. Their usual excuse is

that the State Food Corporation godown did not have the stock. As we understood,

this is a cover-up for the conspiracy of a few officers and the political parties not to

allow these commodities to reach the godowns. Many FPS dealers told that the in-

charge of the godowns often demanded Rs. 30 per quintal as transportation charges

for the BPL cereals failing which they do not release them the allotment.

The FPS dealer gets a commission of only Rs. 6 per quintal for food-grains

and Rs. 30 per drum of kerosene oil that contains 200 liters. This rate was fixed 30

years back and has never been revised. Today the expenses for lifting the food

grains and oil have increased manifolds since the transportation charges have

increased tremendously. In addition, maintaining the records, preparing bank drafts

and photo copying papers also involve expenses for the FPS dealers. The FPS

dealers also complained that the expenses incurred for bringing back the food-grains

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for the mid-day meal scheme and the SGRY scheme are never reimbursed by the

administration.

We observed that the distribution of kerosene oil in all the selected villages is

almost regular but the quantity distributed is less than that decided upon by the

administration. The reasons for this are the following:

The quantity of kerosene oil allotted to the FPS dealer has not been

increased in proportion to the increase in the number of APL cards in the

villages.

Many cardless families are given kerosene oil under the instructions of the

Gram Panchayat.

The influential people of the village appropriate oil.

The FPS dealers are given five to ten liters oil less per drum than the allotted

quantity.

The representatives and staff of the Panchayat demand more oil per month.

Under these circumstances, the question arises why kerosene oil is still

distributed regularly and not the food-grains. The main reasons for this are:

In rural areas, there is no alternative to kerosene oil for lighting up at night in

the absence of electricity.

The huge difference in prices between the kerosene oil sold through PDS and

that sold in the open market.

The unavailability of kerosene oil in the markets.

Use of kerosene oil for other purposes like agriculture, irrigation etc.

The higher price of diesel compared to kerosene oil.

Because of these reasons the demand for kerosene oil is much in rural areas,

which the FPS dealers understand. If the people are not given kerosene oil, there

may be chaos in villages and the FPS dealers will find it difficult to run their shops.

That is why they take care to ensure that the distribution of kerosene oil does not halt

under any circumstances. Distribution of Kerosene oil, thus, shows the bottommost

layer of functioning of PDS.

We observed that the FPS dealers belonging to the scheduled castes were

not well-off economically. Such FPS dealers were also found to be close to the

Pradhans since they often had to borrow money from them to lift their quota every

month. This situation gave the Pradhans and their representatives the opportunity to

exploit the FPS dealers.

In the Vishnupur village of the block Badagoan, we found that the FPS dealer,

Sri Mohanlal, had been running the Quota shop for the last 13 years. He told us that

he requires Rs. 80,000 per month for lifting his quota, of which he can pay only Rs.

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25,000. The rest of the month he borrows from the big farmers in the region. His

stock register was entered till January 2006. There was no record of any transactions

since then. According to him, all the FPS dealers in the region change their registers

after every six months. When asked (for the previous records), he could not locate

them.

According to the records of six months back available with this FPS dealer, all

the commodities were distributed within seven days but the commodity by name and

quantity given to each person was not mentioned. When questioned, he informed

that every month the Pradhan’s son comes to the shop and the goods are distributed

under his supervision. Many APL families are given sugar, cardless people are given

kerosene oil and powerful people of the village are given as much quantity of any

commodity as they demand. That is why there are no records of the distribution and

often the eligible persons are denied their entitlements.

In this village, two months earlier the villagers were issued ration cards based

on their status. However, many poor families who deserved to be given BPL or ANT

cards were not given these cards since their target had been filled in the village.

According to the Pradhan, the Gram Panchayat did not have a list of BPL families, so

the cards were issued based on personal information and physical verification. We

found that the APL card holders did not possess ration cards since the last two

months as their cards had been sent for renewal and had not been sent back from

the block.

In almost all the selected villages the FPS dealer was allegedly charging the

BPL and ANT card holders 30 paisa to Rs.1.50 extra per kg for food grains and 50

paisa to Re 1.00 extra per liter for kerosene oil. They were also not being given the

amount entitled to them. When the FPS dealer of Vishnupur was asked why he was

practicing things not legal, he replied that if he charged the price fixed by the

government, then he would not be able to earn any surplus. The FPS dealer thinks

he is right in distributing a little quantity to everyone to keep all the villagers satisfied.

The supply inspector opined that the particular block was highly sensitive since all

kinds of criminals supported by political parties lived there. That is why both the

Supply Department and the FPS dealers remain cautious.

The food grain godown in the Bansganv block was observed to be located in

three places. Of these, two were close to each other but the third one was seven

kilometers away. This made the verification of stock very difficult. According to the

Marketing inspector, no register had been prepared by the administration for

distributing the food grains on specific days to the FPS dealers. The criminals and

the powerful FPS dealers applied force to get their stock first. In parallel, the godown

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being in three places, the FPS dealers insisted on getting their stock from the

godown of their choice, which led to many difficulties. He informed that the godown is

now being run from a rented premise.

The FPS dealers informed that they are given less distributable amount every

one or two months. The money for the next month’s allotment has to be deposited in

the previous month but there are problems in getting the extra amount adjusted. The

local people, however, do not realize that the FPS dealers are given less stock for

distribution.

The local people of Vishnupur village told that sugar is given to them only

before festivals, which is usually twice a year. They get 10 kgs wheat, 15 to 20 kgs

rice and 1 to 2 litres kerosene oil per card each month but after every month one

commodity or the other is not distributed. The entire distribution process is completed

in 1 to 3 days.

In the same village many BPL and ANT card holders know the irregularities

but are unable to protest. The reasons for these are the following:

The FPS dealer has strong links with the rich and powerful people of the

village whom the ordinary people fear or respect. The latter also work in the

fields of the former and often borrow money from the former.

Most people are convinced that even if they complain, no action will be taken

since the FPS dealer will be able to bribe his way out. Later on, he will

penalize the complainants by not giving them any commodity.

The majority of the BPL and ANT card holders are poor, weak and vulnerable

who work hard throughout the day to earn their daily wages. They have

neither the energy nor the time to complain.

Most of them are not aware where and to whom they should complain.

Many people have no faith on the Panchayat. They believe that no action will

be taken after complaining since there is no vigilance committee to monitor

the activities of the FPS dealer.

In the Pali village in the same block the FPS dealer, Sri Sadanand Rai, told

that he usually distributed goods according to the prevailing local power structure.

The people are not compelled to bring their ration cards to the shop to buy the goods.

He distributes the items according to their status. Thus, the people of the village get

less or more goods depending on their status in the village. At the end of the

distribution period, the stock and distribution registers are filled in and the dates are

entered arbitrarily.

The consumers in the village had no entries in ration cards. The only

commodity given to them was one to three liters of kerosene oil. The BPL card

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holders reported to have had never received any wheat in the last 15 years. They

sometimes got 5 to 10 kgs of rice. The ANT cardholders get 10 to 15 kgs of rice and

wheat every two months. Both ANT and BPL card holders get sugar only before

festivals.

The FPS dealer distributed extra amount to some influential people of each

caste in order to appease them. When the excluded sections across castes

complained against the FPS dealer, the influential internal collaborators supported

the FPS dealer and suppressed the complaint.

The FPS dealer of the Pali village was found to bribe the in-charge of the

godowns while lifting his goods every month but concealed the fact. The FPS dealer

mentioned that every month he got kerosene oil less by 10 liters of per drum at the

depot but there was no way to stop this practice. The reason for this is that the owner

of the oil depot was a ‘Raja’ of the region and had a lot of political and administrative

connections.

The FPS dealer and some local people of the village informed that earlier

there were 812 ration cards in the village. But the number has now been decreased

to 600. Most ration cards had been attached to the villages of rich and powerful

people of the region and most people had not been given the ration cards that they

were entitled to. Many families also remained cardless. The quantity distributed in the

village had also decreased although the amount demanded remained the same. This

has led to many difficulties in distribution.

In the Barhgadahi village in the Bhathar development block, we found that the

village was divided into 14 hamlets each at a distance of half a km. to four km. from

each other. People in many of the hamlets, however, were not getting the benefits of

the PDS. The hamlets inhabited by the powerful people took away all the goods. The

common people received only kerosene oil from time to time.

We were told that the in-charge of the foodgrain godown of the Bhathat block

(Senior Marketing inspector), in the months when the prices of food grains was high,

told the FPS dealers sympathetically that next month the quota of BPL rice, wheat

and sugar would be reduced so they should deposit only 60.0 per cent of the total

money so that their investment would not be blocked. Being assured thus, the FPS

dealers would deposit less money and consequently would be given less quota the

next month. The godown in-charge, the contractors and other people would then

show that there was less demand for the commodities and siphon off the remaining

quantities.

When the FPS dealer of the Baragadahi village was asked why he lifted less

quantity, he replied that at the local level the yield of rice and wheat was high so the

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demand of most of the people was fulfilled. That is why there was less demand from

the FPS dealer’s shop by even the BPL card holders. In parallel, the quantities

supplied at the block godown from the district was often less. He was then allotted

less quota from the godown so that the amount distributed by him was also less. The

ration card holders, however, said that there was adequate demand for wheat, rice

and sugar in the village. The BPL and ANT card holders informed that they

sometimes obtained 10 kgs wheat and 10 kg rice. We found many BPL card holders

who had not received wheat, sugar or rice since the last 8 to 9 years. Many APL

families in the village did not even know what commodities they were entitled to.

Our study of the Quota shop revealed that the FPS dealer had 30 quintals

rice and wheat left over in his stock. He told us that this would be distributed at the

end of the month. The villagers alleged that the distribution used to remain in

operation for only three to four days per month after which FPS remained closed.

The distribution for that month had already been completed. The FPS dealer’s shop

is located inside his house right next to a grocer’s shop. The local people informed

that the FPS dealer used to sell the remaining quantities in black from that shop. The

FPS dealer told us that he had to pay bribe at the godown and to the Supply

Department which he compensated by selling the items in black.

According to some FPS dealers, no verification was carried out at any FPS

dealer’s shop in any village. The supply inspector and other officials visiting the shop

for verification were given money (bribe) to complete the formalities. The FPS dealer

had maintained a stock register but there was no record of who was given what item

and by what quantities. Most of the APL card holders of the village did not have

cards. We were told that the Panchayat had deposited the cards four months ago for

renewal but had not yet returned them.

In the village Golriha in Bhathat block, we observed that the Gram Panchayat

had issued nearly 60.0 per cent of the BPL cards and 40.0 per cent of the ANT cards

to the well-off people of the village. Thus, many needy people of the village had been

deprived of the facilities of PDS. The ANT cardholders who were affluent did not buy

high quality commodities from the ration shop. Most of these families produced

cereals for their own consumption but only bought small quantities of sugar and

kerosene oil from the ration shop.

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Flow Chart

DEMAND SIDE IMPACT

Having no ration card with actual

beneficiary

Have high

demand among them

Weak approach

and low pressure on FPS

SUPPLY SIDE

District Godown

Contractor

Block Godown Fa

ir Pr

ice

Shop

Dea

ler i

n th

e V

illag

e

Not eligible beneficiary

having ration card

Low demand among them

Strong approach and high pressure

on FPS Hig

h Le

akag

e of

Com

mod

ities

Vill

age

The people of the village reported that the FPS dealer and the Godown

incharge were in collusion under which the FPS dealer deliberately did not lift the

entire quota that he was entitled to.

In Wards 2 and 9 of the urban area of Baharalganj, we observed that many

BPL and ANT card holders did not need these cards since they were affluent. Most of

the beneficiaries of the Annapurna scheme were in the age group of 45 to 50. Their

ration cards also had their correct ages written on them. They also had a good

economic condition. We saw that their ages were not signed and sealed by the

Regional Food Controller. Their photographs had been attested by the Executive

Officer Nagar Panchayat. Their ration cards were seen to have proper entries

although they had not been given any item.

The Barhalganj BPL beneficiaries had never received wheat or rice. They

never received sugar excepting only before festivals which was twice a year. The

cards had entries saying that 4 liters of kerosene oil had been allotted to them but the

people reported that they actually received between 2 and 3 liters. The ANT card

holders were overcharged by 50 paise per kg. of the commodity and the supply too

was irregular. The FPS dealer justified this by saying that they managed to save

money through the BPL goods.

6.8 District: Varanasi We observed that the foodgrain godowns in the district were monitored by the Marketing Department. However, because of shortage of staff, the responsibility for

management of most of the godowns was entrusted with the Supply Department as

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an additional charge. The supply inspectors had to allot the monthly quota to the FPS

dealers from the godowns and also ensure proper supply of the commodities to the

godowns. Since the same person was responsible for both the supply of commodities

and their distribution, they were found to be more cautious about the distribution part.

Hence, we found the distribution of food grains to the FPS dealers in district Varanasi

better relative to that in other districts.

All the people in the district were aware about the commodities being

distributed by the FPS dealers. While searching for the reasons, the district supply

officer, Sri A.K. Singh, said that a few months back they had organized awareness

camps in all the villages in the district. On the one hand, the different types of

consumers learnt what commodities they were entitled to, the quantities and the

prices; on the other hand, they also learnt the process of lodging complaints against

irregularities in distribution. These camps, thus, helped to raise the level of

awareness of the consumers for efficient functioning of PDS.

The administration had prepared rosters for the FPS dealers in the Pindra

and Chiraiganv blocks in the district specifying the days when they had to deposit the

money and when they could lift their quota of allotments from the godowns.

According to the roster, the FPS dealers could deposit the money between the 15th

and 20th of each month, the goods would reach the godowns by 22nd, between 23rd

and 30th the FPS dealers could lift their allotments and between 1st and 4th the

verification process would take place. The distribution for Antyodaya cards would be

between 5th and 6th, on 7th and 8th for Midday meals and kerosene oil and on 8th and

9th for the BPL and the other card holders. However, the problems that arose in this

roster system are the following:

By the 23rd of a month only 50.0 per cent of the rice and 30.0 per cent of that

meant for BPL cards reach the selected godowns. In this situation,

discrepancy arises between the actual amount allotted to the FPS dealers

and the amount deposited by them.

According to the roster, the amount for next month’s food-grains had to be

deposited by the FPS dealers between 15th and 20th of each month. Thus,

they had to sell all the commodities in their shop by the 12th or 13th in order to

have the money for investing for next month’s allotments. This implied that

the consumers were given only 8 days for collecting their entitlements. In this

situation, many poor consumers could not obtain the commodities or received

less than the amount allotted to them. Fixing a specific period for the FPS

dealers to deposit the money leads to a tendency among them to either

borrow money or sell the commodities in the black market.

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Following a roster system implies that if a FPS dealer is unable to collect his

quota within the stipulated period because of ill health or bad weather or any

other reason, he is unofficially given his allotment on a back date.

No alternative arrangement has been made in the roster system for FPS

dealers who could not collect their quota in the specified period.

The supply inspectors opined that the decrease in the profit margin of FPS

dealers per quintal food grains and per liter oil and the denial of transportation

charges to them for carrying food-grains under the Mid-day meal system has made

them helpless in controlling the prices of commodities distributed under PDS.

Additionally the responsibility for issuing ration cards has been given to the local units

like Panchayats, which adds to the corruption level since they take this opportunity to

favour their friends, relatives and supporters by issuing false ration cards and also

charging commission from ordinary people for making their cards. Many people come

to the Supply Department to complain against the Panchayats only to realize the

impossibility for the Department to solve their problems.

In the villages under the Pindara block, we found that the Jan Kerosene

Scheme underway. Under this scheme ten sub-dealers have been appointed in the

entire district through whom the FPS dealers have to be allotted kerosene oil every

month. We observed the following in this regard:

The appointment of sub-dealers and their location is not within the perimeter

of the village.

Almost all the sub-dealers are agents of the wholesale dealer who have no

objections to irregularities carried out by them.

The drums were not coloured as specified.

The FPS dealers have to deposit their money with the wholesale dealer.

The oil does not reach the wholesale dealer’s godown from the oil company

within the stipulated period since the oil company has only one vehicle. In most villages the wholesale dealer supplies oil to the FPS dealers directly

in the oil company’s tanker with a capacity of holds 220 liters. The wholesale

dealer informed that he supplied oil directly to the FPS dealers to avoid the

excessive formalities, and financial losses. The FPS dealers are supplied oil twice in a month.

The owner of the Pindara oil depot argued that because of the unavailability

of a roster from the administration’s side specifying the dates for supply, amount to

be deposited, dates for distribution to the FPS dealers and so on, everything was

very unorganized. He told under condition of anonymity that he had to pay a bribe of

Rs 85,000 to the Supply Department every month and other wholesale dealers had

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to pay similar amount depending on the amount allotted to them. In return, no

checking was carried out by the Supply Department implying that they were free to

sell 15 to 20 per cent oil in black. He defended himself by saying that it was not

possible to be honest in such a situation.

The Nehia village in the Pindara block was divided into 22 hamlets inhabited

by different castes. In spite of a high economic gap in the village there was an intra-

village cordial relationship because of their interdependence. Almost all the people

seemed to be satisfied with the PDS. Only those living far from the ration shop were

unhappy because of the distance. Earlier there were two ration shops to cover the

entire village but one was closed down 11 years ago. The people close to that shop

became attached to the one that was far from their houses causing them great

inconvenience. A new shop has not yet been opened because of a stay order from

the High Court.

In almost all villages the BPL card holders had to pay between Rs. 210 and

Rs. 230 for 10 kg wheat and 25 kg rice, while the Antyodaya cardholders had to pay

Rs. 110 for 5 kg rice and wheat, Rs. 14 to Rs.15 for 1 kg sugar and Rs. 11 per liter of

kerosene oil.

The local people of many of the villages alleged that there was collusion

between the FPS dealers and the Gram Panchayats for making a large number of

false ration cards. No one claimed ration on them but the allotments on them were

divided between the FPS dealers and the Gram Panchayats. During checking, only

the genuine buyers were questioned. This was verified by the fact that none of the

FPS dealers had any shop register. Alongside there was a great difference between

the actual number of residents in the village and the number of ration cards in

existence.

It was alleged that the Gram Panchayats committed great irregularities while

issuing ration cards. Usually the cards were issued to the people close to the

Panchayat members like their supporters, relatives, friends, caste members etc.

Many needy people were, thus, denied this facility.

The FPS dealer in the Jathi village of the Pindara block had not supplied

ration in one or two months to the BPL and ANT card holders in the past six months.

The villagers reported that both the FPS dealer and the Gram Panchayat were

relatives and the Block Pramukh was also related to them. Thus, no action was taken

even if anyone complained against them. The villagers had many complaints against

the FPS dealer, e.g., cheating while weighing, often refusing to supply commodities,

and distributing commodities for a very short period of time.

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In the Nehia and Jathi villages in the same block, we observed that both the

FPS dealers had no records of their transactions till April 2006. The FPS dealers

reportedly deposited the records with the Supply Department. No enquiry had been

conducted by any departmental officer in the last three months on this matter.

No vigilance committees, consumer committees or monitoring committees

were found to be in existence in either the urban or rural areas of this district. In the

non-Jan Kerosene project regions in the district we found that the dealer of kerosene

oil does not supply oil to the FPS dealers from the filler point according to the

directive of the administration although fillers were installed in oil depots in 2004. The

oil is supplied by 220 liter tankers of the Supply Department directly to the FPS

dealers. The transportation charge of Rs. 60 to Rs.70 per drum is paid to the tanker

driver by the FPS dealer but no receipt is given in acknowledgement. The wholesale

oil dealer however maintains record of the distribution of oil in terms of the cost of the

filler.

In the Kotwa village of the Chiraigaon block we saw that the FPS dealer had

closed his shop and run away. The local people informed that the FPS dealer was a

non-resident villager who ran the shop from the Panchayat Bhawan. They also

informed that the FPS dealer kept all the cereals and kerosene oil in his house and

distributed them to ‘special’ people. When this was verified at the level of the

beneficiaries, we found that most of them obtained the amount that they were entitled

to. This may imply that the ration shop owner had made some cards under false

names.

In the Siyon village of the district the target number of BPL had been

decreased by the Tehsil. Because of this, the ration cards of 56 BPL families had to

be cancelled by the Gram Panchayat keeping intact the cards of affluent people who

had been issued BPL cards. These affluent people belonged to the Pradhan’s group.

The BPL card holders whose cards had been cancelled were given APL cards

instead. The Quota shop in this village distributed more than 100 quintals of food-

grains but the storage capacity of the shop was less than half of this amount. The

people reported the extra amount was stored in the Pradhan’s house who supervised

the distribution of food grains and supplied extra to his favourite persons. The

financial condition of the FPS dealer was reportedly not sound so that he had to

borrow money from the Pradhan to lift his quota.

In the Kotwa village of this district we found that an NGO called JMD Society

of India, Varanasi, had been formed with the help of the FPS dealer’s assistant after

taking Rs. 35 per card from the BPL card holders. This organization had supplied

soap (body and washing), oil, surf, eatables, biscuits etc. to the card holders at very

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low prices. They had then taken advances of a few thousand rupees from the card

holders and promised to supply the same items the next month and then

disappeared from the village without supplying the items.

Many of the Annapurna beneficiaries did not deserve these cards. Some of

these card holders had received items till December, some till January and some till

February 2006. However, the administration reported that items had been distributed

till March. Among these beneficiaries many were also receiving old age pension.

In most of the selected villages, rosters had been prepared at the supply

inspector’s level for distribution in the villages or wards. According to the roster, the

distribution by FPS dealers under Antyodaya card will be done on 5th-6th of the

month, under Mid-day Meal scheme on 7th and under BPL and ANT on 8th. Many

card holders complained that they were denied these items even after they were

present on the specified dates.

In the urban region of Ramnagar the total number of APL cardholders in all

the wards was 10,000 while BPL and ANT cardholders were 900. There were four

wards and the total number of FPS dealers was 18. The FPS dealer opined that the

allotment of food-grains and oil per FPS dealer was too little for sustaining a family.

The staff of the department at the local level reported that the office had no list of

BPL families in the region. The cards were issued after physical verification and

certification by the urban local body members. In this situation, these members often

issued BPL cards to influential and rich people depriving the needy families.

Many of the poor families of the rural areas do not buy sugar from the ration

shop because of poverty. Some families did not take sugar even if they had money

for fear of over consumption of sugar by their children. That is why they preferred to

buy small quantity of sugar from the market.

In the selected villages we observed that many of the ration cards did not

have the dates when they were issued and also the registration numbers. The

Panchayat members deliberately delayed in issuing new cards since the ration would

be supplied only on production of the ration cards and the intervening period would

be used for selling the goods in the open market.

The following observations were made during the study of three food-grain

godowns in Pindara, Ramnagar and Chiraigaon.

The relationship between the Marketing department and the Supply

Department was not good. Both the departments blamed and accused each

other.

The commodities supplied to the FPS dealers are never weighed but they are

strictly told to say that the commodities are properly weighed.

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If the allotted quantity given to the FPS dealers has 10 to 20 kgs loose, this

quantity is not given to them.

The main food grain godowns (FCI, UPFC) supply 650 gram per kg less food

grains to the FPS dealers. But the godown in-charge also adds the weight of

the bag while weighing the food-grains. The argument given is that the price

of the bag is more than the weight of the foodgrain. In this manner if 5,000

quintals of food-grains is distributed from the godown, then 13 kg per quintal

is deducted, which is a very large amount.

The responsibility for transportation of food-grains from the FCI and UPSFI

godowns to the regional godowns is given to contractors. These truck owners

give one quintal less of each commodity with the logic that their cost has to be

borne.

The godown in-charge said that the contractors who were given the contract

for transportation were criminal type of people having strong connections with

political leaders. They deliberately fill in low tenders which are even lower

than the actual cost incurred for transportation. After getting the tender they

divert a few truckloads of food-grains to cover their loss.

We observed at the godowns that not even one kilogram extra food-grains is

supplied whereas some quantity is lost during transportation and transactions.

The godown in-charge is not given any extra amount to cover this loss. In this

situation he is forced to reduce the quantity supplied to the FPS dealers.

The godown in-charge is not given a detailed description of the quantities of

food-grains supplied by FCI and UPFCI. The tendency for misappropriation

by the godown in-charge thus increases.

The supply of commodities to the regional godowns and to the FPS dealers is

taken to be 100% but the distribution by the FPS dealers is not 100%. The

information about the actual distribution of food-grains by the FPS dealers is

not maintained at any level.

There is a definite date for FPS dealers to collect their quota specified in the

roster but if he is unable to collect it by that date, he is charged extra by the

godown in-charge.

Most FPS dealers pay Rs. 5 to Rs. 10 per quintal as bribe to the godown in-

charge while collecting their quota but are forced to keep quiet out of fear of closure

of shop or delay in supply of commodities by them.

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Chapter VII

Findings and Recommendations

In this chapter, we present the major facts on the public distribution system of

essential commodities in UP based on the observations of the study. We offer

recommendations based on the facts.

Major Facts on PDS in UP In the study we covered 960 beneficiary households and 241 non-beneficiary

households, 46 Fair Price Shops (FPSs), 33 representatives of Gram Panchayats, 48

foodgrains godowns, 27 kerosene oil depots, and 26 functionaries in Government

from eight selected districts of the state of Uttar Pradesh (UP). We selected two

districts from each of the four regions in UP, namely, east, west, central, and

Bundelkhand.

We collected data on the average number of ration cards by types, that is,

APL, BPL, ANP and ANT for two years, 2005-06 and 2006-07. The last three types

may be clubbed as the ‘poor’.

We present below the facts that we could collect from the households (beneficiary

and non-beneficiary), FPS dealers, Godown-in-charge and Depot-in-charge,

Panchayat representatives, and Government functionaries.

I. Facts based on Information Provided by Beneficiary Households In principle, each household under BPL and ANT is entitled to 35 kg. of rice

and wheat taken together per month. If each household really receives it, then

45.4 per cent of total consumption requirement will be fulfilled. Based on what

each household had been receiving, 18.6 per cent of requirement of

foodgrains were fulfilled. Hence, 26.8 per cent of provision was the estimated

leakage. Routes of Fulfillment of Consumption Requirements of Essential Commodities Meant for Distribution through FPSs

Per capita requirement per annum of wheat was estimated to be 121.8 kg,

which were 120.9 kg. in rural and 122.6 kg. in urban region. Per capita

requirement per annum of rice was estimated to be 62.2 kg, which were 54.4

kg. in rural and 70.1 kg. in urban region. Per capita requirement per annum of

sugar was estimated to be 8.3 kg, which were 6.9 kg. in rural and 9.6 kg. in

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urban region. Per capita requirement per annum of kerosene was estimated

to be 8.6 lt., which were 7.6 lt. in rural and 9.7 lt. in urban region.

Except kerosene, the fulfillment of requirement of all the other essential items

like rice, wheat and sugar were mostly met from the market. For wheat,

market satisfied 67.8 per cent of total requirement, which was 55.6 per cent in

case of rice and 78.8 per cent in case of sugar. In case of kerosene, only 12.4

per cent of the requirements were met by the market.

Self-production is a major factor for both rice and wheat in meeting the

requirement. For wheat it was 18.3 per cent while for rice it was 11.4 per cent.

FPSs met only 11.5 per cent of requirement of wheat, which was 33.2 per

cent in case of rice. FPSs met 18.6 per cent of requirement of sugar. 82.6 per

cent of the requirement of kerosene was met by the FPSs. There is no self-

production of kerosene and generally market response to supply of kerosene

is rare in rural areas so that the role of FPSs is most prominent in case of this

commodity.

Self-production determines to some extent the fulfillment of total consumption

requirements in case of rice and wheat, which is more so in case of APL.

Consumption requirements of rice, wheat and sugar were met more by self-

production in rural region than in urban region. FPSs fulfilled 11.0 per cent of

requirement of wheat in rural region, which was 33.4 per cent for rice, 19.2 for

sugar and 80.5 for kerosene. The respective percentages of requirement for

urban region were 12.2, 32.7, 17.5 and 86.7. Most of the requirements of

commodities excepting kerosene were met by market in each of rural and

urban regions and in each district. Self-production, even when positive, was

not at all a significant factor in explaining fulfillment of consumption

requirements excepting rice to some extent.

Consumption Gap in Essential Commodities (Per Household per month in kg.)

Commodities Requirement (Total in kg.)

Fulfilled through PDS (%)

Gap (%)

Wheat 52.1 11.5 88.5 Rice 25.3 33.2 66.8 Sugar 3.3 18.6 81.4 Kerosene (lt.) 3.5 82.6 17.4

Note: Gap = Requirement – Fulfillment through PDS.

The fulfillment of per capita annual average requirement of essential

commodities from alternative routes shows both surplus and deficit relative to

consumption requirement by items. The supply points cover self-production,

market supply (including wage labour and kind payment) and supply by FPSs.

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The balance equation is:

Supply ≥ Demand (Requirement),

where, Supply = Self-Production + Market Supply + FPSs Supply.

There was general deficit (requirement > supply) for kerosene, but the fact

remained that for all households across income brackets, requirement of

kerosene was met mostly by FPSs. If income brackets are considered in an

ascending order, we find increasing requirement of kerosene per annum for

higher income brackets and increasing quantity requirement met by FPSs,

excepting the highest income bracket.

For wheat, if we consider the beneficiary households by income in an

ascending order, we generally find that a lower percentage is met by FPSs at

the highest income brackets (above Rs. 50,000 per annum) and very low

percentage at the level of incomeless households. For the households in the

income bracket between Rs. 50,000 and Rs. One Lakh, the percentage

requirement fulfilled by the FPSs was 4.9 for wheat, which was 11.8 for rice,

7.8 for sugar and 86.5 for kerosene. For the households in the lower income

bracket between Rs. 10,000 and Rs. 19,000 p.a., the fulfillment supplied by

FPSs as a percentage of requirement for wheat was 12.5, for rice 40.0, for

sugar 19.4 and for kerosene 84.3.

The contribution (supply) of FPSs in fulfillment of consumption requirements

of essential commodities of the beneficiary households was more in lower

income brackets relative to what it was in higher income brackets. In the rural

region, FPSs fulfilled 11.1 per cent of the requirement of wheat while the

corresponding figures were 33.4 per cent for rice, 18.8 per cent for sugar and

80.3 per cent for kerosene. In the urban region, FPSs fulfilled 12.6 per cent of

the requirement of wheat which was 32.6 per cent for rice, 17.7 per cent for

sugar and 86.6 per cent for kerosene.

While the contribution of FPSs in fulfillment of requirement of all the essential

items excepting kerosene was very low, its support role was beyond doubt.

Food as Wage For fulfillment of consumption requirement of workers under the SGRY (Food

for Work) from wages in kind, only rice and wheat were offered, that too

insignificantly. Households’ Propensity to Purchase Foodgrains from Market

A combination of need and purchasing power (availability of money) mostly

explained the propensity of the households to buy essential commodities from

the market to fulfill consumption requirement.

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Benefits Derived by Households through PDS Each BPL household received kerosene 3.2 lt. per month at the price of Rs.

11.20 per unit. There was not much difference by quantity and price between

rural and urban regions so far as availability of kerosene from FPSs was

concerned. Each BPL household received 10.4 kg. wheat on average at the

price of Rs. 5.45 per kg. Each BPL household received rice on average 17.3

kg. at a price of Rs. 6.66 per kg. For sugar for BPL households, the average

quantity drawn was 1.4 kg. at a price of Rs. 14.65 per kg..

The ANT households received wheat per household on average 12.3 kg. at a

price of Rs. 2.32 per kg. They received rice on average 22.3 kg. at a price per

kg Rs. 3.30, sugar 1.4 kg. per month at a price per kg. Rs.14.65, kerosene

3.1 lt. per month at a price of Rs. 11.05 per lt. There was not much difference

between rural and urban regions by quantity and price so far as availability of

kerosene from FPSs was concerned.

The ANP households got wheat and kerosene, the former on average 6.8 kg.

per month and the latter 0.6 lt. at an average price of Rs. 11.30.

Each APL household received kerosene 3.0 lt. on average per month at the

price of Rs. 11.0 per unit. There was not much difference between rural and

urban regions by quantity and price so far as availability of kerosene from

FPSs was concerned.

Households who did not Receive Anything from FPSs Most of the households under BPL and ANT who did not receive any items

distributed through FPSs, based on a reference period of second half of 2006,

cited non-availability of money (purchasing power) as the major reason. The

other reasons cited by the households included long distance of the FPS from

the residence, non-information about distribution, absence of the households’

members, bad quality of items and non-requirement.

Reasons Related to FPS Dealers Cited by Households for Non-purchase of any Items on a regular basis during six months ending 2006

The reasons cited by the households for non-purchase of items from the

FPSs during the second half of 2006 relating to the FPS dealers covered non-

distribution of items, non-arrival of items for distribution, distance of the FPSs,

short period of distribution, non-preparation (non-availability) of ration cards,

absence of the household in the village while items were distributed/cards

were issued, and post-distribution non-availability.

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Consumption Habit of Sugar Most of the beneficiary households from both rural and urban regions by

cardholding confirmed regular consumption habit of sugar.

Adequacy of Quantity of Kerosene Oil distributed through FPSs and Open Market

Most of the beneficiary households across cardholding and by regions

reported adequacy of quantity of kerosene oil that they received from FPSs

for household consumption.

The average price of kerosene oil per lt. purchased from the open market was

reported to be Rs. 25.57. The gap between open market price and FPS

supplied price of kerosene was reported to be Rs. 9.47. The percentage price

gap was 58.82 between the two. However, the households paid more when

they bought kerosene from other FPS dealer(s) relative to what they paid

when they bought from the dealer their cards were attached to.

Effect of Withdrawal of Distribution of Sugar and Kerosene If kerosene were withdrawn from the PDS, 92.8 per cent of the households

would be adversely affected. This percentage was 26.3 for sugar. The

necessity of kerosene thus is felt much more by the households. In the rural

region 92.4 and in the urban region 93.7 per cent would be adversely affected

if kerosene were withdrawn from the PDS. In the rural region 26.3 and in the

urban region 26.1 per cent would be adversely affected if sugar were

withdrawn from the PDS. In case PDS is restricted to only distributing rice and

wheat, 86.1 per cent would remain unsatisfied. Consumer Rights, Awareness and Complaints

Ignorance of the beneficiary households was the most important factor when

the question was centered on their rights as consumers to check the records

of FPS dealers. So far as checking stock register was concerned, 87.3 per

cent were ignorant about any such rights, which were for 87.2 per cent of the

households when it was checking sale register, 87.4 per cent when it was

checking ration card or shop register and 87.5 per cent when it was checking

allotment and actual distribution. Less than one per cent in case of each

revealed that they knew the rights-based access to commodities under PDS.

Performance of PDS Based on Some Selected Indicators We got different responses on the indicators that we considered for performance of

PDS in UP from all the beneficiary households. These indicators were manipulation

in measurement of items during delivery, providing benefits to close persons, FPS

dealers keeping government officials in their favour, distributable items lifted but not

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brought to villages where the FPS was located, FPS dealers involved in black

marketing, changing the quality of items, dealers involved in corruption with the help

of Panchayat.

Half of the beneficiary households reported the alliance of the FPS dealers for

corruption with Panchayats. The households’ report centered on the FPS

dealers like keeping government officials in favour, manipulation in

measurement of items for distribution and involvement of the dealers in black

marketing. Thus, the factors that were visible and that affected the beneficiary

households directly had been reported most.

Based on the selected perception-based responses, we developed the

Performance Index of the PDS and ranked the selected districts in UP. Over

all, Lucknow in central UP (the capital city centered district) ranked first,

followed by Varanasi in east UP. Badaun in west UP ranked last. In rural UP

again Lucknow came first while the same district came third in urban UP so

far as performance of PDS from the viewpoint of the households concerned.

In urban UP, the district Jhansi came first followed by Varanasi. Thus, the

rank of Varanasi was uniformly second, over all the districts, and separately

for rural and urban regions. The districts showing performance below average

were Lakhimpur Kheri, Gorakhpur, Lalitpur and Badaun, considered over all

the districts, and separately for rural and urban regions. The districts that

showed performance above average were Lucknow, Varanasi, Jhansi and

Bareilly.

Strength and Weaknesses of PDS Most of the beneficiary households did not perceive any weakness in the

system. The rural BPL households mostly perceived weaknesses in the PDS

most of whom perceived it at the level of the FPS dealers. The perceived

weaknesses also centered on higher officials, all political-administrative

levels, Gram Pradhan, Panchayat Secretary, MLA, DM, Lekhpal and Supply

Department. Of those who perceived weaknesses in PDS, the most important

reason cited was corruption in issuing ration cards and sharing benefits in

bribe. The other reasons cited by the households were non-distribution of

items through FPSs, marketing in the open/black (market), cheating in weight

while distributing items, non-checking, poor quality, higher price charged than

what is fixed, availability less than requirement, and irregular distribution.

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Antyodaya and Annapurna Yojana 84.6 per cent of the beneficiary households under Annapurna Yojana

reported that they would be facing problems in survival in case this scheme

was withdrawn.

91.3 per cent of the households reported that they would be adversely

affected in terms of livelihood if they were not covered by Antyodaya Yojana.

Most of the beneficiary households who reported to be adversely affected in

case the Yojana was closed focused on poverty, hunger, debt and

deteriorating economic condition.

II. Facts Based on Information provided by Non-Beneficiary Households Income Level of Non-Beneficiary Households

There was no reported ‘incomelessness’ among non-beneficiary households

in urban region which was present in rural region. The percentage of non-

beneficiary households earning less than Rs. 19,000 was 71.3. In the urban

region 66.0 per cent of the non-beneficiary households earned income below

Rs. 19,000 per annum, which was 78.5 in the rural region. In the lowest

income brackets the percentage of households was higher in rural region

while in the higher income brackets the percentage was higher in urban

region.

Living Condition of Non-Beneficiary Households

In the urban region, 42.0 per cent of the households lived in kuccha houses,

which was for 47.6 per cent households in rural region. 6.0 per cent of the

households in urban region lived in ‘huts’ which was for 13.1 per cent

households in urban region.

Sources of Fuel

Kerosene as a means of fuel for cooking purposes was generally absent in

both rural and urban regions. Most of the households in both the regions used

multiple sources like wood and ‘kanda’ (cow dung cake) for cooking.

Productive and Non-Productive Assets

Of all non-beneficiary households, 79.7 per cent were landless. Excepting

very few, none of the non-beneficiary households had income-generating

productive assets. Overall, the non-beneficiary households owned no assets

that could have offered scope for income.

Need of Ration Cards for Households

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Most of the non-beneficiary households did not have ration cards for a period

between two and ten years. They needed cards because of income poverty,

and landlessness in rural region. Necessity of kerosene oil was a major factor

for need of ration cards for both the urban and rural regions.

III. Facts Based on Information Provided by Panchayats How Panchayats Verify Eligibility of Beneficiary Households

The officials of Revenue Department (Lekhpal) were mostly engaged in

verification of eligibility of beneficiaries, followed by Block officials and Supply

Inspectors, the three covering two-thirds of total verification.

Existence of Non-Beneficiary Households under Different Categories

Of total households, a section eligible under different types of card holding

had remained cardless. The major reason for cardlessness of households

eligible for Antyodaya was ‘low target’ for each village and non-completion of

formalities.

Existence of Problems in PDS at Different Levels and the Reasons

The major reasons cited for persistence of problems in PDS were low

allotment of items, low allotment of ration cards, corruption among

government officials, and non-receipt of full quota by FPS dealer.

Average Number of Households Attached with an FPS

One FPS dealer, on average, served a total of 741 cards, of which 179 are

BPL cards, 464 APL cards, 18 ANP cards and 81 ANT cards. We found a

monotonic increase in the average number of ration cards served by one FPS

dealer over 2004 to 2006.

Non-Preparation of Ration Cards

The reasons for non-making of ration cards for the households in both rural

and urban regions remaining as non-beneficiary were absence of the

representative of the household while the process of card-making was on,

name not included in BPL list, no new introduction of cards, and voting factor.

IV. Requirement, Availability and Distribution of Commodities as Reported by FPS Dealers Rice and Wheat under BPL Scheme

99.5 per cent of requirement of rice under BPL was available in 2004-05,

which was 98.9 per cent in 2005-06. 98.9 per cent of requirement of wheat

was available in 2004-05 which was cent per cent in 2005-06. Distribution as

a percentage of availability of rice in 2004-05 was 99.5 over all the districts

which was 96.5 in 2005-06. Distribution of wheat as percentage of availability

shows cent per cent for all the districts, excepting Bareilly.

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Rice and Wheat under Antayodaya Yojana

Availability as a percentage of requirement was cent per cent for rice in 2004-

05 and 99.3 per cent in 2005-06. The corresponding percentages for wheat

were 98.8 and 98.9.

Wheat under Annapurna Yojana

92.6 per cent of requirement of wheat in 2004-05 was made available of

which 99.4 per cent had been distributed. The corresponding figures for 2005-

06 were 92.8 and 99.9 per cent.

Distribution of Sugar

In 2004-05, considered over all the selected districts, 98.2 per cent of sugar

required was available. Of this available sugar, 99.5 per cent had been

distributed.

Distribution of Kerosene

For 2004-05, considered over all the selected districts, 78.3 per cent of

kerosene required was available, of which 99.6 per cent had been distributed.

For 2005-06, 81.6 per cent of requirement had been available with the

dealers, of which 99.7 per cent had been distributed.

Quantity Distributed per Household by FPS Dealer The BPL and ANT cardholders are entitled to 35 kg. of rice and wheat

together per month. The ANP cardholders are not entitled to more than 10 kg

of either rice or wheat. The APL cardholders are not entitled to foodgrains and

sugar. Considered over all the selected districts, the BPL as well as ANT

cardholders received 34 kg. of wheat and rice. On average, each of the BPL,

and ANT cardholder is entitled to 3 lt. kerosene per month.

Actual Sale Price of Commodities under Different Schemes

Rice under BPL and Antayodaya Yojana

Actual sale price charged by the FPS dealer is the purchase price that the

consumers pay. This price is the sum of purchase price from the Godown

plus costs on logistics plus compensating the quantity lost (price surrendered)

at the Godown.

For BPL Rice per Unit (kg.)

Actual Sale Price (Rs. 6.62) = Purchase Price from Godown (Rs. 6.09) + Cost

on Logistics (Rs. 0.41) + Cost compensated for Quantity loss at Godown (Rs.

0.11).

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For ANT Rice per Unit (kg.)

Actual Sale Price (Rs. 3.41) = Purchase Price from Godown (Rs. 2.94) + Cost

on Logistics (Rs. 0.41) + Cost compensated for Quantity loss at Godown (Rs.

0.05).

The reported purchase price for each of BPL and ANT rice is fixed and lifted

at the fixed rate across all the selected districts. Costs on logistics included items like

loading/unloading, transportation, weighing and other expenses like paying bribe etc.

The Godown level deduction in quantity meant that the FPS dealer had to pay a

portion to some of the officials/operators for smooth lifting of items.

Wheat under BPL and Antayodaya Yojana

For BPL Wheat per Unit (kg.)

Actual Sale Price (Rs. 5.07) = Purchase Price from Godown (Rs.4.59) + Cost

on Logistics (Rs.0.39) + Cost compensated for Quantity loss at Godown

(Rs.0.09).

For ANT Wheat per Unit (kg.)

Actual Sale Price(Rs.2.37) = Purchase Price from Godown (Rs.1.94) + Cost

on Logistics (Rs. 0.39) + Cost compensated for Quantity loss at Godown

(Rs.0.04).

The reported purchase price for each of BPL and ANT wheat was fixed and

lifted at the fixed rate across all the selected districts. The reported (actual) sale price

of wheat for each of BPL and ANT varied across districts.

Sale Price of Sugar

For Sugar per Unit (kg.)

Actual Sale Price (Rs. 14.07 ) = Purchase Price from Godown (Rs.13.44) +

Cost on Logistics (Rs.0.3) + Cost compensated for Quantity loss at Godown

(Rs.0.2).

The reported purchase price of sugar was fixed and was lifted at the fixed rate

across all the selected districts. The reported (actual) sale price of sugar varied

across districts. The cost on logistics as well as cost on items lost varied across

districts.

Sale Price of Kerosene

For Kerosene per Unit (lt.)

Actual Sale Price (Rs. 10.56 ) = Purchase Price from Godown (Rs.9.82) +

Cost on Logistics (Rs.0.7) + Cost compensated for Quantity loss at Godown

(Rs.0.0).

The reported purchase price at the Depot level of Kerosene varied across

districts. The reported (actual) sale price of Kerosene also varied across districts.

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There was no reported quantity lost at the Depot level. There was, however, loss on

account of logistics overall and across districts.

Price Hike by FPS Dealers Because of Enhanced Cost on Logistics

The FPS dealers reported that they felt compelled to fix the sale price higher

than the price fixed by the Government in the PDS, because of the costs that

they incur on loading/unloading, and transportation.

FPSs Checked by Officials during Last Quarter of 2006

The FPS dealers reported vigilance by Government officials during the last

quarter of 2006. Mostly it was the Gram Panchayat that worked as a catalyst

in checking. The role of Regional Food Controller was nearly absent. The role

of Administrative Officer, ADO, and Lekhpal was negligible as vigilance

catalyst for FPSs. Officials of Supply Department, excepting Lalitpur, did not

pay much attention towards the necessity of vigilance over FPSs.

Role of Panchayats as Viewed by FPS Dealers Panchayat was the major controller of PDS by verification of the stocks in

rural areas. This verification was absent in urban region. In the urban region,

the local administration was alleged to grab individual benefits which were

less in rural areas. Problems Reported by FPS Dealers

How FPS Dealer gets Dealership

The problems in getting dealership centered on political support and

connections, necessary payment of bribe to the Supply Department for

preparation of documents/file, payment of bribe to other officials, and frequent

visit of Government officials at different levels.

Paying Bribe to Supply Department

Most of the FPS dealers reportedly did not pay bribe (money) to the Supply

Department to continue dealership in future. The average bribe paid by an

FPS dealer was Rs. 1422. The person pointed out by the dealers who

received the bribe money was the Supply Inspector.

Problems Faced in running dealership

The major difficulties faced by the FPS dealers in running their shops

included the incompatibility between high demand and low allotment, illegal

demand by political party leaders, low commission fixed for the dealers,

cardless customers’ pressure and ‘loot’ by officials in the name of vigilance.

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Complaints Reported Regarding Foodgrains Godown and Kerosene Depot

The major complaints included false measurement of items by quantity

delivered by the Godown and Depot and commission paid by the dealers on

the items lifted.

V. Facts Based on Information provided by Godown-in-Charge and Depot-in-Charge

Storage Capacity of Food-grains Godowns and Kerosene Depots

One-third of the Foodgrain Godowns had storage capacity between 23 and

50 Mt, while another one-third have capacity between 50 Mt. and 80 Mt. 95.5

per cent of the Foodgrain Godowns have storage capacity below 120 Mt. The

Foodgrain Godowns in Varanasi and Gorakhpur had storage capacity

between 50 and 80 Mt. The Foodgrain Godowns in Lalitpr had storage

capacity cent per cent between 23 Mt. and 50 Mt. Excepting Bareilly and

Jhansi, no district in the sample had storage capacity more than 120 Mt.

As reported by the depot-in-charge, half of the depots had storage capacity

per depot between 15 and 20 kl. Lt. This storage capacity was cent per cent

of the sample depot in Jhansi. The sample oil depot in districts, Lalitpur,

Jhansi, Gorakhpur and Varanasi did not have storage capacity more than 40

kl. lt. Excepting Varanasi, the remaining three districts did not even have

storage capacity more than 30 kl. lt. Each of the three districts, namely,

Bareilly, Badaun and Lucknow, had a storage capacity more than 50 kl. lt.

FPS Dealers Attached with Food-grains Godown and Kerosene Depot

On average one Kerosene depot served 109 FPSs. On average, one

foodgrain Godown served 95 FPSs.

Authorization of Food-grains Godown and Kerosene Depot for Supply of Items

The foodgrain Godowns and the oil depots were authorized to supply items to

blocks, tehsils and directly to FPSs. One-third of the Kerosene oil depots

were authorized to supply oil to a ‘single block’, while another one-third was

authorized to supply to the FPSs of some identified blocks. One-fifth of the

depots were authorized to supply oil to the whole tehsil. More than three-fifths

of the foodgrain Godowns were authorized to supply items to a ‘single block’,

while another one-fifth was authorized to supply to the whole tehsil. Only one-

twentieth of the Godowns were authorized to supply directly to the identified

FPSs.

Loss of Foodgrains and Kerosene due to Management Inadequacy

While most of the Godown-in-charge reported loss of foodgrains due to

inadequate management facility, half of the kerosene oil depot-in-charge

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reported loss in kerosene for the same reason. Of the foodgrain Godown-in-

charge who reported loss in items, the major reasons cited were inadequate

capacity of the Godown and location of the Godowns at different places. Of

the depot-in-charge who reported loss in kerosene, the major reason cited

was the variation in temperature between the time of filling at the company

and the delivery at the depot. The other reasons include leakage at filling

point during delivery.

Coordination among Supply Department, FPS Dealers and Godown/Depot In-Charge

Three-fourths of the depots-in-charge opined that the coordination among the

Supply Department, FPS dealers and depot-in-charge was good, while the

rest argued for the necessity for improvement. Four-fifths of the Godowns

opined that the coordination among the Supply Department, FPS dealers and

Godown-in-charge was good, while the rest argued for the necessity for

improvement.

Problems of Godowns and Depots

The major problems reported in case of oil depots included pressures and

responsibilities imposed by government functionaries, higher level officials in

the government suspecting the depots staff of corruption, short duration fixed

for distribution of oil, and high price gap between kerosene oil and diesel

leading to black marketing of kerosene.

The major problems reported by the Godowns includes high-level government

officials suspecting the Godowns staff, inadequate capacity of Godown, and

health (individual) problems.

VI. Facts Based on Information Provided by Government Functionaries Gap Between Number of Ration Cards Distributed and Number of Households as per Census 2001

For the year 2005-06 the number of ration cards distributed less than the

number of households as per census 2001 for all the selected districts

covered was 47.9 per cent. For 2006-07, the percentage deviation was 48.4.

The district wise deviation (percentage) was always positive for each district.

Allocation, Lifting and Distribution of Commodities

For kerosene the distribution was cent per cent of the amount lifted and the

lifting was cent per cent of allotment. Generally what was lifted was

distributed as reported by the functionaries in the Government of UP. This

was also reported in cases of BPL rice, BPL wheat, ANT rice, ANT wheat,

ANP wheat, and sugar. There were no major district wise variations in

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distribution as percentages of lifting of the items under different types of

cardholding.

Demand and Availability and Supply of Foodgrains and Kerosene

As reported by the Godown-in-charge for 2005-06, the stock/availability on

average was higher than the estimated demand for each of rice, wheat and

sugar. Supply of these items was marginally less than demand in cases of

wheat and sugar. For rice, supply equaled estimated demand. Supply of each

item was less than its stock implying addition to stock for release for the next

year.

Supply of Foodgrains under Different Schemes

Based on the data on average supply of foodgrains to TPDS and welfare schemes

for 2005-06, we offer the following observations:

90.5 per cent of the supply of rice and wheat was distributed under TPDS.

The rest was distributed under the welfare schemes.

Of the supply for TPDS, the ratio for wheat and rice was 48:52.

Items Distributed and Requirement Fulfilled through PDS as Reported by Government Functionaries

On average a BPL cardholder gets 35 kg. of rice and wheat in total of which

distribution of wheat remains more in each of the selected districts. The same

is true for ANT cardholders except that for them the distribution of rice is more

than wheat for each of the districts. On average, a cardholder gets 4.1 lt. of

kerosene oil that varies over districts. On average, 700 grams of sugar is

distributed per unit which is the same for each district excepting Jhansi.

Monitoring Methods Adopted by the Functionaries for Betterment of PDS

The methods adopted by the functionaries, included inspection/control

covering consumers, FPS dealers, regional offices and regional

Godown/Depot. Most of the functionaries reported that they followed a three-

tier checking and monitoring system at all the levels mentioned. It was also

reported that the SDM, BDOs and tehsildar regularly monitored/verified at all

the levels under their respective jurisdictions. Excepting at the level of the

consumers, it is reported that the supply inspectors, ARO, DSO etc.

performed physical verification of items.

VII. Administrative Set up, Local Power Structure and Delivery System The facts that we collected through interviews, conversations and group discussions

are perception-based and hence subjective. Since most of these centers on the

administrative set up that is meant to manage the system and the local power/polity

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structure that affect the system, we offer here the observations centered on

administrative set up and local power structure:

The number of BPL families at the village level was found to change often,

the reason being that the Pradhan kept adding people of his own choice to

the list.

The economic/family register of the BPL families was never found to be

updated.

The basis of selection of BPL families and the duration of time for their

remaining BPL was unclear.

In some villages, many lists of BPL families were found.

The educational level of most of the FPS dealers was very low, which

prevented them from maintaining correct accounts.

Most FPS dealers did not have adequate space in their shops to store the

allotted kerosene oil and the food grains.

The record of the amount allotted to the FPS dealers and collected by them

from the godowns and oil depots every month were not maintained properly.

No vigilance committee had been constituted by the Gram Panchayats in

many villages to ensure proper functioning of the PDS.

BPL and ANT cards were issued arbitrarily in many villages with the

connivance of the Panchayats.

The Panchayats had been given the authority by the district level office to

verify the distribution of commodities by the FPS dealers every month. The

Panchayats often misused power to extract money or favour from the FPS

dealers and gave false verification certificates.

The Panchayats have the power to recommend the cancellation of the ration

shops under special circumstances. This is the reason why the FPS dealers

cannot oppose the benefits demanded by the Panchayats. If the FPS dealers

was not in the same group as the Pradhan, the latter often got the license of

the FPS cancelled and merged the cardholders with anther ration shop. In

return, the Pradhan got between Rs. 2,000 and Rs. 4,000 from the newly

selected FPS dealer.

The other departments of the PDS and the MPs and MLAs consider the

distributable commodities to be their own resources and manoeuvre with the

supplies and allotment, which prevents the Supply Department from taking

independent decisions.

The Supply Department did not have a master list of BPL families per village,

which made it difficult to judge the accuracy of ration cards.

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The state had given a target of BPL, ANT and ANP cards to each district,

which is proportionately distributed among the various villages lying in the

districts. In this condition many regions, which did not have eligible families,

were also allotted these cards while the regions which had more BPL

households did not get the requisite number. The grassroots implementing

bodies also did not like to surrender the cards allotted in their villages.

In the absence of magisterial power, the District supply officer had to remain

dependent on the District Magistrate or the Tehsildars for action if he came

across any incident of irregularity. In such an event he had to forward it to the

administrative officers for necessary action. Often political pressure or bribery

at the administrative level helped the culprits to get away. Often the FPS dealers provided no information to the consumers regarding

the arrival of essential commodities in his shop.

Whenever the consumers reached the shop to buy commodities, they either

found the shop closed or that the commodities were not available.

In many places anomalies occurred, for example, the BPL ration card holders

were being issued APL cards instead.

In many places the old description of families were retained in the new ration

cards.

There was lack of coordination between the Supply Department, the Gram

Panchayat and the Block office, each blaming the other for delay.

There was no information in any of the supply departments of the selected

Tehsils about ration cards, collection of allotment by FPS dealers, distribution

of commodities, categorization of FPS dealers, information about cancelled

cards etc. The information available in some offices was obsolete.

Local Power Structure and PDS

The following qualitative observations regarding the local power structure may reveal

the current condition of the Public Distribution System in UP:

FPS Dealers, Local Polity and Consumers: Relations in PDS

Very often there was a strong link between the FPS dealers and the village

Pradhan. Thus, even if the FPS dealers committed irregularities, the Pradhan

succeeded in influencing the Panchayat and the local leaders in favour of the

FPS dealers.

The major reason why poor people did not complain against the FPS dealers

was the prevailing strong nexus between the FPS dealers and the powerful

people of their village. The customers were afraid to complain against the

FPS dealers because of this nexus.

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Many households did not know where and to whom they would lodge their

complaint.

Some people knew where to lodge their complaints but could not do so

because of poverty and consequent inability to miss a day’s labour.

Social insecurity at the local level and desire to avoid conflict was another

reason cited for not lodging complaints against the dishonest FPS dealers.

Many people expressed fear, in case they complained against the FPS

dealers, by being excluded from the entitlement.

Many persons who had earlier complained reported that there was no

outcome of their complaints since the FPS dealers bribed the enquiry officials

to silence the voice of protest or to turn the report in favour of the FPS

dealers.

According to a system implemented recently, people will receive the reply to

their complaints only when it is accompanied by an affidavit. Because of this

complex formality, many people do not like to complain.

FPS Dealers, Sub-dealers of Kerosene, Wholesale Dealer, Oil Depots: Relations in PDS

The FPS dealers reported that the transportation charges for bringing back

the oil allotted to them had to be borne by them themselves whereas this

charge was adjusted per drum in the cost to the sub-dealer. This did not

happen when they used to collect the oil from the wholesale oil depot.

We observed no verification of the oil supplied or distributed at the level of

both the wholesale dealer and the sub-dealer.

Most of the drums in the custody of the sub-dealers and the FPS dealers did

not fulfill the standards set by the government in terms of size of drums and

the names of the people that had to be written on them. Additionally all the

drums with the sub-dealer belonged to the FPS dealers. The sub-dealers

themselves did not have the required number of drums.

Although all the sub-dealers were supposed to follow an FPS dealer’s roster

prepared by the District Administration, they rarely did so. Each of them

supplied oil to the FPS dealers following their own discretion.

At the levels of the wholesale dealer, the sub-dealer and the FPS dealers, no

fixed system was followed for supplying and carrying away oil. Although the

administration had established a definite norm, it was a mere formality. The

whole system was open to corruption and black marketeering in the absence

of strict vigilance and control.

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In view of many wholesale dealers, if the kerosene oil was distributed by the

filler system then the leakage of oil would be higher than if it was distributed

by the meter system as done in petrol pumps.

Distribution of Kerosene Oil by Manipulation

Distribution of kerosene oil in all the selected villages was almost regular but the

quantity distributed was less than that decided upon by the administration. The

reasons for this are the following:

The quantity of kerosene oil allotted to the FPS dealer had not been

increased in proportion to the increase in the number of APL cards in the

villages.

Many cardless families were given kerosene oil under the instructions of the

Gram Panchayat.

The influential people of the village appropriated oil.

The FPS dealers were given five to ten liters oil less per drum than the

allotted quantity.

The representatives and staff of the Panchayat demanded more oil per

month.

Under these circumstances, the question centered on why kerosene oil was still

distributed regularly and not the same in case of food-grains. The main reasons for

this are the following:

In rural region, there is no alternative to kerosene oil for lighting up at night in

the absence of electricity.

A high difference in prices between the kerosene oil sold through PDS and

that sold in the open market exists.

Kerosene oil is generally not available in the open market.

Kerosene oil is used for other purposes like agriculture, irrigation.

The price of diesel is higher compared to kerosene oil.

Because demand for kerosene oil is much in rural region, there would chaos

in villages if the people were not given kerosene oil. This is why the FPS

dealers take care to ensure that the distribution of kerosene oil does not halt

under any circumstances. Distribution of Kerosene oil, thus, shows the

bottommost layer of functioning of PDS.

Jan Kerosene Scheme

We found the Jan Kerosene Scheme in operation. Under this scheme, ten sub-

dealers have been appointed in the entire district through whom the FPS dealers

have to be allotted kerosene oil every month. We observed the following in this

regard:

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The appointment of sub-dealers and their location was not within the

perimeter of the village.

Almost all the sub-dealers are agents of the wholesale dealer who have no

objections to irregularities carried out by them.

The drums were not coloured as specified.

The oil did not reach the wholesale dealer’s godown from the oil company

within the stipulated period since the oil company has only one vehicle. In many villages the wholesale dealer supplies oil to the FPS dealers directly

in the oil company’s tanker with a capacity of 220 liters. Contradictions and Accommodation in PDS

If there is a narrow economic gap between the various communities living in

the village, then the social relations between them are cordial, leading to a

smooth functioning of the system.

If the number of supporters of two conflicting parties in the village, is equal

then the functioning of the PDS is smooth. This is because there is local

pressure from the village society, who maintains strict control to ensure

smooth functioning of the system.

If the village is inhabited by people of only one caste or if there is dominance

of one particular caste in the village, then the people belonging to the caste

constituting the majority remain more privileged so far as obtaining the

essential commodities are concerned.

In a village where the present and past Pradhans are in competition and there

is little difference in the number of supporters of each of them, PDS remains

efficient.

VIII. Recommendations While at the delivery points, FCI Godown to FPSs, we find responses that

show a well functioning PDS, at the final consumption point we find less than

a happy scenario. The final consumption point covers both the beneficiary (by

BPL, APL, Antyodaya and Annapurna) and non-beneficiary households. The

center or the ‘copula’ of the PDS is the FPS dealer who links the remote

delivery point and the local receiving point.

Leakage of foodgrains from Godowns, purchase of foodgrains from open

market, migration of people and hence their absence, subsidy grabbed by the

non-poor, private purchase of foodgrains by corporate firms from the field and

hence competition-cum-low price, bribe and other types of corruption in PDS

emanate from the weaknesses built-in and/or inserted in the system that need

to be eliminated rather than eliminating the system.

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Self-production, even when it is positive, can not be considered as an

alternative to supply of essential commodities distributed through the FPSs.

Providing pension should not be seen as an alternative to providing

subsidized food.

Suggestions for Improved Performance of FPS Dealers

The existing rate of commission is 0.06 paise per kg. of rice and wheat and

0.15 paise per liter of kerosene sold by FPS dealer. The former rate should

be enhanced between 15 and 20 paise per kg. while the latter rate should be

raised to 25 paise per lt. This may reduce malpractices at the level of the FPS

dealers.

The FPS dealers do not get any return/incentive on the items that they draw

from generally a long distance for distribution under Mid-Day Meal (MDM).

This incentive has to be fixed in the form of a commission at the same rate as

under TPDS and ensured for the FPS dealers.

The FPS dealers may be given the additional responsibility/opportunity to sell

at market prices additional items like salt, edible oil, janata (cheap) saree,

pensil and note books. This will ensure livelihood security of the vulnerable

households as well as add to the incentives of the FPS dealers.

The FPS dealer has to be educated at least up to ten standards to read and

realize the duties and responsibilities and maintain records.

FPS dealer must have reasonable saving in his bank account.

FPS dealer must have completed 21 years of age.

The FPS dealer must not have criminal record.

To the extent possible, the FPS dealer with support from the supply inspector

has to ensure supply of items to the door/kitchen of the poor. The delivery has

to be authenticated by a representative of the PRI. The supply has to be

made in presence of the representative of the PRI.

Village-level FPSs has to be a public building like community hall/Panchayat

Ghar etc. If this Hall/Ghar is not there they must be constructed under Food

for Work scheme/Rural Housing Scheme etc.

FPS Dealer must be a local resident.

There has to be training of FPS dealers for at least one week just after his

selection. The training has to cover the rules and regulations in PDS, the

responsibilities of the dealer, the economics and ethics in distribution etc.

Provide transportation facility and field allowance for FPS dealers.

An FPS dealer serves 741 cards on average which is unmanageable. An FPS

in rural area should serve no more than 200 households or 1000 population

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as opposed is 2000 as per National target as planned by GOI. In the urban

region, this may vary depending on the urban concentration.

Suggestions for Improved Performance of Supply Inspectors

We suggest appointment of supply inspectors on the basis of the number of

FPS dealers in a development block.

There has to be time-cum-merit bound promotion of supply inspectors.

The supply inspectors must verify the distribution system by taking the

beneficiaries into confidence and report the same to the higher authority

immediately. The verification report must be displayed at the level of

consumers in village and block.

Suggestions for Execution by Godwon-in-charge and Deport-in-charge

Improve the transportation services and control the contractors involved in

carrying the commodities.

Period of lifting items by FPS dealers should be decided in advance and

informed.

Transportation cost of the dealer must be compensated in case the items are

not sent by the Godowns to the doorsteps of the FPS dealers.

Steps to be Executed by Panchayats

The local Panchayat has to listen to the voice of the poor by pursuing the following:

Ensure regular meeting of Gram Sabha,

Assist in BPL survey, identify the needy and poor,

protect local Food Bank,

assist in estimating household income,

control local mafia,

avoid discriminatory protection of the non-poor,

represent the absentee/migrant household, the widow and the

physically/mentally challenged while making cards.

Most of the beneficiary households reported problems experienced in PDS.

26.0 per cent of the beneficiaries reported corruption as the reason. But 92.5 per cent

of the total beneficiaries reported that none of them lodged any complaint anywhere.

73.3 per cent of the urban and 65.0 per cent of the rural beneficiaries also reported

that the local bodies did not play any role for improvement of PDS. 84.4 per cent of

the beneficiary households reported that no local vigilance committee was formed in

the memorable past.

The Panchayat has to play a positive role supported by immediate formation

of functioning vigilance committee and that should be monitored by local

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NGOs or higher levels officials. Monthly and quarterly meetings should be

held where NGOs and government officials must participate.

Suggestions for Implementation by State Level Functionaries Allotment of kerosene oil should be increased per card/unit.

Identify local need and supply/distribute items accordingly.

Every household should have a ration card not only to get items but also as

an identity.

A single window (Department) at the level of the state must be assigned the

responsibility for the execution of the delivery mechanism, right from FCI

Godown to FPSs. This is to be a Government Department as different from

the autonomous Food Rights Commission.

Each Block should have one foodgrain Godown and one oil depot.

Kerosene Oil depot owners may be allowed to distribute LPG also.

Household income should be below Rs. 19,884 for rural and Rs. 25,546 for

urban area per annum for eligibility of BPL card, as per GO at present.

Occupations of members in the household should be in the unorganized

sector to be eligible for BPL card.

To the extent possible, state government has to shed the load of the FPS

dealer by ensuring supply at the door of the supply point in the village, rather

than the FPS dealer going a long way with cash to carry back distributable

items. This will save cost on transport-cum-transactions.

BPL and Antyodaya categories should be clubbed as BPL; these

households should be issued identical cards to avoid grass root level

discrimination and distributional inefficiency. Both BPL and Antyodaya live

below poverty line and hence belong to poor category. In the same way, the

subsidy-related extra cost on Antyodaya cards may be eliminated.

Distribution of items to households once a month is based on households

having accumulated money (saving or disposable money revealed in

purchasing power) to buy those items. In reality, as our study shows, the

income-poor households lack ‘saved’ purchasing power; on the contrary, they

have day-based purchasing power. If available items are lifted by FPS

dealers for distribution to target households, it must be available with the FPS

holding and carrying forward a stock and hence the households must be allowed to draw items any time (on any day) of their choice.

Items are distributed based on cards irrespective of family size. In reality, the

family size varies over a wide range. Hence, items should be distributed based on units in the family. This will reduce the actual/fake division of

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family in rural areas. This will also lead to enhanced per capita availability of

foodgrains.

There being no self-production of kerosene and no open market for kerosene,

households feel compelled to buy from black market at a much higher price.

Hence, whatever be the Government-determined source, a second source has to be there for availability of kerosene for households at a price per unit, marginally higher than PDS price.

There has to remain an emergency stock of foodgrains at the FPS level to counter calamities and hunger. The ‘zero balance’ reported by the FPS

dealers thus may be converted to accumulated positive balance.

We accept that any failure in supply/distribution of items at grass root level is

an institutional failure and hence an institution has to be marked responsible

for this failure.

We did not find any significant outcome from the Jan Kerosene programme.

Hence, the programme should be stopped.

There has to be flexibility in FPS price as a reflection of prevailing market

price. A high gap between the two prices may lead to non-functioning PDS

and/or corrupt PDS. Hence, the gap between the two prices has to be minimized. In case the BPL households are buying at a higher price from the

open market, the PDS price should be raised. This will reduce subsidy at the

same time.

Temporary ration cards should be provided for in-migration households

as workers in construction work, rituals and religious festivals etc. The

proportion target number in terms of size of Gram Sabha may be given to

each Gram Panchayats.

There has to be at least one-day campaign in the village about awareness/rights of consumers in PDS every month. This campaign has

to be initiated by Government functionaries.

There has to be transparency in the system. The availability, allocation,

lifting and distribution of items per period per FPS should be on display. For

this, the block office and the local school building etc. may be the site.

The reservation category for FPS dealers often creates problems. The person

in reservation category by being poor borrows initial working capital and gets

trapped. Hence, ether the reservation category has to be abolished or

working capital has to be provided to the FPS dealer under reservation

category through bank loan etc.

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Selection/appointment of FPS dealer has to be through a single authority,

either local Panchayat or Government administration, not both. This will

ensure accountability of the FPS dealer.

At present 18 districts in UP have State Food Corporations (SFCs). We found

these SFCs in poor condition by lack of staff, storage capacity, rented

Godown, poor documentation, high corruption, non-owning responsibility etc.

These SFCs need reorganization. The documentation format has to be

uniform for all the SFCs in the state.

The fixed target has to be flexible for distribution of cards by categories

among the eligible non-beneficiaries.

Identify at the level of village/block/district the food insecure households by

indicators which are observable and quantifiable like land ownership,

residential house, and number of days employed in wage-work in the past

one year. Involve the PRIs in the selection of such households through open

meeting and declaration of the list in public and maintenance of the list in

Panchayat Bhawan. The list has to be flexible for inclusion of representatives

of households absent in the meeting (s) and marginalized people who may

slip into the category of BPL any time for many reasons.

Launch a BPL survey with immediate effect for the whole state by an

autonomous institution with uninterrupted support from the state. The same

institution will be responsible for assessment and monitoring of steps initiated

and implemented by the state to ensure freedom from hunger and food

security of people at the bottom of social and economic ladder. This institution

may be called ‘Food Rights Commission’ in the line of Human Rights

Commission.

Cancel false cards (APL households having BPL cards) and de-link

cardholding from political affiliation.

Ensure state vigilance over stocks and release by FCI, Kothedars etc. A

double check/lock on food store may be executed, for example, one lock used

by FPS dealer and the other lock by Gram Panchayat when it is FPS. To

check collusion of both, the FPS dealer and the entrusted Panchayat

representative, a ‘food custodian’ from the locality may be appointed to

ensure checks and balances.

At present the Annapurna card holders have stopped getting foodgrains. They

are being given Rs. 150 per month which is not only inadequate but also often

does not help them to go to the market to use money to buy foodgrains. This

category has to be ensured foodgrains at the lowest price.

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There should be no limit on the number of distributable cards. If BPL cards

can not be distributed (because of low price of items and hence subsidy

burden), at least APL card has to be ensured for all, so that there is no case

of cardlessness in the state. To assess the households for selection in the

BPL and Antyodaya category, the basis has to be ‘Arthik Register’ and

‘Revenue Register’.

The Gram Pradhans have to be trained about their duties and responsibilities

once every year in the line of the 73rd and 74th Amendments of the

Constitution.

There has to be a Food Bank at the level of the village (Panchayat) so that

no news of death from hunger comes. For this, a community hall has to be

constructed, if it is not there already, in each village having at least 50

households covering all hamlets. If the villages are small by number of

households, a cluster of neighbouring villages should be covered for having

such a community hall. The maintenance of the community hall will be the

responsibility of the PRIs.

The households must be allowed to draw quota/items in installments, and

hence pay in installments. In case these poor households can not pay for the

time being, food coupon has to be given to the households so that they can

buy at their time.

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