race, job training, and economic development: barriers to racial equity in program planning

R A C E , J O B T R A I N I N G , A N D E C O N O M I C

D E V E L O P M E N T : B A R R I E R S T O R A C I A L E Q U I T Y

IN P R O G R A M P L A N N I N G

Joan Fitzgerald and Wendy Patton

This article examines barriers to implementing government programs designed to redress racial economic exclusion. The authors review the current urban employment environment, and the need for more extensive job training and education programs targeting young African Americans. A case study is presented of the implementation of one such program in Ohio, the High Unemployment Population Program. It demonstrates that the most well designed program can fail if staff charged with implementation are not committed to its goals. In the current racially charged environment of the country, this barrier to implementation is likely to affect many new government programs throughout the 1990s. The article concludes with several recommendations for successful program implementation.

INTRODUCTION

A key element of a new urban agenda in the United States is the persistent exclusion of African Americans from economic and employment opportunities. The institutional barriers excluding African Ameri- cans from mainstream economic opportunity are onerous: social, cul- tural, economic and geographic. We turn to government programs as an answer to market failure even though they are weak in their ability to regulate or provide incentives for equal employment opportunity. Gov- ernment programs designed to redress economic injustice tend to be underfunded, based on faulty assumptions, and designed without careful attention to critical issues of implementation.

This article summarizes research on root causes of higher rates of unemployment among African Americans and presents a case study that illustrates barriers to targeted government employment programs. Com- mon problems that have hindered legislative attempts to redress eco-

94 The Review of Black Political Economy/Fall 1994

nomic inequity are identified. Reflecting upon these barriers revealed deep divisions among those implementing government programs about the merits of racial equity as a programmatic goal. The article concludes with recommendations for overcoming barriers and points to some new directions in policy.

Race and Unemployment

The higher rates of unemployment and underemployment of African Americans have multiple roots. Both unemployment and underemployment partially can be explained by the changing structure of employment, which has created both a skills and a spatial mismatch.t Both have had a profound impact on employment in the black community. Blacks are more likely to be employed in the declining sectors such as manufacturing, and thus have been impacted more severely by restructuring. 2 Those manufacturing jobs that still exist are moving from central cities into the suburbs and even more rural locations) In fact, evidence suggests that many manufacturers leave urban locations that have turned predominantly black. 4

While manufacturing employment disperses, central city employment is becoming concentrated in high-skill jobs in information-intensive industries that are filled by better educated suburbanites. 5 These economic and spatial trends have led many scholars to contend that high black unemployment rates are partially the result of a mismatch between inner- city residence and the location of jobs. 6 Yet spatial mismatch represents only part of the problem.

The lower educational attainment of blacks relative to whites also contributes to their higher rates of unemployment, especially for black men. 7 Further, the deteriorating quality of education in many urban school systems perpetuates the skills and spatial mismatch. 8

While it is necessary to improve educational quality and decrease high school dropout rates in predominantly black urban schools, human capital factors alone do not explain racial differences in unemployment and income. 9 The fact that unemployment rates for blacks are more than twice as high as for whites at all education levels l~ suggests that both spatial and skills mismatch are interconnected with racial discrimination. ~

Patterns of racial discrimination in access to employment range from overt selection of equivalent white applicants 12 to exclusion from social networks through which most employment contacts are made, and to bias

Fitzgerald and Patton 95

in job interviewing and employment testing. 13 Further, discrimination continues once a job is landed, in the form of wage disparity. White college graduates in 1987, for example, were twice as likely to earn $35,000 or more as their black counterparts.14

The Failure of Job Training as a Policy Response

The interconnectedness of declining educational attainment, spatial mismatch, skills mismatch and discrimination suggests that policies that address only one aspect of the problem will not be effective. Yet, histori- cally, this has been exactly the approach of most government programs aimed at reducing urban poverty. Whether increasing the supply of education, training, transportation or suburban housing, the Great Society programs ignored the demand side of the employment problem.15

The primary federal employment training program, the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA), for example, has been criticized for not connect- ing the occupational training it provides with local labor market demand. Further, JTPA perpetuates labor market discrimination through differential assignment to its services, and by ignoring discriminatory hiring practices of firms. Black JTPA participants are less likely than whites to find jobs after completion of training. 16 In fact, race is a better predictor of reemployment success than training) 7 The closest link between training and employment is on-the-job training, through which participants are placed with employers for training. Discrimination in the JTPA system occurs through channeling of white males into on-the-job training, which leads to higher reemployment rates than the classroom instruction in which minorities and women are more likely to be placed. 18 This bias is created by on-the-job-training employers who preferentially select white males for job openings. Selection bias is important because the gain in earnings of those receiving on-the-job-training is higher than for those receiving classroom training. There is little civil rights enforcement to alleviate the bias.19

Clearly, the JTPA employment training system is not a sufficient response for lessening racial disparities in access to employment. When interpreted in the context of other findings discussed on the interaction between skills mismatch, spatial mismatch and discrimination, it becomes evident that a more comprehensive solution than that offered by JTPA is needed to address racial inequality in access to training and jobs. Specifi- cally, education and job training should be more closely linked to employment opportunities and affirmative action enforcement.


The State of Ohio's High Unemployment Population Program was developed to counter the above tendencies. Yet the following analysis of its implementation reveals that commitment to equity planning principles does not translate easily into effective outcomes. Thus, this study is an excellent illustration of the difficulty of implementing programs that chal- lenge the predominant model. 2~ The lessons derived from this case study are important to policy makers and planners charged with implementation of employment programs.

The case study is based on interviews with key staff involved in the program's formulation and implementation. The second author was deputy director of business development, Ohio Department of Development, at the time the High Unemployment Population Program was initiated. Se- lection of implementation sites for intensive study were based on ques- tions asked of staff on "best practice" programs. Site visits and extensive interviews also were conducted with representatives from the two programs detailed in this article.

THE OHIO HIGH U N E M P L O Y M E N T POPULATION P R O G R A M

In 1987, a powerful African American Senator in the Ohio Legislature tagged two million dollars onto the budget of the state's industrial training program, and earmarked those funds to serve the hardest-to-employ. Implicit in this earmark was a mandate to serve young black men. The program was called the "High Unemployment Population Program" (HUPP) and was administered by the Ohio Department of Development's Ohio Industrial Training Program (OITP). The program would link employment with education and training by having private sector employers serve as the "home base" for training. Participants would receive on-the- job training in conjunction with classroom instruction leading to a degree or other credential. HUPP would pay all educational fees.

A company that sponsored a HUPP project received complete subsidy for program participants for three years. Firms would be reimbursed for all costs, including loss of salary and training expenses, and would cover the cost of replacement workers needed while the program participant was at school. Child care, transportation, drug and substance abuse coun- seling, the cost of tools and equipment were all covered by the program. Program funds would even cover the cost of a project manager hired to provide mentoring and case management. In return, the company had to


provide a structured, three-year on-the-job and classroom training cur- riculum that would lead the participant through increasingly responsible positions and certification through school or some other process in a field that promised a career with living-wage earnings. HUPP offered real benefits to firms motivated to participate, and provided the supplemen- tary services lacking in JTPA and other training programs.

Context for Implementation

Challenges to implementing HUPP must be presented within the context of the history and development of the parent program and trends within the broader practice of economic development activities. Through- out the 1960s and 1970s, Ohio's Department of Development (ODOD), in partnership with a group of private utility representatives called the Ohio Economic Development Council, was famous for its notorious "Rhoades Raiders," who "raided" other states for their industrial branch plants. By the late 1970s, however, despite successes in industrial attraction, Ohio's economy was floundering. Like other development departments around the nation, the ODD added several new programs to entice new industry to the state.

One such program was the Ohio Industrial Training Program. It provided plants with subsidy for employee training and was used to attract new plants to the state and to retain existing plants. By the middle 1980s, the state had eighteen OITP field staff throughout the state and allocated around ten million dollars annually to industrial training. As indicated by the program title, the focus was on manufacturing jobs. Regional directors had considerable latitude in allocating funds through an informal process with minimal paperwork.

In the minds of OITP's architects, this type of flexible grant program structure allowed the public sector to respond quickly to opportunities for industrial "attraction" and "retention" with direct subsidy. 21 Economic development professionals, like those at OITP, typically pride themselves on ability to avoid or cut through government red tape, which allows quick response to industrial attraction or retention opportunities. In part, this reflects private sector resistance to paper-intensive federal programs of the 1970s that mandated program benefits to low and moderate income individuals. In part, it reflects the "free market" mentality of the 1980s.

By the late 1980% new trends in economic development practice were

98 The Review of Black Political Economy/FaU 1994

emerging. David Birch's much publicized research on the role of small business in job creation led to new interest in economic development assistance for small businesses. Publicity around the "rise of the service sector" brought demand for development assistance for nonmanufacturing companies. The existence of racial and gender disparities in employment opportunities led to demands for development programs targeting these groups. The strongest constituents for development funds and activities, however, remained committed to industrial attraction and retention strategies and focused on manufacturing firms. As new constituents, programs and procedures developed within economic development departments, opposition to them also developed.

In 1987, a new director was appointed to lead the Ohio Department of Development. Ohio industries had rebounded strongly from the recession of the early 1980s, but like everywhere else, the recovery was uneven. This new director was charged with targeting the Department's resources to those areas and people left out of the state's economic recovery. In addition, he was charged with introducing systems of accountability to the fast and loose world of economic development.

A major priority of the new director was bringing changes to the OITP. Program funds were in great demand and hotly contested. He was approached by legislators, alleging favoritism in the program toward new firms at the expense of existing industries and discrimination against minority-owned firms. There was little empirical evidence to substantiate the accusations since, like most industrial training programs, there had been virtually no evaluations of effectiveness or patterns in allocation. However, a diverse advisory board was appointed and a formal proposal process for fund allocation was implemented. Funds were earmarked for labor unions and for older, existing industries. Existing organizational practices were thrown into change. Field directors' powers were cur- tailed. Red tape was introduced. Conflict developed.

Implementation Barriers

The HUPP earmark was a particularly explosive ingredient introduced into this programmatic caldron at the ODOD. There were important value conflicts between traditional goals of economic development and an equity-based program such as HUPP. Job training and economic development professionals had tried throughout the 1980s to free their works of


the stigma of fiscal and administrative scandals that eventually discred- ited many of the Great Society programs and their descendants. Individu- als within the OITP network had been pioneers of the effort to separate economic development from social welfare programs. The HUPP program undermined what they had been trying to achieve within their field. Their outrage was fueled by concerns of their inherently conservative constituent groups such as local chambers of commerce.

This lack of commitment by staff to the program's goals delayed the implementation of the program. An interagency task force was formed to design program parameters of the HUPP. A year passed and no program guidelines were adopted. Finally, the Department of Development revealed the program's approach. It was estimated that per-participant program costs would be $30,000. While this cost, at $10,000 per participant per year, was only $2,000 higher than some of the targeted JTPA programs, DOD and OITP staff were scandalized at the expense. OITP training subsidies traditionally did not exceed $500 per participant.

OITP staff, who resented responsibility for what they perceived to be a "social" program, came to be solely responsible for developing programs under the bulky guidelines, finding companies willing to participate, and monitoring projects through three years of unfamiliar and unexpected expenses and circumstances. The OITP field staff also went into an up- roar about the HUPP program. For example, a key actor in the OITP was a professional who had come from a white Appalachian background. He had overcome many barriers, including poverty and an accent, to achieve his status as a professional. It was his belief that if he could overcome these obstacles without government programs, others could too.

Further, the OITP program manager had no philosophical commitment to the goals of the program and even felt that it represented "reverse discrimination." He hired no additional staff for administration of the program, so existing staff was stretched by the complex new responsi- bilities. Program guidelines and a request for proposals were not mailed to the field until eighteen months after the funds were set aside (the funds would have expired in another six months, after which point legislative opponents could have successfully argued that the program was obvi- ously a failure and that the set-aside should not be renewed.

The field directors and their staff were uniformly white. They received mixed messages about giving priority to working with this program. They knew the unpopular new director placed priority on it, but the OITP


program manager offered no training nor pressure to create proposals. Few field directors took on the hard job of recruiting participants and developing project plans. At least one director went so far as to respond to an inquiry about HUPP by saying that no such program existed.

The OITP field network staff were not alone in their failure to work with this program. Program descriptions and proposal application forms were sent to welfare departments, Private Industry Councils, and employment services offices across the state. Of the roughly 150 agencies that received the program Request for Proposal, only two responded.

The program was renewed in the following year, again by legislative fiat in the final hours of budget negotiations. Several steps were taken to improve program performance. In order to implement the program in the face of outrage and resistance, the director hired new staff (from out of the field and out of state) with explicit instructions to ensure that legislative intent, as indicated through the earmarking of OITP funds, would be honored. Layers of new management at the deputy and program level were given explicit instructions from the director to make the HUPP program work. African American staff were appointed to market and then to administer the program. A training session was held for field directors. A minority-owned economic development consulting firm was retained to publicize the program among minority-owned firms and to help them develop proposals for funding.

Approximately twenty-five proposals were submitted, and funds were allocated in a timely fashion. At that point, administrations changed and no further evaluation of the effectiveness of the program was undertaken. In the majority of cases, these proposals were submitted by private minority-owned firms that had heard of HUPP through the grapevine and had not worked with their local OITP field agent in developing the proposal.

Implementation Success Stories

Some companies approached about the program realized immediately that this was a good way to build a loyal work force, particularly in highly desirable fields such as tool-and-die. Others saw it as a source of inexpensive labor for simple projects that could help ultimately lead to genuine company growth. Key staff interviewed for this study identified five programs that exemplified what the program was meant to accom- plish. These second-year projects experienced remarkable results. The


labor-intensive process of helping hard-to-employ individuals into the work force is illustrated best by the following two projects.

1. R/P International Technologies. Inc.

R/P International (RPI) is a growing minority-owned high-tech firm that provides contract engineering, technical consulting and manufacturing services to the aircraft, aerospace, defense, automotive and electron- ics industries. The company has fifty employees. RPI is located in Lin- coln Heights, Ohio, a predominantly black suburb of Cincinnati. While company policy was to hire local residents as much as possible, this goal was difficult to meet, as few local applicants had the necessary skills for RPI's high-tech operation.

RPI was granted $176,000 to fill twelve training slots in 1989. RPI developed a thirty-six-month program that combined on-the-job training with an associate's degree program. Course work could be completed at Cincinnati Technical College or the University of Cincinnati. During the training period, trainees rotated through the company's sixteen departments on three to four month cycles.

Applicants were recruited through local community groups, employment offices, schools and churches. RPI screened over fifty applicants to fill twelve positions. To insure that applicants possessed both ability and motivation, RPI employed a stringent selection process that included intensive interviewing and drug testing. Once selected, the trainees were subject to the same thirty-day trial period as regular employees.

The commitment of RPI's management team to the project is evident in the amount of time devoted to project administration and coordination. All served as mentors in various capacities, and acted as counselors to the trainees in many areas outside of the realm of job training. Group activities such as company picnics and a softball team were organized to create a sense of belonging for the participants and staff. Many of the trainees had family problems that interfere with good attendance. Many also lacked basic social and work preparation skills, such as how to dress for an interview or work. Management staff reported that addressing these social problems and skills were as essential to the program's success as the technical training.

While RPI managers report that the participants performed well on the job, most participants found that their high school educations left them unprepared to handle the rigorous associate degree programs. Over half


of the first-year participants had to take remedial course work before beginning their degree programs. While necessary, the amount of remedial work required will delay completion of the program. RPI had to hire a person to monitor the program. This person keeps track of students' progress through their academic advisors and intervenes as problems O c c u r .

2. Ohio State Building and Construction Trades Council

The building and construction trades have a history of operating highly effective, but racially exclusionary, apprenticeship and training programs. The Ohio Building and Construction Trades Council (OSB&CTC), an umbrella organization representing construction unions in fifteen trades, is working to address past discriminatory practices. OSB&CTC partici- pated in the HUPP program through its Building Trades Minority Devel- opment Partnership, a not-for-profit organization. The Partnership was created with the dual mission of recruiting minorities into living-wage residential construction jobs, and meeting the rising demand for afford- able urban housing. Once renovated, houses would be rented or sold to low- and moderate-income residents.

Achieving both ends at once required the cooperative planning efforts of the Council with local, state and federal government bodies. The Co- lumbus Department of Human Services assisted the council in identify- ing properties for renovation. The state's Housing Finance Agency provided loans to cover rehabilitation costs. Long-term financing was provided by Section 203K of the U.S. Housing and Urban Development program. Initial funding for the project came from grants from the local building councils and unions. Continued funding of classroom trdining was provided by HUPP, the Ohio Building Trades Training Foundation, EDWAA Title III funds, payroll deduction of members, and through a fee paid by contractors who use the union labor pool.

The Partnership recruited minority applicants with histories of pro- longed unemployment and it works with minority contractors. The Co- lumbus, Ohio, program worked with a minority contractor in renovating thirty houses in one of the city's poorest neighborhoods, South Lindon. Applicants were recruited through the Ohio Bureau of Employment Ser- vices, local churches and community organizations. To further increase community support for the project, minority contractors agreed to retain workers from the project area.

The union-operated training program offered specializations in several


construction trades. 22 After completion of the three-year program the trainee achieved residential journeyman status. 23 At this point, trainees had the option of entering a traditional apprenticeship training program or finding employment.

Ten apprentices were employed through the first-year HUPP program. Apprentices worked forty-hour weeks, totaling to 2,000 hours of on-the- job training and 144 hours of classroom instruction per year. Pay was $7.50 per hour, with a full benefits package. Those without a high school diploma earned the GED through the course of the program. There was a 1:1 journeyman-to-apprentice ratio for on-the-job training. Teachers had considerable on-the-job experience in the areas they teach, and updated their skills through semiannual seminars and annual professional development workshops which bring together experts in training and new technologies.

Problems and Possibilities

The HUPP program overcomes several weaknesses inherent in existing federal and state education and training programs in redressing racial disparities. Three interconnected differences are key. First, the program links employment with education. Second, the program offers a longer and more comprehensive plan of study, providing participants with the skills needed for living-wage jobs. Third, the program invests more resources per participant. The implications of these differences are discussed below.

Linking employment with education addresses several problems inherent to the JTPA system. Even if JTPA were to focus on longer-term training, many of those eligible would not be able to participate because no income support is provided during the training period other than Un- employment Insurance. By linking employment with training, participants are guaranteed an income, which enables them to commit to a longer period of training.

Further, the commitment required of participating corporations is similar to that evident in the highly effective German apprenticeship model. There, firms not only have a social obligation to provide apprenticeships, but also assume financial responsibility for such education, regardless of whether they can hire the apprentice upon program completion. 24 Under JTPA on-the-job training, firms are subsidized for providing minimal training to employees they would have had to hire and train anyway. 25 In contrast, HUPP firms devote considerable administrative resources to


mentoring and addressing the personal, work and school-related problems of trainees, even though only training costs are reimbursed.

Second, HUPP's longer time frame and broader range of skills training can provide trainees with more employment and education options. In RPI, for example, trainees work in all departments of the production end of the facility, and even learn about business management. Because training is not limited to narrow tasks, trainees finishing the program with an associate degree have the option of entering a bachelors degree program or starting their own business. Likewise, with the Building and Construc- tion Trades program, participants can move into journeyman programs in several areas.

This approach does not come without added cost. Average cost per participant per year is approximately $10,000, considerably higher than the equivalent figure for JTPA. Comparative cost-benefit analysis is pre- mature until the program produces graduates. 26 A preliminary analysis conducted in FY1991, however, showed how difficult it is to reach young black males through the private sector. Of the roughly seventy participants in the first funding round, over fifty percent were white, and over 50 percent were female. Only one-third of the participants were black men. This occurred because participant companies were only encour- aged, but not required, to hire black men. The guidelines required only that companies indicate how they planned to reach out to black men and did not provide any mechanism for monitoring hiring practices.

Graduation and placement rates will be the ultimate indicators of success for the HUPP program. Currently, the program receives more appli- cations from firms than can be accepted. Those firms and individuals involved express satisfaction with the program, and are committed to making it work.

SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION

This article began with the claim that current conditions call for a renewed focus on urban policy, specifically for equity-oriented programs to redress racial economic exclusion. The success of these policies and programs ultimately will be determined by how effectively they are implemented. We are a racially divided society, and this division is reflected in the staff of government agencies implementing equity agendas. It is un- likely that the programs developed will be supported by everyone charged with their implementation.


While the HUPP program represents an effort to make racial equity a priority in the state of Ohio, the story of its implementation reveals that getting equity on the agenda is only part of the battle. Indeed, it even may be the easier part. 27 The lesson from this case study is simply stated in Pressman and Wildavsky's classic text on policy implementationZ8: "There is no point in having good ideas if they cannot be carried out." Thus, several observations related to implementation are in order.

1. Without strong and direct leadership from the top, interagency task forces on equity-based programs may not work.

All actors involved in an equity-based program must have clear, self- interested motivation for successful participation. The task force created to develop the HUPP program and make it work in all agencies failed because there were no rewards for making it work, nor penalties for failure, for any agency except ODOD. The governor supported HUPP's goals, and did much to foster its success. However, a governor rarely becomes involved personally in program development, simply because of time constraints. Equity-based programs present such difficulties, however, that top officials must become involved and lend their personal authority to get the program off the ground. Competitive motivation must be created for individuals responsible for implementation. Responsibility must carry with it real rewards and penalties and a system of accountability.

2. Staff with personal belief and~or personal stake in the targeted issue should manage targeted programs.

Empowerment theory has long held that interventions should be wielded by those who experience the effects of those interventions. Not only is this fair, but it overcomes many of the problems recounted above. In the case of the HUPP, all persons involved in fighting for program implementation, including the director of development, were African Ameri- can or came from families that included African American members. Indeed, the program took off only after an African American program manager was appointed.


3. The field of Economic Development hosts considerable resistance to equity-based programs.

Development departments are frequently singled out as the site for targeted job programs, but the distaste for "social welfare programs" that comes from their constituency renders them ineffective in implementing such programs. Private Industry Councils (PICs) were created to be the nexus between "social welfare programs" (e.g., job training serving the needy) and the business community. This is the natural site for programs like HUPP. PICs need to become far more visible and successful in articulating the competitive advantages of workforce development and equity-based training programs. PIC boards generally include powerful media personnel, who can be very effective in using their status to develop and deliver the message to the local audience.

4. Many private firms have considerable resistance to equity-based programs.

Until firms see training and workforce development as being in their competitive interest, they will not participate in equity-based, workforce development programs.

For one thing, American firms simply do not value their workforces yet, still regarding labor as a cost and not an asset. 29 Many firms are downsizing, and do not see workforce development as a priority, particularly when "strings" are attached to the selection of trainees. Two ex- amples illustrate this problem.

Union and management representatives of a major automotive production plant approached the governor and director of development with a request for $8 million in job training funds to keep their plant competitive. The director explained that the standard training funds were ex- hausted, but that they could access up to $2 million immediately through the HUPP program. A variety of approaches for using HUPP funds was developed and presented to the company. The human resource director, African American himself, understood the program, but in the end, the plant never used it. Eventually, they were given several hundred thou- sand dollars in standard OITP training funds.

Neither labor nor management saw long-term workforce development as a competitive issue for the company. Managers probably could see more layoffs, not new hires, with advances in production technology.


There was no competitive reason for the auto plant managers to participate in HUPP. Nor was there a rationale for participation by the union. Their problem was laid-off members, not development of a ready pool of new hires.

similar situation developed when a large, nonunion insurance firm approached the state for training funds as an incentive not to move out- of-state. A combination of regular training funds and HUPP funds was offered. The company refused to participate in HUPP and eventually was given an inducement package that carried no "strings." In this case, the company could have realized a competitive benefit from workforce development offered by HUPP, and could have enjoyed the financial benefits of participating.

Insurance is an expanding industry, unlike the automotive industry. This is exactly the type of firm that needs to understand why the type of workforce development offered by HUPP presents competitive advantage. Yet these firms and others saw the efforts to get them to participate in the HUPP program as a meddlesome government action. The legislature soon heard about these "social engineering" experiments. Eventually a powerful legislator approached the governor and requested that such large firms seeking incentive funds not be directed to the HUPP program.

5. Equity-based programs, and the leadership to sustain them, take time to work.

While leadership at the top is essential to program success, it also has to filter through the organization and program. Leadership was exhibited by the new staff hired and by businesses such as RPI who became voc~al advocates for HUPP. That the program now has more business applicants than slots available is due to the enthusiastic support of middle management and companies satisfied with the program. Such bottom-up support does not happen overnight. Rather, it was generated when skeptical businesses saw that the program could work to their advantage.

The public tends to expect government programs to produce results almost immediately. Yet, although an evaluation of HUPP after its first two years of operation would show a failed program, by year four, the program became a success. This suggests that more time needs to be devoted to examining the process of implementation than in outcome- oriented evaluation.


6. "Implicit" program instructions present structural difficulties to implementation.

The HUPP program was an "implicit" program in that it was a budget set-aside carrying implicit instructions but no legislative mandate, as in a permanent program. Implicit instructions convey a mixed message that hinders implementation. Set-asides generally are temporary. Staff are not hired to administer such programmatic twists because it is expected that funding will expire. A common way to eliminate set-asides is to let the unused, earmarked money roll back into the state coffers at the end of the biennium and explain that the program could not be implemented.

The solution is not to focus on explicitly funding programs targeted to African Americans, since legislators from suburban and rural areas representing primarily white constituents outnumber legislators from city dis- tricts where African American communities are concentrated. Resent- ment for set aside programs is high.

7. Implementing equity-based goals simultaneously with other significant programmatic changes decreases chances of success.

The HUPP was introduced at a time of sweeping administrative changes to the parent program. Field staff had to cope with new procedures and irate clients and constituents at the same time they were expected to implement a very complex, potentially controversial program. Even if all staff had accepted the goals of HUPP, chances are good that it still would have been swept up in the wave of resentment over programmatic changes.

The boom and bust nature of politics makes this factor difficult to avoid. An administration is in office for a limited time. Sometimes the solution is to create an entirely new program to implement the equity- based initiative. The difficulty with this solution is that a new program rarely has time to develop the constituent base that will ensure survival in a change of administrations. Further, an equity-based program, by defini- tion, has a narrow constituency. Therefore, equity-based initiatives should be implemented within existing programs with a minimum of other program changes.


8. The federal government could greatly assist in acceptance of equity- based programs by providing strong leadership in partnership with the private sector and labor unions.

During the Bush administration, several federal initiatives established set-asides similar to that of the HUPP program. States were to develop their own guidelines for use of these funds. In Ohio, the same interagency problems that plagued the HUPP implementation process presented insurmountable barriers to working with the federal funds.

Although open-ended federal programs are supposed to encourage in- novation at the state level, strong leadership and example is needed to make difficult equity-based programs work. The federal government should establish a tripartite commission, composed of companies, labor unions, and government officials, to promulgate how targeted, equity-based programs could be effectively utilized by companies. Such an initiative should feature a strong marketing and publicity component, clear guidelines about how agencies can work together on such programs, and staff training on the federal, state and local levels.

It only makes sense for the private sector to start undertaking such initiatives. Workforce 2000 warned that the labor force is becoming increasingly female, nonwhite, and non-English-speaking. Supplemental training programs are oriented to ensuring a skilled labor force in the twenty-first century.

Firms that are already experiencing labor market bottlenecks in skilled crafts in urban areas face the choice of moving or training new types of workers. It is far more efficient for the government to lead the private sector in finding ways to use our existing capital and human resources than to allow continued deindustrialization of our cities.

CONCLUSIONS

Equity-based government programs can be created to assist individuals in overcoming barriers to participation in the economic mainstream. Such programs are expensive and implementation is very difficult. Strong leadership is critical to successful implementation. The activity of all participants must be motivated by self interest. Until the majority of us see why equity-based programs are important to our interests, such programs will continue to face insurmountable barriers.

Given the mood of the country revealed in the 1994 elections, this case might be increasingly difficult to make. Yet the strength of equity pro-


grams has been their local character---cit izens and businesses coming together to solve local problems. This is not a concept alien to conserva- tives. There clearly is going to be a dynamic tension between those of liberal and conservative ideology. This tension could provide an opportunity for progressive reform.

Ultimately, it might be said that the government ' s success in interven- ing through equity-based programs lies in the ability of each one of us as individuals, companies, or agencies to understand why we share in the success of our neighbors, and how that success contributes to our personal, corporate or organizational bot tom line. This is not a new mes-

sage, but it has a new twist. As a nation, our compet i t iveness is based on preservation and utilization of our resources. As we learned from the practices of total quality control and just-in-t ime management , elimination of waste is a critical source of increased profits. Equi ty-based programs contribute to the elimination of waste of human resources, and this helps all of us. We need to market that message, and find a way of holding ourselves accountable for progress in that arena.

N O T E S

1. William W. Goldsmith and Edward Blakely, Poverty and Inequality in U.S. Cities (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1991); J.D. Kasarda, "Entry-level Jobs, Mobility, and Urban Minority Unemployment." Urban Affairs Quarterly 19 (1983): 21--40; J.D. Kasarda, "Urban Industrial Transition and the Underclass."An- nals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 501 (1989): 26-47.

2. Lori G. Kletzer, "Job Displacement, 1979-1986: How Blacks Fared Relative to Whites." Monthly Labor Review 114 (1991): 7-25; Linda B. Stearns and C. W. Coleman, "Industrial and Local Labor Market Structures and Black Male Unemploy- ment in the Manufacturing Sector." Social Science Quarterly 71 (1990): 285-98; Loic J. Wacquant and William J. Wilson "The Cost of Racial and Class Exclusion in the Inner City." Annals, AAPSS Vol. 501 (1989): 8-25.

3. K. Nelson, "Labor Demand, Labor Supply and the Suburbanization of Low- Wage Office Work." In Production, Work and Territory, edited by A. J. Scott and M. Storper (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1986), 149-71.

4. Gregory D. Squires, "Capital Mobility Versus Upward Mobility: The Racially Discriminatory Consequences of Plant Closings and Corporate Relocations." In Sunbelt Snowbelt, edited by L. Sawers and W.K. Tabb (New York: Oxford University Press, 1984), 152-162; W.J. Wilson, The Truly Disadvantaged (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

5. cf. Kasarda, note 1; Glen G. Cain and Ross E. Finnie, "The Black-White Difference in Youth Employment: Evidence for Demand-Side Factors." Journal of Labor Economies 8 (1990): $364--95; Thomas S. Moore and Aaron Laramore, "In- dustrial Change and Urban Joblessness: An Assessment of the Mismatch Hypoth- esis." UrbanAffairs Quarterly 25 (1990): 640-58.

6. J. Vrooman and S. Greenfield, "Are Blacks Making It in the Suburbs? Some


New Evidence on lntrametropolitan Spatial Segmentation." Journal of Urban Eco- nomics, 7 (1980): 155--67; M. Semyonov, D.R. Hoyt and R.I. Scott, "Place, Race and Differential Occupational Opportunities." Demography, 21 (1984): 258-270; Jonathan S. Leonard, "The Interaction of Residential Segregation and Employment Discrimination." Journal of Urban Economics, 21 (1987): 323--46; Paul R. Blackney, "Spatial Mismatch in Urban Labor Markets: Evidence From Large U.S. Metropoli- tan Areas." Social Science Quarterly, 71 (1990): 3%52.

7. J. Cotton, "More on the 'Cost' of Being a Black or Mexican American Male Worker." Social Science Quarterly, 66 (1985): 867-885; J.E. Farley, "Dispropor- tionate Black and Hispanic Unemployment in U.S. Metropolitan Areas: The Roles of Racial Inequality, Segregation and Discrimination in Male Joblessness." American Journal of Economic Sociology, 46 (1987): 12%150. Woody presents evidence that the workplace status of black women has improved relative to black men, but their earning power is still low relative to white women and men. See Bette Woody, Black Women and the Workplace (New York; Greenwood Press, 1992).

8. Jonathan Kozol, Savage Inequalities (New York: HarperCoilins, 1991); Joan Fitzgerald, The Effect of Education and Training on the Reemployment Success of Displaced Workers in Ohio. Report submitted to the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services and the Ohio Job Training Partnership (1991).

9. Robert B. Hill, The Illusion of Black Progress (Washington D.C.: National Urban League, 1978); David Kiefer and Peter Philips, "Doubts Regarding the Hu- man Capital Theory of Racial Inequality." Industrial Relations 27 (1988): 251-262; Daniel T. Lichter "Racial Differences in Underemployment in American Cities. American Journal of Sociology, 93 (1988): 771-792.

10. Lester M. Salamon, "Overview: Why Human Capital? Why Now?" in Hu- man Capital and America's Future, edited by David W. Hornbeck and Lester M. Salamon (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991), pp. 1-42.

11. D.T. Ellwood, "The Spatial Mismatch Hypothesis: Are There Teenage Jobs Missing in the Ghetto?" in The Black Youth Unemployment Crisis, edited by R.B. Freeman and H.J. Holzer, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986), pp. 147-85; M.I. Pomer, "Labor Market Structure, lntragenerational Mobility, and Discrimina- tion: Black Male Advancement out of Low-Paying Jobs." American Sociological Review, 51 (1986): 650-659; Daniel T. Lichter, "Race, Employment Hardship, and Inequality in the American Metropolitan South." American Sociological Review, 54 (1989): 436--446.

12. M. Turner, M. Fix, and R. Struyk, "Opportunities Denied, Opportunities Di- minished in Hiring." (Washington D.C.: The Urban Institute, 1991).

13. Robert E. Mier and Robert Giloth, "Hispanic Employment Opportunities: A Case of Internal Labor Markets and Weak-Tied Social Networks. Social Science Quarterly, 66 (1985): 296-309; J.S. Braddock, Jomills Henry, and James McPartland, "How Minorities Continue to be Excluded From Equal Employment Opportunities: Research on Labor Market and Institutional Barriers." Journal of Social Issues, 43 (1987): 5-39; H.J. Holzer, "Informal Job Search and Black Youth Unemployment." American Economic Review, 77 (1987): 446--452. Harry J. Holzer, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Local Labor Markets (Kalamazoo, MI: Upjohn Institute, 1989); Kathryn M. Neckerman and Joleen Kirschenman, "Hiring Strategies, Racial Bias, and Inner-City Workers." Social Problems, 38 (1991): 433--447.

14. Bennett Harrison and Lucy Gotham, "Growing Inequality in Black Wages in the 1980s and the Emergence of an African-American Middle Class." Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 11 (1992): 235-253.

15. Bennett Harrison, Education, Training, and the Urban Ghetto (Baltimore:


Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972); Michael K. Brown and Steven P. Erie, "Blacks and the Legacy of the Great Society: The Economic and Political Impact of Federal Social Policy." Public Policy, 29 (1981): 299-329.

16. cf. Lori J. Kletzer, note 2. 17. J. Fitzgerald, "The Effect of Education and Training on the Reemployment

Success of Displaced Workers in Ohio." Report submitted to the Ohio Bureau of Employment Services and the Ohio Job Training Partnership (1991).

18. Gary Orfield and Helene Slessarev, Job Training under the New Federalism (Chicago: University of Chicago, lllinois Unemployment and Job Training Research Project, 1986); Duane Leigh, Assisting Displaced Workers (Kalamazoo, MI: Upjohn Institute for Employment Research, 1989).

19. Helene Slessarev, Racial Inequalities in Metropolitan Chicago Job Training Programs (Chicago: Chicago Urban League, 1988).

20. The second author was deputy director of business development, Ohio De- partment of Development at the time the High Unemployment Population Program was initiated. Interviews also were conducted with the following people involved with development and implementation of the HUPP program: Sharon LaMarr, assis- tant deputy director of business development, Ohio Department of Development; Frankie Coleman, state director of JTPA, Ohio Bureau of Employment Services. Site visits and extensive interviews also were conducted with representatives from participating firms, and with program participants.

21. All states provide substantial subsidies to help medium sized or large plants move in or to keep them from moving out. While evidence repeatedly demonstrates these programs do not create jobs or development, industrial attraction and retention programs simply are political necessities. See Harvey Molotch, "The City as a Growth Machine: Toward a Political Economy of Place." American Journal of Sociology 82 (1976): 309-332; Bennett Harrison and Sandra Kanter, "The Political Economy of State Job Creation and Business Incentives," in Revitalizing the Northeast, edited by George Sternlieb and James W. Hughes (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press, 1978).

22. Applicants can choose training as a carpenter, bricklayer, electrician, painter, plumber, roofer, sheetmetal worker or laborer.

23. The residential journeyman status was created for the Building and Construc- tion Trades program. While trainees can find employment upon completion, as a credential it only qualifies trainees for entry into the traditional union-supported apprenticeships leading to high-paying construction jobs.

24. Stephen Hamilton, Apprenticeship for Adulthood (New York: Macmillan, 1991).

25. cf. Leigh, note 18. 26. In fact, such a comparison may not ever be possible due to the lack of data on

the long-term employment trends and income gains of JTPA participants. 27. Robert Mier and Kari Moe, "Implementing Strategic Planning: Roadblocks to

Reform, Economic Development and Equity," in Harold Washington and the Neigh- borhoods, edited by P. Clavel and W. Wiewel (New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers Univer- sity Press, 1991).

28. Jeffrey L. Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky, Implementation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1984), p. 143.

29. National Commission on Education and the Economy, America's Choice: High Skills or Low Wages (Rochester, NY: NCEE, 1990).

race, job training, and economic development: barriers to racial equity in program planning

Documents