MARCH 2013

R.A. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT)

G.R. NO. 195032 FEBRUARY 20, 2013

ISABELO A. BRAZA V. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN (1ST DIVISION)

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; offenses under section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Braza challenges the sufficiency of

the allegations in the second information because there is no indication of any actual and quantifiable injury suffered

by the government. He then argues that the facts under the second information are inadequate to support a valid

indictment for violation of section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. In a catena of cases, the Supreme Court (SC) has held that

there are two (2) ways by which a public official violates section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 in the performance of his

functions, namely: (1) by causing undue injury to any party, including the Government; or (2) by giving any private

party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference.The accused may be charged under either mode or under

both. The disjunctive term “or” connotes that either act qualifies as a violation of section 3(e) of R.A. 3019.In other

words, the presence of one would suffice for conviction. It must be emphasized that Braza was indicted for violation

of section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 under the second mode. “To be found guilty under the second mode,it suffices that the

accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another, in the exercise of his official,administrative and judicial

functions.” The element of damage is not required for violation of section 3(e) under the second mode.In the case at

bench, the second information alleged, in substance, that accused public officers and employees, discharging official

or administrative function, together with Braza, confederated and conspired to give FABMIK Construction and

Equipment Supply Company, Inc. unwarranted benefit or preference by awarding to it Contract J.D. No. 06H00050

through manifest partiality or evident bad faith, without the conduct of a public bidding and compliance with the

requirement for qualification contrary to the provisions of R.A. 9184 or the Government Procurement Reform Act.

Settled is the rule that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found

guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under section 3 of R.A. 3019. Considering that all the elements of the

offense of violation of section 3(e) were alleged in the second information, the SC found the same to be sufficient in

form and substance to sustain a conviction. .

AUGUST 2013

R.A. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT)

G.R. NO. 187340, AUGUST 14, 2013.

ANTONIO B. SANCHEZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, 

RA 3019, Sec. 3(e); elements. The elements of the crime charged under section 3(e) of RA 3019 are as follows: 1.

The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2. He must have acted

with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3. His action caused any undue

injury to any party, including the government, or gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or

preference in the discharge of his functions. Here, the Supreme Court held that the Sandiganbayan correctly found

the concurrence of the three elements. First, petitioner, being the city engineer of Cebu, is undisputedly a public

officer. Second, the failure of petitioner to validate the ownership of the land on which the canal was to be built

because of his unfounded belief that it was public land constitutes gross inexcusable negligence. In his own

testimony, petitioner impliedly admitted that it fell squarely under his duties to check the ownership of the land with

the Register of Deeds. Yet he concluded that it was public land based solely on his evaluation of its appearance, i.e.

that it looked swampy. Moreover, the undue injury to private complainant was established. The cutting down of her

palm trees and the construction of the canal were all done without her approval and consent. As a result, she lost

income from the sale of the palm leaves. She also lost control and use of a part of her land. The damage to private

complainant did not end with the canal’s construction. Informal settlers dirtied her private property by using the

canal constructed thereon as their lavatory, washroom, and  WASTE DISPOSAL site. 

SEPTEMBER 2013

R.A. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT)

G.R. NO. 187268, SEPTEMBER 4, 2013.

JOVITO C. PLAMERAS V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. In all, the petitioner failed to demonstrate that

the Sandiganbayan committed reversible errors in finding him guilty of the violating section 3(e) of R.A. 3019. For

the aforecited provision to lie against the petitioner, the following elements must concur: 1) The accused must be a

public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official functions; 2) He must have acted with manifest

partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence; and 3) That his action caused undue injury to any party,

including the government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge

of his functions. Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 may be committed either by dolo, as when the accused acted with evident

bad faith or manifest partiality, or by culpa, as when the accused committed gross inexcusable negligence.

G.R. NO. 187268, SEPTEMBER 4, 2013.

JOVITO C. PLAMERAS V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. As correctly observed by the Sandiganbayan,

certain established rules, regulations and policies of the Commission on Audit and those mandated under the Local

Government Code of 1991 were knowingly sidestepped and ignored by the petitioner which enabled

CKLEnterprises/Dela Cruz to successfully get full payment for the SCHOOL DESKS  and armchairs, despite non-

delivery – an act or omission evidencing bad faith and manifest partiality. It must be borne to mind that any

procurement or “acquisition of supplies or property by local government units shall be through competitive public

bidding”. The petitioner admitted in his testimony that he is aware of such requirement, however, he proceeded just

the same due to the alleged advice of the unnamed DECS representative that there was already a negotiated contract

– a representation or misrepresentation he willfully believed in without any verification. As a Governor, he must

know that negotiated contract can only be resorted to in case of failure of a public bidding. As it is, there is no public

bidding to speak of that has been conducted. Intentionally or not, it is his duty to act in a circumspect manner to

protect government funds. To do otherwise is gross inexcusable negligence, at the very least, especially so, that

petitioner acted on his own initiative and without authorization from the Provincial School Board.

G.R. NO. 187268, SEPTEMBER 4, 2013.

JOVITO C. PLAMERAS V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; Section 3(e) offense; elements. The same thing can be said about the act of

petitioner in signing the sales invoice and the bank draft knowing that such documents would cause the withdrawal

by CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz of the corresponding amount covered by the Irrevocable Domestic Letter of Credit. It

must be noted that any withdrawal with the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) must be accompanied by the

appropriate document evidencing deliveries. In signing the draft and sales invoice, petitioner made it possible for

CKL Enterprises/Dela Cruz to withdraw the entire P5,666,600.00 without any delivery of the items. As the records

would bear, the CKL Enterprises Invoice dated 16 April 1997, contains the signature of the accused as customer.

Above the customer’s signature is the phrase: “Received and accepted the above items in good condition.” The

significance of the customer’s signature on the invoice is that it initiates the process of releasing the payment to the

seller. This is all that the LBP needs in order to release the MONEY  alloted for the purchase. Unfortunately,

despite receipt of payment, it was almost a year after when delivery of the items was made on a piece meal basis-

some of which were even defective. The Supreme Court, therefore, was not persuaded that petitioner deserves to be

exonerated. On the contrary, evidence of undue injury caused to the Province of Antique and giving of unwarranted

benefit, advantage or preference to CKL Enterprises/DelaCruz committed through gross inexcusable negligence was

proven beyond reasonable doubt. 

NOVEMBER 2013

R.A. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT)

G.R. NO. 168951 & G.R. NO. 169000, NOVEMBER 27, 2013.

DR. ROGER R. POSADAS AND DR. ROLANDO P. DAYCO V. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, 

R.A. 3019;   Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; causing undue injury . Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019 requires the

prosecution to prove that the appointments of Dr. Posadas caused “undue injury” to the government or gave him

“unwarranted benefits.” The Supreme Court has always interpreted “undue injury” as “actual damage.” What is

more, such “actual damage” must not only be capable of proof; it must be actually proved with a reasonable degree

of certainty. A finding of “undue injury” cannot be based on flimsy and non-substantial evidence or upon

speculation, conjecture, or guesswork. The element of undue injury cannot be presumed even after the supposed

wrong has been established. It must be proved as one of the elements of the crime. Here, the majority assumed that

the payment to Dr. Posadas of P30,000.00 monthly as TMC Project Director caused actual injury to the

Government. The record shows, however, that the P247,500.00 payment to him that the COA Resident Auditor

disallowed was deducted from his terminal leave benefits. 

DECEMBER 2013

R.A. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT)

G.R. NO. 188165/ G.R. NO. 189063, DECEMBER 11, 2013.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION AND THIRD DIVISION

HERNANDO BENITO PEREZ, ROSARIO PEREZ, RAMON ARCEO AND ENEST ESCALER

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HON. SANDIGANBAYAN, FIRST DIVISION AND THIRD DIVISION

HERNANDO BENITO PEREZ, ROSARIO PEREZ, RAMON ARCEO, ENEST ESCALER AND RAMON

CASTILLO ARCEO, JR.,

Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; “in connection with a contract or transaction.”  In issuing the questioned

resolution, the Sandiganbayan applied the restrictive meaning of the term transactionas used in section 3(b) of R.A.

3019 adopted in Soriano Jr. v. Sandiganbayan. In Soriano Jr., the Supreme Court (SC) pronounced that “the

investigation conducted by the petitioner was not a contract. Neither was it a transaction because this term must be

construed as analogous to the term which precedes it. A transaction, like a contract, is one which involves some

consideration as in credit transactions and this element (consideration) is absent in the investigation conducted by

the petitioner.” The State here argues that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion resulting to lack

or in excess of jurisdiction for applying the interpretation of the term transaction inSoriano Jr. considering that the

term transaction should be construed more liberally. The SC did not give credence to the State’s position. It held

that it does not help the State any that the termtransaction as used in section 3(b) of R.A. 3019 is susceptible of

being interpreted both restrictively and liberally, considering that laws creating, defining or punishing crimes and

laws imposing penalties and forfeitures are to be construed strictly against the State or against the party seeking to

enforce them, and liberally against the party sought to be charged. Hence, the SC ruled that the Sandiganbayan did

not arbitrarily, or whimsically, or capriciously quash the information for failing to properly state the fourth element

of the violation of section 3(b) of R.A. 3019. 

MARCH 2013

R.A. 3019 (ANTI-GRAFT AND CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT)

G.R. NO. 168539, MARCH 25, 2014.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HENRY T. GO, 

Private persons acting in conspiracy with public officers may be indicted: The only question that needs to be settled

in the present petition is whether herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating

Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have conspired, has died prior to

the filing of the Information. Respondent contends that by reason of the death of Secretary Enrile, there is no public

officer who was charged in the Information and, as such, prosecution against respondent may not prosper. The

Supreme Court was not persuaded. It held that, it is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile ’s death, there is no longer

any public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that

the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already

expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did not

extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent.

Stated differently, the death of Secretary Enrile does not mean that there was no public officer who allegedly

violated Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. In fact, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to

indict Secretary Enrile for infringement of Sections 3(e) and (g) of R.A. 3019. Were it not for his death, he should

have been charged. 

G.R. NO. 168539, MARCH 25, 2014.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V. HENRY T. GO, 

Private persons acting in conspiracy with public officers may be indicted: The requirement before a private person

may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged

to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all

instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public officer may no longer

be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has already died, the private person may be

indicted alone.