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THE IBC DIGESTVOLUME V

MARCH 2021

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The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code Digest:

March 2021

The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 has been one among the most dynamic legislative

enactments in India that has been amended from time to time to meet the ever-changing needs in

the field of insolvency laws. Each legislature gets its shape over increased litigation that helps

conclusively decide matters and acts as a tool for interpretation of the provisions of the statute.

The provisions of the IBC have been tested time and again before the judicial and quasi-judicial

authorities ranging from the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal to the Apex Court namely

the Supreme Court of India. The judgments passed by the National Company Law Tribunal

(NCLT), National Company Law Appellate Tribunal (NCLAT), the High Court and the Supreme

Court of India have helped the Insolvency Professionals and every professional practicing in the

field of Insolvency Laws, interpret the Code read with the relevant Regulations, in its true letter

and spirit.

‘The Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code Digest’, is an initiative by Corpvin Curious, the Knowledge

and Research Cell of Corpvin Consulting LLP to summarize all the landmark judicial

pronouncements passed each month in the field of Insolvency and interpret the amendments that

are introduced in the Code or the Regulations made thereunder, if any, to assist professionals in

understanding the implications of such pronouncements and/or amendments in a summarized way.

Corpvin Curious is the brainchild of CS Jasveen Bindra and the team of Corpvin Curious is led by

her.

About the Author: CS Jasveen Bindra is a member of the Institute of Company Secretaries of

India as a Practicing Professional. She is a designated partner at Corpvin Consulting LLP. She has

an enriching experience in the field of Insolvency Laws, relating to; inter alia, the Initiation of

Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP) by a Financial Creditor, Initiation of CIRP by an

Operational Creditor, Process specific compliances during CIRP, Handholding of Insolvency

Professionals to ensure the smooth execution of CIRP and Liquidation Processes.

Happy Reading!

Disclaimer: Nothing contained in this document shall be construed as a legal opinion or view of

Corpvin Consulting LLP whatsoever and the content is to be used strictly for educational purpose

only.

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Table of Contents

Supreme Court Judgments .............................................................. 6

1. Kridhan Infrastructure Private Limited v. Venkatesan Sankaranarayan &

Ors……………………………………………………………..…………6

Upheld the Liquidation order against the Corporate Debtor due to delayed

implementation of the approved Resolution Plan and also held that time is a crucial

facet of the scheme under the IBC.

2. A. Navinchandra Steels Private Limited v. SREI Equipment Finance

Limited & Ors…..………………………………………………………..6

A petition either under Section 7 or Section 9 of the IBC is an independent proceeding

which is unaffected by winding up proceedings that may be filed qua the same company.

3. P. Mohanraj & Ors. v. M/s. Shah Brothers Ispat Private Limited ............ 7

Whether the institution or continuation of a proceeding under Section 138/141 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be said to be covered by the moratorium under

Section 14 of the IBC?

4. Gujrat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Mr. Amit Gupta & Ors. ................. 8

Whether the Hon’ble NCLT and NCLAT can exercise jurisdiction under the IBC over

dispute arising from contracts such as the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA)?

5. Kalpraj Dharamshi & Anr. v. Kotak Investment Advisors Ltd. & Anr…..

................................................................................................................ 9

Whether the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 or the principles laid

down therein would be applicable to proceeding under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy

Code, 2016?

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6. Alok Kaushik v. Mrs Bhuvaneshwari Ramanathan and Others ..............11

The issue in the present appeal relates to the costs, charges, expenses and professional

fees payable to a registered valuer appointed after the initiation of the CIRP under the

IBC, in a situation where the CIRP is eventually set aside by the Adjudicating Authority

or, as the case may be, Appellate Authority.

7. Arun Kumar Jagatramka v. Jindal Steel and Power Ltd. & Anr. ............12

It was held that a person who is ineligible under Section 29A of the IBC to submit a

resolution plan, is also barred from proposing a scheme of compromise and

arrangement under Section 230 of the Companies Act, 2013.

8. Sesh Nath Singh & Anr. v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank

Ltd and Anr..... ………………………………………………………….13

Whether prior proceedings under the SARFAESI Act qualify for the exclusion of time

under Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963?

9. Jaypee Kensington Boulevard Apartments Welfare Association & Ors. v.

NBCC (India) Ltd. & Ors. .....................................................................15

It was held that in the Adjudicatory process concerning a resolution plan under the

Code, there is no scope for interference with the commercial aspects of the decision of

the Committee of Creditors (CoC).

10. Indus Biotech Private Limited v. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund &

Ors………………………………………………………………………15

Decision upon the priority of consideration of an application under Section 8 of the

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 vis-à-vis an application under Section 7 of the

IBC by the Hon’ble NCLT.

11. Laxmi Pat Surana v. Union Bank of India & Anr. ..................................17

Whether an action under Section 7 of the IBC can be initiated by a financial creditor

against a corporate person (being a corporate debtor) concerning guarantee offered

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by it in respect of a loan account of the principal borrower (not being a Corporate

Debtor)?

National Company Law Appellate Tribunal Judgments

1. India Resurgence ARC Private Limited v. Amit Metaliks Limited and

Ors. ........................................................................................................19

It was held that the discretion of the CoC to take into account the value of security

interest of a Secured Creditor in approving of a Resolution Plan, is a guideline and not

imperative in terms.

2. Mr. Gulabchand Jain v. Mr. Ramchandra D. Choudhary ........................20

CoC is empowered to take a decision in regard to the liquidation of the Corporate

Debtor even after an application has been filed by the Resolution Professional placing

the Resolution Plan approved by the CoC before the Adjudicating Authority for

approval.

3. Vijay Sitaram Dandnaik v. Punjab National Bank and Anr. ...................20

The provisions of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 shall be applicable only if the

debt is acknowledged within three years i.e. before the expiry of the Limitation Period.

4. Committee of Creditors of EMCO Limited v. Mary Mody and Anr. ......21

Whether the Adjudicating Authority can direct the CoC to raise interim finance even if

the CoC has voted against the proposition?

5. Ram Ratan Kanoongo v. Veda Kumar Nimbagal and Anr. ....................21

It was held that a claim from third parties relating to any contract entered into by the

Corporate Debtor shall be deemed to have been extinguished upon approval of this

Resolution Plan, without any liability whatsoever on the Corporate Debtor.

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6. Mr. Ravi Shankar Deverakonda v. Committee of Creditors of Meenakshi

Energy Limited ......................................................................................19

The exercise of the power of extending the time limit by the ‘Adjudicating Authority’

in negation of the statutory provision under Section 12 of the Code may be desirable in

an exceptional/extraordinary circumstances

7. Indian Overseas Bank v. RAM Infrastructure Ltd., and Anr. .................22

Whether after imposition of moratorium any transaction done with respect to the assets

of the Corporate Debtor is deemed to be valid or not?

8. Radico Khaitan Ltd. v. BT & FC Pvt. Ltd. and Ors. ...............................23

Parameters for consolidation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Processes

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Supreme Court Judgments

1. Kridhan Infrastructure Private Limited v. Venkatesan Sankaranarayan & Ors.

Date of Pronouncement: 01.03.2021

Order Passed by: The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India

Coram: Hon’ble Justice Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, Hon’ble Justice M R Shah

In the impugned matter, the appellant submitted a Resolution Plan for the Corporate Debtor

under the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code 2016. The Resolution Plan was approved by the

CoC on 8 March 2019 with a majority of 89.92%. The Resolution Plan was approved by the

National Company Law Tribunal on 15 May 2019. The appellant accordingly deposited an

amount of Rs 5 Crores in an Escrow Account of the Corporate Debtor. However, the appellant

did not fulfil its further obligations, including equity infusion, under the Resolution Plan

despite numerous opportunities over a period of six months.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while passing an order in the matter, inter alia, held that time is

a crucial facet of the scheme under the IBC. To allow such proceedings to lapse into an

indefinite delay will plainly defeat the object of the statute. A good faith effort to resolve a

corporate insolvency is a preferred course. However, a resolution applicant must be fair in its

dealings as well. The appellant has, unreasonably, failed to abide by its obligations as

warranted under the Resolution Plan, hence the order of the Hon’ble NCLAT liquidating the

Corporate Debtor was upheld by the Hon’ble Apex Court.

Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/554ba9e24acf8eb0bd2e02c4df162436.pdf

2. A. Navinchandra Steels Private Limited v. SREI Equipment Finance Limited & Ors.



Coram: Hon’ble Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman, Hon’ble Justice B.R. Gavai

In the Instant matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India while deciding the matter, reiterated

that, given the object of the IBC as delineated in paragraphs 25 to 28 of Swiss Ribbons (P) Ltd.

v. Union of India, (2019) 4 SCC, it is clear that the IBC is a special statute dealing with revival

of companies that are in the red, winding up only being resorted to in case all attempts of

revival fail. Vis-à-vis the Companies Act, which is a general statute, deals with companies,

including companies that are in the red, the IBC is not only a special statute which must prevail

https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/554ba9e24acf8eb0bd2e02c4df162436.pdf

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in the event of conflict, but also has a non-obstante clause contained in Section 238, which

makes it even clearer that in case of conflict, the provisions of the IBC will prevail.

A petition either under Section 7 or Section 9 of the IBC is an independent proceeding which

is unaffected by winding up proceedings that may be filed qua the same company. Given the

object sought to be achieved by the IBC, it is clear that only where a company in winding up

is near corporate death, that no transfer of the winding up proceeding would then take place to

the NCLT to be tried as a proceeding under the IBC. Short of an irresistible conclusion that

corporate death is inevitable, every effort should be made to resuscitate the corporate debtor in

the larger public interest, which includes not only the workmen of the Corporate Debtor, but

also its creditors and the goods it produces in the larger interest of the economy of the country.

Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/6a65edb0cc17d66c677814115b1477f5.pdf

3. P. Mohanraj & Ors. v. M/s. Shah Brothers Ispat Private Limited



Coram: Hon’ble Justice Rohinton Fali Nariman, Hon’ble Justice Navin Sinha, and Hon’ble

Justice K.M. Joseph

Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and Section 138 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act, 1881

In the Instant matter, the issue that fell for determination in this appeal before the Hon’ble

Supreme Court of India was whether the institution or continuation of a proceeding under

Section 138/141 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 can be said to be covered by the

moratorium provision, namely, Section 14 of the IBC.

While deciding the matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court deliberated on several cardinal points

of law, inter alia, the Interpretation of Section 14 of the IBC, Application of the Noscitur a

sociis and ejusdem generis rules of interpretation to the Section 14(1)(a) of the IBC, the Object

of Section 14 of the Code, Section 14 vis-à-vis other moratorium sections in the IBC, The

Nature of Proceedings under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act etc.

Some key takeaways from the Judgment are as follows:

Given the tests laid down for distinction between Criminal and Civil Proceedings, it is

clear that a Section 138 proceeding can be said to be a “civil sheep” in a “criminal

wolf’s” clothing, as it is the interest of the victim that is sought to be protected, the

larger interest of the State being subsumed in the victim alone moving a court in cheque

https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/6a65edb0cc17d66c677814115b1477f5.pdf

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bouncing cases, as has been seen upon the analysis of Chapter XVII of the Negotiable

Instruments Act, 1881.

Regard being had to the object sought to be achieved by the IBC in imposing this

moratorium under Section 14 of the Code, a quasi-criminal proceeding which would

result in the assets of the Corporate Debtor being depleted would directly impact the

corporate insolvency resolution process in the same manner as the institution,

continuation, or execution of a decree in such suit in a civil court for the amount of debt

or other liability.

Hence, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it is clear that a quasi-criminal proceeding that is

contained in Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 would, given the object

and context of Section 14 of the IBC, amount to a “proceeding” within the meaning of Section

14(1)(a), the moratorium therefore attaching to such proceeding.

Further, for the period of moratorium, since no Section 138/141 proceeding can continue or be

initiated against the corporate debtor because of a statutory bar, such proceedings can be

initiated or continued against the persons mentioned in Section 141(1) and (2) of the

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, namely, the persons who, at the time when the offence was

committed, were in charge of, and was responsible to, the company (corporate debtor) for the

conduct of the business of the company and any director, manager, secretary or other officer

of the Company. This being the case, it is clear that the moratorium provision contained in

Section 14 of the IBC would apply only to the corporate debtor, the natural persons mentioned

in Section 141 continuing to be statutorily liable under Chapter XVII of the Negotiable

Instruments Act.

Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/4fd82b27266f68ac4065537fc1474029.pdf

4. Gujrat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited v. Mr. Amit Gupta & Ors.



Coram: Hon’ble Justice Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud and Hon’ble Justice M.R. Shah

Section 60 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

In the Instant matter, the questions that fell for consideration before the Hon’ble Supreme Court

of India were, whether the Hon’ble NCLT and NCLAT can exercise jurisdiction under the IBC

over dispute arising from contracts such as the Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) and whether

the appellant’s right to terminate the PPA in terms of 9.2.1(e) of the Agreement (on grounds

of initiation of CIRP) is regulated by the IBC.

https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/4fd82b27266f68ac4065537fc1474029.pdf

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While deciding the matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, inter alia, held that considering the

text of Section 60(5)(c) and the interpretation of similar provisions in other insolvency related

statutes, NCLT has jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes, which arise solely from or which relate

to the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor. However, in doing so, we issue a note of caution to

the NCLT and NCLAT to ensure that they do not usurp the legitimate jurisdiction of other

courts, tribunals and fora when the dispute is one which does not arise solely from or relate to

the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor. The nexus with the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor

must exist. For the adjudication of disputes that arise dehors the insolvency of the Corporate

Debtor, the RP must approach the relevant competent authority. For instance, if the dispute in

the present matter related to the non-supply of electricity, the RP would not have been entitled

to invoke the jurisdiction of the NCLT under the IBC.

Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/79e3093d3be5f907a06411924f0a6b62.pdf

Summary of Judgment:

https://www.ibbi.gov.in/uploads/legalframwork/6a638b7d5cb6127680a4e0aeb470a3c5.pdf

5. Kalpraj Dharamshi & Anr. v. Kotak Investment Advisors Ltd. & Anr.



Coram: Hon’ble Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, Hon’ble Justice B.R. Gavai and Hon’ble Justice

Krishna Murari

Section 61 and Section 238A of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and Section 14 of

the Limitation Act, 1963

In the Instant matter, the crucial question that fell for consideration before the Hon’ble

Supreme Court of India was, inter alia, whether the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation

Act, 1963 or the principles laid down therein would be applicable to proceeding under the

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

For the convenience of our readers, the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963

set forth as follows:

‘14. Exclusion of time of proceeding bona fide in court without jurisdiction. —

(1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit the time during which the plaintiff has

been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first

instance or of appeal or revision, against the defendant shall be excluded, where the

https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/79e3093d3be5f907a06411924f0a6b62.pdf

https://www.ibbi.gov.in/uploads/legalframwork/6a638b7d5cb6127680a4e0aeb470a3c5.pdf

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proceeding relates to the same matter in issue and is prosecuted in good faith in a court which,

from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

(2) In computing the period of limitation for any application, the time during which the

applicant has been prosecuting with due diligence another civil proceeding, whether in a court

of first instance or of appeal or revision, against the same party for the same relief shall be

excluded, where such proceeding is prosecuted in good faith in a court which, from defect of

jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, is unable to entertain it.

(3) XXXX ’

In this matter, the Respondent herein namely, Kotak Investment Advisors Limited (hereinafter

referred to as ‘KAIL) contented that the procedure followed by NCLT (for approving the

Resolution Plan under Section 30 and 31 of the IBC) was in breach of the principles of natural

justice, hence KAIL filed a Writ Petition before the Bombay High Court challenging the orders

passed by the Hon’ble NCLT. The High Court dismissed the Writ Petition filed by KIAL on

the ground that KIAL had an alternate and efficacious remedy of filing an appeal before

NCLAT. KIAL, thereafter filed appeals before the NCLAT, however the same was beyond the

limitation period of thirty days from the date of the order of the Hon’ble NCLT as prescribed

under Section 61 of the Code.

Hence, in the present matter, it was to be adjudged by this Hon’ble Supreme Court, if the time

period during which KIAL was prosecuting the Writ Petition before the Hon’ble High Court

would be excluded for the purpose of calculating the Limitation Period in accordance with

Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963.

While deciding the matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court, inter alia, held that the provisions of

Section 14 of the Limitation Act are meant for grant of relief, where a person has committed

some mistake. Referring to the Judgment in the matter of Consolidated Engineering Enterprises

(supra), it was reiterated that while considering the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation

Act, proper approach will have to be adopted and the provisions will have to be adopted and

the provisions will have to be interpreted, so as to advance the cause of justice, rather than

abort the proceedings. The Section is intended to provide a relief against the bar of limitation

in cases of mistaken remedy or selection of a wrong forum.

It was further observed that the legislature has enacted Section 14 to exempt a certain period

covered by a bona fide litigious activity. In accordance with Section 14, the time taken

diligently pursuing a remedy, in a wrong court, should be excluded.

Though strictly, the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not be

applicable to the proceedings before the quasi-judicial Tribunal, however, the principles

underlying the same would be applicable i.e., the proper approach will have to be of advancing

the cause of justice, rather than to abort the proceedings.

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Referring, to the Judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Central Inland Water

Transport Corporation Limited and another v. Brojo Nath Ganguly and another, it was also

reiterated in the Judgment that the Courts will not enforce and will, when called upon to do so,

strike down an unfair and unreasonable contract or an unfair and unreasonable clause in a

contract entered into between parties who are not equal in bargaining power. It has also been

held, that this principle will apply where a man has no choice, or no meaningful choice, but to

give his assent to a contract or sign on the dotted line in a prescribed or standard form or to

accept a set of rules as part of the contract, however unfair, unreasonable and unconscionable

a clause in that contract or form or rules may be.

Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/09d6ec71f2fdefd0e1011ae0c57e3e38.pdf

6. Alok Kaushik v. Mrs Bhuvaneshwari Ramanathan and Others



Coram: Hon’ble Justice Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud and Hon’ble Justice M.R. Shah

Section 60(5)(c) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

The present appeal was filed by Alok Kaushik, in the capacity of being a registered valuer of

the Plant and Machinery of Kavveri Telecom Infrastructure Limited (hereinafter referred to as

the Corporate Debtor). The issue in the present appeal relates to the costs, charges, expenses

and professional fees payable to a registered valuer appointed after the initiation of the CIRP

under the IBC, in a situation where the CIRP is eventually set aside by the Adjudicating

Authority or, as the case may be, the Appellate Authority.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that, the Appellant is justified in contending that there must

be a forum within the ambit and purview of the IBC which has the jurisdiction to make a

determination on a claim of the present nature, which has been instituted by a valuer who was

appointed in pursuance of the initiation of the CIRP by the RP.

In this matter, the NCLT had held that it was rendered functus officio in relation to the

appellant’s claim to which the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that it would be an incorrect

reading of the jurisdiction of the NCLT as an Adjudicating Authority under the IBC. In a recent

judgment in Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Limited vs Amit Gupta and Others, this Court clarified

the jurisdiction of the NCLT/NCLAT under Section 60(5)(c) of the IBC specifically stating

that considering the text of Section 60(5)(c) and the interpretation of similar provisions in

other insolvency related statutes, NCLT has jurisdiction to adjudicate disputes, which arise

solely from or which relate to the insolvency of the Corporate Debtor.

https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/09d6ec71f2fdefd0e1011ae0c57e3e38.pdf

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Though the CIRP was set aside later, the claim of the appellant as registered valuer related to

the period when he was discharging his functions as a registered valuer appointed as an incident

of the CIRP. The NCLT would have been justified in exercising its jurisdiction under Section

60(5)(c) of the IBC and, in exercise of our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution,

the Hon’ble Supreme Court accordingly ordered and directed that in a situation such as the

present case, the Adjudicating Authority is sufficiently empowered under Section 60(5)(c) of

the IBC to make a determination of the amount which is payable to an expert valuer as an

intrinsic part of the CIRP costs.

The availability of a grievance redressal mechanism under the IBC against an insolvency

professional does not divest the NCLT of its jurisdiction under Section 60(5)(c) of the IBC to

consider the amount payable to the appellant.

Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/02de2a8a337a49cec272b055e0884335.pdf

7. Arun Kumar Jagatramka v. Jindal Steel and Power Ltd. & Anr.



Coram: Hon’ble Justice Dr Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud and Hon’ble Justice M.R. Shah

Section 29A and 35(1)(f) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and Section 230 of the

Companies Act, 2013

In the Instant Matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that a person who is ineligible under

Section 29A of the Insolvency Bankruptcy Code, 2016 to submit a resolution plan, is also

barred from proposing a scheme of compromise and arrangement under Section 230 of the

Companies Act, 2013.

The background of the case was that, Mr. Arun Kumar Jagatramka, assailed the order dated 24

October 2019 of the NCLAT, inter alia, on the ground that Section 230 of the Act of 2013 does

not place any embargo on any person for the purpose of submitting a scheme. According to

the appellant, in the absence of a disqualification, the NCLAT could not have read the

ineligibility under Section 29A of the IBC into Section 230 of the Act of 2013.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court while deciding the matter held that, the stages of submitting a

resolution plan, selling assets of a company in liquidation and selling the company as a going

concern during liquidation, all indicate that the promoter or those in the management of the

company must not be allowed a back-door entry in the company and are hence, ineligible to

participate during these stages.

https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/02de2a8a337a49cec272b055e0884335.pdf

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Another submission by the Counsels representing the Appellant was that on the withdrawal of

the application under Sections 7, 9 and 10, as the case may be, the company goes back to the

same promoter in spite of such a promoter being ineligible under Section 29A for submitting

a resolution plan. As such, it was urged that there is no reason or justification then to preclude

a promoter from presenting a scheme of compromise or arrangement under Section 230. The

Hon’ble Supreme Court responded to this submission by stating that, there is a fundamental

fallacy in the submission. An application for withdrawal under Section 12-A is not intended to

be a culmination of the resolution process. This, as the statutory scheme would indicate, is at

the inception of the process.

Hence, the Hon’ble Apex Court based on its detailed deliberations, held that the prohibition

placed by the Parliament in Section 29A and Section 35(1)(f) of the IBC must also attach itself

to a scheme of compromise or arrangement under Section 230 of the Act of 2013, when the

company is undergoing liquidation under the auspices of the IBC.

Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/8b20adae7a37b302f30a02b3aa64ae91.pdf

8. Sesh Nath Singh & Anr. v. Baidyabati Sheoraphuli Co-operative Bank Ltd and Anr.



Coram: Hon’ble Justice Indira Banerjee and Hon’ble Justice Hemant Gupta

Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and Section 5 and 14 of the Limitation

Act, 1963

In the Instant matter, the Appellant herein, in an appeal before the NCLAT, contended that the

account of the Corporate Debtor had been declared NPA on 31st March, 2013 whereas the

application under Section 7 of IBC had been filed on 27th August, 2018, after almost five years

and five months from the date of accrual of the cause of action, and was therefore barred by

limitation.

The issues involved in this appeal were: -

(i) Whether delay beyond three years in filing an application under Section 7 of IBC

can be condoned, in the absence of an application for condonation of delay made

by the applicant under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963?

The Hon’ble Supreme Court while deciding the matter held that, the condition precedent for

condonation of the delay in filing an application or appeal, is the existence of sufficient cause.

Whether the explanation furnished for the delay would constitute ‘sufficient cause’ or not

would dependent upon facts of each case. Acceptance of explanation furnished should be the

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rule and refusal an exception, when no negligence or inaction or want of bona fides can be

imputed to the defaulting party.

Further, it was also held that, Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 does not speak of any

application. The Section enables the Court to admit an application or appeal if the applicant or

the appellant, as the case may be, satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making

the application and/or preferring the appeal, within the time prescribed. Although, it is the

general practice to make a formal application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, in

order to enable the Court or Tribunal to weigh the sufficiency of the cause for the inability of

the appellant/applicant to approach the Court/Tribunal within the time prescribed by limitation,

there is no bar to exercise by the Court/Tribunal of its discretion to condone delay, in the

absence of a formal application. A plain reading of Section 5 of the Limitation Act makes it

amply clear that, it is not mandatory to file an application in writing before relief can be granted

under the said section.

(ii) Whether Section 14 of the Limitation Act, 1963 applies to applications under

Section 7 of the IBC? Can prior proceedings under the SARFAESI Act, 2002 be

considered for the purpose of exclusion under Section 14 of the Limitation Act,

1963?

The Hon’ble Supreme Court while holding that the provisions of Section 14 of the Limitation

Act, 1963 applies to application under the IBC stated as mentioned hereinafter. ‘The language

and tenor of Section 238A is significant. The Section reads that the provisions of the Limitation

Act, 1963 shall, as far as may be, apply to proceedings or appeals inter alia before the

NCLT/NCLAT.’ Section 14 (2) of the Limitation Act provides that in computing the period of

limitation for any application, the time during which the petitioner had been prosecuting, with

due diligence, another civil proceeding, whether in a court of first instance, or of appeal or

revision, against the same party, for the same relief, shall be excluded, where such proceeding

is prosecuted in good faith in a Court which, from defect of jurisdiction or other cause of like

nature, is unable to entertain it. The conditions for exclusion are that the earlier proceedings

should have been for the same relief, the proceedings should have been prosecuted diligently

and in good faith and the proceedings should have been prosecuted in a forum which, from

defect of jurisdiction or other cause of a like nature, was unable to entertain it.

Another question put forth was whether prior proceedings under the SARFAESI Act do not

qualify for the exclusion of time under Section 14, inasmuch as they are not civil proceedings

in a Court, referring to the judgment of the Hon’ble NCLAT in the matter of Ishrat Ali v.

Cosmos Cooperative Bank Limited and Anr. The Hon’ble Supreme Court while deciding this

question held that, if, in the context of proceedings under Section 7 or 9 of the IBC, Section 14

were to be interpreted with rigid and pedantic adherence to its literal meaning, pronounced

that, if it were to be held that only civil proceedings in Court would enjoy exclusion, the result

would be that an applicant would not even be entitled to exclusion of the period of time spent

in bona fide invoking and diligently pursuing an earlier application under the same provision

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of IBC, for the same relief, before an Adjudicating Authority, lacking territorial jurisdiction.

This could not possibly have been the legislative intent.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court put forth its considered view that, keeping in mind the scope and

ambit of proceedings under the IBC before the NCLT/NCLAT, the expression ‘Court’ in

Section 14(2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be deemed to be any forum for a civil

proceeding including any Tribunal or any forum under the SARFAESI Act.

Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/29e594ee74eee313c8b6c8532146c5cb.pdf

9. Jaypee Kensington Boulevard Apartments Welfare Association & Ors. v. NBCC (India)

Ltd. &Ors.



Coram: Hon’ble Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, Hon’ble Justice Dinesh Maheshwari and Hon’ble

Justice Sanjiv Khanna

Section 30 and Section 31 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

The present matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that in the Adjudicatory process

concerning a resolution plan under the Code, there is no scope for interference with the

commercial aspects of the decision of the Committee of Creditors (CoC), and that there is no

scope for substituting any commercial term of the Resolution Plan approved by the CoC. It

was also noted that, only if the NCLT or the NCLAT, as the case may be, within their limited

jurisdiction, found any shortcoming in the resolution plan vis-à-vis the specified parameters,

would the resolution plan be sent back to the CoC, for re-submission after satisfying the

parameters delineated by Code, and exposited by the Court. The Supreme Court also noted that

for a proper and meaningful implementation of the approved resolution plan, the payment to

dissenting financial creditors as envisaged by the second part of Section 30(2)(b) of the Code

could only be payment in terms of money, as the dissenting financial creditor cannot be forced

to remain attached to the corporate debtor by way of provisions in the nature of equities or

securities.

Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/0fb1262c0473ece0b614ecc9d46fbb12.pdf

10. Indus Biotech Private Limited v. Kotak India Venture (Offshore) Fund & Ors.



https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/29e594ee74eee313c8b6c8532146c5cb.pdf

https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/0fb1262c0473ece0b614ecc9d46fbb12.pdf

16 | P a g e

Coram: Hon’ble Justice S.A. Bobde, Hon’ble Justice A.S. Bopanna and Hon’ble Justice V.

Ramasubramanian

Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and Section 8 of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996

In the instant matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court decided that, when an application under

Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 is made while an application under

Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IBC’) is

pending before the Hon’ble NCLT for admission, the Hon’ble NCLT should first decide

whether, the application under Section 7 of the IBC is to be admitted.

For the convenience of our readers, Section 8 (1) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996

reads as follows:

8. Power to refer parties to arbitration where there is an arbitration agreement.— (1) A

judicial authority, before which an action is brought in a matter which is the subject of an

arbitration agreement shall, if a party to the arbitration agreement or any person claiming

through or under him, so applies not later than the date of submitting his first statement on the

substance of the dispute, then, notwithstanding any judgment, decree or order of the Supreme

Court or any Court, refer the parties to arbitration unless it finds that prima facie no valid

arbitration agreement exists.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court set forth that, if the Application under Section 7 of the IBC is

concluded by deciding that there is default and the debt is payable, due to which the

Adjudicating Authority proceeds to pass the order as contemplated under sub-section 5(a) of

the Section 7 of the IBC to admit the application, the proceedings would get itself transformed

into a proceedings in rem having erga omnes effect due to which the question of arbitrability

of the so called inter-se dispute sought to be put forth, vide the application under Section 8 of

the Act of 1996, would not arise. The Hon’ble Supreme Court also reiterated its decision in

Vidya Drolia and others v. Durga Trading Corporation that exhaustively concluded that a

dispute will be non-arbitrable when a proceeding is in rem.

On the other hand, on such consideration of Section 7 application under the IBC made by the

Adjudicating Authority if the satisfaction recorded is that there is no default committed by the

Company, the Petition would stand rejected as provided under sub-section 5(b) to Section 7 of

the IBC, it would also leave the field open for the parties to secure appointment of the Arbitral

Tribunal in an appropriate proceedings as contemplated in law and the need for the NCLT to

pass any orders on such application under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act,

1996 would not arise.

Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/165267b7826a9da22930afb04059e787.pdf

https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/165267b7826a9da22930afb04059e787.pdf

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11. Laxmi Pat Surana v. Union Bank of India & Anr.



Coram: Hon’ble Justice A.M. Khanwilkar, Hon’ble Justice B.R. Gavai and Hon’ble Justice

Krishna Murari

Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and Section 18 of the Limitation Act,

1963

In the instant matter, the Hon’ble Supreme Court decided two central issues, as follows:

(i) Whether an action under Section 7 of the IBC can be initiated by the financial

creditor against a corporate person (being a corporate debtor) concerning

guarantee offered by it in respect of a loan account of the principal borrower, who

had committed default and is not a ‘corporate person’ within the meaning of the

Code?

The Hon’ble Supreme Court while deciding upon this question held that, Section 7 is

an enabling provision which permits the Financial Creditor to initiate CIRP against a

Corporate Debtor. The Corporate Debtor can be the Principal Borrower and it can also

be a corporate person assuming the status of corporate debtor having offered guarantee,

if and when the Principal Borrower/Debtor (be it a corporate person or otherwise)

commits default in payment of its debt. The obligation of the Guarantor is coextensive

and coterminous with that of the Principal Borrower to defray the debt, as predicated

in Section 128 of the Contract Act.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court clarified that in case of consequence of default committed

by the Principal Borrower, the status of the Guarantor metamorphoses into a debtor or

a Corporate Debtor if it happens to be a Corporate Person within the meaning of Section

3(8) of the Code. The principal borrower may or may not be a Corporate Person, but if

a Corporate Person extends guarantee for the loan transaction concerning a principal

borrower not being a corporate person, it would still be covered within the meaning of

expression ‘Corporate Debtor’ under Section 3(8) of the Code. Further, the expression

‘Debt’ in Section 3(11) of the Code is wide enough to include liability of a Corporate

Person on account of guarantee given by it in relation to a loan account of any person

including not being a corporate person in the event of default committed by the latter.

Hence, upon default committed by the principal borrower (whether or not a Corporate

Person), the liability of the Company (Corporate person), being the Guarantor, instantly

triggers the right of the financial creditor to proceed against the Corporate Person.

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(ii) Whether an application under Section 7 of the Code filed after three years from

the date of declaration of the loan account as NPA, being the date of default, is

barred by limitation?

The Hon’ble Supreme Court while deliberating on this question held that, ordinarily,

upon declaration of the loan account/debt as NPA that date can be reckoned as the date

of default to enable the Financial Creditor to initiate action under Section 7 of the Code.

However, Section 7 of the Code comes into play when the Corporate Debtor commits

a ‘default’ and this Section consciously uses the expression ‘default -not the date of

notifying the loan account of the Corporate Person as NPA.

Thus, when the Principal Borrower and/or the Corporate Guarantor admit and

acknowledge their liability after declaration of NPA but before the expiration of three

years therefrom including the fresh period of limitation due to successive

acknowledgments, it is not possible to extricate them from the renewed limitation

accruing due to the effect of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963. Such

acknowledgement, however, must be before the expiration of the prescribed period of

limitation including the fresh period of limitation due to acknowledgment of debt from

time to time. Further, the fact that acknowledgment was only by the principal borrower

and not the guarantor, would not absolve the guarantor of its liability flowing from the

letter of guarantee.

Hence, the liability of the Corporate Guarantor also triggers when the Principal

Borrower (irrespective of being a Corporate Person or otherwise) acknowledges its

liability in writing within the expiration of prescribed period of limitation (as may be

applicable in accordance with the provisions of Limitation Act, 1963), to pay such

outstanding dues.

Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/4ed4a21540b05893704433eca2efade9.pdf

https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/4ed4a21540b05893704433eca2efade9.pdf

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National Company Law Appellate Tribunal

Judgments

1. India Resurgence ARC Private Limited v. Amit Metaliks Limited and Ors.


Incidence of Appeal: Appeal against orders passed by Hon’ble National Company Law

Tribunal, Kolkata Bench, Kolkata dated 20th October 2020 and as amended on 21st October

2020.

Coram: Justice Bansi Lal Bhat (Acting Chairperson), Dr. Ashok Kumar Mishra (Member

Technical)

Appeal on the grounds of Section 30 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

In the instant matter, it was contended on behalf of Appellant that while approving the

Resolution Plan the value and quality of security interest of the Appellant was not considered

by the Successful Resolution Applicant and the Committee of Creditors.

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that, on a plain reading of the provision of Section 30(4)

of the Code it is manifestly clear that the considerations regarding feasibility and viability of

the Resolution Plan, distribution proposed with reference to the order of priority amongst

creditors as per statutory distribution mechanism including priority and value of security

interest of Secured Creditor are matters which fall within the exclusive domain of Committee

of Creditors for consideration. These considerations must be present to the mind of the

Committee of Creditors while taking a decision in regard to approval of a Resolution Plan with

vote share of requisite majority.

As regards amendment introduced in Section 30(4), be it seen that the amendment that it,

introduced vide Section 6 (b) of Amending Act of 2019 vests discretion in the Committee of

Creditors to take into account the value of security interest of a Secured Creditor in approving

of a Resolution Plan. It’s a guideline and not imperative in terms, which may be taken into

account by the Committee of Creditors in arriving at a decision as regards approval or rejection

of a Resolution Plan, such decision being essentially a business decision based on commercial

wisdom of the Committee of Creditors.

It abundantly clear that the considerations including priority in scheme of distribution and the

value of security are matters falling within the realm of Committee of Creditors. Such

considerations, being relevant only for purposes for arriving at a business decision in exercise

of commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors, cannot be the subject of judicial review

in appeal within the parameters of Section 61(3) of I&B Code. Such consideration of the value

20 | P a g e

of security interest in favour of a Secured Creditor is only aimed at arming the Committee of

Creditors with more teeth so as to take an informed decision in regard to viability and feasibility

of a Resolution Plan, fairness of distribution amongst similarly situated creditors being the

bottomline. However, such business decision taken in exercise of commercial wisdom of

Committee of creditors would not warrant judicial intervention unless creditors belonging to a

class being similarly situated are not given a fair and equitable treatment.

Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/c97a95e3f1b0f96f059a3c5724cfbd26.pdf

2. Mr. Gulabchand Jain v. Mr. Ramchandra D. Choudhary


Incidence of Appeal: Order passed by the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal,

Ahmedabad Bench dated 31st December, 2020

Coram: Justice Bansi Lal Bhat (Acting Chairperson), Dr. Ashok Kumar Mishra (Member

Technical)

Appeal against order passed under Section 33 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

In the case in hand, the Hon’ble National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, reiterated that the

CoC is empowered to take a decision in regard to liquidation of the Corporate Debtor even

after an application has been filed by the Resolution Professional placing the Resolution Plan

approved by the CoC before the Adjudicating Authority for approval. This implies that even

after approval of the Resolution Plan by the COC and laying it before the Adjudicating

Authority, the CoC can change its mind and pass a Resolution liquidating the Corporate Debtor

subject to only exception that such course cannot be adopted after its confirmation i.e., after

approval of the Resolution Plan by the Adjudicating Authority.

Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/a42f637d2f464008d6a8cf947efd5f6f.pdf

3. Vijay Sitaram Dandnaik v. Punjab National Bank and Anr.


Incidence of Appeal: Order passed by the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai

Bench dated 06th November, 2019

Coram: Justice Anant Bijay Singh (Member Judicial), Ms. Shreesha Merla (Member

Technical)

https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/c97a95e3f1b0f96f059a3c5724cfbd26.pdf

https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/a42f637d2f464008d6a8cf947efd5f6f.pdf

21 | P a g e

Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and Section 18 of the Limitation Act,

1963

In this case, the Appellate Tribunal reiterated the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in

‘Jaipur Metals and Electricals Employees Organization’ (Supra) and in ‘Forec India

Limited’ V/s. ‘Edelwiss Assets Reconstruction Company Limited’ wherein it was decided that

the Application under Section 7 was maintainable irrespective of the pendency of the Petition

before the Hon’ble High Court.

Further, deciding upon the point of the Financial debt being barred by limitation and the

validity of acknowledgement of debt under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, the Hon’ble

Appellate Tribunal held that that there is nothing on record to suggest that the Appellant has

acknowledged the debt ‘within three years’ and has agreed to pay the debt. As the scope and

objective of the Code was not to give a fresh lease of life to time barred debts, the Appellate

Tribunal was of the considered opinion that the ratio of ‘Babulal Vardharji Gurjar’ (Supra) is

squarely applicable to the facts of the instant case.

Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/63aea4be94109d1491a812c6de137474.pdf

4. Committee of Creditors of EMCO Limited v. Mary Mody and Anr.


Incidence of Appeal: Order passed by the Hon’ble National Company Law Tribunal, Mumbai

Bench dated 15th January 2020

Coram: Justice Anant Bijay Singh (Member Judicial) and Ms. Shreesha Merla (Member

Technical)

Section 5(15) and Section 28 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016

In this case, the Hon’ble National Company Law Appellate Tribunal relying upon the decision

of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in ‘K. Sashidhar’ V/s ‘Indian Overseas Bank’ (2019) 12 SCC

150 held that, where the Committee of Creditors (CoC) has by a majority vote rejected to raise

any interim finance then the Adjudicating Authority cannot direct the CoC to do the same.

Link: https://nclat.nic.in/Useradmin/upload/21467681396017dfea03b6a.pdf

5. Ram Ratan Kanoongo v. Veda Kumar Nimbagal and Anr.


Incidence of Appeal: Order dated 4th August, 2020 passed by the Hon’ble National Company

Law Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench, Hyderabad

https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/63aea4be94109d1491a812c6de137474.pdf

https://nclat.nic.in/Useradmin/upload/21467681396017dfea03b6a.pdf

22 | P a g e

Coram: Justice A.I.S. Cheema (Member Judicial) and Justice V.P. Singh (Member Technical)


In the instant matter, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that any claims and debts and other

dues of the Corporate Debtor in relation to any person for the period prior to the Completion

Date, that are not expressly provided for in the Resolution Plan, including any claim from third

parties relating to any contract entered into by the Corporate Debtor shall be deemed to have

been extinguished upon approval of the Resolution Plan, without any liability whatsoever on

the Corporate Debtor. The Hon’ble NCLAT also held that any claim for the CIRP period could

have been raised before approval of a Resolution Plan. After the Resolution Plan's approval

and implementation, no direction can be issued to the erstwhile Resolution Professional on

account of any belated and settled claim. Successful Resolution Applicant cannot be burdened

with the claim/dues of the Corporate Debtor.

Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/778212840a6e3425a797f44d93cd5311.pdf

6. Mr. Ravi Shankar Deverakonda v. Committee of Creditors of Meenakshi Energy

Limited


Incidence of Appeal: Order dated 8th January 2021 passed by the Hon’ble National Company

Law Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench

Coram: Justice Venugopal M (Member Judicial) and Justice V.P. Singh (Member Technical)


In the Instant Case, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that undoubtedly, an extension of time

for extension of time for ‘CIRP’ is a ‘critical arena’. However, the exercise of the power of

extending the time limit by the ‘Adjudicating Authority’ in negation of the statutory provision

of the Code may be desirable in an exceptional/extraordinary circumstance of a given case.

Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/4f6c0e9d352f1e0e3b23216ab6fcac0f.pdf

7. Indian Overseas Bank v. RAM Infrastructure Ltd., and Anr.


Incidence of Appeal: Order dated 15th July 2020 passed by the Hon’ble National Company

Law Tribunal, Hyderabad Bench

https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/778212840a6e3425a797f44d93cd5311.pdf

https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/4f6c0e9d352f1e0e3b23216ab6fcac0f.pdf

23 | P a g e

Coram: Justice Jarat Kumar Jain (Member Judicial) and Mr. Kanthi Narahari (Member

Technical)

Section 14 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 and Section 13(2) and Section 13(4)

of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and Enforcement of Securities

Interest Act, 2002 (SARFAESI Act, 2002)

In the Instant Case, the Appellant herein being the Financial Creditor of RCM Infrastructure

Limited (the Corporate Debtor) sold the two Secured assets mortgaged with it and the sale was

confirmed by e-auction on 13.12.2018 in favour of the successful bidders in the public auction

and the successful bidders deposited 25% of the bid amount in respect of the same. While so,

the Corporate Debtor herein filed an Application under Section 10 of the Insolvency and

Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (in short IBC) before the Hon’ble Adjudicating Authority and the

Hon’ble Adjudicating Authority admitted the Application on 03.01.2019 and Corporate

Insolvency Resolution Process (in short CIRP) commenced declaring a moratorium under

Section 14(1) of IBC. Further, the Appellant accepted balance payment of 75% of the bid

amount on 08.03.2019 from the successful bidders.

Hence, upon auction of the property of the Corporate Debtor, the Appellant Bank received only

25% of the bid amount on 13.12.2018. Remaining 75% of the bid amount was only received

by the Appellant on 03.03.2019 i.e., after commencement of moratorium in terms of Sect ion

14 of IBC.

The matter for consideration before the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal was whether after

imposition of moratorium any transaction done with respect to the assets of the

Corporate Debtor is deemed to be valid or not?

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal while deciding the matter, held that mere receiving of 25% of

the sale proceeds does not conclude the sale unless the full amount is paid prior to imposition

of moratorium. The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal was also not inclined to accept the submission

of the learned Counsel for the Appellant that 25% of the sale proceeds were received thereby

the sale was confirmed prior to imposition of moratorium. It was finally decided in the matter

that, when the moratorium was imposed by the learned Adjudicating Authority, receipt of the

balance sale consideration is illegal and the learned Adjudicating Authority rightly set aside

the sale transaction.

Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/8bbf86d680dc29641ac757b40ef1d3c5.pdf

8. Radico Khaitan Ltd. v. BT & FC Pvt. Ltd. and Ors.


https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/8bbf86d680dc29641ac757b40ef1d3c5.pdf

24 | P a g e

Incidence of Appeal: Order dated 2nd September 2020 passed by the Hon’ble National

Company Law Tribunal, Bengaluru Bench

Coram: Justice Jarat Kumar Jain (Member Judicial) and Justice Kanthi Narahari (Member

Technical)

Consolidation of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process

In the Instant Case, the Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal reiterated the decision of the Ld.

Adjudicating Authority Mumbai Bench in the case of SBI Vs Videocon Industries Ltd. (Supra)

which set forth the parameters to be considered while ordering the consolidation of CIRP.

The eight parameters enlisted by the Ld. Adjudicating Authority in the aforementioned matter

were the existence of Common Control; Common Directors; Common Assets; Common

Liabilities; Inter-Dependence; Pooling of Resources; Intricate links between the Companies;

Common Financial Creditors.

The Hon’ble Appellate Tribunal held that, if all the eight parameters are fully met and satisfied

the consolidation of CIRP shall be the most viable for the purpose of convenience of the

stakeholders of the connected Corporate Debtors.

Link: https://ibbi.gov.in//uploads/order/e5484483c5dd17c55923e41b5c198d0d.pdf

About the Author:

CS Jasveen Bindra is a member of the Institute of Company Secretaries of India as a Practicing

Professional. She secured an All-India Rank 9 in her CS Executive Examination and has

cleared all the CS examinations in the first attempt.

She is a designated partner at Corpvin Consulting LLP. She has an enriching experience in

the field of Insolvency Laws, relating to; inter alia, the Initiation of Corporate Insolvency

Resolution Process (CIRP) by a Financial Creditor, Initiation of CIRP by an Operational

Creditor, Process specific compliances during CIRP, Handholding of Insolvency

Professionals to ensure the smooth execution of CIRP and Liquidation Processes. To get in

touch with her contact at 8983352620 or drop an email at [email protected]

https://ibbi.gov.in/uploads/order/e5484483c5dd17c55923e41b5c198d0d.pdf

25 | P a g e

Disclaimer

This write up is a knowledge resource of Corpvin Consulting LLP and is prepared by ensuring

the accuracy, completeness and reliability of the information available to us. The author will

not be responsible for any action taken on the basis of this document for any reasons

whatsoever.

Any form of plagiarism will be considered as an offence and in the case of any excerpt

required due reference has to be given.

We are present at:

Mumbai | Aurangabad | Delhi |

Jaipur | Gurugram

Connect with us:email ID: [email protected]

Mobile: +91 8983352620Website: https://corpvin.in/

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