radiation protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

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Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas Thomas Otto based on material from RP group

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Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas. Thomas Otto based on material from RP group. Proton Target Areas at CERN. Radiation Protection Items. Ionisation and radiolysis Chemically Aggressive atmosphere (NO x , O 3 ) - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

Radiation Protection during design, operation and

dismantling of target areas

Thomas Ottobased on material from RP group

Page 2: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 2

Proton Target Areas at CERN

AD 26 GeV/c 0.24 kW

N-TOF 20 GeV/c 1.25 kW

ISOLDE 1.4 GeV 3 kW

North 400 GeV/c 10’s of kW

CNGS 400 GeV/c 440 kW

Page 3: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 3

Radiation Protection Items

Ionisation and radiolysis Chemically Aggressive atmosphere (NOx, O3)

Activated air (spallation, activation) Release to the environment

Activation of ground and potentially ground water Environmental concern (3H, 22Na)

Material activation High ambient dose rates from activated material Future radioactive waste

Page 4: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 4

Air Ionization and Activation

Energetic secondary particles emerge from target

Traverse air, ionize and activate

A ~ (pathlength in air)

Estimate activation by heuristic formulae or Monte-Carlo simulation

Mainly short-lived beta-plus emitters 11C, 13N, 15O, 41Ar

Page 5: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 5

Purpose of “Nuclear” Ventilation

Create dynamic depression in the most radioactive area – protect other areas from leaking of activation/ contamination

Direct airflow to release point Allow release at a suitable point (e.g. at height) Permit aerosol filtering at unique point Permit monitoring at unique release point

Plus the usual purposes of ventilation, such as cooling, removal of noxious agents …

Page 6: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 6

Transport and Release of Air Two simplifying

cases: Laminar flow of air

volume at speed v (e.g. in tunnel)

Complete mixing of air in target volume, average dwell time

v v

Under these assumptions, activation release rate (Bq/s) can be estimated from ventilation speed

Page 7: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 7

ISOLDE 20072007: 3-times higher activity concentration at stack for equal proton beam current

“solved” by intensity limitationThe simplifying assumptions do not always work as advertised.

Small changes in air flow may have a big effect.

It took man-months of work at ISOLDE to re-establish release figures similar to those achieved before 2007

Page 8: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 8

Release vs. current

Activity production functions as expected !

Page 9: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 9

n-TOF 2009

Integrated release higher than expected

lack of tightness in target area requires higher extraction rate

Spikes ??From degassing system of cooling water: 15O

Solved by additional delay / decay tank

Page 10: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 10

Due to current interest:No directed extraction - PS

PS volume ≈ 24 000 m3

Ventilation injects 40 000 m3/h 1.7 exchanges / hour p(tunnel) higher than p(environment)

Smoke tests revealed: Uncontrolled release One reason for higher-than usual ambient dose

rates in PS ring

Page 11: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 11

PS Smoke Tests 2005

Page 12: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 12

Environmental model

A set of conservative models for transport of radionuclides into and in

the environment (by air and water, deposition, resuspension, uptake by crop and animals)

Exposure of representative group of public (irradiation, uptake)

Estimated dose can be compared with appropriate limits

Effluent (release)

Environmental transfer

Exposure Pathways

Dose Estimation

Page 13: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 13

Dose from CERN releases (Meyrin site, 2008)

For comparison:Dose to reference groups at Swiss NPP: PWR: < 1 Sv /y BWR: 5 Sv /y

Release*

(GBq)

Dose

Sv)

Short-lived beta emitters

13240 3.05

Other

(60 Co)

0.0092 0.22

Stray radiation - 3.7

Total 7.0

•PS underestimated (non-representative sampling point)

•PSB, EAST, AD at present not monitored•N-TOF 2009:

+5000 GBq, +1.1 Sv

Airborne releases are at the limit of the optimisation threshold. (10 Sv / y)

Any increase of releases will have to be justified and optimised

Page 14: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 14

Reduction of air-borne releases

Add shielding in target area Reduce track length in air

Closed ventilation system Cool and dry air in closed circuit Only vent before access

Release from height Construct a stack of h > 80 m

Page 15: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 15

Shielding in target area

Shielding absorbs secondary radiation cascade emerging from target

Less activation of air

Activation of shielding

Page 16: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 16

CNGS as an example

The target and horn are well shieldedCrane available for remote dismantling of shielding

Page 17: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 17

Closed ventilation system Cool & dry

activated air “never” release only before access

Appears a good idea, but Dynamic depression

difficult to maintain Accumulation of 3H

in condensate

TNM418m3

TSG430m3

TCV430m3

Page 18: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 18

Tritium – where from ?

Tritium is copiously produced as a light fragment in spallation reactions in (humid) air and in structural materials.

It diffuses out of the walls in form of HTO

In a closed ventilation system, the moist air is condensated in the dehumidifiers and the Tritium concentrated

Page 19: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 19

Consequence of CNGS – 3H

N-TOF 2008: “open” ventilation The concentration of short-lived

beta emitters allowed this solution

Tritiated water Storage in tanks Elimination via nuclear site in

France Evaporation – the concentration

in air is no reason to worry

Page 20: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 20

Release from height (stack)

Diffusion (dilution) coefficient for radionuclide concentration as a function of stack height.

High stack affords orders of magnitude better dilution in the close zone (< 1000 m) !

1.E-08

1.E-07

1.E-06

1.E-05

1.E-04

1.E-03

1.E-02

100 1000 10000 100000

Distance (m)

Dil

uti

on

6-15

26-35

>80

Page 21: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 21

Ground activation and ground water contamination

Soil around accelerator is inevitably activated Activation may be fixed or unreachable for

any human purpose (e.g. LEP / LHC) Activation migrates with ground water and

runoff water Fermilab experiments (1980’s):

7Be, 51Cr, 22Na, 54Mn, 46Sc, 48V, 55Fe, 59Fe, 60Co, 45Ca and 3H are produced

22Na, 3H are soluble and easily transported

Page 22: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 22

Distribution of activation

0 100 200 300 400 5001E-10

1E-9

1E-8

1E-7

1E-6

1E-5

1E-4

1E-3

0.01

0.1

1

10

3H

Act

ivity

(B

q c

m-3)

Depth in Soil from Accelerator wall (cm)

5 , 2, 1 GeV

500 MeV

200 MeV

100 MeV

0 100 200 300 400

0.4

0.5

0.6

0.7

0.8

0.9

1.0

100 MeV 200 MeV 500 MeV 5 GeV

Fra

ctio

n of

cum

ulat

ed a

ctiv

ity

Depth in Soil from Accelerator wall (cm)

Lateral to proton accelerator tunnel:Exp. activation profile, = 38 cm

99.9 % of all activation is produced in a layer less than 3 m thick.(“activation zone”)

Water from the activation zone is exceeding rad. waste levels for 22Na and must be dealt with appropriately (infiltrations!)

Power of uncontrolled losses 1 W/m

Page 23: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 23

Protective layers

Drinking water resources outside the “activation zone” can be protected with a “geomembrane”

(example SNS)

Page 24: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 24

Situation at CERN

Accelerators and target areas close to the surface (Linac, PSB,PS, East, AD, ISOLDE, n-TOF, North) are far from drinking water sourcing areas

The potentially activated run-off must be diluted, in some cases in little streams with limited capacity

Infiltration water in tunnels and target areas may be activated beyond free release guidelines

Page 25: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 25

Waste from Target areas

Most target areas produce one-off waste, e.g. the ISOLDE front-ends or the n-TOF target

Highly activated, high ambient dose rate

Find special agreements with national repositories for elimination and final storage

Page 26: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 26

Waste from ISOLDE

ISOLDE produces 30 waste target units per year

High dose rate and actinide (alpha-emitter) content makes treatment in hot cell mandatory

Temporary storage saturated

Elimination pathway is required now

Page 27: Radiation Protection during design, operation and dismantling of target areas

IEFC Workshop 2010 - Thomas Otto 27

Summary

Target areas have radiation protection topics in common Activation, radioactive releases, waste production

Imagine CERN increases beam power on targets: Ventilation must be well-designed, air-flow fully understood Release close to ground reaches its limits

closed circuit, high stack, shielding: no “silver bullet” Ground activation becomes an issue for close-to-surface

accelerators Target areas produce highly activated waste

Suitable interim storage and elimination pathways must be defined