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Case 2:12-cv-00023-DLC Document 1 Filed 03/29/12 of 21

W. Wayne HarperHARPER LAW FIRM35 West GraniteButte, Montana 59701Tel: 406.782.5729Fax; [email protected]

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE DISTRICT OF MONTANA

BUTTE DIVISION

ADAM PRIQUETTE, )) Cause No. Q,V-t~-J.3 -BU-DLC

Plaintiff, ))

vs. ) COMPLAINT AND) DEMAND FOR JURY} TRIAL

MANHATTAN SCHOOL DISTRICT, SCHOOL}DISTRICT NO.3, GALLATIN COUNTY )and JAMES NOTARO, individually and as }SUPERINTENDENT OF MANHATTAN )SCHOOL DISTRICT, AND JOHN DOES )1 through 5. )

)Defendants )

--------------)

COMES NOW the Plaintiff herein, Adam Priquette, by and through

his counsel, W. Wayne Harper, and for his claims against Defendants

herein, complains and alleges against each Defendant as follows:

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 1


JURISDICTION

1. Plaintiff, Adam Priquette (hereafter Plaintiff) is a resident and citizen

of the State of Montana, residing in Manhattan, Gallatin County,

Montana.

2. Named Defendants are the MANHATTAN SCHOOL DISTRICT,

SCHOOL DISTRICT NO.3, GALLATIN COUNTY (hereafter

Manhattan School District), a public school system in Manhattan,

Montana and JAMES NOTARO, individually and as

SUPERINTENDENT OF MANHATTAN SCHOOL DISTRICT. Each

Defendant is a resident of Manhattan, Montana and all acts that

occurred in this matter happened in Gallatin County, Montana.

3. One of the claims the Plaintiff is asserting in this action is that the

Defendants and their employees and agents violated Plaintiff's rights

protected under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United

States Constitution in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

4. The Court therefore has jurisdiction over this action pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343 and has jurisdiction over the related state

law claims pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367.

COMPlAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL 2


FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

5. Plaintiff was hired by the Manhattan School District in August of 1988;

providing appropriate credentials during the hiring process.

6. While the Plaintiff served the Manhattan School District in several

areas over the ensuing years, his main emphasis remained as an

elementary teacher. As such, he was employed in the Manhattan

School District for in excess of 23 years and had achieved tenure.

7. In Early October 2011, Plaintiff was approached by Defendant James

Notaro, Superintendent of the Manhattan School District, and advised

that the district had completed an investigation.

8. Plaintiff, Adam Priquette, was informed that he would be given only

48 hours to either sign the negotiated resignation or to be terminated

and have the investigative report published.

9. Plaintiff, Adam Priquette, was not provided a copy of the final

investigation, but rather was simply told it was damning to him and

that he would never work in a public school district again if it were

published given its damning information.

10. Plaintiff, Adam Priquette, was informed by the Defendants that he

would only be given a copy of the investigation if one was also

released to the School Board at a public meeting, thereby being



available to be published to the local newspaper. He was further led

to believe that such publishing would effectively guarantee that he

would never work in a public school system again.

11. Despite the fact that the investigation was completed and provided to

the Named Defendants on September 1, 2011, over six weeks later,

on October 18, 2011, when Plaintiff signed the negotiated

resignation, he nor his union had ever been provided with a copy of

the investigative report.

12. That within the negotiated resignation, Defendants made several

promises which they did not lntend to, nor could they, honor under

the agreement. A fact known to Defendants, but not Plaintiff.

13. Section 20-4-204, MCA, clearly provides that a tenured teacher is to

be afforded proper notification and a hearing relative to any

employment actions. Further, pursuant to § 20-4-204, MCA and the

case law applicable to it, there must be "just cause" to revoke or

terminate a teacher's contract. The Defendants ignored these

provisions of Montana law.

14. The Defendants failed to provide Plaintiff with due process of law as

required by the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal

Constitution and Section 17 of the Montana Constitution. The



Defendants acted arbitrarily and terminated Plaintiff's teaching

contract via a negotiated resignation without providing Plaintiff with

the requisite hearing, opportunity to present evidence, face or cross-

examine witnesses, and/or not following the statutory guidelines of §

20-4-204, MCA; thus violating his Constitutional Right to due process

of law guaranteed by Section 17 of the Montana Constitution.

15. The Defendants caused Plaintiff to suffer loss of wages both in the

past and future, loss of benefits, fringe benefits, retirement benefits,

emotional distress, extreme damage to his reputation and good

name, and forced him to incur attorney fees to protect his rights.

COUNT I

Deprivation of Due Process, Constitutional and Statutory Rights of aTenured Teacher

16. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1

through 15, as though herein restated.

17. Adam Priquette had a Federal and Montana Constitutional Right to

life, liberty, and happiness and none of these rights could be taken

away from him without due process of law. He also maintained a

Statutory Right as a tenured teacher under § 20-4-204, MCA. Adam

Priquette had a property interest in continued employment with the

Defendant District which was protected by the Fifth and Fourteenth



Amendments to the United States Constitution which provided the

Plaintiff the right to due process before being deprived of his property

interests, in this case his right to continued employment.

18. The Defendants had a duty to provide the Plaintiff with due process of

law both substantively and procedurally and protect his Statutory

Rights as a tenured teacher. The Defendants breached their duty

and violated Plaintiff's Constitutional Rights when they failed to

provide him with due process of law and terminated his contract

without following the prerequisites of Montana law; which ultimately

lead to the loss of his job. Defendants are in violation of Adam

Priquette's Constitutional Rights, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, § 20-4-204, MCA,

and any other resulting Constitutional or Statutory right violations

under the Montana Constitution.

19. The Defendants' unlawful actions were made under the color of state

law and in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

20. The Defendants' actions in terminating the Plaintiff's employment

were arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable.

21. The Defendants' violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have caused the

Plaintiff to suffer lost wages, both in the past and future, loss of

benefits, retirement benefits, fringe benefits, and damage to his



reputation and good name, and have force him to incur attorney fees

to fight for his rights. Further, Defendants' actions have caused

Adam Priquette to suffer severe emotional distress. Plaintiff seeks

amounts to compensate him for these losses.

22. The Defendants are responsible for the acts and omissions of its

Superintendent and the school board, its agents, and any others who

have deprived the Plaintiff of his Constitutional Rights in violation of

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

COUNT IIDeclaratory Judgment

23. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1


24. Plaintiff requests relief under § 27-8-201, MCA, and requests that the

Court declare that the Plaintiff was a tenured teacher of the

Defendants and to declare that the Defendants acted in an

unconstitutional manner in violation of Plaintiff's Constitutional and

Statutory Rights as a tenured teacher; since Defendants terminated

Plaintiff's employment without affording his due process of law and,

accordingly, violated his rights as a tenured teacher.



COUNT III

Breach of Contract - Tenured Teacher

25. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in allegations 1

through 24 as though herein restated.

26. Upon the acceptance of his fourth contract with the Manhattan School

District, Adam Priquette achieved the status of a tenured teacher

entitled to all statutory gUidelines applicable to a tenured teacher.

27. The Defendants breached Plaintiff's contractual rights by failing to

give him the requisite documentation and accords required for a

tenured teacher when they terminated his employment under the

negotiated resignation.

28. The Defendants have caused Mr. Priquette damages in the form of

past, present, and future lost wages, benefits and fringe benefits,

retirement benefits, and other damages.

29. That the Defendants breached the contract by attempting to rely on a

non-material and unbargained for terms in the contract to terminate

the contract.



COUNT IV

Breach of Contract - Negotiated Resignation

30 Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in Paragraphs 1


31 That the Defendants breached the negotiated resignation contract by

not following the terms of the agreement and by knowing that said

terms would not and could not be followed.

32 Defendants committed, via the negotiated resignation contract, to

provide Plaintiff with a letter of recommendation in 3 (c) but did not

follow through on this commitment.

33 That Defendants agreed, via the negotiated resignation contract, to

II seal Priquette's personnel file, except as required by law.", but did

not, and knew they could not, follow through on this agreement.

34 That Defendants breached the negotiated resignation contract by not

intending to or by not fulfilling their contractual rights under the

agreement.

35 That Defendants knew, or should have known, that they could not

seal an employee's file; and yet made a contractual term of the

negotiated resignation contract relative to such.



36 That Defendants knew, or should have known, that Plaintiff would rely

upon such promises, as he did not have the requisite legal knowledge

or background of Defendants.

37 The Defendants have caused Mr. Priquette damages in the form of

past, present, and future lost wages, benefits and fringe benefits,

retirement benefits, and other damages.

38 As a result of Defendant's breach of the negotiated resignation

contract, Plaintiff has been foreclosed the opportunity to attain his 25

year of public school employment, thereby losing his ability to receive

a full vesting of his retirement benefits.

39 As a result of breach of the negotiated resignation contract, Plaintiff

has suffered damages to his profession and reputation; in an amount

to be proven at trial.

40 Paragraph 6 of the negotiated resignation contract provides that the

prevailing party in any action to enforce its terms shall be entitled to

an award of reasonable attorney's fees and costs.



COUNTV

Contractual Violation of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

41. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained In paragraphs 1

though 40 as though herein restated.

42. Adam Priquette had a justified and reasonable expectation that the

Defendants would act in a reasonable manner in honoring and

satisfying the promises and assurances made by the Defendants

relative to his tenured teacher status.

43. The Defendants violated the covenant to act in good faith and acted

outside of accepted practices to deprive Adam Priquette of the

benefits which were promised to tenured teachers.

44. The Defendants accepted the benefits provided by Adam Priquette's

commitment to teach as a tenured teacher and in disregard of their

obligations and duties refused to allow him to continue to teach.

45. That Defendants knew that Montana law required them to disclose

any settlements or negotiated contracts relative to employees; yet

added a clause alleging that they would "seal" Plaintiffs records.

46. That Defendants used the duress of a 48 hour time frame to require

Plaintiff to sign the negotiated resignation contract.



47. That Defendants had a copy of the investigative report from

September 1, 2011, until such time as Plaintiff signed the negotiated

resignation contract on October 18. 2011, yet did not provide a copy

of said report to Plaintiff or his union.

48. That Defendants knew, or should have known, that Plaintiff under

both the tenure laws and contractual good faith and fair dealing was

entitled to see the investigative report prior to making any decisions

relative to his employment.

49. That Defendants withheld the investigative report, knowing that

Plaintiff would not resign had he been allowed to review it and that he

would have been successful had he fought any attempt to terminate

his employment as a tenured teacher.

50. While Adam was negotiating with Defendants, there existed a

fiduciary relationship between the parties. Defendants had fiduciary

duties of utmost good faith, honesty, full disclosure and fair dealing in

dealing with Plaintiff. for his rights.

51. In addition. lIspecial circumstancesll existed, as defined by Montana

law. Defendants created a false impression concerning the true

nature of the underlying, yet undisclosed documentation (the

investigative report), and the risks presented to Plaintiff thereby.



Defendants failed to disclose relevant facts. and Plaintiff reasonably

relied to his detriment on such misrepresentations and false

impressions. If the true nature of the investigative report and the

duty to release it had been disclosed, Adam Priquette would not have

executed the negotiated resignation contract and would have

retained his tenured teacher rights.

52. That Defendants knew, or should have known, that they were required

to negotiate with Plaintiffs union relative to any employment actions,

yet knowingly negotiated directly with Plaintiff.

53. That the Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the Defendants

breaches of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Each

teaching contract of Mr. Priquette's contained the covenant of good

faith and fair dealing; as did his negotiated resignation contract.

COUNT VI

Tortious Violation of the Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

54. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained in paragraphs 1


55. The Plaintiff was in an unequal bargaining position when the

Defendant forced him out of his job as a tenured teacher. The



Plaintiff did not have the expertise to know that this was, in fact,

contrary to Montana State law, established publishing of public

document case law, contractual law, and a violation of his

Constitutional Rights. The Plaintiff relied solely on the expertise of

the Defendants which were in superior bargaining positions and had

superior knowledge about the requirements of these laws with

respect to contracts and other statutory requirements to terminate a

tenured teacher or to negotiate with a represented individual.

56. The Plaintiffs motivation for entering the contracts and other

agreements was to secure monetary benefits for his family security

and he had a no other motivation when entering the contracts. The

Plaintiff was attempting to provide security and future protection for

his family based upon the promises made by Defendants.

57. Ordinary contract damages are inadequate in this case. because

they do not make the Defendants account for their actions of forcing

the Plaintiff out his long term teaching position. Contract damages

do not make Plaintiff whole because his teaching position afforded

him numerous financial and health benefits which are now

irreplaceable. Further, his ability to attain the vesting of a full

retirement has been destroyed by Defendants' breaches. Plaintiff



has also had to hire an attorney to prosecute these claims and

attempt to be afforded his rights. He has suffered emotional distress

and has been greatly inconvenienced by the problems associated

with the termination of his teaching contract and the pUblishing of his

negotiated resignation contract and the investigative report.

58. The Plaintiff was especially vulnerable in this matter because he did

not have the expertise to recognize that Defendants had no right to

force him from his teaching position and he necessarily relied on the

expertise of Defendants. Defendants knowingly used this undue

influence to guide Plaintiff in what was allegedly acceptable

standards with regard to his teaching contract and his statutory rights

as a tenured teacher.

59. The Defendants were aware that the Plaintiff did not have the

expertise to recognize that the Defendants could not terminate him

and Defendants knew that he was vulnerable in that respect and

used it to their unfair advantage.

60. Plaintiff suffered damages as a result of the Defendants' tortuous

breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing.

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL lS


61. By this conduct the Defendants were guilty of actual malice and fraud

and should be punished by way of punitive damages for the sake of

example.

COUNT VII

Fraud



63. Defendants intentionally made false representations to Plaintiff

relative to his tenured status and employment position, that induced

him to forego efforts to fight his termination at the time it was

presented to him.

64. Defendants knew that they did not have grounds to terminate

Plaintiff, but knowingly used their undue influence and false account

of what the investigative report would provide to dupe Plaintiff into

entering into the negotiated resignation contract.

65. Defendants knew, or should have known, that their representations

to Plaintiff were false when they were made to Plaintiff.

66. Plaintiff relied on Defendants false representations and had no way

of knowing them to be false, and acted in reliance thereon, to his own

detriment, causing monetary and non-monetary damages to himself.



COUNT VIII

Negligence



68. Defendants negligently made representations to Plaintiff that it

desired actions performed under the contract between the parties.

69. Plaintiff relied on these negligent representations and acted In

reliance thereon, to his detriment, causing monetary and non

monetary damaged to himself.

COUNT IX

Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress



71. As a result of Defendants actions against Plaintiff~ he has suffered

and continues to suffer embarrassment, sleepless nights, rage,

insecurity, fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, disappointment,

worry, and nausea. Further, given Plaintiff's close working

relationship with the Defendants, they knew, or should have known,

of his susceptibility to such types of distress. Such effects on Plaintiff

have caused him to suffer serious and severe emotional distress.



COUNT X

Intentional Infliction of Emotionar Distress



73. That Plaintiffs serious and severe emotional distress was a

reasonably foreseeable consequence of the Defendants' intentional

acts and/or omissions. Defendants, as a large school district with a

large human resources department, knew or should have known that

Plaintiff would suffer emotional distress, by the actions of its

employees. Such damages are in a monetary amount to be proven

at the time of trial.

COUNT XI

Deceit

74. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations contained In paragraphs 1


75. As set forth above, Defendants Willfully deceived Adam Priquette,

with the intent to induce him to enter into the negotiated resignation

contract.

76. Defendants' actions constitute "deceit" as defined by one or more of

the provisions of MeA 27-1-712(2)(a-e).

77. Defendants deceitful actions constituted actual malice and/or actual



fraud as defined by MeA 27-1-221. Defendants, and each of them,

should be assessed punitive damages in a reasonable amount,

sufficient to punish and educate these Defendants, and other persons

or entities similarly situated, that such conduct will not be allowed by

the Courts of Montana.

COUNT XI

Undue Influence



79. Defendants actions in this matter constituted a violation of MCA 28-2

407, undueinftuence.

80. Defendants were people or organizations with whom Plaintiff reposed

confidence and they held real or apparent authority over Plaintiff.

81. Defendants used this confidence or authority for the purpose of

obtaining an unfair advantage over Plaintiff.

82. Defendants took unfair advantage of Plaintiff's weakness of mind.

83. Defendants took a grossly oppressive and unfair advantage of

Plaintiffs known necessities or distress.

WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff, having fully set forth his claims herein,

prays for jUdgment as follows:



1. For a Declaration that the Defendants' statutory or

administrative scheme for terminating Plaintiff's employment

violated Mr. Priquette's Constitutional Right to Due Process of

Law'I

2. For lost benefits and lost fringe benefits, including but not

limited to retirement benefits, health insurance benefits, sick

days, holiday pay, and any other benefits of being employed by

Defendants, all both past and future, as are allowed by law;

3. For emotional distress damages as allowed by law;

4. For damages to his reputation and good name;

5. For attorney's fees and costs in bringing this action;

6. For punitive damages; and

7. For all such other relief which the Court deems equitable and

just, including attorney fees allowed by law.

DATED this 29th day of March 2012.

HARPER LAW

By

lsi W. Wayne Harper

COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAl 20


W. Wayne HarperP.O. Box 506Butte, MT 59703Attorney for Plaintiff

DEMAND FOR JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff hereby demands a jury trial on all issues triable to a jury.

DATED this 29th day of March 2012.

HARPER LAW

By

lsi W. Wayne Harper

W. Wayne HarperP.O. Box 506Butte, MT 59703Attorney for Plaintiff


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