pylkkanen time consciousness 2

8/2/2019 Pylkkanen Time Consciousness 2

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CHAPTER FIFTEEN

DOES DYNAMICAL MODELLING EXPLAIN TIME

CONSCIOUSNESS?

PAAVO PYLKKNEN

Abstract

1. One of the fascinating features of conscious experience is its temporal

structure. When I am listening to a song, I am conscious of the notes that I hearnow for the first time. But I also seem to be conscious of the notes that I heard amoment ago, and through my anticipations I even seem to be conscious of thenotes I have not yet heard.

2. Husserls famous model of time consciousness has three aspects. There is theprimal impression directed to the notes heard 'now'. But there is also anawareness of the 'just past' ('retention') and even an awareness of the tones tocome ('protention'). Husserl thought that retention and protention are perceptualprocesses. At the same time he realized that the idea that we would literallyperceive the past is paradoxical. According to the usual view of time only thepresent and what is in it exists; the past no longer exists, the future does not yetexist. How could we possibly perceive that which does not exist?

3. van Gelder has proposed that time consciousness can be approached byconsidering a dynamical model of auditory pattern recognition. Here the state ofthe system at any given time models the awareness of the auditory pattern at thatmoment. Van Gelder suggests that this state builds the past and the future intothe present, which is what Husserl required. However, van Gelder denies theidea that retention involves perception of the past.

4. I propose that even the dynamical approach fails to give an intelligible


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Computation, Information, Cognition - The Nexus and the Liminal 219

account of time consciousness. van Gelder just eliminates an essential aspect oftime consciousness, namely the perception of previously experienced elements.A more adequate account can be provided within David Bohms 'implicateorder' framework. This allows for a continued perception of previously heardnotes, because these are understood to be 'enfoldments' that actually are in thepresent moment. Because Bohms approach builds upon a richer (quantumphysically inspired) view of time and movement, it can better than Husserlsmake sense of the idea of retention as 'perception of the past'.

1. Introduction

Conscious experience has become a focus of intense study in recent years inphilosophy, psychology, cognitive neuroscience, cognitive science, artificialintelligence, etc., so much so that it is fair to say that a new interdisciplinaryfield of 'consciousness studies' has been born (see e.g. Gzeldere 1997, vanGulick 2004). An important aim of consciousness studies is simply to explainthe various puzzling aspects of consciousness. Following van Gulicks (1995)classification, the puzzling aspects that need explanation include a) thedifference between conscious mental states and nonconscious or unconsciousmental states or processes; b) the distinction between conscious and

nonconscious or unconscious creatures; c) qualia and the qualitative nature ofconscious experience; d) subjectivity; and e) intrinsic intentionality / semantictransparency. There is yet another feature which van Gulick lifts up. Whileconsciousness researchers sometimes use the term phenomenalinterchangeably with qualitative (connected to raw feels), van Gulick prefersto reserve phenomenal for a more comprehensive range of features:

Current philosophical debate has focused heavily on raw feels, but they arejust one aspect of our experienced inner life and thus only part of what we mustdeal with if we aim to describe the phenomenal structure of experience. In thissense the use of phenomenal accords better with its historical use by Kant andlater by the phenomenologists. The order and connectedness that we find withinexperience, its conceptual organization, its temporal structure, its emotive tonesand moods, and the fact that our experience is that of a (more or less) unified

self set over against an objective world are just a few of features other than rawfeels that properly fall within the bounds of the phenomenal. All will need to beaddressed if we take the phenomenal aspect as our explanandum. (1995: 64)

This article discusses the phenomenal structure of experience in light ofsome new theoretical developments. I will focus on the temporal structure ofconsciousness, in particular to a phenomenon known as 'time consciousness',


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Chapter Fifteen220

characterized by Tim van Gelder as ...a special kind of awareness of temporalobjects an awareness of them as enduring (1999: 245).

A good example of time consciousness is provided by considering whathappens when one is listening to music. When I am listening to a song, I amconscious of the notes that I hear now for the first time. But I also seem to beconscious of the notes that I heard a moment ago, and through my anticipations

I even seem, as least in some sense, to be conscious of the notes I have not yetexplicitly heard.

Husserls famous model of time consciousness has three aspects. There isthe primal impression directed to the notes heard now. But there is also anawareness of the just past (retention) and even an awareness of the tones tocome (protention). Van Gelder emphasizes that Husserl thought that retentionand protention are perceptual processes. At the same time Husserl realized thatthe idea that we would literally perceive the past is paradoxical. According tothe usual view of time only the present and what is in it exists; the past nolonger exists, the future does not yet exist. How could we possibly perceive thatwhich does not exist?

Van Gelder (1999) has tried to resolve the above paradox by proposing thattime consciousness can be adequately described by dynamical models (such as a

dynamical model of auditory pattern recognition). Here the state of the system atany given time models the awareness of the auditory pattern at that moment.Van Gelder suggests further that this state builds the past and the future into thepresent, which is what Husserl required. However, van Gelder denies Husserlsidea that retention involves perception of the past, in this way hoping to avoidthe paradox.

I propose in this article that even the dynamical approach fails to givean intelligible account of time consciousness. For it seems to me that van Gelder

just eliminates rather than describes or explains an essential aspect of timeconsciousness, namely the perception of previously experienced elements. Tounderstand the limits of the dynamical approach even better, I will consider thephysicist-cum-philosopher David Bohms criticism of the differential calculusas a description of motion. I will finally consider Bohms own characterization

of time consciousness within his implicate order framework. I suggest that aBohmian model of time consciousness allows for a continued perception ofpreviously heard notes, because these are understood to be enfoldments thatactually are in the present moment. Because Bohms approach builds upon aricher (quantum physically inspired) view of time and movement, I suggest thatit can better than that of Husserl make sense of the idea of retention asperception of the past.


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2. van Gelders dynamical model of time consciousness

When trying to tackle time consciousness in light of the dynamical approachvan Gelder considers a dynamical model of auditory pattern recognition (theLexin model, developed by Sven Anderson and Robert Port). The idea here isthat the state of the system at any given time models awareness of the auditorypattern at that moment, and that state builds the past and the future into thepresent, just as Husserl saw was required. How is the past, according to vanGelder, built in to current awareness? He notes that in a dynamical system thereis only one way in which the past can be retained in the present, namely bymaking a difference to the current state of the system, i.e. to the location of thecurrent state in the space of possible states. The idea is that it is that location inits difference from other locations in the context of the intrinsic dynamics of thesystem, which stores in the system the way in which the auditory patternunfolded in past. It is how the system remembers where it came from. In suchan arrangement the past intrinsically and automatically flavours awareness ofthe current stage. In this kind of model, the momentary awareness (Husserlsprimal impression) is essentially shaped by retention of the past.

How, then, is the future built in? Van Gelder notes that a dynamical system,by its nature, continues on a trajectory from any point, even when there is noexternal influence. The particular path it follows is determined by its currentstate in conjunction with its intrinsic dynamics. He suggests that there is a realsense in which the system automatically builds in a future for every state ithappens to occupy. The system will automatically proceed on a path that reflectsthe particular auditory pattern that it has heard up to that point. For van Gelderthis implies that protention, too, is a geometrically describable property ofdynamical systems. What is relevant about the current state is the way in which,given the systems intrinsic dynamics, the location shapes the future behaviourof system. The current location of the state of the system stores the systemssense of where it is going. As with retention, protention is an essential aspectof current awareness

Van Gelder says, however, that if retention is the current location of system(considered insofar as that current location reflects the past inputs), it is hard to

make sense of retention as perceptual and especially as perceptual with regard tosomething no longer exists. He is thus led to conclude that Husserl wasmistaken in attempting to describe retention on a perceptual model.

I think there are reasons to question van Gelders suggestion. Does adynamical model really describe, say, our experience of listening to musicadequately? When I am listening to a song, I hear some notes for the first timenow, but the notes I have heard some time ago are typically stillreverberating in my conscious experience. It seems obvious that I perceive


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them both, and in this sense it seems that Husserl was correct. Can a dynamicalmodel, in the way characterized by van Gelder, thus really describe myexperience. Van Gelder suggests, for example, that in a dynamical system thereis only one way in which the past can be retained in the present, namely bymaking a difference to the current state of the system, i.e. to the location of thecurrent state in the space of possible states. Presumably this means that thenotes heard a little time ago no longer are present in experience but ratherinfluence the only notes that exist, namely the notes that are heard now. But Ithink that in our actual experience the past notes make a difference to thecurrent state of conscious experience by simply being present in experience, andthus they can be perceived. If this is correct, it seems that the dynamical modelcannot really describe the past tones adequately. It is no wonder that van Gelderis led to give up the notion that retention of the past notes is a kind ofperception. But it seems to me that when doing this he does justice to dynamicalsystems, not to actual conscious experience.

I would like to suggest further that the above kind of troubles of trying tomodel time consciousness with dynamical models might connected with thetroubles of using the differential calculus to model motion in general. Suchtroubles have been described in an illuminating way by David Bohm in the lastchapter of his 1980 book Wholeness and the Implicate Order. In this contextBohm also proposed another way of characterizing motion in terms of a notionhe called the implicate order. Further, he described time consciousness inlight of his new theory. Assuming that van Gelders attempt to use dynamicalmodelling to describe time consciousness does not really work, it might beworth examining Bohms views. For on the one hand these might help us to geta deeper understanding of why dynamical modelling fails to capture the essenceof time consciousness; on the other hand they might offer us an alternative,more fruitful way of describing time consciousness. In what follows I shalltherefore first examine Bohms criticisms of using the differential calculus todescribe physical motion in general (section 3). I will then briefly considerBohms alternative approach to describe motion and consider what a Bohmianmodel of time consciousness might look like (section 4).

3. Bohms criticism of the differential calculus as a description

of motion

Bohm starts his discussion of the limitations of the differential calculus in thedescription of physical motion by drawing attention to the way motion is usuallythought of, i.e. in terms of a series of points along a line. If a particle moves, onetypically assumes that at a given time t1 a particle is at a position x1, while at alater time t2, it is at another position x2. The velocity v of such a particle can be


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then be expressed as

x2-x1/t2-t1.

Bohm then criticizes (in a way that resembles Bertrand Russells criticisms) thisusual way of thinking:

Of course, this way of thinking does not in any way reflect or convey theimmediate sense of motion that we may have at a given moment, for example,with a sequence of musical notes reverberating in consciousness (or in the visualperception of a speeding car). Rather, it is only an abstract symbolization ofmovement, having a relation to the actuality of motion, similar to that between amusical score and the actual experience of the music itself. If, as is commonlydone, we take the above abstract symbolization as a faithful representation ofthe actuality of movement we become entangled in a series of confused andbasically insoluble problems. (1980: 201-2)

Bohm is thus strongly underlining the difference between our immediate senseof motion and the commonly used abstract symbolization of motion. If one takesthe abstract symbolization as a representation of motion, one is led to assumethat the times t1 and t2 both exist. For presumably, if the abstract symbolisationis assumed to represent something real, the things it represents must exist. Thesymbolization refers to t1 and t2 at the same time, so presumably t1 and t2 mustexist at the same time. Bohm emphasizes, however, that the assumption thatboth t1 and t2 exist at the same time is in contradiction with our actualexperience, which indicates that ...when a given moment, say t2, is present andactual, an earlier moment, such as t1 is past. That is to say, it is gone, non-existent, never to return (ibid: 202). The key trouble is that ...if we say thatthe velocity of a particular now (at t2) is (x2-x1)/(t2-t1) we are trying to relatewhat is (i.e., x2 and t2) to what is not (i.e., x1 and t1) (ibid: 202). The usualview of time says that only the present and what is in it exists. The past is gone,the future is not yet. Yet the usual notion of velocity at a given nowparadoxically involves both the present and the past.

Bohm admits that we can use the above expression as long as weremember that we are using it abstractly and symbolically, as is, indeed,commonly done in science and mathematics. But he emphasizes that the abstractsymbolism cannot comprehend that:

...the velocity now is active now (e.g., it determines how a particle will act fromnow on, in itself, and in relation to other particles). How are we to understand thepresent activity of a position (x1) that is now non-existent and gone for ever?


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He notes that it is commonly thought that this problem is resolved by thedifferential calculus:

What is done here is to let the time interval, delta t = t2-t1 become vanishinglysmall, along with delta x = x2-x1. The velocity now is defined as the limit of theratio delta x/delta t as delta t approaches zero. It is then implied that the problemdescribed above no longer arises, because x2 and x1 are in effect taken at the

same time. They may thus be present together and related in an activity thatdepends on both. (1980: 202)

However, Bohm is not satisfied with even this approach. He claims that ...thisprocedure is still as abstract and symbolic as was the original one in which thetime interval was taken as finite. Thus one has no immediate experience of atime interval of zero length, nor can one see in terms of reflective thought whatthis could mean (ibid: 202). The procedure is thus both empirically andconceptually/logically ambiguous! Bohm thus thinks that when taken as anabstract formalism, the differential calculus is not fully consistent in a logicalsense. Of course, it is widely used in contemporary science, so it does work upto a point. What is particular important for our present discussion is that there iseven a whole research programme in cognitive science, namely the abovementioned dynamical approach or dynamical modelling which makesessential use of the differential calculus when describing various cognitiveprocesses (see e.g. Port and van Gelder eds 1995). However, Bohm underlinesthat the differential calculus has a limited range of applicability even forphysical phenomena:

...it applies only within the area of continuous movements and then only as atechnical algorithm that happens to be correct for this sort of movement....however, according to the quantum theory, movement is not fundamentallycontinuous. So even as an algorithm its current field of application is limited totheories expressed in terms of classical concepts ... in which it provides a goodapproximation for the purpose of calculating the movements of material objects.(1980: 202)

The above point might also encourage us to reflect upon the applicability of

dynamical systems theory (insofar as it relies on the different calculus) todescribe cognition and consciousness. To be sure, cognition and consciousexperience involve the sort of movement which can conveniently be describedin terms of the differential calculus. However, one sees sometimes a tendencyto assume that this approach works for cognition and conscious experience in avery broad and comprehensive sense. But is such a tendency really justified?For example, we saw briefly above that van Gelders (1999) attempt to discusstime consciousness in terms of the dynamical approach seems very problematic.


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He ends up eliminating the idea of retention as perception, because there is noroom for such perception of the past in the dynamical framework. But thismay be more a reflection of the limits of the dynamical approach, than anindication that time consciousness does not involve perception of the past.

I think Bohms above criticism of the differential calculus applies strongly alsoin the case of time consciousness, thus suggesting that there are important limits

of applicability to the dynamical approach in the domain of cognition andconsciousness. But how should we then think about time consciousness? Bohmproposed an alternative way of thinking about this, and we shall now move on tobriefly consider this.

4. A Bohmian model of time consciousness

We saw above how for Husserl time consciousness involves perceiving thepast. He proposed that the retentions of the just past tones ought to beunderstood as a kind of perception. At the same time he admitted that suchperception of the past is paradoxical. Let us now see whether Bohmsdescription of time consciousness can avoid this paradox, without eliminatingimportant aspects of time consciousness, as van Gelders model seems to do.

Bohm notes that when listening to music (e.g. a rapid sequence of C-D-E-F-G), in the moment we hear G for the first time, we also hear C-D-E-Freverberating in consciousness. Such reverberations are not memories norrepresentations but rather active transformations of the original sounds. Theyare all co-present but can differ in that they can have a different degree ofenfoldment.

We can measure this degree of enfoldment in terms of the time elapsed sincethe sound was first heard. Let us assume our unit of time to be 100 ms, andintroduce an enfoldment parameter n. Cn then means that C was first heard nunits ago, and is at the nth degree of enfoldment. We hear now G for the firsttime, and we have just heard the sequence of C-D-E-F-G (with 100 ms intervalbetween the notes). We can now describe the conscious experience of themelody at that moment as a co-presence of Cn, Dn-1, En-2, Fn-3, Gn-4. That is,

we have a co-presence of elements at different degrees of enfoldmentWhen listening to music one is thus apprehending a set of co-present

elements at different degrees of enfoldment. Such an experience has a certainorder, which Bohm calls enfolded or implicate order. He suggests that whenlistening to music one is directly perceiving an implicate order (as opposed tothinking about such an order abstractly in terms of thought). Bohm furthersuggests that such a direct perception of an implicate order consists of animmediate sense of flow. In other words, our sense of flow is a certain mode of


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experiencing, namely a mode of directly experiencing an implicate order

In my view, Bohms characterization helps to make sense of Husserlsparadoxical view of time consciousness which involves perceiving the past.For in Bohms model the past elements are assumed to be in the present, asactive transformations or enfolded structures. Thus, they can be perceivedwithout such a perception involving any paradox. At the same time Bohms

model does not eliminate important aspects of time consciousness, in the wayvan Gelders dynamical approach seems to do.

Bohm arrived at the notion of implicate order when thinking about theproblems of interpreting quantum theory. Although Bohm himself proposed in1950 famous hidden-variable model, in which we can think of particles (suchas electrons) as moving continuously, he admitted that it is not likely that theyactually move continuously at very short time intervals (e.g. the Planck time of10 to -33 s). The notion of a particle moving continuously thus has to bereplaced by some model which gives rise to discrete movement. In one suchdiscrete model we have co-present elements (fields) at different degrees ofenfoldment, i.e. an implicate order in Bohms terms (see Bohm 1980: 179-86;Bohm and Hiley 1993: 367-8). The basic mathematical algorithm to describe animplicate order is a certain kind of algebra, not the differential calculus (Bohm

1980: 157-71).The above suggests, amazingly, that the implicate order model of an electronin Bohmian quantum theory is in some key ways analogous to a model that candescribe the phenomenal structure of time consciousness. This opens up thepossibility of a whole new research programme, with a wide range ofapplications. Of course, we have seen that even dynamical modelling has beenapplied in a wide range of fields, from the physical to the cognitive, all the wayto time consciousness. What we have suggested in this article is that there maybe important limits to the applicability of dynamical modelling, especially whenit comes to phenomena which have a discrete structure, such as motion at thequantum level, or time consciousness. We have further suggested that it seemsthat the implicate order can do better. Much study is, of course, required in thefuture to establish in more detail the prospects of this new approach (for further

discussion, see Bohm 1980; 1986, Pylkknen forthcoming).

5. Concluding Remarks

Basic motivation for writing this paper was to show that the idea of logicalpluralism could be applied to the notion of semantic information, and morespecifically to that of informational content as it arises from the InverseRelationship Principle.


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Thus far the following has been argued for: (i) logical pluralism arises infairly simple communication contexts, and (ii) the formulation of apluralistically inspired measure for informational content is necessary to get afirm grip on what is informative in such contexts. More generally it could beclaimed that, on the one hand, logical pluralism provides an elucidation (if not away out) of the problem of assigning informational content to logical truths,while on the other hand the informational perspective on logic makes the idea oflogical pluralism more plausible (for it represents a useful application).

Notwithstanding the fact that a comprehensive theory of informationalpluralism is not a part of the present paper, its basic features have been outlined.Most importantly, it is shown to be not only a viable alternative to a monistunderstanding of information, but also a fundamentally superior one. The keyargument in favour of informational pluralism could be summarised byappealing to the notion of a logics discriminatory power. The idea of the latterbeing that deductive strength varies with discriminatory strength: the more alogic proves, the fewer distinctions (or discriminations) it registers (Humberstone, 2005, 207), it appears that a weaker logic leads to a morediscriminatory measure of informational content. Informational pluralism then,is precisely the idea that from a certain perspective (called global or external)these discriminations should partly be disregarded.

As to the blindspots in this exposition, a few need to be highlighted. First andforemost, very little attention was paid to the requirement for semanticinformation to have an informee-independent meaning. Despite the non-pragmatic character of the last examples informational pluralism, the meaninginvariance of a message was not as such established. In other words, noargument was provided to show that a difference in informational contentbetween internal and external perspective should not entail a change in meaning.This being a serious threat to a purported pluralist theory of semanticinformation, it should be treated in detail when designing such a theory. For themoment, such a defence could be restricted to pointing out that, when adopting aminimalist understanding of meaning, the meaning-invariance requirement canbe fulfilled within the bounds of a pluralist understanding of information.

Next, the problem of assigning informational content to contradictions the so-called Bar-Hillel/Carnap-paradox from property 3.2 (see Floridi, 2004) was not treated either. The semantics of relevant logic allowing forinconsistent situations, one might be tempted to think that a solution would arisein a very similar way to its dual problem (the content of logical truths).Inconsistent situations being very different from their incomplete siblings, it isdoubtful whether they could count as genuine (that is, possibly factual) cases inthe sense of definition 4 and the concept of information as being true in virtue ofwhat is factual (Israel & Perry, 1990). Assigning less than maximal content to a


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contradiction, would require one to either adopt a (non-semantic) dialetheistposition (the world is possibly inconsistent), or to reject the factualityrequirement on semantic information. Both options need an extensive discussionwhich lies beyond present papers aim.

Apart from mentioned omissions, further research on the topic of informationalpluralism might include the formulation of an independent motivation of

pluralism which relies on methodological considerations emerging from thephilosophy of information. Reconsidering the notion of logical discrimination,one might easily start to think of a logic as an interface in the sense of Floridi &Sanders (2004), thus leading to a reformulation of informational pluralism interms of levels of abstraction. This being only one possible suggestion forfurther research, the broad topic of informational pluralism as a part of thephilosophy of information shows itself as a promising line of enquiry into thenature of semantic information.

References

Atmanspacher, H. and Ruhnau, E. eds, 1997. Time, Temporality, Now.Experiencing Time and Concepts of Time in an InterdisciplinaryPerspective.

Berlin: Springer.Bohm, D. 1980. Wholeness and the Implicate Order. London: Routledge.. 1986. Time, the implicate order and pre-space, in D.Griffin ed. Physics

and the Ultimate Significance of Time: Bohm, Prigogine and Process

Philosophy. Albany: SUNY Press.Dainton, B. 2000. Stream of Consciousness. Unity and continuity in conscious

experience. London and New York: Routledge.. 2001. Time and Space. Chesham: Acumen.Gzeldere, G. 1997. Introduction: The Many Faces of Consciousness: A Field

Guide, in Block et al. eds, 1997. The Nature of Consciousness:Philosophical Debates. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.

Petitot, J. et al. eds, 1999. Naturalizing phenomenology, Stanford UniversityPress.

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