r2e availability october 15 th 2014 experience from past lhc and injector operation and scaling to...

R2E Availability October 15th 2014

Experience from Past LHC and Injector Operation and scaling to the future

G. Spiezia


Outline Recall of Run-1

What changes after LS1

Equipment and radiation impact to be expected for after LS1

How to face the challenge

Conclusion


Failures 2012

Dump Confirmed Dump TBC No Dump No Dump TBC58 10 36 7

Destructive failuresDump Confirmed Dump TBC No Dump No Dump TBC

17 1 4 0


What was done and what remains Previous LS1

Immediate relocation Shielding (2011)

LS1 Main impacted systems – observed failure signatures:

Equipment Upgrades and new developmentsRelocation (UJs, US85, UX45)Shielding (RRs)

Conditions after LS1 DS/ARC will be more and more loaded Long-term damage to be considered in cells 8-13 Impact of 25ns operation to be evaluated Future upgrades/changes/new installations to be evaluated Continuous check of the ‘safe areas’, e.g. RE


SEE Failure analysis

Without giving numbers it is clear that the there is little margin on the budget for radiation failures

~250 hDowntime

~400 hDowntime

LS1 – LS2 Aiming for

<0.5 dumps / fb-1

~12

dum

ps /

fb-1

~3 d

umps

/ fb

-1

HL-LHC: < 0.1 dumps / fb-1

Relocation& Shielding

Equipment Upgrades

Mitigation

Prevention

Rad-tol design

No unqualified equipment in exposed areas


Equipment overview (LHC and Injectors)

A&T

QPSPower

Converter

Cryogenic

Interlock systems

Radiation Monitor &Testing

Beam Instruments

RF

Kicker magnet

Control Equip

Survey

Vacuum

CV

IT tools

Safety and Alarms

Light system

100 Gy – 10 kGy1011 1013 HEH/cm2

100-1000 subsystems for each equipment

LHC&PSB,PS, SPS

LHC



A&T

QPSPower

Converter

Cryogenic

Interlock systems


Beam Instruments

RF

Kicker magnet

Control Equip

Survey

Vacuum

CV

IT tools

Safety and Alarms

Light system

LHC&PSB,PS, SPS

LHC SEE



A&T

QPSPower

Converter

Cryogenic

Interlock systems


Beam Instruments

RF

Kicker magnet

Control Equip

Survey

Vacuum

CV

IT tools

Safety and Alarms

Light system

LHC&PSB,PS, SPS

LHC Cumulative effects

70 Gy



A&T

QPSPower

Converter

Cryogenic

Interlock systems


Beam Instruments

RF

Kicker magnet

Control Equip

Survey

Vacuum

CV

IT tools

Safety and Alarms

Light system

LHC&PSB,PS, SPS

LHC Cumulative effects


Examples to clarify SEE and prevention LHC: few thousand electronic units exposed Aim: less than one radiation induced failure per operational week

Reliability in FIT: aiming for few hundred FITs/SYSTEM!

Example of System

© R. Baumann

LHC case: REALLY CARE


Examples to clarify TID effect and preventionAcquisition system example Repeated N times in the ring

Failure at 70 Gy

Multiplexer behaviour

month1 2 3 4 5 6 7

Sample to sample variation is limited for TID

N acquisition systems in error between month 4 and 5

TID (Gy)15 30 45 60 75 90


Recipe for Prevention/Availability

Availability

Rad Tol development

Monitor• Calibration• Radiation levels• Failures

Test• Facilities• Instruments


Test (done and needed) A&Ts electronic designs based predominantly

on COTS 2011-2014:almost 100 components

tested/qualified Special agreements & Blanket Contracts

with facilities “Prime-Time” at PSI “Main customer” of Fraunhofer

In house facilities Co60 source (with RP) CHARM

Radiation test team of EN/STI working together with all equipment groups Coordinated through the RadWG Available Data: See summary table of

RadWG test campaigns, Twiki for all Fraunhofer related tests

http://radwg.web.cern.ch/RadWG/Pages/summary_table.aspx

https://twiki.cern.ch/twiki/bin/view/FraunhoferRadTests/WebHome


Monitor (done and needed)

Follow up and tracking of the equipment failures

Radiation levels reports on a weekly basis

New RadMon version


Rad Tolerant Developments FGC Lite development

Power Converter development

QPS equipment upgrade

Cryogenic update for the heater

And others (see talks Session2)


Rad Tolerant DevelopmentsWhy not evaluating common needs for qualifying rad-hard

devices?

Today


Rad Tolerant DevelopmentsWhy not evaluating common needs for qualifying rad-hard

devices?Tomorrow ?


Structure


Conclusion Past

Errors identified and mostly correctedDirect impact on the beam dump mitigated

TodayBudget for failure rate is lowAfter LS1 effort Equipment availability is goodEffort to move from mitigation to prevention

Run2 and next SEE and cumulative effects (TID+DD)Keep doing what was done so far ….

Test, monitor, continue rad tolerant developments Individuate the common requirements to share effort

(cost/time/manpower)

r2e availability october 15 th 2014 experience from past lhc and injector operation and scaling to...

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