Els Elffers, University of Amsterdam

Earlier and later anti-psychologism in linguistics

Abstract

Psychologism has been a mainstream view in linguistics throughout many

centuries. Serious and prominent anti-psychologism flourished in the first

half of the 20th century, mainly in European structuralism. As a minority

view, mostly dubbed “anti-mentalism,” anti-psychologism resurfaced in the

1970s in reaction to Chomsky’s strong psychologism. I will show that, in

spite of differences due to their relationship to divergent problem contexts,

the earlier and later varieties of anti-psychologism share as a common

kernel a full recognition of the intentional character of language. However,

the locus of intentionality differs between the two.

1. Introduction

Psychologism is generally regarded as the most plausible view of language.

According to this view, language exists in the mind of the language user; it

is a mental object. Although the term “psychologism” was not used by

linguists before the 19th century, the corresponding view was taken for

granted from Antiquity onwards.1 In earlier days, the focus of psychologism 1 Cf. Formigari (2004) for the development of psychologism throughout the centuries.

1

was on semantics: meanings were regarded as mental entities (“concepts” or

“ideas”); language sounds were thought to be physical. After the

introduction of a sharp distinction between phonetics and phonology

(around 1875), linguistically relevant sounds were seen as psychical as well

(“sound images”).

During the first decades of the 20th century, psychologism came under

increasing criticism in writings of European structuralists such as Roman

Jakobson (1870-1960) and Louis Hjelmslev (1899-1965). After a revival of

psychologism, anti-psychologistic views were defended again from the

1970s onwards by, among others, Jerrold Katz (1902-1999).

The central characteristics of earlier and later anti-psychologism will be

discussed in the following two sections (2 and 3). In section 4, the focus will

be on differences and similarities between earlier and later anti-

psychologism, in relation to the linguistic and scientific climate of the

periods involved.

2. Earlier anti-psychologism

Anti-psychologism in its early stages arose as a reaction to the extremely

concrete variety of 19th-century psychologism, which was defended by

psychologically-oriented linguists such as Heymann Steinthal (1823-1899)

and Hermann Paul (1846-1921). They interpreted language use as a direct

2

reflection of thought processes. In conformity with the contemporary state

of the art in German psychology, these processes were mainly conceived as

series of successive mental representations (“Vorstellungen”), that could

enter into synthetic relations, for example through association.2 In its most

extreme form, this view was purely mechanistic: utterances were regarded

as reflexive responses to inner occurrences.3

This type of psychologism was criticized since the end of the 19th century.

The view was more and more regarded as a source of problems, all related

to its general lack of abstraction. Two lines of criticism can be

distinguished:

a) Criticism related (implicitly or explicitly) to main tenets of new

philosophical and psychological approaches that were based upon the work

of Franz Brentano (1838-1917) and Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Their

views profoundly influenced many disciplines. Remnants of psychologism

in 19th-century logic and mathematics disappeared through the important

distinction that was now being made between thoughts as concrete

psychological processes and thoughts as abstract objective contents of these

processes (their “intentional objects”): only the latter interpretation, the one

that went unrecognized by representationist psychologists, was judged

relevant to logic and mathematics.4 2 The psychological ideas of linguists such as Steinthal were mainly borrowed from the philosopher-psychologist Johann Friedrich Herbart (1776-1841).3 According to this extreme view, silence is, in fact, a phenomenon in need of explanation. Steinthal, indeed, asserts that we have to “learn” to integrate our expressions without speech. Cf. Knobloch (1988: 111).4 For the de-psychologization of logic and mathematics, the work of Gottlob Frege (1848-1925) was of crucial importance.

3

Psychology and linguistics were also affected by the new approach. Newly

developed currents in psychology such as Akt-psychology, Gestalt-

psychology and phenomenological psychology were developed and replaced

the earlier representationist and associationist view of human thought by a

non-atomistic view, in which intentional acts, directed to objective contents,

replaced the passive “inner theatre” of successive representations.5 For

linguists and philosophers of language (e.g. Karl Bühler (1879-1963)) this

implied a semantics of willful acts (sometimes explicitly related to

communicative goals and contexts) and of abstract propositional contents,

instead of a semantics of concrete inner psychical occurrences, which

ultimately implied that all we can talk about is our own inner life.6

b) Criticism related (implicitly or explicitly) to new autonomist tendencies

in the work of linguists such as Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) and

early students of semiotics, especially Russian formalists such as Viktor

Šklovsky (1893-1984). In these approaches, languages, other symbolic

systems and also works of literary art were conceived as abstract, self-

contained systems. For linguistics, this implied an abstract, functional

conception of phonological as well as semantic elements, all of which were

seen as being based not upon pre-established psychical entities, but solely

upon their relations of opposition to other elements within the system.5 I borrow the expression “inner theatre” from Knobloch (1984: 414-415), who explains that the “innere Bühne” could contain slightly variable inhabitants; its very existence, however, was a “fraglose psychologische Realität.”6 Anton Marty (1847-1914),who was a pupil of Brentano, just like Husserl, observed and criticized this implication. Cf. his comment: “The announcement of one own psychic life is not the only, nor the primary thing which is intended in deliberate speaking” (Marty 1908: 237, transl. E.E.),

4

European structuralism combined both lines of criticism. The label “anti-

psychologism” covered both. Scholars such as Jakobson of the Prague

School and Hjemslev of the Copenhague School propagated anti-

psychologism as a milestone in the difficult route towards a new and

methodologically sound linguistic approach.

In this route, liberating linguistics from the spell of representationism was

the central issue. Despite explicit rejections of psychologism, linguists

hardly elaborated an alternative, non-psychological ontology. Whereas in

mathematics and logic the insights of Brentano and Husserl eventually

resulted in a complete depsychologization,7 linguistics retained what can

best be called a “wavering psychologism”: communicative acts,

propositional contents and self-contained language systems became

disengaged from concrete psychical phenomena, but their ontological realm

either remained unclear or was actually described as belonging to some

(more abstract) area of psychology.8

3. Later anti-psychologism

7 For example, Frege (cf. note 4) assumes the existence of a non-physical, non-psychological “drittes Reich.” Objective contents of thought, belong to this realm. Frege‘s view inspired Popper to his conception of “world 3” (cf. section 3 below).8 Cf. Knobloch’s (1988: 312) characterization of the school of Brentano as “den mit psychologistischen Mitteln vorgegangen Versuch, den Psychologismus zu überwinden.” In Elffers(1998) I deal with the phenomenon of “wavering psychologism” in more detail.

5

After the powerful impulse of early 20th -century anti-psychologism,

psychologism regained its prominent status in the 1960s, and kept it until

the present day. This was mainly due to Chomsky’s influential work.9 For

Chomsky, linguistics is a branch of psychology. Theoretical-linguistic

statements refer to entities and processes in the “language faculty” or

“competence” in the language user’s mind. Grammars are “psychologically

real”; they describe the speaker’s/listener’s “knowledge of language.”10

Chomsky’s strong type of psychologism (mostly labeled “mentalism”11) has

been criticized, by linguists as well as by philosophers and psychologists. In

many cases criticism did not lead to a total rejection of the psychologist

program, but rather to suggestions for changes within the program.12

Only a small minority of critics developed a fully fledged anti-psychologist

alternative. Between 1970 and 1990, four authors, independently of each

other, devoted volumes to an elaborate defense of an anti-psychologist view

of linguistics, namely David Cooper (b. 1942) , Isa Itkonen (b. 1944),

Jerrold Katz and Philip Carr (b. 1953). More recently, after a period of near-

silence, the debate over psychologism was reignited by the appearance in

9 Cf. Graffi (2001), a historiography of 200 years of syntax, in which periodization proceeds in terms of (anti-)psychologism: 19th-century psychologistic syntax is followed by 20th-century anti-psychologistic structuralistic syntax. The last periode of theoretical (mainly Chomskian) syntax begins halfway the 20th-century and is again psychologistic.10 Cf. Chomsky’s (1965: 8) statement: “Every speaker of a language has mastered and internalized a generative grammar that expresses his knowledge of his language.”11 Chomsky’s view was a reaction to what was called “anti-mentalism” in American structuralism. This anti-mentalism should not be confused with anti-psychologism as discussed in this article. It was actually a behavioristic “translation” of concrete and mechanistic 19th-century psychologism, be it that its significance for linguistic practice was almost nil.12 For example, suggestions were made for psychological experiments to test psychological reality claims, or for weaker varieties of psychologism.

6

2006 of the vehemently anti-psychologist book Ignorance of Language by

Michael Devitt (b. 1942).13

This minority line of thought was triggered by the observation of four

problems with Chomskian psychologism:

(i) The justification problem. Given the fact that grammars are theories,

proposed by the linguist to cover a set of data, there are in principle many

extensionally equivalent grammars. How can we know, without

psychological tests, that the grammarian’s favorite grammar is also the

psychologically real grammar?

(ii) The ‘knowing how - knowing that’ problem. Psychological reality of

grammars implies propositional knowledge of the ‘knowing that’ type,

whereas linguistic competence has a non-propositional ‘knowing how’

character, comparable with, for example, knowing how to ride a bicycle.

How can psychological reality be rescued without the implausible

assumption that language users have propositional knowledge of e.g.,

grammatical structures and rules?

(iii) The competence - content problem. Knowledge as a psychological state

(i.e. linguistic competence) has to be distinguished from knowledge as the

abstract content to which this state is directed (e.g. a language), which

seems to be the linguist’s primary object of research. Chomskian

psychologism equates the two. How can psychological reality be rescued if

13 Cf. the bibliography for exact titles and other data about the books. Some short anti-psychologists texts, which will not be discussed here, appeared in the same period. Antal (1984) is an example.

7

the primary object of linguistic investigation appears not to be linguistic

competence?

(iv) The linguistic practice problem. If linguists were seriously engaged in a

psychological enterprise, their practice would resemble the psychologist’s

practice of observing large groups of experimental subjects and devising

tests for psychological reality. Does not the fact that expert linguists mostly

rely upon their own observations and theories suggest that they are actually

engaged in a non-psychological project?

Later anti-psychologists do not all observe all four problems, or attach the

same importance to them, but they all discuss at least three of them. All

present a clear ontological alternative to psychologism, but the alternatives

themselves are different, also in their degree of elaboration. Put very briefly,

for Cooper, linguistic entities belong to a purely linguistic reality; for

Itkonen, this reality is a non-psychological social reality consisting of

conventions and norms; for Katz the relevant realm is Platonic; for Carr

language belongs to the abstract World 3 as defined by the philosopher Karl

Popper (1902-1994). Devitt, like Cooper, appeals to a linguistic reality,

which is, however, connected to physical reality.14

Anti-psychologists thus solve the four above problems by rejecting the

psychological reality claim. Language users are no longer supposed to

possess any knowledge of the linguist’s theoretical results (problem 1 and 2)

because these results do not refer to the language user’s mind (problem 3 14 According to Devitt, linguistic properties are ””high-level” relational properties” of physical entities.

8

and 4). Instead, linguists are supposed to study phenomena that belong to

some non-psychological realm.

4. Earlier and later anti-psychologism: differences and similarities

In the previous sections, only a very concise sketch of earlier and later

varieties of anti-psychologism could be presented. However, the picture that

emerges is clear enough to allow some conclusions about differences and

similarities.15 The differences are in the majority, which explains the fact

that there are hardly references to earlier anti-psychologism in the work of

later anti-psychologists.16 Despite the differences, all types of anti-

psychologism appear to share one common kernel.

4.1 Differences

There is one clear contrast between earlier and later anti-psychologism:

earlier anti-psychologists were actually still inclined to adopt some watered-

down type of psychologism, whereas the later anti-mentalists’ ontology is

entirely non-psychological.

15 More extensive documentation about earlier anti-psychologism is presented in Knobloch (1988) and Elffers (1998). Later anti-psychologism is dealt with in more detail in Carr (1984) and Botha (1992).16 Itkonen (1978) is the only later anti-psychologist text that refers to earlier anti-psychologists.

9

This difference can be shown to be connected with differences in

motivation. The central aim for earlier anti-psychologists was to develop a

sound analysis of what a system of linguistic signs is, qua structure and qua

function; an analysis that could avoid the problematic view of a pre-

established “inner theatre”, and of human communication as being about

occurrences in that theatre.17 In that context the possibility of a sufficiently

abstract view of linguistic entities was essential, more than the precise

ontological status of the abstract elements and structures.18

For later anti-psychologists this abstraction is no longer an issue; the “inner

theatre” has been closed long ago. What they worry about is the alleged

status of the abstract linguistic entities as unconscious knowledge of the

language user. They are in need of a sound metatheory that avoids

problematic aspects of the psychological reality claim. A radical non-

psychological ontology fulfills this need.

These different motivations, are, in turn, closely connected with the

intellectual contexts in which both views were developed. Earlier anti-

psychologism was part of a broad and powerful de-psychologizing

movement, in which also mathematics and logic, the study of literature and

even psychology itself, were involved. In this context, the wavering

17 Cf. Hermann Paul’s (1846-1921) definition of the sentence as “das Symbol dafür dass sich die Verbindung mehrerer Vorstellungen […] in der Seele des Sprechenden vollzogen hat” (Paul 1920: 121). Cf. note 6 for Marty’s criticism of this view.18 In a later text, Jakobson, observes that the use of the term “anti-psychologism” to indicate “new, phenomenological psychology with its fundamental concept of intentionality” was confusing: “The legend of a ‘militant anti-psychologism’ […] is based on several misunderstandings. When phenomenologically oriented linguists resorted to the slogans of anti-psychologism, they used this term in the same way as Husserl did […].” (Jakobson 1973: 16).

10

ontology of abstract intentional objects (which did not go unnoticed), did

not stand in the way of a general notion of being on the right track.

For later anti-psychologism, broader interdisciplinary developments are

relevant as well. These developments are closely connected with three of the

four problems that necessitated a non-psychological ontology:

(i) During the first half of the 20th century, social sciences and linguistics

completed their separation from philosophy and made a further turn towards

the methods of the empirical sciences. From the 1960s onwards, Chomsky’s

introduction of generative grammar fostered this development in linguistics.

At the same time, a similar renewal of psychology, which had resulted in a

strong experimental tradition, triggered a critical attitude towards

Chomsky’s variety of psychologism. Consequently, the justification

problem was formulated again and again from the early 1960s onwards.

(ii) From about 1950, the Oxonian current of analytical philosophy

(“ordinary language philosophy”) was engaged in a meticulous research of

psychological terms and concepts. One of the results was the distinction

between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’, which was later incorporated in

psychology as ‘declarative knowledge’ vs. ‘procedural knowledge.’19

Doubts about Chomskian psychologism based upon the ‘knowing how’-

‘knowing that’ problem could only arise against this background.

19 Gilbert Ryle (1900-1976) introduced the distinction between ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing how’. Of the later anti-psychologists, only Devitt discusses later elaborations of the distinction in terms of ‘declarative knowledge’ vs. ‘procedural knowledge’ (Devitt 2006: ch.11).

11

(iii) “Naturalizing” developments in the philosophy of science, initiated in

the 1970s by philosophers such as Thomas Kuhn (1922-1996) and Imre

Lakatos (1922-1974), led to major changes in the character of this

discipline. Contrary to the early-20th-century view of this area as a

prescriptive “logic of science,” conformity to actual scientific practice now

became an important requirement: if a scientific metatheory is in conflict

with current scientific practice, it may be the metatheory that is in need of

correction. The linguistic practice problem is based upon this line of

thought.

In summary, earlier anti-psychologism and later anti-psychologism owe

their specific content to the problems they were supposed to solve. These

problems, are, in turn, closely connected to general developments in the

contemporary intellectual climate.

4.2 Similarities

In contrast to the other problems with Chomskian psychologism, the

competence - content problem appears not to be restricted to the period in

question, but to be related to the earlier period as well. There is a continuity

between the earlier lack – of - abstraction problem and the later competence

- content problem: ‘intentionality’ can be regarded as the key concept of

both.

12

The main tenet of the concept of intentionality, which originated in

mediaeval scholastic philosophy, is the distinction between psychical

processes and the abstract contents (the intentional objects) to which they

are directed. Earlier and later anti-psychologists reject the equation of

psychological states or processes and their contents, and favor the

distinction embodied in the intentionality concept. The early 20th-century

lack –of - abstraction problem and the late 20th-century competence -

content problem are thus rooted in the recognition of a common distinction.

However, intentionality is a multi-aspect concept. The modern sense of

“goal-directness” was absent from the scholastic notion, which refers to a

metaphorically conceived relation of “containing”, and was applied to intra-

psychical phenomena such as observation or thought and their content. Only

gradually was the act-goal aspect activated, in reaction to Brentano’s

reviving the concept.20

The focus of earlier and later anti-psychologism is on different aspects of

intentionality. For early anti-psychologism, one important area to which the

concept was applied was semantics, as noted above. The meaning of

linguistic elements and structures was regarded from a new act-oriented

psychological perspective, This sometimes included goal-directedness, in

the sense that communicative goals were taken into account. In this context,

20 Cf. Van Baaren (1996).

13

the act-goal aspect of intentionality was activated, which furthered the rise

of early speech act theories.21

For newer anti-psychologism, intentionality is relevant only in the old

scholastic meaning. Its area is the total language system, which is no longer

regarded as a psychical state but as an abstract object. The act-goal aspect is

not relevant to this application. Not surprisingly, in later anti-psychologism,

explicit references to intentionality are hardly related to the role of the

concept in earlier linguistic anti-psychologism, but rather to the alleged

ontological similarity between linguistics and logic and mathematics, also

areas to which only the old meaning applies.22

A certain historical distance allows us, nevertheless, to recognize the

common intentional kernel in earlier and later anti-psychologism.

Bibliography

Antal, László. 1984. “Psychologism, platonism and realism in linguistics”. Word 35. 163 - 175.Baaren, Robbert van. 1996. “Brentano's intentionaliteitsbegrip en het ontstaan van de psychologie als wetenschap”. Algemeen Nederlands Tijdschrift voor Wijsbegeerte 87. 136-147.Botha, Rudolf. 1992. Twentieth-century conceptions of language: mastering the metaphysics market. Oxford: Blackwell.Carr. Philip. 1984. Linguistic realities. An autonomist metatheory for the generative enterprise. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Chomsky, Noam. 1965. Aspects of the Theory of Syntax. Cambridge, Mass.: M.I.T. Press. Cooper, David. 1975. Knowledge of language. London: Prism Press & New York: Humanities Press Inc.

21 The work of Adolf Reinach (1883-1917) is an interesting example of a speech act theory avant-la-lettre.22 For example, Katz (1981) draws explicit parallels between Husserl’s and Frege’s views of mathematics and his own view of linguistics.

14

Elffers, Els. 1998. “Linguistics and psychology; how should we reconstruct their relationship?” Metahistoriography. Theoretical and methodological aspects in the historiography of linguistics. Ed. by Peter Schmitter & Marijke van der Wal, 87 - 106. Münster: Nodus.Formigari, Lia. 2004. A history of language philosophies. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.Graffi, Giorgio. 2001. 200 Years of Syntax: A critical survey. Amsterdam & Philadelphia: John Benjamins.Itkonen, Esa. 1978. Grammatical analysis and metascience. A critical investigation into the methodological and philosophical foundations of ‘autonomous’ linguistics. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. Jakobson, Roman. 1973. Main Trends in the Science of Language. London: George Allen & Unwin.Katz, Jerrold. 1981. Language and other abstract objects. Oxford: Blackwell.Knobloch, Clemens. 1984. “Sprache und Denken bei Wundt, Paul und Marty. Ein Beitrag zur Problemgeschichte der Sprachpsychologie”. Historiographia Linguistica 11, 413-448.Knobloch, Clemens.1988. Geschichte der psychologischen Sprachauffassung in Deutschland von 1850 bis 1920. Tübingen: Niemeyer.Marty, Anton. 1908. Untersuchungen zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Grammatik und Sprachphilosophie. Halle: Niemeyer.Paul, Hermann.19205 . Prinzipien der Sprachgeschichte. Halle: Niemeyer. (1st edition 1880).

15