Troubling Masculinities: Changing Patterns of Violent Masculinities in a Society Emergingfrom Political Conflict

Fidelma Ashe and Ken Harland

Men’s dominance of the political and military dimensions of the Northern Ireland conflicthas meant that the story of the conflict has generally been a story about men. Ethno nationalistantagonism reinforced men’s roles as protectors and defenders of ethno nationalgroups and shaped violent expressions of masculinities. Due to the primacy ofethno-nationalist frameworks of analysis in research on the conflict, the relationshipsbetween gender and men’s violence have been under-theorized. This article employs theframework of Critical Studies of Men and Masculinities to examine these relationshipsand also explores the changing patterns of men’s violence in Northern Ireland.

During the early years of second wave feminism the constitution of men’s gendered identitiesremained concealed in gender analysis. The newly emerging and radical feministmovements of the 1960s recognized that, historically, men had been the subjects of socialand political inquiry and many feminists at that time wanted to place women at the forefrontof analysis. Feminism’s core analytical focus on femininity resulted in the equation of genderanalysis with studies of women; men remained genderless, the norm and the standardby which the identities of women were evaluated. However, by the 1980s gender studieshad started to examine men as a gendered category, giving rise to new directions in feministresearch that culminated in an explosion of academic interest in men and masculinities inthe 1990s. Since then, masculinity or masculinities, “that previously untraversed frontier”in feminist analysis, has become “gold rush territory.”1

While in other geopolitical contexts it seemed like “everyman and his dog”2waswritingabout masculinities during this period, in Northern Ireland masculinities remain unchartedterritory in political analysis. The reasons for this lack of interest are paradoxically bothsimple and complex, and we consider them in the early part of this article. The article thenengages in an exploration of the analytical and political value of addressing the categoryof masculinities in political research on Northern Ireland. Turning the analytical lens to acore concern of mainstream analysis it draws out the value of assessing the relationshipsbetween masculinities and changing patterns of violence in the region since the onset ofthe Troubles in 1969.

Masculinities and Mainstream AnalysisThe global upsurge in academic discourses around masculinities from the 1980s wasgenerated by a range of social, cultural, and political changes that led to claims thattraditional forms of normative masculinities were being eroded by new social conditions.3Social changes that weakened traditional models of gender identities fuelled interrogationsof masculinities in other geopolitical contexts and in Western Europe and North Americain particular.4 Even when feminists sent out “mixed messages” about the ability of men toengage critically with their gender identities, social changes generated what was largely adeconstruction of masculinities by male academics and writers.5

As the next section reveals, Northern Ireland was not immune to the effects of the socialchanges that fuelled men’s engagement with masculinities elsewhere. However, the onsetof the Troubles reinforced traditional forms of masculinities and created conditions thatpreserved men’s power in both public and private arenas; the fortification of men’s power

tended to marginalize feminism both culturally and politically.6 However, the dynamics ofthe conflict, explored in more detail in later sections, do not explain fully why mainstreamanalysis in the region has paid so little attention to studies of masculinities. Theoretical andinstitutional frameworks have also played a role.7

In other contexts the increasing influence of post-structuralism from the 1970s createdaffinities between mainstream political theory and feminism. The deconstruction of subjectivity,the critique of traditional theories of power and the “cultural turn” were commonto both scholarly traditions. Referring to the North American context, Newton writes thatby the late 1980s “male authored ‘postmodern’ theories of knowledge, identity, and powerhad brought male colleagues closer theoretically to their feminist colleagues.”8 Yet, despitethe institutional integration of critical gendered analysis into the academy and the growthof explorations of masculinities, feminism remained on the borders of mainstream analysiseven in contexts such as Scandinavia and North America where it is more firmly establishedboth educationally and politically. Yet, in general, social and intellectual change combinedto increase feminism’s influence within the academy from the 1980s, which helped framegender as an integral aspect of discussions of democracy, identity, difference, and justice.9The influence of contemporary political theory on formulations of human subjectivitywas a key theoretical development that supported the integration of gender identitiesinto more traditional areas of political analysis.10 The human subject has increasinglybeen understood “as being constructed and continuously reconstructed out of a varietyof competing discourses.”11 Subsequently, identities become framed as products of narrativesand practices. This understanding of identities often draws on post-structuralism’sre-conceptualizations of power as operating through multiple modalities such as ethnicity,gender, class, and sexuality, thereby increasing the space for the integration of gender intounderstandings of identities.12 Most scholarship in the region has not been influenced bythe “cultural turn” and ethnic blocs tend to be viewed as concrete political entities that limitthe space for gendered analysis to emerge.13 Analyses of the conflict have concentratedon ethnicity for obvious reasons and have generally focused on the strategies and politicalagendas of ethnic groups as opposed to ethno-gendered groups.

Additionally, the inequalities, antagonisms, and violence constituted through genderedrelationships have not been viewed as core concerns for political analysis by the mainstream.In the context of Northern Ireland political research has coded a range of identities as core orperipheral sites of analysis. Moreover, the institutional power-sharing framework reinforcedthe marginal location of gender politics in the political realm. The peace Agreement14 in1998 was framed around elite negotiations and bargaining that reinforced the continuedimportance of the political standpoints, strategies, and struggles of ethno-nationalist communities.Rather than creating the conditions for a model of devolved government basedaround heterogeneity and diversity that recognizes the political standpoints of a range ofmarginalized groups including women, the Agreement reinforced the political power ofethnic blocs.15

While feminists have continued to try to push issues such as the political underrepresentationof women on to mainstream agendas and have highlighted the continuingocclusion of gender in analysis, which has prompted some mainstream scholars to scrutinizethe political and communal positioning of women, studies of masculinities remain thepreserve of a small number of feminist theorists. For some mainstream theorists masculinitiesare not relevant. Even against the background of the perceived “failures” of militarismin the region, masculinities have remained outside of the boundaries of critical analysis. In

contrast, the end of the Vietnam War provoked intense reflection on American manhood.16Masculinity did not cause the conflict, but as illustrated below it has been an integralaspect of its contours.17 Twenty years on from the paramilitary cease-fires that opened spacefor the development of processes of demilitarization, interrogations of the interactionsbetween particular constitutions of masculinities and the ethnic conflict have not beensufficiently developed or integrated into the broader analysis of the conflict or conflicttransformational processes in the region. In the absence of thorough academic scrutiny,masculinities have become framed through sensationalized journalistic accounts of thehyper-masculinity of high profile paramilitaries such as Johnny Adair.18 Feminism providesmuch more than a reductionist theory of patriarchy to analysts mapping the intersectionalityof identities in contexts of ethnic antagonism. We utilize the framework of Critical Studiesof Men and Masculinities to illustrate how masculinities were an element in “formations ofviolence” during the conflict and conflict transformational periods.19 This framework viewsidentities as socially constituted, multi-faceted and open to reconstitution. Illuminatingmasculinities as elements in the conflict, and identifying how certain models of masculinitiesengender a range of power-effects frames masculinities as an important area of concern inthe analysis of Northern Ireland’s conflict and conflict transformational process.

Critical Studies of MasculinitiesThe framework of critical studies of men and masculinities (CSMM) was originally setout by Jeff Hearn and David Morgan to provide a theoretical agenda to guide analyticalwork across a range of studies of men.20 CSMM was designed to consolidate and extendfeminism’s critical focus onto the terrain of masculinities21 by theorizing masculinities ashistorical, context dependent, shifting, and multi-faceted identities.22 From this perspective,men’s gender identities, or their masculinities, are constituted through social discoursesand practices; they are not biologically determined.23 Subsequently, the constitution ofmasculinities depends on the particular constructions of men’s gendered identities thatbecome dominant or normative within specific societies, groups, and contexts. Moreover,reflecting the influence of the work of Raewyn Connell, CSMM understands masculinitiesas intersectional identities shaped not only by gender but also by factors such as ethnicity,social class, sexuality, age, and disability.24

The complexity of the cultural constitution of masculinities means that what constitutesnormative masculinities is constantly shifting and open to reconfiguration through socialchange. Moreover, the intersectionality of masculinities results in relationships of powerand subordination between groups of men.25 Most of the critical literature in the arearecognizes that while men as a group benefit from the social organization of gender,particular groups of men are located in socially subordinated positions due to, for example,their ethnicity or social class.26 Subsequently, analysts have struggled to define the coreideals of masculinities with some scholars suggesting that the category should be kept openand undefined.27

Despite the slippery nature of the concept scholars have identified a range of featuresthat have tended to be associated with normative masculinities in contemporary Westernsocieties. Independence, autonomy, superiority, dominance over others, heterosexuality, andaggression or violence are strongly identified with the achievement of normative modelsof masculinities. Unsurprisingly, the issue of men’s violence has been of particular interestto scholars working in the area of domestic violence,28 but scholars working in the areas ofnationalism and international relations have also engaged with the relationships between theideals of normative masculinities and men’s involvement in violent nationalist conflicts.29These studies have illustrated how the ideals of normative manhood have served nationalist

struggles by forming part of the discursive narrative that, to borrow from Althusserianterminology, “hails” or “calls” men to protect and fight for the nation.30 Nagel commentsthat: “terms like honour, patriotism, cowardice, and duty are hard to distinguish as eithernationalist or masculinist, since they seem so thoroughly tied both to the nation and tomanliness.”31

While masculinities in contexts of nationalist conflict are constituted through thesebroad ideological themes, the complexity of masculinities means that a localized analysisof their constitution provides greater insight in to the relationships between masculinity andpolitical violence within particular geopolitical contexts. The following section exposes thespecific configurations of masculinities, class and nationalism that produced patterns ofviolent behaviour by groups of men during the conflict in Northern Ireland. In a changingpolitical culture characterized by processes of de-militarization the narratives and practicesof violent masculinities will reconfigure, and we map these changes in later sections,paying particular attention to young men. However, the framework of CSMM remindsresearchers that studies of men and masculinities can inadvertently occlude women andwider networks of gender inequality from the analysis. The occlusion of women in analysesof men reflects an approach that has become known as men’s studies; a framework that hasbeen heavily criticized for failing to place the analyses of masculinities within the broadercontext of the historical relationships of gender.32 Such an approach would be particularlyregressive in the Northern Ireland context given that gender inequality and power have beenunder-theorized. A critical analysis of masculinities directly informed by feminist concernscan provide a point of engagement that opens a broader analysis of gender focusing onthe reproduction of gender inequities through the constitution of both masculinities andfemininities.

Moreover, as the analysis of the changing patterns of men’s violence in Northern Irelanddevelops, it will become clear that certain models of masculinities have a range of negativeeffects on men. However, these costs occur in broader networks of gender oppression andthe narratives that emerge around the costs of violent masculinities have implications forwider discussions of gender inequality. Therefore, we pay close attention to the effects ofviolent nationalist masculinities on women’s positioning in both the conflict and conflicttransformational period.

Masculinities and the TroublesUnderstanding the dominant models of masculinities within particular societies is an importantstarting point for engaging with masculinities and political violence. Prior to the periodof the Troubles, normative gender roles in Northern Ireland were generally reflective ofthose in other industrialized Western societies.33 The dominant construction of masculinityrevolved around the core idea that developing a normative masculinity required theachievement of the protector/provider role. Traditionally, the role of protector/provider underpinned men’s dominance in both the workplace and the family.34 Conversely, normativefemininity was achieved through the roles of wife and mother.35

Middle-class men achieved the protector/provider role mainly through the professionsand business ventures. Up until the 1960s heavy industries such as shipbuilding, whichtended to be located in protestant working-class areas, provided a family wage and enabledworking-class protestant men to secure breadwinner status within the family. Catholic mentended to be employed in the lower end of the job market. Catholics were employed predominantlyin unskilled and lower-paying jobs, such as clothing manufacture and textiles.36The number of foreign multinational companies in Northern Ireland rose from 7 in 1958

to 27 in 1968 generating many new manufacturing jobs37 filled by both Protestant andCatholic workers.38

From the 1970s, the Northern Ireland economy had begun to reflect more generaleconomic trends in industrialized societies, including a decline in the heavy engineeringindustries that provided employment for working-class men. Declining heavy industries inNorthern Ireland were replaced by service industries and a large public sector. By the 1990s,the combined effects of the neoliberalism and globalization had reshaped the social andeconomic contours of most European and North American countries, including NorthernIreland. The conflict shaped the effects of these broader economic trends. Political murders,sectarian assassinations, car-bombings, petrol bombings, and the actions of paramilitarygroups created “a defender” mentality in the working-class communities that bore thebrunt of the violence and were also blighted by high levels of unemployment. Moreover,the conflict created costs for companies operating in Northern Ireland and many shiftedproduction to other countries. However, the “peace dividend.” which was delivered mainlyin the form of European funds meant inward investment returned. For example, between1995 and 1999 €400 million of European funding supported 13,000 projects in NorthernIreland that focussed on job creation, social inclusion, urban and rural regeneration, andcross-border co-operation.39 Economic investment in the region led to a period of sustainedeconomic growth and large-scale redevelopment40 including the £400 million VictoriaSquare retail development in Belfast City Centre and more recently the Titanic QuarterScheme costing over £1 billion. However, the impact of broader economic restructuring onworking-class men’s ability to secure their traditional breadwinner role was reflected in thenew forms of employment created. Of the 52,320 jobs created during the “peace dividendyears, 1995-2000, more than half were part-time and generally low paid.”41

In other geographical contexts the decline of traditional male working-class jobs, theimpact of feminism and increased consumerism had generated interrogations of masculinitiesand adaptations by some men to the new social conditions.42 Much of the literature inthe 1990s and 2000s suggested that masculinities in late capitalist societies were in a periodof crisis or transition, which at times resulted in erroneous claims by some commentatorsthat power was being redistributed from men to women.43 Moreover, ideas that the traditionalmale role actually harmed men were popularized by academics, pressure groups andthe media during this period.44

The political conflict in Northern Ireland smothered these kinds of debates, and whilea few men’s groups did emerge in that context, they had little impact on gender politics. Ina society that was emerging from a conflict where a patchwork of mural representations ofhard men covered urban spaces,45 claims that contemporary feminism had rendered menthe “disposable sex” were unlikely to gain political momentum. Similarly, notions thatwomen’s social advances had given them legal advantages over men were less likely tobe taken seriously in a society that has no female high court judges.46 Also, as StephenWhitehead points out, one of the problems with crisis of masculinities discourses is thatthe claim of crisis “speaks of masculinity in the singular; usually white heterosexual andethno-centric.”47 As indicated above, due to the political contours of the society meninvolved in political research continued to focus both intellectually and in some casesemotionally on ethnicity. However, as later sections illustrate, the issue of the costs ofmen’s traditional identities as community defenders would emerge again during the periodof conflict transformation, but it would be cast within an ethno-nationalist framework ofanalysis that contained it within the boundaries of the conflict and shrank the space fordialogue around masculinities. In effect, the Troubles supported certain aspects of the

traditional models of masculinity. While the traditional provider/protector role was beingchallenged and gendered roles in the workplace were undergoing significant changes,the conflict operated to fortify aspects of men’s power in communal and formal politicalarenas.48

Masculinities, Defense, and ViolenceThe political conflict reinforced dimensions of traditional models of masculinities at bothconcrete and representational levels.During and after the Troubles, politics remained largelythe terrain of men.49 The figure of Ian Paisley most clearly expressed the ideals of ethno nationalist masculinity during the conflict. Lysaght notes Paisley utilized a rhetoric which is“highly attuned to the masculinity of defence.”50 The positioning of men as defenders at thelevel of politics was reflected at the communal level in the ideal of men as defenders of thecommunity. Ghetto warfare in the spatially segregated, urban, working-class communitiescharacterized the Troubles. Men’s localized violence in “defense” of community spacesreaffirmed their traditional roles in working-class areas. Women participated in all levelsof the conflict, but their activities were often hidden and tended to be overshadowed bythe spectacles of violence perpetrated by the “men of violence.” Throughout the conflictwomen became framed as representing the vulnerability of the community that requiredmale protection from the “enemy.”51 When women transgressed traditional gender rolesand engaged directly in physical force violence, through involvement in the paramilitaryorganizations that were overwhelmingly male and working-class, women’s involvement inparamilitary activities was viewed differently to men’s.52 Female combatants were oftentreated with suspicion or unease.53 Men’s involvement in violence was viewed as normative,women’s was non-normative.54 Narratives of sexual difference preserved the genderednaturalness of male violence vis-`a-vis their female counterparts.

The state security forces were also predominantly male, and in the case of the UlsterDefence Regiment and the Royal Ulster Constabulary predominantly Protestant. Yet whiledefense, militarism, and political violence were primarily male arenas, the construction ofmilitarized and violent masculinities shifted during the period of the conflict. Real men’sbodies were the instruments for violence in the form of bombings and shootings. However,the figure of the gunman was only one expression of violent masculinities. The spectacle ofthe emaciated bodies of the hunger strikers exposed the fluidity of militarized masculinitiesand demonstrated how the bodies of men and the ideals of masculinity, bravery, sacrificeand stoicism could be deployed through the practices of suffering and martyrdom to exposethe cruelty and corruption of the enemy.55 Women were not permitted to join the hungerstrike as it was felt that the community would not be able to accept the death of a woman.56The ultimate sacrifice for the nation was coded male in the very public political strugglessurrounding the hunger strike.

Regardless of these shifts in the deployment of the male body during the Troubles,with the exclusion of a few notable women, the story of conflict and political violencein Northern Ireland has been a story about men, and it shaped patterns of male violenceand reinforced men’s power. The tactical advantages to controlling communities combinedwith a policing vacuum produced a system of informal policing. Young men inparticular were often targeted for engaging in anti-social behavior.57 Rioting was oftenharnessed to the national cause, while individualistic anti-social behavior was punished.Young men’s socialization in local cultures that valorized men’s violence operated as aresource for the wider ethnic community—a first line of defense especially at times ofdeep communal conflict. Those young men whose anti-social tendencies and violence becamedeployed for personal gain, for example for the thrills of joyriding, were violently

policed through informal justice and exiling.58 One outcome of the targeting of young menwas that young men in marginalized communities reported being concerned about theirpersonal safety on a daily basis and confused about issues surrounding law and order andpolicing.59

However, the masculinities that have been constituted through the local conditionsgenerated by the conflict were difficult to discipline and even the paramilitaries could notcontain young men’s anti-social behavior within the boundaries of communal or nationaliststruggles as they challenged their control by defying the threat of punishment.60 Whileyoung men were located in challenging contexts a number of cross-cutting identities andcontextual factors moderate the attraction of violence to specific groups of men, whichexplains why many men did not engage in violent expressions of nationalist conflict inNorthern Ireland. Adult men and women worked on the ground to try to mediate theeffects of the social conditions on young people particularly in areas most affected by andsusceptible to conflict.

Masculinities and Violence in Changing ContextsThe paramilitary cease-fires in the 1990s and the 1998 Agreement generated new socialand political conditions in the region. From a gendered perspective, the post-conflict contextraised more than a set of issues about ethno-nationalist power-sharing; it also raisedissues about how a historical legacy of gendered inequality could be addressed. A politicalenvironment dominated by men and characterized by physical force violence pushedout the political claims of historically marginalized identities, including sexual, gendered,and class identities. Feminists involved in the negotiations leading to the Agreement highlightednot only gendered issues but also set out an agenda that highlighting the relevanceof issues of social exclusion and disadvantage in peace-building.61 Similarly, the politicalrepresentatives of Loyalism were also generating discussion about economic and socialissues.62 These agendas drew in the material conditions of young working-class men inboth communities, but they remained low priority in a culture dealing with the “realities”of conflict transformation.

The 1998 Agreement and the St. Andrews Agreement in 2006 did set in motionprocesses of de-militarization. Alongside the paramilitary cease-fires, the British Armypresence was reduced to “peacetime” levels. Processes of de-militarization suggested thatmasculinities would also become de-militarized, which might open debate around men’sparticipation in violence and generate new nonviolent identities for men. However, the discussionsof violent masculinities that followed both the 1998 and 2006 Agreements wereframed within an ethno-nationalist framework that lacked the conceptual tools to genderthe analysis of men’s violence or their violent pasts. Fanned by the threat of paramilitarismthat continued to “bubble under the surface” in many working-class communities, analyticalpriority was given to mapping the reintegration needs of ex-combatant males. Thede-militarization of men was perceived as a key stumbling block in a society attemptingto move from political conflict towards peace. However, the legacy of militarized masculinitiesand the social conditions that shaped those masculinities have not been addressedsufficiently.

Violence, Masculinities, and Conflict TransformationThe demilitarization of former combatants was a dual process. Some men were reintegratedinto communities through taking up key positions in the community, and there has beena leveraging of funds to ex-combatant men involved in community work. As communitywork became more professional and salaried men moved on to the peace-building territory,

which was traditionally dominated by women, low-paid and undervalued. This shift hasbeen understood as representing a transition from violent masculinities to peace-buildingmasculinities. While these analyses have contributed to the mapping of the processesof the de-militarization, de-mobilization, and reintegration of combatants, analyzing theimplications of that shift on women requires further attention.63

Other men experienced the costs of war in the form of drug addiction, hyper-vigilance,and underemployment.64 Research has suggested that some of these men often returnedhome to find that their authority within the household was challenged or rejected by thewomen who had been left to keep families together in their absence.65 During the periodof conflict transformation these men became the focus for analyses of the costs of men’sinvolvement in war. While the crisis of masculinity thesis had been formulated througha general analysis of masculinities in other contexts, in Northern Ireland it was morecontained. In a sense, the costs of masculinities that were identified in studies of these menreflected some of the costs that working-class women had been incurring both during andafter the conflict. A study of women’s health in a socioeconomically deprived area of Belfastin 2000 found that mental health difficulties were self-reported by over half of the surveygroup, ranging from severe stress (62 percent), depression (53 percent) to anxiety/worry(24 percent).66 The study also revealed a high level of prescription drug dependency bywomen.67

Other men continued to assume militarized roles perceiving the war as yet to be won.The Irish Republican dissidents who rejected Sinn Fein’s political strategy are almostexclusively male and recent data indicate that 14 percent of respondents in the Irish republican/nationalist community have sympathy with the dissidents.68 It can be suggested thatsome of this sympathy emerges less from the dissidents’ political standpoints, and morefrom their dispensing of informal justice to young anti-social men perceived as damagingcommunities. The dissidents have waged a war on two fronts. They have targeted thesecurity forces and also targeted young men who they label as anti-social in punishmentattacks. These attacks impact whole families and mothers in particular who experience thetrauma of sons being kneecapped for example.69 However, in the period since the signingof the Agreement levels of militarism did drop, but some young working-class men’sattraction to ghetto warfare has remained strong and has been fuelled by the dynamics ofethno-nationalism, class, and gender.70

Contemporary Patterns of Men’s ViolenceThe post-conflict environment retained the effects of late capitalist societies in the form ofpoverty, social marginalization, and under-employment, which has meant that poor, urbancommunities reflected the same social conditions that mark poor urban communities inmany European countries.71Again, these types of social conditions impact both men andwomen in multiple ways. Young women’s expectations remain low although they tend tohave higher educational achievement than their male counterparts.72 It is difficult to assesswhether this slight educational advantage translates into significant social gains in laterlife given the wider social inequalities women experience.73 What can be suggested is thatyoung working-class women often achieve one of the indicators of normative femininity,motherhood, but they do so often under conditions of social exclusion. Young men, in thecontext of recession and communities that have undergone decades of conflict, find securingnormative forms of masculinities through the traditional anchors of employment difficult.The strength of the industrial base thirty years ago in Northern Ireland almost guaranteedyoung Protestant men employment or access to a trade through an apprenticeship.74 Thiswas a fundamental route through which young men gained status and recognition from

others of their manhood.75 The social conditions that young men experience can lead to thedevelopment of what can be termed hyper-masculinities.

Raewyn Connell explains that adaptations by socially marginalized young men tothe ideals of masculinities can be marked by expressions of hyper-masculinity as youngmen try to gain respect, independence, and power through developing physical toughnessrather than through building a career.76 In Northern Ireland these ideals are reflected inthe activities of a section of the older generation who lived through or participated inthe Troubles. While there has been some symbolic rebranding within communities, thegunman is still commemorated by the murals.77 Some young men continue to look up tothe paramilitaries.78 During the 2005 loyalist riots one young man said “I know them all.Even with their balaclavas on.”79

In inner city Belfast young men are bombarded with powerful images of what it meansto be a man and often their masculinities become constituted in hostile and dangerousenvironments.80 In some urban areas the conflict produced the spatial “encirclement” ofresidential areas inhabited by one ethno-nationalist community by residential areas populatedby the opposing group. This spatial ordering of communities entrenches sectarianism,and encourages strong ideological and cultural ethno-nationalist identifications. It also reproducesfeelings of being under perpetual threat from the opposing group which in turnreinforces the community’s need to defend itself from attacks by the other ethno-nationalistgroup.81

These social conditions impact young men in multiple ways. A study by Harlandrevealed that young men in inner city communities in Belfast remained pessimistic abouttheir futures, and he notes the lack of employment for these young men means that theoutcomes from school are more precarious and insecure than they were a generation ago,which compounds the problem of educational underachievement.82 The context of austeritywill no doubt reinforce these negative perceptions. Moreover, Harland and McCready’s2012 longitudinal study of adolescent males found that “consistently, the majority of boysdescribed their schools and homes as safe, and their own communities often as beingunsafe.”83 Sectarianism, ethnicity, geography, and alcohol were identified by the sample asthe most important factors in terms of their experience of violence. “There were examplesgiven of fighting at interface areas and stones being thrown at their school bus as they wentthrough certain areas.”84

Masculinities, Social Exclusion, and Ethnic InclusionTraditional class-based politics addressed the conditions underlying the creation of theseforms of hyper-masculinity, including poverty, educational under-achievement, and socialmarginalization. In the absence of an agenda to tackle social inequality, working-classcommunities lack a narrative to express their grievances. The decline of class politicsin England exposed a youth culture that lacked any stable political narrative to addressthe increasingly impoverished conditions of the urban poor. James Treadwell et al. arguethat all that is left for these communities is to focus on consumerism.85 In relation to theU.K. summer riots in 2011 they observe that in England “perpetually marginalised youthpopulations have become moody and vaguely ‘pissed off’ without ever understanding why.”Lacking a political narrative, the rioters took their frustrations to “the shops.”86

Northern Ireland has not been immune to the effects of neoliberalism and globalizationbut the legacy of ethno-nationalist conflict creates particular dynamics in relation to howthese factors impact masculinities and patterns of protest, aggression, and violence.87 Despite

ongoing processes of conflict transformation, ethnic identifications and sectarianismremain strong among the younger generation particularly in working-class communities,and recent survey data suggests a hardening of ethnic identity.88 At an instrumental level,violence, at times, has been proven to be a successful strategy in terms of securing communitydemands. Men’s violence is also utilized to broadcast grievances to the widercommunity and raise the spectre of widespread violence by men in defense of nationalistspaces, culture, and aspirations. Young men’s violence and rioting is particularly useful forcommunicating the breakdown of normal modes of life and the impending threat that thede-stabilizing effects of localized violence will spread to the broader society.

However, there are key differences between the constitution of violent masculinitiesin Northern Ireland and those studied in the English context. Those young men whorioted in England in the summer of 2011 were discursively placed outside of the authenticcommunity.89 The dynamics of the loyalist riots provoked in late 2012 by restrictions beingplaced on the flying of the Union flag on Belfast City Hall were different in terms of therelationship between young male rioters and the broader community. When young men’sprotesting and rioting in Northern Ireland occurs in the service of nationalist grievancesthey continue to be located within the authentic community through their ethno-nationalistidentifications. This relationship is complicated further by the fact that the Police Serviceof Northern Ireland believed local paramilitaries orchestrated much of the rioting. Youngmen’s violence articulates resentment towards unwanted changes that impact on the broadercommunity. This explains partly why there has been less emphasis on the relationshipbetween dysfunctional families and anti-social behavior and underachievement by youngmen in mainstream political discourse in Northern Ireland.

However, responses to these expressions of violence are not immune from the discoursesof capitalism and consumerism. During the period of the loyalist flag protestsmuch of the journalistic analysis of the effects of the protests considered their impact onbusiness in the run up to Christmas. However, the young men who rioted were unlikely toshare in the jobs that were preserved or created in the city centre or to benefit from theinward investment their protests might deter.90 As the protests progressed, the intra-dividingclass lines become clearer along the financial fault lines that divide the more affluent from

those dispossessed by neoliberal economics and the effects of decades of political violence.Steve Hall has engaged in an historical analysis that mapped what he calls the “pacification”of masculinities in late capitalism.91 Hall argues that success in contemporary societies,particularly success in the arena of employment, requires the sublimation of aggressive andviolent behavior.92 Cultures that generate male violence reinforce working-class men’s disadvantagewithin late capitalist societies. According to Hall, violence creates subordinationand exclusion not dominance and power for groups of working-class men.93 Therefore, thedynamics of patterns of men’s violence in Northern Ireland are complex, bound up with thepreservation of ethnic power while also exposing the effects of economic disempowermenton working-class men. While the dynamics of men’s violence has been rarely addressedthrough explorations of their masculinities, some research has engaged with young men atlocalized levels through the institution of the school.

Changing Patterns of Violent Masculinities?Many studies have shown that schools are instrumental in the formation of masculineidentities.94 Harland and McCready’s five-year longitudinal study in Northern Ireland with378 adolescent boys in post-primary school found complex and changing patterns of masculinitythrough the ways in which boys think about what it means to be a man. For

example, from the ages of 11–13, irrespective of school type, perceptions of normativemasculinity were relatively high across the whole sample with the majority of boys believingthat men, for example, should be dominant, aggressive, a good fighter, competitive,powerful, heterosexual, and able to stand up for themselves. Violence and violence relatedissues were considered to be a normal part of young male development and an acceptableway to resolve issues. Those boys reporting highest levels of normative masculinity scoredlower in levels of academic motivation/preference and higher in levels of misbehavior. Incontrast, boys reporting lowest levels of normative masculinity scored higher in academicmotivation/preference and lower in levels of misbehavior.

For the majority of boys, however, their perceptions of normative masculinity becamemuch more complex as they progressed through adolescence. There was a moveaway from stereotypical notions of masculinity to a more considered and less stereotypicalunderstanding of masculinity. Boys also became increasingly confused about the morecontroversial, identity-challenging aspects of what it means to be a man in response toquestions such as “a man should hug another man,” “can have a boyfriend,” or “it’s okfor a man to cry.”95 One aspect of masculine identity formation that remained consistentfor all boys across the five years was that it was important for a man to displaymoral and ethical responsibility and provide for his family.96 These changing patternsof masculinity during adolescence reveal complexities boys experience when attemptingto understand masculine identities that sit outside a traditional normative masculinitiesframework.

Acknowledging a boy’s capacity to change and mature is a pivotal factor in understandingadolescent behavior. This maturing aspect of adolescent male development andcomplex mental processing can be easily overlooked. Schools and community interventioncannot be tasked with remedying the long-term poverty and social marginalizationthat create masculine identities and expressions of violent masculinities. Strengthening thecapacity of primary welfare agencies is an essential part of a broader program of socialpolicies aimed at addressing socioeconomic marginalization and poverty. However, becauseboys are rarely taught about masculinity, or gender, they are often left to their own,or other perhaps more sinister, influences to forge their masculine identities. This can meanthat certain boys and young men remain susceptible, or attracted to, violent masculinities,either as victims or perpetrators. This is perhaps where interventions supporting boys toquestion attitudes and behavior associated with normative or violent masculinities may bemost useful. Helping boys to understand and process changing patterns of masculinities isan underdeveloped area of intervention that could be developed to support a range of socialinstitutions and adults working with adolescent boys.

Concluding RemarksDespite critical studies of masculinities being an important and growing part of globalsocial inquiry, to date there has been a dearth of studies into masculinities in NorthernIreland. In particular, despite over forty years of political conflict, the notion of violentmasculinities has not been considered an important variable in analysis of that conflict.While we acknowledge that the constitution of masculinities did not produce the ongoingethno-nationalist antagonisms, this article presents evidence of the complexities withinchanging patterns of violent masculinities that have particular relevance in understandingmen’s violence in conflict and conflict transformational contexts. We also suggest thatmuch more critical analysis is required to address the complexities and multiplicity ofmasculinities in relation to the specific contours of the region. This article has attemptedto illustrate how particular constitutions of masculinities have impacted both men and

women in negative ways. An impetus to address violent masculinities within the context ofa feminist agenda remains a vital aspect of conflict transformation.

Notes1. Judith Newton, “White Guys,” Feminist Studies 24(3) (1998), p. 576.2. John Innes, The End of Masculinity (Buckingham: Open University Press, 1998), p. 2.3. See Fidelma Ashe, The New Politics of Masculinities (London and New York: Routledge,2007).4. SeeMichael Flood, “The Men’s Bibliography.” Available at http://mensbiblio.xyonline.net/(accessed 24 September 2013).5. Ashe, Politics of Masculinities, pp. 96–156.6. Fidelma Ashe, “Gender and Ethno-nationalist Politics in Northern Ireland,” in Colin Coulterand Michael Murray, eds., Northern Ireland after the Troubles (Manchester: Manchester UniversityPress, 2008), pp. 45–60.7. See Marysia Zalewski, “Gender Ghosts in McGarry and O’Leary and Representations ofthe Conflict in Northern Ireland,” Political Studies 53(1) (2005), pp. 201–221.8. Newton, “White Guys,” p. 572.9. For example, Iris Marion Young, Justice and the Politics of Difference (Princeton, NJ:Princeton University Press, 1990).10. Newton, “White Guys,” p. 572.11. Rodgers Brubaker and Frederick Cooper, “Beyond Identity,” Theory and Society 29(1)(2000), pp. 1–47.12. See Michel Foucault, The History of Sexuality Vol. 1: The Will to Knowledge (London:Penguin, 1990).13. See Adrian Little, “Feminism and the Politics of Difference in Northern Ireland,” Journalof Political Ideologies 7(2) (2002), pp. 163–177 as an example.14. The 1998 Northern Ireland peace agreement is often referred to simply as the Agreement.15. See Jonathan Tonge, The New Northern Irish Politics? (London: Palgrave MacMillan,2004).Downloaded by [University of Ulster Library] at 03:10 14 August 2014Troubling Masculinities 75916. See for an overview, Susan Faludi, Stiffed, The Betrayal of the American Man (Hammersmith:HarperCollins, 1990).17. See Ashe, “Gender and Ethno-Nationalism.”18. For critical readings see Debbie Ging, Men and Masculinities in Irish Cinema (London:Palgrave MacMillan, 2013), p. 100; Caroline Magennis, Sons of Ulster: Masculinities in the ContemporaryNorthern Irish Novel (Oxford: Peter Lang, 2010). For analyses see Fidelma Ashe, “FromParamilitaries to Peacemakers: The Gender Dynamics of Community-Based Restorative Justice inNorthern Ireland,” British Journal of Politics and International Relations 11(2) (2009), pp. 298–314;Lorraine Dowler, “Till Death Do Us Part: Masculinity, Friendship and Nationalism in Belfast, NorthernIreland,” Environment and Planning D, Society and Space 19 (2001), pp. 53–71; Karen Lysaght,“Dangerous Friends and Deadly Foes—Performances of Masculinity in a Divided Society,” IrishGeography 35(1) (2002), pp. 51–62; Sara McDowell, “Commemorating Dead ‘Men’: Genderingthe Past and Present in Post-conflict Northern Ireland,” Gender, Place and Culture 15(4) (2008),pp. 335–354; Linda Racioppi and Katherine O’Sullivan See, “‘This We Will Maintain’: Gender,Ethno-Nationalism and the Politics of Unionism in Northern Ireland,” Nations and Nationalism 7(1)(2001), pp. 93–112; Simona Sharoni, “Gendering Resistance within an Irish Republican PrisonerCommunity: A Conversation with Laurence McKeown,” International Feminist Journal of Politics2(1) (2000), pp. 104–123.19. Alan Feldman, Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terrorism

in Northern Ireland (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991).20. Jeff Hearn and David Morgan, “The Critique of Men,” in Hearn and Morgan, eds., Men,Masculinity and Social Theory (London: Hyman Unwin, 1990), pp. 206–214. See also Jeff Hearn,“The Implications of Critical Studies on Men,” Nora 3 (1997), pp. 48–60; Jeff Hearn, “TheorizingMen and Men’s Theorizing: Varieties of Discursive Practices in Men Theorizing of Men,” Theoryand Society 27 (1998), pp. 781–816.21. See Hearn, “Critical Studies on Men”; Hearn, “Theorizing Men.”22. See Ashe, Politics of Masculinities; R.W. Connell, Masculinities (Cambridge: Polity Press,1995); Connell and James W. Messerschmidt, “Hegemonic Masculinities: Rethinking the Concept,”Gender and Society 19(6) (2005), pp. 829–859; Michael Kimmel, Manhood in American: A CulturalHistory (New York: Free Press, 1996).23. See for example Judith Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity,(London: Routledge, 1990); Lynne Segal, Slow Motion: Changing Masculinities, Changing Men(London: Virago Press, 1997).24. Connell, Masculinities, chapter 1.25. Ibid.26. See, for example, Gary T. Barker, Dying to be Men: Youth, Masculinity and Social Exclusion(London and New York: Routledge, 2005); Connell, Masculinities; Steve Hall, “Daubing theDrudges of Fury: Men, Violence and the Piety of the ‘Hegemonic Masculinity’ Thesis,” TheoreticalCriminology 6(1) (2002), pp. 35–61.27. Alan Petterson, “Research on Men and Masculinities: Some Implications of Recent Theoryfor Future Work,” Men and Masculinities 6(1) (2003), pp. 54–69.28. For example, Jeff Hearn, The Violences of Men: How Men Talk About and How AgenciesRespond to Men’s Violence to Women (London: Sage Publications, 1998).29. Joanne Nagel, “Masculinity and Nationalism: Gender, Sexuality and the Making of Nations”Ethnic and Racial Studies, 21 (2) (1998), pp. 242–269.30. See alsoGeorge L. Mosse, The Image of Man: The Creation of Modern Masculinity (Oxford:Oxford University Press, 1996).31. Nagel, “Masculinity and Nationalism,” p. 252.32. See Hearn and Morgan, “The Critique of Men,” pp. 206–208.33. Ibid., pp. 7–8.34. Mosse, The Image of Man.35. See Martin MacAnGhaill, ed., Understanding Masculinities: Social Relations and CulturalArenas (Birmingham: Open University Press, 1996).Downloaded by [University of Ulster Library] at 03:10 14 August 2014760 F. Ashe and K. Harland36. Bew, Gibbon, and Patterson, Social Classes (London: Serif, 2002).37. Landon Hancock, “Northern Ireland: Troubles Brewing.” Available at http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/landon.htm (accessed 28 May 2013).38. Sabine Wichert, Northern Ireland since 1945 (Essex: Longman, 1991), p. 89.39. The European Commission Office in Northern Ireland, “EU Structural Funds in NorthernIreland” (Belfast: European Commission Office in Northern Ireland, 2004), p. 1.40. Michael Smyth, “The Northern Ireland Labour Market 1977-2007: Then, Today and Tomorrow”(Newtownabbey, University of Ulster). Available at http://www.lra.org.uk/smyth paper-2.pdf(accessed 23 August 2013).41. Socialist Party, “Good Friday Agreement.” Available at http://redlug.com/Documents/TDNPPt4.htm (accessed 28 May 2013), p. 5.42. See Michael Messner, The Politics of Masculinities: Men in Movements (Thousand Oaks,CA: Sage, 1997).43. Neil Lyndon, No More Sex Wars (London: Sinclair Stevenson, 1992).44. Warren Farrell, The Myth of Male Power (New York: Random House, 1993).

45. McDowell, “Dead Men.”46. See Dermot Feenan, “Women Judges: Gendering Judging, Justifying Diversity,” Journal ofLaw and Society 35(4) (2008), pp. 490–519.47. Stephen M. Whitehead, Men and Masculinities (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), p. 55.48. Ashe, “Gendering Ethno-Nationalism.”49. Centre for the Advancement of Women into Politics, “NI Assembly Election 2011.” Availableat http://www.qub.ac.uk/cawp/election.html (accessed 10 July 2013).50. Karen Lysaght, “Mobilising the Rhetoric of Defence: Exploring Working-Class Masculinitiesin a Divided City,” in Betitina Van Hoven and Kathrin Horschelmann, eds., Spaces of Masculinities(London: Routledge, 2005), pp. 115–127, at p. 119.51. Spike V. Peterson, “Political Identities: Nationalism as Heterosexism,” International FeministJournal of Politics 1(1) (1999), pp. 34–65.52. Lorraine Dowler, “‘And They Think I’m a Nice Old Lady’: Women and War in Belfast,Northern Ireland,” Gender, Place and Culture 5(2) (1998), pp. 159–176.53. Ibid.54. Ibid.55. Feldman, Formations of Violence, pp. 176–185; see also Padraig O’Malley, Biting at theGrave, The Irish Hunger Strikes and the Politics of Despair (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990).56. Begona Aretxaga, “Dirty Protest,” Ethos 23(2) (1995), pp. 123–148.57. Kieran McEvoy and Harry Mika, “Punishment, Policing and Praxis: Restorative Justiceand Non-Violent Alternatives to Paramilitary Punishments in Northern Ireland,” Policing and Society11(3–4) (2001), pp. 359–382.58. Ibid.59. Ken Harland, “Violent Youth Culture in Northern Ireland: Young Men, Violence and theChallenges of Peacebuilding,” Youth & Society 43 (June) (2011), pp. 422–430.60. Kate Fearon and Monica McWilliams, eds., The Story of the Northern Ireland Women’sCoalition (Belfast: Blackstaff, 1999).61. Ibid.62. Lyndsey Harris, A Strategic Analysis of Loyalist Paramilitaries in Northern Ireland (Ph.D.Diss.: University of Ulster, 2008).63. Ashe, “From Paramilitaries to Peacemakers.”64. For example, Adrian Grounds and Ruth Jamieson, “No Sense of an Ending: Researchingthe Experience of Imprisonment and Release Amongst Republican Ex-Prisoners,” TheoreticalCriminology 7 (2003), pp. 347–362.65. Lorraine Dowler and Peter Shirlow, “‘Wee Women No More’: Female Partners of RepublicanPolitical Prisoners in Belfast,” Environment and Planning A, 42(2) (2010), pp. 384–399.66. Anne Lazenbatt, Una Lynch, and Eileen O’Neill, “Revealing the Hidden ‘Troubles’ inNorthern Ireland: The Role of Participatory Rapid Appraisal,” Health Education Research 16(5)(2001), pp. 567–578.Downloaded by [University of Ulster Library] at 03:10 14 August 2014Troubling Masculinities 76167. Ibid.68. Jonathan Tonge, “No-One Likes Us: We Don’t Care,” Political Quarterly 83(2) (2012),pp. 219–226.69. Derry Journal Online, “I Hope He Listens Now: Mum Ordered to Bring Son to be Shot.”Available at http://www.derryjournal.com/news/i-hope-he-listens-now-mum-ordered-to-bring-sonto-be-shot-1-3789831 (accessed 10 July 2013).70. On sexuality see Marian Duggan, “Theorising Homophobic Hate Crime in Northern Ireland,”papers from the British Criminology Conference, 8 (2008), pp. 33–49. Available at http://shura.

shu.ac.uk/6014/4/Duggan theorising homophobic.pdfhttp://shura.shu.ac.uk/6014/4/Duggan theorisinghomophobic.pdf (accessed 27 August 2013). Duggan also discusses evidence of more liberalattitudes to sexuality by young people in Northern Ireland.71. Goretti Horgan, “The Making of an Outsider: Growing Up in Poverty in Northern Ireland,”Youth & Society 43(2) (2011), pp.453– 467.72. Ken Harland and Sam McCready, “Taking Boys Seriously: A Longitudinal Study of AdolescentMaleSchool-Life Experiences” (2012). Available at http://www.dojni.gov.uk/index/statisticsresearch/stats-research-publications/ad-hoc-research-reports/taking-boys-seriously-a-longitudinalstudy-of-adolescent-male-school-life-experiences-in-northern-ireland-final.pdf (accessed 22 July2013).73. Office of the First and Deputy First Minister, “Gender Equality Statistics 2011 Update.”Available at http://www.ofmdfmni.gov.uk/gender equality strategy statistics 2011 update.pdf (accessed10 July 2013).74. Ken Harland and Susan Morgan “Work with Young Men in Northern Ireland—An AdvocacyApproach,” Youth and Policy: Journal of Critical Analysis 81(2003).75. Ken Harland, Karen Beattie, and SamMcCready, Young Men and the Squeeze of Masculinity(Ulster: University of Ulster Centre for Young Men’s Studies, 2005).76. Connell, Masculinities.77. McDowell, “Dead Men.”78. Harland, “Violent Youth Culture.”79. Stephen Howe, “Mad Dogs and Ulstermen: the Crisis of Loyalism: Part One.” Availableat http://www.opendemocracy.net/globalization-protest/loyalism 2876.jsp (accessed 10 July2013).80. Ken Harland, Young Men Talking: Voices from Belfast (Ulster: University of Ulster Centrefor Young Men’s Studies, 1997).81. See Peter Shirlow, “Belfast: The ‘Post-Conflict City,”’ Space and Polity 10(2) (2006),pp. 99–107.82. Ken Harland, Men and Masculinity: An Ethnographic Study into the Construction of MasculineIdentities in Inner City Belfast (Ph.D. Diss.: University of Ulster, 2000).83. Harland and McCready “Taking Boys Seriously,” p. 65.84. Ibid., p. 66.85. James Treadwell, Daniel Briggs, Simon Winlow, and Steve Hall, “Shopocalyse Now: ConsumerCulture and the English riots of 2011,” British Journal of Criminology 53 (2013), pp. 1–17,at p. 3. See also Fidelma Ashe, “‘All about Eve’: Mothers, Masculinities and the 2011 UK Riots,”Political Studies EarlyView. Available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9248/earlyview (accessed 27 August 2013)86. Ibid., p. 3.87. Ibid.88. Northern Ireland Young People’s Life and Times Survey, 2012. Available athttp://www.ark.ac.uk/ylt/2012/Identity/ (accessed 22 July 2013).89. Ibid.90. For further explorations of class and economic regeneration in the city see Peter Shirlowand Brendan Murtagh, Belfast: Segregation Violence and the City (London: Pluto Press, 2006).91. Steve Hall, “Daubing the Drudges.”92. Ibid.93. Ibid.Downloaded by [University of Ulster Library] at 03:10 14 August 2014762 F. Ashe and K. Harland94. Carolyn Jackson, Lads and Ladettes in School (Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2006);

Martin Mac An Ghaill, The Making of Men: Masculinities, Sexualities and Schooling (Buckingham:Open University Press, 1994); Carrie Paechter, Being Boys, Being Girls: Learning Masculinities andFemininities (Buckingham: Open University Press, 2007).95. Harland and McCready “Taking Boys Seriously,” pp. 51–53.96. Ibid., p. 52.Downloaded by [University of Ulster Library] at 03:10 14 August 2014