public lecture presentation slides (11.27.2012)

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History, Territory and Japan’s growing isolation in East Asia Thomas U Berger Associate Professor Department of International relations Boston University For Presentation at Temple University, Tokyo November 27, 2012

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Thomas Berger: History, Territory and Japan’s Diplomatic Isolation in East Asia

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Page 1: Public Lecture Presentation Slides (11.27.2012)

History, Territory and Japan’s growing isolation in East Asia

Thomas U BergerAssociate Professor

Department of International relationsBoston University

For Presentation at Temple University, Tokyo November 27, 2012

Page 2: Public Lecture Presentation Slides (11.27.2012)

The Basic Problem

• Despite:A) growing regional interdependence, andB) a military balance that strongly favors the

US and its allies We have growing regional acrimony, fueled by tensions over history and minor territorial issues

Why?

Page 3: Public Lecture Presentation Slides (11.27.2012)

A vigorous Dispute over historical commemoration

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and the portrayal of history

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Tensions spill over into maritime disputes with China

The 2010 Trawler Incident

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and Korea…

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…with Russia in the mix as well

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The intensity has increased

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Efforts to re-establish harmony seem to not meet with enduring success

Premier Wen Jiao Bao in Yoyogi Park, May 31, 2010

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Three Questions:

• What is the basis of the ways countries think about history and territory (the Official Narrative)?

• When and why do differing historical narratives become the source of inter-state conflict?

• What – if anything – can be done about it?

Page 11: Public Lecture Presentation Slides (11.27.2012)

Forces shaping the Official Narrative

• Historical Determinist – historical memory based on individual experiences

• Instrumentalist – historical memory manipulated by cynical elites for their own gain

• Culturalist – historical memory part of the larger political culture of a society

• Combination of the above

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Historical Determinism

• Powerful experiences can create powerful memories

• Memories can be suppressed both by individuals or society, but they often resurface, even after many decades

• Individuals and groups press to have their memories reflected in the official narrative

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The Carriers of Memory

Atomic Bomb survivor

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Instrumentalism

• Politicians and other elites manipulate official narrative to promote their own agendas

• The balance of power between politicians and interest groups determines the official narrative

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The Political Uses of History

Nazi Era Postcard

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Culturalism

• The interpretation of events and interest are central elements of a society’s political culture

• Each generation is socialized with a particular historical narrative – through education, movies, plays, etc.

• Over time, the historical narrative evolves as each generation reinterprets events in its own way

• The existing historical narrative set the boundarie for the kind of historical narrative a state can adopt

Page 17: Public Lecture Presentation Slides (11.27.2012)

Cultural Vectors of Memory – novels plays, movies and popular history

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The History of the History issue in Asia

• 1945-1951 – Initial Settlement• 1951-1982 – Successful Japanese damage

control• 1982 – 1992 – the beginning of the “history

issue”• 1992-2002 – era of apology diplomacy• 2002 –Deadlock over history – apology fatigue

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Period 1 - Initial Settlement

• The Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal• Reverse Course in US occupation policy• Ascent of the Conservative LDP in Japan• The Treaty of San Francisco – Article 11 – Japan accepts the IMTFE VerdictArticles 14-21 – limited reparations regime, Western Allies give up further claims• Ambiguous Boundaries created

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Trial and Rehabilitation

The International Military Tribunal in the Far East – 1946-1948

The Treaty of San Francisco signed November 1951-

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Ambiguous Boundaries left open

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Period 2 - 1951-1978 Successful Japanese Damage Control

• Japan chooses to focus on damage control• Taiwan and South Korea unsuccessfully push

for compensation and concessions by Japan• Japan signs normalization treaties with all

major Asian nations except the DPRK 1952 Taiwan 1965 South Korea 1978 The PRC

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Things were more orderly in Beijing

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Reasons for First Equilibrium

• Politics in Command - Instrumental factors predominate historical memory and cultural discourse

• PRC, ROK, Taiwan all authoritarian states• The Left in Japan focuses on Japanese

victimization• Japanese conservatives not interested in

pursuing “War Responsibility”

Page 26: Public Lecture Presentation Slides (11.27.2012)

Period III – History Issue Resurfaces

• 1982 – The First textbook Controversy• New MOE guidelines on textbooks• Nakasone apology in Korea• 1985 – Nakasone visits Yasukuni

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Drivers for the Emergence of the History Problem

• Strong, historically rooted Anti-Japanese discourse in China and Korea (Cultural discourse)

• Pluralization allows victims groups to come to the fore (Historical memory)

• Increased interdependence of Asian countries– First strategic (Cold war)– Then economic

• Use of human rights norms by victims groups

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The Birth of Modern Chinese and Korean Nationalism

The March 1rst, 1919 Movement in Korea

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Korea – Colonial Modernity – authoritarianism made in Japan

Park Cheung Hee – as an officer in the Japanese Imperial Army, ca. 1944 and as President of the Republic of Korea

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Replacing Mao with “Patriotic Education”

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Period IV – Groping for Reconciliation

• 1991 - Kaifu in Singapore – history key to a more active role in Asia

• 1992 – Emperor visits China• 1993 – Kono statement on the Comfort Women• 1995 – Asian Women’s Fund Murayama Statement• 1998 – Kim Dae Jung-Obuchi Keizo Summit• 2002 – Korea-Japan host the World Cup

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Limited Reconciliation with Korea

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Develop into powerful Narratives of Victimization

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Japan also feels victimized

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Period IV – Deadlock over history

• 2001-2006 Under Koizumi tensions flare up• Collapse of territorial negotiations with Russia• Korean-Japanese reconciliation founders

under Lee Myun Bak• Anti-Japanese riots in 2005 in China• Japanese Apology fatigue• Escalates into territorial disputes

Page 37: Public Lecture Presentation Slides (11.27.2012)

Reasons for Deadlock

• Japanese conservative backlash and “apology fatigue”

• Lack of active support for reconciliation from the Korean government

• Lack of interest in reconciliation by the Chinese government

• Temptation to utilize popular sentiments for domestic political agenda

• Inability of governments (China, Korea and Japan) to re-establish control over the diplomatic agenda

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China’s diminishing leaders

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Aggressively Patriotic Sentiments

Translation: Even if the whole of China is covered with tombs, [we] must kill all Japanese; even if no grass grows in China, we must recover Diaoyudao [the Senkakus]

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Sentiments are hard to control

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In Japan as well populist sentiments intrude on Foreign Policy

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Politicians can use for their own agendas

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Bottom Line – a Paradox

• The broad framework of international relations – balance of power and interdependence - favors general stability

• The political dynamics of the history issue – the combination of historical memory, cultural discourse and instrumental use of the issue by opportunistic politicians – creates volatility

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Risks for Japan and the US-Japan Relationship

• Japan risks diplomatic isolation in East Asia• Lack of sympathy on the part of the US –

especially with regard to the Comfort women issue

• Danger of accidental escalation in the Senkakus

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US Sympathy for the Comfort Women

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US Fears of entanglement

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Possible Counter measures

• Greater flexibility on territorial issues• Damage control on history with China/

reconciliation with Korea – if Korea is ready• CSBMs on Senkakus – when China is ready• Is this politically possible for Japan and its

neighbors?