quantitative risk assessment specialist report

Annex H

Quantitative Risk Assessment Specialist Report

Burgan Oil Cape Terminal Major Hazard Installation Risk Assessment for EIA v3.0 Ref: 0220778

MHI 0012

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Burgan Oil Cape Terminal wishes to construct a fuel receiving, storage and distribution terminal (hereafter referred to as the “facility” or the “site”) on the Eastern Mole Berth in Cape Town Harbour. It is understood that Burgan Oil will operate the terminal on behalf of major oil companies. The site is intended to store petrol and diesel of various grades as well as additives such as ethanol and Bio Fame to supplement the petrol and diesel supply. The site will receive fuel from ships and ethanol and Bio Fame from road tankers. The site will then fill road tankers. Burgan Oil Cape Terminal identified this proposed bulk storage and handling of flammable liquids as having the potential to affect the health and safety of employees as well as members of the public in the event of a major incident. Hence there is a need to manage the risks and ensure compliance with the MHI Regulations promulgated under the Occupational Health and Safety Act No. 85 of 1993 which were revised in 2001. The current Major Hazard Installations Regulations are attached in ANNEX B. The proposed Burgan Oil Cape Terminal site is intended to be located on Portside Road on the Eastern Mole Berth in the Cape Town Harbour, Western Cape (GPS coordinates in decimal degrees: -33.909887, 18.437570). The site is intended to have two primary, separate operating areas. A storage area will be located to the north western end of the mole while the road tanker loading gantry is located further to the south east. A bulk heavy oil storage terminal belonging to Fuel Firing Services (FFS) is located between the two proposed Burgan Oil site areas. The two areas are linked by aboveground product pipelines. The land-use surrounding the site can be summarised as follows: Both Berth 1 and Berth 2 are located on the south western side of the mole and therefore south west of both the storage tanks and the gantry loading facility. At the end of the mole, between Berth 1 and the proposed storage tanks in Bund B, the winch cable storage building is located. Also located on the mole is the Fuel Firing Services (FFS) site which is situated between the proposed Burgan Oil storage site and road loading gantry bays. FFS is located on the south west side of the mole with part of the FFS storage located between the proposed gantry bay and Berth 2. In addition the site intends to install an import pipeline to receive product from the Chevron Refinery via the Chevron Refinery white oils pipeline. The Burgan Oil pipeline will either terminate at Tanker Berth 2 or at the Chevron Refinery import manifold at the Chevron Joint Bunkering Services (JBS) fuel terminal. Due to the nature of the harbour and mole design, other industrial sites within the harbour are located outside the largest consequence distance and are therefore judged to be not affected in the event of a major incident at the Burgan Oil Cape Terminal site.

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Important Surrounding sites:

FFS (Fuel Firing Services located adjacent to the site Chevron Joint Bunkering Services (JBS) Fuel Terminal

Major transport routes in close proximity to the site:

Portside Road is the primary access road to the Eastern Mole Berth.

The following Major Hazard Installations have been identified to be near the site:


The aim of the project was to undertake a Quantified Major Hazard Installation (MHI) Risk Assessment of the Cape Town Harbour site, with the objective to assess the risk to people off site via the Land Use Planning (LUP) and Fatality approaches. ERM have assumed that the proposed development will comply with world class standards of design, construction and operation. We would also recommend that the site considers implementing all of the recommendations which arose from the incident at the Buncefield Terminal in the United Kingdom in 2005 contained in the UK HSE Process Safety Leadership Group Final Report entitled Safety and Environmental Standards for Fuel Storage Sites. LOCATION SPECIFIC INDIVIDUAL RISK Figure 1 represents the location specific individual risks (LSIR) for hypothetical persons located outdoors (including Buncefield scenarios). Beyond the 1 cpm contour risks are considered broadly acceptable. Between the 1 cpm contour and the 10 cpm contour, the risks to the public are considered tolerable, so long as they can be demonstrated by Burgan Oil Cape Terminal to be as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). The 100 cpm contour extends off site to a maximum of 10 m but does not envelope any of the surrounding sites. The risk to the workers in the adjacent facilities does not exceed 100 cpm. Therefore the risks are not considered intolerable according to the assessment criteria of Section 6.3.3. There is a 1,000 cpm contour at the loading gantry. According to the assessment criteria in Section 6.3.3 this would be deemed intolerable, however the actual individual risk experienced by workers in this area will be less as these workers are not on site 100% of the time. A typical gantry operator is understood to work for 40 hours per week and 48 weeks per year. This leads to an occupancy factor of 21.9%. The maximum risk within the gantry area is 1800 cpm. Therefore the actual individual risk experienced by operators is approximately 394.2 cpm. This level of individual risk is therefore below 1000

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cpm and can be deemed to not be intolerable according to the assessment criteria. Figure 2, represents the LSIR for persons located indoors (including Buncefield scenarios). Beyond the 1 cpm contour risks are considered broadly acceptable. Between the 1 cpm contour and the 10 cpm contour, the risks to the public are considered tolerable, so long as they can be demonstrated by Burgan Oil Cape Terminal to be as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). The 100 cpm contour extends off site to a maximum of 10 m but does not envelope any of the surrounding sites. The risk to the workers in the adjacent facilities does not exceed 100 cpm. Therefore the risks are not considered intolerable according to the assessment criteria of Section 6.3.3. The 1000 cpm contour is only reached in the vicinity of the loading gantry. As no structures exist in this area the assessment criteria in Section 6.3.3 are not applicable. Additional Pipeline options were included and found not to alter the individual risk contours shown in Figure 1 and Figure 2.

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Figure 1 Location Specific Individual Risks of Fatality Contours for Persons Located outdoors (Including Buncefield Scenarios)

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Figure 2 Location Specific Individual Risks of Fatality Contours for Persons Located Indoors (Including Buncefield Scenarios)

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Societal Risk The calculated societal risk results for off-site populations (i.e. excluding known Burgan Oil on site population) as a result of risks posed by the site (including Buncefield) scenarios are shown in Figure 3.

Figure 3 Societal Risk for the Burgan Oil Off Site Populations – Including Buncefield Scenarios

As illustrated by Figure 3 in the sites current proposal the societal risk F-N curve lies below the ‘Broadly Acceptable’ indicator line and therefore also below the intolerable line with Buncefield Scenarios included.

0.01

0.1

1

10

100

1000

10000

1 10 100 1000 10000 100000 1000000

F (c

pm)

N

Burgan OilIntolerableBroably Acceptable

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Land Use Planning – Location specific Individual Risk Figure 4 represents the location specific individual risks (LSIR) of dangerous dose for hypothetical persons located outdoors (including Buncefield scenarios) for Land Use Planning (LUP). As shown in Figure 4, the risk consultation distance (i.e. the 0.3 cpm contour), as referred to in Section 6.3.1, measured from the site boundary extends off-site to the west partly enveloping the winch cable store and to the south east of the storage area partly enveloping the FFS site as well as over the edge of the mole to the north. The middle zone (1 cpm contour) follows the same trend as the 0.3 cpm contour to the north but does not extend so extensively over the FFS site and Berth 2. The 10 cpm (inner zone) contour extends off site and follows similar trend to the 1 cpm contour but a reduced amount towards the north and the area surrounding the road loading gantry. Using the criteria outlined in Section 6.3.1 it has been shown that the Burgan Oil site falls within the ‘Don’t Advise Against DAA’ category for all 3 probability of dangerous dose zones as the only other sites enveloped by any of the contours are industrial sites. Restrictions on future development around the site should be enforced based on the LUP criteria explained within the report. Risk contours shown in Figure 4 should be compared against the criteria to deem if any proposed future development falls into the ‘Advise Against AA’ or ‘Don’t Advise Against DAA’ category. If the development falls within the ‘Advise Against AA’ category the proposed development cannot be continued. The inclusion of pipeline Option A extends the risk consultation distance (i.e. the 0.3 cpm contour) around the proposed pipeline layout as shown in Figure 5. The inclusion of pipeline Option A extends the risk consultation distance (i.e. the 0.3 cpm contour) around the proposed pipeline layout as shown in Figure 6. Both proposed pipelines do not affect the conclusion of the Land Use Planning assessment and the site still falls within the ‘Don’t Advise Against DAA’ category for all 3 probability of dangerous dose zones. Restrictions on future development around the site should be enforced based on the LUP criteria explained within the report. Risk contours shown in Figure 5 and Figure 6 should be compared against the criteria to deem if any proposed future development falls into the ‘Advise Against AA’ or ‘Don’t Advise Against DAA’ category. If the development falls within the ‘Advise Against AA’ category the proposed development cannot be continued.

Figure 4 Location Specific Individual Risks of Dangerous Dose Contours – Land Use Planning

Figure 5 Location Specific Individual Risks of Dangerous Dose Contours with Pipeline Option A – Land Use Planning

Figure 6 Location Specific Individual Risks of Dangerous Dose Contours with Pipeline Option B – Land Use Planning

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CONCLUSIONS The societal risk posed by the site is concluded to be broadly acceptable. The individual risk of fatality was found to not be intolerable but only tolerable if proved to be ALARP. In accordance with Section (5)(a) of the MHI Regulations shown in Annex B it is the opinion of ERM as an AIA that Burgan Oil have shown a commitment to the reduction of tank overfill events which could potentially result in a Buncefield type incident. This is highlighted in their Operating and Control Philosophy as shown in Annex F and their letter of commitment to this philosophy as shown in Annex G. Further, it is the opinion of ERM that the measures proposed in the Operating and Control Philosophy show a reasonable degree of risk reduction for this stage of the Burgan Oil fuel terminal design process as specific overfill prevention technologies have been accounted for. As such the individual risk of fatality posed by the proposed site can be considered as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) for this stage of the design process and therefore tolerable as stated in the criteria in Section 6.3.3. To verify this view, following completion of the Burgan Oil final design, an update of the current MHI risk assessment taking into account the final design overfill prevention measures must be carried out. Considering the surrounding land uses and using the criteria outlined in Section 6.3.1 it has been shown that the proposed Burgan Oil site falls within the ‘Don’t Advise Against DAA’ category for all 3 probability of dangerous dose zones as the only other sites enveloped by any of the land use planning contours are industrial sites. Restrictions on future development around the site should be enforced based on the LUP criteria explained within the report. Environmental Resources Management Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd would declare the proposed Burgan Oil Cape Terminal which will be located at Portside Road, Eastern Mole Berth, Western Cape (GPS coordinates in decimal degrees: : -33.909887, 18.437570) will be a Major Hazard Installation (MHI) as outlined in the current legislation. As a result of being declared a MHI, the Requirements of the MHI Regulations must be followed completely to ensure the proposed Burgan Oil Cape Terminal is legally compliant. Copies of this risk assessment must be submitted to the Local Provincial Director of the Department of Labour, the Chief Inspector of the Department of Labour Head Office in Pretoria and the Local Authorities.

CONTENTS

1 INTRODUCTION 1

1.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION 1 1.2 REQUIREMENTS OF THE MHI REGULATIONS 3

2 RISK ASSESSMENT & MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY 4

2.1 DEFINITIONS 4 2.2 PROCESS OF RISK MANAGEMENT 4 2.3 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 6 2.4 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS 6 2.4.1 Harm Criteria for Consequence Analysis 6 2.4.2 Consequence Modelling 6 2.5 FREQUENCY OF MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS 7 2.6 RISK CALCULATION 8 2.7 RISK ASSESSMENT 9

3 ENVIRONMENTAL SITE SETTINGS 11

3.1 SITE LOCATION 11 3.2 METEOROLOGY 14 3.3 REQUIREMENTS OF OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION 15

4 DESCRIPTION OF FACILITIES 16

4.1 DESCRIPTION OF SITE OPERATIONS 16 4.1.1 Bulk Storage Facilities 16 4.1.2 Ship Offloading Facilities 17 4.1.3 Road Tanker Off-loading Facilities 17 4.1.4 Road Tanker Loading Facilities 17 4.2 MANAGEMENT OF STORAGE TANKS 18 4.3 ADDITIONAL IMPORT PIPELINE 19 4.4 DESCRIPTION OF PRODUCTS STORED ON SITE 22 4.5 DESCRIPTION OF FIRE FIGHTING FACILITIES 22 4.6 POPULATION DATA 24

5 POTENTIAL MAJOR HAZARDS 26

5.1 INTRODUCTION 26 5.2 POOL FIRES 27 5.3 TANK FIRES 27 5.4 FLASH FIRES 27 5.5 VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSIONS 28

6 APPROACH TO THE ASSESSMENT 29

6.1 TERMINOLOGY 29 6.2 HARM CRITERIA 29

6.2.1 Thermal Radiation 29 6.2.2 Buncefield Criteria 31 6.2.3 Flash Fire Flammability Limit 31 6.2.4 Fatality Probabilities 32 6.3 ASSESSMENT CRITERIA 33 6.3.1 Land Use Planning Around Major Hazard Installations 35 6.3.2 Risk Tolerability Criteria 37 6.3.3 Individual Risk of Fatality Criteria 38 6.3.4 Societal Risk Criteria 39 6.4 METHODOLOGY 40

7 RISK ASSESSMENT OF LIQUID FUELS 42

7.1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION 42 7.1.1 Bulk Storage tank Scenarios 42 7.1.2 Buncefield Scenarios 43 7.1.3 Pipework and Pipeline Scenarios 45 7.1.4 Road Tanker Offloading Scenarios 46 7.1.5 Road Tanker Loading Scenarios 46 7.2 ESTIMATION OF CONSEQUENCES 47 7.2.1 Pool Fires 47 7.2.2 Buncefield Scenarios 49 7.3 ESTIMATION OF INCIDENTS 52 7.3.1 Pool Fire Frequency Calculations 52 7.3.2 Overfill Frequency Calculations 53 7.3.3 Explosion and Flash Fire Frequency Calculations 57

8 RISK ANALYSIS RESULTS 59

8.1 FATALITY RISK CALCULATION 59 8.1.1 Location Specific Individual Risk for the site 59 8.1.2 Societal Risk 66 8.1.3 Rate of Harm (Contributors to the Risk) 68 8.2 ESCALATION EFFECTS 69 8.3 LUP RISK CALCULATION 70

9 RISK ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR ADDITIONAL PIPELINES 72

9.1 FATALITY RISK CALCULATION 72 9.1.1 Location Specific Individual Risk for the site 72 9.1.2 Societal Risk 79 9.1.3 Rate of Harm (Contributors to the Risk) 81 9.2 ESCALATION EFFECTS OF THE ADDITION OF PIPELINE OPTIONS A AND B 82 9.3 LUP RISK CALCULATION 82

10 NEIGHBOURING MAJOR HAZARDOUS INSTALLATIONS 87

11 EMERGENCY PLANNING 88

11.1 MHI REGULATIONS, SECTION 6 - ON SITE EMERGENCY PLAN 88

12 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS 90

12.1 CONCLUSIONS 90 12.2 RECOMMENDATIONS 91

ANNEX A ERM CERTIFICATES OF ACCREDITATION ANNEX B MHI REGULATIONS ANNEX C MATERIAL SAFETY SHEETS ANNEX D CONSEQUENCE AND FREQUENCY ANALYSIS ANNEX E EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN ANNEX F BURGAN OIL OPERATING AND CONTROL PHILOSOPHY ANNEX G BURGAN OIL COMMITMENT O OPERATING AND CONTROL PHILOSOPHY

ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 0220778-BURGAN OIL MHI FOR EIA V3.0

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1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 GENERAL INTRODUCTION

A series of major accidents at fuel storage, handling and production facilities have focused worldwide attention on the need to control the design and management of facilities where potential for major accidents exists. In South Africa, the Major Hazard Installation (MHI) Regulations were promulgated on the 16th January 1998 under Section 43 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act No. 85 of 1993 as amended, to control and manage such activities. The MHI Regulations were revised on 30th July 2001 and they apply to “employers, self-employed persons and users, who have on their premises, either permanently, or temporarily, a major hazard installation or a quantity of a substance which may pose a risk, that could affect the health and safety of employees and the public.” A requirement of the MHI Regulations is that a risk assessment needs to be undertaken by an Approved Inspection Authority (AIA), and reviewed at intervals not exceeding five years thereafter. A risk assessment is also required prior to the proposed construction of any major hazard installation. Normally these risk assessments take the form of Quantified Risk Assessments (QRAs). In addition, if there is an incident at an existing site, the facility is also required to revise the MHI Risk Assessment. The MHI Risk Assessment report must be submitted to the Department of Labour and the Local Authorities for review and if necessary, for registration. Environmental Resources Management Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd (hereafter referred to as “ERM”) is accredited by SANAS (certificate no. MHI-0012) and is a Department of Labour Approved Inspection Authority (AIA), No. MHI 0008 for Major Hazard Installation Regulations risk assessments. The certification documents are shown in Annex A. As per the accreditation requirements, this report has been reviewed by an ERM Southern Africa Technical Signatory, namely Gary McFadden. Burgan Oil wishes to construct a fuel receiving, storage and distribution terminal (hereafter referred to as the “facility” or the “site”) on the Eastern Mole Berth in Cape Town Harbour. It is understood that Burgan Oil will operate the terminal on behalf of major oil companies. The site is intended to store petrol and diesel of various grades as well as additives such as ethanol and Bio Fame to supplement the petrol and diesel supply. The site will receive fuel from ships and ethanol and Bio Fame from road tankers. The site will then fill road tankers. In addition the site intends to install an import pipeline to receive product from the Chevron Refinery. This pipeline will either terminate at Tanker Berth 2 or at the Chevron Refinery import manifold at the Chevron Joint Bunkering Services (JBS) fuel terminal. Burgan Oil Cape Terminalidentified the proposed terminal as having the potential to affect the health and safety of employees, as well as members of the public beyond the site boundaries, in the event of a major incident.


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The aim of the project was to undertake a Quantified Major Hazard Installation (MHI) Risk Assessment of the proposed Burgan Oil Cape Town Harbour terminal, with the objective to assess the risk to people off-site via the Land Use Planning (LUP) and Fatality approaches. For this report, ERM have used the current proposed design submitted for the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Any changes to the design of the site will require a new revision to this MHI risk assessment. ERM have assumed that all equipment on the proposed Burgan Oil site will be designed, constructed, operated and maintained to world class standards and will comply with all relevant South African legislation. The latest approaches and some of the lessons arising from the major accident at Buncefield, UK in December 2005 were considered in the assessment. Until the Buncefield explosion of December 2005, significant vapour cloud explosions involving motor spirit were generally not considered credible unless they occurred in heavily congested areas. At Buncefield, a large cloud of vapour was generated when a storage tank was over-filled with petrol over a period of about half an hour. This vapour cloud was ignited and a powerful explosion occurred causing widespread damage and initiating fires in many adjacent tanks. Research is underway to investigate the Buncefield explosion and there is no currently validated simulation tool that is available to predict overpressures in a similar event. Some UK Health and Safety Executive guidance has been published(1)

that gives a method for demonstrating the impact of a Buncefield type event. Using the HSE guidance, this Buncefield method has been used within this study. ERM have assumed that the proposed development will comply with world class standards of design, construction and operation. We would also recommend that the site considers implementing all of the recommendations which arose from the incident at the Buncefield Terminal in the United Kingdom in 2005 contained in the UK HSE Process Safety Leadership Group Final Report entitled Safety and Environmental Standards for Fuel Storage Sites. Technical specifications for Burgan Oil Cape Terminal, Cape Town Harbour were gathered during a site visit undertaken by Tim Price of ERM on 21st November 2014 as well as conversations with Stijn Willem van Zelst. It should be noted that this site investigation was undertaken only for the purpose of gathering information for this quantified risk assessment and not for the purpose of judging the adequacy of the design, operation or maintenance of the site.

(1) HSE 2007. Annex 17 - Predictive Assessment ‘Line to take for VCE at Bulk HFL Storage Depots’, Hazardous

Installations Directorate. SPC/Permissioning/11


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1.2 REQUIREMENTS OF THE MHI REGULATIONS

The specific requirements for undertaking the QRA are set out in Section 5 of the MHI Regulations and are summarised in Table 1.1 (including the relevant section of this report where the requirement has been satisfied). The current Major Hazard Installations Regulations are attached in Annex B.

Table 1.1 MHI Risk Assessment Requirements

Requirement Corresponding ERM Report Section

(i) a general process description of the major hazard installation Section 4 (ii) a description of the major incidents associated with that type of installation and the consequences of such incidents, which shall include potential incidents

Sections 5, 7.1 and 7.2.

(iii) an estimation of the probability of a major incident Section 7.3 (iv) a copy of the site emergency plan Annex E (v) an estimation of the total result in case of an explosion or fire Section 7.1 (vi) in the case of toxic release, an estimation of concentration effects of such release

N/A

(vii) the potential effect of an incident on a major hazard installation or part thereof on an adjacent major hazard installation or part thereof

Section 9

(viii) the potential effect of a major incident on any other installation, members of the public and residential areas

Section 8

(ix) meteorological tendencies Section 3.2 (x) the suitability of existing emergency procedures for risks identified

Section 11

(xi) any requirements laid down in terms of the Environment Conservation Act 1989

Section 3.3

(xii) any organizational measures that may be required N/A


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2 RISK ASSESSMENT & MANAGEMENT METHODOLOGY

2.1 DEFINITIONS

A hazard is defined by the UK Institution of Chemical Engineers (1) (IChemE) as “a physical situation with a potential for human injury, damage to property, damage to the environment or some combination of these. A major hazard is described as an imprecise term for a large scale chemical hazard, especially one which may be realised through an acute event”. A major hazard installation is described in the South African Major Hazard Installation Regulations (2) as “an installation where any substance is produced, processed, used, handled or stored in such a form and quantity that it has the potential to cause a major incident”. A major incident is defined (2) as “an occurrence of catastrophic proportions, resulting from the use of plant and machinery, or from activities at a workplace”. The process of hazard identification is described by the IChemE (1) as “the identification of undesired events followed by an analysis of the mechanisms by which undesired events could occur”. Risk assessment is described (2) as “a process of collecting, organising, analysing, interpreting, communicating and implementing information in order to identify the probable frequency, magnitude and nature of any major incident which could occur at a major hazard installation and the measures needed to be taken to remove, reduce or control potential causes of such incidents”.

2.2 PROCESS OF RISK MANAGEMENT

Risk management has become widely used as a technique to aid decision-making. Five specific elements are involved: 1. Hazard Identification: to determine the incident scenarios, hazards and

hazardous events, their causes and mechanisms.

2. Consequence Analysis: to determine the extent of the consequences of identified hazardous events.

3. Frequency Estimation: to determine the frequency of occurrence of identified hazardous events and the various consequences.

4. Risk Summation: to determine the risk levels.

5. Risk Assessment: to identify if the risk is tolerable/intolerable and to identify risk reduction or mitigation measures and prioritise these using techniques such as risk ranking and cost-benefit analysis.

(1) IChemE (1985). Nomenclature for Hazard and Risk Assessment in the Process Industries. (2) Regulation R.692 Occupational Health and Safety Act (85/1993): Major Hazard Installation Regulations.


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These elements are shown in the flow diagram in Figure 2.1. The elements of the procedure are used both to generate information and as an aid to decision-making in managing the risk. For decision-making, the procedure is only taken as far as is necessary to generate the information required or to make the decision. The extent of application of the various elements and degree of quantification employed therefore varies significantly from one situation to another.

Figure 2.1 Risk Assessment Process


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2.3 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

The first stage in any MHI risk assessment is to identify the potential incidents that could lead to the release of a hazardous material from its normal containment and result in a major accident. This is achieved by a systematic review of the facilities to determine where a release of a hazardous material could occur from various parts of the installation. The major hazards are generally one of three types: flammable, reactive and or toxic. In this study, only flammable hazards are relevant involving loss of containment of diesel, petrol, ethanol and bio Fame. Flammable hazards may manifest as high thermal radiation from fires and overpressures following explosions that may cause direct damage, building collapse, etc. Flammable hazards are present throughout the facility and associated pipelines. Fires may occur if flammable materials are released to the atmosphere and ignition takes place. The possibility of explosions in the instance of over-filling (Buncefield-type incident) has been considered. This study is only concerned with major incident hazards as defined by the scope of the South African Major Hazard Installation Regulations (1). These regulations are concerned only with incidents which involve dangerous substances that give rise to off-site risk as far as the general public and other industries are concerned.

2.4 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS

2.4.1 Harm Criteria for Consequence Analysis

During the analysis it is necessary to define harm criteria (or ‘end points’) for use with the consequence models. In the case of this study, these harm criteria are levels of thermal radiation intensity and where relevant, overpressure (in the case of vapour cloud explosions). The derivation of the harm criteria used in this study is described in Section 6.2.

2.4.2 Consequence Modelling

Factors Affecting Consequences

There are several factors which affect the consequences of materials released into the environment. These include (but are not limited to):

Release quantity or release rate Duration of release

(1) Regulation R.692 Occupational Health and Safety Act (85/1993): Major Hazard Installation Regulations.


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Initial density of the release Source geometry Source elevation Prevailing atmospheric conditions Surrounding terrain Physical and chemical properties of the material released.

Such factors will affect the consequence zones for the specific hazardous materials, e.g. the distance at which the level of thermal radiation from a fire or overpressure from an explosion has reduced sufficiently so that it is no longer dangerous. Factors Affecting Fire Hazards

When considering large open hydrocarbon fires, the principal hazard is from thermal radiation. The primary concerns are safety of people and potential damage to nearby facilities or equipment. Determination of thermal radiation hazard zones involves the following three steps:

Geometric characterisation of the fire, that is, the determination of the burning rate and the physical dimensions of the fire; Characterisation of the radiative properties of the fire, that is, the determination of the average radiative heat flux from the flame surface; and Calculation of radiant intensity at a given location.

These, in turn, depend upon the nature of the flammable material, size and type of fire, prevailing atmospheric conditions and the location and orientation of the target/receptor. Consequence Models

The hazards described above can be modelled analytically by standard models used for consequence analysis. Many of these models are performed by computer software and ERM has access to a range of such models. The modelling of event consequences is described in Section 7.2.

2.5 FREQUENCY OF MAJOR ACCIDENT HAZARDS

For each hazard identified, the frequency is assessed. A simple way of defining the frequency of major accident events within a QRA is to use a ‘top down’ approach. This provides frequencies of the events of interest (fires, explosions, etc.) by reference to historical accident data sources, without considering the causes or development of these events in detail.


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Alternatively, if more detail is required, a ‘bottom up’ approach may be used, where the frequency of individual release scenarios is considered. The different outcomes that may result from these releases and the associated frequencies are then developed using techniques such as event tree analysis. A release of hazardous material may be considered for a range of hole sizes, which will depend on the various causes considered. For example, a leak from a pipeline due to corrosion will tend to be small, whereas external impact, say, by a mechanical digger, is likely to produce a much larger hole. ERM has obtained a copy of the Planning Case Assessment Guide (PCAG) developed by the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE). This enables an estimate of the likelihood of potential hazards following the failure of tanks, vessels, process piping, valves, flanges, etc. to be made. The frequency of the various outcomes (accident scenarios) is then estimated by multiplying the frequency of the release by the probability of the various outcomes. In this study, for flammable releases these outcomes are principally pool fires and flammable vapour clouds of various sizes.

2.6 RISK CALCULATION

The individual risk for a specified level of harm is calculated taking the following variables into consideration:

The frequency of the hazardous outcome (consequence), e.g. pool fire event The probability that the hazardous outcome (consequence) will reach the location specified (This includes variation of wind direction with consequent change to flame tilt; both downwind and crosswind distances need to be taken into account) Probability of an individual being at the location Probability of escape into shelter by an individual The probability that, given exposure to the hazardous outcome, the person suffers a defined level of harm.

The frequency of harm (fh) being present from each hazardous outcome (consequence) event must be calculated and summed to give the maximum individual risk (IR) from all events at one location.

IR(max) = fh for all consequences As individual risk is location specific, the above process needs to be repeated for each location considered. The individual risk from other facilities can be summed to give the overall individual risk level from several major hazards.


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Calculation can be avoided if it is obvious that the event would not be able to affect a location e.g. the specified location is too far away. The frequency of harm will be different for differing weather categories and needs to be calculated for each weather category used. The frequency of harm for a given consequence and weather category is expressed as follows: fh = fe x Pw x Pd x Pexp x Pharm Where: fe = frequency of the hazardous outcome (consequence) Pw = probability of that weather category Pd = probability of the wind blowing in the required direction for event to affect the individual (Pd = 0 if event cannot reach a particular location) Pexp = probability of exposure Pharm = probability that defined level of harm results given that exposure has occurred The probability of the wind blowing in the required direction depends on the angle of entrapment, or the circular sector where a particular hazardous outcome encompasses the specified location. This is a function of the distance from the source, the size, and shape of the hazard ‘footprint’. The size and shape of the footprint is determined from the results of the consequence analysis, but gives a complex shape and is correspondingly difficult to calculate the angle of entrapment. These complex shapes are often simplified to regular shapes in order to calculate the angle of entrapment. The frequency of harm for a specific event is the sum of the frequencies of harm for the different weather conditions:

fh = fh,weather i all weathers The stability category and wind speed combinations used in the study are discussed in Section 3.2. ERM’s proprietary ViewRisk computer software has been used to calculate iso-risk contours, which show the geographical distribution of individual risk of harm to people.

2.7 RISK ASSESSMENT

The final and most significant step in the process is the assessment of the meaning and significance of the calculated risk levels. Risk assessment is a process by which the results of a risk evaluation are used to make judgements, either through relative risk ranking of risk reduction strategies or through comparison with established risk targets (criteria). Where off-site risk criteria relevant to QRA have been issued (in this case based on criteria used in the UK), it is possible to assess the calculated risk


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levels against these criteria. This determines whether the risks are tolerable, broadly acceptable, or if risk reduction/mitigation measures are required to reduce the risk to levels which can be considered to be as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). The risk events can then be ranked to determine the relative contribution of each to the overall risk level. In general the higher risk events should be examined for possible areas of reduction or mitigation as a first step. Measures that prevent the potential incident from occurring should be considered first, followed by measures that reduce the probability (e.g. reduction in flanges), then measures that may limit the amount released (e.g. remotely operated valves, ROVs) and finally measures that may reduce the potential consequences (e.g. water sprays). The risk assessment will thus enable decisions to be made on whether an investment should be made on particular mitigation measures so that the risk is effectively managed. The residual risk will then be managed by appropriate safety management systems to ensure safe operations, maintenance, good practice, etc. The risk criteria used in this study are presented in Section 6.3.


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3 ENVIRONMENTAL SITE SETTINGS

3.1 SITE LOCATION

The proposed site is intended to be located on Portside Road on the Eastern Mole Berth in the Cape Town Harbour, Western Cape (GPS coordinates in decimal degrees: -33.909887, 18.437570). The site is intended to have two primary, separate operating areas. A storage area is located to the north western end of the berth while the road tanker loading gantry is located further to the south east. A bulk heavy oil storage terminal belonging to Fuel Firing Services is located between the two Burgan Oil site areas. The two areas are linked by aboveground product pipelines The land-use surrounding the site can be summarised as follows: Both Berth 1 and Berth 2 are located on the south western side of the mole and therefore south west of both the storage tanks and the gantry loading facility. At the end of the mole, between Berth 1 and the proposed storage tanks in Bund B, the winch cable storage building is located. Also located on the mole is the Fuel Firing Services (FFS) site which is situated between the proposed Burgan Oil storage site and road loading gantry bays. FFS is located on the south west side of the mole with part of the FFS storage located between the proposed gantry bay and Berth 2. In addition the site intends to install an import pipeline to receive product from the Chevron Refinery via the Chevron Refinery white oils pipeline. The Burgan Oil pipeline will either terminate at Tanker Berth 2 or at the Chevron Refinery import manifold at the Chevron Joint Bunkering Services (JBS) fuel terminal. Due to the nature of the harbour and mole design, other industrial sites within the harbour are located outside the largest consequence distance and are therefore judged to be not affected in the event of a major incident at the Burgan Oil site. Important surrounding sites:


Major transport routes in close proximity to the site:

Portside Road is the primary access road to the Eastern Mole Berth.

The land-use around the site is shown in Figure 3.1. The following Major Hazard Installations have been identified to be near the site:


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Fuel Firing Services located adjacent to the site, separated by a service corridor Chevron Joint Bunkering Services (JBS) Fuel Terminal

Figure 3.1 Aerial Map for Burgan Oil Cape Terminal, Cape Town Harbour, Western Cape


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3.2 METEOROLOGY

Typically, quantitative risk assessments (QRAs) require information about the wind speed, wind direction and stability class. Atmospheric stability is difficult to measure and often varies dramatically over relatively short distances. Atmospheric stability classes need to be defined in the dispersion modelling to facilitate estimates of lateral and vertical dispersion parameters. The preferred stability classification scheme for use in air quality modelling applications is the scheme proposed by Pasquill (1961). The Pasquill Stability Classes are defined by the letters A to F and are described as follows: A. Extremely unstable conditions B. Moderately unstable conditions C. Slightly unstable conditions D. Neutral conditions E. Slightly stable conditions F. Moderately stable conditions. Neutral conditions correspond to a vertical temperature gradient of approximately 1 C per 100 m. The meteorological conditions defining Pasquill stability classes are given in Table 3.1:

Table 3.1: Pasquill Stability Classes

Surface Wind Speed (m/s)

Day-time Insulation Night-time Insulation Strong Moderate Slight >4/8 low cloud 4/8 cloud

<2 A A - B B 2 – 3 A – B B C E F 3 – 5 B B - C C D E 5 – 6 C C - D D D D >6 C D D D D

It is understood that to date no weather stations in South Africa measure both wind speed and stability categories. Since no site-specific weather data were available, meteorological data (i.e. wind and stability data) from the closest weather station, namely Cape Town Airport was sourced from the research report ‘Stability Wind Roses for Southern Africa’ (1) . The average ambient temperature and humidity for Cape Town Harbour were obtained from South African Weather Services. A summary of the data is as follows:

(1) Tyson, P.D. et al,'Stability Wind Roses for Southern Africa', Department of Geography and Environmental Studies,

University of Witwatersrand, 1979.


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Average ambient temperature is 17 C and average relative humidity 75.5%.

ERM selected the following stability classes and wind speed scenarios for modelling purposes:

B3 – meaning a stability class of B (moderately unstable conditions) where the wind speed is greater than 3 m/s. C8 - meaning a stability class of D (neutral conditions) where the wind speed is greater than 8 m/s.

The above weather scenarios give a conservative daytime weather condition.

F2 – meaning a stability class of F (moderately stable) where the wind speed is less than or equal to 2 m/s. This class is often used by the US Environmental Protection Agency for determining worse case scenarios for vapour cloud dispersion consequence analysis. F2 gives a conservative night time weather condition.

Selecting the above categories gives an average and a ‘worst case’ condition for the risk assessment study.

3.3 REQUIREMENTS OF OTHER ENVIRONMENTAL LEGISLATION

EIA Regulations (GNR 543, 544 and 546 of 18th June 2010) promulgated under the National Environmental Management Act No. 107 of 1998, as amended An Environmental impact assessment on the proposed Burgan Oil development is currently being undertaken by ERM.


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4 DESCRIPTION OF FACILITIES

4.1 DESCRIPTION OF SITE OPERATIONS

The proposed Burgan Oil Fuel Terminal is intended to receive AGO (diesel) and ULP (petrol) from transport tanker ships and by pipeline from the Chevron Milnerton refinery. Fuel will be offloaded by two Hard Arms on Eastern Mole Berth 2. Ethanol and Bio Fame are intended to supplement the ULP and AGO at the terminal and are added to the fuels in a set ratio. Ethanol and Bio Fame are delivered to the site by road tanker. Fuel is received from the Chevron refinery by a connection to the current white oils pipeline. The Burgan Oil pipeline connection will be discussed in Section 4.3. The products are pumped from the site storage area through aboveground pipework to the site road tanker loading gantry. Road tankers are then loaded in any of the six loading bays. Road tanker loading occurs during the day and at night. For this MHI report, ERM have assumed that all equipment on the Burgan Oil site will be designed, constructed, operated and maintained to world class standards and will comply with all relevant South African legislation. Burgan Oil is yet to complete detailed designs on the terminal however the site proposed design philosophy is included in Annex F. Burgan Oil has committed to implementing all design features in the aforementioned design philosophy and a letter indicating this intent is shown in Annex G.

4.1.1 Bulk Storage Facilities

The various aboveground storage tanks, along with their products, volumes, height and diameter are shown n in Table 4.1.

Table 4.1 Site Storage Tank Details

Tank Name

Client Name for Product

Max Liquid Level (m)

Fill rate (m3/s)

Working Volume (m3)

Comments/ References

Maximum Volume (m3)

Diameter (m)

Tank 1 ULP 18.42 0.26 9,000 HH, 9,780 26 Tank 2 AGO 18.42 0.26 9,000 HH 9,780 26 Tank 3 ULP 18.42 0.26 9,000 HH 9,780 26 Tank 4 AGO 18.42 0.26 9,000 HH 9,780 26 Tank 5 ULP 18.42 0.26 9,000 HH 9,780 26 Tank 6 AGO 18.42 0.26 9,000 HH 9,780 26 Tank 7 AGO 18.41 0.26 13,000 HH 14,075 31.2 Tank 8 AGO 18.41 0.26 13,000 HH 14,075 31.2 Tank 9 AGO 18.41 0.26 13,000 HH 14,075 31.2 Tank 10 AGO 18.41 0.26 13,000 HH 14,075 31.2 Tank 11 Ethanol 17.31 0.02 1,700 HH 1,845 11.65 Tank 12 Bio Fame 17.31 0.02 1,700 HH 1,845 11.65


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4.1.2 Ship Offloading Facilities

The petrol and diesel storage tanks are filled via pipeline from ships moored at Berth 2): Table 4.3 below summarizes the ship off-loading facility characteristics. The ship will be moored at the berth for 32 hours during off-loading.

Table 4.2 Ship Offloading

Characteristics Petrol Diesel Size of fuel delivery 30,000 m3 30,000 m3 Hard arm size 250 mm 250 mm Line size 300 mm 300 mm Maximum Flowrate 0.26 m3/s 0.26 m3/s Frequency (Deliveries/year) 7 16

4.1.3 Road Tanker Off-loading Facilities

The ethanol and Bio Fame tanks are filled by means of road tanker off-loading (referred to as ‘bridging’): Table 4.3 below summarizes the road tanker off-loading facilities characteristics. It is understood that a bridging road tanker can remain on site for up to 40 minutes.

Table 4.3 Road Tanker Off-loading (Bridging)

Characteristics Ethanol Bio Fame Road tanker capacities 30 m3 30 m3 Drained area 800 m2 800 m2 Hose size 100 mm 100 mm Pumps 1 ( plus standby) 1 ( plus standby) Line size 100 mm 100 mm Maximum Flowrate 0.0133 m3/s 0.0133 m3/s Frequency (Deliveries/year) 325 1,517

4.1.4 Road Tanker Loading Facilities

Table 4.4 below summarizes the road tanker loading facilities characteristics. It is assumed that the road tanker can remain on site for up to 40 minutes.


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Table 4.4 Road tanker Loading Facility Details

Characteristics Ethanol Bio Fame Tanker sizes 42 m3 42 m3 Compartment size 6 m3 6 m3 Connections per tanker 2 2 Bunded area 3900 m2 3900 m2 Hose size 100 mm 100 mm Pumps 5 5 Line size 200 mm 200 mm Average Flowrate in Pipeline to Gantry 0.1 m3/s 0.1 m3/s Frequency (Deliveries/year) 4,875 11,917

4.2 MANAGEMENT OF STORAGE TANKS

For the storage tanks, the storage and movement of fuels at the tank farm will be managed via tank dip reading, and a combination of both manual and automatic tank gauging. All tank management, we have assumed will be undertaken to world class standards and will comply with all relevant South African legislation. Based on proposed designs, all storage tanks on site will be provided with secondary containment and will be able to contain leaks and spills. Table 4.5 shows the proposed bund sizes with the layout of the bunds shown in Figure 4.3.

Table 4.5 Burgan Oil Cape Terminal, Cape Town Harbour- Bund sizes

ID Containment Name

Containment Type

Gross Area (m2)

Net Area (m2)

Wall Height (m)

Secondary Containment Bunds and Area (m2)

Secondary Containment Wall Height (m)

1 Bund A1 Tank Bund 1,225 694 1 A2, A3 - 2.8 2 Bund A2 Tank Bund 1,291 760 1 A1, A4 - 2.8 3 Bund A3 Tank Bund 1,202 671 1 A1, A4, A5 2.8 4 Bund A4 Tank Bund 1,298 767 1 A2, A3, A6 2.8 5 Bund A5 Tank Bund 1,151 620 1 A3, A6 2.8 6 Bund A6 Tank Bund 1,234 703 1 A4, A5 2.8 7 Bund B1 Tank Bund 1,935 1170 1 B2, B3 2.8 8 Bund B2 Tank Bund 1,625 860 1 B1, B3, B4 2.8 9 Bund B3 Tank Bund 2,181 1416 1 B1, B2, B4 2.8 10 Bund B4 Tank Bund 2,199 1434 1 B2, B3 2.8 11 Bund C1 Tank Bund 401 294 1 C2 2.8 12 Bund C2 Tank Bund 410 303 1 C1 2.8 13 Drained Gantry Drained Area 3939 3939 / 2.8

It is understood that all bunds will comply with SANS 10089-1 and that bund sizes and capacities will be appropriate according to the standard(1).

(1) South African National Standard 10089-1 Storage and distribution of petroleum products in above ground bulk

storage installations, edition 4.1 2003


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It is assumed that the Burgan Oil Cape Terminal and all equipment on the Burgan Oil site will be designed, constructed, operated and maintained to world class standards and will comply with all relevant South African legislation. ERM would also recommend that the site considers implementing all of the recommendations which arose from the incident at the Buncefield Terminal in the United Kingdom in 2005 contained in the UK HSE Process Safety Leadership Group Final Report entitled Safety and Environmental Standards for Fuel Storage Sites.

4.3 ADDITIONAL IMPORT PIPELINE

It is understood that Burgan Oil intends to allow for an import pipeline connected to the main import pipeline servicing the Joint Bunkering Services (JBS) from the Chevron Refinery. The pipeline is understood to be intended to originate in one of two places on the Eastern Mole Berth. These two options will be referred to Option A and Option B and will originate at Tanker Berth 2 connected to the JBS import manifold or connected directly to the Chevron Refinery pipeline import manifold at JBS respectively. The pipeline is understood to run aboveground alongside the Eastern Mole Berth service road and enter the Burgan Oil terminal past the nearby FFS facility, terminating at the Burgan Oil import fuel manifold. The pipeline is understood to transfer both diesel and petrol to the terminal and is expected to perform transfers not more than twice per month. The operating details of the pipeline are shown in Table 4.6. The layouts of the two additional piping options are shown in Figure 4.1 and Figure 4.2.

Table 4.6 Burgan Oil Import Pipeline Operating Specifications

Characteristics Diesel Petrol Line Diameter (mm) 254 254 Operating Pressure (barg) 12 12 Operating Flowrate (m3/h) 500 500 Days in Use per Month 1 1

Figure 4.1 Burgan Oil Import Pipeline Layout Option A

Figure 4.2 Burgan Oil Import Pipeline Layout Option B


4.4 DESCRIPTION OF PRODUCTS STORED ON SITE

The characteristics of flammable products on site considered for the MHI appear in their respective Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS). Copies of the MSDS’s are attached as Annex C.

4.5 DESCRIPTION OF FIRE FIGHTING FACILITIES

The site will have to comply with the requirements of Transnet Ports Authority (TPA) and world class best practices and standards such as those published by NFPA, SANS and API.

Figure 4.3 Site Layout with Bunds Highlighted for Burgan Oil Cape Terminal, Cape Town Harbour, Western Cape


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4.6 POPULATION DATA

Both individual and societal risks were addressed in this assessment (refer to Section 6.3). In order to do so, it was necessary to identify average populations at various locations surrounding the sites. A survey of populations of the surrounding areas showed the populations are as described in Table 4.7. These areas are shown in Figure 4.4.

Table 4.7 Population of Areas Surrounding Burgan Oil Cape Terminal, Cape Town Harbour

Area Day Night FFS 5 (indoors)

25 (outdoors) 0 (indoors) 10 (outdoors)

Other areas where site specific population data was not available were assigned populations based on population densities defined by the TNO Green Book. The population densities for various designations of areas are shown in Table 4.8. It has been concluded that the industrial area ranges between low and medium density (both highlighted in Table 4.8).

Table 4.8 Populations Densities for Areas Surrounding Burgan Oil Cape Terminal, Cape Town Harbour (1)

Type of area Description Population density (persons/ha)

Residential areas/habitats Wildlife area 0 Rural area 1 Sporadic residential development 5 Quiet residential area 25 Busy residential area 70 Urban development with high-rise buildings

120

Industrial areas Personnel density low 5 Medium 40 High 80 Offices – high-rise buildings 200

Recreational areas (in season) Campsite, holiday park 60-200

(1) TNO ‘Green Book’ Methods for the Determination of Possible Damage – CPR 16E – First Addition - 1992

Figure 4.4 Specified Population Areas Surrounding Burgan Oil Cape Terminal, Cape Town Harbour


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5 POTENTIAL MAJOR HAZARDS

This section satisfies the requirements of Section 5 (5) (b) (ii) of the MHI Regulations.

5.1 INTRODUCTION

There are a number of hazards that are present at the proposed Burgan Oil site that may result in injury to people or a fatality in more serious cases. Some hazards may even give rise to multiple fatalities. This study is only concerned with ‘major hazards’, which are as follows:

Hydrocarbon fires associated with pipework failures Hydrocarbon fires associated with tank failures Storage tank fires Vapour cloud explosions Flash fires.

Each of these hazards is described below. Typically the release of hydrocarbons is associated with the failure of equipment, e.g. a vessel hole or hose breach. The Buncefield accident of 11 December 2005 indicated that a potentially large flash fire or explosion could result from the overfilling of above ground low flash product storage tanks. The accident resulted from the prolonged overfill of a petroleum storage tank. The excess liquid splashed down the side of the tank, breaking up into droplets. This had the effect of enhancing the vaporisation of lighter hydrocarbon fractions in the petrol, resulting in the generation of a large vapour cloud. This cloud spread beyond the site boundary. The flammable vapour came into contact with an ignition source, at which point the explosion occurred. The Buncefield incident investigation report (1) details certain criteria required for a Buncefield-type accident. These include the tank height (greater than 5m), the filling rate (greater than 100 m3/hour) and the product stored (with a low flash point, such as petrol). Several tanks at the proposed site exhibit these criteria and therefore Buncefield scenarios have been investigated for these tanks. This study is primarily concerned with ‘major hazards’ giving rise to off-site risk and therefore for this assessment, on site risk has not been considered.

(1) Major Incident Investigation Board (2008).. The Buncefield Incident 11 December 2005. The final report of the Major

Incident Investigation Board. Available at http://www.buncefieldinvestigation.gov.uk/index.htm


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5.2 POOL FIRES

The principal type of hydrocarbon fire of interest in this study is a pool fire. If a liquid release has time to form a pool and is then ignited before the pool evaporates or drains away, then a pool fire results. Because they are less well aerated, pool fires tend to have lower flame temperatures and produce lower levels of thermal radiation than some other types of fire (such as jet fires); however, this means that they will produce more smoke. Although a pool fire can still lead to structural failure of items within the flame, this will take several times longer than in a jet fire. An additional hazard of pool fires is their ability to move. A burning liquid pool can spread along a horizontal surface or run down a vertical surface to give a running fire. Due to the presence of kerbs, slopes, drains and other obstacles; pool fire areas and directions can be unpredictable. To provide a good conservative model, the pool fires are modelled as perfect circles. For this study, pool-fires have been limited to the following sizes:

Bund size is used for a full bund fire ¼ of the bund size for small bund fires 100 m pool diameter for unconfined fire, reflecting the effect of uneven terrain and containment from curbs and bunds.

For cases where releases are not contained within a bund but within areas with drainage (e.g. road loading gantries), those were considered to limit pool sizes with the area limited by the drainage system.

5.3 TANK FIRES

Ignition at the roof of a conventional atmospheric storage tank will result in a tank fire. One mechanism for the occurrence of a tank fire is considered to be ignition of a flammable vapour – air mixture within the tank vapour space, possibly giving rise to an explosion. Tank fires have not been included in this assessment because, given the height of the tanks, the effect for a person at ground level will be below the harm threshold outside the tank bunds and such the risk is therefore judged to not be significant.

5.4 FLASH FIRES

Vapour clouds can be formed from the release of flashing liquids of pressurised flammable material as well as from non-flashing liquid releases where vapour clouds can be formed from the evaporation of liquid pools or from an overfilling of storage tanks or vessels. Where ignition of a release does not occur immediately, a vapour cloud is formed and moves away from the point of origin under the action of the wind.


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This drifting cloud may undergo delayed ignition if an ignition source is reached, resulting in a flash fire if the cloud ignites in an unconfined area or a vapour cloud explosion (VCE) if within confined area. (An unconfined vapour cloud explosion is also possible under certain conditions). The flash fire is typically modelled through simulating the dispersion of the initial cloud to the lower flammability limit (LFL). The damage area then corresponds to the LFL cloud footprint. It is also possible that pockets of gas capable of igniting travel outside the LFL cloud footprint. Therefore concentrations are also modelled to the half LFL (0.5LFL) level. Flash fires are considered to be possible as a result of overfilling of a storage tank (i.e. a Buncefield-type incident). Guidance on the size of flash fires is given in Section 7.2.2. Vapour from evaporating pools is not considered to result in flash fires due to slower evaporation rates. The cloud typically stays above the liquid pool and does not disperse significantly out of the bund limits. Should vapour be ignited it will most likely initiate a pool fire of the released pool. Pool fire ignition probabilities do take this scenario into consideration.

5.5 VAPOUR CLOUD EXPLOSIONS

If the generation of heat in a fire involving a vapour-air mixture is accompanied by the generation of pressure then the resulting effect is a vapour cloud explosion (VCE). The amount of overpressure produced in a VCE is determined by the reactivity of the gas, the strength of the ignition source, the degree of confinement of the vapour cloud, the number of obstacles in and around the cloud and the location of the point of ignition with respect to the escape path of the expanding gases. In most VCEs the expanding flame front travels more slowly than the pressure wave; this type of explosion is called a deflagration and the maximum overpressure is determined by the expansion ratio of the burning gases. If the flame front travels fast enough to coincide with the pressure wave then the explosion is called a detonation and very severe overpressures can be produced. Detonation is most likely to occur with more reactive gases such as hydrogen and ethylene. VCEs resulting from the overfilling of a tank (i.e. a Buncefield-type incident) have been considered within this assessment. This is due to the criteria having been met for a Buncefield type scenario as outlined in Section 5.1 for a number of the proposed storage tanks on site and the considerations for this explosion scenario are detailed in Section 7.2.


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6 APPROACH TO THE ASSESSMENT

6.1 TERMINOLOGY

Individual Risk: The frequency at which an individual may be expected to sustain a given level of harm from the realisation of specific hazards. It is a measure of the risk of harm to an individual with defined characteristics at a given point. Maximum Individual Risk: The individual risk to persons exposed to the highest risk in an exposed population. Risk Contours: Lines that connect points of equal risk around the facility or installation (also known as risk iso-lines). Risk Notation: The numerical expression of risk. Risk assessment results involve small numbers and so an exponential notation or a scientific notation is often used. A ‘unit conversion table’ is presented in Table 6.1.

Table 6.1 Risk Notation Conversion Table

Exponential/ scientific

Power Decimal Chance per Million (cpm)

Description

1 E-05/yr 1x10-5/yr 0.00001/yr 10 cpm 1 in 100 000 per year 1 E-06/yr 1x10-6/yr 0.000001/yr 1 cpm 1 in million per year 1 E-07/yr 1x10-7/yr 0.0000001/yr 0.1 cpm 1 in 10 million per year

In this assessment the chance per million (cpm) notation is generally used in figures and graphs.

6.2 HARM CRITERIA

6.2.1 Thermal Radiation

One of the causes for harm to people considered in this study is thermal radiation, which occurs as a result of a fire. The vulnerability of people exposed to thermal radiation depends on the intensity of the incident radiation and the duration of exposure. Thermal flux values are used as criteria for long duration fires such as pool fires as well as jet fires and thermal dose values are used for short duration intense fires such as boiling liquid expanding vapour explosions (BLEVEs) and fireballs. Fatality Criteria

Thermal Flux impact criteria chosen to be used in the fatality assessment have been selected based on the effects of thermal radiation summarised in Lees (1) and have been reproduced in Table 6.2.

(1) Lees F P (2001). Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 2nd Edition, reprinted with corrections


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Table 6.2 Thermal Flux Impact Criteria For Fatality Assessments (Lees)

Thermal Flux (kW.m-2) Effect 37.5 Intensity at which damage is caused to process equipment 12.5 Intensity at which piloted ignition of wood occurs 6.3 Intensity in areas where emergency actions lasting up to 1

minute may be required without shielding but with protective clothing

The UK HSE has developed criteria based on a research report (1) that used the following relationship to calculate the thermal dose:

3/4tFtdu where

tdu thermal dose units ([kW/m2]4/3).s T time (s) F Thermal flux (kW/m²)

This report uses the HSE thermal radiation impact criteria for short duration fires that are chosen based on the effects described in Table 6.3.

Table 6.3 Thermal Dose Impact Criteria (HSE)

Thermal Dose (tdu) Effect 1800 50% fatalities among a ‘typical’ population 1000 Dangerous dose to a ‘typical’ population – equates to

approximately 1% fatalities 500 Dangerous dose to a vulnerable / sensitive population

Land Use Planning Criteria

This risk assessment uses 1000 tdu as the dangerous dose criterion for land use planning based on the HSE planning case assessment guide (2) . Assuming that the maximum exposure time is 30 seconds (allowing for exposed persons to escape or find shelter), the thermal flux required to meet the above criteria of 1000 tdu is 13.9 kW/m2. These values for land use planning are summarised in Table 6.4.

Table 6.4 Thermal Flux Impact Criteria For Land Use Planning Assessments (HSE)

Impact Effect 1000 tdu Dangerous dose to a ‘typical’ population – equates to

approximately 1% fatalities 13.9 (kW.m-2) Intensity to reach a thermal dose of 1000 tdu in 30 seconds

(1) Hymes I, The Physiological Effects of Thermal Radiation, SRD R 275, September, 1983. (2) Planning Case Assessment Guide, 09/07/2002


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6.2.2 Buncefield Criteria

Buncefield-type events are only considered for tanks that are over 5 m in height and are filled at a rate in excess of 100 m3/h with low flashpoint products (such as gasoline). This is in line with the recommendations of the Buncefield Standards Task Group (BSTG) (1).Table 6.5 shows the specific Buncefield Criteria for Explosions. For this assessment, it has been determined that the Buncefield criteria have only been met for the proposed ULP storage tanks on site and therefore Buncefield scenarios have been included in this assessment.

Table 6.5 Buncefield Criteria for Explosions

Buncefield Explosion Effects Fatality Probability People Indoors People Outdoors

200 kPa 1.00 1.00 0.250 kPa 0.40 0.00 The various consequences which may arise from a Buncefield-type event are discussed in Section 7.2.2.

6.2.3 Flash Fire Flammability Limit

The extent of a Flash Fire is defined by dispersion of material vapour until the lower flammability limit (LFL) is reached. Within the ½ LFL contour there is still a possibility of fatality due to exposure to burning pockets of vapour. Therefore for the fatality assessment, the dangerous dose end point criteria for flash fires has been designated as the extent to the LFL and half LFL. For land use planning, the dangerous dose end point criteria for flash fires has been designated as the extent to the LFL. The dangerous dose end point criteria for flash fires has been highlighted in Table 6.6.

Table 6.6 Flash Fire Impact Criteria

Criteria Effect

LFL Vapour is able ignite and produce a flash fire ½ LFL Burning pockets of vapour can still occur

(1) http://www.hse.gov.uk/comah/buncefield/bstgfinalreport.pdf


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6.2.4 Fatality Probabilities

Thermal Radiation

Based on the impact criteria described in Sections 6.2, fatality probabilities have been assigned based on the information below. To assign a probability of fatality to people exposed to the thermal flux values in Table 6.2, probabilities of fatality have been assigned based on the required time to reach thermal doses and the probability of fatality that the HSE has assigned to these thermal doses shown in Table 6.3. Information on the time taken to reach a given thermal dose level at different levels of thermal flux is given in Table 6.7.

Table 6.7 Thermal Dose Impact Criteria

Thermal Flux (kW.m-2)

Time to 1800 tdu (s) Time to 1000 tdu (s) Time to 500 tdu (s)

37.5 14.5 8.0 4.0 12.5 62.0 34.5 17.2 6.3 154.7 85.9 43.0

At a thermal flux of 37.5 kW.m-2: For outdoor, a high thermal dosage (1800 tdu) is reached rapidly offering little chance of escape and leaving a high probability of fatality. For indoor, although a building may offer some degree of protection, as 37.5 kW.m-2 is above the spontaneous ignition threshold of wood (1) , there is a high probability that the building will catch fire and force occupants to escape into a higher thermal flux field resulting into a high probability of fatality. At a thermal flux of 12.5 kW.m-2: For outdoor, a thermal dose of 1000 tdu is reached after 30 seconds and 1800 tdu after 1 minute, leading to a fatality probability of 1% and 50% respectively. This offers some chance of escape at this level. For indoor, piloted ignition of wood is possible during long exposure at this thermal flux causing a building to catch fire. However, even if the building does ignite, there is still possibility of the occupants escaping to alternative shelter. At a thermal flux of 6.3 kW.m-2: For outdoor, a thermal dose of 1500 tdu is reached after 1.5 minutes seconds and 1800 tdu after 2.5 minutes, leading to a fatality probability of 1% and 50% respectively. This offers a chance of escape resulting in a low fatality.

(1) Lees F P (2001). Loss Prevention in the Process Industries. 2nd Edition, reprinted with corrections


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For indoor, thermal flux levels are below the piloted ignition threshold for wood and therefore the likelihood of fatality for building occupants is considered to be very low. Therefore the probabilities of Fatality are assigned as presented in Table 6.8.

Table 6.8 Fatality Probability for Thermal Effects

Thermal Effects Fatality Probability People Indoors People Outdoors

Pool fire or Jet fire, Flux > 37.5 kW/m2 (or within flame boundary if not reached); Fireball, Dose> 1800 tdu (or within flame boundary if not reached);

0.80 1.00

Pool fire or jet fire, 37.5 kW/m2 / flame < Flux < 12.5 kW/m2; Fireball, 1800 / Flame< Dose < 1000 tdu

0.25 0.50

Pool fire or jet fire, 12.5 kW/m2 < Flux < 6.3 kW/m2; Fireball, 500 < Dose < 1000 tdu

0.00 0.05

6.3 ASSESSMENT CRITERIA

The current South African Major Hazard Installation Regulations do not offer criteria to define what level of risk is deemed acceptable. To assist in the decision as to whether the site should be registered as an MHI, an internationally used methodology was applied. The risk criteria used are based on those adopted by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in the United Kingdom. This methodology is internationally recognised and accepted as a basis for risk management. The HSE has developed different sets of risk criteria for different applications. One role that the HSE fulfils in the UK is to advise on development of land in the vicinity of existing MHIs. For this purpose the HSE uses its so-called land-use planning (LUP) criteria. Another set of criteria is used by the HSE to judge the acceptability of risk from existing MHIs. These are known as risk tolerability criteria. In this project, a stepwise approach has been taken, as illustrated in and the Figure 6.1 steps taken in this particular assessment are highlighted in ‘yellow’.


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Figure 6.1 Approach to Application of Criteria

The first screening step involves consideration of the consequences of potential accidents. For those activities that are known from ERM’s experience to give a potential for off-site effects, a risk based approach has been used. Where it is not clear whether an activity has the potential for an off-site effect or not, a screening analysis is performed which determines the distance to dangerous dose (1% fatalities) for worst case events. The results are used to determine whether accidents involving that activity can have an impact on members of the public beyond the site boundaries. Where there is the potential to affect members of the public, then further risk calculations were undertaken. The risk calculation incorporates both the consequences of potential accidents and the associated likelihood (frequency). In this study, the end-point used has been ‘dangerous dose’. Exposure to a dangerous dose results in 1% fatalities in a typical population. Risks are measured in chances per million per year (cpm) of an individual receiving a dangerous dose or worse. Another screening test is then applied to see whether further risk studies are necessary. This test involves application of the HSE land-use planning criteria, which compare the nature of the surrounding land-use with the risks produced by the MHI. This test is used to judge whether further, detailed risk assessment studies and application of the risk tolerability criteria would be appropriate. This is explained further in Section 6.3.1.


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6.3.1 Land Use Planning Around Major Hazard Installations

A number of countries have well developed approaches to land-use planning around Major Hazard Installations, being either primarily probabilistic (i.e. risk based) or deterministic (i.e. consequence based). The purpose of such systems is to prevent the growth of incompatible land-uses around major hazard sites, or the location of new major hazard sites in inappropriate locations. An overview of the approach used by the UK HSE is given below (1): A three zone system is applied - inner zone, middle zone and outer zone with the outermost extent of the outer zone referred to as the Consultation Distance (CD). In combination with this, land-uses are classified according to sensitivity level, with Sensitivity Level 1 (typically places of work) being the least sensitive and Sensitivity Level 4 (typically large schools or hospitals) being the most sensitive. A set of rules (in the form of a ‘decision matrix’) is applied to determine which land-uses are appropriate for which zones. In practice, the zones are related to the risk of an individual being exposed to a dangerous dose or load which would “...cause severe distress to almost everyone, many [would] require medical treatment, some [would] be seriously injured and highly vulnerable people might be killed”. This approach appreciates the general public’s aversion not only to fatality but also to injury and other distress (i.e. the concept of harm) - and is distinct from approaches solely related to fatality. Proposals for new developments in the vicinity of MHIs are assessed by the authorities. Different types of developments are assigned to different ‘sensitivity levels’, with schools and hospitals being amongst the most sensitive; and factories the least sensitive. The authorities recommend that a proposed development does not proceed if the level of risk is above the value that has been established for developments of that type. Similar approaches may be used for new hazardous installations in developed areas. The extent of the three zones may be determined by either a probabilistic assessment (i.e. on a risk basis) or by performing a consequence assessment (i.e. on a ‘protection’ basis). For this study, the extent of each zone is based on probabilistic assessment, taking account of, inter alia:

Control measures; Frequency of events Event duration; Weather conditions Specified harm criteria Likelihood of exposure

(1) Davies. P., Land-use Planning in the Vicinity of Major Hazard Installations www.hazardview.com, ERM Risk


36

In the absence of ‘official’ South African guidance, the risk levels applied in this assessment are those employed by the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) when setting zones around MHIs. The zones for an annual individual being harmed from exposure to flame/heat, explosion overpressure, toxic gas or asphyxiant (i.e. a specified frequency of receiving a dangerous dose); have been set to correspond to the following risk levels:

inner zone - 10 chances per million per year (10-5); middle zone - 1 chance per million per year (10-6); and outer zone (Consultation Distance) - 0.3 chances per million per year (3 x 10-7).

In November 2001 the UK HSE modified its zoning criteria. This is summarised in Table 5.2, with proposed developments categorised as either ‘advise against’ (AA) or ‘don’t advise against’ (DAA). This refers to the advice the HSE would give to the local authority in relation to a development proposal of a given type in the vicinity of a MHI. For example, the HSE would advise the local authority against building of a new housing development in the inner zone.

Table 6.9 Land-use Sensitivity to Risk

Level of Sensitivity Inner Zone

Middle Zone

Outer Zone

1. The normal working public DAA DAA DAA 2. The general public at home AA DAA DAA 3. Vulnerable members of the public (schools, hospitals, etc.) AA AA DAA 4. Large examples of No 3 & large outdoor examples of No 2 (i.e. recreational areas)

AA AA AA

Note that some types of development can change Sensitivity Level depending on their size. For example, large industrial / office land-uses (for more than 100 persons) would move up a Sensitivity Level from Sensitivity Level 1 to Sensitivity Level 2. It should also be noted that HSE does not apply these criteria retrospectively to existing land-use around existing MHIs. This is because the cost of turning down proposals for a development that does not yet exist is much lower than the costs involved in relocating existing land-uses. For example, the costs involved in relocating the occupants of houses in a residential area to new housing elsewhere would be very large compared to the cost of turning down a similar development before it is built. For this reason the land-use planning risk criteria are somewhat more stringent than the criteria applied to existing MHIs. As stated above, the HSE uses these criteria to consider the suitability of proposed, new land-uses in the vicinity of an existing MHI. In this study, the criteria have been used as a screening step to judge whether further risk assessment studies would be appropriate.


37

Where land-uses are identified that would be advised against if they were submitted as new applications, this is used to indicate that further risk studies, potentially with application of risk reduction measures at the site, are required to show that the risks are as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). Land-uses that would be advised against if they were proposed as new applications are termed ‘potentially incompatible’. The presence of potentially incompatible land-uses does not necessarily mean that the risks from the MHI are intolerable. It simply means that further studies would be worthwhile to determine whether or not more needs to be done to reduce the risk. If no potential incompatibilities are identified, then further, more detailed risk analyses would not be considered necessary at this time. In this assessment it was found that the consequences could extend off-site and affect members of the public. Further calculations were undertaken to show whether the risks can be considered to be as low as reasonable practicable.

6.3.2 Risk Tolerability Criteria

The HSE risk tolerability criteria are used to judge the acceptability of the risks from existing MHIs. In the HSE tolerability of risk framework (1), risk levels are divided into three bands of increasing risk, as shown in Figure 6.2 In the lowest band, within the ‘broadly acceptable’ region, the risk is considered to be insignificant and adequately controlled. Risks that are within the ‘unacceptable’ level fall into the uppermost band. In such cases, either action should be taken to reduce the risk levels, or the activity giving rise to the risk should be halted. Between the unacceptable and broadly acceptable regions the risk is considered to be tolerable if it is as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). The risk is ALARP when the cost of any further risk reduction measures would be grossly disproportionate to (i.e. much greater than) the benefits gained. This is demonstrated in Figure 6.2.

(1) HSE (2001). Reducing Risks, Protecting People. HSE Books, C100.


38

Figure 6.2 HSE Risk Criteria Framework

6.3.3 Individual Risk of Fatality Criteria

The individual risk is the risk to which a hypothetical person (usually with defined characteristics and behaviour pattern) is exposed. The HSE criteria (1) are stated in terms of individual risk of fatality for two types of hypothetical person: a person who is engaged in the industrial activity under consideration (e.g. an employee); and, a person who is not involved in the activity (e.g. a member of the public). The HSE has provided individual risk values corresponding to the boundaries between the different regions indicated in Figure 6.2. These are summarised in Table 6.10.

Table 6.10 Individual Risk Criteria

Level Individual Risk to Personnel Engaged in the Activity (/yr)

Individual Risk to People not Engaged in the Activity (/yr)

Unacceptable Greater than 1 in 1,000 (10-3) Greater than 1 in 10,000 (10-4) Broadly Acceptable

No greater than 1 in 1,000,000 (10-6) No greater than 1 in 1,000,000 (10-6)

(1) HSE (2001). Reducing Risks, Protecting People. HSE Books, C100.


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6.3.4 Societal Risk Criteria

Societal risk can be considered a measure of society’s aversion to accidents with multiple fatalities and/or injuries and should be calculated where large numbers of people may be exposed to individual hazards. With regard to societal risk, the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) document (1) states that: “…the risk of an accident causing the death of 50 people or more in a single event should be regarded as intolerable if the frequency is estimated to be more than one in five thousand per annum.” This gives a criterion ‘point’ from which intolerable, tolerable and broadly acceptable regions can be extrapolated when considered in conjunction with individual risk criteria. It should be noted that:

Taken in context, the criterion refers to fatalities among members of the public from accidents at a ‘single major industrial activity’; and The criterion appears to be referring to a cumulative frequency (since it refers to ’50 people or more’) rather than the single value associated with a single release outcome.

With this in mind, the following extrapolations have been performed:

The criterion for workers at the site is taken to be ten times higher than that for members of the public, i.e. – the risk of an accident causing the death of 50 workers or more should be regarded as intolerable if the frequency is greater than one in five hundred per annum; The broadly acceptable region is taken to be two orders of magnitude lower than the criterion point for members of the public, i.e. - risk of an Accident causing the death of 50 people or more is taken to be broadly acceptable if the estimated frequency is less than one in 500,000 per annum; and Each individual point is plotted on a graph and criterion lines extrapolated through them, to give the Cumulative Frequency (F) – Number of Fatality (N) criteria lines shown in Figure 6.3.


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Figure 6.3 Cumulative F-N Criteria Lines

6.4 METHODOLOGY

The source term and thermal radiation analyses were undertaken using the DNV Phast v6.6 package. This package has been developed by DNV and has been used extensively globally for modelling such incidents. The software package integrates a suite of programmes to perform consequence calculations related to release events and quantifies the resulting hazardous effects and calculates the impact at a specified distance or target. The ViewRisk risk summation package (developed by ERM) was used for the summation, analysis and presentation of risks related to the installations. The results from the consequence analysis were used as inputs to calculate risks for every scenario. Consequence dimensions are expressed in terms of a number of parameters as illustrated in Figure 6.4.

Number of Fatalities

Freq

uenc

y (/y

)


41

Figure 6.4 Harm Envelope Dimension Parameters


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7 RISK ASSESSMENT OF LIQUID FUELS

7.1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

The main hazards associated with the storage and handling of fuels are pool fires resulting from the ignition of released material as well as explosions and flash fires resulting from the ignition of a flammable cloud formed in the event of tank overfilling. The hazards may be realised following tank overfilling and leaks/failures in the storage tank and ancillary equipment such as transfer pumps, metering equipment, etc all of which can release significant quantities of flammable material on failure. Section 5 previously provided an explanation of the events which may occur as a result of release of flammable material, followed by ignition.

7.1.1 Bulk Storage tank Scenarios

In addition to overfill, the scenarios considered for the storage tanks were partial/local failures and cold catastrophic failures. Factors that have been identified as having an effect on the integrity of tanks are related to design, inspection, maintenance, and corrosion (1).

The following representative scenarios for the tanks were considered:

Catastrophic failure with release of the entire storage content of the tank. It was assumed that 50% of the tank volume would overtop the bund; Failure of the tank with release resulting in a quarter of the bund surface (or the intermediate bund where applicable) being covered; and Failure of the tanks with release resulting in the entire bund being covered with product.

Catastrophic failure of a full tank is considered as being the ‘worst case’ scenario and would result in the loss of the entire tank contents within one minute. It is assumed that the bund could fail or be overtopped on catastrophic release of tank content given that the sudden release of large quantities of liquid can form a powerful wave which could damage or surge over the walls. Therefore, for pool fire calculation purposes, it was assumed that 50% of the tank contents overtops the bund. An effective pool diameter (2) is calculated from the sum of the surface areas of the bund and the unconfined pool created from half the tank contents overtopping the bund.

(1) AEA Technology, HSE Guidance Document (2) The equivalent diameter is that of a circle whose surface area is equal to that of the pools.


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The unconfined pool diameter was assumed not to exceed 100 m, to provide for the presence of kerbs, slopes, drains and other obstacles.

7.1.2 Buncefield Scenarios

Following an overfilling of a tank with light petroleum products such as petrol, the Buncefield incident shows that 3 types of events can happen depending on the weather and surroundings conditions. Explosion Consequences

Guidance from the Process Safety Leadership Group (1) suggests that the overpressures listed in Table 7.1 and illustrated in Figure 7.1 should be used to characterise overpressures from this type of event.

Table 7.1 Overpressure Zones

Zone Name Zone Size (Measured from the tank Wall)

Comment

A r < 250 m HSE research report RR718 on the Buncefield explosion mechanism indicates that over-pressures within the flammable cloud may have exceeded 2 bar (200 kPa) up to 250 m from the tank that overflowed (see Figure 11 in RR718). Therefore within Zone A the probability of fatality should be taken as 1.0 due to over-pressure and thermal effects unless the exposed person is within a protective building specifically designed to withstand this kind of event.

B 250 m < r < 400 m Within Zone B there is a low likelihood of fatality as the over-pressure is assumed to decay rapidly at the edge of the cloud. The expected over-pressures within Zone B are 5 – 25 kPa (see RR718 for further information on overpressures). Within Zone B occupants of buildings that are not designed for potential overpressures are more vulnerable than those in the open air.

C r > 400 m Within Zone C the probability of fatality of a typical population can be assumed to be zero. The probability of fatality for members of a sensitive population can be assumed to be low.

This is further illustrated in Figure 7.1.

(1) Safety and environmental standards for fuel storage sites - Process Safety Leadership Group - Final Report, to be

published December 2009


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Figure 7.1 Overpressure Zones

It should be noted that these contours are based on empirical data from the Buncefield incident and may vary from site to site. The size of the flammable cloud will be affected by local topography, filling rate, levels of congestion within the vapour cloud and prevailing weather conditions. The assessment presented is a conservative best estimate, based on current industry best practice. Large Flash Fire Consequences

It is possible that the flammable vapour cloud formed in the event of a large release may not result in an explosion, but rather a large flash fire in the event of ignition. The Buncefield flammable cloud size (i.e. a cloud with a length and width of 470 m and 270 m respectively) was assumed. Small Flash Fire Consequences

Very low wind speed conditions contributed to the flammable vapour cloud build-up over a relatively large area at Buncefield. In the event of a release under non-calm weather conditions, it is unlikely that an explosion or large flash fire will result. Instead it is more likely that a small flash fire would occur under this type of weather condition.


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To determine the extent of a small flash fire during non-calm weather conditions, it was assumed that 20% of the spilled product is vaporised and will disperse. This was modelled using 20% of the maximum fill rate. The flash fire is modelled through simulating the dispersion of the initial cloud to the lower flammability limit (LFL). The damage area then corresponds to the LFL cloud footprint.

7.1.3 Pipework and Pipeline Scenarios

The following representative scenarios for the pipework and pipelines were considered:

Depending on the diameter of the pipe, release from holes having diameters as indicated in Section 7.3.1 Pump failure with the failure equivalent to the full bore failure of the outlet pipe Flange failure with the failure equivalent to that of a 13 mm diameter hole in the pipe.

It was assumed that failures of pipework inside the tank bunds would result in a bund fire. It is understood that all of the pipework on-site used to transfer product to the storage tanks pass through bund walls. Therefore, when the product is transferred from a pump to a tank, a release resulting from the rupture of this pipework will be driven by both the liquid head in the tank (since the pipework used for tank filling enters near the base of the tanks) as well as the pump. For releases from pipework attached to the storage tanks, it is understood that the valves on the tank outlets would be closed manually. In the event of a release and assuming that the operator will react efficiently, it is assumed that the manually operated valves would be closed within 20 minutes, limiting the release of product from the storage tanks. It is understood that all of the pumps on site can be shutdown using an emergency stop button. Therefore, in the instance of a release from pipework downstream of a pump and assuming that the operator will react efficiently, the pump is assumed to be shutdown within 10 minutes. Generally release rates for this assessment have been taken equal to the initial release rates. Where the flow through a pipe is driven by a pump, the maximum flow rate arising from a leak is set to 150% of the normal flow rate to allow for pump over-speed. The full list of scenarios investigated the failures and the resulting source releases are given in Annex D.


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7.1.4 Road Tanker Offloading Scenarios

For offloading scenarios, generally release rates for this assessment have been taken equal to the initial release rates. Where the flow through a hose is driven by a pump, the maximum flow rate arising from a leak was set to 150% of the normal flow rate to allow for pump over-speed. The following representative scenarios for road tanker offloading are considered:

Catastrophic failure with release of the entire storage contents of the tanker Hose connection failures:

- Guillotine hose breach - 15 mm hole in the offloading hose - 5 mm hole in the offloading hose. Hard arm connection failures:

- Hard arm Guillotine - Hole in hard arm with diameter equivalent to 10% of hard arm

diameter Where tanker operations occur the area was considered to be surrounded by a low pavement wall however the entire road area is also drained, limiting the potential size of leaks in the area. Connection failures for scenarios are assumed to result in a pool confined only by the low pavement area. The released volume in these scenarios is taken as the volume of the road tanker and due to the presence of an operator during offloading the release time is limited to 5 minutes and the frequencies are discussed in Section 4.1.3.

7.1.5 Road Tanker Loading Scenarios

For offloading scenarios, generally release rates for this assessment have been taken equal to the initial release rates. Where the flow through a hose is driven by a pump, the maximum flow rate arising from a leak was set to 150% of the normal flow rate to allow for pump over-speed. The following representative scenarios for the tankers loading are considered:

Catastrophic failure with release of the entire storage contents of the tanker Guillotine hose breach 15 mm hole in the offloading hose 5 mm hole in the offloading hose.

Tanker loading facilities will exist on site. These operations are assumed to occur in a drained and partially enclosed area and the frequencies are discussed in Section 4.1.4.


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Connection failures for scenarios are assumed to result in a pool confined only by the low pavement area. The released volume in these scenarios is taken as the volume of the road tanker and due to the presence of an operator during offloading the release time is limited to 5 minutes.

7.2 ESTIMATION OF CONSEQUENCES

7.2.1 Pool Fires

There is a risk of an on-site fire associated with the storage and handling of fuel on-site. The thermal radiation could potentially impact members of public in the surrounding areas and employees on-site. This assessment estimates the effects of thermal radiation from fires on human beings. The associated harm envelopes for the event scenarios are summarised in Annex D. The meteorological characteristics that govern the extent of the thermal radiation zone are described in Section 3.2. As described previously, to account for the presence of kerbs, slopes, drains and other obstacles pool fires were modelled as perfect circles and any unconfined pool diameters are taken to be limited to a maximum of 100 m diameter. Table 7.2 shows the maximum pool fire sizes for several radiation levels associated with failure scenarios at the site.

Table 7.2 Maximum Pool Fire Consequence Distances

Tank Scenario and Weather Radiation Level (kW/m2)

Maximum Downwind distance(m)

Tank 8 Catastrophic Failure with 50% bund overtopping (C8)

6.3 151 12.5 77 37.5 71

The greatest distance to a radiation level of concern from a pool fire, 151 m, extends off-site and encompasses the winch cable storage and part of Berth 1. The area encompassed by the largest pool fire is shown in Figure 7.2 below. Pool fires from pipeline Option B are also likely to encompass a portion of the Chevron JBS tank farm as this pipeline terminates on the Chevron JBS site.

Figure 7.2 Areas Enveloped by the Largest Pool Fires


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7.2.2 Buncefield Scenarios As was discussed previously, Buncefield-type events are only considered for tanks that are over 5 m in height and are filled at a rate in excess of 0.0278 m3/ s with low flash products (such as petrol). Taking the above into account, Buncefield scenarios are considered for the tanks listed in Table 7.3.

Table 7.3 Tanks Falling within the Buncefield Criteria

Tank Product Height (m) Maximum Filling Rate (m3/s)

1 Petrol 18.42 0.26 3 Petrol 18.42 0.26 5 Petrol 18.42 0.26

Explosion Overpressure Consequences The peak overpressures observed at Buncefield were extremely high, exceeding two bar (200 kPa) across much of the site. For the purposes of this assessment, the overpressure in Zone B was taken as 250 mbar (25 kPa). Information in the explosion mechanism report (Vol 2 B.11) (1) suggests that there was some degree of building damage up to 2 km from the site. The overpressure at this distance is estimated to be of the order of 10 mbar (1 kPa) (2). For the purposes of this assessment, the harm envelope dimensions that are used for vapour cloud explosions associated with the overfilling of the tanks are the same for each tank and are shown in Table 7.4.

Table 7.4 Distance to Various Overpressures Resulting from a VCE

Overpressure d c S m 2 bar 250 250 -250 0 250 mbar 400 400 -400 0

Large Flash Fire Consequences As discussed previously, for a large flash fire, the dimensions of the flammable vapour cloud formed at Buncefield are used. These dimensions are shown in Table 7.5 below.

(1) Safety and environmental standards for fuel storage sites - Process Safety Leadership Group - Final Report, to be published December 2009 (2) TNO Yellow Book


50

Table 7.5 Distance to Flammability Limits Resulting in a Large Flash Fire

Concentration d c S m LFL 470 135 0 235

Small Flash Fire Consequences For small flash fires, it is assumed that 20% of the spilled product is vaporised and will disperse. The flammability limits for these clouds are shown in Table 7.6.

Table 7.6 Distance to Flammability Limits Resulting in a Small Flash Fire

Concentration d c S m LFL (Calm weather) 29 17 0 81 0.5LFL (Calm weather) 33 24 0 100 LFL (Not calm weather) 192 30 0 139 0.5LFL (Not calm weather) 305 66 0 184

Results for the Buncefield small flash fire scenario associated with overfilling reveals that facilities up to 305 m from tanks falling within the Buncefield criteria would be impacted. This includes the majority of the surrounding areas of the Winch Cable Storage, FSS, Berth 1, Berth 2 and ships moored at these berths. The detailed results of the consequence modelling are provided in Annex D. The largest distances of a Buncefield incident from Tank 3 are plotted over the site in Figure 7.3. Tanks 1 and 5 would produce similar consequences but centred over the respective tanks.

Figure 7.3 Areas Enveloped by the Largest Buncefield Scenarios


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7.3 ESTIMATION OF INCIDENTS

7.3.1 Pool Fire Frequency Calculations

To determine the probability of a pool fire occurring, the failure rate needs to be modified by the probability of the material finding an ignition source. The probability of a pool fire occurring in the event of a release is therefore equal to the product of the failure rate and the probability of ignition. The frequency of the release scenarios identified in Section 5 is represented in Table 7.7 to Table 7.9. The ignition probability is dependent on a number of factors including the type of site, the release rate and the type of material released.

Table 7.7 Tank Event Frequency Data Utilised in the Risk Analysis (1)

Failure Type – Tanks Frequency

Catastrophic tanks failure 5 x 10-6 per tank per year Small bund fire 9 x 10-5 per tank per year Large bund fire 6 x 10-5 per tank per year

Table 7.8 Failure Frequencies for Road tankers Utilised in the Risk Analysis

Failure Type Frequency Hose failure(2) Full bore 4 x 10-6 per operation 15 mm Hole 0.4 x 10-6 per operation 5 mm Hole 6 x 10-6 per operation Road tanker failure(3) Catastrophic failure 1x10-5 per year Large connection failure 5x10-7 per year

Table 7.9 Failure Frequencies for Pipework Utilised in the Risk Analysis (4)

Release Hole Size (mm)

Failure Frequency (per metre year) for Pipe Diameter (mm) <50 50-149 150-299 300-499 500-1000

3 1 x 10-5 2 x 10-6 4 1 x 10-6 8 x 10-7 7 x 10-7 25 5 x 10-6 1 x 10-6 7 x 10-7 5 x 10-7 4 x 10-7

1/3 pipe diameter

4 x 10-7 2 x 10-7 1 x 10-7

Full bore 1 x 10-6 5 x 10-7 2 x 10-7 7 x 10-8 4 x 10-8

The ignition frequencies have been taken from the OGP report no. 434-6.1 (5) (March 2010).

(1) OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory Report No 434 – 3, March 2010, Section 2 – Summary of Recommended Data (2) Failure Rate and Event Data for use within Land Use Planning Risk Assessments – FR 1.2.3 – Hoses and Couplings (3) Publication Series on Dangerous Substances - Guidelines for quantitative risk assessment, ‘Purple Book’, CPR18E,

Chapter 3.2.9 Transport units in an establishment, Page 3.12 (4) Failure Rate and Event Data for use within Land Use Planning Risk Assessments – FR 1.3 –Pipework (5) OGP Risk Assessment Data Directory, Report No. 434-6.1, March 2010


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For scenarios considered inside bunds, Scenario 13 - tank Liquid 100m x 100m Bund (Liquid release from onshore tank farm where spill is limited by small or medium sized bund) is used; for releases outside bunded areas Scenario 9 - Large Plant Liquid (Liquid release from Large onshore plant) is used. For low flash point products such as petrol the ignition probabilities are taken as they appear in the OGP report. For higher flash point products such as diesel the report recommends that an additional factor of 0.1 be used to reduce the ignition probability due to the low amount of fuel vapours.

7.3.2 Overfill Frequency Calculations

The frequency of overfilling can be determined by a number of methods, such as fault tree analysis, LOPA assessment etc. The current study used a semi-quantified method based on the API 353 methodology (1). The frequency of overfilling is determined by multiplying the base frequency of overfill by a number of modifying factors as illustrated below: Overfill frequency = base frequency MFQuality MFLevel Gauging MFAuto Shut

MFAttend No. fills/year where: Base frequency = 1.0 x 10-4 events per tank fill/year/tank (i.e. 100 chances per

million) MFQuality = Adjustment for the quality of the facility’s overfill

management systems MFLevel Gauging = Adjustment for level gauging MFAuto Shut = Adjustment for automatic shutdown MFAttend = Adjustment for attendance at AST fill operations. Table 7.10 shows the scorecard for assessing the quality of overfill management systems.

(1) API 353: Managing Systems Integrity of Terminal and tank Facilities, First Edition


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Table 7.10 Assessing Quality of Overfill Management Systems

Line Quality Assessment Questions 1 What is the quality of your fill procedures?

A. Written procedures in accordance with API RP 2350, score = 20 B. Written procedures, not in full accordance with API RP 2350, score = 10 C. No written procedures, score = 0

2 How well do you plan product receipts? A. Planning of product receipt in accordance with API RP 2350, score = 10 B. Planning of product receipt, not in full accordance with API RP 2350, score = 5 C. No planning of product receipt, score = 0

3 How well do you test electronic systems associated with tank fill operations? A. In accordance with API RP 2350, score = 10 B. Testing once per month, score = 5 C. No testing or no electronic systems, score = 0

4 How well have you prepared for emergencies? A. In accordance with API RP 2350, score = 10 B. Written procedures in place, drills conducted, not in full accordance with API RP 2350, score = 5 C. Little or no emergency preparedness, score = 0

5 How well do you conduct training and performance evaluations? A. In accordance with API RP 2350, score = 10 B. Specific training and evaluation of overfill operations, but not in full accordance with API RP 2350, score = 5 C. Little or no specific training for operators on overfill operations, score = 0

6 How well do you test and inspect the overfill protection system? A. In accordance with API RP 2350, score = 20 B. Some testing and inspection, not in full accordance with API RP 2350, score = 10 C. Little or no testing or inspection on overfill protection, score = 0

Add lines 1 through 6. Refer to the table below to assess the overall rating for the quality of overfill management systems.

Quality of Operations Modifying Factor Total Score Quality Modifying Factor 50-80 A 0.3 30-49 B 1 0-29 C 3

By assessing the transfer procedure and interviewing the people responsible on site, all the points of Table 7.10 were evaluated against the requirements of API2350. ERM have assumed that all equipment on the proposed Burgan Oil site will be designed, constructed, operated and maintained to world class standards and will comply with all relevant South African legislation. ERM would also recommend that the site considers implementing all of the recommendations which arose from the incident at the Buncefield Terminal in the United Kingdom in 2005 contained in the UK HSE Process Safety Leadership Group Final Report entitled Safety and Environmental Standards for Fuel Storage Sites. Therefore all the points of Table 7.10 were evaluated and assumed to comply with the requirements of API2350 and the site fall under Category A in terms of quality (i.e. the modifying factor is 0.3).


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Table 7.11, Table 7.12 and Table 7.13 show other adjustment factors attributed to different levels of overfill protection.

Table 7.11 Adjustment for Level Gauging

Type of Level Gauging Modifying Factor Two-stage independent level gauging 0.5 Instrumental level gauging 0.8 Ground level gauging 1

Table 7.12 Adjustment for Automatic Shutdown

Shutdown System Modifying Factor Automatic 0.1 Manual 1.0

Table 7.13 Adjustment for Attendance at AST Fill Operations

Type of Shutdown Level of Attendance at Fill Operations

Quality Rating

A B C

Automatic shutdown Full time (90-100% present) 0.6 1 1.5 Partial (25-90% present) 0.8 1.5 3 Unattended (0-25% present) 1 3 5 Manual shutdown Full time (90-100% present) 0.3 0.7 1 Partial (25-90% present) 0.7 1 2 Unattended (0-25% present) Not considered

Once again ERM have assumed that all equipment on the proposed Burgan Oil site will be designed, constructed, operated and maintained to world class standards and will comply with all relevant South African legislation. Therefore, for the tanks, all of which have manual shutdown systems, the modifying factor is 0.3. The modifying factors for the tanks falling within the Buncefield criteria are summarised in the Table 7.14 below.

Table 7.14 Buncefield Frequencies for Burgan Oil Cape Terminal Cape Town Harbour

Tank Nos. Product

New product

flash point

Buncefield potential?

Number of fills

per year

Overfill protection

Modifying factor:

Quality Management

Systems

Modifying factor: Level

Gauging

Modifying factor:

Automatic Shutdown

Modifying factor:

Attendance at Fill

Overfill frequency per tank

per fill

Overfill frequency per year

Tanks 1, 3 & 5 Petrol LOW Y 7 High,

High-High 0.3 0.5 0.1 0.6 6.30x10-6 1.89x10-5


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7.3.3 Explosion and Flash Fire Frequency Calculations

The explosion and flash fire frequencies will be affected by a number of factors. The event tree that was used to determine the explosion frequency for each tank is presented in Figure 7.4. The manner in which the overfill frequency is determined is presented in Section 7.3.2.

Figure 7.4 Event Tree for Buncefield-type Events

Calm Large Strong Weather Cloud Explosion Outcome

Strong Explosion Y (50%)

Y (50%) N (50%) Large Flash-Fire

Y

Overfill N (50%) Smaller Flash-Fire

Frequency

N Smaller Flash-Fire

The fraction of calm weather was used as the conditional probability for calm weather. This calm weather probability was found using wind-rose data. The consequences associated with calm and unstable weather were separated in the ViewRisk programme, ensuring the correct consequences were associated with the correct weather type. The probability of a large cloud forming is dependent on the length of time that overfilling occurs for. The overfill frequency includes events that are very short in duration as well as those which persist for a significant period. The presence of operators during overfilling, especially in the tank farm, reduce the likelihood of overfilling continuing for long enough periods for a large vapour cloud to form. Also, the ability to communicate with the source of fuel allows for quick shut-off in the event that any overfilling is detected. For the case of Burgan Oil Cape Terminal it is assumed that operators are present during offloading and constant communication exists with ship. However as the communication has to occur with a ship directly it has been conservatively assumed that breaks in communication can occur and therefore a large cloud has been assumed to occur in the event of overfilling. It is understood that for typical explosions, some level of congestion of the vapour cloud is required. The area surrounding the Burgan Oil Cape Terminal includes sites, which are unlikely to cause high levels of congestion.


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The spaces between large fuel tanks could cause the required level of congestion for a detonation, resulting in a vapour cloud explosion. As there are several tanks on site, it has been estimated that it is equally likely for a strong explosion to occur as for a large flash fire to occur. Typical frequencies for Buncefield-type events are shown in Table 7.15.

Table 7.15 Buncefield Event Frequencies

Tanks considered for Buncefield Assessment

Description Frequency day (cpm)

Frequency night (cpm)

Tank 1, 3, 5 Small flash fire following overfilling of petrol tanks

3.05 2.15

Large flash fire following overfilling of petrol tanks

4.86x10-2 5.00x10-1

Vapour cloud explosion following overfilling of petrol tanks

4.86x10-2 5.00x10-1

All frequencies are shown in Annex D.


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8 RISK ANALYSIS RESULTS

8.1 FATALITY RISK CALCULATION

The scenario frequencies and consequence results are used within the ERM ViewRisk risk summation package to calculate the individual risk and societal risk associated with the bulk fuel installations.

8.1.1 Location Specific Individual Risk for the site

Individual risks are by definition specific to individuals and need to take into account the extent and circumstances under which exposure arises. For instance, the risk will depend on the amount of time the individual spends outdoors as well as the time they may spend indoors which will afford them some protection. Risks are calculated for hypothetical persons located both indoors and outdoors. The percentage of time spent by people outdoors and indoors is discussed in Section 4.6. The risk contours presented in this section represent Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR). It should be noted that the Location Specific Individual Risk (LSIR) relates to an individual who is permanently exposed 24 hours a day 365 days a year. This is therefore an overestimate of the individual risk to personnel or public who may be present at these locations. Individual risk of fatality contours for persons located outdoors and indoors at 1, 10, 100 and 1,000 chances per million per year (cpm) for the installations were calculated using the fatality probabilities detailed in Section 6.2.4. Location Specific Individual Risks – Including Buncefield Scenarios

Figure 8.1 represents the location specific individual risks (LSIR) for hypothetical persons located outdoors. It can be seen that the 1 cpm contour extends off site to the north over the mole and harbour water. The winch cable storage is encompassed to the west, with Berth 1, 2 and the FFS storage encompassed to the south. Beyond the 1 cpm contour risks are broadly acceptable. Between the 1 cpm contour and the 10 cpm contour, the risks to the public are considered tolerable, so long as they can be demonstrated by Burgan Oil Cape Terminal to be as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). The 10 cpm contour extends off site following the site boundary, some area of the winch cable storage is enveloped to the west as well as part of the FFS storage to the south east. The 100 cpm contour extends off site to a maximum of 10 m but does not envelope any of the surrounding sites. The risk to the workers in the adjacent


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facilities does not exceed 100 cpm. Therefore the risks are not considered intolerable according to the assessment criteria of Section 6.3.3. There is a 1,000 cpm contour at the loading gantry. According to the assessment criteria in Section 6.3.3 this would be deemed intolerable, however the actual individual risk experienced by workers in this area will be less as these workers are not on site 100% of the time. A typical gantry operator is understood to work for 40 hours per week and 48 weeks per year. This leads to an occupancy factor of 21.9%. The maximum risk within the gantry area is 1800 cpm. Therefore the actual individual risk experienced by operators is approximately 394.2 cpm. This level of individual risk is therefore below 1000 cpm and can be deemed to not be intolerable according to the assessment criteria. Figure 8.2 represents the LSIR for persons located indoors. It can be seen that the 1 cpm contour extends off site to the north over the mole and harbour water. The winch cable storage is encompassed to the west, with Berth 1, 2 and the FFS storage encompassed to the south. Beyond the 1 cpm contour risks are broadly acceptable. Between the 1 cpm contour and the 10 cpm contour, the risks to the public are considered tolerable, so long as they can be demonstrated by Burgan Oil Cape Terminal to be as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). The 10 cpm contour extends off site following the site boundary, some area of the winch cable storage is enveloped to the west as well as part of the FFS storage to the south east. The 100 cpm contour extends off site to a maximum of 10 m but does not envelope any of the surrounding sites. The 1000 cpm contour is only reached in the vicinity of the loading gantry. As no structures exist in this area the assessment criteria in Section 6.3.3 are not applicable. The risk to the workers in the adjacent facilities does not exceed 100 cpm. Therefore the risks are not considered intolerable according to the assessment criteria of Section 6.3.3.

Figure 8.1 Location Specific Individual Risks of Fatality Contours for Persons Located Outdoors – Including Buncefield Scenarios

Figure 8.2 Location Specific Individual Risks of Fatality Contours for Persons Located Indoors - Including Buncefield Scenarios


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Location Specific Individual Risks – Excluding Buncefield Scenarios

To illustrate the significance of the ‘Buncefield’ type tank overfill events, the QRA has been re-run with these events omitted. By excluding the Buncefield scenarios Figure 8.3 and Figure 8.4 show the risks for outdoor and indoor respectively. It can be seen that the 1 cpm contour extends off site to the north over the mole and harbour water. The winch cable storage is partly encompassed to the west, with FFS storage partly encompassed to the south. Beyond the 1 cpm contour risks are broadly acceptable. Between the 1 cpm contour and the 10 cpm contour, the risks to the public are considered tolerable, so long as they can be demonstrated by Burgan Oil Cape Terminal to be as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). The 10 cpm contour extends off site following the site boundary; some area of the winch cable storage is enveloped to the west as well as part of the FFS storage to the south. The indoor contours are slightly reduced compared to the outdoor contours with a reduction around the transfer pipework from the fuel storage tanks to road loading gantry. The 100 cpm contour extends off site to a maximum of 10 m but does not envelope any of the surrounding sites. The risk to the workers in the adjacent facilities does not exceed 100 cpm. Therefore the risks are not considered intolerable according to the assessment criteria of Section 6.3.3. By comparing Figure 8.1 and Figure 8.3, it can be seen that one of the highest contributors to off-site risk is the potential for Buncefield scenarios as a result of tank overfilling.

Figure 8.3 Location specific Individual Risks of Fatality Contours for Persons Located Outdoors – Excluding Buncefield Scenarios

Figure 8.4 Location specific Individual Risks of Fatality Contours for Persons Located Indoors – Excluding Buncefield Scenarios


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8.1.2 Societal Risk

To calculate societal risks, the release scenarios, associated frequencies of occurrence, the dimensions of consequence for each weather set and stability class probability were entered into ERM’s risk summation package ViewRisk. The format for presenting societal risk data is in the form of FN curves. These curves illustrate the relationship between an incident which causes N or more fatalities and the cumulative frequency (F) of such an event for the population areas as identified previously. Societal Risk for Burgan Oil Cape Terminal Cape Town Harbour– Off Site Impacts

The calculated societal risk results for off-site populations (i.e. excluding known on site populations) as a result of risks posed by the site including Buncefield scenarios are shown in Figure 8.5 and the results with Buncefield scenarios removed are shown in Figure 8.6.

Figure 8.5 Societal Risk for the Burgan Oil Cape Terminal Cape Town Harbour for Off Site Populations – Including Buncefield Scenarios

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Figure 8.6 Societal Risk for the Burgan Oil Cape Terminal Cape Town Harbour for Off Site Populations – Excluding Buncefield Scenarios

As illustrated by Figure 8.5 and Figure 8.6, the total societal risk F-N curve lies below the ‘Broadly Acceptable’ indicator line and therefore below the ‘Intolerable’ indicator line as defined in the societal risk criteria in Section 6.3.3. Therefore, the risks are considered broadly acceptable but Burgan Oil should reduce risk levels to As Low As Reasonably Possible (ALARP).

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8.1.3 Rate of Harm (Contributors to the Risk)

The Rate of Harm (also known as the Potential Loss of Life, PLL, or Expectation Value, EV) is the sum of the number of people harmed multiplied by the frequency with which this happens. The Rate of Harm breakdown indicates those scenarios which are the largest contributors to the risk. The Rate of Harm breakdown for the site is presented in Table 8.1.

Table 8.1 Rates of Harm Contributing Greater than 1% - Including Buncefield Scenarios

Location Description Rate of Harm (people*cpm)

Rate of Harm (%)

A5 VCE 15.6 17.6 A3 VCE 15.1 17.0 A1 VCE 14.3 16.1 Trans to Gantry Petrol pool fire 9.6 10.8 A4 Diesel pool fire 9.4 10.6 Trans to Gantry Petrol pool fire 4.8 5.4 A6 Diesel pool fire 3.3 3.7 A3 LFF 2.2 2.4 A5 LFF 2.1 2.4 A1 LFF 2.1 2.4 A2 Diesel pool fire 1.9 2.2 B2 Diesel pool fire 1.9 2.2 Trans to Gantry Diesel pool fire 1.1 1.2 A4 Diesel pool fire 0.9 1.1 Other 4.5 5.04 Total 88.8 100

The Rate of Harm breakdown indicates that 57.9% of the RoH table is made up of vapour cloud explosions and large flash fires which are due to Buncefield-type scenarios. Removing the Buncefield scenarios show which other events contribute to the risk of the site. The rates of harm for these events are shown in Table 8.2.


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Table 8.2 Rates of Harm Contributing Greater than 1% - Excluding Buncefield Scenarios


Rate of Harm (%)

Trans to Gantry Petrol pool fire 9.55 25.56 A4 Diesel pool fire 9.40 25.15 Trans to Gantry Petrol pool fire 4.78 12.79 A6 Diesel pool fire 3.31 8.86 A2 Diesel pool fire 1.92 5.14 B2 Diesel pool fire 1.92 5.14 Trans to Gantry Diesel pool fire 1.07 2.87 A4 Diesel pool fire 0.94 2.51 Ship transfer Petrol pool fire 0.85 2.26 A3 Petrol pool fire 0.72 1.93 Trans to Gantry Diesel pool fire 0.54 1.43 A6 Diesel pool fire 0.42 1.13 Ship transfer Petrol pool fire 0.42 1.13 Other 35.84 4.10 Total 37.37 100

As indicated in Table 8.2, without Buncefield scenarios, the largest risks are associated with the transfer of fuel from the ship and to the gantry via pipework. As identified in the LSIR and societal risk studies the Buncefield scenarios account for the majority of the risks posed by the Burgan Oil Cape Terminal Cape Town Harbour.

8.2 ESCALATION EFFECTS

No escalation effects (i.e. a minor incident escalating to a major incident) are considered in this risk assessment. It is judged that escalation impacts (in terms of the immediate effect on people off-site) associated with large, multi-tank pool fires are unlikely to result in more severe consequences than the original fire. This is due to the fact that the majority of the bulk storage tanks are contained within intermediate bunds in the primary bund, thereby limiting the effects of the pool fire. Furthermore, it is expected that evacuation of personnel would take place when the initial pool fire occurred. In the event of a vapour cloud explosion, the effects of the explosion could impact adjacent tanks, resulting in secondary effects such as a large unconfined pool fire or multi-tank bund fires (as observed at Buncefield). However, the majority of the casualties would be expected to come from the vapour cloud explosion itself.


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8.3 LUP RISK CALCULATION

The scenario frequencies and consequence results are used within the ERM ViewRisk risk summation package to calculate the individual risk associated with bulk fuel installations. Individual risk contour lines at 10, 1 and 0.3 chances per million per year (cpm) of receiving a dangerous dose or worse from the flammable liquid installations were calculated and illustrated on a map of the site. The 10, 1 and 0.3 cpm values are the risk levels used by the UK HSE to set the three zone land-use planning policy (refer to Section 6.3.1). Figure 8.7 illustrates the risk contour lines for the proposed Burgan Oil Terminal. The individual risk contours can be compared with the risk criteria used by the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) for deciding upon the risk and hence, acceptability of developments around MHIs. The criteria are listed in Table 6.9 of Section 6.3.1. As shown in Figure 8.7, the risk consultation distance (i.e. the 0.3 cpm contour) measured from the site boundary extends off-site to the west partly enveloping the winch cable store and to the south east of the storage area partly enveloping the FFS site as well as over the edge of the mole to the north. The middle zone (1 cpm contour) follows the same trend as the 0.3 cpm contour to the north but does not extend so extensively over the FFS site and Berth 2. The 10 cpm (inner zone) contour extends off site and follows similar trend to the 1 cpm contour but a reduced amount towards the north and the area surrounding the road loading gantry. Using the criteria outlined in Section 6.3.1 it has been shown that the Burgan Oil site falls within the ‘Don’t Advise Against DAA’ category for all 3 probability of dangerous dose zones. This is because the contours only extend onto land that is used for ‘The normal working public’ and not sensitive developments such as hospitals or schools. As a result, for the current land-use surrounding the site, the storage and use of flammable liquids within the site is acceptable in accordance with the HSE land-use planning assessment. However, restrictions on future development around the site should be enforced based on the LUP criteria outlined in Section 6.3.1. Risk contours shown in Figure 8.7 should be compared against the criteria in Section 6.3.1 to deem if any proposed future development falls into the ‘Advise Against AA’ or ‘Don’t Advise Against DAA’ category. If the development falls within the ‘Advise Against AA’ category the proposed development cannot be continued.

Figure 8.7 Location Specific Individual Risks of Dangerous Dose Contours


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9 RISK ANALYSIS RESULTS FOR ADDITIONAL PIPELINES

9.1 FATALITY RISK CALCULATION

The scenario frequencies and consequence results are used within the ERM ViewRisk risk summation package to calculate the individual risk and societal risk associated with the bulk fuel installations. These scenarios include those for the two additional pipeline options described in Section 4.3.

9.1.1 Location Specific Individual Risk for the site

Individual risk of fatality contours for persons located outdoors and indoors at 1, 10, 100 and 1,000 chances per million per year (cpm) for the installations were calculated using the fatality probabilities detailed in Section 6.2.4. Location Specific Individual Risks for Option A

Figure 9.1represents the location specific individual risks (LSIR) for hypothetical persons located outdoors for the Option A routing of the proposed pipeline. It can be seen that the 1 cpm contour extends off site to the north over the mole and harbour water. The winch cable storage is encompassed to the west, with Berth 1, 2 and the FFS storage encompassed to the south. Beyond the 1 cpm contour risks are broadly acceptable. Between the 1 cpm contour and the 10 cpm contour, the risks to the public are considered tolerable, so long as they can be demonstrated by Burgan Oil Cape Terminal to be as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). The 10 cpm contour extends off site following the site boundary, some area of the winch cable storage is enveloped to the west as well as part of the FFS storage to the south east. The 100 cpm contour extends off site to a maximum of 10 m but does not envelope any of the surrounding sites. The risk to the workers in the adjacent facilities does not exceed 100 cpm. Therefore the risks are not considered intolerable according to the assessment criteria of Section 6.3.3. There is a 1,000 cpm contour at the loading gantry. According to the assessment criteria in Section 6.3.3 this would be deemed intolerable, however the actual individual risk experienced by workers in this area will be less as these workers are not on site 100% of the time. A typical gantry operator is understood to work for 40 hours per week and 48 weeks per year. This leads to an occupancy factor of 21.9%. The maximum risk within the gantry area is 1800 cpm. Therefore the actual individual risk experienced by operators is approximately 394.2 cpm. This level of individual risk is therefore below 1000


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cpm and can be deemed to not be intolerable according to the assessment criteria. Figure 9.2 represents the LSIR for persons located indoors for option A of the proposed pipeline routing. It can be seen that the 1 cpm contour extends off site to the north over the mole and harbour water. The winch cable storage is encompassed to the west, with Berth 1, 2 and the FFS storage encompassed to the south. Beyond the 1 cpm contour risks are broadly acceptable. Between the 1 cpm contour and the 10 cpm contour, the risks to the public are considered tolerable, so long as they can be demonstrated by Burgan Oil Cape Terminal to be as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP). The 10 cpm contour extends off site following the site boundary, some area of the winch cable storage is enveloped to the west as well as part of the FFS storage to the south east. The 100 cpm contour extends off site to a maximum of 10 m but does not envelope any of the surrounding sites. The 1000 cpm contour is only reached in the vicinity of the loading gantry. As no structures exist in this area the assessment criteria in Section 6.3.3 are not applicable. The risk to the workers in the adjacent facilities does not exceed 100 cpm. Therefore the risks are not considered intolerable according to the assessment criteria of Section 6.3.3. From the results it can be seen that the addition of pipeline option A does not significantly increase the risk profile of the Burgan Oil site for individual risk and the conclusions of the assessment do not change. This is likely due to the low frequency of use of the pipeline.

Figure 9.1 Location Specific Individual Risks of Fatality Contours for Persons Located Outdoors for Option A – Including Buncefield Scenarios

Figure 9.2 Location Specific Individual Risks of Fatality Contours for Persons Located Indoors for Option A - Including Buncefield Scenarios


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Location Specific Individual Risks for Option B

Figure 9.3 represents the location specific individual risks (LSIR) for hypothetical persons located outdoors for Option B of the proposed pipeline routing. As with the results of the assessment of option A, no additional individual risks can be seen with the inclusion of option B. Figure 9.4 represents the LSIR for persons located indoors for option B of the proposed pipeline routing. As with the results of the assessment of option A, no significant additional individual risks can be seen with the inclusion of Option B and the conclusions of the assessment do not change.

Figure 9.3 Location Specific Individual Risks of Fatality Contours for Persons Located Outdoors for Option B – Including Buncefield Scenarios

Figure 9.4 Location Specific Individual Risks of Fatality Contours for Persons Located Indoors for Option B - Including Buncefield Scenarios


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9.1.2 Societal Risk

To calculate societal risks, the release scenarios, associated frequencies of occurrence, the dimensions of consequence for each weather set and stability class probability were entered into ERM’s risk summation package ViewRisk. The format for presenting societal risk data is in the form of FN curves. These curves illustrate the relationship between an incident which causes N or more fatalities and the cumulative frequency (F) of such an event for the population areas as identified previously. The societal risks for the additional pipelines, Option A and Option B will be assessed and compared to that of the original case. Societal Risk for Burgan Oil Cape Terminal Cape Town Harbour for Option A – Off Site Impacts

The calculated societal risk results for off-site populations (i.e. excluding known on site populations) as a result of risks posed by the site including Buncefield scenarios are shown in Figure 9.5.


As illustrated by Figure 9.5 the total societal risk F-N curve lies below the ‘Broadly Acceptable’ indicator line and therefore below the ‘Intolerable’ indicator line as defined in the societal risk criteria in Section 6.3.3. Therefore,

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the risks are considered broadly acceptable but Burgan Oil should reduce risk levels to As Low As Reasonably Possible (ALARP). From the results the addition of pipeline Option A does not change the conclusion and the societal risk is still considered broadly acceptable. Societal Risk for Burgan Oil Cape Terminal Cape Town Harbour for Option B – Off Site Impacts

The calculated societal risk results for off-site populations (i.e. excluding known on site populations) as a result of risks posed by the site including Buncefield scenarios are shown in Figure 9.6.


As illustrated by Figure 8.5 the total societal risk F-N curve lies below the ‘Broadly Acceptable’ indicator line and therefore below the ‘Intolerable’ indicator line as defined in the societal risk criteria in Section 6.3.3. Therefore, the risks are considered broadly acceptable but Burgan Oil should reduce risk levels to As Low As Reasonably Possible (ALARP). From the results the addition of pipeline Option B does not change the conclusion and the societal risk is still considered broadly acceptable.

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9.1.3 Rate of Harm (Contributors to the Risk)

The Rate of Harm (also known as the Potential Loss of Life, PLL, or Expectation Value, EV) is the sum of the number of people harmed multiplied by the frequency with which this happens. The Rate of Harm breakdown indicates those scenarios which are the largest contributors to the risk. Rates of Harm for Burgan Oil Cape Terminal Cape Town Harbour for Option A – Off Site Impacts The Rate of Harm breakdown for the site including pipeline Option A is presented in Table 9.1.



Rate of Harm (%)

A5 VCE 15.6 17.2 A3 VCE 15.1 16.6 A1 VCE 14.3 15.7 Trans to Gantry Petrol pool fire 9.6 10.6 A4 Diesel pool fire 9.4 10.3 Trans to Gantry Petrol pool fire 4.8 5.3 A6 Diesel pool fire 3.3 3.6 A3 LFF 2.2 2.4 A5 LFF 2.1 2.3 A1 LFF 2.1 2.3 A2 Diesel pool fire 1.9 2.1 B2 Diesel pool fire 1.9 2.1 Pipeline Option A Petrol pool fire 1.2 1.3 Trans to Gantry Diesel pool fire 1.1 1.2 Other 6.3 7.0 Total 90.9 100

The Rate of Harm breakdown indicates that 56.5% of the RoH table is made up of vapour cloud explosions and large flash fires which are due to Buncefield-type scenarios. The additional pipeline Option A increases the risk of fatality by 2.4%. Rates of Harm for Burgan Oil Cape Terminal Cape Town Harbour for Option B – Off Site Impacts The Rate of Harm breakdown for the site including pipeline Option B is presented in Table 9.2.


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Rate of Harm (%)

A5 VCE 15.6 17.1 A3 VCE 15.1 16.6 A1 VCE 14.3 15.7 Trans to Gantry Petrol pool fire 9.6 10.6 A4 Diesel pool fire 9.4 10.3 Trans to Gantry Petrol pool fire 4.8 5.3 A6 Diesel pool fire 3.3 3.6 A3 LFF 2.2 2.4 A5 LFF 2.1 2.3 A1 LFF 2.1 2.3 A2 Diesel pool fire 1.9 2.1 B2 Diesel pool fire 1.9 2.1 Pipeline Option B Petrol pool fire 1.3 1.4 Trans to Gantry Diesel pool fire 1.1 1.2 Other 6.3 6.9 Total 91.0 100

The Rate of Harm breakdown indicates that 56.5% of the RoH table is made up of vapour cloud explosions and large flash fires which are due to Buncefield-type scenarios. The additional pipeline Option B increases the risk of fatality by 2.5%.

9.2 ESCALATION EFFECTS OF THE ADDITION OF PIPELINE OPTIONS A AND B

No escalation effects (i.e. a minor incident escalating to a major incident) are considered in this risk assessment. It is judged that escalation impacts (in terms of the immediate effect on people off-site) associated with failure of equipment enveloped by a pool fire reaching the Chevron JBS site from proposed pipeline Option B is unlikely to result in a pool fire larger than the initiating pool fire. This is due to the originating pool fire not enveloping areas close to the bulk fuel storage. Furthermore it is understood that the fuel stored at the Chevron JBS fuel terminal is of a high flash point nature and therefore unlikely to vapourise and form flash fires or vapour cloud explosions. It is also expected that evacuation of personnel would take place when the initial pool fire occurred.

9.3 LUP RISK CALCULATION

The scenario frequencies and consequence results are used within the ERM ViewRisk risk summation package to calculate the individual risk associated with bulk fuel installations. Individual risk contour lines at 10, 1 and 0.3 chances per million per year (cpm) of receiving a dangerous dose or worse from the flammable liquid installations were calculated and illustrated on a map of the site. The 10, 1 and 0.3 cpm values are the risk levels used by the UK HSE to set the three zone land-use planning policy (refer to Section 6.3.1).


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Land Use Planning for Burgan Oil Cape Terminal Cape Town Harbour for Option A – Off Site Impacts Figure 9.7 illustrates the risk contour lines for the proposed Burgan Oil Terminal with the addition of pipeline Option A. The individual risk contours can be compared with the risk criteria used by the UK Health and Safety Executive (HSE) for deciding upon the risk and hence, acceptability of developments around MHIs. The criteria are listed in Table 6.9 of Section 6.3.1. As shown in Figure 8.7, the risk consultation distance (i.e. the 0.3 cpm contour) measured from the site boundary extends off-site to the west partly enveloping the winch cable store and to the south east of the storage area partly enveloping the FFS site as well as over the edge of the mole to the north. The addition of the new pipeline Option A extends this contour around the pipeline development. The middle zone (1 cpm contour) follows the same trend as the 0.3 cpm contour to the north but does not extend so extensively over the FFS site and Berth 2. The 10 cpm (inner zone) contour extends off site and follows similar trend to the 1 cpm contour but a reduced amount towards the north and the area surrounding the road loading gantry. Using the criteria outlined in Section 6.3.1 it has been shown that the Burgan Oil site falls within the ‘Don’t Advise Against DAA’ category for all 3 probability of dangerous dose zones. This is because the contours only extend onto land that is used for ‘The normal working public’ and not sensitive developments such as hospitals or schools. As a result, for the current land-use surrounding the site, the storage and use of flammable liquids within the site is acceptable in accordance with the HSE land-use planning assessment. However, restrictions on future development around the site should be enforced based on the LUP criteria outlined in Section 6.3.1. Risk contours shown in Figure 9.7 should be compared against the criteria in Section 6.3.1 to deem if any proposed future development falls into the ‘Advise Against AA’ or ‘Don’t Advise Against DAA’ category. If the development falls within the ‘Advise Against AA’ category the proposed development cannot be continued. Land Use Planning for Burgan Oil Cape Terminal Cape Town Harbour for Option B – Off Site Impacts Figure 9.8 illustrates the risk contour lines for the proposed Burgan Oil Terminal with the addition of pipeline Option A. The individual risk contours can be compared with the risk criteria used by the UK Health and Safety


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Executive (HSE) for deciding upon the risk and hence, acceptability of developments around MHIs. The criteria are listed in Table 6.9 of Section 6.3.1. As shown in Figure 9.8, the risk consultation distance (i.e. the 0.3 cpm contour) measured from the site boundary extends off-site to the west partly enveloping the winch cable store and to the south east of the storage area partly enveloping the FFS site as well as over the edge of the mole to the north. The addition of the new pipeline Option B extends this contour around the pipeline development and envelops a portion of the Chevron JBS fuel terminal. The middle zone (1 cpm contour) follows the same trend as the 0.3 cpm contour to the north but does not extend so extensively over the FFS site and Berth 2. Restrictions on future development around the site should be enforced based on the LUP criteria outlined in Section 6.3.1. Risk contours shown in Figure 9.8 should be compared against the criteria in Section 6.3.1 to deem if any proposed future development falls into the ‘Advise Against AA’ or ‘Don’t Advise Against DAA’ category. If the development falls within the ‘Advise Against AA’ category the proposed development cannot be continued.

Figure 9.7 Location Specific Individual Risks of Dangerous Dose Contours with Pipeline Option A

Figure 9.8 Location Specific Individual Risks of Dangerous Dose Contours with Pipeline Option B


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10 NEIGHBOURING MAJOR HAZARDOUS INSTALLATIONS

There are only two neighbouring Major Hazardous Installation known to ERM as described in Section 3 which are:


From the individual risk of fatality profiles shown in Section 8 and Section 9, none of the surrounding sites will be encompassed by the 100 cpm contour. The neighbouring FFS MHI site will be partly enveloped by the 1 cpm and 10 cpm contours. Based on the assessment criteria shown in Section 6.3 the individual risk of fatality is not concluded to be intolerable however the risk is only considered to be tolerable if ALARP. From the risk of dangerous dose shown in the Land Use Planning risk assessment in Section 8 and Section 9 the risk of dangerous dose contours envelop both nearby MHI sites. As these sites are industrial areas the proposed Burgan Oil development is concluded as “Don’t Advise Against” based on the assessment criteria found in Section 6.3.1. The main contributor of the risks to which the FFS site is exposed is flash fires and explosions from a Buncefield-type incident. The main contributor to the risk to which the Chevron JBS site is exposed is hydrocarbon pool fires.


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11 EMERGENCY PLANNING

The current Burgan Oil Cape Terminal, Cape Town Harbour site Emergency Response Plan (ERP), which was revised during October 2011, and which is required to be included within the MHI assessment, is shown in Annex E. Although the existing ERP has been compiled to deal with a number of potential incidents which could occur on-site, this plan will have to be reviewed and where necessary revised to take into account of the findings of this risk assessment and must comply with the regulations as outlined in Section 11.1. The potential consequences of the incidents identified in this assessment should be discussed with the local Emergency Services, Transnet Port Authorities and the Burgan Oil Cape Terminal personnel, with the ERP being revised as a result of the discussions where necessary. It is recommended that the ERP is maintained and tested regularly. The Local Emergency Services, Transnet Port Authorities and the adjacent industries should also be kept informed of Burgan Oil Cape Terminal’s emergency plans, and included in future trial emergency drills.

11.1 MHI REGULATIONS, SECTION 6 - ON SITE EMERGENCY PLAN

Section 6 of The Major Hazard Installation regulations; outline the requirements for on-site emergency planning. All of these points must be complied with by Burgan Oil Cape Terminal within the ERP. “6.(1) An employer, self-employed person and user shall after submission of the information contemplated in regulation 3 (4) –

a) establish an on-site emergency plan to be followed inside the premises of the installation or part of the installation classified as a major hazard installation in consultation with the relevant health and safety representative or the relevant health and safety committee;

b) discuss the emergency plan with the relevant local government, taking

into consideration any comment on the risk related to the health and safety of the public;

c) review the on-site emergency plan and where necessary, update the plan,

in consultation with the relevant local government service at least once every three years;

d) sign a copy of the on-site emergency plan in the presence of two witnesses,

who shall attest the signature;


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e) ensure that the on-site emergency plan is readily available at all times for implementation and use;

f) ensure that all employees are conversant with the on-site emergency plan;

and

g) cause the on-site emergency plan to be tested in practice at least once a year and keep a record of such a test.”


90

12 CONCLUSIONS & RECOMMENDATIONS

12.1 CONCLUSIONS

The individual and societal risks of fatality have been calculated for the Burgan Oil Cape Terminal, Cape Town Harbour site. The study has shown that the operations have the potential to adversely affect the health and safety of people working on-site as well as members of the public off-site and other workers on other sites in the area. The consequence of a pool fire from a catastrophic release from a tank on-site can extend up to 151 m and poses a threat to workers on-site and people off-site. The consequence from a flash fire following a Buncefield type overfilling incident has the potential to extend up to 470 m and poses a threat to workers on-site and people off-site. For workers on-site the individual risks are found to be below 1000 cpm and therefore tolerable if Burgan Oil Cape Terminal can demonstrate that they are ALARP. For workers on other sites, namely FFS Refiners and Chevron JBS, the individual risk is below 100 cpm and therefore not considered intolerable, however the risk is above 1 cpm and therefore considered to be tolerable if ALARP. The societal risk profile for the Burgan Oil Cape Terminal site is considered to be broadly acceptable. The individual risks are considered to not be intolerable but only tolerable if proved to be As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP) for members of the public. Burgan Oil must show that actions have been taken to ensure the levels of risk are ALARP for members of the public. The individual risk of fatality was found to not be intolerable but only tolerable if proved to be ALARP. In accordance with Section (5)(a) of the MHI Regulations shown in Annex B it is the opinion of ERM as an AIA that Burgan Oil have shown a commitment to the reduction of tank overfill events which could potentially result in a Buncefield type incident. This is highlighted in their Operating and Control Philosophy as shown in Annex F and their letter of commitment to this philosophy as shown in Annex G. Further, it is the opinion of ERM that the measures proposed in the Operating and Control Philosophy show a reasonable degree of risk reduction for this stage of the Burgan Oil fuel terminal design process as specific overfill prevention technologies have been accounted for. As such the individual risk of fatality posed by the proposed site can be considered as low as reasonably practicable (ALARP) for this stage of the design process and therefore tolerable as stated in the criteria in Section 6.3.3. To verify this view, following completion of the Burgan Oil final design, an update of the current MHI risk assessment taking into account the final design overfill prevention measures must be carried out. Using the criteria outlined in Section 6.3 it has been shown that the Burgan Cape Terminal Cape Town Harbour site falls within the ‘Don’t Advise Against DAA’ category for all 3 probability of dangerous dose zones. As a result, the storage and


91

use of flammable liquids within the site is acceptable for the current land-use surrounding the proposed Burgan Oil Eastern Mole site in accordance with the HSE land-use planning criteria. Environmental Resources Management Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd would declare the proposed design of the Burgan Oil Cape Terminal located at Portside Road, Eastern Mole Berth, Western Cape (GPS coordinates in decimal degrees: : -33.909887, 18.437570) a Major Hazard Installation (MHI) as outlined in the current legislation. As a result of being declared a MHI, the Requirements of the MHI Regulations must be followed completely to ensure the Burgan Oil Cape Terminal is legally compliant. Copies of this risk assessment must be submitted to the Local Provincial Director of the Department of Labour, the Chief Inspector of the Department of Labour Head Office in Pretoria and the Local Authorities.

12.2 RECOMMENDATIONS

Given that the site could potentially impact the general public off-site as well as employees on-site, it is recommended that the facility be registered with the Department of Labour as a Major Hazard Installation (MHI) under the MHI Regulations. In addition, the following advisory comments for further consideration are made. Note that the following section of the report falls outside of ERM’s SANAS AIA Accreditation and is presented to provide Burgan Oil Cape Terminal with guidance on how the risks may potentially be further reduced. As shown in Section 8.1.3 the largest risk drivers are from Buncefield type overfilling incidents. Burgan Oil should therefore consider including further industry best practises such as the Buncefield Incident Report(1) recommendations or the American Petroleum Institute guidance on tank management(2) into the final design of the site, with special emphasis on operational aspects of these recommendations. For this report, ERM have used the current proposed design submitted for the Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA). Any changes to the design of the site will require a new revision to this MHI risk assessment.

(1) UK HSE Process Safety Leadership Group Final Report, Safety and Environmental Standards for Fuel Storage Sites, First

published 2009, ISBN 978 0 7176 6386 6 (2) Overfill Protection for Storage Tanks in the Petroleum Industry, American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practise 2350

Annex A

ERM – Approved Inspection Authority, Certificates of Accreditation

Annex B

Major Hazard Installation Legislation

Government Gazette

REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA

Regulation Gazette No. 7122 Vol. 433 Pretoria 30 July 2001 No. 22506

Government Gazette 30 July 2001

GOVERNMENT NOTICE

DEPARTMENT OF LABOUR No. R. 692 30 July 2001

OCCUPATIONAL HEALTH AND SAFETY ACT, 1993

MAJOR HAZARD INSTALLATION REGULATIONS The Minister of Labour has, after consultation with the Advisory Council for Occupational Health and Safety, under section 43 of the Occupational Health and Safety Act (Act No. 85 of 1993), made the regulations in the Schedule.


ENVIRONMENTAL RESOURCES MANAGEMENT 0220778-BURGAN OIL MHI FOR QRA V3.0

B4

SCHEDULE

1 DEFINITIONS

In these regulations any expression to which a meaning has been assigned in the Act shall have the meaning so assigned and, unless the context otherwise indicates – “emergency plan” means a plan in writing which, on the basis of identified potential incidents at the installation, together with their consequences, describes how such incidents and their consequences should be dealt with on-site and off-site; “local government” means a local government as defined in section 1 of the Local Government Transition Act, 1993 (Act No. 209 of 1993); “material safety data sheet” means a material safety data sheet as contemplated in regulation 7 of the General Administrative Regulation; “near miss” means any unforeseen event involving one or more hazardous substances which, but for mitigating effects, actions or systems, could have escalated to a major incident; “on site emergency plan” means the emergency plan contemplated in regulation 6; “risk assessment” means the process contemplated in regulation 5; “rolling stock” means any locomotive, coach, railway carriage, truck, wagon or similar contrivance used for the purpose of transporting persons, goods or any other thing, and which can run on a railway; “temporary installation” means an installation that can travel independently between planned points of departure and arrival for the purpose of transporting any substance, and which is only deemed to be an installation at the points of departure and arrival respectively; “the Act” means the Occupational Health and Safety Act, 1993 (Act No. 85 of 1993); “transit” includes any time or place in which rolling stock may be between planned points of departure and arrival.



B5

2 SCOPE OF APPLICATION

(1) Subject to the provisions of sub-regulation (3) these regulations shall apply to employers, self-employed persons and users, who have on their premises, either permanently or temporarily, a major hazard installation or a quantity of a substance which may pose a risk, that could affect the health and safety of employees and the public.

(2) These regulations shall be applicable to local governments, with specific reference to regulation 9.

(3) These regulations shall not apply to nuclear installations registered in terms of the Nuclear Energy Act, 1993 (Act No. 131 of 1993).

3 NOTIFICATION OF INSTALLATION

(1) Every employer, self-employed person and user, shall notify the chief inspector, provincial director and relevant local government in writing of-

(a) the erection of any installation which will be a major hazard installation, prior to commencement of erection thereof, and;

(b) the conversion of any existing installation into a major hazard installation prior to such conversion.

(2) Every employer, self-employed person user shall notify the chief inspector, the local government and the provincial director within 60 days of the promulgation of these regulations of an existing major hazard installation.

(3) No employer, self-employed person and user shall modify an installation by increasing its storage or production capacity or altering the process or by affecting any other change that may increase the risk of an existing major hazard installation, without first notifying the chief inspector, the relevant local government and provincial director in writing.

(4) The information submitted by and required from an employer, self-employed person and user in terms of sub-regulations (1), (2), and (3) shall include -

(a) the physical address of the installation;

(b) the complete material safety data sheets of all substances that resulted in the installation being classified as a major hazard installation;



B6

(c) the envisaged maximum quantity of such substance that may be on the premises at any one time;

(d) the risk assessment of the major hazard installation as contemplated in regulation 5 (1); and

(e) any further information that may be deemed necessary by an inspector in the interests of health and safety of the public.

(5) Sub-regulations (1), (2) and (3) shall not apply to railway rolling stock in transit.

(6) An employer, self-employed person and user shall advertise the notifications contemplated in sub-regulations (1), (2) and (3) in at least one newspaper serving the communities in the vicinity of the installation which is to be declared a major hazard installation, a proposed major hazard installation or an existing installation which is to be modified, and by way of notices posted within those communities.

4 TEMPORARY INSTALLATIONS

(1) Any employer, self-employed person and user who has a temporary installation on his or her premises which would, taking into consideration the risks attached to the quantity of substance and the procedure of discharge, result in that temporary installation being declared a major hazard installation if it were not a temporary installation, shall be deemed to be responsible for the storage and discharge of that installation while on his or her premises.

(2) An employer, self-employed person and user contemplated in sub-regulation (1) shall ensure that a risk assessment for the storage and discharge procedure be carried out for a temporary installation prior to the risk coming into existence.

(3) An employer, self-employed person and user contemplated in sub-regulation (1) shall, after taking into consideration the risk assessment, take reasonably practicable steps that may be necessary to reduce the risks attached to the storage and discharge of such temporary installation.



B7

5 RISK ASSESSMENT

(1) An employer, self-employed person and user shall, after consultation with the relevant health and safety representative or relevant health and safety committee, carry out a risk assessment at intervals not exceeding five years and submit such risk assessment to the chief inspector, relevant local government and provincial director.

(2) The risk assessment is the process of collecting, organising, analysing, interpreting, communicating and implementing information in order to identify the probable frequency, magnitude and nature of any major incident which could occur at a major hazard installation, and the measures required to remove, reduce or control the potential causes of such an incident.

(3) An employer, self-employed person and user shall, after informing the relevant health and safety representative or relevant health and safety committee in writing of the arrangements made for the assessment contemplated in sub-regulation (1), give them 60 days within which to comment thereon and ensure that the results of the assessment are made available to the relevant representative or committee who may comment thereon.

(4) An employer, self-employed person and user shall make available on the premises a copy of the latest risk assessment for inspection by an inspector.

(5) An employer, self-employed person and user shall ensure that the risk assessment as contemplated in sub-regulation (1) shall -

(a) be carried out by an Approved Inspection Authority which is competent to express an opinion as to the risks associated with the major hazard installation; and

(b) at least include –

(i) a general process description of the major hazard installation;

(ii) a description of the major incidents associated with this type of installation and the consequences of such incidents, which shall include potential incidents;

(iii) an estimation of the probability of a major accident;

(iv) a copy of the on site emergency plan;

(v) an estimation of the total result in the case of an explosion or fire;



B8

(vi) in the case of toxic release, an estimation of concentration effects of such release;

(vii) the potential effect of an incident on a major hazard installation or part thereof on an adjacent major hazard installation or part thereof;

(viii) the potential effect of a major incident on any other installation, members of the public and residential areas;

(ix) metrological tendencies;

(x) the suitability of existing emergency procedures, for the risks identified;

(xi) any requirements as laid down in terms of the Environment Conservation Act, 1989 (Act No. 73 of 1989); and

(xii) any organisational measures that may be required.

(6) (a) An employer, self-employed person and user shall ensure that the risk assessment required in terms of sub-regulation (1) is reviewed forthwith if –

(i) there is a reason to suspect that the preceding assessment is no longer valid;

(ii) there has been a change in the process involving a substance resulting in the installation being classified a major hazard installation or in the methods, equipment or procedures in the use, handling or processing of that substance; or

(iii) after an incident that has brought the emergency plan into operation or after any near miss.

(b) Where the risk assessment has been updated an employer, self-employed person and user shall submit a copy of the updated risk assessment to the chief inspector, the relevant local government and the provincial director within sixty (60) days.

(7) Sub-regulation (5) (b) shall not apply in the case of rolling stock in transit: Provided that the operator of a railway shall ensure -

(a) that a risk assessment applicable to rolling stock in transit is carried out and made available for inspection at the request of an inspector or local government or both that local government and inspector, as the case may be; and



B9

(b) that in the interest of health and safety of the public the necessary precautions are taken.

(8) An employer, self-employed person and user shall ensure that risk assessments contemplated in sub-regulations (1) and (5) (a) be made available for scrutiny by any interested person or any person that may be affected by the activities of a major hazard installation, at a time, place and in a manner agreed upon between the parties.

6 ON-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN

(1) An employer, self-employed person and user shall after submission of the information contemplated in regulation 3 (4) –

(a) establish an on site emergency plan to be followed inside the premises of the installation or part of the installation classified as a major hazard installation in consultation with the relevant health and safety representative or the relevant health and safety committee;

(b) discuss the emergency plan with the relevant local government, taking into consideration any comment on the risk related to the health and safety of the public;

(c) review the on-site emergency plan and where necessary, update the plan, in consultation with the relevant local government service at least once every three years;

(d) sign a copy of the on-site emergency plan in the presence of two witnesses, who shall attest the signature;

(e) ensure that the on-site emergency plan is readily available at all times for implementation and use;

(f) ensure that all employees are conversant with the on-site emergency plan; and

(g) cause the on-site emergency plan to be tested in practice at least once a year and keep a record of such a test.

(2) An employer, self-employed person and user owning or in control of a pipeline that could pose a threat to the general public shall inform the relevant local government and shall be jointly responsible with the relevant government for the establishment and implementation of an on-site emergency plan.



B10

(3) Sub-regulation (1) shall not apply to rolling stock in transit: Provided that the operator of a railway shall -

(a) establish an emergency plan for each route traversed within twelve (12) months of the coming into operation of these regulations;

(b) draw up the plan as contemplated in paragraph (a) in consultation with the local government through whose jurisdiction the rolling stock is being transported;

(c) sign a copy of the on-site emergency plan in the presence of two witnesses, who shall attest the signature;

(d) ensure that the plan is readily available at all times for implementation and use; and

(e) cause that plan to be tested when reasonably practicable and keep a record of such a test.

7 REPORTING OF RISK AND EMERGENCY OCCURRENCES

(1) Every employer, self-employed person and user of a major hazard installation and owner or user of a pipeline shall –

(a) Subject to the provisions of regulation 6 of the General Administrative Regulations, within 48 hours by means of telephone, facsimile or similar means of communication inform the chief inspector, the provisional director and relevant local government of the occurrence of a major incident or an incident that brought the emergency plan into operation or any near miss;

(b) submit a report in writing to the chief inspector, provincial director and local government within seven days; and

(c) investigate and record all near misses in a register kept on the premises, which shall at all times be available for inspection by an inspector and the local government.

(2) Every employer, self-employed person and user shall in the case of a major incident or an incident contemplated in sub-regulation (1) that was or may have been caused by a substance, inform the supplier of that substance of the incident.

(3) An employer, self-employed person and user shall -



B11

(a) record all near misses in a register kept on the premises, which shall at all times be available for inspection by an inspector; and

(b) ensure that the contents of the register contemplated in paragraph (a) shall also be available in the event of an inspection contemplated in regulation 5 (4).

8 GENERAL DUTIES OF SUPPLIERS

(1) Every person that supplies a substance to a major hazard installation that has been classified as a major hazard installation for the reason of the presence of that substance in that installation shall ensure that he or she supplies with the substance a material safety data sheet contemplated in regulation 7 of the General Administrative Regulations.

(2) On receipt of the information contemplated in regulation 7 (2) every supplier of the relevant substance shall assess the circumstances and substance involved in an incident or potential incident and inform all persons being supplied with that substance, of the potential dangers surrounding it.

(3) Every supplier of a hazardous substance to a major hazard installation shall provide a service that shall be readily available on a 24-hour basis to all employers, self-employed persons and users, the relevant local government and any other body concerned, to provide information and advice in the case of a major incident with regard to the substance supplied.

9 GENERAL DUTIES OF LOCAL AUTHORITIES

(1) Without derogating from the provisions of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act, 1977 (Act No. 103 of 1977), no local government shall permit the erection of a new major hazard installation at a separation distance less than that which poses a risk to –

(a) airports;

(b) neighbouring independent major hazard installations;

(c) housing and other centres of populations; or

(d) any other similar facility.



B12

Provided that the local government shall permit new property development only where there is a separation distance which will not pose a risk in terms of the risk assessment: Provided further that the local government shall prevent any development adjacent to an installation and that will result in that installation being declared a major hazard installation.

(2) Where a local government does not have the facilities available to control a major incident or to comply with the requirements of the legislation, that local government shall make prior arrangements with a neighbouring local government, relevant provincial government or the employer, self-employed person and user for assistance.

(3) All off-site emergency plans to be following outside the premises of the installation or part of the installation classified as a major hazard installation shall be the responsibility of local government.

10 CLOSURE

An employer, self-employed person and user shall notify the chief inspector, relevant provincial director and local government in writing, 21 days prior to the installation ceasing to be a major hazard installation.

11 OFFENCES AND PENALTIES

Any person who contravenes or fails to comply with any provision of regulation 3 (1), 3 (2), 3 (3), 3 (4), 3 (6), 4 (2), 4 (3), 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9, shall be guilty of an offence and on conviction be liable to a fine or to imprisonment for a period of 12 months and, in the case of a continuous offence, to an additional fine of R200 or additional imprisonment of each day on which the offence continues: Provided that the period of such additional imprisonment shall not exceed 90 days.

Annex C

Material Safety Data Sheets (MSDS)

Fuels Safety Data Sheet

DIESOLINE

1. IDENTIFICATION OF THE SUBSTANCE/PREPARATION AND COMPANY

Product name:

Product code:

Product type:

Supplier:

Address:

Contact numbers:Telephone:Fax:

Emergency telephone number:

Priority Action Line

2. COMPOSITION/INFORMATION ON INGREDIENTS

Synonyms:

Preparation description:

Dangerous components/constituents:

Component name CAS number Content range EC hazard R phrases

3. HAZARDS IDENTIFICATION

Human health hazards:

Safety hazards:

Environmental hazards:

4. FIRST AID MEASURES

Symptoms and effects:

First Aid - Inhalation:

First Aid - Skin:

First Aid - Eye:

First Aid - Ingestion:

Advice to physicians:

5. FIRE FIGHTING MEASURES

Specific hazards:

Extinguishing media:

Unsuitable extinguishing media:

Other information:

6. ACCIDENTAL RELEASE MEASURES

Personal precautions:

Personal protection:

Environmental precautions:

Clean-up methods - small spillage:

Clean-up methods - large spillage:

Other information:

7. HANDLING AND STORAGE

Handling:

Handling temperature:

Storage:

Storage temperature:

Product transfer:

Tank cleaning:

Recommended materials:

Unsuitable materials:

Other information:

8. EXPOSURE CONTROLS/PERSONAL PROTECTION

Occupational exposure standards:

Respiratory protection:

Hand protection:

Eye protection:

Body protection:

9. PHYSICAL AND CHEMICAL PROPERTIES

Physical state:Colour:Odour:Initial boiling point:Final boiling point:Vapour pressure:Density:Kinematic viscosity:Vapour density (air=1):Pour point:Flash point:Flammability limit - lower:Flammability limit - upper:Auto-ignition temperature:Explosive properties:Oxidizing properties:Solubility in water:n-octanol/water partition coefficient:Evaporation rate:

10. STABILITY/REACTIVITY

Stability:

Conditions to avoid:

Materials to avoid:

Hazardous decomposition products:

11. TOXICOLOGICAL INFORMATION

Basis for assessment:

Acute toxicity - oral:

Acute toxicity - dermal:

Acute toxicity - inhalation:

Eye irritation:

Skin irritation:

Respiratory irritation:

Skin sensitization:

(Sub) chronic toxicity:

Carcinogenicity:

Mutagenicity:

Reproductive toxicity:

Human effects:

12. ECOLOGICAL INFORMATION


Mobility:

Persistence/degradability:

Bioaccumulation:

Ecotoxicity:

Sewage treatment:

Other information:

13. DISPOSAL CONSIDERATIONS

Precautions:

Waste disposal:

Product disposal:

Container disposal:

Local legislation:

14. TRANSPORT INFORMATION

UN Number:

UN Class/Packing Group:

UN Proper Shipping Name:

UN Number (sea transport, IMO):

IMO Class/Packing Group:

IMO Symbol:

IMO Marine Pollutant:

IMO Proper Shipping Name:

ADR/RID Class/Item:

ADR/RID Symbol:

ADR/RID Kemler Number:

ADR/RID Proper Shipping Name:

ADNR Class/Item:

UN Number (air transport, ICAO):

IATA/ICAO Class/Packing Group:

IATA/ICAO Symbol:

IATA/ICAO Proper Shipping Name:

Hazchem code:

15. REGULATORY INFORMATION

EC Label name:

EC Classification:

EC Symbols:

EC Risk Phrases:

EC Safety Phrases:

2

EINECS (EC):

National legislation:

Other information:

16. OTHER INFORMATION

Uses and restrictions:

Technical contact point:

Technical contact number:

Telephone:Fax:

SDS history:

Revisions highlighted:

SDS distribution:

Other information:

References:

Fuels Safety Data Sheet

ULTRA DETERGENT PETROL

1. IDENTIFICATION OF THE SUBSTANCE/PREPARATION AND COMPANY

Product name:

Product code:

Product type:

Supplier:

Address:

Contact numbers:

Telephone:Fax:

Emergency telephone number:

Priority Action Line


Synonyms:

Preparation description:

Dangerous components/constituents:

Component name CAS number Content range EC hazard R phrases


Human health hazards:

Safety hazards:

Environmental hazards:


Symptoms and effects:

First Aid - Inhalation:

First Aid - Skin:

First Aid - Eye:

First Aid - Ingestion:

Advice to physicians:


Specific hazards:

Extinguishing media:

Unsuitable extinguishing media:

Other information:


Personal precautions:

Personal protection: Wear: impervious overalls, PVC or nitrile rubber gloves, safety shoes or boots - chemical resistant, monogoggles.

Environmental precautions:

Clean-up methods - small spillage:

Clean-up methods - large spillage:

Other information:


Handling:

Handling temperature:

Storage:

Storage temperature:

Product transfer:

Tank cleaning:

Recommended materials:

Unsuitable materials:

Other information:


Occupational exposure standards:

Component name Limit type Value Unit Other information

Respiratory protection:

Hand protection:

Eye protection:

Body protection:


Physical state:

Colour:

Odour:

Initial boiling point:

Final boiling point:

Reid vapour pressure:

Density:

Kinematic viscosity:

Vapour density (air=1):

Flash point:

Flammability limit - lower:

Flammability limit - upper:

Auto-ignition temperature:

Explosive properties:

Oxidizing properties:

Solubility in water:

n-octanol/water partition coefficient:

Evaporation rate:

10. STABILITY/REACTIVITY

Stability:

Conditions to avoid:

Materials to avoid:

Hazardous decomposition products:



Acute toxicity - oral:

Acute toxicity - dermal:

Acute toxicity - inhalation:

Eye irritation:

Skin irritation:

Respiratory irritation:

Skin sensitization:

(Sub) chronic toxicity:

Carcinogenicity:

Mutagenicity:

Reproductive toxicity:

Human effects:

Other information:



Mobility:

Persistence/degradability:

Bioaccumulation:

Ecotoxicity:

Sewage treatment:

Other information:


Precautions:

Waste disposal:

Product disposal:

Container disposal:

Local legislation:


UN Number:

UN Class/Packing Group:

UN Proper Shipping Name:

UN Number (sea transport, IMO):

IMO Class/Packing Group:

IMO Symbol:

IMO Marine Pollutant:

IMO Proper Shipping Name:

ADR/RID Class/Item:

ADR/RID Symbol:

ADR/RID Kemler Number:

ADR/RID Proper Shipping Name:

ADNR Class/Item:

UN Number (air transport, ICAO):

IATA/ICAO Class/Packing Group:

IATA/ICAO Symbol:

IATA/ICAO Proper Shipping Name:

Hazchem code:


EC Label name:

EC Classification:

EC Symbols:

EC Risk Phrases:

EC Safety Phrases:

EINECS (EC):

National legislation:

Other information:


Uses and restrictions:

Technical contact point:

Technical contact number:

Telephone:Fax:

SDS history:

Revisions highlighted:

SDS distribution:

Other information:

References:

IPA

Material Safety Data Sheet

1. MATERIAL AND COMPANY IDENTIFICATION

Material Name IPAProduct Code Company Shell Chemical LP

MSDS Request Customer Service

Emergency Telephone NumberChemtrec Domestic (24 hr) Chemtrec International (24 hr)


Chemical Name CAS No. Concentration


Emergency OverviewAppearance and Odour

Health Hazards

Safety Hazards

Health Hazards Inhalation

Skin Contact Eye Contact Signs and Symptoms

IPA


Aggravated Medical Condition


Inhalation

Skin Contact

Eye Contact

Ingestion

Advice to Physician


Flash pointExplosion / Flammability limits in airAuto ignition temperatureSpecific Hazards

Extinguishing Media

Unsuitable Extinguishing MediaProtective Equipment for FirefightersAdditional Advice


Protective measures

IPA


Clean Up Methods

Additional Advice


General Precautions

Handling

Storage

IPA


Product Transfer

Recommended Materials

Unsuitable MaterialsContainer Advice


Occupational Exposure Limits

Material Source Type ppm mg/m3 Notation

Additional Information

Exposure Controls

Personal Protective EquipmentRespiratory Protection

Hand Protection

IPA


Eye ProtectionProtective Clothing

Monitoring Methods

Environmental Exposure Controls


IPA


10. STABILITY AND REACTIVITY

Stability

Conditions to AvoidMaterials to AvoidHazardous Decomposition Products

Hazardous Reactions


Basis for AssessmentAcute Oral ToxicityAcute Dermal ToxicityAcute Inhalation Toxicity

Skin Irritation Eye IrritationRespiratory IrritationSensitisationRepeated Dose Toxicity

Material Carcinogenicity Classification

Reproductive and Developmental Toxicity Additional Information


Acute ToxicityFishAquatic Invertebrates AlgaeMicroorganisms

Chronic Toxicity FishAquatic Invertebrates

Mobility

IPA


Persistence/degradability

Bioaccumulation


Material Disposal

Container Disposal

Local Legislation


US Department of Transportation Classification (49CFR)

IMDG

IATA (Country variations may apply)

Additional Information : This product may be transported under nitrogen blanketing. Nitrogen is an odourless and invisible gas. Exposure to nitrogen may cause asphyxiation or death. Personnel must observe strict safety precautions when

IPA


involved with a confined space entry.


The regulatory information is not intended to be comprehensive. Other regulations may apply to this material.

Federal Regulatory Status

Notification Status

SARA Hazard Categories (311/312)

State Regulatory Status

California Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act (Proposition 65)

New Jersey Right-To-Know Chemical List

Pennsylvania Right-To-Know Chemical List


IPA


NFPA Rating (Health, Fire, Reactivity) MSDS Version Number

MSDS Effective Date

MSDS Revisions

MSDS Regulation

MSDS Distribution

Disclaimer

SAFETY DATA SHEET Page : 2Revision nr : 2Issuing date :24/12/2010

CAS 67762-26-9 Supersedes :09/11/2010


2.1. Classification of the substance or mixture

2.1.1. Classification according to Regulation (EU) 1272/2008CLP-Classification : The product is non-dangerous in accordance with Directive 1272/2008/EECNot classified

2.1.2. Classification according to EU Directives 67/548/EEC or 1999/45/EC

Classification : Not a hazardous substance or mixture according to EC-directives67/548/EEC or 1999/45/EC.

Not classified

2.2 Label elements2.2.1. Labelling according to Regulation (EU) 1272/2008No labelling applicable

2.2.2. Labelling according to Directives (67/548/EEC - 1999/45/EC)Not relevant

2.3. Other hazardsNo data available


3.1. SubstancesSubstance name Product identifier % Classification according to

Directive 67/548/EECFatty acids, C14-18 and C16-18-unsatd., Me esters (CAS no) 67762-26-9

(EC No) 267-007-0100

Substance name Product identifier % Classification according toRegulation (EC) No1272/2008 [CLP/GHS]

Fatty acids, C14-18 and C16-18-unsatd., Me esters (CAS no) 67762-26-9(EC No) 267-007-0

100

For the full text of R- and H-phrases in this section, see section 16.

3.2. MixturesNot applicable


4.1. Description of first aid measuresInhalation : Move to fresh air.

Keep at rest.Consult a physician if necessary.

Skin contact : Wash off immediately with soap and plenty of water.Eye contact : In case of contact, immediately flush eyes with plenty of water for at least 15


CAS 67762-26-9 Supersedes :09/11/2010

minutes.If eye irritation persists, consult a specialist.

Ingestion : Clean mouth with water and drink afterwards plenty of water.If you feel unwell, seek medical advice (show the label where possible).

4.2. Most important symptoms and effects, both acute and delayedInhalation : No adverse effects are expected. May cause irritation of respiratory tract.Skin contact : No adverse effects are expected. Prolonged skin contact may cause skin

irritation.Eye contact : No adverse effects are expected. May cause eye irritation.Ingestion : No adverse effects are expected.

4.3. Indication of immediate medical attention and special treatment neededNo data available

5. FIRE-FIGHTING MEASURES

5.1. Extinguishing mediaSuitable extinguishing media : Use dry chemical, CO2, water spray or alcohol resistant foam.Extinguishing media which shall not be usedfor safety reasons

: High volume water jet

5.2. Special hazards arising from the substance or mixtureFire Hazard : Combustible materialSpecific hazards : In case of fire hazardous decomposition products may be produced such

as: Carbon oxides Fire or intense heat may cause violent rupture ofpackages. Heating may cause an explosion. Fire residues andcontaminated fire extinguishing water must be disposed of in accordancewith local regulations.

5.3. Advice for firefightersSpecial protective equipment for fire-fighters : Wear personal protective equipment. In the event of fire, wear self-

contained breathing apparatus.


6.1. Personal precautions, protective equipment and emergency proceduresPersonal precautions : Evacuate personnel to safe areas. See also section 8. Keep people away

from and upwind of spill/leak. Do not breathe vapours or spray mist.

6.2. Environmental precautionsEnvironmental precautions : Do not flush into surface water or sanitary sewer system.

6.3. Methods and materials for containment and cleaning upMethods for cleaning up : Remove all sources of ignition. Hose down gases, fumes and/or dust with

water. Dam up. Prevent further leakage or spillage if safe to do so. Soak upwith inert absorbent material. Sweep up and shovel into suitable containersfor disposal. Dispose of in accordance with local regulations. Localauthorities should be advised if significant spillages cannot be contained.


7.1. Precautions for safe handling


CAS 67762-26-9 Supersedes :09/11/2010

Handling : Avoid contact with skin, eyes and clothing. See also section 8. Use only inwell-ventilated areas. Do not smoke. Do not breathe vapours or spray mist.

Packaging material : metal containers

7.2. Conditions for safe storage, including any incompatibilitiesStorage : Keep containers tightly closed in a dry, cool and well-ventilated place. Keep

away from direct sunlight. Do not store near or with any of the incompatiblematerials listed in section 10.

Hygiene measures : Handle in accordance with good industrial hygiene and safety practice.Remove and wash contaminated clothing before re-use. Wash hands beforebreaks and immediately after handling the product. When using, do not eat,drink or smoke.

7.3. Specific end use(s)Specific use(s) : See chapter Exposure scenario.


8.1. Control parameters

Exposure limit(s) : No data availableDNEL : Exposure scenarioPNEC : Exposure scenario

8.2. Exposure controlsRespiratory protection : In case of insufficient ventilation wear suitable respiratory equipment.Hand protection : Protective glovesEye protection : Safety glassesSkin and body protection : Overalls, apron and boots recommended.

Engineering measures : Use only in area provided with appropriate exhaust ventilation.Environmental exposure controls : Do not flush into surface water or sanitary sewer system.


9.1. Information on basic physical and chemical properties

Appearance : liquidColour : Yellow to whiteOdour : characteristic

pH : Not applicableBoiling point/boiling range : 300 - 360 °CMelting point/range : -20°C - 10 °CFlash point : > 101 °C closed cupExplosive properties : No data availableOxidizing properties : No data availableEvaporation rate : No data availableVapour pressure : NegligibleVapour density : >1Water solubility : Immiscible


CAS 67762-26-9 Supersedes :09/11/2010

Viscosity : 0,35 - 0,5 mm²/s @ 40°CRelative density : 0,86 - 0,9 @ 15°cPartition coefficient: n-octanol/water : No data available

9.2. Other informationVolatile organic compounds (VOC) content : Negligible

10. STABILITY AND REACTIVITY

10.1. ReactivityReactivity : See also section 10.5

10.2. Chemical stabilityStability : Stable under normal conditions.

10.3. Possibility of hazardous reactionsNo data available

10.4. Conditions to avoidConditions to avoid : Exposure to sunlight. Heat, flames and sparks.

10.5. Incompatible materialsIncompatible materials : Strong oxidizing agents

10.6. Hazardous decomposition productsHazardous decomposition products : Thermal decomposition can lead to release of irritating gases and vapours.


11.1. Information on toxicological effectsGeneral Information

Acute toxicityNo data available

Inhalation : No adverse effects are expected. May cause irritation of respiratory tract.Skin contact : No adverse effects are expected. Prolonged skin contact may cause skin

irritation.Eye contact : No adverse effects are expected. May cause eye irritation.Ingestion : No adverse effects are expected.

Chronic toxicityChronic toxicity : No adverse effects are expected.

Further informationNo data available


12.1. ToxicityNo data available


CAS 67762-26-9 Supersedes :09/11/2010

12.2. Persistence and degradabilityPersistence and degradability : Readily biodegradable

12.3. Bioaccumulative potentialBioaccumulation : Does not bioaccumulate

Partition coefficient: n-octanol/water : No data available

12.4. Mobility in soilMobility : immiscible

12.5.Results of PBT and vPvB assessmentNo data available

12.6. Other adverse effectsNo data available


13.1. Waste treatment methodsWaste from residues / unused products : Keep product and empty container away from heat and sources of

ignition. Dispose of in accordance with local regulations. Wherepossible recycling is preferred to disposal or incineration.

Additional ecological information : Do not flush into surface water or sanitary sewer system.Codes of waste (2001/573/EC, 75/442/EEC,91/689/EEC)

: Waste codes should be assigned by the user based on theapplication for which the product was used.


No transport regulation applicable


15.1. Safety, health and environmental regulations/legislation specific for the substance or mixture

15.1.1. EU-RegulationsNo data available

15.1.2. National regulations

WGK : -

15.2. Chemical Safety AssessmentChemical Safety assessment : A Chemical Safety Assessment has been carried out for this substance.


Sources of key data used to compile the datasheet : http://ecb.jrc.it

Updated sections : 2,3,16


CAS 67762-26-9 Supersedes :09/11/2010

The contents and format of this SDS are in accordance with EEC Commission Directive 1999/45/EC, 67/548/EC,1272/2008/EC and EEC Commission Regulation 1907/2006/EC (REACH) Annex II.

DISCLAIMER OF LIABILITY The information in this SDS was obtained from sources which we believe are reliable. However,the information is provided without any warranty, express or implied, regarding its correctness. The conditions or methods ofhandling, storage, use or disposal of the product are beyond our control and may be beyond our knowledge. For this andother reasons, we do not assume responsibility and expressly disclaim liability for loss, damage or expense arising out of or inany way connected with the handling, storage, use or disposal of the product. This SDS was prepared and is to be used onlyfor this product. If the product is used as a component in another product, this SDS information may not be applicable.

Extended MSDS for Biodiesel - (Fatty Acid Methyl Ester)

Substance Name: EC Number: CAS Number:

Substance Name: EC Number: CAS Number:

SUMMARY OF RISK MANAGEMENT MEASURES

Annex D

Consequence Modelling Results


D1

D CONSEQUENCE IMPACT AREAS (ISO-PLETHS)

D1 CONSEQUENCE ISO-PLETH CALCULATION

Modelling of pool fires resulting from the ignition of released material from the bulk fuel installations have been performed using models within Phast 6.6.

D1.1 Inputs for Modelling Pool Fires

The pool fires were modelled using the parameters summarised in Table D.0.1.

Table D.0.1 Pool fire parameters

Flammable liquids modelled AGO, ULP, Ethanol and Bio Fane Density of liquid (kg/m3) 850, 750, 800 and 800 kg/m3 Ambient (air) temperature ( C) 17°C (average) Relative humidity (%) 75.5% Wind velocity at 10 m (m/s) 2, 3,and 8 Figure D.1 illustrates the various consequence zones.

Figure D.1 Consequence Zone Representation

The detailed results of the bulk fuel installations consequence modelling for fatality end point criteria appear in Table D.2. Details of the bulk fuel installations consequence modelling for dangerous dose end point criteria appear in Table D.3. Large flash fire and vapour cloud explosion consequence distances are taken from Buncefield literature and are identical for all tanks. The details of the Buncefield scenario modelling appear in Table D.4. Details of the additional pipeline installations consequence modelling for fatality end point criteria appear in Table D.5, and for dangerous dose end point criteria appear in Table D.6.

Table D.2 Results of the Pool Fire Modelling – Fatality Assessment

Name Description Release Rate

(kg/s) Ignition

Probability Pool Diameter

(m) Weather Thermal Flux

(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences

d (m) c (m) s (m) m (m) Diesel_Tanks_2 S N/A 1.00E-01 35 B3 6.3 kW/m2 4.50E+01 4.50E+01 42 30 -20 11

C8 6.3 kW/m2 52 34 -18 17 F2 6.3 kW/m2 40 30 -22 9 B3 12.5 kW/m2 22 20 -18 2 C8 12.5 kW/m2 25 21 -18 3 F2 12.5 kW/m2 22 20 -18 2 B3 37.5 kW/m2 17 17 -17 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 17 17 -17 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 17 17 -17 0

Diesel_Tanks_2 L N/A 1.00E-01 70 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.00E+01 3.00E+01 68 50 -37 15 C8 6.3 kW/m2 85 57 -35 25 F2 6.3 kW/m2 64 50 -39 12 B3 12.5 kW/m2 36 35 -36 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 38 37 -35 2 F2 12.5 kW/m2 36 35 -35 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 35 35 -35 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 35 35 -35 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 35 35 -35 0

Diesel_Tanks_2 C N/A 1.50E-03 122 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.75E-03 3.75E-03 108 83 -65 21 C8 6.3 kW/m2 133 94 -60 37 F2 6.3 kW/m2 103 82 -68 17 B3 12.5 kW/m2 62 62 -61 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 66 62 -60 3 F2 12.5 kW/m2 62 62 -61 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 61 61 -61 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 61 61 -61 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 61 61 -61 0

Diesel_Tanks_3 w 1.23E+03 1.30E-02 38 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.12E-03 3.12E-03 45 32 -22 12 C8 6.3 kW/m2 55 36 -20 18 F2 6.3 kW/m2 42 31 -23 9 B3 12.5 kW/m2 24 21 -20 2


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences

d (m) c (m) s (m) m (m) C8 12.5 kW/m2 26 23 -20 3 F2 12.5 kW/m2 23 21 -20 2 B3 37.5 kW/m2 19 19 -19 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 19 19 -19 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 19 19 -19 0

Diesel_Tanks_3 x 1.23E+01 1.57E-03 38 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.78E-03 3.78E-03 45 32 -22 12 C8 6.3 kW/m2 55 36 -20 18 F2 6.3 kW/m2 42 31 -23 9 B3 12.5 kW/m2 24 21 -20 2 C8 12.5 kW/m2 26 23 -20 3 F2 12.5 kW/m2 23 21 -20 2 B3 37.5 kW/m2 19 19 -19 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 19 19 -19 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 19 19 -19 0

Diesel_Tanks_4 b 3.15E-01 1.36E-04 11 B3 6.3 kW/m2 7.95E-04 7.95E-04 27 18 -10 8 C8 6.3 kW/m2 29 19 -8 11 F2 6.3 kW/m2 25 18 -11 7 B3 12.5 kW/m2 17 11 -7 5 C8 12.5 kW/m2 20 12 -7 6 F2 12.5 kW/m2 15 10 -7 4 B3 37.5 kW/m2 6 6 -6 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 6 6 -6 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 6 6 -6 0

Diesel_Tanks_4 c 1.23E+01 1.57E-03 59 B3 6.3 kW/m2 6.44E-03 6.44E-03 60 44 -32 14 C8 6.3 kW/m2 75 50 -30 23 F2 6.3 kW/m2 56 43 -34 11 B3 12.5 kW/m2 31 30 -30 1 C8 12.5 kW/m2 33 32 -30 2 F2 12.5 kW/m2 31 30 -30 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 29 29 -29 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 29 29 -29 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 29 29 -29 0

Diesel_Tanks_4 d 1.37E+02 1.30E-02 100 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.04E-02 3.04E-02 91 69 -53 19 C8 6.3 kW/m2 113 79 -49 32 F2 6.3 kW/m2 86 68 -56 15


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences

d (m) c (m) s (m) m (m) B3 12.5 kW/m2 51 51 -51 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 54 52 -50 2 F2 12.5 kW/m2 51 51 -50 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0

Diesel_Tanks_4 e 1.23E+03 1.30E-02 100 B3 6.3 kW/m2 1.52E-02 1.52E-02 91 69 -53 19 C8 6.3 kW/m2 113 79 -49 32 F2 6.3 kW/m2 86 68 -56 15 B3 12.5 kW/m2 51 51 -51 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 54 52 -50 2 F2 12.5 kW/m2 51 51 -50 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0

Diesel_Tanks_4 f 3.33E+00 5.22E-04 33 B3 6.3 kW/m2 2.78E-04 2.78E-04 41 29 -19 11 C8 6.3 kW/m2 50 32 -17 16 F2 6.3 kW/m2 38 28 -21 9 B3 12.5 kW/m2 22 19 -17 2 C8 12.5 kW/m2 24 21 -17 4 F2 12.5 kW/m2 21 19 -17 2 B3 37.5 kW/m2 16 16 -16 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 16 16 -16 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 16 16 -16 0

Diesel_Tanks_4 v 3.33E+00 5.22E-04 33 B3 6.3 kW/m2 4.62E-04 4.62E-04 41 29 -19 11 C8 6.3 kW/m2 50 32 -17 16 F2 6.3 kW/m2 38 28 -21 9 B3 12.5 kW/m2 22 19 -17 2 C8 12.5 kW/m2 24 21 -17 4 F2 12.5 kW/m2 21 19 -17 2 B3 37.5 kW/m2 16 16 -16 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 16 16 -16 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 16 16 -16 0

Diesel_Tanks_5 b 2.82E-01 1.30E-04 11 B3 6.3 kW/m2 8.14E-03 8.14E-03 26 18 -10 8 C8 6.3 kW/m2 29 19 -8 11


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences

d (m) c (m) s (m) m (m) F2 6.3 kW/m2 24 18 -11 7 B3 12.5 kW/m2 17 11 -7 5 C8 12.5 kW/m2 20 12 -6 7 F2 12.5 kW/m2 15 10 -7 4 B3 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0


Diesel_Tanks_5 d 8.45E+01 1.00E-02 100 B3 6.3 kW/m2 2.50E-01 2.50E-01 91 69 -53 19 C8 6.3 kW/m2 113 79 -49 32 F2 6.3 kW/m2 86 68 -56 15 B3 12.5 kW/m2 51 51 -51 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 54 52 -50 2 F2 12.5 kW/m2 51 51 -50 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0


Diesel_Tanks_5 f 2.98E+00 4.81E-04 31 B3 6.3 kW/m2 2.76E-03 2.76E-03 40 28 -19 11


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences

d (m) c (m) s (m) m (m) C8 6.3 kW/m2 48 31 -17 16 F2 6.3 kW/m2 37 28 -20 9 B3 12.5 kW/m2 21 18 -17 2 C8 12.5 kW/m2 24 20 -16 4 F2 12.5 kW/m2 21 18 -17 2 B3 37.5 kW/m2 16 16 -16 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 16 16 -16 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 16 16 -16 0


Diesel_Tanks_6 S N/A 1.00E-01 40 B3 6.3 kW/m2 4.50E+01 4.50E+01 46 33 -23 12 C8 6.3 kW/m2 57 37 -21 18 F2 6.3 kW/m2 43 32 -24 10 B3 12.5 kW/m2 24 22 -21 2 C8 12.5 kW/m2 27 24 -21 3 F2 12.5 kW/m2 24 22 -21 1 B3 37.5 kW/m2 20 20 -20 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 20 20 -20 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 20 20 -20 0



(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences

d (m) c (m) s (m) m (m) Diesel_Tanks_6 C N/A 1.50E-03 128 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.75E-03 3.75E-03 112 87 -69 22




Diesel_Tanks_7 C N/A 1.50E-03 121 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.75E-03 3.75E-03 107 83 -65 21 C8 6.3 kW/m2 133 94 -60 37 F2 6.3 kW/m2 102 82 -68 17 B3 12.5 kW/m2 62 61 -61 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 65 62 -60 3 F2 12.5 kW/m2 62 62 -61 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 61 61 -61 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 61 61 -61 0


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences

d (m) c (m) s (m) m (m) F2 37.5 kW/m2 61 61 -61 0




Diesel_Tanks_9 S N/A 1.00E-01 50 B3 6.3 kW/m2 4.50E+01 4.50E+01 54 39 -27 13 C8 6.3 kW/m2 67 44 -26 20 F2 6.3 kW/m2 50 38 -29 11 B3 12.5 kW/m2 28 26 -26 1 C8 12.5 kW/m2 30 28 -26 2 F2 12.5 kW/m2 27 26 -26 1 B3 37.5 kW/m2 25 25 -25 0


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences

d (m) c (m) s (m) m (m) C8 37.5 kW/m2 25 25 -25 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 25 25 -25 0




Diesel_Tanks_10 L N/A 1.00E-01 101 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.00E+01 3.00E+01 91 70 -54 19 C8 6.3 kW/m2 114 79 -50 32 F2 6.3 kW/m2 87 69 -56 15 B3 12.5 kW/m2 51 51 -51 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 54 52 -50 2 F2 12.5 kW/m2 51 51 -51 0


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences

d (m) c (m) s (m) m (m) B3 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0




Diesel_Tanks_11 C N/A 1.50E-03 133 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.75E-03 3.75E-03 116 90 -71 22 C8 6.3 kW/m2 143 102 -65 39 F2 6.3 kW/m2 111 89 -75 18 B3 12.5 kW/m2 68 68 -67 1 C8 12.5 kW/m2 72 68 -65 3


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences

d (m) c (m) s (m) m (m) F2 12.5 kW/m2 68 68 -67 1 B3 37.5 kW/m2 66 66 -66 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 66 66 -66 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 66 66 -66 0




Diesel_Tanks_12 e 8.45E+01 1.00E-02 100 B3 6.3 kW/m2 4.01E-01 4.01E-01 91 69 -53 19 C8 6.3 kW/m2 113 79 -49 32 F2 6.3 kW/m2 86 68 -56 15 B3 12.5 kW/m2 51 51 -51 0


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences





Diesel_Tanks_13 c 1.10E+01 3.96E-04 30 B3 6.3 kW/m2 4.46E-03 4.46E-03 39 28 -18 11 C8 6.3 kW/m2 47 31 -16 15 F2 6.3 kW/m2 37 27 -19 9


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences





Diesel_Tanks_13 v 2.98E+00 1.73E-04 30 B3 6.3 kW/m2 1.12E-03 1.12E-03 39 28 -18 11 C8 6.3 kW/m2 47 31 -16 15


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences





Diesel_Tanks_14 e 8.45E+01 1.50E-03 31 B3 6.3 kW/m2 2.36E-03 2.36E-03 40 28 -19 11


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences






(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences

d (m) c (m) s (m) m (m) Diesel_Tanks_15 c 1.10E+01 3.96E-04 43 B3 6.3 kW/m2 9.91E-03 9.91E-03 48 35 -24 12




Diesel_Tanks_15 f 2.98E+00 1.73E-04 31 B3 6.3 kW/m2 1.05E-03 1.05E-03 40 28 -19 11 C8 6.3 kW/m2 48 31 -17 16 F2 6.3 kW/m2 37 28 -20 9 B3 12.5 kW/m2 21 18 -17 2 C8 12.5 kW/m2 24 20 -16 4 F2 12.5 kW/m2 21 18 -17 2 B3 37.5 kW/m2 16 16 -16 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 16 16 -16 0


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences

d (m) c (m) s (m) m (m) F2 37.5 kW/m2 16 16 -16 0




Diesel_Tanks_16 d 8.45E+01 1.50E-03 33 B3 6.3 kW/m2 7.50E-03 7.50E-03 41 29 -19 11 C8 6.3 kW/m2 50 33 -18 16 F2 6.3 kW/m2 39 29 -21 9 B3 12.5 kW/m2 22 19 -17 2 C8 12.5 kW/m2 24 21 -17 4 F2 12.5 kW/m2 21 19 -17 2 B3 37.5 kW/m2 17 17 -17 0


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences





Diesel_Tanks_17 b 2.82E-01 1.30E-04 10 B3 6.3 kW/m2 1.30E-03 1.30E-03 26 17 -10 8 C8 6.3 kW/m2 28 18 -7 10 F2 6.3 kW/m2 24 17 -11 7 B3 12.5 kW/m2 16 10 -6 5 C8 12.5 kW/m2 19 12 -6 7 F2 12.5 kW/m2 15 10 -7 4


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences





Diesel_Tanks_17 p 8.45E+01 1.00E-02 10 B3 6.3 kW/m2 6.01E-01 6.01E-01 26 17 -10 8 C8 6.3 kW/m2 28 18 -7 10 F2 6.3 kW/m2 24 17 -11 7 B3 12.5 kW/m2 16 10 -6 5 C8 12.5 kW/m2 19 12 -6 7


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences





Diesel_Tanks_18 c 1.10E+01 1.42E-03 56 B3 6.3 kW/m2 9.95E-03 9.95E-03 58 42 -30 14 C8 6.3 kW/m2 72 48 -28 22 F2 6.3 kW/m2 54 41 -32 11 B3 12.5 kW/m2 30 29 -29 1


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences




Diesel_Tanks_18 p 8.45E+01 1.00E-02 100 B3 6.3 kW/m2 4.51E-01 4.51E-01 91 69 -53 19 C8 6.3 kW/m2 113 79 -49 32 F2 6.3 kW/m2 86 68 -56 15 B3 12.5 kW/m2 51 51 -51 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 54 52 -50 2 F2 12.5 kW/m2 51 51 -50 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0

Diesel_Tanks_18 f 2.98E+00 4.81E-04 10 B3 6.3 kW/m2 8.38E-04 8.38E-04 26 17 -10 8 C8 6.3 kW/m2 28 18 -7 10 F2 6.3 kW/m2 24 17 -11 7


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences



Diesel_Tanks_19 k 7.76E-02 1.00E-04 6 B3 6.3 kW/m2 7.15E+00 7.15E+00 23 16 -8 8 C8 6.3 kW/m2 24 16 -6 9 F2 6.3 kW/m2 22 15 -9 6 B3 12.5 kW/m2 16 9 -4 6 C8 12.5 kW/m2 19 11 -4 7 F2 12.5 kW/m2 14 8 -5 5 B3 37.5 kW/m2 3 3 -3 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 3 3 -3 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 3 3 -3 0

Diesel_Tanks_19 l 6.98E-01 2.00E-04 16 B3 6.3 kW/m2 9.52E-01 9.52E-01 30 20 -12 9 C8 6.3 kW/m2 34 22 -10 12 F2 6.3 kW/m2 28 20 -13 7 B3 12.5 kW/m2 18 12 -9 4 C8 12.5 kW/m2 20 14 -9 6 F2 12.5 kW/m2 16 12 -10 3 B3 37.5 kW/m2 8 8 -8 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 8 8 -8 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 8 8 -8 0

Diesel_Tanks_19 m 3.10E+01 3.76E-03 30 B3 6.3 kW/m2 1.79E+02 1.79E+02 39 28 -18 11 C8 6.3 kW/m2 48 31 -16 16


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences


Diesel_Tanks_19 n 3.10E+03 1.30E-02 72 B3 6.3 kW/m2 5.90E-02 5.90E-02 70 52 -39 16 C8 6.3 kW/m2 87 59 -36 26 F2 6.3 kW/m2 66 51 -41 13 B3 12.5 kW/m2 37 37 -37 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 40 38 -36 2 F2 12.5 kW/m2 37 37 -37 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 36 36 -36 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 36 36 -36 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 36 36 -36 0

Petrol_20 w 1.95E+02 1.30E-01 38 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.12E-02 3.12E-02 46 32 -22 12 C8 6.3 kW/m2 57 37 -20 18 F2 6.3 kW/m2 43 32 -23 10 B3 12.5 kW/m2 23 21 -20 2 C8 12.5 kW/m2 26 23 -20 3 F2 12.5 kW/m2 23 21 -20 1 B3 37.5 kW/m2 19 19 -19 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 19 19 -19 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 19 19 -19 0

Petrol_20 x 1.16E+01 1.49E-02 27 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.58E-02 3.58E-02 39 27 -17 11 C8 6.3 kW/m2 48 30 -15 17 F2 6.3 kW/m2 37 26 -18 9 B3 12.5 kW/m2 20 17 -15 3 C8 12.5 kW/m2 23 18 -14 5 F2 12.5 kW/m2 20 16 -15 2 B3 37.5 kW/m2 14 14 -14 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 14 14 -14 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 14 14 -14 0

Petrol_21 b 2.97E-01 1.33E-03 12 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.40E-03 3.40E-03 31 19 -11 10


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences


Petrol_21 c 1.16E+01 1.49E-02 60 B3 6.3 kW/m2 2.67E-02 2.67E-02 61 45 -32 14 C8 6.3 kW/m2 76 51 -30 23 F2 6.3 kW/m2 58 44 -34 12 B3 12.5 kW/m2 32 31 -31 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 33 32 -30 1 F2 12.5 kW/m2 31 31 -31 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 30 30 -30 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 30 30 -30 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 30 30 -30 0

Petrol_21 d 1.29E+02 1.30E-01 100 B3 6.3 kW/m2 1.33E-01 1.33E-01 91 70 -54 19 C8 6.3 kW/m2 113 80 -50 32 F2 6.3 kW/m2 87 69 -56 15 B3 12.5 kW/m2 51 51 -51 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 53 52 -50 2 F2 12.5 kW/m2 51 51 -50 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0

Petrol_21 e 1.16E+03 1.30E-01 100 B3 6.3 kW/m2 6.66E-02 6.66E-02 91 70 -54 19 C8 6.3 kW/m2 113 80 -50 32 F2 6.3 kW/m2 87 69 -56 15 B3 12.5 kW/m2 51 51 -51 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 53 52 -50 2 F2 12.5 kW/m2 51 51 -50 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences

d (m) c (m) s (m) m (m) Petrol_21 f 3.14E+00 5.00E-03 34 B3 6.3 kW/m2 1.17E-03 1.17E-03 43 30 -20 12


Petrol_21 v 3.14E+00 5.00E-03 34 B3 6.3 kW/m2 1.93E-03 1.93E-03 43 30 -20 12 C8 6.3 kW/m2 53 34 -18 18 F2 6.3 kW/m2 40 29 -21 10 B3 12.5 kW/m2 22 19 -18 2 C8 12.5 kW/m2 25 21 -17 4 F2 12.5 kW/m2 22 19 -18 2 B3 37.5 kW/m2 17 17 -17 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 17 17 -17 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 17 17 -17 0

Petrol_22 S N/A 1.00E+00 34 B3 6.3 kW/m2 4.50E+01 4.50E+01 43 30 -20 12 C8 6.3 kW/m2 54 34 -18 18 F2 6.3 kW/m2 41 30 -22 10 B3 12.5 kW/m2 22 19 -18 2 C8 12.5 kW/m2 25 21 -18 4 F2 12.5 kW/m2 22 19 -18 2 B3 37.5 kW/m2 17 17 -17 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 17 17 -17 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 17 17 -17 0

Petrol_22 L N/A 1.00E+00 69 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.00E+01 3.00E+01 67 50 -37 15 C8 6.3 kW/m2 84 57 -34 25 F2 6.3 kW/m2 64 49 -39 12 B3 12.5 kW/m2 35 35 -35 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 37 36 -35 1 F2 12.5 kW/m2 35 35 -35 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 34 34 -34 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 34 34 -34 0


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences

d (m) c (m) s (m) m (m) F2 37.5 kW/m2 34 34 -34 0

Petrol_22 C N/A 1.50E-02 121 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.75E-02 3.75E-02 108 83 -65 21 C8 6.3 kW/m2 134 95 -61 37 F2 6.3 kW/m2 103 82 -69 17 B3 12.5 kW/m2 62 62 -61 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 65 63 -61 2 F2 12.5 kW/m2 62 62 -61 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 61 61 -61 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 61 61 -61 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 61 61 -61 0


Petrol_23 L N/A 1.00E+00 79 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.00E+01 3.00E+01 74 56 -42 16 C8 6.3 kW/m2 93 64 -39 27 F2 6.3 kW/m2 71 55 -44 13 B3 12.5 kW/m2 40 40 -40 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 42 41 -40 1 F2 12.5 kW/m2 40 40 -40 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 39 39 -39 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 39 39 -39 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 39 39 -39 0

Petrol_23 C N/A 1.50E-02 127 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.75E-02 3.75E-02 112 87 -69 22 C8 6.3 kW/m2 139 100 -64 38 F2 6.3 kW/m2 108 86 -72 18 B3 12.5 kW/m2 66 65 -64 1 C8 12.5 kW/m2 69 66 -64 3 F2 12.5 kW/m2 65 65 -64 1 B3 37.5 kW/m2 64 64 -64 0


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences



Petrol_24 L N/A 1.00E+00 68 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.00E+01 3.00E+01 66 49 -36 15 C8 6.3 kW/m2 82 56 -34 24 F2 6.3 kW/m2 63 48 -38 12 B3 12.5 kW/m2 35 34 -34 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 36 36 -34 1 F2 12.5 kW/m2 35 34 -34 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 34 34 -34 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 34 34 -34 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 34 34 -34 0

Petrol_24 C N/A 1.50E-02 121 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.75E-02 3.75E-02 107 83 -65 21 C8 6.3 kW/m2 133 95 -60 36 F2 6.3 kW/m2 103 82 -68 17 B3 12.5 kW/m2 62 61 -61 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 65 62 -60 2 F2 12.5 kW/m2 62 61 -61 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 60 60 -60 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 60 60 -60 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 60 60 -60 0

Petrol_25 b 2.66E-01 1.28E-03 11 B3 6.3 kW/m2 2.55E-01 2.55E-01 31 19 -11 10 C8 6.3 kW/m2 37 21 -8 14 F2 6.3 kW/m2 28 19 -12 8 B3 12.5 kW/m2 17 11 -7 5 C8 12.5 kW/m2 22 13 -7 8 F2 12.5 kW/m2 16 10 -7 4


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences


Petrol_25 c 1.04E+01 1.35E-02 57 B3 6.3 kW/m2 1.89E+00 1.89E+00 59 43 -31 14 C8 6.3 kW/m2 73 49 -29 22 F2 6.3 kW/m2 56 42 -33 11 B3 12.5 kW/m2 30 29 -29 1 C8 12.5 kW/m2 32 31 -29 2 F2 12.5 kW/m2 30 30 -29 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 29 29 -29 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 29 29 -29 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 29 29 -29 0

Petrol_25 d 7.50E+01 8.91E-02 100 B3 6.3 kW/m2 7.13E+00 7.13E+00 91 70 -54 19 C8 6.3 kW/m2 113 80 -50 32 F2 6.3 kW/m2 87 69 -56 15 B3 12.5 kW/m2 51 51 -51 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 53 52 -50 2 F2 12.5 kW/m2 51 51 -50 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0

Petrol_25 e 7.50E+01 8.91E-02 100 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.56E+00 3.56E+00 91 70 -54 19 C8 6.3 kW/m2 113 80 -50 32 F2 6.3 kW/m2 87 69 -56 15 B3 12.5 kW/m2 51 51 -51 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 53 52 -50 2 F2 12.5 kW/m2 51 51 -50 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 50 50 -50 0

Petrol_25 f 2.80E+00 4.61E-03 32 B3 6.3 kW/m2 8.40E-02 8.40E-02 42 29 -19 12 C8 6.3 kW/m2 52 33 -17 17 F2 6.3 kW/m2 39 29 -20 9 B3 12.5 kW/m2 22 19 -17 2 C8 12.5 kW/m2 24 20 -17 4


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences



Petrol_26 k 6.89E-02 1.00E-03 6 B3 6.3 kW/m2 2.93E+01 2.93E+01 28 17 -9 10 C8 6.3 kW/m2 34 18 -6 14 F2 6.3 kW/m2 26 17 -10 8 B3 12.5 kW/m2 17 9 -4 6 C8 12.5 kW/m2 22 11 -4 9 F2 12.5 kW/m2 15 9 -5 5 B3 37.5 kW/m2 3 3 -3 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 3 3 -3 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 3 3 -3 0

Petrol_26 l 6.20E-01 1.87E-03 16 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.64E+00 3.64E+00 33 21 -12 10 C8 6.3 kW/m2 40 24 -10 15 F2 6.3 kW/m2 31 21 -14 8 B3 12.5 kW/m2 18 13 -9 4 C8 12.5 kW/m2 22 15 -9 7 F2 12.5 kW/m2 17 12 -10 4 B3 37.5 kW/m2 8 8 -8 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 8 8 -8 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 8 8 -8 0

Petrol_26 m 2.76E+01 3.36E-02 30 B3 6.3 kW/m2 6.54E+02 6.54E+02 41 28 -18 11 C8 6.3 kW/m2 50 32 -16 17 F2 6.3 kW/m2 38 28 -20 9 B3 12.5 kW/m2 21 18 -16 3


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences


Petrol_26 n 2.76E+03 1.30E-01 72 B3 6.3 kW/m2 2.41E-01 2.41E-01 69 52 -38 15 C8 6.3 kW/m2 87 60 -36 25 F2 6.3 kW/m2 66 51 -41 13 B3 12.5 kW/m2 37 37 -37 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 39 38 -36 1 F2 12.5 kW/m2 37 37 -37 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 36 36 -36 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 36 36 -36 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 36 36 -36 0

Petrol_27 b 2.66E-01 1.04E-03 11 B3 6.3 kW/m2 2.07E-02 2.07E-02 31 19 -11 10 C8 6.3 kW/m2 37 21 -8 14 F2 6.3 kW/m2 28 19 -12 8 B3 12.5 kW/m2 17 11 -7 5 C8 12.5 kW/m2 22 13 -7 8 F2 12.5 kW/m2 16 10 -7 4 B3 37.5 kW/m2 6 6 -6 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 6 6 -6 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 6 6 -6 0


Petrol_27 d 7.50E+01 1.50E-02 28 B3 6.3 kW/m2 7.50E-02 7.50E-02 40 27 -17 11 C8 6.3 kW/m2 49 30 -15 17 F2 6.3 kW/m2 37 27 -19 9


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences



Petrol_27 f 2.80E+00 1.68E-03 28 B3 6.3 kW/m2 5.11E-03 5.11E-03 40 27 -17 11 C8 6.3 kW/m2 49 30 -15 17 F2 6.3 kW/m2 37 27 -19 9 B3 12.5 kW/m2 21 17 -15 3 C8 12.5 kW/m2 24 19 -15 4 F2 12.5 kW/m2 20 17 -15 2 B3 37.5 kW/m2 14 14 -14 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 14 14 -14 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 14 14 -14 0


Petrol_28 b 2.66E-01 1.04E-03 11 B3 6.3 kW/m2 2.59E-02 2.59E-02 31 19 -11 10 C8 6.3 kW/m2 37 21 -8 14


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences



Petrol_28 d 7.38E+01 1.50E-02 29 B3 6.3 kW/m2 1.50E-01 1.50E-01 40 28 -18 11 C8 6.3 kW/m2 50 31 -16 17 F2 6.3 kW/m2 38 27 -19 9 B3 12.5 kW/m2 21 17 -16 3 C8 12.5 kW/m2 24 19 -15 4 F2 12.5 kW/m2 20 17 -16 2 B3 37.5 kW/m2 15 15 -15 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 15 15 -15 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 15 15 -15 0


Petrol_28 f 2.80E+00 1.68E-03 29 B3 6.3 kW/m2 6.59E-03 6.59E-03 40 28 -18 11


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences



Petrol_29 b 2.66E-01 1.28E-03 10 B3 6.3 kW/m2 1.28E-02 1.28E-02 30 19 -10 10 C8 6.3 kW/m2 36 20 -8 14 F2 6.3 kW/m2 27 18 -11 8 B3 12.5 kW/m2 17 11 -6 5 C8 12.5 kW/m2 22 13 -6 8 F2 12.5 kW/m2 16 10 -7 5 B3 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0



(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences

d (m) c (m) s (m) m (m) Petrol_29 d 7.38E+01 8.76E-02 10 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.50E-01 3.50E-01 30 19 -10 10



Petrol_29 p 7.50E+01 8.91E-02 10 B3 6.3 kW/m2 4.01E+00 4.01E+00 30 19 -10 10 C8 6.3 kW/m2 36 20 -8 14 F2 6.3 kW/m2 27 18 -11 8 B3 12.5 kW/m2 17 11 -6 5 C8 12.5 kW/m2 22 13 -6 8 F2 12.5 kW/m2 16 10 -7 5 B3 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0

Petrol_29 f 2.80E+00 4.61E-03 10 B3 6.3 kW/m2 8.03E-03 8.03E-03 30 19 -10 10 C8 6.3 kW/m2 36 20 -8 14 F2 6.3 kW/m2 27 18 -11 8 B3 12.5 kW/m2 17 11 -6 5 C8 12.5 kW/m2 22 13 -6 8 F2 12.5 kW/m2 16 10 -7 5 B3 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences

d (m) c (m) s (m) m (m) F2 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0


Ethanol_30 k 4.21E-01 1.53E-03 7 B3 6.3 kW/m2 1.50E+00 1.50E+00 28 17 -9 10 C8 6.3 kW/m2 34 18 -6 14 F2 6.3 kW/m2 26 17 -10 8 B3 12.5 kW/m2 17 9 -5 6 C8 12.5 kW/m2 22 12 -5 9 F2 12.5 kW/m2 15 9 -5 5 B3 37.5 kW/m2 3 3 -3 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 3 3 -3 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 3 3 -3 0

Ethanol_30 l 3.79E+00 5.76E-03 7 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.74E-01 3.74E-01 28 17 -9 10 C8 6.3 kW/m2 34 18 -6 14 F2 6.3 kW/m2 26 17 -10 8 B3 12.5 kW/m2 17 9 -5 6 C8 12.5 kW/m2 22 12 -5 9 F2 12.5 kW/m2 15 9 -5 5 B3 37.5 kW/m2 3 3 -3 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 3 3 -3 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 3 3 -3 0

Ethanol_30 m 1.00E+01 1.30E-02 7 B3 6.3 kW/m2 8.47E+00 8.47E+00 28 17 -9 10 C8 6.3 kW/m2 34 18 -6 14 F2 6.3 kW/m2 26 17 -10 8 B3 12.5 kW/m2 17 9 -5 6 C8 12.5 kW/m2 22 12 -5 9 F2 12.5 kW/m2 15 9 -5 5 B3 37.5 kW/m2 3 3 -3 0


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences


Ethanol_30 n 1.00E+01 1.30E-02 56 B3 6.3 kW/m2 1.61E-03 1.61E-03 58 43 -30 14 C8 6.3 kW/m2 72 49 -28 22 F2 6.3 kW/m2 55 42 -32 11 B3 12.5 kW/m2 30 29 -29 1 C8 12.5 kW/m2 32 31 -29 2 F2 12.5 kW/m2 30 29 -29 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 28 28 -28 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 28 28 -28 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 28 28 -28 0

Ethanol_31 b 2.66E-01 1.04E-03 10 B3 6.3 kW/m2 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 30 19 -10 10 C8 6.3 kW/m2 36 20 -8 14 F2 6.3 kW/m2 27 18 -11 8 B3 12.5 kW/m2 17 11 -6 5 C8 12.5 kW/m2 22 13 -6 8 F2 12.5 kW/m2 16 10 -7 5 B3 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0

Ethanol_31 c 1.00E+01 3.67E-03 10 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.67E-02 3.67E-02 30 19 -10 10 C8 6.3 kW/m2 36 20 -8 14 F2 6.3 kW/m2 27 18 -11 8 B3 12.5 kW/m2 17 11 -6 5 C8 12.5 kW/m2 22 13 -6 8 F2 12.5 kW/m2 16 10 -7 5 B3 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0

Ethanol_31 d 4.61E+00 2.16E-03 10 B3 6.3 kW/m2 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 30 19 -10 10 C8 6.3 kW/m2 36 20 -8 14 F2 6.3 kW/m2 27 18 -11 8 B3 12.5 kW/m2 17 11 -6 5 C8 12.5 kW/m2 22 13 -6 8 F2 12.5 kW/m2 16 10 -7 5


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences


Ethanol_31 e 1.00E+01 3.67E-03 10 B3 6.3 kW/m2 1.84E-02 1.84E-02 30 19 -10 10 C8 6.3 kW/m2 36 20 -8 14 F2 6.3 kW/m2 27 18 -11 8 B3 12.5 kW/m2 17 11 -6 5 C8 12.5 kW/m2 22 13 -6 8 F2 12.5 kW/m2 16 10 -7 5 B3 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0

Ethanol_31 p 1.00E+01 3.67E-03 10 B3 6.3 kW/m2 5.51E-02 5.51E-02 30 19 -10 10 C8 6.3 kW/m2 36 20 -8 14 F2 6.3 kW/m2 27 18 -11 8 B3 12.5 kW/m2 17 11 -6 5 C8 12.5 kW/m2 22 13 -6 8 F2 12.5 kW/m2 16 10 -7 5 B3 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0

Ethanol_31 f 2.80E+00 1.68E-03 10 B3 6.3 kW/m2 6.79E-03 6.79E-03 30 19 -10 10 C8 6.3 kW/m2 36 20 -8 14 F2 6.3 kW/m2 27 18 -11 8 B3 12.5 kW/m2 17 11 -6 5 C8 12.5 kW/m2 22 13 -6 8 F2 12.5 kW/m2 16 10 -7 5 B3 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 5 5 -5 0

Ethanol_31 v 2.80E+00 1.68E-03 10 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.24E-02 3.24E-02 30 19 -10 10 C8 6.3 kW/m2 36 20 -8 14 F2 6.3 kW/m2 27 18 -11 8 B3 12.5 kW/m2 17 11 -6 5 C8 12.5 kW/m2 22 13 -6 8


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences


Ethanol_32 S N/A 1.00E+00 16 B3 6.3 kW/m2 4.50E+01 4.50E+01 33 21 -12 10 C8 6.3 kW/m2 40 23 -10 15 F2 6.3 kW/m2 30 21 -13 8 B3 12.5 kW/m2 18 13 -9 4 C8 12.5 kW/m2 22 14 -9 7 F2 12.5 kW/m2 17 12 -9 4 B3 37.5 kW/m2 8 8 -8 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 8 8 -8 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 8 8 -8 0

Ethanol_32 L N/A 1.00E+00 32 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.00E+01 3.00E+01 42 29 -19 12 C8 6.3 kW/m2 52 33 -17 17 F2 6.3 kW/m2 39 29 -21 9 B3 12.5 kW/m2 22 19 -17 2 C8 12.5 kW/m2 24 20 -17 4 F2 12.5 kW/m2 21 18 -17 2 B3 37.5 kW/m2 16 16 -16 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 16 16 -16 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 16 16 -16 0

Ethanol_32 C N/A 1.50E-02 105 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.75E-02 3.75E-02 95 73 -56 19 C8 6.3 kW/m2 118 83 -52 33 F2 6.3 kW/m2 91 72 -59 16 B3 12.5 kW/m2 53 53 -53 0 C8 12.5 kW/m2 56 54 -53 2 F2 12.5 kW/m2 53 53 -53 0 B3 37.5 kW/m2 53 53 -53 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 53 53 -53 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 53 53 -53 0

Ethanol_33 b 2.66E-01 1.28E-03 11 B3 6.3 kW/m2 2.55E-01 2.55E-01 31 19 -11 10 C8 6.3 kW/m2 37 21 -8 14 F2 6.3 kW/m2 28 19 -12 8 B3 12.5 kW/m2 17 11 -7 5


(kg/s) Ignition



(kW/m2) Frequency:

Day Frequency:

Night

Consequences


Ethanol_33 c 1.25E+00 2.79E-03 22 B3 6.3 kW/m2 3.91E-01 3.91E-01 36 24 -15 11 C8 6.3 kW/m2 44 27 -13 16 F2 6.3 kW/m2 34 24 -16 9 B3 12.5 kW/m2 19 15 -12 4 C8 12.5 kW/m2 23 17 -12 5 F2 12.5 kW/m2 18 15 -12 3 B3 37.5 kW/m2 11 11 -11 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 11 11 -11 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 11 11 -11 0

Ethanol_33 d 1.25E+00 2.79E-03 22 B3 6.3 kW/m2 2.23E-01 2.23E-01 36 24 -15 11 C8 6.3 kW/m2 44 27 -13 16 F2 6.3 kW/m2 34 24 -16 9 B3 12.5 kW/m2 19 15 -12 4 C8 12.5 kW/m2 23 17 -12 5 F2 12.5 kW/m2 18 15 -12 3 B3 37.5 kW/m2 11 11 -11 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 11 11 -11 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 11 11 -11 0

Ethanol_33 e 1.25E+00 2.79E-03 22 B3 6.3 kW/m2 1.12E-01 1.12E-01 36 24 -15 11 C8 6.3 kW/m2 44 27 -13 16 F2 6.3 kW/m2 34 24 -16 9 B3 12.5 kW/m2 19 15 -12 4 C8 12.5 kW/m2 23 17 -12 5 F2 12.5 kW/m2 18 15 -12 3 B3 37.5 kW/m2 11 11 -11 0 C8 37.5 kW/m2 11 11 -11 0 F2 37.5 kW/m2 11 11 -11 0

Ethanol_33 f 1.25E+00 2.79E-03 22 B3 6.3 kW/m2 5.09E-02 5.09E-02 36 24 -15 11 C8 6.3 kW/m2 44 27 -13 16 F2 6.3 kW/m2 34 24 -16 9

quantitative risk assessment specialist report

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