public with confidential annex
TRANSCRIPT
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
Case No. IT-04-74-T
Before: Judge Jean-Claude Antonetti, Presiding Judge Arpad Prandler Judge Stefan Trechsel Reserve Judge Antoine Kesia-Mbe Mindua Registrar: Mr. John Hocking Date filed: 09 August 2010
THE PROSECUTOR
v.
JADRANKO PRLI Ć BRUNO STOJIĆ
SLOBODAN PRALJAK MILIVOJ PETKOVI Ć
VALENTIN ĆORIĆ BERISLAV PUŠIĆ
PUBLIC WITH CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
JADRANKO PRLI Ć’S MOTION TO DISALLOW EVIDENCE GENERATED BY AND/OR ASSOCIATED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH UN CI VIL
AFFAIRS ADVISOR IN BIH VIKTOR ANDREEV OR IN THE ALT ERNATIVE FIND THAT SAID EVIDENCE SHALL BE PRESUMED UNRELIABL E
BEARING NO PROBATIVE VALUE &
REQUEST FOR A PUBLIC HEARING
Office of the Prosecutor: Mr. Kenneth Scott Mr. Douglas Stringer Counsel for the Accused: Mr. Michael G. Karnavas and Ms. Suzana Tomanović for Jadranko Prli ć Ms. Senka Nožica and Mr. Karim A. A. Khan for Bruno Stojić Mr. Božidar Kova čić and Ms. Nika Pinter for Slobodan Praljak Ms. Vesna Alaburić and Mr. Nicholas Stewart for Milivoj Petković Ms. Dijana Tomašegović-Tomić and Mr. Dražen Plavec for Valentin Ćorić Mr. Fahrudin Ibrišimovi ć and Mr. Roger Sahota for Berislav Pušić
61791IT-04-74-TD61791 - D6175809 August 2010 SF
IT-04-74-T 09 August 2010 1
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA
CASE NO. IT-04-74-T
PROSECUTOR v. JADRANKO PRLIĆ ET AL
PUBLIC WITH CONFIDENTIAL ANNEX
JADRANKO PRLI Ć’S MOTION TO DISALLOW EVIDENCE GENERATED BY AND/OR ASSOCIATED DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY WITH UN CI VIL
AFFAIRS ADVISOR IN BIH VIKTOR ANDREEV OR IN THE ALT ERNATIVE FIND THAT SAID EVIDENCE SHALL BE PRESUMED UNRELIABL E
BEARING NO PROBATIVE VALUE &
REQUEST FOR A PUBLIC HEARING
Jadranko Prlić, through his Counsel, respectfully moves to disallow any evidence
generated by and/or associated directly or indirectly with UN Civil Affairs Advisor in
BiH, Viktor Andreev, or in the alternative, for the Trial Chamber to find that said
evidence is presumed unreliable bearing no probative value. This motion is made
necessary because entries from the Mladić diary show that Viktor Andreev was providing
the Bosnian Serb political and military leadership with inside information, thus
negatively influencing the events in Bosnia and Herzegovina, including the negotiating
process led by the internationals. Given Andreev’s position and actions, the accuracy and
reliability of many of the UN documents, and in particular UNPROFOR documents, are
called into question, as well as the testimony of witnesses who were associated with
Andreev or relied on any information or reports by and through Andreev (together
“questioned evidence”). This motion is respectfully submitted in keeping with the due
diligence obligations imposed on the parties in order to ensure Dr. Prlić a fair trial as
enshrined in Article 21 of the ICTY Statute.1 In order to transparently develop all
relevant facts and arguments a public hearing is requested.
1 Article 11 of the ICTY Code of Professional Conduct by Counsel, requires Counsel to represent his “client diligently and promptly in order to protect the client’s best interests.” See Prosecutor v. Mučić et al. (Čelebići case), IT-96-21-A, Judgement, 20 February 2001, para. 631, where the Appeals Chamber reiterated the importance of the obligation to act diligently: “[f]ailure of counsel to object will usually indicate that counsel formed the view at the time that the matters to which the judge was inattentive were not of such significance to his case that the proceedings could not continue without attention being called thereto.” See also JUDGE RICHARD MAY & MARIEKE WIERDA, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL
EVIDENCE 306 (Transnational Publishers Inc., 2002), discussing Prosecutor v. Tadić, IT-94-1-A,
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I. BACKGROUND
1. On 22 June 2006, the Prosecution introduced UN documents in which the name of
Viktor Andreev, UN Civil Affairs Advisor in BiH, appeared for the first time.2
2. On 14 January 2008, Cedric Thornberry, a former Assistant-Secretary-General of
the United Nations, Director of Civil Affairs for the United Nations Protection
Force (UNPROFOR) and Deputy Chief of Mission for UNPROFOR until March
1994, testified. When questioned about Andreev, Thornberry, who was
responsible for UNPROFOR’s political, civil, legal and police activities,3 noted:
“Andreev was one of our best, most experienced reporters… rapporteur I
mean.” 4
3. On 8 March 2010, while testifying Accused Petković remarked that Andreev
played “games”5:
Your Honour, Mr. Viktor Andreev was informed by me and others regarding the position of Croats in Travnik, Kakanj, Fojnica, and he never reacted in this way. But he said, as did others, that many Croats had left. So you cannot accept, when he says with respect to such events which had happened before Vares, that the Croats had left, and he didn't take any steps. We asked him to go to Catici. There was a thermal power-plant in Kakanj. There were 200-odd Croats there, and Mr. Viktor Andreev did not want to go to Catici to see what was happening to those Croats. Therefore, I have the right to conclude that Mr. Andreev has a double standard.6
4. On 14 April 2010, the Prosecution disclosed to the Defence the Mladić diary, a
composite of notebooks. Numerous entries reveal meetings between Andreev
and the Bosnian Serb political and military leadership. Andreev appears to be
providing sensitive UN / UNPROFOR inside information, undermining his UN
Decision on Appellant’s Motion for the Extension of the Time Limit and Admission of Additional Evidence, 15 October 1998, wherein Judge May notes that the purpose of according the accused certain rights under the ICTY Statute “was that the accused should exercise due diligence in utilizing them.”1 2 Trial Transcript, 22 June 2006, pp. 3727 – 3728 discussing Exh. P02108. The first document where Andreev’s title is mentioned is Exh. P01353, 29 January 1993, “CAC BiH Command Kiseljak” (UNPROFOR HQ Kiseljak) discussed with Witness Cedric Thornberry, Trial Transcript, 14 January 2008, pp. 26174-26176. 3 Trial Transcript, 14 January 2008, p. 26167; Exh. P10041, para. 4. 4 Trial Transcript, 14 January 2008, p. 26176. 5 Trial Transcript, 8 March 2010, pp. 50599 – 50601. 6 Id., at p. 50600.
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superiors and colleagues at UNPROFOR, providing advice on how to deal, inter
alia, with the UN and international negotiators. He also appears to play “games”
with his interlocutors, thus, invariably, influencing UNPROFOR through his
reports. The following entries from the Mladić diary are telling examples of
some of Andreev’s discussions with the Bosnian Serb political and military
leadership:7
- the Muslims want Sarajevo to remain blocked.8
- Unfortunately they are not in favour of a [demilitarization]. We have applied considerable pressure on them... 9 - the [VOPP] plan is dead, but it should not be referred to as that, we will stick to that until we get something new.10 - Muslims will try to scare the Serbs with the creation of a union with H, a union is not possible, it's a political game, because F.Tuñman proposed an option and Alija another.11 - The political UN leadership is against bombing the Serbs while the military leadership is in favour of bombing.12 - the Muslims don't want a cease fire across the entire territory.13 - if you ask for the civilian police at once, we do not have a mandate,
and we are approaching the UN and this gives you some time.14
II. ARGUMENT
A. Evidence generated by and/or associated directly or indirectly with Viktor Andreev should be disallowed
7 For a more comprehensive showing of Andreev’s “games” see Annex I. 8 Mladić’s Notebook No. 36, p. 109. 9 Id., at 111. 10 Id., at 114. 11 Mladić’s Notebook No. 35, p. 9. 12 Id., at 10. 13 Mladić’s Notebook No.31, p. 8. 14 Mladić’s Notebook No.36, pp. 110-11.
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5. As an UN Civil Affairs Advisor in BiH, Viktor Andreev’s functions included,
inter alia, reporting to his superior, Cedric Thornberry, the Director of Civil
Affairs for the United Nation Protection Force (UNPROFOR) and Deputy Chief
of Mission for UNPROFOR. UNPROFOR’s mission was, inter alia, to “secure
delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and other parts of BiH and the
establishment of the security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its Airport. Later
[the] mandate was expanded.15 Thornberry’s testimony shows that he valued
Andreev as one of the “best, most experienced reporters”16 of UNPROFOR’s
Civil Affairs.
6. Evidence adduced throughout the proceedings shows that reports from the field
went upwards and sideways;17 i.e. reports or selective portions found their way
into reports such as those prepared by Tadeusz Mazowiecki,18 while also
distributed to regional field offices and other organizations, who, in turn, used the
information - without attribution at times – to pass it on as if the information was
the product of first-hand knowledge.19 Indeed, such was the reporting system
used by the various organizations, that an error at the initially reporting stage was
likely to be copied, repeated and disseminated all the way to the highest levels.20
7. If the Mladić diary is to be accepted as authentic (as in being the real diary),
reliable (as in not having been tampered with) and accurate (as in what is
reported), Andreev - armed with UN-inside information - used his position to
back-channel advice and influence to Mladić, Karadžić and other Bosnian Serb
military and political leaders. Effectively, Andreev was covertly collaborating
with one of the parties of the conflict, the Bosnian Serbs, in order to give them an
advantage in the field and for purposes of circumventing the international
negotiating process to which the UN and the European Community (EC) /
15 Witness Cedric Thornberry, Trial Transcript, 14 January 2008, pp. 26184 – 26185; Exh. P10041, para. 38; Exh. P00487. 16 Trial Transcript, 14 January 2008, p. 26176 (emphasis added). 17 See e.g. Exh. P07887, where the distribution list among others shows: COS, G1-5, Chief UNMO, UNCHR, LO, ECMM. See also Confidential Annex II. 18See Confidential Annex II, para. 2. 19 Id., para. 3. 20 Witness Roger Philip Watkins, Trial Transcript, 22 May 2007, pp. 18927-18928. See also Confidential Annex II, para. 3.
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European Union (EU) were committed. As such, it is submitted that Andreev’s
reporting to his superiors and colleagues, as well as the reports generated by him
relied upon by UNPROFOR, the UN in general and by others, are highly suspect
and unreliable, thus calling into question their probative value.
8. It is submitted that based on the ICTY Statue, Rules and jurisprudence, the Trial
Chamber is well within its rights and authority to disallow the questioned
evidence. Pursuant to Rule 89(B), the Trial Chamber “shall apply rules of
evidence which will best favour a fair determination of the matter before it and
are consonant with the spirit of the Statute and the general principles of law.” In
Delalić the Appeals Chamber held that: [a] pre-requisite for admission of
evidence must be compliance by the moving party with any relevant safeguards
and procedural protections and […] it must be shown that the relevant evidence is
reliable.21 In Kordić & Čerkez, a case not directly on point but instructive
nonetheless, the Appeals Chamber held that Rule 89(C) statements (unsworn and
not subject to confrontation), in the absence of indicia of reliability lack probative
value and thus should be excluded from admission.22 Rule 89(D) requires the
exclusion of evidence “if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
need to ensure a fair trial,” whereas Rule 95 requires the exclusion of evidence “if
its admission is antithetical to, and would seriously damage, the integrity of the
proceedings.”
9. It is submitted that it is virtually impossible to fully identify and isolate the
evidence contaminated by Andreev’s deleterious actions. Given Andreev’s
“games”, the Trial Chamber cannot but pause and wonder about what sort of
information Andreev was feeding his superiors and subordinates / colleagues, and
how his information, misinformation and disinformation colored the perception of
UNPROFOR, ultimately impacting on some of the parties - such as how the
Croats were perceived by the internationals (UNPROFOR, UNHCR, ECMM,
etc.) and reported upon. Based on Musema, where it was held that “the probative
21 See Prosecutor v. Delalić et al., IT-96-21-T, Appeal Judgement, 20 February 2001, para. 533 (emphasis added). 22 See Prosecutor v. Dario Kordić and Mario Čerkez, IT-95-14/2, Decision on Appeal Regarding Statement of a Deceased Witness, 21 July 2000, para. 28.
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value of evidence is based upon an assessment of its reliability,”23 the Trial
Chamber, after finding the questioned evidence to be unreliable, should find that
the probative value is substantially outweighed by the need to ensure Dr. Prlić a
fair trial as enshrined in Article 21 of the ICTY Statute. Thus, the Trial Chamber
should simply exclude the questioned evidence.
B. In the alternative evidence generated by and/or associated, directly or
indirectly with Viktor Andreev should be presumed unreliable bearing no
probative value
10. In the alternative, should the Trial Chamber be disinclined to exclude the question
evidence, it is submitted that absent a showing of strong and reliable independent
indicia, a presumption of unreliability with no probative value should be afforded
to it. The mere admission of a document into evidence does not ipso facto signify
that the statements contained therein are necessarily an accurate portrayal of the
facts.24
11. “[E]vidence which is both relevant and probative must also enjoy some
component of reliability.25 Indeed, reliability is the invisible golden thread which
runs through all the components of admissibility.26 Consequently, the Trial
Chamber must consider all questioned evidence with great circumspection and
23 See Prosecutor v. Musema, ICTR-96-13-A, Judgement and Sentence, 27 January 2000, para. 40. 24 See Draft Guidelines for the Admissibility of Evidence and to Ensure Efficient Conduct of the Proceedings, 1 March 2006. Although the language of the Guidelines were ultimately adopted by the Trial Chamber do not reflect the exact language of the Draft Guidelines, the evidentiary principle is nonetheless instructive. As noted by the Prlić Defence in its Submissions to the Trial Chamber’s Draft Guidelines for the Admissibility of Evidence and to Ensure Efficient Conduct of the Proceedings, 15 March 206, p. 9, para. b:
The Defence fully endorses the guiding principle that the mere admission of a document into evidence does not axiomatically make the document accurate or trustworthy. In light of the voluminous documents anticipated in this trial, the Defence submits that if certain documents are admitted and seem to be suspect on their face, a judicial hint to the parties might be appropriate. Such a judicial hint would not be a prejudgment on the probative value of the documents, but could serve to alert the parties that, barring additional independent indicia of reliability, the Trial Chamber may be inclined to give little or no weight to this documentary evidence. “
25Id., at para. 35; see also Prosecutor v. Tadić, Decision on Defence Motion on Hearsay, IT-94-1-T (5 August 1996). 26 Id., at para. 37.
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suspicion. In the interest of justice, the Trial Chamber should find that the
questioned evidence is presumed to be unreliable; the onus being on the
Prosecution, through reliable independent evidence - to rebut said presumption.
C. A hearing is necessary to thoroughly ventilate these issues in a transparent manner
12. A public hearing is warranted: the importance of the issues involved require
transparency and public scrutiny. Given that the issues raised herein deal with the
UN, its personnel, its activities in BiH relevant to the period of the Indictment,
and the fact that the Trial Chamber is being called upon to accept, evaluate and
give weight to UN documents connected directly or indirectly with Andreev and
others, the need for total transparency is paramount.
13. As an institution the UN should not be sheltered from necessary and valid
transparent scrutiny, as was most recently noted by the outgoing director of the
Office of Internal Oversight Services, Ms. Inga-Britt Ahlenius. In her 16 July
2010 internal end-of-assignment report that at the UN (at least with respect to
rooting out financial corruption) “There is no transparency; there is a lack of
accountability.”27 While Andreev is not being accused of the sort of corruption
that the Office of Internal Oversight Services is generally involved with, such as
financial malfeasance, Andreev’s conduct does have the scent of deceit and
connivance, which, if not thoroughly exposed and vetted, could seriously
undermine the fair-trial rights of Dr. Prlić. There are no justifiable reasons why
all relevant facts and arguments concerning this Motion should not be thoroughly
vetted by the Parties thought a public hearing. Moreover, such a hearing would
be significantly beneficial to the Trial Chamber in making its findings of facts and
conclusions of law.
27 See Annex III. NEIL MACFARQUHAR, U.N. approves new anti-corruption chief, International Herald Tribune, 30 July 2010, p. 3.
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III. RELIEF SOUGHT
WHEREFORE , for all the reasons stated herein, the Prlić Defence respectfully requests
the Trial Chamber to:
GRANT this Motion and disallow evidence generated by and/or associated with
Viktor Andreev; or in the alternative,
FIND the questioned evidence shall be presumed unreliable bearing no probative
value; and
GRANT a public hearing.
Dated: 09 August 2010 Respectfully submitted, The Hague, The Netherlands ______________________
Michael G. Karnavas Counsel for Jadranko Prlić
Word Count: 2497
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ANNEX I
Background
The name Viktor Andreev, UN Civil Affairs Advisor in BiH, first surfaced during the
trial proceedings when the Prosecution introduced UN documents.1 Andreev’s name was
first invoked during viva voce testimony when Cedric Thornberry was questioned by the
Prosecution. According to Thornberry, a former Assistant-Secretary-General of the
United Nations, Director of Civil Affairs for the United Nation Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) and Deputy Chief of Mission for UNPROFOR until March 1994,
responsible for UNPROFOR’s political, civil, legal and police activities,2 “Andreev was
one of our best, most experienced reporters… rapporteur I mean.”3 The last time
Andreev’s name surfaced was during the testimony of General Petković, prompting
Judge Prandler to pose the following question:
“ I would like to only to ask Mr. Petkovic about the following: It happened to me
that I knew Mr. Andreev from the United Nations work and from New York, so
when you said that, No, I do not accept what he wrote, and then you continued,
“Those are his assessments and his games,” end of quotation, I would like to ask
you if you have anything – a kind of opinion or concrete events which you base
your position on him, as far as when you say that those are his assessments and
his games, and what do you mean by “games?’’ 4
It bears highlighting – for contextual purposes - UNPROFOR’s mission which, inter alia,
was “to secure delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and other parts of BiH and the
establishment of the security zone encompassing Sarajevo and its Airport (Security
1 Witness BJ, Trial Transcript, 22 June 2006, pp. 3727 – 3728 discussing Exh. P02108. First document where his title is mentioned is Exh. P01353 29 January 1993, “CAC BiH Command Kiseljak” (UNPROFOR HQ Kiseljak) discussed with Witness Cedric Thornberry, Trial Transcript, 14 January 2008, pp. 26174-26176. 2 Witness Cedric Thornberry, Trial Transcript, 14 January 2008, p. 26167; Exh. P10041, para. 4. 3 Witness Cedric Thornberry, Trial Transcript, 14 January 2008, p. 26176 (emphasis added). 4 Witness Milivoj Petković, Trial Transcript, 8 March 2010, pp. 50599 – 50601.
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Council Resolution 757, 30 May 1992). Later, [the] mandate was expanded.”5 Thus, it is
against this backdrop that the Mladić entries concerning Andreev must be examined.
Revealingly, Andreev seems to have gone rogue, as he used his position, background
(Russian and fellow Orthodox/Slav) and UN-inside information to back-channel his
advice and influence to Mladić, Karadžić and other Bosnian Serb military and political
leaders.
It is difficult to fathom how a high level UN representative from a permanent member-
state of the Security Council can be considered objective and even-handed when he is
surreptitiously providing inside information and advice to one of the parties of the
conflict – particularly when the information and advice is provided for the sake of giving
that party (the Bosnian Serbs) an advantage in the field and for the purpose of
circumventing the international negotiating process to which the UN and the European
Community (EC) / European Union (EU) are committed. Query whether this is the work
of an operative skilled in the dark art of intelligence or that of a naïve and sentimental
fool who, despite his shortcomings, found himself in a position well beyond his
capabilities. Given his UN experience, as Judge Prandler seems to have eluded to in his
question to General Petković, it would appear that Andreev, if anything, was not some
neophyte, some babe in the woods, clueless as to what he was doing or to what extent the
likes of Mladić and Karadžić would rely and act on his observations and advice.
1 May 1992
Context
The conflict in BiH had officially begun on 18 September 1991,6 though the events in
Croatia had been ongoing for some months.7 Andreev is there – in theory – as an honest
broker, since he is a representative of the UN.
5 Witness Cedric Thornberry, Trial Transcript, 14 January 2008, pp. 26184 – 26185; Exh. P10041, para. 38; Exh. P00487. 6 As recognized by the benefits offered to veterans of the war. See Exh. 3D03226, Sn Fed-2, Regulation on the Criteria, Way and Procedure of the Recognition on Time, Spent in Defence of Bosnia and Herzegovina into the Pension Seniority as Special Seniority, Article 2, 19 May 2005. 7 Witness Stjepan Kljujić, Trial Transcript, 26 June 2006, p. 3848; Witness Miomir Žužul, Trial Transcript, 6 May 2008, pp. 27618-27625.
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To fully appreciate the nature of Andreev’s exchange it is important to note that Croatia
is under attack by the JNA, with some of its territory occupied, while other parts, such as
the Dalmatian coast, under extreme threat.8 The Muslims were not the only ones who
coveted a slice of the Croatian coast;9 the Serbs had similar desires and designs.10 It is
also relevant that at this point in time, Mladić is still a JNA officer.11 As such, Andreev
is in fact meeting with a representative of the JNA/FRY and the UN. This is relevant
because even after Mladić leaves the JNA to take up the post of the Head of the VRS
(Bosnian Serb armed forces) Main Staff, he continues to press for Croatian coastal
territory. This in turn is relevant in appreciating the context related to the HV (Croatian
armed forces) being just over the Croatian- BiH border.12
While the Prosecution would have the Trial Chamber find that the HV forces across the
Croatian-BiH border supports that there was an act of aggression by Croatia against BiH,
in actuality, the HV was there to protect against the JNA naked aggression.13 The text in
the UN Security Council Resolutions concerning HV troops in BiH was the handiworks
8 Witness Nicholas Miller, Trial Transcript, 25 September 2007, pp. 22766-22767; Witness Miomir Žužul, Trial Transcript, 6 May 2008, pp. 27631-27635 and 7 May 2008, pp. 27710-27711; Witness Damir Zorić, Trial Transcript, 15 May 2008, p. 28072. 9 Witness Peter Galbraith, Trial Transcript, 12 September 2006, pp. 6445-6450 discussing Exh. P09498; Witness Philip Roger Watkins, Trial Transcript, 22 May 2007, pp. 18914-18915 discussing Exh. P07290; Witness Cedric Thornberry, Trial Transcript, 16 January 2008, p. 26302 discussing Exh. P05033, para. 11; Witness Miomir Žužul, Trial Transcript, 8 May 2008, p. 27786 discussing Exh. 1D02896. See also Mladić’s Notebook No. 35, 18 January 1994 entry, p. 27 (0668-2198), Mladić records Andreev to have said: “On the issue of access to the sea Muslims are asking for 10km on Peljesac and the Croats are saying that they will lease it out, the Muslims say give us Peljesac and we’ll give you Neum.” 10 Witness Peter Galbraith, Trial Transcript, 12 September 2006, pp. 6445-6450 discussing Exh. P09498. 11 See Report of UN Secretary-General, of 30 May 1992 (Exh. P00233), where in para. 2 it is noted that the on 13 May 1992, “authorities of the so-called ‘Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina’ announced their decision to form their own army, which would be composed of units of the former JNA based in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and appointed General Ratko Mladic as Commander of that Army.” 12 Witness Klaus Johann Nissen, Trial Transcript, 27 June 2007, pp. 20592-20594; Witness Josip Praljak, Trial Transcript, 13 May 2009, pp. 40016-40017; 28 May 2009, p. 40945 discussing Exh. 3D02469; 4 June 2009, pp. 41241-41245 discussing Exh. P00466; 14 July 2009, pp. 43031-43037, discussing Exh. P03886; Witness Milivoj Petković, Trial Transcript, 1 March 2010, pp. 50130-50138, discussing Exh. IC01190. 13 See testimony of Prlić Defence Witness Miomir Žužul, Trial Transcript, 6 May 2008, pp. 27621-27627, where he discusses in general the situation in and around Dubrovnik as it was being attacked by the JNA. Specifically, Žužul observed: “anyone in their right state of mind could only draw the following conclusion. The only way to defend Dubrovnik was by defending the part of the coast that actually belonged to Bosnia and Herzegovina. There simply was no other way to defend Dubrovnik or, indeed, to stop the aggression from spreading and more territory from being seized.” (p. 27625). Žužul also noted the significance of Neum which is sandwiched along the Croatian Adriatic coast and the “hours and hours [that] were spent in friendly negotiations between Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina about Neum.” (p. 27626).
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of the Serbs. The most poignant proof of this comes from General Morillon’s mouth14 in
the presence of Andreev as recorded by Mladić’s hands: “The SB15 has taken into
consideration your request to withdraw the HV/Croatian Army/ from BH territory.”16
Andreev is unquestionably advising the JNA/FRY (Serbs) on geopolitical strategy – in
particular how to galvanize support within the UN Security Council, presumably to
reverse or alter the Vance Plan.17 He is specifically urging the Serbs to travel to Moscow
and China for support “because these things are done in a coordinated fashion and in the
right way.”18 The Serbs are also counselled to write to UN Secretary General Boutros
Boutros Ghali and to try to meet with him and Vance. The point being:
There must be [a] country which will immediately request an extraordinary session of the Security Council. It is still not late. You have time. In that case, he can be certain that the proposal or some of them will be accepted. After this plan there can only be compromises. If you do this then you might get it.19
While one would have to read between the proverbial tea leaves to fully grasp the
meaning of these pithy entries, it is clear that Andreev is acting in a highly biased
manner: favoring the Serbs, as he coaches them on strategy and tactics in dealing with the
UN and its member states. Whether he is acting in accordance with the instructions from
his Russian government (known to be sympathetic to the Serbs / fellow Slavs, bonded by
their common confessional – the Christian Orthodox faith) or whether he is acting
independently, is unclear. However, what is clear is the fact that from this and other
Mladić entries, Andreev’s reporting to his superiors and colleagues, as well as the reports
generated by him relied upon by UNPROFOR, the UN in general and by others, are
called into question. To what extent can anything reported by Andreev, bearing the
imprimatur of the UN, be trusted to be objective, accurate and trustworthy?
14 See the following section devoted to General Morillon as featured in Mladić’s notes. 15 SB stands for “Savjet Bezbjednosti,” which is the Security Coucil. 16 Mladić’s Notebook No. 46, 27 November 1992 entry, p. 210 (emphasis added). 17 Mladić’s Notebook No. 39, p. 232. 18 Id., at p. 233. 19 Id., at pp. 233-234. See also p. 239, where Andreev gives advice on how to make an effective presentation through the use of photographs and documentary evidence.
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À propos to the advice dispensed by Andreev are two other entries, which, if anything,
validate Andreev’s bona fides as a valued consigliere to the Bosnian Serb political and
military leadership. In his entries of 8 September 1992, Mladić notes that President
Panić is reported to be going to the USSR, China and Japan20 – just as counselled by
Andreev on 1 May 1992. In a subsequent entry, 16 September 1992, it is recorded that
General Gvero, at a “Reporting of organs of the Main Staff of the Army of Republika
Srpska” is noted to have said that there are “Teams of reporters from Russia, China and
Japan are on location.”21 The fruits of Andreev’s counselling can be seen when
considering his advice to the Serbs, President Panić’s trip to those countries
recommended by Andreev, and the results of having journalists from those respective
countries (obviously to influence the public relations / disinformation campaign) arrive at
the scene.22
Andreev, because of his position, would have been privy to confidential, inside
information emanating from or provided to the UN. From other Mladić entries
referenced below, what emerges is that Andreev was clandestinely passing on such inside
information. The purpose is more than obvious: to guide and influence the negotiating
strategies, tactics and decisions of the Serbs vis à vis the other parties to the conflict, the
international negotiators, individual member states of the UN and EU, as well as the UN
and EU.23 The underlying impression seems to be that Andreev is implying to the Serbs
that they can count on Russia for support.24
20 See Mladić’s Notebook No. 37, 8 September 1992 entry, p. 110, of where Ćocić notes: “5. President PANIĆ is going to the USSR, China and Japan.” 21 Mladić’s Notebook No. 33, 16 September 1992 entry, p. 59. 22 The use of propaganda and disinformation was a calculated ploy as can be seen from the 6 August 1992 entry of Mladić’s diary (Notebook No. 37, at p. 29-31). In a meeting with FRY (Serbia and Montenegro) Prime Minister Panić and JNA General Panić, Mladić records General Panić to have said: “From each region a man who should be told that we will be saying one thing and doing another – that is a philosophy and you have to work ‘under the counter’… I proposed that Mladic should be commander of BiH armed Forces (OS BiH) (deputy Muslim and Croat) – rights should be guaranteed to everyone, Croats, Serbs and Muslims.” This is identical to the strategy adopted by Izetbegović: say one thing but do something else, while having a token Croat (and maybe Serb) in the ABiH or the Presidency or the Government to give the impression of multi-ethnicity and legitimacy. See e.g., Witness Christopher Beese, Trial Transcript, 28 August 2006, pp. 5275-5278, discussing Exh. 1D00814; Witness Mile Akmadžić, Trial Transcript, 19 June 2008, pp. 29647-29659. 23 Interestingly, Brendan Simms in his UNFINEST HOUR: BRITAIN AND THE DESTRUCTION OF BOSNIA
(Penguin Books, 2002) [NOT IN EVIDENCE], recounts an initiative by UK Gen. Michael Rose where it would appear that Andreev, much like Shakespeare’s Iago in OTHELO, was behind it as both progenitor
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Andreev’s musings on geopolitics during this meeting are somewhat bizarre.25 They
seem to be akin to coffeehouse political theorizing, though Andreev is obviously trying to
impress and perhaps influence his audience with his views, especially given his
background and position. Andreev’s views concerning “the possibility of a coalition
among the allies in WW2 with possible inclusion of Japan”26 could be interpreted to
mean that Germany, Italy and Turkey will be lending their support to the Croats and
Muslims, so the Serbs will need to look to England, France, the US and Russia for
support. It could be that Andreev is simply rambling on because of his sense of self-
importance and the attention lavished on him by his attentive audience, or that he is
clearly attempting to manipulate the thinking of the Serbs. Whatever the case may be,
Andreev appears to be promoting an agenda that conflicts with his remit as an
UNPROFOR Civil Affairs Advisor.
and midwife. The initiative according to General Rose, the then Commander of UNPROFOR, BiH Command, (1994-1995) called for engineering a situation in which “could legitimately employ NATO air strikes in order to demonstrate a more robust UN approach to peacekeeping. After some discussion with [the Russian] Viktor Andreev, who firmly supported the idea,” was “to launch an air strike against the Croats than the Serbs”. As Simms points out: “The thinking behind this gambit was as follows: ‘The Croats were not central to our main effort, and even if they reacted by closing routes, they could not afford to do this for as long as the sizeable Croatian population in the Lasva Valley was wholly dependent on UN aid. Such an attack would send the right signal to Mladic, who would also understand that NATO was not set on destroying the Serbs and that the use of force was impartial. The attack would indeed have sent a signal to Mladic – a dangerous message that the first UN air strike would have been carried out not against the principle aggressors, the Serbs, but against Croat scavengers.” (pp. 184-185, footnotes omitted). Simms also notes that General Rose’s “closest confidant within the UN civilian bureaucracy was certainly the Russian Viktor Andreev, the same man who had enthusiastically endorsed his plans for a first strike against the Croats.” (p. 204). In General Rose’s own words “The only people I felt at ease with, were my own team and particularly Viktor Andreev, whose familiar cure of iced Vodka and caviar always seemed to make me feel better.” (p. 212, footnotes omitted). 24 See e.g. Mladić’s Notebook No. 36, Mladić’s entry of afternoon 15 May 1993, p. 105, where Andreev informs the following: -The situation is better now.
-Amerika has not reached agreement with Europe. - Chances for an intervention are smaller now. -Russia will not allow an intervention.
See also Mladić’s Notebook No. 30, 14 January 1993 entry, pp. 68-71, concerning his conversations with Russian Colonel Shipilov and Mladić’s Notebook No. 30, 19 January 1993 entry, pp. 73-76, concerning his conversation with Russian Colonel Genadij Sorokin. Whether this is serendipitous or part of a concerted effort to embed themselves into the Bosnian Serb military leadership in order to advance their own or mutual agenda is unknown. These conversations do reveal, however, an underlying theme: Russia is willing and able to assist. To what extent Andreev may have been behind these meetings is speculative, but these and other like coincidences may be more than just that – particularly when viewing Andreev’s modus operandi. 25 See Mladić’s Notebook No. 39, pp. 234-244. 26 Id., at p. 236.
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In this entry there is also a reference about a document having been signed by Austria,
Hungary, Slovenia and Croatia.27 This may be relevant, but without more information it
is impossible to tell.
Andreev’s assessments of the Balkans and “where the interests of the East and West
meet” are interesting in the sense that it resembles the thoughts of Tuñman and are
similar to Samuel Huntington’s The Clash of Civilizations.28 This is relevant in that it
shows that Tuñman’s thoughts on this issue are hardly novel or dark.
Lastly, Andreev’s answer to Mladić’s question “How do you see the resolution of the
crisis in our country [presumably SFRY],” that “The secession of Bosnia is the biggest
blow”29 is too Delphic to decipher. Given the context, it could give the impression to
Mladić that the Serbs should not simply accept BiH’s secession without taking some
measures, including military action. Query whether Andreev is interposing himself as an
agent provocateur.
3 June 1992
Here Mladić records a meeting he held with Thornberry concerning the Sarajevo airport
and modalities for providing humanitarian aid. Thornberry is holding this meeting
because he was instructed to do so by the Secretary General of the UN,30 and was ordered
to remain there while the negotiations are taking place; “the G/S wants [Thornberry] to
send him a report by tomorrow evening ON A PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT.”31
Relevant to the subject of Andreev are the remarks made by Thornberry to Mladić:
“I have not had the opportunity to 27 Id., at pp. 236-37. 28 See e.g testimony of Prlić Defence Witness Miomir Žužul, Trial Transcript, 8 May 2008, pp. 27778-27781; see also SAMUEL HUNTINGTON, THE CLASH OF CIVILIZATION AND THE REMAKING OF THE WORLD
ORDER 239, 242 (First Touchstone Edition 1997). 29 Id., at 244. 30 Mladić’s Notebook No. 40, pp. 61-62. 31 Id., at p. 63.
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meet the General before, I have only
heard his reputation,
and I have heard from VIKTOR
ANDREYEV that he has
several constructive con-
versations with you.”
As was seen from Thornberry’s testimony, he valued Andreev as one of the “best, most
experienced reporters”32 of UNPROFOR’s Civil Affairs. This entry also confirms that
Andreev did in fact report to his superior, Thornberry, and that his reports /
representations were valued and in all likelihood relied upon.
The significance of Andreev’s representations become eminently clear when considering
the various entries related to Andreev and his discussions with Mladić and other Bosnian
Serb leaders – political and military. Given Andreev’s “games,” the Trial Chamber
cannot but pause and wonder about what sort of information Andreev was feeding his
superiors and subordinates / colleagues, and how his information, misinformation and
disinformation colored the perception of UNPROFOR, ultimately impacting on some of
the parties - such as how the Croats are to be perceived by the internationals
(UNPROFOR, UNHCR, ECMM, etc.) and reported upon.33
15 May 1993
Here is another example of Andreev providing inside information to the Serbs, and in
doing so, influencing the course of events on the ground and the negotiating table.
Before discussing what is attributed to Andreev during his meeting with Mladić, it may
be useful to dwell a bit – for contextual reasons - on what is recorded from an earlier
meeting held that day between General Morrillon and Mladić. It is unclear whether
Andreev was present at this meeting, though it seems that at some point (Mladić’s
32 Supra note 3. 33 Approximately 27 documents authored or received by Andreev have been admitted as exhibits.
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Notebook. No. 36, entry of 1350 hours, p. 102 General Petković joins the meeting. The
entries to the first meeting on this day (1100 hours, p. 100), shows that General Morillon
notes, quite rightly given the UN’s remit: “The idea is to solve the problem between you,
AI [Alija Izetbegović], Boban, with the UNPROFOR support.” Clearly, General
Morillon is impressing on Mladić that it is up to the parties (through their representatives)
to the conflict to identify, accept and implement a mutually agreed solution.
Conversely, we have Andreev in a participatory role for or with the Serbs, as he informs
Mladić that there is no need to fear US intervention: the chances are lower and “Russia
will not allow” it.34 He then goes on to provide information about General Morillon, in
the context of his French background:35
-“It is important that British units have been in the field for 7 months, they have a
record of resolving international conflicts and, of course, the British know how to
work with the civilians, while the French always have a programme of their own.
-General MORILLON is a nice person, but he occasionally does terrible
things; he /?sees himself/ as the saviour of Sarajevo.
-MORILLON always considers that he resolves things well.
- In Srebrenica, he almost caused a catastrophe, but you controlled the
situation beautifully. – You sorted this out well.
-MORILLON is due to go in June, it is very difficult to work with him.
- What you need to know is that whenever there is an important decision, he
[Morillon] should not be involved, but General WAHLGREN should come.
Clearly – setting aside Andreev’s personal assessment about Srebrenica and his
congratulatory remarks about how Mladić handled that situation well, a matter which also
belies Andreev’s wanton character36 - he is explicitly undermining General Morillon’s
authority, who at the time was the Commander of the UN Forces in BiH.
34 Mladić’s Notebook No. 36, p. 105 (emphasis added). 35 Id., at 106 (emphasis added). 36 Similarly he notes on p. 107, “The Venezuelan ambassador wants to be president, so he behaved in a very provocative way. Luckily, we managed to water it down. You responded really well by letting the ambassadors into Srebrenica. You did an excellent job with the agreement in Srebrenica, and he wanted to destroy us all.” Id. Andreev is referring to the Agreement between the ABiH and the VRS for the
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It is unclear who the “non-aligned” Andreev was referring to when he remarked: “I do
not like the zone around Sarajevo. This was a proposal by the non-aligned countries,
perhaps they need some sort of war, they can finance it.” Nonetheless this is quite a
remarkable statement.
Andreev makes an observation that has been shared by others concerning Sarajevo and
the Muslims. He notes: “The Muslims are the biggest problem to resolve. As soon as
you say “yes”, they will say “no”. It is in their interest for Sarajevo to remain a
problem.” 37
Mladić asks Andreev what he would do if he were Mladić.38 To this question Andreev
provides a long list of suggestions.39 He begins by suggesting that concerning the
removal of Serb artillery, the Serbs should make it conditional based on the Muslim
infantry retreating, since the Serb “problem” is their [Muslim] infantry. This is
significant when considering that during the VOPP negotiations, Izetbegović used the
removal of the Serb artillery as an excuse for not agreeing to some aspects of the
VOPP.40
demilitarization of Žepa and Srebrenica, brokered by UNPROFOR and signed by Mladić, Halilović and Morillon on 8 May 1993; see Exh. P11192. 37 This virtually mirrors the approach Izetbegović advocated, a negotiating tactic so no agreement could ever be reached. See Exh. 4D00930, Tape recording of the session of Presidency of Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina held on January 14, 1994, where Alija Izetbegović, while Presiding over the meeting advised:
Let us all understand all these talks we had - including republics and 33% etc., nothing of it has been determined. Because Klas warned me, when I talked about some things, he said: "You know Mr. Izetbegović the rule about politics - until we agree on everything we agreed on nothing." So, so far we have not agreed on anything. These are all just preconditions for some agreement. Of course if it suits us we can go back to the beginning. We only have to ask ourselves if we have better solution. But as soon as we see that we are better off, turn everything back to the beginning. Then we have to turn everything back.
See also DAVID OWEN, BALKAN ODYSSEY 218-221 (Guernsey Press Co. Ltd, 1996) (“OWEN”), (Exh. 1D01548), where Ganić’s strategy and tactics are revealed by Lord Owen. 38 Mladić’s Notebook No. 36, at 108. 39 Id., at 108-11. 40 See e.g. OWEN, at 110-11, where Lord Owen recounts when Izetbegović in 30 January 1993 first agreed to VOPP constitutional principles and the “Bosnian Serbs signed the agreement on cessation of hostilities,” only to have Izetbegović, who had previously agreed, say that “his reservations on heavy weapons precluded him from signing.”
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Andreev provides sage advice to the Serbs on how to win at the public relations game,
since, in Andreev’s words, “this is a TV war”.41 He reiterates that “The Muslims want
Sarajevo to remain blocked”42 and they “know that they are provoking” the Serbs. He
urges the Serbs to “be categorical” with the UN and to insist that “Be decisive – we
cannot withdraw without UN troops in the zone.”43 He also instructs Mladić “If you ask
for the civilian police at once, we do not have a mandate, and we are approaching
the UN and this gives you some time.”44
When asked by Tošo whether “the Muslims agree to some sort of demilitarisation and a
possible withdrawal of forces,” Andreev responds: “Unfortunately they are not in
favour of any demilitarisation. We have applied considerable pressure on them, we
told them that they were prepared to sacrifice their people for an intervention. You
were on the verge of a victory in Srebrenica, and they will not accept this in Sarajevo.”45
41 Mladić’s Notebook No. 36, at 106. 42 Id., at 109 (emphasis added). 43 Id.,at 110. 44 Id., at 110-11 (emphasis added). 45 Id., p. 111 (emphasis added). Andreev’s conclusions about the willingness of the Muslim political leadership to sacrifice its people and effective use them as cannon fodder or expendable bargaining chips was also shared by Lord Owen. Two examples from his Balkan Odyssey merit recalling. One example is when Lord Owen asked “why he did not let Muslim children and their mothers leave Sarajevo he retorted that the British would never have let them leave London during the Blitz and seemed genuinely surprised when I told him how Churchill’s government arranged for children to not only leave London but to go as far afield as Canada.”(Exh. 1D01552, at p. 264). Another example concerns Ejup Ganić, commonly referred to and thought of as the “Vice President” of the Presidency of BiH (a title or position which did not exist - at least de jure); a Muslim who actually hailed from Sandžak, Serbia and not BiH. According to Lord Owen:
He [Ganić] has one central policy objective, namely to involve the US army as a combatant in the Bosnian fight to defeat the Serbs. As he sees it, to achieve his aim – of which he makes no secret – he is entitled to use whatever means are necessary. To him the end justifies those means. He orchestrates Bosnian government propaganda, operating at every level in the US – at the White House, on Capitol Hill and on the television screens in American homes. {…} There is a doggedness about his character that shows itself in his readiness to spend much time in Sarajevo and take the risks of its citizens; but the focus of his attention and his travels is on the US. He knows that you have to spend money to be heard in America and is ready therefore to employ media consultants and use all the modern techniques of communications. [...] His message is simple – ‘we are the victims’- and like all good propagandists he does not shrink from repeating the message over and over again. He authorizes publicity to depict Muslims as victims. He fears Sarajevo going off the headlines, for that will mean less pressure on US politicians to intervene. It is a very credible but ruthless strategy from the Muslim point of view and its continuing influence is too often underrated, for Ganić’s message is relayed on by Sacirbej and Silajdžić, both skilled in television and radio. […] I left Sarajevo for Zagreb and Geneva [19 December 1992] hopeful but worried, for I had detected that the strongest resistance to our agreement was coming not from the Bosnian Serbs but
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Andreev then advises Mladić that he should write to UNHCR, to Sadako Ogata, the then
UN High Commissioner for Refugees, and provides Mladić with a list of points the letter
should cover.46 Whether this list is a genuine expression of goodwill offered in the spirit
of cooperation or purely for propaganda or obfuscation purposes is unclear. Nonetheless,
when viewed in the context of the discussion held during that meeting, Andreev, yet
again, seems to be using his inside knowledge to advise Mladić and his colleagues on
how best to engage high level members of the UN in order to curry favor or persuade,
while pursuing the Serb political and military agenda.
When asked about Jeremy Braid (believed to have then been the Sarajevo Head of
UNHCR), Andreev reveals that he does not like Owen, that Braid is “an excellent man
but he is part of Owen’s team” and that “Owen is against the Serbs.”47 He then notes that
“ the [VOPP] plan is dead, but it should not be referred to as that, we will stick to
that until we get something new.”48 From this exchange it is rather evident that
Andreev is undermining the peace efforts which are being co-sponsored by the UN along
with the EU. In light of Andreev’s position, it is only reasonable to conclude that these
sorts of representations cannot but influence the way the Serbs will behave at the
negotiations – which, after all, are being conducted in order to find an immediate
resolution to the conflict. Andreev follows up by informing Mladić of the new issues that
are going to be offered at a future meeting in Athens,49 thus giving the Serbs the heads-up
so they can develop their negotiating posture in advance of the negotiations. Andreev
ends by telling Mladić that the conflict between the Muslims and Croats will not stop and
that “Many at the UN don’t like you. They will do everything to po /unclear/”50 Mladić
ends his entries on this meeting by noting “Propaganda is a very powerful thing and it is
strongly against the Serbs.”51
from Ejup Ganić. Demilitarization in Sarajevo would remove the most powerful weapon in his propaganda armoury for involving the US. A quiet Sarajevo was, he almost admitted, not in his interests, and he preferred a continuation of the siege.”
(Exh. 1D01547, at pp. 89-90). 46 Id., at. 113. 47 Id., at 114. 48 Id.(emphasis added). 49 Id. 50 Id., at 115. 51 Id.
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Unquestionably this sort of a remark exposes Andreev’s sentiments toward the Serbs; it
can hardly be viewed as a constructive observation from a high official of UNPROFOR.
If anything, Andreev’s views on this point could easily been construed by Mladić that the
Serb political and military leadership - being the victims of a propaganda campaign
conducted by some internationals - should continue in the same vein since they are on the
right path – or at least the path appreciated and supported by Russia.
18 May 1993
This entry deals with a meeting between Mladić and Morillon in the presence of
Karadžić. Three days before this meeting (see 15 May 1993 entry), Andreev is quoted as
having said that the VOPP is dead. At this meeting with Morrilon, Mladić quotes
Karadžić as saying almost exactly what Andreev had said: “The V/O plan is dead for
us.” Karadžić’s coincidental use of almost the exact language used by Andreev, is
startling. Perhaps it is just a coincidence. But then, it just may be a fine example of how
the inside information being passed on by Andreev to the Bosnian Serb political and
military leadership is being used in their dealings with UNPROFOR representatives and
others, such as the international negotiators.
Relevant to the 15 and the 18 May 1993 Mladić entries, it bears highlighting that the UN,
and in particular the UN Security Council, has been engaged in fostering the peace-
negotiating process. For example, on 7 April 1993, approximately a month prior to
Andreev telling Mladić that the VOPP is dead, the UN Security Council passed
Resolution 820, commanding
the peace plan for Bosnia and Herzegovina in the form agreed to by two of the Bosnian parties and set out in the report of the Secretary-General of 26 March 1993 (S/25479), namely the Agreement on Interim Arrangements (annex I), the nine Constitutional Principles (annex II), the provisional provincial map (annex III) and the Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (annex IV);52
When considering Mladić’s entries of 15 May and 18 May 1993, it would appear that
Andreev is working at cross-purposes with the UN - the very same organization which is 52 Exh. P01924, section, para. 1.
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effectively employing him. Whether within the UN or elsewhere (such as within the US
government) the VOPP is perceived to be or is actually “dead” at this particular time, is
utterly irrelevant. What is relevant, however, is that Andreev, a member of UNPROFOR,
imbued with the influence and authority of the UN, is undermining the peace process.
20 June 1993
Mladić in this entry has Andreev saying:
- OWEN is going, he's out
- STOLTENBERG may be staying.
- The V–O plan is finished
- There will be one Serbian republic in BH,
two Croatian (Mostar and Posavina) and
two Muslim ones (the Cazin Krajina and Central Bosnia)
- Intervention is still possible. -
- They are after ABDIĆ
- Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ is playing a balancing act, GANIĆ
would like the war to go to Serbia and Kosovo
- Muslim access - provocations -53
Here is yet another example of Andreev passing on a heady cocktail of inside information
and observations. Unquestionably, Andreev is offering this information to Mladić in
order to assist him, Karadžić and other Bosnian Serb political and military leaders in their
future course of actions concerning the international negotiations.
6 November 1993
The entries related to the meeting between Mladić and Andreev on 6 November 1993
provide another fine example of Andreev’s questionable behavior. Here are but a few
significant remarks attributed to Andreev:54
53 Mladić’s Notebook No. 36, p. 225 (emphasis added). NOTE: a more accurate translation of the last line is believed to be: “Approach of Muslims – a provocation”.
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- The Americans want the whole of BH. Izetbegović wanted to sign, but the US
stayed his hand.
- SILAJDŽIĆ is talking to the US Ambassador every day. SILAJDŽIĆ wanted
to set up a meeting between Alija IZETBEGOVIĆ and KARADŽIĆ to have
the Serbs reject ABDIĆ. KARADŽIĆ wisely refused to do so.
- BRIQUEMONT is a good man, MORILLON was a fool.
- COT is like MORILLON …
- The Muslims want to replace STOLTENBERG and OWEN. The
international community does not know what to do.
- Ganić is quiet these days, HALILOVIĆ has been detained, he has links to
Sandžak mafia …
Andreev then provides detailed information on the composition of the BiH government,
including personal information concerning every member of the government.55 The
information appears to have details that would not have necessarily been publicly
available. No reason is provided as to why this information is being offered, though
obviously it would have been useful to Mladić.
18 January 1994
Once again Andreev is attributed to have been providing useful inside information to
Mladić. The following excerpts are rather telling.
- they, Muslims, asked for the removal of Owen and they talk of substituting
both, they will take a different approach where the Fed.Secu. would create
new frameworks and resolutions that don’t maintain the current situation.56
- They want to merge the future w/ the SC Resolutions.57
54 Mladić’s Notebook No. 44, p. 15. 55 Id., at 16-18. 56 Mladić’s Notebook No. 35, pp. 8-9. 57 Id., at 9.
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- Muslims will try to scare the Serbs with the creation of a union with H, a
union is not possible, it’s a political game, because F. Tuñman proposed on
option and Alija another.58
- Your army is losing its positions, you have no infantry, they are calculating
that you can’t conduct a serious off…59
- Muslims are counting that they have managed the Winter.60
- There was never agreement in the triangle Stoltenberg-Cot-Thornberry …61
- Cot is leaving, since 12:00 o’ clock yesterday he is no longer in command, the
reason is that in the last four months relations between military and political
structures are becoming more complicated.62
- The political UN leadership is against bombing the Serbs while the military
leadership is in favour of bombing.63
- NATO doesn’t have maneuvering space for new requests towards you, they
listen to the Muslims and Americans.64
- It should be emphasized that in a humanitarian sense this airport holds no
significance, and you should point out that convoys enter T every day. You
should say this and help us.65
- Muslims think that if you won’t hand over the airport. This will cause NATO
to strike against you.66
- They want to provoke a NATO attack.67
- There are differences in New York, the SC is removed from reality!68
- Here and in Geneva and New York the positions are the same – against the
use of force and strike, but in the Security Council there are opposing opinions
– and the danger has not yet been removed.69
58 Id. 59 Id. 60 Id. 61 Id. 62 Id., at 10. 63 Id. 64 Id. 65 Id., at 11. 66 Id. 67 Id. 68 Id.
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- Airport Tuzla will keep the Muslims from signing an agreement, which is
good.70
- This issue took on a national change in the USA which is creating problems
for us.71
- Your arguments concerning a/T are completely OK you could constantly keep
asking the question regarding guarantees that no one can give, so discussions
are held up with all sides, and we have to have agreement of all sides.72
- This in itself is the essence of peace, there is a conflict between those who are
in favour of the parties and the diplomacy of use of force.73
- The Muslims know that what they get now they will have for history, for the
first time they feel like a nation and have a high level of moral. They shift
their forces to take piece by piece from the Croats.74
- The USA has still not said to the Alija Izetbegović side – this is enough.75
7, 8 & 9 April 1994
To fully appreciate Andreev’s behavior and actions, as well as his ability to influence
those in UNPROFOR with whom he was working with, it warrants observing three
consecutive entries; together, a rather convincing picture emerges that Andreev was not
just advising the Bosnian Serbs as noted above, but that he is also engaged in advancing
the Bosnian Serb agenda.
7 April 1994
Here there is an exchange between General Rose and Mladić in the presence of Andreev.
Mladić records:76
General Rose:
69 Id. 70 Id. 71 Id. 72 Id. (emphasis added). 73 Id. 74 Id., at 14. 75 Id. 76 Mladić’s Notebook No. 31, p. 7.
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-As far as I know you were the one to suggest a cease fire in the entire territory …
-The Muslims are asking that you retreat to Goražde to the position you held 9
days ago, and that you remain at the other positions.
-He offered that the issue of Goražde be resolved first and then the global plan.
V. Andrejev:
-Allow us to organize a meeting at the Sarajevo airport – so that we may first
discuss the global plan.
8 April 1994
This entry is titled: NEGOTIATIONS with representatives of UNPROFOR.77
*they are attempting everything possible to give the Muslims an honorable
withdrawal for the situation …
Viktor:
-the Muslims don’t want a cease fire across the entire territory ….
-they want to talk, if you would accept a temporary cease fire and withdrawal at
Goražde…
Gen. Rose:
-the opposite side is sensitive and they are afraid that the country will be like
Cyprus.
9 April 1994
This entry is titled: MEETING with the Muslim delegation.78
*Mr. Rose (R):
-implement a cease fire over the entire territory of BiH
77 Id., at 8. 78 Id., at 9.
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IT-04-74-T Annex I 19
[…]
*Andrejev (VA):
-the agreement is ready to be signed.
Mr. Mladić:
*we have submitted our draft of an Agreement on complete and permanent cease
of hostilities …
When all three consecutive entries are viewed, one plausible conclusion emerges:
Andreev has the capacity to influence not just the civilian sector of UNRPOFOR but the
military sector as well. The Bosnian Serb leadership was pressing for a “global plan of a
cease fire in the entire territory. From a strategic and tactical point of view, such an
agreement would have born no fruit, particularly when considering the logistics involved
in maintaining and enforcing such a global plan. Andreev’s retort is that a meeting be
held not to discuss what the Muslims are pressing for, but for the Bosnian Serb proposal,
i.e. for a global plan. The following day, Andreev remarks what is already known, i.e.
“the Muslims don’t want a cease fire across the entire territory,” and we see Rose’s
understanding of the Muslim’s reasoning. Whether the Muslim leadership to simply
content to keep fighting because it is only interested in a situational cease fire for tactical
purposes (such as just around Goražde), is a matter of speculation, though it does seem to
fit within the overall Muslim strategy.79 However, what does seem clear is that on the
third meeting of 9 April 1994 with the Muslim delegation and Mladić, Rose is declaring
that “a cease fire over the entire territory of BiH” (global plan) be implemented, while
Andreev remarks that “the agreement is ready to sign,” which, coincidently, Mladić has
submitted as a draft. The fact that Rose does a sudden about-face in favor of the Bosnian
Serb position seems far too coincidental when considering that Andreev’s machinations
and his behind-the-scene relations with Mladić, Karadžić and others within the Bosnian
Serb leadership.
79 Witness Cedric Thornberry, Trial Transcript, 16 January 2008, pp. 26300-26301, discussing Exh. 4D00498; Witness Slobodan Praljak, Trial Transcript, 26 May 2009, pp. 40701-40702; Witness Milivoj Petković, Trial Transcript, pp. 49417-49425.
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