quarterly business review - united states coast guard
TRANSCRIPT
DP ASSURANCE A VALUE ADDED PROCESS
March 2016
OBJECTIVE OF DP ASSURANCE • Success = Incident Free Operations = Predictable outcomes • An Incident = An Unacceptable Outcome and consequences
• Minimize the potential of a loss of position leading to unacceptable consequences.
• Real Examples:
Coring Vessel operating open water
Probability of LOP High Consequences of LOP were acceptable Consequence manifested Predictable outcome which was acceptable (ALARP)
PSV with cross connections operating close proximity
Cross connections in DP system couldn’t be mitigated Mitigation: Drift off condition Consequence manifested Predictable outcome which was acceptable (ALARP)
IFO
DP ASSURANCE AS A VALUE ADDED PROCESS • Is one element of an objective based Integrated Risk
Management approach to achieving predictable outcomes.
• Intergrates risks, mitigations and consequences….
• …and value is extracted when the appropriate mitigations and barriers are implemented to achieve: No harm to people
No harm to the environment
Predictable Outcomes / Incident free operations
Risks drive Consequences
Consequences need Mitigations
Risks
Consequences
Mitigations
DP ASSURANCE SHOULD NOT BE VIEWED AS … • A compliance based approach. • A prescriptive standard.
• A one size fits all process. • Categorical in its implementation.
Risks
Consequences Mitigations
Value
ROADMAP TO ACHIEVING INCIDENT FREE DP OPERATIONS
Conduct Risk Assessment
Develop Mitigations Implement
Monitor & Feedback
DEVELOPING THE RISK PROFILE
• Starts with 2 questions:
1. “What are the consequences if I lose position during (insert activity)?” 2. “Are those consequences acceptable if they manifest?”
If yes, proceed with activity. If no, develop & implement mitigations till risk profile acceptable.
• Understanding impacts & consequences will focus our mitigation efforts.
ELEMENTS OF A RISK PROFILE
Objective
Category of Vessel
Situational Specific
Well specific(as applicable)
Industrial Mission Specific
• No Harm to: • People • Environment • Reputation
• Drilling rigs (jack up, anchored semi-submersible, DP vessels), • Liftboats, • Barges, • Offshore Supply Vessels (DP 1, DP2, DP3), • Built for purpose and modified-fit for purpose WI vessel, • Inspection Maintenance & Repair (IMR) Vessels
• Open Water • Close Proximity
• Subsea assets • Production platforms • Other vessels
• Deep water • Shallow water • Hydrocarbon Zone • Non hydrocarbon zone
• Exploration Drilling/ Development Drilling • Well Intervention • Heavy Lift • Subsea Installation • Pipelay • Flotelling
Developing Mitigations
Top Event
Loss of Vessel Integrity
Loss of Station Keeping
Des
ign
Bar
rier
Peop
le B
arrie
r
Proc
ess
Barr
ier
Ope
ratio
nal B
arrie
r
Threats
Developing Mitigations
Who has a role?
Operational
Design
People
Process
• Shipyards • Class Societies • Vessel Owners • End User*
• Lease Operators • Vessel Operators • Regulators • Best Industry Practices
• Lease Operators • Vessel Operators • Industry Guidance
• Vessel Owners • DPO Certifiers • Flag State
Barrier Thinking Design Considerations
Robust Design − Design philosophy for DP is redundancy
− Design with 7 Pillars in mind
− Do not ignore reliability
− Integrity in all configurations (CAM/ TAM)
− Design to test • Statutory requirements
• Basis of confidence
− A systems approach to achieve highest post
failure capability • Align all systems to redundancy concept
− 2 power supplies on a triple redundant
system
− A 3 way split compromised by a 2 way split
auxiliary system
Source: MTS DP Vessel Design Philosophy Document - Part I
Training Certificates of Compliance are OK but there is room for improvement.
Additional focus on developing competency in key focus areas critical to station keeping.
Enable delivery capability by effective decision support tools (quality ASOG’s).
MTS MDAT Tool delivers competency roadmap.
Barrier Thinking People Considerations
Source: MTS DP MDAT Doc.
Barrier Thinking Process Considerations
Effective processes in place − Hazards and Effects Management Process (HEMP’s)
− Permit To Work (PTW)
− Management of Change (MoC)
− Positioning Standby
− Executable contingency plans
Source: www.gateinc.com
Barrier Thinking Operational Considerations
Focus on mitigating risks associated with Industrial Mission of the vessel.
Critical Activity Mode vs. Task Appropriate Mode
Establishment of Operational Criteria − Residual capability following a WCF
Special attention to vessel Modes & Features
− Heavy lift mode
− External force compensation
− Track Follow
Don’t forget SIMOPs planning − Status of other vessels in area
− Communications plan
− Escape routes
WSOG Template
Critical Activity Mode (CAM) Every vessel has a CAM configuration
that provides the highest degree of station keeping integrity.
Goes beyond open vs. closed bus ties. − Controls in place for IRM, reinstating
critical equipment. − Establishes post WCF capability. − Establishes requirements for PRS’s.
When CAM may be appropriate: − A low tolerance for unintended position
changes. − A long termination time. − Involves vessel operations within 500
meter zone of another asset.
Source: MTS DP TECHOP ODP_12_(O)
Task Appropriate Mode (TAM)
Is a risk based mode.
Strives to offer station keeping integrity
and fault tolerance.
TAM is intended to address issues brought
about by continuously operating in CAM,
such as: − Increased equipment runtime.
− Increased fuel consumption (and
emissions).
− In ability to conduct maintenance on DP
systems.
Source: MTS DP TECHOP ODP_12_(O)
Summary DP Assurance…
• can and should be a value delivering process
• Enables achieving objectives of:
No harm to people
No harm to the environment
Predictable Outcomes / Incident free operations
• Enables achieving mission objectives cost effectively.
Houston Office 16360 Park Ten Place Suite 206 Houston, TX 77084
New Orleans Office 830 Union Street Suite 400 New Orleans, LA 70112
www.gateinc.com