The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 15 | Issue 9 | Number 4 | Apr 27, 2017

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“Quite Unimportant”: Franco-Australian Settler Antagonismin the New Hebrides and British Imperial Policy in theSouthwest Pacific, 1870-1906

Viktor M. Stoll

Abstract

With the withdrawal of British troops from theAustralian colonies in 1870, a sense of strategicexposure crept through the colonies over thefollowing decades. This feeling of exposure wasconspicuously felt in the New Hebrides(modern Vanuatu), where French settlerintrigues threatened the Pacific "island wall"the Australian colonies increasingly hopedwould guard against the "Yellow Peril" of anexpansionist Japan. However, Whitehall foundthat the growing Australian-French settlerantagonism over the New Hebrides interferedwith its global imperial policy. Britain wasforced to balance competing interests betweenits primary Pacific dominion and its emergingEuropean ally. The move towards an eventualAnglo-French New Hebrides Condominium(1906), led to a distinct bifurcation of Anglo-Australian imperial policy in the Pacific. It alsoresulted in the physical, cultural and socialdecimation of native society.

Keywords: New Hebrides, Australia, FrenchColonialism, Japan, Pacific, British Empire,Anglo-French Condominium, Sub-imperialism

"His Majesty's Government regards the NewHebrides as quite unimportant from the pointof view of defence, and do not consider thattheir occupation would in any sense be astrategic gain."1 This matter of fact responsewas forwarded to Prime Minister of theCommonwealth of Australia, Alfred Deakin, byAustralian Governor-General Henry Northcote

in November 1905 at the height of a decades-long Australian-French settler rivalry over thefuture control of the archipelago.

The New Hebrides, modern Vanuatu, could notbe any further from the main centers of Britishimperial power at the time, and most certainlynot any further from its core imperial interests.Indeed, this island chain lying 2,500 kmnortheast of Sydney in the middle SouthwestPacific, held little economic and even lessstrategic importance for Whitehall. It did notcontrol a chokepoint of Far Eastern trade likeSingapore, nor protect the approaches toBritish India like Aden. The New Hebrides werejust another set of Melanesian islands wherelittle more than copra could be cultivated, andWhitehall had historically tried everything in itspower to resist being dragged into officialcolonial administration in the region.

While “quite unimportant” to Whitehall policymakers during the high tide of the BritishEmpire, Vanuatu would emerge as animportant well -spring of Melanesiannationalism during the era of decolonizationfollowing World War II. By the 1960s, landdisputes between native groups and Europeansettlers, a common dynamic of revolution in thedecolonizing world, spurred the foundation ofone of the earliest Melanesian nationalistmovements in the region. Under the leadershipof Jimmy Stevens, known to his followers as“Moses”, the Nagriamel conservative-traditionalist movement and the socialistVanua'aku Pati party of Anglican Fr. WalterLini emerged as leaders calling for Melanesian

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self-determination. As the two partiescompeted for influence throughout the 1970’samidst the backdrop of broader decolonizationin the Pacific, British and French interestsagain clashed.

British policy makers, happy to rid themselvesof the expense of economically and strategically“unimportant” Pacific colonies, hoped thatVanuatu's independence would coincide withthat of the other British colonies in the region.However, French interests, which opposeddecolonization in French Polynesia and NewCaledonia , act ively undermined theindependence movement. French interestssupported Stevens' Nagriamel movement,which sought a prolonged transition toindependence, while the British supported Lini.In the end, Lini’s Vanua'aku Pati triumphed -with Lini becoming Vanuatu’s first primeminister in 1980. An effort to establish aseparate French-backed state on Espiritu Santoby Stevens was put down with the support ofPapua New Guinean troops.2

Lini’s government, which many in the Westviewed as Communist-aligned, pursued anindependent Melanesian socialism whichsought to blend Western socialist thought withtraditional forms of the Melanesian economy,culture and society (known as kastom).3 Thisdoctrine gained admirers among Melanesianpopulations throughout the region andcontinues to be advocated by pro-independenceparties in French New Caledonia. Lini alsosought stronger ties with other Melanesiannations, like Papua New Guinea and theSolomon Islands, laying the basis for theMelanesian Spearhead Group (MSG).4 Lini alsoremained a vocal critic of continued Frenchcolonial occupation in the region, and Vanuatuemerged as a major supporter of Melanesiannationalists in New Caledonia calling for thetermination of French nuclear testing duringthe 1980s.5 In this role Vanuatu continues toexercise a quite important regional leadershiprole, specifically through the MSG, advocating

for Melanesian self-determination in places likeNew Caledonia and West Papua.6

Map of the modern Southwest Pacific withinset of Vanuatu (former New Hebrides)7

However, a century before Vanuatu'sindependence, this "quite unimportant" islandchain gave rise to a dramatic reorientation ofBritish imperial policy during the Edwardianyears. In the New Hebrides, British foreignpolicy's dramatic shift away from its Pacificcolonies and toward Europe would accelerate -diverging from Australia and increasinglyconverging with that most traditional of foes,France. In the signing of the Anglo-FrenchCondominium of the New Hebrides in 1906,Britain would formally subordinate the desireof its Pacific settler colonies to its alliance withFrance.

Not surprisingly, given the "unimportance" ofthe New Hebrides for the British Empire, thehistoriography of the region in light of itsimperial relevance is sparse. Most macro-imperial histories fail to even mention the NewH e b r i d e s o r t h e A n g l o - F r e n c hCondominium.8 In Australian historiography theNew Hebrides are often little more than afootnote. Only amongst Australian defenseworks, such as Neville Meaney's The Search for

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Security in the Pacific, 1901-14, do the NewHebrides have a place at the table.9 By far thebest accounts of the New Hebrides are fromthe French perspective but still fall victim tothe nationalist narrative.10 The intent of thispaper is to bring the Franco-Australian settlerantagonism over the New Hebrides out ofobscurity and define the role this small, "quiteunimportant" chain of islands played inaccelerating Britain's turn from empire in thePacific.

The end of British Hegemony in the Asia-Pacific

The Franco-Australian antagonism over theNew Hebrides, which reached a fever pitch by1905, should be viewed in the context of adecades-long shift in the status quo of the Asia-Pacific, which in turn was shaped by theevolving strategic situation in Europe followingthe unification of Germany. The aggressive riseof German Weltpolitik and naval projectionunder the influence of nationalist elementsbeginning in the 1880s, forced a reevaluationof British imperial policy that sent significantripples through the Pacific. The SecondGerman Naval Law of 1900, which wasspearheaded by arch-Alldeustchen AdmiralTirpitz, called for the doubling of the GermanNavy by 1912. General Bernhardi, a leadingGerman strategist, would state that theKaiserliche Marine was created specifically towage a bold and energetic campaign againstBritish commerce.11 The bellicose posturing ofthe Germans during the Moroccan Crisis andthe Algeciras Conference (1905) fullyconfirmed suspicions that Britain itself wasunder an unambiguous threat for the first timesince Napoleon.

The Foreign Office, in close coordination withthe Admiralty, acted with foreseeable alacrityin countering this German threat as itcontinued to develop towards the turn of thetwentieth century. The Anglo-Japanese Treaty(1902) was signed, the Entente Cordiale (1904)

was codified with France, and the Admiraltyrequisitioned all "non-essential" Royal Navyships from the colonial-based squadrons toreinforce the newly constituted home fleet atScapa Flow in the Orkney Islands off the coastof Scotland. The Pacific security brought byJapanese victory in the Russo-Japanese Warand the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliancein 1905 allowed the Admiralty to target thePacific squadrons for reduction while leavingregional security to their Japanese allies. By1906, five British battleships had left thePacific.12 This worked out to approximately one-third of all British ships in Australasian watersremoved in less than a year.13 This reduction,which capped nearly two decades of creepingBritish disengagement from the SouthwestPacific, inflated the sense of strategicvulnerability of Britain's settler colonies in theregion.

Policy makers in the six self-governingAustralian colonies (New South Wales,Queensland, Victoria, South Australia,Tasmania and Western Australia) becameincreasingly anxious about declining Britishmilitary support after the formal withdrawal ofBritish soldiers from the continent in 1870. Thissense of abandonment was further exacerbatedby the meteoric rise of Japan. An unabashedjingoism, which was codified in various anti-Asian immigration policies and merged into theofficial "White Australia" policy after thefederal unification of the colonies in 1901,rejected Asian immigration into the colony andsaw Japanese mil itary and industrialmodernization as a great "Yellow Peril" toAnglo-Saxon settlement in the region. But anyJapanese-excluding "Monroe Doctrine forAustralia", as Alfred Deakin later termed it, wassolely reliant on British hegemony in theregion.14 And as Britain withdrew and Japanrose, the balance of power slowly turned infavor of the Rising Sun.

By 1905, the Australian self-governing colonieshad been united as the Commonwealth of

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Australia (1901) in light of Britain's withdrawalfrom the region, while the Japanese secured anundisputed position of regional primacy. Overthe preceding three decades, the Japanese hadmilitarily defeated the other independentAsiatic power, Qing China (1895), and theirprimary Eurasian rival, Russia (1905). TheImperial Japanese Fleet now was quantitativelysuperior to any other fleet in the region anddwarfed the British Royal Navy’s AustraliaStation.15 The Japanese population was twelvetimes that of the Commonwealth of Australiaand her GDP was three times as large.16 Japanhad annexed the Ryukyu Islands (1879) andFormosa (1895) and incorporated the Empire ofKorea as a protectorate (1905) . Thecolonization of Formosa expanded the JapaneseEmpire 2000 km further south toward theAustralian continent.

Moreover, the new Japanese position not onlyalarmed Australia. The United States came toview Japan as a likely adversary in the Asia-Pacific and began reorganizing its military andforeign policy to check continued Japaneseexpansion, which increasingly dovetailed withAustralian security objectives. Japanese victoryover Russia in 1905, crushing the RussianBaltic Fleet at the Battle of Tsushima Straitsand capturing Port Arthur, marked a watershedmoment in the reordering of the entire Asia-Pacific balance of power.

In response to Japan’s new geopoliticalpreeminence in the Western Pacific, anddespite the assurances of the Anglo-JapaneseAlliance, the Commonwealth governmentsought to hastily buttress its defense againstpossible Japanese aggression. Key to this newcolonial defense was Deakin's efforts in 1905 toclose the "island wall" between Australia andJapanese possessions north of the equator, aconcept which had increasingly shapedAustralian defense policy since the late 1870s.By painting Melanesia and Polynesia, from NewGuinea to Samoa, British Red, the Australiancolonies hoped to create a strategic tripwire

that would keep Japan from crossing theequator. In 1905, with Japan’s regionalstrength secured, the Commonwealthfrantically pushed for British annexation of theNew Hebrides - the final unclaimed section ofthe “island wall” - before Japan turned hernewfound capabilities toward Australia.

Franco-Australian antagonism in the NewHebrides

Tensions between French settlers and Britishsettlers from the Australian colonies in the NewHebrides initially arose in response toantagonisms beginning in the 1870s. Economiccompetition between the settler blocs wasgrowing and it was presumed that eitherBritain or France would seek to annex the NewHebrides. French settlers, predominantly fromNew Caledonia, were unified in support ofFrench annexation. However, considerabledifferences of opinion on which colonial powershould annex the islands emerged withinBritish settler circles. British settlers from Fijion Efate (Sandwich Island) actually demandedFrench annexation in 1875-76, given the strongFrench support for settler over native interests,while the movement for British annexation wasled by John Paton, a Methodist missionaryrepresenting the British settlers from theAustralian colonies.17 The fact that Britishsettlers from Fiji, often viewed as representingthe interests of Whitehall, generally supportedFrench annexation of the New Hebrides againstthe wishes of their Anglo-Saxon cousins fromthe Australian colonies remained a point oftension between London and the Australiancolonies throughout the period of conflict.

Public opinion across the Australian coloniescertainly supported the calls for Britishannexation, particularly in light of Britain’sincreasing disengagement in the region. Aletter to the editor of the Melbourne Argusstated that British annexation was needed "tocheck French des igns upon the NewHebrides."18 By October 1877, an official

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petition was sent to Whitehall from the BritishAustralian colony of Victoria requestingannexation and the Sydney Morning Heraldblatantly supported this aspiration.19 ByNovember the powerful Presbyterian lobby inthe colony of New South Wales, appalled at thethought of the New Hebrides metamorphosinginto a New Caledonian-esque French penalcolony, appealed directly to Queen Victoria fora swift hoisting of the Union Jack over thearchipelago.20

The growing raucous calls for annexationwithin the Australian colonies alarmed Frenchsettlers in the New Hebrides. Responding to anofficial request from the French Foreign Office,Georges d'Harcourt, Ambassador at the Courtof St James (1875-79), wrote to the BritishForeign Office for assurances of neutrality inJanuary 1878.21 In February the Frenchreceived a response from Lord Derby, BritishSecretary of State for Foreign Affairs(1874-78), who was pleased "to inform YourExcellency that it is not the intention of HerMajesty's Government to...modify theindependence which the New Hebrides at thepresent possess."22

The news of this "self-denying ordnance" wouldnot reach the Australian colonies until June1878, and laid the foundations for decades ofmistrust between policy makers in theAustralian colonies and the Commonwealth ofAustralia, and Whitehall from 1901.23 However,the response did not quell Franco-Australiansettler competition in the islands and, by theearly-1880s, the intrigues of a naturalizedFrench settler of Anglo-Irish descent werecausing increasing anxiety in the Australiancolonies.

John Higginson, a well-to-do Anglo-Irishresident of New Caledonia, founded theCompagnie Calédonienne des Nouvelles-Hébrides in 1882. Originally constituted with£20,000 capital, the company aggressivelypurchased real estate in what became one of

the greatest land speculation efforts in thecolonial Pacific. The company soon controllednearly 100,000 hectares in the New Hebridesand was viewed by the Australians as a backdoor for a de facto French annexation of thearchipelago.24 By July 1883, Australiansuspicions were validated by a major exposé inThe Argus. Not only was there a major effortled by Higginson’s Compagnie Calédonienne toensure French annexation, directly seeking tocapitalize on its land speculation, thecompany's largest financiers were the Britishfirms Morgan and Nephew and MorganBrothers. The fact that British capital wassupporting French attempts to destabilizeAustralian security further undermined theAustralian colonies’ confidence in Whitehall.

Higginson's efforts did not materialize withoutprovocation. Victoria Premier James Servicehad emerged as the leading public advocate

from the Australian colonies demanding Britishannexation - particularly during the debacleover the German annexation of Northeastern

New Guinea. There was a scramble for coloniesin the Pacific, and the British had best lay claimto the remaining unincorporated islands in theregion or the security of the Australian colonieswould be compromised even further. Tensions

with France were particularly high in theaftermath of Britain’s seizure of Egypt in 1882,

and the possibility of a hostile French navalsquadron in Australasian waters was not

reassuring to any of the Australian colonies.

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John Higginson (left) and James Service(right)25

The French settlers responded to Service'sagitation with a major gathering in Noumea(New Caledonia) in 1883 where Service'ssupport was termed an act in "violation of ourrights" and "a mortal blow" to French interestsin the region.26 The audience solicited Mons.Pallie de la Barriere, Governor of NewCaledonia, with a resounding call to bolster thetricolor that "has been planted in the NewHebrides."27 By September reports werearriving in Australia from Paris that Higginsonand Morgan were attempting to import Frenchconvict labor to the New Hebrides to create anoverwhelmingly demographic majority for theFrench. And rumors were rife throughoutAustralian colonial policy circles about animpending French annexation.28

The Compagnie Calédonienne, refusing to easeits provocative quasi-official speculation,continued to aggressively purchase landthroughout the New Hebrides as tensionssimmered. By 1884, Higginson’s companycontrolled the vast majority of cultivated land,further exacerbating fears in the Australiancolonies of a de facto annexation. Higginson,ruthless in his quest to monopolize trade,brazenly undercut investors of the recentlyfounded Anglo-Australian Company onMalekula in late 1884. Arriving with Frenchmarines, Higginson intimidated the local chiefsinto nullifying previous contracts with theAnglo-Australian Company and selling toHigginson exclusively.29 With French marinessupporting settler land grabs, the specter ofFrench annexation elevated to a distinctlikelihood. The Australian colonies had hadenough and by late 1884 an official request wassent to London from Premier Service on behalfof all the colonies, stating that they were readyto meet "any expenses in taking possession ofthe archipelago" as long as Britain hoisted theUnion Jack.30 It is interesting that this offer to

take over full administrative and fiscalresponsibilities was not replicated in BritishNew Guinea (occupied in 1884) and arguably offar greater strategic importance, until 1902.Thus, it appears that the importance of theNew Hebrides for Australian defense had takencenter stage by the mid-1880s.

The British Foreign Office would again finditself pulled into the Franco-Australian settlerstruggle. Much to their annoyance, Britainwould invest significant resources in somethingutterly worthless to Whitehall. Even as late as1914, the New Hebrides were destitute whencontrasted with comparable colonialpossessions in the Pacific. British total exportsfrom Tonga reached £240,104 by 191131, Fijireached £1,425,940 by 191332, and Frenchexports from New Caledonia peaked in 1914 at15,468,607 francs3 3 (£608,521).3 4 Thiscompared to less than £121,000 in totalexports, French and Anglo-Australian, from theNew Hebrides in 1914. However, thearchipelago's unimportance to the ForeignOffice did not deter the French, with support ofthe British settlers from Fiji, or the Australiansettlers, from continuing their calls forannexation. By 1885 the Foreign Office wasobliged to directly approach the Frenchgovernment to resolve the quarrel before somespark ignited a violent confrontation betweenthe two parties.

During the 1885-1887 negotiations over theNew Hebrides, neither the Ministère desAffaires étrangères nor the Foreign Officecalled for direct annexation. Indeed, bothgovernments were even open to sidelining theinterests of their own settlers to gain moreimportant diplomatic concessions elsewhere.Although he was awarded the Légion d'honneurfor his work in early 188735, the French statedthat they would gladly sacrifice Higginson’sclaims to the New Hebrides for Britishconcessions in Tahiti and Newfoundland.Concurrently, Whitehall was not whollyopposed to French contro l over the

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archipelago, but sought to restrain the rowdyAustralian colonial lobby before some majorincident occurred.36 Though it should be notedthat the British still supported the Australiancolonies' concerns over French settler calls forannexation, and the British informed theFrench that its position "could not but bemainly guided...by the opinion of the Australiancolonies."37 Ultimately, both governmentssettled on an Anglo-French Joint NavalCommission (16 November 1887), an effort toreduce both security and administrative coststo the extent possible.

The commission's leadership would alternatemonthly between French and Brit ishcommanders who would coordinate responsesto any violent disturbances on the islands andprotect and police their own national settlers.Only in cases of imminent danger to the whitepopulation from the native population wouldindependent military action be allowed.38 Thecommission, which was also tasked withdiplomatically settling land disputes betweenthe settler factions, seems little more than anattempt by both London and Paris to controltheir unruly and unpredictable settlers in orderto prevent any escalation which could damageAnglo-French cooperation in more importanttheaters. This commission brought bothgovernments closer together at a time ofsignificant Anglo-French antagonism overEgypt and the Scramble for Africa following theBerlin Conference (1884). The willingness ofboth parties to ignore the calls for directannexation by their settlers, and the equality ofthe military aspect of the commission, speaksto the growing relationship between Britainand France.

While fraught with administrative deficiencies,the commission did lower Anglo-Frenchantagonisms for the better part of two decades.However, a petition of 42 British and 14 Frenchlandholders, representing a supposed1,650,000 acres, sent to the Governor of NewCaledonia in August 1899 demonstrates that

support for French annexat ion s t i l lexisted.39 Settler opinion aside, the commissiondashed Higginson's hopes for direct Frenchannexation and caused the CompagnieCalédonienne efforts at land speculation tospectacularly collapse.40 By 1894 the Frenchgovernment was forced to reorganize thecompany as the Société Française desNouvelles-Hébrides, which excluded Higginsonfrom the board of directors.41 With their arch-antagonist dislodged, the Australian colonieswere far less agitated. France further thwarteda subversive effort by French settlers to founda new municipality at Francheville on Vila in1889.42 Paris was serious about upholding itsend of the bargain, a bargain substantially inits favor. French officials in Paris believed thatthe agreement was preferable to directannexation. With a growing preponderance ofFrench sett lers, land ownership andcommercial control, France already reaped themajority of the benefits of direct colonial rulewhile sharing the burden of administration andsecurity with the British.43

A French Copra Plantation during theAnglo-French Commission Period (ca.1890)44

Despite a growing French settler population,the commission’s judicial structure was viewedas favoring the settlers from the Australian

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colonies, particularly regarding disputes overland claims. Vital to the early success of thecommission was the de facto governingcapacity of the well-established Protestantmissions, tied to churches in the Australiancolonies, which helped mitigate inter-indigenous and inter-settler rivalries. Thesemissionaries, who were often the onlyEuropeans to speak native languages and gainfamiliarity with native culture, acted as arbitersand assisted the commission in settling landdisputes. However, the primacy of theseAustralian-based institutions was soonchallenged by the arrival of the antagonisticCatholic Marist mission, sponsored by the VicarApostolic of New Caledonia in the 1890's.

The aggressive push by the Marists led toincreased land-claim disputes as Frenchsettlers now had the powerful political backingof the French Catholic Church. Ultimately,growing land-claim disputes, combined with anincreasing French settler population andcommercial control, rekindled calls for Britishannexation by a now united Commonwealth ofAustralia. The divided state of affairs,increasingly incited by the inter-missionaryrivalry, had made the islands ungovernable by1904 and the ability of the Joint NavalCommission to adequately resolve land-claimdisputes collapsed.45

The growing land-claims issue led theCommonwealth government under Deakin toforce a final showdown with the Frenchsettlers, much to the annoyance of Whitehall.By 1905, and against the larger backdrop ofJapan’s new position as the region’s hegemonicpower, Deakin officially proclaimed that "theNew Hebrides will become part and parcel ofthe Commonwealth."46 Deakin informedGovernor-General Northcote that, "nosettlement wil l be satisfactory to theCommonwealth which does not decide thepossession of the Group, and that the onlyownership which can be acceptable...is that ofGreat Britain."47 In his conclusion, Deakin

brashly derided the Foreign Office for failing totake "even the simplest and most necessarymeasure to protect British [particularlyAustralian] settlers" which had resulted in" d i s c o u r a g e m e n t t h r o u g h o u t t h eCommonwealth." 4 8

Deakin's brazenness earned the ire of theBritish Foreign Office who had painstakinglycrafted a land settlement agreement with theFrench since June 1905. This sentiment wasreflected in Northcote's terse reply on 03November 1905. In addition to describing theislands as "quite unimportant", Northcotestated that "His Majesty's Government havetaken...action in regard to the islands solely atthe wishes of Australia and in her non-militaryinterests."49 Not only would Whitehall notsupport the Australian position for annexation,it had invited a "French official" to expedite theestab l i shment o f a new land c la imstribunal.50 Eventually Deakin, who wascompletely sidelined during the negotiations,was forced to abandon the idea of directannexation and moved to support joint controlby early 1906.51

During consultations with the French,Whitehall realized that a more substantial formof government was needed and, on 27 February1906, produced a draft envisaging an Anglo-French Condominium - a form of joint rulepreviously employed in Anglo-Egyptian Sudan(from 1899). The draft was forwarded to thegovernments of Australia and New Zealand,which duly replied with a significant list ofamendments. Then the issue sat at the ForeignOffice until September, despite repeatedenquiries from the Commonwealth as to thestatus of the agreement and its proposedamendments. According to Le Matin, the delaywas due to Australian protests at beingexcluded from the negotiations.52 However,within weeks, the condominium was hastilyfinalized and ratified. An Anglo-FrenchCondominium was established on 20 October1906 without any input from their respective

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settler representatives.

In contrast to the 1885-87 crisis, the BritishForeign Office failed to even tacitly support thewishes of the Austral ians during thenegotiations. A draft of a Whitehall pressrelease dated 03 November 1906 demonstratesthe u t te r l ack o f cons idera t i on fo rCommonwealth interests on the part of theBritish during the negotiations. According toWhitehall, the Commonwealth was onlyinformed that the French were seeking acondominium on 09 March 1906, four monthsafter Northcote's "land claims tribunal" replyand two weeks after the draft condominiumwas submitted.53 Lord Elgin, Secretary of Statefor the Colonies (1905-08), was even moredisdainful, informing the Australians that thedraft must be "confirmed or rejected practicallyas it stands."54

The British had had enough of Australianagitation and set about engineering a panic inAustral ia to achieve the object ive ofpermanently ending this unimportant matter inthe New Hebrides. The British falsely hintedthat the condominium needed to be approvedimmediately as a "third party" annexation,possibly by Germany or Japan, was imminent.The Foreign Office correctly surmised that theAustralian government would prefer a jointcondominium to Japanese annexation. Ananxious Commonwealth, left completely in thedark by the Foreign Office, requested on 31August, 08 and 18 September, that a JointProtectorate be immediately established"leaving the details...to be settled later."55 Inresponse to the Australian position, the Frenchgovernment forwarded their request forimmediate action on 20 September 1906. TheBritish coyly agreed that haste was needed andfai led to support any of the proposedAustralasian amendments.56 The British ForeignOff ice had completely subordinatedAustralasian interests to that of their newFrench allies.

When news of Whitehall’s chicanery reachedAustralasia, the Anglo-French condominiumwas roundly attacked in the press. Theagreement was presented by the SydneyMorning Herald as "new evidence of the[British] to buy foreign friendship at theexpense of the colonies" and that it went"against the interests...of the coloniesconcerned and of the Empire.57 New ZealandPremier J. G. Ward echoed these sentiments bydescribing the whole affair as a "subordinatingof the self-governing colonies to the Imperialrequirements with France."58 The Timescorrespondent in Sydney reported that publicopinion "is one of disgust that British electorscan impose upon the Empire a Ministry whichwithin a single year endangers the interests ofAustralasia."59

The antipathy was mutual at Whitehall. LordLoreburn, Lord Chancellor, candidly declaredthat "the motherland must not make ruinoussacrifices to the colonies and ...there ought tobe no more annexations” – to Loreburn, thecolonies should provide their own defense andnot expect assistance from Britain in thefuture. 6 0 The French did not miss theopportunity to twist the knife with La Patriecongratulating the French diplomats on greatly"irritating" the Australian lobby.61 The Journaldes Débats Politiques et Littéraires, hopefulthat the future would "open the eyes ofAustralians", lectured the Commonwealth on itsrole as an unconditional supporter of Britanniaand her French entente partners.62

Of course, there were other interests in thearchipelago than simply French and Australiansettlers which found themselves wrapped up innearly half-century antagonism. The nativeMelanesian population of the islands, knowntoday as Ni-Vanuatu, had suffered considerableharm over their decades-long contact withFrench, British and Australian settlers. Asystem of indentured labour established in the1860s to support cotton and sugar productionin places like Queensland, Fiji, New Caledonia

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and Samoa – known as “Blackbirding” –enlisted tens of thousands of Melanesian menfrom New Guinea, the Solomons and the NewHebrides.63 It was a practice that persisted tothe establishment of the condominium.

The practice, which often involved coercingilliterate islanders into signing years-longcontracts and employing brutal corporalpunishment to ensure obedience, tore apartindigenous societies. It is estimated that nearlyhalf of the male population of the NewHebrides were employed in overseasplantations during the height of blackbirding.With many males absent, indigenous birth ratesplummeted. Many laborers also died of diseaseon the plantations, and those that survivedoften brought back diseases, like syphilis andtuberculosis , which decimated localpopulations. Returning laborers also introducedWestern ideas about social hierarchies and,combined with increased wealth fromplantation pay, undermined traditional chieflypower structures. This, in turn, led to inter andintra-tribal conflict, which was exacerbated bythe uncontrolled trade in European fire arms,alcohol and opium.64

This societal collapse was further aggravatedas British, French and Australians increasinglysettled in the archipelago. Various Protestantmissions, most of which were based inAustralasia, began proselytizing in earnest bythe late 1860s. Although the missions assistedin native health care and education during theantagonism, and were leading advocates for theabolition of blackbirding throughout the period,they also undermined native hierarchies basedon indigenous religious authority. Furthermore,many young Ni-Vanuatu converts sawChristianity as a way to challenge traditionalpower brokers – ultimately destabilizing nativesocial cohesion.

The establishment of industrialized plantationsby Europeans from the 1870s, with cotton andcopra being the chief products, further

removed many males from traditionalsubsistence agriculture and political authority.The European planters, whether Anglo-Saxonor French, also contributed to widespreadnative land alienation. European landspeculation companies like Higginson's coercedlocal groups to sell prime cultivated land forEuropean plantation cultivation en masse,removing whole groups to agriculturally poorregions. For a native economy based chiefly onsubsistence agriculture and a cultural traditionof shared access to land, land alienation wasdevastating in both economic and socialterms.65 Under this multifaceted pressureduring the inter-European antagonism, it wasestimated that the native population of the NewHebrides fell from 650,000 in 1870 to only100,000 in 1900.66

Irrigated Native Taro Field on EspirituSanto (ca. 1913)67

But European sett lement a lso led towidespread changes in native society whichtoday form the basis of a Ni-Vanuatan identity.Missionary activity led to a native populationwhich is predominantly Protestant. The trainingand education of native clergy has likewisedeveloped unique Melanesian forms ofChristian practice and worldview. Father Lini’spolitical rise to power, successful independencemovement, and Melanesian nationalism morebroadly were rooted in this unique Melanesian

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Protestant tradition of which he was trained.The establishment of European plantations alsoaltered the character of the islands’ economy.Copra now makes up a third of Vanuatu’s totalexports, while cattle, introduced by Frenchsettlers, are the nation’s second largest export.Moreover, the widespread introduction ofBislama, a form of Pidgin English whichbecame a lingua franca for various indigenousgroups working on the plantations, is today aunifying national language. Although Europeansettlement greatly undermined traditionalsociety, the antagonism also influenced the riseof a part icular ly Melanesian form ofnationalism which has been exportedthroughout the region.

Conclusion

After thirty years of growing Franco-Australiansettler antagonism over the New Hebrides, theForeign Office had made clear Britain’sreorientation from the Pacific and embrace ofFrance in 1906. The self-denying ordnance of1878 attempted to maintain the status quo,while the 1887 Joint Naval Commission soughtto placate Australian colonial ambitions whileincorporating the French in administration. Bythe time of creation of the Anglo-FrenchCondominium in 1906, colonial demands werecompletely subordinated to the interests of theAnglo-French Entente (1904). Perhaps mosttelling was Whitehall's unapologetic stance onthe issue. Despite the outrage of the Australiangovernment, press and people, the ForeignOffice refused to apologize for its demeaningactions.

It was now apparent to policy makers inAustralia and New Zealand, that they wouldneed to look to their own defense and set theirown "sub-imperial" foreign and security policiesbased on regional threats - specifically that ofJapan's "Yellow Peril". Within a year of theCondominium's establishment, Australiaappealed directly to America for a visit of theGreat White Fleet (1908), the first foreign naval

port call in Australian waters and a symbol of anew Anglo-Saxon solidarity. 6 8 Deakinspecifically described the new relationship asan alliance of Anglo-Saxon Pacific powers, tiedtogether by a common fear of the "YellowPeril". Over the next decade, Australia greatlyexpanded its own military, coastal defense andnaval forces with an eye toward Japan, despitethe good standing of the Anglo-JapaneseAlliance.

At the outbreak of World War One, Australiaand New Zealand moved quickly to ensure thatJapan did not breach the "island wall" byoccupying Germany’s colonies south of theequator. The capture of New Guinea, Samoa,and Nauru effectively sealed the Japanese outof the Southwest Pacific. But despite the finalachievement of the "island wall", and the factthat the Imperial Japanese Navy escortedAustralian ships from Suez to Sydneythroughout World War One, the Australiangovernment continued to view the "YellowPeril" as its main strategic threat. It was theAustralasian government which, during theParis Peace Conference in 1919, insisted that aJapanese-sponsored racial equality clause beexcluded in the final Versailles Treaty. Such aclause would undermine the "White Australia"policy, which now extended to all Australasianoccupied territories south of the equator. Bythe Imperial Conference of 1921, Australia andNew Zealand vehemently argued for thetermination of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance infavor of a stronger relationship with the UnitedStates. Unlike during the debate over the NewHebrides, Australian posturing, combined witha desire to maintain its relationship with theJapanophobic United States, led Britain toterminate the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1923.

Ultimately, the "quite unimportant" issue of theNew Hebrides exacerbated the shiftingdynamics of British prewar imperial policy. Theanimosity between the Australian colonies (andlater Commonwealth) and Britain, generated byFranco-Australian settler antagonisms over the

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New Hebrides and a fear of strategicabandonment in the face of the Japanese"Yellow Peril", altered the perception of

imperial responsibilities in the Pacific by bothparties.

(https://apjjf.org/#_ftnref1)

Viktor M. Stoll (http://www.hist.cam.ac.uk/directory/viktor-stoll) is a PhD Candidate inHistory at the University of Cambridge and current Doctoral Fellow at the AcademicFoundation of the Berlin House of Representatives (Freie Universität Berlin). His researchexplores the transnational influence of anthropology on colonial rule and development theoryin the interwar Pacific. He received his MA in Modern History from King’s College London(2014) with a focus on comparative British, French and German imperialism in the Pacific.

Notes1 Governor General Henry Northcote to Prime Minister Alfred Deakin, 03 November 1905,Prime Minister Papers, No. 05/4706, para 4, National Archives of Australia, Canberra[hereafter NAA].2 "Vanuatu: History (http://thecommonwealth.org/our-member-countries/vanuatu/history)",The Commonwealth, accessed on 30 March 2017.3 Mark Kurt Tabani, "Walter Lini, la coutume de Vanuatu et le socialisme mélanésien", Journalde la Société des océanistes, Vol. 111 (2002). pp. 173-194.4 "Melanesian Spearhead Group (http://www.msgsec.info)", accessed on 30 March 2017.5 Stephen Henningham, The Pacific Island States: Security and Sovereignty in the Post-ColdWar World (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995), p. 38-40.6 PMC Editor, "Solomon Islands, Vanuatu promote MSG support for West Papua(http://asiapacificreport.nz/2016/05/13/solomon-islands-vanuatu-promote-msg-support-for-west-papua/)", 13 May 2016, accessed 30 March 2017.7 This composite map was created from two separate maps. "Southwest Pacific" and "VanuatuBase", CartoGIS, College of Asia and the Pacific, The Australian National University, accessed07 April 2017. See here (http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/mapsonline/base-maps).8 John Darwin, Unfinished Empire: The Global Expansion of Britain (London, 2012).9 Neville Meaney, The Search for Security in the Pacific, 1901-14 (Sydney, 1976), p. 16-21 and117-119.10 For a substantive view of the New Hebrides in a French Regional Context, see: RobertAldrich, The French Presence in the South Pacific, 1842-1940 (London, 1990).11 "Das schließt natürlich ... überraschend einsetzen müßte." Friedrich v Bernhardi,Deustchland und die nächste Krieg (Berlin, 1912), p. 176.12 Henry P. Frei, "Japan in World Politics and Pacific Expansion, 1870s-1919", The GermanEmpire and Britain's Pacific Dominions 1871-1919, (ed.) John Moses, and Christopher Pugsley(California, 1999), p. 182. 13 Niall Ferguson, Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World (London, 2004), p. 246.14 Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 12 September 1901, Vol.

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4. p. 4805-7, 4817, in F. K. Crowley, Modern Australia in Documents, Vol. I (Melbourne,1973), p. 17.15 By 1905, the Imperial Japanese Navy consisted of six first-rate battleships, eight heavycruisers and seventeen light cruisers. The Royal Navy’s Australia Station maintained only ten2nd and 3rd rate cruisers. Masayoshi Matsumura, Baron Suematsu in Europe during the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5); His Battle with Yellow Peril, Ian Ruxton (trans.) (Morrisville, 2011), p.72.16 In 1905, the Japanese population was 46.8 million and her annual GDP was 54 billion (in1990 US dollars). Australia, by comparison, had a population of four million and an annualGDP of 17.1 billion. Angus Madison, Historical Statistics for the World Economy(http://www.ggdc.net/maddison/historical_statistics/horizontal-file_03-2007.xls), 1-2003 A.D.,accessed 12 February 2017.17 Historical Section of the British Foreign Office, Peace Handbooks (1920), Vol. XXII, No.147, p. 10.18 Argus, 03 October 1877.19 Sydney Morning Herald, 09 October 1877.20 The Maitland Mercury & Hunter River General Advertiser, 13 November 1877.21 Le Marquis d'Harcourt to Lord Derby, 15 January 1878, Ministère des Affaires ÉtrangèresParis, Affaires Des Nouvelles-Hébrides et des Îles-sous-le-vent de Tahiti, DocumentsDiplomatiques, (Paris, 1887), No. 2.22 Peace Handbooks, Vol XXII, No. 147. p. 10-11.23 The Brisbane Courier, 04 June 1878.24 Argus, 26 October 1882. 25 La Dépêche coloniale illustrée (http://gallica.bnf.fr/ark:/12148/cb327559237/date) (Paris),31 Julliet 1902, Cover Page, Bibliothèque nationale de France, Paris, accessed on 20 April2017, James Service (http://handle.slv.vic.gov.au/10381/153644), State Library of Victoria,Melbourne, H93.359/5, accessed on 20 April 2017.26 "Un tel acte ... patriotiques de développement colonial". Argus, 24 July 1883. 27 "Au nom de la colonie ... iles de l'archipel néo-hébridais". Argus, 24 July 1883. 28 Argus, 14 September 1883.29 Peace Handbooks, Vol. XXII, No. 147, p. 11.30 Ibid, p.12.31 Peace Handbooks, Vol. XXII, No. 144, p. 115.32 Ibid, p. 104.33 Statistiques du Commerce des Colonies françaises, in Peace Handbooks, Vol. XXII, No. 145,p. 61.34 Conversion rate of 25.42 Francs to Pounds Sterling based on adjusted conversion rates ofthe British Foreign Office in 1920. Peace Handbooks, Vol. XXII, No. 146, p. 29.35 Aldrich, p. 132.36 Jean-Philippe Dumas, "La Marine et les intéréts française aux Nouvelles-Hébrides(1860-1907)", La Revue administrative, 57e Année, No. 337 (Janvier 2004), p. 75-84.37 Lord Rosebery to Mons. Waddinton, 07 July 1886, Ministère des Affaires Étrangères,Affaires Des Nouvelles-Hébrides et des Îles-sous-le-vent de Tahiti, Documents Diplomatiques(Paris, 1887), No. 24.

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38 Declaration between Great Britain and France, for the constitution of a Joint NavalCommission for the protection of Life and Property in the New Hebrides (Paris, 26 January1888).39 "16. Que les pétitionnaires ... pour la condition des colons". E. N. Imhaus, Les Nouvelles-Hébrides (Paris, 1890), p. 153.40 By 1888, only 250 out of 100,000 hectares were under active cultivation by the CompagnieCalédonienne. Aldrich, p. 132.41 Aldrich, p. 133.42 W. P. Morrell, Britain in the Pacific Islands (London, 1960), p. 349.43 "Une opinion absurde ... chaque île du groupe", Imhaus, p. 146.44 Imhaus, p.91 45 Morrell, p. 351-355.46 Argus, 10 October 1908.47 PM Deakin to GG Northcote, 23 August 1905, Prime Minister Papers, No. 05/5377, fo. 4,NAA. 48 Ibid, fo. 5.49 GG Northcote to PM Deakin, 03 November 1905, Prime Minster Papers, No. 05/4706, fo. 2,NAA.50 Ibid, fo. 1.51 Peace Handbooks. Vol. XXII, No. 147. p. 1552 "Après qu'eurent ... de la convention franco-anglaise". Le Matin, 21 October 1906.53 Draft notes from Whitehall Press Statement, London, 03 November 1906, Department ofExternal Affairs, No. 06/8527, fo. 2, NAA.54 Ibid, fo. 2.55 Ibid, fo. 3.56 Ibid, fo. 4.57 Sydney Morning Herald, 02 November 1906.58 New Zealand House Debates, Vol. CXXXVIII, p. 43, NAA.59 The Times, 02 November 1906. 60 The Register, 08 December 1906.61 "The British colonies are irritated at seeing their representations have not been taken intoconsideration and they hold that the clauses of the agreement are too favorable toFrance....that once again is to the honour of M. Marcel Saint-Germain...it would be impossibleto congratulate them too warmly on their achievement". Argus, 06 December 1906.62 "Peut-être un avenir ... européens de ce dernier". Journal des Débats Politiques etLittéraires, 10 November 1906.63 Gerald Horne, The White Pacific: U. S. Imperialism and Black Slavery in the South Seasafter the Civil War (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2007), Chap. 2.64 Felix Speiser, "Decadence and Preservation in the New Hebrides", Essays on theDepopulation of Melanesia, W. H. R. Rivers (ed.) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,1922), p. 25-61; John R. Baker, "Depopulation in Espiritu Santo, New Hebrides", The Journalof the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland, Vol. 58 (January - June1928), p. 279-303.65 Palauni M. Tuiasosopo, "Land Alienation in the New Hebrides: Colonial Policies of France

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and Great Britain", Unpublished MA Thesis (Honolulu: University of Hawaii, 1994).66 Horne, The White Pacific, p. 33.67 Felix Speiser, Two Years with the Natives in the Western Pacific (London: Mills & Boon,1913), p. 180.68 Meaney, p. 165.