Public Responsiveness to Supreme Court Decisions

Joseph Daniel Ura∗

ABSTRACT

Much research concludes that public reactions to Supreme Court decisions are marginal, con-ditional, or highly localized. This paper reevaluates that result in light of substantial support for thetheory of thermostatic public responsiveness to changes in public policy and the macro economy.This macro political theory suggests that there will be negative feedback from the ideological di-rection of Supreme Court decisions in public mood. I assess this expectation, modeling Stimson’spublic mood index as a function of cumulative Supreme Court liberalism, controlling for congres-sional policymaking and the state of the economy. Consistent with a thermostatic theory of publicopinion, I find significant evidence of a negative relationship between Supreme Court liberalismand public mood. This result indicates that Supreme Court decisions may loom larger in the publicmind than current scholarship suggests and have consequences for American national electionsand patterns of public policymaking.

Keywords: macro politics, public opinion, Supreme Court, thermostatic models, time series.

Paper prepared for presentation at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political ScienceAssociation.

∗Joseph Daniel Ura is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Texas A&M University, Box 4348TAMU, College Station, TX 77843-4348 (jura@politics.tamu.edu).

Over the last six decades, federal courts in general, and the Supreme Court in particular,

have become increasingly prominent and institutionalized components of American national gov-

ernment, “seeking to control matters at the heart of contemporary politics” (Kramer 2004, p. 227;

see also Burns 2009; McGuire 2004). At a minimum, the federal courts now define the lim-

its of state and national policymaking on a variety of salient issues.1 More profoundly, though,

the modern Supreme Court has increasingly positioned itself as the final and authoritative voice

on constitutional interpretation. As Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote in United States v. Morrison

(2000), “No doubt the political branches have a role in interpreting and applying the Constitution,

but ever since Marbury this Court has remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text”

(see also Friedman 2009; Starr 2002; Tushnet 2000; and also Tate and Vallinder 1995 for a com-

parative perspective). The growing importance of the judiciary in American national politics is

evident in several ways, including the emergence of judicial nominations as a salient issue in pres-

idential election campaigns (Nemacheck 2004; Pickerill and Clayton 2004; Stephenson 1999) and

the growing role of interest groups and public campaigns in the confirmation of federal judges and

Supreme Court justices (Caldeira and Wright 1998; Grossman and Wasby 1972; Maltese 1998;

Segal, Cameron, and Cover 1992).2

1These include the death penalty (Furman v. Georgia 1972; Gregg v. Georgia 1976; Atkins v. Virginia 2003),affirmative action (Regents of the University of California v. Bakke 1978; Gratz v. Bollinger 2003; Grutter v. Bollinger2003), abortion (Roe v. Wade 1973; Harris v. McCrae 1980; Planned Parenthood v. Casey 1992; Gonzales v. Carhart2007), the conduct of the War on Terror (Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 2006), and even standards for counting contested ballotsin presidential elections (Bush v. Gore 2000).

2Though the federal judiciary has emerged as an important issue in one form or another in presidential electioncampaigns throughout American history, attention to Supreme Court appointments has become a steady theme ofcampaigns for the White House during the last three decades . This pattern has been especially prominent in recentelections. In 2004, Senator John Kerry rallied supporters for his presidential campaign by pointing to the election’s im-plications for ideological balance on the nation’s highest court: “You want three words of motivation?. . . The SupremeCourt. That alone is the motivation” (Johnson 2004). In 2008, Senator John McCain promised to use the power ofthe presidency to correct the “one great exception” to the balanced functioning of the federal “system of checks andbalances” represented by the “abuse of our federal courts by the people we entrust with judicial power” who “leg-islate from the bench. . . [against the] expressed will of the voters” (Toobin 2008). Endorsing then-Senator Obama’spresidential candidacy in 2008, the editors of Esquire magazine wrote, “The best argument for the election of BarackObama as president of the United States is written quite clearly in the peaks and squiggles of [89 year old AssociateJustice] John Paul Stevens’s EKG” (Esquire 2008).

Similarly, the process confirming Supreme Court justices has become high political drama in its own right. Con-firmation votes now “represent a seismic. . . struggle between the President and the US Senate over the ideologicalmakeup of the nation’s highest court” (Johnson and Roberts 2004, p. 663). The magnitude of the struggle is evident inthe (increasingly) intense efforts of organized interest groups to generate and amplify public support for and opposition

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Despite these trends, the scholarly literature on public reactions to Supreme Court decisions

generally concludes that the Court has, at most, marginal, conditional, or highly localized effects

on public opinion (e.g. Baas and Thomas 1984; Franklin and Kosaki 1989; Hoekstra 2000, 2002;

Hoekstra and Segal 1996; Johnson and Martin 1998; Marshall 1989; Mondak 1991). These con-

clusions stand in sharp contrast with the role of the federal courts in salient policy domains and

the attention given to courts by presidential candidates and interest groups. Indeed, the juxtapo-

sition of growing judicial entanglement with ordinary politics and scholarly conclusions that the

Supreme Court is generally inconsequential for national public opinion raises a critical problem

for students of judicial politics and mass political behavior. Are accounts of the growing role of the

Supreme Court in normal politics much ado about nothing in the minds of ordinary Americans, or

have scholars of linkages between Supreme Court decisions and public opinion missed something

important about how the Court’s decisions influence public sentiment?

In this paper, I reconsider the role of the Supreme Court in shaping public opinion. I argue,

first, that a lack of evidence of attitude changes in the wake of Supreme Court decisions—that is,

changes in the distribution of absolute preferences on an issue or of ideal points in some policy

space—does not necessarily imply a general lack of public reaction to the Court. Next, I draw

on the macro politics literature to identify an alternative theory of public responsiveness to the

Supreme Court. In particular, I show that the thermostatic model of public opinion predicts that

the ideological direction of Supreme Court decisions should be negatively related to public prefer-

ences over the ideological direction of future policymaking. I assess this expectation by modeling

Stimson’s (1999, 2009) mood index as a function of liberalism in Supreme Court decisions, con-

trolling for policymaking by Congress and the state of the macro economy. As predicted, the model

indicates a significant, negative relationship between Supreme Court decision-making and public

mood.

to individual nominees on the basis of the expected policy implications of their membership on the Court (Caldeiraand Wright 1998; Grossman and Wasby 1972; Maltese 1998; Segal, Cameron, and Cover 1992).

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The Supreme Court and Public Opinion: Legitimation

The foundation of contemporary political science’s consideration of the relationship between the

Supreme Court and public opinion is the legitimation hypothesis due to Dahl (1957). Dahl argued

that the Supreme Court’s ability to make policy is highly constrained, and that its principal function

is to attach “the unique legitimacy attributed to its interpretations of the Constitution. . . [to] the

fundamental policies of the successful [governing] coalition” (1957, pp. 293-294). Generally,

Dahl’s statement has been interpreted as a theoretical prediction that the Supreme Court’s decisions

are persuasive, “shap[ing] policy attitudes on even the most controversial issues” (Hoekstra 2002,

p. 90).3 In other words, the legitimation hypothesis has been presented as a prediction that the

Supreme Court’s decisions have the ability to influence individuals’ absolute policy preferences—

their ideal points in a policy space—changing “people from segregationists to integrationists, from

pro-lifers to pro-choicers (Caldeira 1991, p. 305). However, empirical support for this proposition

has been limited.

For example, Marshall (1989) rejects the legitimation hypothesis. Examining eighteen in-

stances over a 45-year period where survey data exist on aggregate public opinion on issues shortly

3Dahl’s own statement of the legitimation hypothesis is actually more circumspect than its characterization insubsequent literature suggests. For his part, Dahl writes that the Court may attach “the unique legitimacy of itsinterpretations of the Constitution. . . [to] the fundamental policies of the successful [governing] coalition.” (1957, pp.293-294). Yet, Dahl also notes, “In the absence of substantial agreement within the [national governing] alliance, anattempt by the Court to make national policy is likely to lead to disaster, as the Dred Scott decision and the early NewDeal cases demonstrate” (1957, p. 293). Dahl is careful to confine his speculation on the Court’s powers to the domainof “legitimacy” rather than the realm of “preference.”

Thus, Dahl’s essay does not suggest that the Supreme Court can manufacture support for this or that policy outof thin air. Rather, Dahl suggests that the Court may “legitimize” some critical policies which have already beenadopted by a persistent, national lawmaking majority, such as “the Jeffersonian alliance, the Jacksonian, the extraor-dinarily long-lived Republican dominance of the post-Civil War years, and the New Deal alliance shaped by FranklinRoosevelt” (1957, p. 293).

This begs the question, If legitimacy is not “support,” what is it? Caldeira (1991) suggests several alternatives:including compliance with policies at odds with one’s preferences and “the opportunity to persuade the [disagreeing]public of governmental agencies’ rights to undertake action” (p. 305). While it is difficult to discern the originalmeaning, as it were, of Dahl’s 1957 essay, Caldeira’s latter suggestion seems closest to the mark. Elsewhere, Dahlargues that a “political system does not depend on a widespread belief that certain. . . rules. . . are preferable to otherrules; in some circumstances a democratic system could be highly stable if a substantial part of the electorate merelyaccepted them” (Dahl 1961, p. 314). Though it is not stated explicitly, it is reasonable to infer that Dahl’s sense oflegitimation relates to the notion of acceptance, that his concept of legitimizing is more strongly associated with de-escalating political opposition to a majority policy from the realm of constitutional objections to the domain of meredisagreement.

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before and after relevant Supreme Court decisions, Marshall finds that public opinion is just as

likely to shift away from the Supreme Court’s positions as toward them. He concludes that there

is no systematic relationship between Supreme Court decisions and the public’s absolute issue

preferences, let alone a consistent pattern supporting the legitimation hypothesis.

Franklin and Kosaki’s (1989) study of public reaction to Roe v. Wade (1973) also rejects

the legitimation hypothesis, showing that the decision had only a marginal influence on the ag-

gregate distribution of support for abortion rights. In particular, they find that exposure to Roe

had a polarizing effect on abortion attitudes, catalyzing both abortion supporters and opponents

to become more extreme in their issue positions. Using data from the General Social Survey,

Franklin and Kosaki show that the predicted probability of a white, Catholic respondent oppos-

ing all discretionary abortions increased from 0.51 in 1972 (pre-Roe) to 0.53 in 1973 (post-Roe)

while the probability of a Protestant respondent opposing all discretionary abortions declined from

0.34 in 1972 to 0.28 in 1973. Johnson and Martin (1998) also reject the legitimation hypothesis,

finding evidence that some Supreme Court decisions have a marginal but significant polarizing

effect on abortion and death penalty attitudes. However, Johnson and Martin also refine Franklin

and Kosaki’s “structural response” hypothesis, showing that the Supreme Court “may affect public

opinion when it initially rules on a salient issue, but that subsequent decisions on the same issue

will have little influence on opinion” (1998, p. 299).

Evidence of the Supreme Court’s limited powers to change the nation’s mind on salient

policy questions has catalyzed research on more focussed public responses to the Court’s decisions.

Hoekstra’s (2000, 2003; Hoekstra and Segal 1996) analyses of the Supreme Court’s influence

on local public opinion begin with the premise that individual-level responsiveness to Supreme

Court decision-making is conditioned by the strength of pre-existing attitudes and exposure to

information about the Court and its decisions, which corresponds with individual’s geographic

proximity to a community in which a Supreme Court case has originated. Hoekstra finds much

empirical support for this position, demonstrating that support for policy positions adopted by

the Supreme Court increases marginally among individuals who live in communities nearby those

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in which Supreme Court cases originated and not at all in communities far removed from the

specific controversy addressed by the Court (2000, 2002). Experimental studies, have generally

confirmed this argument, showing that sufficient information about Supreme Court decisions can

be persuasive in some non-salient issue domains for which respondents may not have strong prior

attitudes (Mondak 1994; Hoekstra 1995; Unger 2008; but see Bass and Thomas 1984).

Taken as a whole, the literature suggests that public reactions to Supreme Court decisions

are, at most, modest and conditional. On the one hand, observational evidence of legitimation is

limited to local attitudes on a small number of issue domains. On the other, polarizing “structural

responses” to the Court’s decisions are limited to a handful of landmark cases. Indeed, it appears

that Caldeira’s now-classic critique of legitimation—that “we have relatively few well-documented

instances when the Supreme Court has shaped the aggregate distribution of public support for this

or that policy”— remains substantially accurate (1991, p. 312).4

A Different Perspective: Thermostatic Responsiveness

Evidence of the Supreme Court’s limited ability to legitimize policy attitudes does not necessarily

imply that public opinion is unresponsive to the Supreme Court in other ways, and it is a mistake

to generalize that the absence of one kind of public reaction to the Supreme Court entails a general

lack of engagement with the judiciary. Indeed, the public may observe and react to Supreme Court

decisions in politically relevant ways even if the Court does not regularly lead Americans to change

their attitudes about “this or that policy.” For example, the degree of ideological convergence

between aggregate patterns of Supreme Court decision-making and public mood predicts changes

in the level of public confidence in the Court (Durr, Martin, and Wolbrecht 2000), which, in turn,

4This conclusion is more than an empirical curiosity. The public’s apparent lack of responsiveness to judicialdecision-making along with some evidence that it is generally ignorant of the Supreme Court (Delli Carpini and Keeter1996; Morin 1989; Kritzer 2001; but see Caldeira and McGuire 2005; Gibson and Cladeira 2009) have combined tocreate a folk theorem among many judges, legal academics, and political scientists that ordinary citizens cannot (andperhaps should not) meaningfully assess or sensibly respond to the work of judges and courts. Gibson and Caldeira(2009, p. 429) summarize this stark syllogism, ”[I]f the American people are irretrievably ignorant of law and courts,elites—preferably legal elites—should be given the task of [evaluating courts and] determining who should, and shouldnot, be a judge.”

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influences congressional support for the Supreme Court (Ura and Wohlfarth N.D.) and judicial

self-restraint (Clark 2009). This result suggests that, “despite the supposed imperceptibility of

the Court. . . the public perceives. . . and evaluates the Court” (Durr, Martin, and Wolbrecht 2000 p.

775).

More generally, this “ideological divergence” result suggests that (at least some) individuals

are capable of comparing the political content of Supreme Court decisions with their own policy

preferences to render a judgment about the fitness and faithfulness of the Court as a governmental

agent. The ability to compare the Court’s decisions with personal policy preferences suggests

the potential for thermostatic responsiveness to Supreme Court decision-making. Thermostatic

models of public opinion posit a signalling relationship between the public and the government:

when policy deviates from the public’s ideal position, it communicates a desire for policymakers

to adjust policy in a corrective direction (Wlezien 1995, 1996).5 In general, thermostatic models

posit that as public policy changes, individuals amend their preferences for future policy changes

in response, demanding relatively “more” of some policy as an outcome moves away from their

preferred state of the world and relatively “less” of the policy as the observed state of the world

converges with their preferred states. These individual changes in relative preferences aggregate

up into a macro-level signal of the mass public’s demand (or lack thereof) for future (corrective)

policy change.

To visualize this process in the context of judicial decision-making, consider a hypothetical

uniform distribution of citizens in a liberal-conservative policy space where there exists some status

quo policy, Q1 (Figure 1). Each individual in this space has some absolute policy preference, an

ideal point. Each also has a relative preference for the direction of future policymaking—those to

the left of the status quo prefer “more liberalism” in the future; those to the right would prefer “less

5Thermostatic models of the linkages between public opinion and government have been applied broadly to studythe national government’s responsiveness to changes in public opinion—including the Supreme Court’s responsivenessto changes in public mood—(Durr 1993a; Ellis, Ura, and Ashley-Robsinson 2006; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson2002; McGuire and Stimson 2004; Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson 1995; Ura and Ellis 2008; Wlezien 1995, 1996)and the public’s responsiveness to policymaking by Congress and the President (Enns and Kellstedt 2008; Erikson,Stimson, and MacKuen 2002). Yet, their application to the study of public responsiveness to the Supreme Court hasbeen more limited, as I discuss below.

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Liberal Conservative

Old Policy (Q 1)New Policy (Q 2)

Consistentsupporters of "more liberalism."

Consistentsupporters of "less liberalism."

Prefer "more liberalism"under the old policy,"less liberalism" underthe new policy.

Figure 1: The Supreme Court and Relative Policy Preferences

liberalism.” Suppose a Supreme Court decision had the effect of changing public policy in a liberal

direction, creating a new policy at Q2. As the literature suggests, the Court’s decision is not likely

to provoke much change in the underlying distribution of policy preferences. However, the change

in policy would produce a reduction in the proportion of citizens expressing a preference for “more

liberalism” in future policymaking. Citizens whose ideal points fall between the old policy and the

new policy would have expressed a preference for “more liberalism” before the Court acted and

“less liberalism” afterward. So, while the Court may have no effect on the aggregate distribution of

absolute policy preferences (policy attitudes), it may have an important influence on the distribution

of relative preferences. As the Court makes more and more liberal or conservative decisions over

time, some individuals will continue to exhibit changes in their relative preferences for future

policy changes in the opposite direction of policymaking. In other words, there will be negative

feedback from policymaking by the Supreme Court in the individuals’ relative policy preferences.

This micro theory also has a clear macro implication: the accumulation of public policy changes

emanating from the Court should produce dynamic, negative responses in the public’s aggregate

preferences for the direction of future policy change.

While there is much evidence showing this type of mass responsiveness to important policy

changes promulgated in the elected branches of national government (Enns and Kellstedt 2008;

Erikson, Stimson, and MacKuen 2002), general public reactions to Supreme Court decisions have

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not been incorporated into the literature on thermostatic public opinion.6 Yet, the Supreme Court’s

ability to make public policy that “markedly rearranges the prior distribution of political benefits,

either material or symbolic, for various segments of the population” suggests the potential for sim-

ilar dynamics in public opinion in the wake of important Supreme Court decisions (Flemming,

Bohte, and Wood 1997, p. 1247; but see Rosenberg 1992). The emergent prediction that rela-

tive public opinion liberalism is affected by Supreme Court decision-making can be subjected to

empirical scrutiny.

Assessing Thermostatic Responses to Supreme Court Decisions

The extant literature indicates a relatively straightforward set of predictive influences on public

mood. These influences establish a useful baseline model of mass policy sentiment into which

Supreme Court decision-making may be integrated. The first of these is public policy created in

the elected branches of national government, usually measured as cumulative legislative enact-

ments (Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson 2002; Kelly 2009) or federal spending (Wlezien 1995,

1996; Wlezien and Soroka 2010). Regardless of the measurement approach employed, these mod-

els regularly show negative feedback in public opinion from changes in public policy. The second

baseline predictor of policy sentiment is the state of the macroeconomy, usually indicated by the

rates of inflation and unemployment (Enns and Kellstedt 2008; Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson

2002). Increased inflation predicts greater conservatism in mood while greater unemployment pre-

dicts more public opinion liberalism. The thermostatic theory of public responsiveness to Supreme

Court decision-making may be assessed by incorporating estimates of the effects of Supreme Court

decisions on public mood into this baseline model.

6Two studies, though, do find negative relationships between the ideological direction of decision making of federalcourts and public opinion on some issues. Page, Shapiro, and Dempsey (1987) find that the direction of federal courts’decision-making has a negative relationship with public opinion on several issues. They conclude that the unpopularfederal judiciary of the period they analyzed was a point of negative reference, and that “When their [the federalcourts’] statements and actions push in one direction. . . public opinion tends to move in the opposite direction” (1987,p. 32). Similarly, Wlezien and Goggin (1993) find that public opinion in support of abortion policy “as it is now”increased during the 1980s as the Supreme Court permitted the states to regulate abortion more strictly over that decadeand interest groups became more active in that policy domain.

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Measurement and Data

I measure aggregate public opinion liberalism using the 2008 estimates of Stimson’s (1999; 2009)

annual mood index. Inflation is the the percentage change in the Consumer Price Index (January to

December) in each year (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009a). Unemployment is the average annual

rate of unemployment (Bureau of Labor Statistics 2009b).

Since the Supreme Court’s “outputs” are discrete decisions, which are more analogous to

individual pieces of legislation rather than budget authorization, I measure public policy based

on counts of major legislative enactments rather than budget authorizations. Following Erikson,

MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) and Kelly 2009(), I begin with Mayhew’s (1991, 2008) list of

major or important pieces of legislations passed in each year (selected based on media coverage of

Congress), code each law as liberal or conservative, and take the net number of important liberal

laws created in each year as an indicator of the annual amount of policy liberalism created by

Congress. Next, these values are used to construct a cumulative a measure of cumulative policy

liberalism produced by Congress and the president by scoring each year’s policy outputs as the

difference between its value and the mean of the annual series and then taking the sum of the

resulting series at each point in time. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson refer to the resulting series

as the policy index, a convention I also adopt. The policy liberalism series, beginning in 1953 and

extended through 2006, is illustrated in Figure 2(a).7

To measure the ideological content of Supreme Court decisions, I compute a cumulative

index that mirrors the basic approach employed in the construction of the policy index. I begin

by identifying a set of important or salient Supreme Court cases from 1953 to 2006. Following

Epstein and Segal’s (2000) approach, I define “salient cases” as those with a decision mentioned

on the front page of The New York Times.8 Next, I identify the ideological direction of each case

using the Original United States Supreme Court Database (2007). This allows me to compute the

7Mayhew has extended his list of important legislation passed in each year since from 1990 to 2008 (1991, 2008).Ideological codings are based on the procedure described by Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002). A list of impor-tant legislation from 1990 to 2006 and ideological codings are reported in the appendix.

8Epstein and Segal (2000) report cases appearing on the front page of The New York Times through 1996, and Iextend the list through 2006. The list of salient cases from 1997-2006 is included in the Appendix.

9

-6

15

-5

52

-8

26

-7

119

Important Laws Aggregating to

“Policy”

Salient Cases Aggregating to

“Caselaw”

20061964 1972 1981 1989 20011953

Note : Bars are the net number of liberal “important” laws enacted by Congress (Mayhew 1989, 2010) and “salient” Supreme Court decisions (Epstein and Segal 2000) in each calendar year from 1953 to 2006. Black bars correspond to labeled years. Bar values correspond to the left vertical axes, which are labeled with the observed maximum and minimum of each series. Lines are the policy and caselaw indices described in the text and represent the cumulative policy liberalism created by Congress and the Supreme Court. Line values are scaled on the right vertical axes, which are also labeled with the observed extreme values in each series.

Important Laws: Mean = 1.54Std. dev. = 3.59 Policy Index: Mean = 26.84Std. dev. = 18.56

Salient Cases: Mean = 3.11Std. dev. = 6.82 Caselaw Index: Mean = 43.72Std. dev. = 38.25

Figure 2: Measuring Cumulative Liberalism in “Important” Legislation and “Salient” SupremeCourt Cases

net number of salient or important Supreme Court decisions in each year. Finally, I construct a

cumulative measure of liberalism in the Supreme Court’s decisions by rescaling the net number of

liberal decisions in each period as its deviation from the mean value of the annual Supreme Court

liberalism series and taking the sum of the series at each point in time. For convenience’s sake, I

refer to the resulting time series, which is shown in in Figure 2(b), as the caselaw index.

Model Specification and Estimation

With these data in hand, I test the theory of thermostatic responsiveness to Supreme Court decision-

making by incorporating the caselaw index into a model of public mood. Among alternative statis-

tical models, the error correction model (ECM)—which explicitly models short-run and long-run

effects for each independent variable (DeBoef and Keele 2008; Beck 1993; Durr 1993; Smith

1993)—stands out as an appropriate choice for assessing the dynamic linkages between Supreme

Court decisions and changes in public mood. In the bivariate case, the Bardsen (1989) single

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equation ECM takes the form:

∆Yt = α0 + α∗1Yt−1 + β∗

1∆Xt + β∗2Xt−1 + εt, (1)

where α1 indicates the speed of the reequilibration of Y to a deviation from its equilibrium with

X , β2 reflects the long run effect of changes in X on Y , and β1 indicates the contemporaneous

relationship between a change in X and a change in Y . Thus, in addition to indicating the direction

and magnitude of the effect of each independent variable on changes in public mood, the ECM can

also reveal the temporal dynamics of the specified predictive relationships. Though ECM was

originally developed for investigating cointegrated time series, DeBoef and Keele (2008) note

that it may also be applied in a variety of time series contexts in the absence of cointegration

with either stationary or nonstationary data. (Indeed, they show that the ECM is equivalent to

the more familiar autoregressive distributed lag model.) In addition to these attractive analytic

properties, Monte Carlo experiments indicate that an ECM implemented through OLS capably

recovers the data generating process even in small samples (DeBoef and Keele 2008). Thus, I

implement the ECM approach, estimating a pair of models of the first difference of mood. The

first is a baseline model, and estimates the effects of the first lag of mood (error correction) as well

as a the first difference (short run effect) and first lag (long run effect) of policy (congressional

liberalism), inflation, and unemployment. The second model builds on this baseline, estimating

short run and long run effects associated with the caselaw index (Supreme Court liberalism). Since

annual estimates of mood for the early 1950s are unstable due to the small number of underlying

survey marginals available during that period (Erikson, Stimson, and MacKuen 2002; Stimson

1999, 2004), models are estimated for years from 1956 forward. Estimates and diagnostics for the

baseline model and the expanded Supreme Court model are reported in Table 1.

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Table 1: An Error Correction Model of Annual Mood (1956-2006)

Predictors (Expected Sign) Baseline Model Supreme Court Model

Short Run Effects

∆ Policy Indext (+) 0.12 0.13(0.08) (0.08)

∆ Caselaw Indext (−) -0.14*(0.04)

∆ Inflationt (−) -0.18 0.20(0.14) (0.14)

∆ Unemploymentt−1 (+) 0.63* 0.68*(0.33) (0.31)

Long Run Effects

Policy Indext−1 (−) -0.05* -0.07*(0.02) (0.02)

Caselaw Indext−1 (−) 0.01(0.01)

Inflationt−1 (−) -0.25* -0.26(0.14) (0.16)

Unemploymentt−1 (+) 0.21 0.06(0.24) (0.22)

Error Correction, Constant, and Diagnostics

Error Correction (Moodt−1) -0.30* -0.28*(0.08) (0.08)

Constant 18.75* 18.99(5.78) (5.20)

R2 0.35 0.52Adjusted R2 0.24 0.41

Breusch-Pagan Test for Heteroskedasticitya 1.08 0.83Breusch-Godfrey LM Test for Autocorrelationb 0.01 0.04Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test for Unit Rootc -8.49* -6.75*Note: OLS Estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05; One-tailed tests. N = 29.aThe Breusch-Pagan statistic tests the null hypothesis of constant error variance.bThe Breusch-Godfrey Lagrange multiplier tests the null hypothesis of uncorrelated residuals.cThe augmented Dickey-Fuller statistic tests the null hypothesis of a unit root (integrated) process in themodel’s residuals using MacKinnon’s (1994) critical values.

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Estimates of the the Baseline Model

First, the baseline model recovers the key substantive results of Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson

(2002), though the error correction specification provides novel insight about the dynamics which

govern public responsiveness to public policy and the state of the macro economy. Consistent with

a thermostatic theory of public opinion, the model indicates a negative and significant long-run

relationship between the ideological direction of policy change and public opinion liberalism. In

particular, the model predicts that each additional piece of important liberal legislation passed at

time t would begin to filter into mood, beginning at time t + 1, at a rate indicated by the error

correction parameter (-0.30). (The estimated short run effect of policy is incorrectly signed and

not significantly different than zero.) This error correction estimate indicates that the system of

congressional responsiveness to public support for the Supreme Court adjusts at a modest pace,

predicting that 30 percent of the predicted long run effect would appear in the mood series in year

t+1, with 30 percent of the remainder appearing in year t+2, and so forth until mood has increases

a total of 0.05 points. This rate of error correction predicts that half of the predicted long effect of

a change in policy will appear in mood over a two year period (yielding a median lag length of 2),

and that about 75% of this total effect will filter into the mood time series within four years.

Of course, the magnitude of the estimated long run effect of public policy for mood is quite

modest expressed in terms of a unit change. However, the baseline effect of public policy for mood

is better understood relative to the observed range of the policy index. The mean of the absolute

value of the policy index’s year-to-year changes is 2.64, and the standard deviation of the policy

index itself is 18.56. This means that the change in policy liberalism produced in a typical year

predicts a long run change in of 0.13 points in mood. A standard deviation increase in policy

liberalism yields an expected decrease in mood of 0.92 points (roughly 0.21 standard deviations).

In addition to the effects of public policy for mood, the baseline model also shows the influ-

ence of macroeconomic currents on public opinion liberalism. Again, the error correction model

estimates confirm the substantive conclusions of Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) while

revealing new information about the dynamics at work in mood’s over-time changes. The baseline

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model shows that public mood is negatively associated with the rate of inflation in the long run and

positively associated with the rate of unemployment in the short run. (Neither the short run effect

of inflation nor the long run effect of unemployment are statistically significant, though both are

correctly signed.)

Each point increase in the rate of inflation predicts a long run decrease of 0.25 points in

mood. Thus, higher inflation predicts greater conservatism in public mood. As with public policy,

the model indicates that changes in inflation affect mood in a manner consistent with the estimated

error correction dynamics. A one-unit increase in the public’s confidence in Congress in year t

disrupts the equilibrium relationship between public opinion and the macro economy, predicting

a long-run decrease of 0.25 points in mood, which filters into mood at the estimated rate of error

correction, -0.30. This predicts that 30 percent of the predicted long-run effect would appear in the

institutionalization series in year t + 1, with 30 percent of the remainder appearing in year t + 2,

and so on until the full long-run decrease in mood has transpired.

In contrast to the long run effects associated with public policy and inflation in the baseline

model, public opinion responds to changes in unemployment in the short run. Higher unemploy-

ment is associated with greater public opinion liberalism, and each point increase in the rate of

inflation predicts a short increase of 0.63 points in the mood index. In the jargon of error correc-

tion models, short run effects reflect “instantaneous adjustment” in contrast to the “reequilibration”

represented by long run effects. Here, the significant short run effect associated with a unit change

in unemployment at time t predicts an increase of 0.63 points in mood, also at time t.

As with the effects of public policy, the practical magnitudes of the estimated effects of

macroeconomic conditions for mood are somewhat obscured by expressing them in terms of sin-

gle unit changes. Though the size of the effects associated with one-unit changes in inflation and

unemployment are superficially much larger than the effect of a single important law, macro eco-

nomic conditions are obviously measured on percentage scales that are not directly comparable

to the metric of policy index. The standard deviations of inflation and unemployment are 3.04

and 1.53, respectively. The mean absolute value of annual changes in inflation is 3.81 and 1.79

14

in unemployment. Thus, the expected values of the changes in inflation and unemployment from

one year to the next respectively predict a long run decrease of 0.95 points in mood and a short

run increase of 1.13 in public opinion liberalism. Alternatively, a standard deviation increase in

inflation yields an expected long run decrease in mood of 0.76 points (0.17 standard deviations); a

standard deviation increase unemployment predicts a yields short run increase of in mood of 1.00

points (0.23 standard deviations).

Taken together, the estimates in the baseline model confirm what is already known about

public opinion’s reactions to changes in the macro political-economy. There is negative feedback

in public mood from policymaking by the elected branches of national government. Inflation gen-

erates greater public demand for conservative policies (shrinking the size and scope of government)

while unemployment catalyzes greater public opinion liberalism (demand for a bigger, more ac-

tive government). Additionally, the standardized magnitudes of each of these effects are roughly

comparable (about one fifth of a standard deviation’s total change in mood for each standard de-

viation’s change in policy, inflation, or unemployment), indicating some balance in the collective

public mind with respect to the weight assigned to these forces as they bear on mass policy senti-

ment.

Additionally, differences in the dynamics associated with these effects (long run versus short

run effects) provide interesting insight into the behavioral aspects that motivate changes in aggre-

gate mood. Whereas public responses to public policy and inflation play out only in the long run,

responses to unemployment are immediate. This may reflect the “long and variable lags”—to bor-

row Friedman’s (1969) evocative phrase—with which policies enacted into law actually become

effectual (or are even implemented) and the relatively distant time horizon at which the (usually

slowly) diminishing value of savings, wages, and annuities due to inflation filters into the nation’s

political consciousness compared to the relatively stark realities of lost jobs and downward wage

pressures.

15

Estimates of the Expanded Supreme Court Model

Against this backdrop, I proceed to the second stage of the analysis, incorporating the the cumula-

tive ideological content of Supreme Court decision-making, measured by the caselaw index, into

the baseline model described above. Estimates of this expanded model are reported in the second

column of Table 1.

Consistent with expectations derived from the thermostatic theory of public responsiveness to

Supreme Court decision-making, the model shows that changes in the caselaw index are negatively

and significantly associated with changes in public mood. Thus, growing cumulative liberalism

in Supreme Court decision-making predicts increasing conservatism in public opinion, and vice

versa. This effect takes the form of a short run effect, or instantaneous adjustment. (The long

run effect associated with the caselaw index is insignificant and incorrectly signed.) All else equal,

each additional salient liberal Supreme Court decision at time t significantly predicts a conservative

change in mood of 0.14 points at time t. This effect indicates that a typical year’s change in the

caselaw index (5.29 net Supreme Court decisions in one ideological direction or the other) is

expected to alter public mood by 0.74 points, and that a one standard deviation increase in the

caselaw index (38.13 points) predicts a short run decrease of 1.21 standard deviations in mood

(5.34 points).

In addition to information about the dynamic effects of Supreme Court decisions for public

mood, estimating the two model parameters associated with the caselaw index (i.e. the short run

and long run effects) improves the overall fit and explanatory power of the baseline model. In terms

of explanatory power, the R2 statistic for the baseline model is 0.35 while the R2 of the expanded

model including Supreme Court decisions is 0.52. The effects associated with the caselaw index,

therefore, account for nearly 17 percent of the observed variance in mood and improve the overall

proportion of variance explained by the model by nearly 49 percent. This improvement in overall

model fit corresponds to a preference for the expanded model over the baseline model even after

accounting for the parsimony lost by two additional model parameters. This preference is evident

16

in the adjusted R2 reported for each model (0.24 for the base model and 0.41 for the expanded

model).

In relation to other included predictors, the estimated effects of Supreme Court decision-

making do not significantly alter parameter estimates associated with any other model component.

This generally means that the results of hypothesis tests and subsequent inferences about the ef-

fects of public policy and the state of the macroeconomy are the same in either mode. The only

substantive difference between the models with respect to other predictors of mood relates to the

rate of inflation. A modest increase in the variance estimate associated with the long run effect of

inflation for public mood in the expanded model “tips” the t statistic associated with that parameter

estimate below its critical value. Thus, the results of the second model do not support rejection of

the null hypothesis of no relationship between changes in public mood and the lagged value of the

rate of inflation.

Substantively, these results indicate that public opinion responds systematically to Supreme

Court decisions and that this responsiveness takes the form of negative feedback. When the Court’s

decision’s push in one ideological direction, public opinion is likely to push back in the opposite

direction. Moreover, the model indicates that the magnitude of the impact of Supreme Court

decision-making for public mood is relatively large. The total predicted effect of a single “salient”

Supreme Court decision is three times as large the effect associated with an “important” piece of

legislation, and and the standardized (short run) effect of the caselaw index is roughly five times

the size of the standardized (long run) effect of the policy index. Though alternative data may yield

different estimates of the relative strength of the various predictive effects discussed here, the data

analyzed here strongly suggest that the Supreme Court’s and its decisions weigh more heavily on

public opinion than most extant literature suggests.

Discussion

At least two factors perhaps account for estimated dynamics with which Supreme Court decisions

influence mood and the size of their effects relative to policy changes and economic dynamics.

17

First, the Court’s decisions (salient and otherwise) are much more likely to be given in the first

half of each year than the second half. This pattern arises as a result of the Supreme Court’s term,

which opens in October and is usually concluded by June. As a result, the public regularly has at

least six months to register its political reaction to a typical Supreme Court decision in the same

calendar year as the decision itself. Though this process is dynamic in the real world—unfolding

over days, weeks, and months—both the Supreme Court decisions and public responses to them

are likely to register in the same year, appearing contemporaneous in a matrix of annual data.

In contrast, structural features of the policymaking process in Congress may exert downward

bias on any empirical estimate of the effect of public policy on public opinion. Unlike Supreme

Court decisions, the lack of temporal regularity and the availability of advanced information about

future congressional policy changes may diminish the estimated influence of other policy changes

for public mood. The legislative agendas of presidents and party leaders in Congress are well

known. Proposed legislation, committee hearings, proposed amendments, markups, and floor de-

bates are all public records. The partisan breakdown of each chamber is known, and a variety of

official and unofficial whip counts often enter public discussions of proposed legislation. Thus,

it is often clear well before major legislation receives a final up or down vote whether it is likely

to become law. As such, information about the likely state of future public policy changes can

often be incorporated into public opinion well before changes have actually been enacted. In other

words, the general outline of a future policy change may be well known to the public well before

a president hands out ceremonial signing pens. Public responses to congressional policymaking,

then, may be spread out in a way that makes them difficult to discern or systematically estimate

since it is likely that some part of the response occurs before legislation becomes law.

Similar dynamics are also likely to be at work in estimates of the economy’s effects. Ad-

vanced information about the state of the future economy is also widely available in to form of

economic forecasts. There is considerable evidence that (in the aggregate) the public assimilates

forward-looking economic data and forms reasonable judgements about the prospective state of

the economy (citations) and that these prospective evaluations of economic conditions influence

18

current public opinion (e.g. MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992). Again though, the availability

of information about likely future conditions may erode the magnitude of the effects of economic

conditions for public mood estimated for any given point in time.

Second, the timeline of the Supreme Court’s decision process also makes the nature of infor-

mation about those decision’s relatively unique in the system of public opinion dynamics. Supreme

Court decisions offer “news” only three times in their life cycle: when the Court grants certiorari,

when a case is argued, and when a decision is rendered. Though public debate about cases can

(and often does) accompany them throughout their lifecycle, actual news coverage of cases is

necessarily punctuated. All conference votes and memoranda, all debate and deliberation among

and between the justices, and all other processes and procedures that take place within the Court

between the public events associated with each case are kept secret. Therefore, much preliminary

information about the likely direction of case outcomes remains unknown to ordinary citizens. The

actual announcement of decisions, therefore, amounts to a sudden release of information which can

be absorbed into public opinion only after the Court has acted. This pattern may, again, contribute

to the estimated dynamic form of public responsiveness to the Court.

Conclusions

I began by identifying a puzzle in “the supposed imperceptibility of the [Supreme] Court” in na-

tional public opinion (Durr, Martin, and Wolbrecht 2000, p. 775). While historians, legal schol-

ars, and some political scientists have noted the increasing prominence of the Supreme Court in

American national politics during the last half-century, most scholarly analysis of the relationship

between the Supreme Court and public opinion has found, at most, marginal and conditional rela-

tionships between the Court’s decisions and the distribution of policy attitudes in the mass public.

Yet, the Supreme Court is increasingly engaged with salient questions of public policy, the ob-

ject of growing attention by interest groups and candidates for public office, a subject of public

commentary and debate, and assertive of a uniquely authoritative voice in matters of constitutional

19

interpretation. The juxtaposition of growing judicial entanglement with our ordinary politics and

scholarly conclusions that the Supreme Court is generally inconsequential for national public opin-

ion raises the critical puzzle: Are accounts of the growing role of the Supreme Court in normal

politics merely much ado about nothing in the minds of ordinary Americans, or have scholars of

linkages between Supreme Court decisions and public opinion missed something important about

how the Court’s decisions influence public sentiment?

There is, indeed, considerable evidence that the Supreme Court does not legitimize policy at-

titudes at the national level and that “structural responses” to the Court’s decisions are marginal and

conditional. I have argued, however, that it is a mistake to infer that an absence of particular kinds

of public responsiveness implies general public disengagement with the judiciary. Moreover, there

is, in fact, important evidence showing sensible and systematic relationships between the Supreme

Court’s decisions and public evaluations of the Court and some policy attitudes. Existing evi-

dence of mass responsiveness to the Supreme Court suggests the public’s capacity for thermostatic

reactions to the Court’s decisions. The theory of thermostatic responsiveness to Supreme Court

decisions predicts negative feedback in the public’s relative policy preferences from changes in

public policy resulting from the Court’s actions.

I assess this theory by modeling public mood as a function of the cumulative liberalism

in salient Supreme Court decisions, controlling for changes in public policy created by the elected

branches of national government and the state of the macro economy. Single-equation error correc-

tion model estimates show a significant negative relationship between public mood and Supreme

Court liberalism in the short run. When the Supreme Court’s decisions accumulate in one ideolog-

ical direction, public mood presses back in the other direction. Moreover, the estimated effects of

Supreme Court liberalism are especially strong. The predicted effect of a single salient Supreme

Court decision is about three times the size of the effect of a single important piece of legislation

enacted by Congress, though there are some cogent reasons to think that estimates of the effects of

ordinary legislation may be depressed by the availability of information about the legislative pro-

20

cess. Nevertheless, the models indicate significant, systematic, and theoretically sensible reactions

to Supreme Court decisions in public opinion.

These findings suggest several important implications for American national politics. First,

the Supreme Court may loom larger in the public mind than current scholarship suggests. Along

with new evidence indicating that the public is more knowledgeable about the Supreme Court than

previously thought (Gibson and Caldeira 2009), a correspondence between public mood and pat-

terns of Supreme Court decision-making shows that the mass public (on average) has both the

capacity and proclivity for forming judgments about the Supreme Court’s decisions and translat-

ing those judgments into meaningful political signals (see also Durr, Martin, and Wolbrecht 2000).

Far from the folk theorem of widespread ignorance and disengagement that is endemic in scholarly

discussions of the public’s relationship with courts, evidence of knowledge of courts and respon-

siveness to Supreme Court decisions in the mass public show that many ordinary Americans can

call on a reasonable reserve of civic competence to integrate judicial decisions with broader cur-

rents in American politics. This conclusion, in turn, informs the ongoing debate over the use of

elections and other institutions of public voice in the selection and retention of judges.

Second, the Court’s influence on public mood indicates that Supreme Court decisions may

be consequential for American national elections. In particular, Supreme Court decisions pushing

in one ideological direction may ultimately yield political support for candidates and parties advo-

cating policy changes that reverse the Court’s decisions. This would be consistent with historical

accounts of President Nixon’s invocation of the Warren Court’s record on civil rights and criminal

procedure to garner support in the South, for example, as well as the dynamics of abortion politics

since Roe v. Wade (1973). While most attention to the intersection of judicial decision-making

and electoral politics has focussed on the content of presidential campaigns, this research suggests

that the scope of that research agenda might be fruitfully expanded to explore linkages between

Supreme Court decisions and votes and election outcomes.

Finally, to the extent that global (ideological) public mood influences policymaking across

issue domains (rather than issue-specific opinion), judicial influence on mass policy sentiment may

21

inject substantial noise into the system of dynamic representation (Stimson, MacKuen, and Erikson

1995). A series of ideologically charged decisions by the Supreme Court may create political pres-

sure on Congress and the president (via negative feedback in mood) to enact corrective legislation

that has little to do substantively with the original Supreme Court decisions. For example, a series

of liberal Supreme Court decisions on abortion and gay rights is likely to catalyze greater conser-

vatism in public opinion, which may induce Congress to pass conservative legislation which may

or may not have much relationship to the Court’s decisions, e.g. an across-the-board tax cut. This

hypothetical is consistent with Frank’s (2004) claim that the Republican Party has systematically

exploited social issues like abortion to generate electoral support among poor and working class

whites while pursuing a policy agenda that focused on economic policies that benefit the wealthy.

In recent political history, for example, then-Governor George W. Bush campaigned against the

moral lapses of the Clinton White House and for a “culture of life” only to win the presidency and

make the 2001 tax cut his first major legislative priority. While there are good reasons to doubt

that social issues have become more important among lower social class voters compared to other

socioeconomic groups in the electorate, there is little doubt that social issues have become more

important across the socioeconomic spectrum in the last two decades (Bartels 2006?; Ellis and Ura

2010). While the forces that have pushed issues of traditional morality onto the national political

agenda in place of (or in addition to) traditional conflict over distributive and redistributive policies

are undoubtedly many and varied, the Supreme Court’s increased engagement with and dominance

over some salient social policy domains may have played an important role in reshaping the issue

bases of national political discourse.

22

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Appendix: Salient Supreme Court Cases for Calendar Years 1996-2006 Cases Docket Liberal Conservative Dec. Term Dec. Date MLB v. SLJ 95-853 1 0 1996 12/17/96 Schenk v. Pro-Choice Network 95-1065 1 0 1996 2/19/97 Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC 95-992 0 1 1996 3/31/97 Clinton v. Jones 95-1853 1 0 1996 5/27/97 Agostini v. Felton 96-552 0 1 1996 6/23/97 City of Boerne v. Flores 95-2074 0 1 1996 6/25/97 Reno v. ACLU 96-511 1 0 1996 6/25/97 Washington v. Glucksberg 96-110 0 1 1996 6/25/97 Vacco v. Quill 95-1858 0 1 1996 6/25/97 Printz v. United States 95-1478 0 1 1996 6/27/97 State Oil v. Khan 96-871 1 0 1997 11/4/97 Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Services 96-568 1 0 1997 3/4/98 New Jersey v. New York Orig. #120 . . 1997 5/26/98 Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District 96-1866 0 1 1997 6/22/98 Faragher v. City of Boca Raton 97-282 1 0 1997 6/26/98 Burlington Industries Inc. v. Ellerth 97-569 1 0 1997 6/26/98 Clinton v. City of New York 97-1374 1 0 1997 6/26/98 Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation 97-930 1 0 1998 1/12/99 Department of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives 98-404 1 0 1998 1/26/99 Cedar Rapids v. Garrett F 96-1793 1 0 1998 3/3/99 Saenz v. Roe 98-97 1 0 1998 5/17/99 Davis v. Monroe County 97-843 1 0 1998 5/24/99 Chicago v. Morales 97-1121 1 0 1998 6/10/99 Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Association v. United States 98-387 1 0 1998 6/14/99 Sutton v. United Airlines 97-1943 0 1 1998 6/22/99 Alden v. Maine 98-436 0 1 1998 6/23/99 Florida Prepaid v. College Savings Bank 98-531 0 1 1998 6/23/99 College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid 98-149 0 1 1998 6/23/99 Kimel v. Florida Board of regents 98-791 0 1 1999 1/11/00 Illinois v. Wardlow 98-1036 0 1 1999 1/12/00 Stenberg v. Carhartt 99-830 0 1 1999 1/14/00 Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC 98-963 1 0 1999 1/24/00

Florida v. J.L. 98-1993 1 0 1999 2/28/00 Food and Drug Administration v. Brown & Williams 98-1152 0 1 1999 3/21/00 Board of Regents v. Southworth 98-1189 0 1 1999 3/22/00 City of Erie v. Pap's AM 98-1161 0 1 1999 3/29/00 Williams v. Taylor 99-6615 1 0 1999 4/18/00 Williams v. Taylor 98-8384 1 0 1999 4/18/00 United States v. Morrisson 99-5 0 1 1999 5/14/00 United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group 98-1682 1 0 1999 5/22/00 Troxel v. Granville 99-138 1 0 1999 6/5/00 Santa Fe Independent School District 99-62 1 0 1999 6/20/00 Dickerson v. United States 99-5525 1 0 1999 6/26/00 Boy Scouts of America v. Dale 99-699 0 1 1999 6/29/00 Indianapolis v. Edmund 99-1030 1 0 2000 11/28/00 Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Board 00-836 0 1 2000 12/4/00 Bush v. Gore 00-949 0 1 2000 12/12/00 Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett 99-1240 0 1 2000 2/21/01 Whitman v. American Trucking Association 99-1257 1 0 2000 2/27/01 Legal Services Coporation v. Velasquez 99-603 1 0 2000 2/28/01 Ferguson v. Charleston 99-936 1 0 2000 3/21/01 Easley v. Cromartie 99-1864 1 0 2000 4/19/01 Atwater v. City of Lago Vista 99-1408 0 1 2000 4/24/01 United States v. Oakland Cannabis Buyers Cooperative 00-151 0 1 2000 5/14/01 PGA Tour v. Martin 00-24 1 0 2000 5/29/01 Penry v. Johnson 00-6677 1 0 2000 6/4/01 Kyllo v. United States 99-8508 1 0 2000 6/11/01 Good News Club v. Milford Central School 99-2036 0 1 2000 6/11/01 INS v. St. Cyr 00-767 1 0 2000 6/25/01 New York Times v. Tasini 00-201 1 0 2000 6/26/01 Zadvydas v. davis 99-7791 1 0 2000 6/28/01 Palazzo v. Rhode Island 99-2047 0 1 2000 6/28/01 Lorillard Tobacco v. Reilly 00-596 1 0 2000 6/29/01 Toyota Motor Manufacturing Inc. v. Williams 00-1089 0 1 2001 1/8/02 Kansas v. Crane 00-957 1 0 2001 1/22/02 Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition 00-795 1 0 2001 4/16/02 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency 00-1167 1 0 2001 4/23/02 Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports Authority 01-46 0 1 2001 5/28/02

Atkins v. Virginia 00-8452 1 0 2001 6/20/02 Rush Prudential HMO Inc. v. Moran 00-1021 0 1 2001 6/20/02 Ring v. Arizona 01-488 1 0 2001 6/24/02 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 00-1751 0 1 2001 6/27/02 Board of Education v. Earls 01-332 0 1 2001 6/27/02 Miller-El v. Cockrell 01-7662 1 0 2002 2/25/03 Ewing v. California 01-6978 0 1 2002 3/5/03 Lockyer v. Andrade 01-1127 0 1 2002 3/5/03 Virginia v. Black 01-1107 1 0 2002 4/7/03 Demore v. Kim 01-1491 0 1 2002 4/29/03 Pharmaceutical Research & Manufacturers of America v. Walsh 01-188 1 0 2002 5/19/03 Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs 01-1368 1 0 2002 5/27/03 Sell v. United States 02-5664 1 0 2002 6/16/03 Grutter v. Bollinger 02-241 1 0 2002 6/23/03 Gratz v. Bollinger 02-516 0 1 2002 6/23/03 United States v. American Library Association 02-361 0 1 2002 6/23/03 Lawrence v. Texas 02-102 1 0 2002 6/26/03 McConnell v. Federal Election Commission 02-1674 1 0 2003 12/10/03 Locke v. Davey 02-1315 1 0 2003 2/25/04 Elk Grove Unifed School District v. Newdow 02-1624 0 1 2003 6/14/04 Aetna Health Services Inc. v. Davila 02-1845 1 0 2003 6/21/04 Blakely v. Washington 02-1632 1 0 2003 6/24/04 Rasul v. Bush 03-334 1 0 2003 6/28/04 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 03-6696 0 1 2003 6/28/04 Rumsfeld v. Padilla 03-1027 1 0 2003 6/28/04 Ashcroft v. ACLU 03-218 1 0 2003 6/29/04 United States v. Booker 04-104 1 0 2004 1/12/05 Roper v. Simmons 03-633 1 0 2004 3/1/05 Jackson v. Birmingham Board of Education 02-1672 1 0 2004 3/29/05 Granholm v. Heald 03-1116 1 0 2004 5/16/05 Andersen v. United States 04-368 1 0 2004 5/31/05 Gonzales v. Raich 03-1454 0 1 2004 6/6/05 Smith v. City of Jackson 03-1160 1 0 2004 6/13/05 Miller-El v. Dretke 03-9659 1 0 2004 6/13/05 Kelo v. City of New London 04-108 1 0 2004 6/23/05 Van Orden v. Perry 03-1500 0 1 2004 6/27/05

McCreary County v. ACLU 03-1693 1 0 2004 6/27/05 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios v. Grokster 04-480 0 1 2004 6/27/05 Schaeffer v. Weast 04-698 0 1 2005 11/14/05 Gonzales v. Oregon 04-623 1 0 2005 1/17/06 Rumsfled v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights 04-1152 0 1 2005 3/6/06 Georgia v. Randolph 04-1067 1 0 2005 3/22/06 Hill v. McDonough 05-8794 1 0 2005 6/12/06 Rapanos v. United States 04-1034 0 1 2005 6/19/06 Randall v. Sorrell 04-1528 1 0 2005 6/26/06 League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry 05-204 1 0 2005 6/28/06 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 05-184 1 0 2005 6/29/06 Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England 04-1144 1 0 2005 1/19/06