radiological crime scene management · 5 crime scene (that is, a crime scene without the presence...
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NUCLEAR SECURITY SERIES NO. XX 1
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RADIOLOGICAL CRIME SCENE 10
MANAGEMENT 11
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DRAFT IMPLEMENTING GUIDE 13
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INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY 28
VIENNA, 20XX 29
NST013 DRAFT, February 2013
STEP 8: 120-day Member State comment: deadline 28 June 2013
Interface document: NSGC, RASSC
FOREWORD 1
[To be prepared by the Secretariat at a later time] 2
CONTENTS 1
1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................................................... 1 2
1.1. BACKGROUND .................................................................................................................... 1 3
1.2. OBJECTIVE ........................................................................................................................... 1 4
1.3. SCOPE .................................................................................................................................... 1 5
1.4. STRUCTURE ......................................................................................................................... 2 6
2. OVERVIEW OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO A NUCLEAR SECURITY EVENT ...................... 3 7
2.1. GENERAL .............................................................................................................................. 3 8
2.2. RESPONSE SYSTEM ACTIVATION .................................................................................. 4 9
2.3. RADIOLOGICAL CRIME SCENE MANAGEMENT ......................................................... 5 10
2.4. FORENSIC EXAMINATION ................................................................................................ 7 11
2.5. INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES ........................................................................................... 7 12
2.5.1. Routine investigative activities ....................................................................................... 8 13
2.5.2. Investigative activities requiring assistance from nuclear or radiation specialists .......... 8 14
2.5.3. Investigative activities for determining the national and international security 15
implications ..................................................................................................................................... 9 16
2.6. PUBLIC INFORMATION ..................................................................................................... 9 17
3. FRAMEWORK FOR RADIOLOGICAL CRIME SCENE MANAGEMENT ............................ 11 18
3.1. GENERAL ............................................................................................................................ 11 19
3.2. INTEGRATED COMMAND, CONTROL, COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION 20
SYSTEM ........................................................................................................................................... 11 21
3.2.1. National/strategic command level ................................................................................. 12 22
3.2.2. Local/tactical command level ....................................................................................... 14 23
3.2.3. On-scene/operational command level ........................................................................... 14 24
3.3. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ON-SCENE/OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL .... 15 25
3.3.1. On-scene/operational commander ................................................................................. 15 26
3.3.2. Hazardous materials operations specialist .................................................................... 17 27
3.3.3. Safety specialist............................................................................................................. 18 28
3.3.4. Radiological assessor .................................................................................................... 19 29
3.3.5. Scene modeller .............................................................................................................. 20 30
3.3.6. Evidence recovery personnel ........................................................................................ 21 31
3.3.7. Photographer ................................................................................................................. 22 32
3.3.8. Evidence recorder/custodian ......................................................................................... 23 33
3.4. SPECIALIZED PERSONNEL FOR RADIOLOGICAL CRIME SCENE MANAGEMENT34
23 35
4. CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS ................................................................................................... 25 1
4.1. GENERAL ............................................................................................................................ 25 2
4.2. SCENE CONTROL .............................................................................................................. 27 3
4.2.1. Perimeter security ......................................................................................................... 27 4
4.2.2. Traffic control ............................................................................................................... 27 5
4.2.3. Scene access control...................................................................................................... 28 6
4.3. COMMON-HAZARDS RISK ASSESSMENT ................................................................... 28 7
4.3.1. Event action plan ........................................................................................................... 29 8
4.3.2. Scene safety plan ........................................................................................................... 29 9
4.4. DANGER-REDUCTION PROCEDURES ........................................................................... 30 10
4.4.1. General .......................................................................................................................... 30 11
4.4.2. Control areas ................................................................................................................. 30 12
4.4.3. Categorization ............................................................................................................... 33 13
4.5. FORENSIC EVIDENCE MANAGEMENT......................................................................... 33 14
4.5.1. General .......................................................................................................................... 33 15
4.5.2. Evidence collection plan ............................................................................................... 34 16
4.5.3. Radiological evidence collection procedures ................................................................ 34 17
4.5.4. Initial forensic examination at the scene ....................................................................... 37 18
4.5.5. Evidence packaging, transportation and submission .................................................... 37 19
4.5.6. Interim Evidence Storage Site ....................................................................................... 37 20
4.6. RELEASE OF SCENE ......................................................................................................... 38 21
4.7. AFTER-ACTION REVIEW ................................................................................................. 38 22
5. PREPAREDNESS ........................................................................................................................ 40 23
5.1. GENERAL ............................................................................................................................ 40 24
5.2. BASIS FOR PREPAREDNESS ........................................................................................... 40 25
5.3. PLANS AND PROCEDURES ............................................................................................. 41 26
5.3.1. National plan to manage nuclear security events .......................................................... 41 27
5.3.2. Inter-agency arrangements ............................................................................................ 42 28
5.3.3. Competent authority’s specific procedures ................................................................... 42 29
5.4. EQUIPMENT ....................................................................................................................... 43 30
5.4.1. General .......................................................................................................................... 43 31
5.4.2. Radiation detection instruments .................................................................................... 44 32
5.4.3. Personal protective equipment ...................................................................................... 44 33
5.4.4. Ancillary equipment ...................................................................................................... 44 34
5.5. INFORMATION RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT ................................................... 45 35
5.5.1. Points of contact ............................................................................................................ 45 1
5.5.2. Routine communications ............................................................................................... 45 2
5.6. TRAINING ........................................................................................................................... 45 3
5.7. DRILLS AND EXERCISES ................................................................................................. 46 4
5.8. SUSTAINABILITY .............................................................................................................. 46 5
6. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE ...................................................... 48 6
6.1. GENERAL ............................................................................................................................ 48 7
6.2. AREAS OF COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE ........................................................... 49 8
6.3. DEVELOPMENT OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR ASSISTANCE ....................................... 51 9
Appendix I ............................................................................................................................................ 53 10
Appendix II ........................................................................................................................................... 63 11
REFERENCES ..................................................................................................................................... 65 12
Annex I ................................................................................................................................................. 68 13
Annex II ................................................................................................................................................ 81 14
DEFINITIONS ...................................................................................................................................... 83 15
16
1
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. BACKGROUND 1
Radiological crime scene management is the process used to ensure safe, secure, effective, and 2
efficient operations at a crime scene where nuclear or other radioactive materials are known to be or 3
are suspected of being present. These operations are similar to those used to manage a conventional 4
crime scene (that is, a crime scene without the presence of nuclear or other radioactive material). 5
However, radiological crime scene operations differ due to radiation protection and nuclear security 6
considerations. 7
Management of a crime scene is the process of ensuring the orderly, accurate and effective 8
collection and preservation of evidence so that the evidence may be used in the context of legal 9
proceedings. Integral to the concept of radiological crime scene management is the condition of 10
intentional, unauthorized activities involving nuclear or other radioactive materials out of regulatory 11
control to be criminalized [1–3]. In the absence of laws criminalizing such activities, there will be no 12
crime related to unauthorized acts with these materials requiring investigation, although other crimes 13
may have occurred. While the radiological crime scene management is essentially the same as that for 14
other crime scenes, there are differences arising from the presence of nuclear or other radioactive 15
material. 16
There are interfaces between security, safety and emergency response that need to be considered 17
for the management of a radiological crime scene. In particular, law enforcement operations, radiation 18
protection and security procedures and emergency response activities should be applied 19
simultaneously and in a coordinated manner at a radiological crime scene. 20
1.2. OBJECTIVE 21
The objective of this publication is to provide law enforcement, national policy makers, decision 22
makers, local authorities and technical support personnel with guidance on the framework and the 23
main functional elements for radiological crime scene management so that it may be adopted or 24
adapted to meet the needs of the various jurisdictions and competent authorities within each Member 25
State. 26
1.3. SCOPE 27
This publication focuses on the framework and functional elements to managing a radiological 28
crime scene that are distinctive from any other crime scene. It assumes that States have a capability 29
for managing conventional crime scenes. States needing guidance on conventional crime scene 30
operations are encouraged to take advantage of published resources, such as in Ref. [4–7]. 31
2
This implementing guide is limited to radiological crime scene management. It provides guidance 1
on the interface of this issue with the detection of nuclear and other radioactive material, the initiation 2
of response procedures to confirm the detection of material and declaration of a nuclear security event 3
and on the use of nuclear forensic examination in support of investigations. This publication does not 4
address the legal framework that supports the management of a radiological crime scene, nor does it 5
address the nuclear security detection architecture [8] and nuclear forensic categorization and 6
characterization of nuclear and other radioactive material [9]. It also does not address radiation 7
protection and emergency response aspects of a nuclear security event. These other aspects are 8
covered in other IAEA publications [10–21]. 9
Additionally, this publication omits any specific guidance on the proper procedures for dealing 10
with individuals injured as a result of the nuclear security event. It also omits guidance on proper 11
procedures for collection and disposition of human remains. General guidance on best practices for 12
collecting human remains is given in Missing People, DNA Analysis and Identification of Human 13
Remains [22]. Finally, this publication does not cover all aspects of a criminal investigation into a 14
nuclear security event. 15
1.4. STRUCTURE 16
This publication contains six sections, two appendices, references, definitions, and two annexes. 17
Section 2 presents an overview of the process for investigating a nuclear security event. Section 3 18
addresses the framework for radiological crime scene management, describing roles and 19
responsibilities of an integrated command and control structure as well as of the on-scene operating 20
personnel. Section 4 describes the conduct of operations at a radiological crime scene. Section 5 21
presents the general responsibilities associated with preparedness needed to manage a radiological 22
crime scene. Section 6 discusses international cooperation and assistance. 23
3
2. OVERVIEW OF INVESTIGATIONS INTO A NUCLEAR SECURITY EVENT
2.1. GENERAL 1
Managing a radiological crime scene is a key part of responding to a nuclear security event. 2
Radiological crime scenes share evidence-collection characteristics with conventional crime scenes 3
regarding a wide range of activities, e.g. evidence search patterns, geographical scene modelling, 4
evidence recording (see section 4), even if explosives are involved. 5
A radiological crime scene can involve nuclear or other radioactive material that is either intact 6
or dispersed. Scenarios involving the detection of intact materials are for example: 7
— Radiological exposure device (RED) ; 8
— An un-functioned radiological dispersal device (RDD); and 9
— Nuclear or other radioactive material which is out of regulatory control such as being 10
illicitly trafficked. 11
Scenarios involving dispersed material are for example: 12
— A functioned device; and 13
— Acts of sabotage involving the release of radioactive material. 14
The effective management of these scenarios requires a national response system for managing a 15
nuclear security event to be in place. A national response system for managing a nuclear security 16
event is an essential part of a State’s nuclear security infrastructure. Managing the radiological crime 17
scene is also an integral part of law enforcement investigations needed to support any future legal 18
proceedings in relation to the nuclear security event. 19
Response systems are integrated sets of response measures, which are intended to assess an 20
instrument alarm and/or an information alert and to respond to a nuclear security event [3]. A national 21
framework for managing nuclear security events should be integrated and coordinated with the 22
national arrangements for preparedness and response for natural and technological disasters, to 23
include a nuclear or radiological emergencies [16]. The response system of a State is ideally 24
documented in a national plan for managing nuclear security events. The response to nuclear security 25
events comprises two phases: i) assessment, and ii) management. The first phase is a continuation of 26
the initial assessment of an instrument alarm or an information alert if that initial assessment is 27
inconclusive. The second phase of the response is the management of the nuclear security event 28
through the execution of the national plan. This execution is comprised of: 29
— Notification of the nuclear security event; 30
— Activation of the response system; 31
— Radiological crime scene management; and 32
4
— Forensic examination. 1
Figure 1 illustrates a generic flow of actions to be implemented in response to a nuclear security 2
event. 3
4
5
FIG. 1. Two phases of the response to a nuclear security event. 6
2.2. RESPONSE SYSTEM ACTIVATION 7
Upon detection of nuclear or other radioactive material through an instrument alarm or an 8
information alert, the relevant competent authority should implement procedures with the objective of 9
interrupting the potential criminal act, or an unauthorized act, with nuclear security implications [3]. 10
In parallel, a law enforcement investigation into the potential criminal act or unauthorized act or 11
terrorist act should also commence. Figure 2 illustrates a generic scheme of actions for investigation 12
of a nuclear security event, from the time of detection of an instrument alarm and/or information alert 13
until the forensic examination, which will lead to the institution of legal proceedings. 14
CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION
Detection Assessment Confirmation ActivationCrime Scene
Management
Forensic
Examination
LEGAL
PROCEEDINGS
PUBLIC INFORMATIOM
15
FIG. 2. Generic scheme of actions for responding to a nuclear security event involving radiological 16
crime scene management, from the detection and extending to the legal proceedings. 17
5
An instrument alarm and/or an information alert should lead to the conduct of an initial 1
assessment whose results will determine whether a nuclear security event has occurred or not. If the 2
initial assessment is inconclusive, then a detailed assessment should be carried out to arrive at a 3
definite conclusion. The outcome of the assessment process could be the determination that a nuclear 4
security event has occurred, unless the instrument alarm is determined to be innocent or false or the 5
information alert is false. 6
The outcome of the initial assessment should be reported to the competent authority designated 7
for this purpose in the national plan for managing nuclear security events, e.g., a national operations 8
and analysis centre [8]. Upon a conclusive assessment, the designated competent authority should 9
initiate phase two of the response by declaring the occurrence of the nuclear security event and 10
activating the response system, including the appropriate level of response to be activated. 11
As in any natural disaster, crime, or other event, traces are left at the scene. Due to the transient 12
and fragile nature of those traces, their reliability and the preservation of their physical integrity 13
depend to a very large extent on initial actions at the scene [4]. If a nuclear security event is 14
confirmed, crime-scene control procedures should be established immediately by first responders and, 15
as applicable, by other competent authorities. 16
Upon notification, the relevant competent authorities (such as local and/or national response 17
organization(s)) should promptly initiate the pre-planned and coordinated actions appropriate to the 18
nuclear security event and in accordance with the national plan for managing nuclear security events. 19
In summary, upon a conclusive assessment that a nuclear security event has occurred, the 20
following immediate actions should be undertaken: 21
— Establishment (by the first responders) of crime-scene control procedures in parallel to 22
other immediate actions at the scene; 23
— Reporting by the first responders of the occurrence of the nuclear security event to the 24
relevant competent authority; 25
— Declaration and notification of a nuclear security event by the designated competent 26
authority; 27
— Activation of the response system; 28
— Initiation of pre-planned and coordinated actions, at the radiological crime-scene and 29
other places in connection with the nuclear security event; and 30
— Management of public information. 31
2.3. RADIOLOGICAL CRIME SCENE MANAGEMENT 32
Law enforcement operations in Member States may have seen instances where radioactive 33
materials have been found at, and seized from, crime scenes. These operations have indicated on 34
6
occasion a lack of awareness surrounding procedures for notification of relevant competent 1
authorities, coordination for dealing with the radioactive material as evidence and other difficulties 2
associated with these nuclear security events. 3
The primary goal of a crime scene investigation is to establish what has happened (crime scene 4
reconstruction) and to identify and prosecute those involved or suspected. This is done by carefully 5
documenting the conditions at a crime scene and recognizing all relevant physical evidence. The 6
ability to recognize and properly collect physical evidence is crucial to both solving and prosecuting 7
crimes. 8
At its most basic level, a radiological crime scene is a location where either a criminal act 9
involving nuclear or other radioactive material has taken place or is suspected of having taken place 10
as well as the location where traces or evidence related to criminal action has been found. The act, the 11
subject of the radiological crime scene, may be an unauthorized possession of nuclear or other 12
radioactive material. However, the scene may be made more complex by other factors such as the 13
detonation of explosives with the intention of deliberately dispersing nuclear or other radioactive 14
material in a densely populated area. 15
Every nuclear security event should be managed so that: i) all subsequent actions conducted at 16
the scene are implemented to ensure the integrity of the criminal investigations; ii) all relevant 17
criminal investigation procedures should apply; and iii) the safety and security of all personnel 18
involved and the general public should take precedence over the integrity of the evidence and 19
preservation of its later admissibility in a courtroom setting. Special attention should be paid to the 20
importance of securing the crime scene in order to prevent any destruction or contamination of 21
physical evidence as well as for better protection of life of responding personnel and other 22
individuals. In addition, the radiological crime scene should be managed in a way that recognizes that 23
the presence of multiple hazards is possible (see Section 4.4). 24
Figure 3 illustrates a set of actions to be implemented after a nuclear security event has been 25
identified and notified extending through to evidence submission in an appropriate forum and 26
subsequent release of the scene. 27
7
1
FIG. 3. Set of pre-planned and coordinated actions for radiological crime scene management to be 2
implemented at the scene after a nuclear security event has been notified extending through to 3
evidence submission for forensic examination and the subsequent release of the scene to the 4
competent authorities. 5
2.4. FORENSIC EXAMINATION 6
Nuclear forensics is one element of the broader investigation into a nuclear security event. It is an 7
iterative process that aims to answer questions regarding the nature, history and origin of nuclear and 8
other radioactive material involved in a nuclear security event. Nuclear forensic examinations when 9
combined with other aspects of the investigation may provide information to possibly link the 10
material to people, places or events. Detailed information on nuclear forensic examinations in support 11
of investigations can be found elsewhere [9]. It is imperative that all responders are aware of the need 12
for forensic examinations, just as they would be aware of this need for any other crime scene. For this 13
reason, care should be taken to preserve the crime scene and protect the integrity of the evidence. 14
2.5. INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITIES 15
An investigation into a nuclear security event extends beyond the radiological crime scene itself. 16
These investigative activities should be conducted close to but external from a radiological crime 17
scene as near to the time of the nuclear security event as possible. Such activities are ordinarily the 18
province of law enforcement agencies and their personnel. 19
8
2.5.1. Routine investigative activities 1
Routine investigative activities that should be undertaken include collecting items of potential 2
evidentiary value or other items that might yield information useful to the investigation, noting that 3
the individuals involved may have associated residences and conveyances as well as perhaps an 4
assembly site. Some examples are digital recording devices that might help identify individuals or 5
vehicles entering or exiting the scene and that might help in reconstructing the path taken by the 6
nuclear or other radioactive material. Examples of potential sources of digital evidence include 7
desktop, laptop and tablet computers, as well as the hard drives, floppy drives, memory cards, and 8
USB flash drives associated with these computers; cell phones; global positioning system (GPS) 9
devices; security and surveillance cameras, such as those used by banks, at Automated Teller 10
Machines (ATMs), and by many businesses and some residential buildings or communities; traffic 11
cameras, used in many jurisdictions to spot traffic infractions or to monitor traffic flow; portable 12
media players (such as iPods); and digital cameras. 13
Personnel should take statements and pursue other investigative activities aimed at obtaining 14
evidence as prescribed by the applicable criminal procedures code from individuals in the vicinity of 15
the radiological crime scene who may have witnessed the events leading up to during, or immediately 16
following the nuclear security event. 17
2.5.2. Investigative activities requiring assistance from nuclear or radiation specialists 18
Most investigative activities are essentially the same as those for other crime scenes and, thus, 19
are not unique to the investigation of a nuclear security event. What might be unique, however, is the 20
need for subject area expertise in the chemical, physical and isotopic properties of nuclear and other 21
radioactive materials. Such expertise might be beyond that possessed by many law enforcement 22
agencies but could be obtained from national resources, such as nuclear regulatory authorities, other 23
government agencies, universities, industries and laboratories fulfilling some role involving nuclear or 24
other radioactive materials, or through international cooperation and assistance (see Section 6). The 25
expertise might prove helpful to the investigators in formulating questions to ask of prospective 26
witnesses and in understanding the importance of the responses that are received. 27
For example, specialists in nuclear forensics or radiation protection might note for the 28
investigators the potential usefulness of establishing whether anyone noticed: 29
— A radiation warning trefoil placard or similar hazard warnings displayed on any items; 30
— Instruments, such as Geiger-Mueller radiation detectors, or dosimeters associated with a 31
person or persons; 32
— Protective gloves, boots, suits or respirators in use or being acquired for potential use; 33
9
— Specialized containers, such as those used for transport or storage of radioactive 1
materials; 2
— Unusual occurrences of illness or injury suggestive of radiation over-exposure, such as 3
skin reddening, blisters, or vomiting; and 4
— Any material emitting heat or radio-luminescence in the absence of any external heat- or 5
light-generating source. 6
Specialists might aid the law enforcement personnel and other investigators by assembling 7
images, such as those of typical or representative radiation symbols, detectors, protective equipment, 8
and transport and storage containers, so that these images might be shown to prospective witnesses. 9
Such images can be collected in advance of any nuclear security event and incorporated into the 10
national plan. 11
2.5.3. Investigative activities for determining the national and international security 12
implications 13
In order to analyse the nuclear security implications of a nuclear security event, it is essential that 14
proper data be collected and provided in a timely fashion to the responsible competent authorities. 15
The data could include: 16
— Description of the radiological crime scene, causes, impacts, and possible consequences; 17
— Circumstantial information regarding the crime scene, e.g., weapons, detonations; 18
— Information on the criminals or terrorists involved; and 19
— Data on the categorization of the involved nuclear or other radioactive material. 20
Based upon the above data, investigative activities should be performed to determine the nuclear 21
security implications for the State as well as other States and the application of proper procedures for 22
notification to interested international intergovernmental organizations. 23
2.6. PUBLIC INFORMATION 24
A nuclear security event is likely to be of keen interest to national governments and local 25
authorities. If news of this event is disseminated by the media, there will be a similar heightened 26
interest by the public [22]. Effective, timely and clear communications within the government and 27
with news media outlets and the public are essential activities that should be performed as part of the 28
management of the radiological crime scene [3]. 29
Prior to the occurrence of a nuclear security event, effective communications should be 30
established among the various ministries, and relevant competent authorities of the national 31
governments and local authorities as well as for communicating with news media outlets and the 32
general public. An individual or individuals need to be designated as spokesperson(s) for 33
10
communications with the news media outlets and the general public. A communications team should 1
be in place, with well-defined roles and responsibilities. The known or suspected presence of nuclear 2
or other radioactive materials should require the availability of specialists who are knowledgeable in 3
public health aspects associated with radioactive materials to brief as appropriate or provide up to date 4
briefings to the spokesperson(s). 5
11
3. FRAMEWORK FOR RADIOLOGICAL CRIME SCENE MANAGEMENT 1
3.1. GENERAL 2
The management of a radiological crime scene needs an integrated command structure with 3
multiple levels of decision making responsibility. While such a command structure would be largely 4
similar to that for conventional crime scene management, it should have additional decision making 5
requisites to ensure that: 6
— The safety of the public and of all persons associated with the crime scene is protected in 7
a manner that minimizes the risks associated with radiation hazards [16, 17, 23]; 8
— The collection of evidence in the presence of nuclear or other radioactive material is done 9
safely and, securely in a manner that whenever possible should avoid compromising the 10
investigative value of the evidence; 11
— The nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory control is placed under 12
regulatory control or is otherwise managed, to guard against any further unauthorized 13
activities in relation to that material; and 14
— Where ever possible, the actions in the crime scene should be oriented in a way that 15
prioritizes the removal of the radiological material. 16
An integrated command structure will involve a systematic approach to both the response 17
personnel and the structure of the command itself. This integrated command structure needs to be 18
understood by all involved personnel and to be periodically exercised prior to an actual event. 19
Managing radiological crime scenes is complex, involves multiple competent authorities, and 20
may extend across local and national jurisdictions. There may also be an international component, 21
resulting from a State’s obligations under relevant international legal instruments. Depending on the 22
size and magnitude of the nuclear security event, there may be multiple crime scenes that are linked to 23
this event. Therefore, an integrated command structure needs to include national, local and on-scene 24
levels of command. 25
3.2. INTEGRATED COMMAND, CONTROL, COORDINATION AND COMMUNICATION 26
SYSTEM 27
The adoption of an integrated command, control, coordination and communication system is 28
essential for achieving effective radiological crime scene management. The system is optimized if 29
implemented in a flexible manner, while maintaining its efficiency and its multi-directional flow of 30
information. 31
The system will likely have three tiers associated with radiological crime scene management: 32
12
— National/strategic command level; 1
— Local/tactical command level; and 2
— On-scene/operational command level. 3
This design allows for the flow of information from one level to the next through the designation 4
of a primary point of contact at each level. This design also allows for horizontal communication. 5
The commander at each level can provide direction to the team leaders under his/her command, 6
who in turn, direct the personnel under their supervision to perform the task assigned. The team 7
leaders need to provide updates at regular intervals on the assigned task until it is completed, after 8
which they can advise their commander of the outcome of the assigned task. 9
Effective management of a crime scene involving radioactive material demands coordination at 10
the strategic, tactical and operational levels ensuring that all parties understand their roles and 11
responsibilities and are kept advised of developments. Figure 4 presents a notional diagram of the 12
functional relationships of these levels as they relate to a radiological crime scene. 13
3.2.1. National/strategic command level 14
The national plan establishes three levels of command. The first level is the national/strategic 15
command level. At this level the following roles and responsibilities should be carried out: 16
— Ensuring the strategic and political management of the nuclear security event in 17
accordance with the national plan; 18
— Setting the strategy that will assist and provide directions to the tactical command level, 19
including setting priorities for radiological crime scene management; 20
— Establishing a mechanism to manage request for, coordination of and assessment of 21
additional information pertaining to the nuclear security event received from other 22
department and agencies; 23
— Establishing a briefing process to ensure senior government officials are informed 24
regularly on the progress and magnitude of the nuclear security event and its effect on the 25
affected population and local infrastructure. These regular communications might be 26
conducted on a pre-determined, periodic basis according to a schedule established in the 27
national plan; 28
— Providing expert legal advice to the tactical and operational levels to ensure compliance 29
with the applicable legal requisites concerning crime scene operations and the collection 30
of evidence; 31
— Determining the need for and the coordination of international co-operation and 32
assistance; 33
13
— Managing of public information and provision of guidance to the tactical command level 1
on this matter; and 2
— Securing personnel and financial resources as well as logistical support. 3
Se
cure
d c
om
m.
Se
cure
d c
om
mu
nic
ati
on
Release
Contamination
Control
COMMAND STRUCTURE
National
Command
Control and
Command Post
Local
Commander
Radiation Protection
Bomb Squad
Medical Care
Emergency
Services
Law
Enforcement
SECURED
AREA
Hazardous materials
operations specialist
Radiological
assessor
Safety
specialist
Scene
modeler
Photographer
Evidence recovery
personnel
Ancillary
Equipment
Se
cure
d c
om
mu
nic
ati
on O
N-S
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NE
/OP
ER
AT
ION
AL LE
VE
L
Access
Control
Exit
Control
Forensic
Pu
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low
(In
stru
ctio
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(S
ou
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)
Se
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Release
Pu
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Strategic Planning
Legal Advice
International
Cooperation
Coordination
Information
Management
Interagency
Coordination
TACTIC AREA
STRATEGIC AREA
OPERATIONAL
AREA
Reachback Expert
Capabilities
LOC
AL/T
AC
TIC
LEV
EL
NA
TIO
NA
L/ST
RA
TE
GIC
LEV
EL
HAZARD CONTROL AREA
SECURED
AREA
Access
Control
Exit
Control
Decontamination
Station
Exit
Control
Access
Control
Meetingpoint
Heliport
4
FIG. 4. Radiological crime scene management extends from the national (strategic) level to the on-5
scene (operational) level. 6
14
The national/strategic command level may include senior personnel from various competent 1
authorities and support organizations which have a vested interest in any particular nuclear security 2
event. 3
3.2.2. Local/tactical command level 4
The next level in the national plan is the local/tactical command level. At this level the following 5
roles and responsibilities should be carried out: 6
— Implementing the relevant measures of the national plan selected by the national/strategic 7
command level; 8
— Setting tactical directions for on-scene/operational command level, such as priorities for 9
radiological crime scene management; 10
— Establishing the mechanism for ensuring the national/strategic command level is 11
informed regularly on the progress and magnitude of the nuclear security event and its 12
effect on the affected population and local infrastructure; 13
— Establishing the decision making structure to ensure that directions received from the 14
national/strategic command level with respect to managing public information are 15
followed; 16
— Allocating resources for crime scene and ancillary operations; and 17
— Requesting additional support for operations, as needed. 18
The local/tactical command level includes personnel from the various competent authorities and 19
support organizations which have been designated roles and responsibilities in relation to the nuclear 20
security event. 21
3.2.3. On-scene/operational command level 22
The third level in the national plan is the on-scene/operational command level. At this level the 23
following roles and responsibilities should be carried out: 24
— Providing on-scene/operational direction to the personnel responding to the nuclear 25
security event in a manner that is compliant with recognized health and safety practices; 26
— Ensuring that the local/tactical command level is informed regularly on the progress and 27
magnitude of the nuclear security event and its effect on the affected population and local 28
infrastructure; 29
— Executing directions received from the local/tactical command level with regard to 30
radiological crime scene management; and 31
— Ensuring that information relevant to the developing criminal investigation is reported to 32
the involved law enforcement agencies in a timely manner. 33
15
The on-scene/operational command level includes personnel from the various competent 1
authorities and support organizations which have been designated roles and responsibilities in relation 2
to the any particular nuclear security event. 3
3.3. ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF ON-SCENE/OPERATIONAL PERSONNEL 4
The roles and responsibilities of personnel operating at or near a radiological crime scene are 5
similar to the roles and responsibilities of personnel operating at or near any other crime scene. The 6
inherently hazardous nature of a crime scene involving radioactive material is likely to necessitate 7
additional knowledge, equipment and conditions1 for certain personnel. It also requires the addition of 8
specialized personnel to address the hazards associated with the nuclear or other radioactive material 9
itself. 10
Essential functions for radiological crime scene management related to on scene/operational 11
personnel are described below. 12
The functions of on scene/operational personnel are often the responsibility of a single person, 13
such as the on-scene/operational commander or the hazardous materials operations specialist, a group 14
or team of specialists might actually assume a particular role and responsibility. The need for a 15
number of persons fulfilling particular roles and responsibilities will be dictated by scene-specific 16
factors, such as the expected duration of operations, the physical area to be processed for evidence, 17
and the complexity of the tasks to be performed. Sample forms for use by these personnel are 18
presented in Appendix I. 19
3.3.1. On-scene/operational commander 20
The most senior official with decision making authority at the scene automatically assumes the 21
role of the on-scene/operational commander until confirmed or relieved as such by the local/tactical 22
commander. 23
The roles and responsibilities of the on-scene/operational commander for a radiological crime 24
scene are essentially the same as those for any other crime scene. He or she is designated as the lead 25
official for all on-scene activities and, as such, is empowered to make decisions that ensure the health 26
1 All on scene/operational personnel in fulfilling their respective roles and responsibilities at a
crime scene involving radioactive material should protected in accordance with radiation protection
standards [24]. However, if a nuclear/radiological emergency is declared, they should be regarded as
emergency workers and protected in a accordance with Ref. [16, 17].
16
and safety of the general public as well as the crime scene personnel. The roles and responsibilities 1
traditionally associated with the on-scene/operational commander should include: 2
— Assumption of overall responsibility for the coordination of the response at the scene; 3
— Ensuring the safety and security of personnel and the public, to include designating an 4
individual or a team of qualified personnel to address the threat posed by unexploded 5
ordnance and by individuals2 at or near the scene; 6
— Ensuring the overall security at the scene; 7
— Determining the search pattern to be used within the scene; 8
— Making appropriate assignments for teams; 9
— Ensuring access to the scene is controlled, including designating an individual to log 10
everyone entering or exiting the scene; 11
— Establishing and supervising the operational control areas (see also Figures 4 and 5), 12
recognizing that operational control areas need to reflect the geographical area needed to 13
manage the nuclear security event; 14
— Coordinating activities with other competent authorities having a role with regard to the 15
scene; 16
— Providing a continuous flow of information to the local/tactical commander; 17
— Notifying the local/tactical commander of needs for resources and personnel; 18
— Ensuring a cooperative spirit is maintained; 19
— Ensuring effective and efficient exchange of information among all responding personnel; 20
— Continually re-evaluating the efficiency of on-scene operations during the entire course of 21
operation; 22
— Ensuring that appropriate measures are taken to ensure chain of custody of all evidence is 23
maintained and documented in compliance with all relevant legal obligations; and 24
— Releasing the scene to an identified competent authority in accordance with national and 25
local practices after a final survey and inventory of the evidence is completed. 26
One tool that the on-scene/operational commander might use to maintain awareness of on-scene 27
activities is to establish and maintain an administrative worksheet. This document is described in 28
Appendix I, Section I.2, and a generic administrative worksheet is given in Appendix I, Figure I.2. 29
In addition, the roles and responsibilities of the on-scene/operational commander, which apply 30
specifically to a radiological crime scene should include: 31
— Ensuring that any nuclear or other radioactive material is placed under proper control by a 32
relevant competent authority at the scene; 33
2 These human-based threats might arise from individuals having nefarious intent or from victims of the criminal event who, as a consequence may be acting irrationally.
17
— Recognizing the need for follow-on examination both of any nuclear or other radioactive 1
material collected at the scene as well as of items associated with examinations performed 2
in the traditional forensic science disciplines; 3
— Notifying the organizations and laboratories of the pending delivery of the evidentiary 4
items collected from the scene and of the possible or known presence of radioactivity 5
associated with these items; and 6
— Ensuring that special attention is paid to the safety of personnel and the public on the 7
scene due to the presence of radiation. 8
3.3.2. Hazardous materials operations specialist 9
The roles and responsibilities of a hazardous materials operations specialist are similar to those at 10
any other crime scene where hazardous materials are present or are suspected as being present. 11
However, the exact nature of the duties of the hazardous materials specialist will differ according to 12
the nature of the hazard material. The roles and responsibilities traditionally associated with the 13
hazardous materials specialist should include: 14
— Identifying hazardous materials and monitoring the scene for the presence of hazardous 15
situations and conditions; 16
— Coordinating with the safety specialist (see Section 3.3.3) on developing and 17
implementing mitigation techniques for dealing with these same hazardous situations and 18
conditions and in planning and supervising the initial entry into the crime scene (see 19
Section 4.4.2); and 20
— Coordinating with the on-scene/operational commander to ensure all personnel on-scene 21
is informed of the presence of these hazardous situations and conditions and appropriate 22
ways of managing them. 23
In addition, the roles and responsibilities of the hazardous materials operations specialist, which 24
apply specifically to a radiological crime scene should include: 25
— Establishing and supervising hazard control areas; 26
— Conducting radiation monitoring at the scene; 27
— Establishing safety objectives for personnel conducting operations in areas where nuclear 28
or other radioactive material is present or is suspected and that these same objectives are 29
within the limits of every member of personnel’s training and that they have the 30
appropriate equipment; and 31
— Ensuring that all operations in the hazard control areas and the operational control areas 32
are coordinated with the on-scene/operational commander to ensure that goals are being 33
met. 34
18
3.3.3. Safety specialist 1
The roles and responsibilities of the safety specialist for a radiological crime scene are essentially 2
the same as those for any other crime scene. The presence of nuclear or other radioactive material will 3
influence some of the tasks performed by the safety specialist, but the safety specialist remains the 4
primary advisor to the on-scene/operational commander on matters of safety of all on-scene 5
personnel. The roles and responsibilities traditionally associated with the safety specialist should 6
include: 7
— Coordinating with the hazardous materials operations specialist to identify hazardous 8
conditions and situations, to plan and supervise the initial entry into the crime scene (see 9
Section 4.4.2) and to develop a plan for mitigating these conditions and situations; 10
— Ensuring the availability of medical care for injuries, illness and stress on the part of on-11
scene personnel, including the availability and administration of drugs and other 12
medications needed to deal with these injuries, illnesses and stress; 13
— Implementing a plan for monitoring the general physical health of on-scene personnel; 14
and 15
— Coordinating with local and national medical care centres to arrange specialized treatment 16
of injuries to on-scene personnel, to include arranging for the transport of personnel in 17
need of such care. 18
The additional roles and responsibilities for the safety specialist which apply specifically to a 19
radiological crime scene should include: 20
— Advising the hazardous materials operations specialist of all aspects of health and safety, 21
including work/rest cycles for teams working in the hazard control areas and the selection 22
of the appropriate personal protective equipment (PPE); 23
— Ensuring the protection of all personnel operating in the hazard control areas from 24
exposure to all physical, chemical and environmental hazards; 25
— Coordinating with the radiological assessor (see Section 3.3.4) to provide insight and 26
advice regarding the application of the time/distance/shielding paradigm related to the 27
safety of those personnel operating at or near an environment where radiation is present 28
above background levels; 29
— Identifying and monitoring personnel operating within the hazard control areas including 30
documenting and confirming both “stay times” (time using an air supply and/or radiation 31
exposure limit) and “work times” (time within the hazard control areas performing work); 32
and 33
— Ensuring that appropriate decontamination facilities are available as necessary for on-34
scene personnel. 35
19
3.3.4. Radiological assessor 1
The known or suspected presence of nuclear or other radioactive material at a crime scene 2
necessitates the addition of a radiological assessor to the roster of crime scene personnel. The roles 3
and responsibilities of the radiological assessor apply uniquely to a crime scene involving radioactive 4
material. The radiological assessor is a subject matter/technical expert who will advise the on-5
scene/operational commander on all aspects of radiation protection. The roles and responsibilities of 6
the radiological assessor should include: 7
— Advising the hazardous materials operations specialist and the safety specialist on the 8
development of the hazard risk assessment and in the selection of personal protective 9
equipment taking into consideration scene-specific factors, such as geography, presence 10
of debris, and weather, noting that each could change over the course of time; 11
— Briefing the on-scene personnel on the radiological situation and necessary protection 12
measures; 13
— Measuring airborne and surface contamination as well as monitoring for the presence of 14
nuclear and other radioactive materials; 15
— Categorization/characterization of any radioactive materials present (see Annex I); 16
— Measuring external dose; 17
— Assessing internal dose; 18
— Assisting the hazardous materials operation specialist and the safety specialist on the 19
establishment of the hazard control areas based on potential radiation exposure; 20
— Calculating the permissible or recommended times (“stay times”) for personnel who are 21
operating in any hazard control area; 22
— Conducting and interpreting radiation surveys (A form used for this purpose is described 23
in Appendix I, Section I.4, and a generic radiation survey map is given in Appendix I, 24
Figure I.4. Radiation detection instruments and other tools that might be used in the 25
conducting the radiation survey are presented in Annex I) in close coordination with the 26
evidence recovery personnel in order to protect the integrity of forensic evidence in the 27
scene; 28
— Advising the evidence recovery personnel (see Section 3.3.6) on establishing background 29
radiation levels; 30
— Assisting the hazardous materials operations specialist and the evidence recovery 31
personnel in surveying evidence as it is processed out of any hazard control area; 32
— Coordinating with the safety specialist (see Section 3.3.3) to provide insight and advice 33
regarding the application of the time/distance/shielding paradigm and the number of 34
persons involved related to the radiation safety of those personnel operating at or near an 35
environment where nuclear or other radioactive material is present; 36
20
— Ensuring that personal external radiation monitoring logs and records are maintained for 1
all team members (a form used for this purpose is described in Appendix I, Section I.9, 2
and a generic personal external radiation monitoring log sheet is given in Appendix I, 3
Figure I.10); 4
— Identifying appropriate procedures for decontamination of personnel, equipment and 5
evidence removed from the scene as well as conducting supporting measurements; 6
— Assisting in planning the collection, packaging, labelling, storage and transportation of 7
items of evidence; 8
— Advising regarding the on-scene decontamination of injured personnel; and 9
— Ensuring that any waste items, e.g., PPE, contaminated with radioactive material and 10
produced during the processing of the scene are recorded and disposed according to 11
national guidelines. 12
3.3.5. Scene modeller 13
The roles and responsibilities of the scene modeller at a radiological crime scene are essentially 14
the same as those at any other crime scene. The roles and responsibilities traditionally associated with 15
the scene modeller should include: 16
— Preparing a diagram of the crime scene, establishing a scale for the diagram, and 17
geographically orienting the sketch with respect to North A form used for this purpose is 18
described in Appendix I, Section I.5, and a generic scene diagram form is given in 19
Appendix I, Figure I.5); 20
— Setting forth on the diagram the major items of evidence; 21
— Coordinating the naming convention used for each item of evidence with the evidence 22
recovery personnel and the evidence recorder/custodian to ensure consistency in the 23
naming of such items; 24
— Annotating the diagram to indicate such things as adjacent buildings, rooms, furniture, 25
etc., as needed; 26
— Designating and labelling areas to be searched and advising the on-scene/operational 27
commander and the evidence recovery personnel of appropriate naming conventions for 28
designated areas; 29
— Obtaining appropriate assistance for taking measurements and listing each method of 30
measurement selected on the diagram; 31
— Ensuring necessary information, such as a scale disclaimer (for example, “rendering is not 32
drawn to scale”), is recorded on each sketch prepared of the crime scene; and 33
— Preparing all documents related to the scene in a manner suitable for use in any 34
subsequent legal proceedings. 35
21
However, fulfilling these roles and responsibilities at a radiological crime scene is likely to be 1
more challenging than would be the case for conventional crime scenes. This is in part due to the 2
obligation to the scene modeller to wear appropriate personal protective equipment while working 3
within the hazard control areas. 4
3.3.6. Evidence recovery personnel 5
The roles and responsibilities of evidence recovery personnel for a radiological crime scene are 6
essentially the same as those for any other crime scene. The roles and responsibilities traditionally 7
associated with evidence recovery personnel should include: 8
— Planning for the identification, collection, packaging, storage and transportation of items 9
of evidence, with advice from the hazardous materials operations specialist; 10
— Ensuring items of evidence deemed to be significant are photographed in place, with and 11
without scale, before they are collected, thereby assisting with reconstruction of the crime 12
scene; 13
— Keeping the on-scene/operational commander informed whenever items of evidence 14
deemed to be significant are located; 15
— Initialling and dating the evidence (typically on the bag or other container used for 16
purposes of collecting the evidence), noting where the item was located (typically by 17
reference to the sketch of the crime scene), and then releasing it to the evidence 18
recorder/custodian. This action is the first entry into a chain-of-custody log for the 19
particular item of evidence that has been collected. A form used for this purpose is 20
described in Appendix I. Section I.3, and a generic chain-of-custody form is given in 21
Appendix I, Figure I.3); 22
— Coordinating the naming conventions used for each item of evidence with evidence 23
recorder/custodian and the scene modeller to ensure consistency in naming such items; 24
and 25
— Ensuring all appropriate safety measures as detailed in the site safety plan is adhered to, 26
especially with respect to proper use of personal protective equipment. 27
However, fulfilling these roles and responsibilities at a radiological crime scene is likely to be 28
more challenging than would be the case for conventional crime scenes. This is in part due to the fact 29
that the evidence recovery personnel need to wear appropriate personal protective equipment while 30
working within the hazard control areas. 31
In addition to these roles and responsibilities, evidence recovery personnel take on two further 32
additional duties at a radiological crime scene: 33
22
— Coordinating with the radiological assessor and the hazardous materials operations 1
specialist to ensure each item of evidence is surveyed to determine whether each item of 2
evidence is contaminated with radioactive material and/or whether radiation is present 3
above background levels (as measured off scene) and, if so, to categorize that radiation. 4
This ensures that all personnel potentially coming into proximity with the evidence or 5
with the packaging associated with the evidence are alerted to any radiation hazard. 6
— Ensuring each item of evidence is secured in a manner that will enable it to be processed 7
through the hazard control areas and decontamination station with a minimum possibility 8
of the loss of items of potential evidentiary value. This last step may compel that evidence 9
containing nuclear or other radioactive material is placed into a double bag or is wrapped 10
in an appropriate material prior to its being processed through the decontamination 11
station. 12
The evidence recovery personnel are typically organized in teams, with each team having a team 13
leader. The evidence recovery team leader is responsible for preparing the evidence collection plan 14
(see Section 4.5.2). Additional information on the actions taken by the radiological evidence recovery 15
team is given in Section 4.5.4. 16
3.3.7. Photographer 17
The roles and responsibilities of the photographer for a radiological crime scene are essentially 18
the same as those for any other crime scene. However, fulfilling these roles and responsibilities at a 19
radiological crime scene is likely to be more challenging than would be the case for conventional 20
crime scenes. This is in part due to the fact that the photographer needs to wear appropriate personal 21
protective equipment while within the hazard control areas. 22
The roles and responsibilities traditionally associated with the photographer should include 23
recording images (still photography, video-photography, or a combination) of: 24
— The entire scene prior to the collection of any evidence. This step is vital to faithful 25
reconstruction of the crime scene. Such reconstruction will most likely be needed as part 26
of the investigation; 27
— Victims (including body parts, in the event there has been an explosion or other event that 28
has resulted in dismembering of victims), the public and any vehicles on-scene or 29
proximate to the scene; 30
— Major evidence items prior to their recovery or to their being moved for any reason; and 31
— Fingerprints, other impressions (shoe prints, tire tread marks), blueprints, maps and other 32
documents visible at the scene. 33
23
The photographer will also obtain any photographic images of the scene taken prior to the crime. 1
Finally, the photographer is responsible for preparing a log detailing each photographic image and 2
sketching where that image was taken (a form used for this purpose is described in Appendix I, 3
Section I.6, and a generic photography log sheet is given in Appendix I, Figure I.6). As far as 4
possible, every effort needs to be taken for this sketch to be coordinated with that prepared by the 5
scene modeller. 6
3.3.8. Evidence recorder/custodian 7
The roles and responsibilities of the evidence recorder/custodian for a radiological crime scene 8
are essentially the same as those for any other crime scene. The roles and responsibilities traditionally 9
associated with the evidence recorder/custodian should include: 10
— Preparation of the evidence recovery log3 (a form used for this purpose is described in 11
Appendix I, Section I.7, and a generic evidence recovery log sheet is given in Section I.7 12
describes the Evidence Recovery Log, and a generic form used for this purpose is given 13
in Figures I.7 and I.8); 14
— Coordinating the preservation and packaging of any evidence; 15
— Coordinating with the scene modeller and evidence recovery personnel regarding the 16
naming conventions used to describe each item of evidence; 17
— Receiving and recording all evidence; 18
— Maintaining custody and control of all evidence; 19
— Maintaining chain of custody in relation to all evidence; and 20
— Coordinating transmittal of all evidence to the case investigator or to a qualified 21
laboratory, in accordance with relevant guidelines [9]. 22
However an additional duty at a radiological crime scene is for the evidence recorder/custodian 23
to ensure that warnings regarding any radiation hazard associated with the evidence are properly 24
affixed and displayed. This step ensures that all personnel transporting, receiving or otherwise 25
handling the evidence are made aware of the presence of radiation and any radiation hazards 26
associated with transporting, receiving or otherwise handling evidence. 27
3.4. SPECIALIZED PERSONNEL FOR RADIOLOGICAL CRIME SCENE MANAGEMENT 28
The specialized personnel essential for managing a crime scene involving radioactive material 29
are dependent on its nature, magnitude, location and complexity. These resources will be managed 30
and organized at the national/strategic, local/tactical and on-scene/operational levels. 31
3 The evidence recovery log used with a conventional crime scene is augmented by the inclusion of radiation survey results for each item of evidence.
24
At the national/strategic command level, these resources should be comprised of senior officials 1
from ministries, agencies, and relevant authorities. At the local/tactical command level these resources 2
should be comprised of officials from the judicial, law enforcement and other emergency services, 3
public health, military and scientific and technical support agencies. The resources at the on-4
scene/operational command level should be the same as those for the local/tactical command level. 5
These resources organized, in command levels, will take into account the following functions 6
which are relevant to radiological crime scenes: 7
— Conduct of site surveys for and categorization of radiation hazards; 8
— Establishment, maintenance and control of hazard control areas; 9
— Protection of personnel against radiation hazards; 10
— Radiation risk reduction; 11
— Identification, collection, packaging, interim storage and transportation of items of 12
evidentiary value containing nuclear or other radioactive materials to the forensics 13
laboratory (ies); 14
— Decontamination of personnel, equipment, and areas, following monitoring and as 15
needed; 16
— Decontamination of evidence in a manner that avoids compromising its value to the 17
associated criminal investigation; 18
— Containment and treatment of liquids, such as decontaminating solutions, in a manner that 19
minimizes pollution; 20
— Clean-up of the site, to include the containment and treatment of any waste materials, and 21
— Proper disposal of contaminated waste items in accordance with national guidelines. 22
The management and organization of these resources will ensure their availability at the needed 23
location in a timely manner. 24
25
4. CONDUCT OF OPERATIONS 1
4.1. GENERAL 2
The conduct of operations at a radiological crime scene has several elements in common with the 3
conduct of operations at any other crime scene. The need to protect response personnel and the public 4
is critical and therefore will take priority over collecting evidence, interviewing witnesses, taking 5
photographic images and preparing written records of the scene. However, the conduct of operations 6
at a radiological crime scene differs from the conduct of operations at other crime scenes with respect 7
to: 8
(i) Time spent on-scene: 9
Personnel entering a radiological crime scene may need to limit the time spent within the 10
zone where nuclear or other radioactive material is known to be, or suspected of being, 11
present. Limiting time within the crime scene is necessary to protect the health and safety 12
of all on-scene personnel, regardless of their role on-scene. The effects of exposure to 13
radiation are well-known, and radiation exposure limits have been developed for single 14
event, annual, and lifetime radiation doses. Guidance on these radiation exposure limits 15
and other basic radiation safety standards can be found in Radiation Protection and Safety 16
of Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards, Interim Edition [24]. This 17
situation is unlike other crime scenes, where there may be an imperative to process the 18
scene as quickly as possible so that it might be re-opened for commerce or to the public4. 19
Crime scenes involving radioactive material are unique in those on-scene operations and 20
any subsequent release of the scene to other competent authorities needs to comply with 21
national radiation exposure limits and other standards related to radiation protection. 22
(ii) Distance between the evidence and the individual collecting that evidence: 23
To the extent reasonably possible, personnel conducting operations at a radiological crime 24
scene may need to maintain distance from any evidence containing nuclear or other 25
radioactive material. This is necessary in order to limit the personnel’s exposure to 26
radiation. 27
(iii) Shielding between the evidence and the individual collecting that evidence: 28
Personnel processing a radiological crime scene may need to be shielded in some manner 29
from nuclear or other radioactive material. This necessity for shielding means that 30
personnel may have impaired visibility of any item being sketched, photographed, 31
4An exception exists for scenes where toxic chemicals or biological pathogens are known to be or suspected of being present. For those types of scenes, there may be a need to limit time spent on-scene to minimize possibility of accidental exposure to the chemicals or pathogens.
26
collected, or inventoried. At some radiological crime scenes, the need for shielding of 1
personnel may result in their wearing personal protective equipment that encumbers their 2
on-scene movements, reduces their manual dexterity and might inhibits their ability to 3
communicate. Nonetheless radiation protection requisites are to be adhered to at a crime 4
scene involving radioactive material at all times and by all personnel. 5
(iv) Contamination control (surface activity concentration)5: 6
Measures to minimize the further dispersion of radioactive material should be 7
implemented. These may include, but are not limited to, the erection of barriers, damping 8
down of particulates, access control, and decontamination lines. Continuous checking of 9
the efficacy of these measures is important and should include: 10
• Monitoring for airborne radioactive material, 11
• Monitoring of personnel and equipment entering and exiting the scene, 12
• Monitoring the crime scene for changes in location of radiation hazards, 13
• Monitoring of evidentiary material and other items removed from the scene. 14
Personnel entering a radiological crime scene should be aware of the potential for, and 15
trained in measures that avoid: 16
• Intake of radionuclides; 17
• Activity concentration on personal protective equipment surfaces; 18
• Cross contamination of evidence; and 19
• Further dispersion of radioactive material. 20
Personnel exiting a radiological crime scene as well as equipment, evidentiary material 21
and other items being removed from the scene may need to be processed through a 22
decontamination station. 23
(v) Exposure control: 24
It is necessary to minimize the risk to personnel who may be exposed to radiation or any 25
associated chemical toxicity [24]. This minimization involves trade-offs between the number 26
of personnel involved and, for example, the dose each may receive. 27
The degree to which each of these factors will apply depends on the radioactive material present, 28
as determined by the common-hazards risk assessment (see Section 4.3). The operations at the 29
radiological crime scene have to be adapted to the level of hazards. Additionally, generalized 30
5 A similar requisite for decontamination might exist for other crime scenes, such as a scene where blood-borne pathogens might be present. But the extent to which decontamination is applied and the manner in which it is managed differ for a radiological crime scene.
27
guidance for conducting operations at any scene where nuclear or other radioactive material might be 1
present is given in Ref. [16, 17]. 2
4.2. SCENE CONTROL 3
Scene control involves all those activities undertaken to manage access into, within, and out of a 4
radiological crime scene. The overarching goals in controlling such a scene should be to: 5
— Minimize any radiation hazard and other hazards posed by a nuclear security event to the 6
general public and to those personnel who need to gain access to the scene for legitimate 7
purposes, such as evidence collection and scene security; 8
— Establish and maintain effective control over the nuclear or other radioactive material 9
associated with the radiological crime scene; and 10
— Preserve items of potential evidentiary value, both those that contain nuclear or other 11
radioactive material and those without such material. 12
The primary activities undertaken for scene control are perimeter security, traffic control, and 13
access control. In most regards, these activities are essentially the same as those activities undertaken 14
for other crime scenes. The important distinction, however, is that the suspected or known presence of 15
nuclear or other radioactive material demands special attention to ensure the protection of the public 16
and of the response personnel as well as the need to secure the nuclear or other radioactive material. 17
4.2.1. Perimeter security 18
An initial step in scene control is to secure its perimeter. Perimeter security is often under the 19
jurisdiction of law enforcement personnel, who are authorized to stop pedestrians and vehicles from 20
entering or exiting the scene and who can take appropriate action against those individuals or groups 21
who fail to obey a lawful order to stop. Perimeter security personnel need to be integrated into the 22
overall command, control, coordination and communication system, previously described in Section 23
3. 24
4.2.2. Traffic control 25
Control of traffic entering, exiting and moving around a radiological crime scene can be 26
accomplished either in concert with establishing perimeter security or immediately following 27
establishment of perimeter security. As with perimeter security, traffic control is often under the 28
jurisdiction of law enforcement personnel. In addition to control of surface traffic, traffic control 29
might also need to be extended to include control of air, maritime and sub-surface traffic through the 30
national/strategic command level or the local/tactical command level. 31
28
4.2.3. Scene access control 1
The procedures for scene access control include ensuring that anyone entering the scene needs to 2
pass by a designated official, who will determine whether the individual can be granted access. This 3
determination is often made through the on-scene/operational commander or his/her designated 4
representative or is established by means of a written list of personnel who are authorized to have 5
access to the scene (either by name or by position). Once it is determined that scene access can be 6
granted, the designated official will record the date and time of entry, the name of the individual for 7
whom access was granted, and the purpose associated with access (for example: evidence collection, 8
preparing a sketch of the scene, delivery of supplies). Similarly, the date and time are recorded when 9
this same individual exits the scene. In this way, an accurate log is maintained that documents who 10
had scene access, for what purpose, and for how long. A form used for this purpose is described in 11
Appendix I, Section I.1, and a portion of a generic crime scene entry log sheet is given in Appendix I, 12
Figure I.1). 13
4.3. COMMON-HAZARDS RISK ASSESSMENT 14
The initial phase of operations at a radiological crime scene needs to include an assessment of the 15
risks that might be encountered at the scene. This assessment encompasses hazards commonly 16
encountered that might pose a risk to health and safety of the public and/or personnel conducting 17
operations at the scene (e.g., debris, exposed utilities, severe weather). This assessment is known as a 18
common-hazards risk assessment and is essentially the same as those that would be performed for 19
other crime scenes. However, the conduct of common-hazards risk assessment at a radiological crime 20
scene differs from those at other crime scenes particularly with respect to: 21
— The known or suspected presence of nuclear or other radioactive materials obliges that a 22
material categorization be performed as part of the common-hazards risk assessment; and 23
— The hazards need to be assessed not only for the risks they might pose to routine 24
operations at the scene but also for the risks they might pose to (a) the personnel wearing 25
equipment to protect themselves from radiation while at the scene; (b) the uncontrolled 26
migration of nuclear or other radioactive material; and (c) the ancillary equipment to be 27
used to support operations at a radiological crime scene. 28
Additionally, attention needs to be given to the possibility of unexploded ordnance, secondary 29
devices and access denial devices (booby-traps) as well as any explosives that might be associated 30
with the nuclear or other radioactive material, as might be the case for a RDD. The tasks of locating 31
and rendering safe any such items are routinely performed for crime scenes by an individual or a team 32
of specialists designated for this task by the on-scene commander, as noted in Section 3.3.1. Examples 33
of common-hazards are described in Appendix II. 34
29
The common-hazards risk assessment will be used in developing plans describing the nature of 1
these hazards as well as the actions to be taken to mitigate them. Two such plans are described below 2
and are the event action plan and the scene safety plan. 3
4.3.1. Event action plan 4
The event action plan concisely defines the actions to be taken during the operational period. 5
The on-scene/operational commander is responsible for preparing the event action plan, which 6
consists of: 7
— The goal of on-scene operations; 8
— Objectives associated with meeting this goal; 9
— Strategies and tactics to be used to meet each objective; 10
— Task assignments; and 11
— Relevant safety and medical guidance. 12
4.3.2. Scene safety plan 13
The scene safety plan describes the scene-specific hazards as well as the danger-reduction 14
measures to be used. The safety specialist is responsible for preparing the scene safety plan. The 15
scene safety plan typically consists of: 16
— Key safety issues for all personnel at the scene6; 17
— Scene safety objectives; and 18
— Safety command structure. 19
Scene safety objectives specific to a radiological crime scene, include: 20
— Having the minimum number of personnel operating in the area where nuclear or other 21
radioactive material is present; 22
— Avoiding physical contact with items containing radioactive material or, where such 23
avoidance is impossible owing to the work being performed, limiting such contact 24
through using appropriate tools; 25
— Avoiding or otherwise limiting passage through areas where nuclear or other radioactive 26
material is present; 27
6 All personnel entering the hazard control areas as well as back-up personnel who might enter the hazard control areas need to be formed into teams having a minimum of two members. This condition ensures that the “buddy system” can be implemented, in which each person entering the hazard control area is paired off with one other person (that is, a “buddy”). Each individual is directed to look after the safety of other person, including observing his/her personal protective gear to be alert to rips, tears, or other openings and watching the actions (especially the posture, walk and speech) for signs of fatigue or heat-stress.
30
— Refraining from placing equipment on surfaces where nuclear or other radioactive 1
material is present; and 2
— Using the ALARA7 principle and the concepts of minimizing time, maximizing distance, 3
and employing shielding to reduce exposure to radiation. 4
Additional aspects of scene safety include necessitating that all personnel operating at the scene 5
be briefed on the scene safety plan and policies; establishing an escape route and emergency 6
evacuation signals; briefing personnel with all tasks and responsibilities prior to entry into the hazard 7
control areas; maintaining radio communications among the entry team, back-up team and the safety 8
specialist; and prohibiting drinking, eating, smoking and elimination of body wastes until after 9
personnel have been processed through the decontamination station. 10
4.4. DANGER-REDUCTION PROCEDURES 11
4.4.1. General 12
Most hazards at a radiological crime scene will be essentially the same as those found at other 13
crime scenes. Therefore, the danger-reduction procedures will be essentially the same. An additional 14
danger-reduction procedure at a radiological crime scene is the implementation of radiation protection 15
measures. These measures include monitoring and documenting the individual radiation doses 16
received by crime scene personnel. Results of this monitoring will be used in accordance with Ref. 17
[16], including comparing individual doses to documented radiation exposure limits. Activities 18
conducted at a radiological crime scene need to adhere to Ref. [24]. 19
4.4.2. Control areas 20
Establishing an operational control area and a hazard control area assists in the command and 21
control within those areas as well as with scene access control. Perimeters to the operational control 22
area and the hazard control area need to be established and marked to facilitate perimeter security and 23
scene access control. 24
The establishment of a hazard control area will indicate whether nuclear or other radioactive 25
material has been dispersed. Such dispersal might occur as a result of the functioning of an 26
improvised nuclear device (IND) or a RDD. These differences are depicted in Figures 4 (no dispersal) 27
and 5 (dispersal). 28
7ALARA stands for “As Low as Reasonably Achievable”.
31
Operational Control
Area
Hazard Control Area
1
FIG. 5. Illustration of a hazard control area and an operational control area of a radiological crime 2
scene where no dispersal of nuclear or other radioactive material has occurred. 3
4
5
FIG. 6. Illustration of adjustment (based on prevailing winds) that may be needed in a hazard control 6
area of a radiological crime scene, in the case of the airborne dispersal of nuclear or other 7
radioactive material. 8
Establishing the hazard control area for a radiological crime scene obliges that an initial entry be 9
conducted in a controlled manner into the areas where nuclear or other radioactive material is present 10
or is suspected. This entry is conducted by personnel whose actions are coordinated with hazardous 11
32
materials operations specialist (Section 3.3.2), safety specialist (Section 3.3.3), and the radiological 1
assessor (Section 3.3.4). The objectives of the initial entry should include: 2
— Measuring oxygen levels in air to help determine whether there are any respiratory 3
protection needed; 4
— Measuring levels of combustible gases and vapours in terms of their explosive range in 5
air to determine whether additional safety measures will be necessary; 6
— Measuring levels of radiation in the general area to determine the permissible stay times 7
for team personnel as well as having an understanding of areas of high radiation levels8; 8
— Detecting the presence of airborne and surface contamination with radioactive material to 9
determine suitable protective measures; 10
— Categorizing the radioactive material; and 11
— Obtaining spectral data to help identify radionuclide(s) and to increase confidence in the 12
identification process (detection instruments useful for this purpose is listed in Annex I). 13
At the time the initial entry is conducted, knowledge of the actual radiation hazards as well as any 14
other hazards within the scene will be incomplete. Therefore, planning for this entry will err on the 15
side of caution, and the actions of the personnel conducting the entry should be monitored closely. 16
The results of this initial entry are used by the hazardous materials operations specialist, the 17
safety specialist and the radiological assessor to determine: 18
— The geographical limits to the hazard control area; 19
— The levels and types of personal protective equipment and personal respiratory equipment 20
to be worn during subsequent entries; 21
— Stay times and action levels for personnel entering the hazard control area; 22
— The presence of common hazards and of mitigation techniques appropriate to these 23
hazards (a discussion of common hazards is given in Appendix II); and 24
— The need for specialized equipment to assist in evidence collection (for example, to 25
remove debris to enable access to evidence) 26
Further entries into hazard control areas should be predicated on selection and use of personal 27
protection equipment and personal respiratory equipment appropriate to the situation and for which 28
personnel have been trained and are deemed competent to use. Any individual making routine entry 29
into a hazard control area should receive a pre-entry safety briefing and vital signs assessment9. 30
8 Areas having high radiation levels are to be avoided, to the maximum extent practical. If avoidance is impossible or impractical, then specific procedures will need to be implemented to minimize time spent in such areas, consider distance from the nuclear or other radioactive material and/or incorporate use of shielding. 9 This assessment should include taking the individual’s temperature, pulse rate, respiration rate, and blood pressure.
33
The safety specialist, radiological assessor and hazardous materials operations specialist will 1
collaborate on the preparation of the briefing. All personnel prior to entry will acknowledge its receipt 2
in writing. Back-up teams need to be ready and available to assist. The decontamination station will 3
be established prior to any entry and personnel will be informed of its location prior to entry. Upon 4
the exit from any hazard control area and any decontamination station, a post-entry vital signs 5
assessment should be performed on each team member. 6
The entry team provides a briefing to the on-scene/operational commander or his/her delegate 7
regarding the operations that they performed and the conditions that they witnessed or measured. 8
4.4.3. Categorization 9
Categorization activities can be performed quickly and should provide information about the 10
potential risk of the questioned material to first responders, law enforcement personnel and the public 11
[3]. This information may also help to determine if laws covering the unauthorized use or possession 12
of radioactive material may have been broken, thereby forming the basis for a continued investigation. 13
In some cases, categorization may lead to the determination that no further investigation is warranted. 14
The general categories of nuclear and other radioactive materials are provided in Ref. [9]. Examples 15
of commonly used techniques and methods for achieving categorization are described in Annex I. 16
4.5. FORENSIC EVIDENCE MANAGEMENT 17
4.5.1. General 18
Collection of items of potential evidentiary value at a radiological crime scene should take place 19
following the development of the common-hazards risk assessment and the implementation of danger-20
reduction procedures. Forensic evidence management at a radiological crime scene is essentially the 21
same as it is at other crime scenes. However, it differs in the important respects that: 22
— The known or suspected presence of nuclear or other radioactive material obliges that all 23
evidence should be checked for radioactivity; and 24
— Nuclear or other radioactive material should be collected as part of both the evidence-25
gathering as well as the mitigation. 26
An essential element for the effective management of forensic evidence is the need to identify the 27
forensic laboratory or laboratories to which evidence should be submitted for examination. These 28
laboratories should be designated in advance, as described in Ref. [9]. 29
There are two types of items of potential evidentiary value that might contain radioactive 30
material: 31
— The nuclear or other radioactive material itself; and 32
34
— Other items associated with examinations performed in the traditional or emerging 1
forensic science disciplines but containing nuclear or other radioactive material10. 2
These will need special consideration in both collection and subsequent handling. All items 3
seized as items of potential evidence from the radiological crime scene or from any other scene of 4
interest to the investigation will: 5
— Be recorded in an evidence recovery log; 6
— Carry a unique identifier; 7
— Be placed under chain of custody at the time of collection; and 8
— Remain under chain of custody until it is no longer needed, and at that point disposed of 9
according to law as applicable. 10
4.5.2. Evidence collection plan 11
The evidence recovery team leader prepares the evidence collection plan, assisted by the 12
radiological assessor. Information obtained during the first entry into the hazard control areas will 13
assist in the development of an evidence collection plan. This information also assists in the 14
identification of any special engineering techniques that will be needed to facilitate collection of 15
evidence, such as the removal of debris or the conduct of confined space operations. These requisites 16
should be part of the evidence collection plan. Any special requisites for packaging or transportation 17
of the evidence (e.g., the removal of a vehicle or of other large items) will also be included. The plan 18
should identify any prerequisites for special collection techniques, such as underwater operations or 19
the handling of human remains. 20
Radiological crime scene evidence determined to emit radiation at or below recommended safety 21
levels [24] should be packaged, labelled, stored, transported, and examined in the same manner as that 22
used for other crime scenes. Evidence emitting radiation above recommended safety levels should be 23
packaged, labelled, stored and transported in accordance with relevant national regulations and 24
international standards, such as those given in Regulations for the Safe Transport of Radioactive 25
Material, including the use of special arrangements for transport of nuclear and other radioactive 26
material [10]. 27
4.5.3. Radiological evidence collection procedures 28
There is no precise figure as to the number of personnel who comprise a radiological evidence 29
recovery team. However there are definitive roles for all personnel within it. It is important that all 30
personnel within the team knows their assigned roles and responsibilities. It is equally important that 31
10 Traditional and emerging forensic science disciplines include fingerprints, DNA, explosives, fibers, paints, tool marks, and digitally recorded data. A more comprehensive discussion of these and other forensic science disciplines can be found in [9].
35
they know the roles and responsibilities of the other team members. Their roles and responsibilities 1
are clearly defined before they enter the radiological crime scene. This would normally be done 2
through a team briefing and preferably before personnel are dressed in personal protective equipment 3
(PPE), including their respiratory protective equipment (RPE). If this is not possible for operational 4
or other reasons, then the personnel can be in a relaxed state of dress, i.e. not wearing RPE and with 5
the PPE hood down and the PPE suit itself not completely zipped up. 6
At the briefing, an evidence collection plan needs to be in place (Section 4.5.2). This plan details 7
the priority in collecting the items of evidence or other samples. This plan should be based upon, inter 8
alia, the images of the scene taken by the photographer (Section 3.3.7) or otherwise made available to 9
the team as well as any reconnaissance that has been conducted. Collecting items of evidence may 10
involve using certain specialized pieces of equipment that may be unfamiliar to evidence recovery 11
team personnel. Even if they are familiar with the equipment, using it while dressed in full PPE and 12
RPE complicates its use. Consequently, support from scientific experts may be needed, especially as 13
they are more likely to be familiar with taking samples in full PPE and RPE. 14
All personnel entering the radiological crime scene should wear two sets of gloves in order that 15
the outer set of gloves can be disposed of and replaced with an additional pair of gloves when needed, 16
without leaving the hand exposed. 17
The team leader should form part of the deployment into the scene and should take responsibility 18
for the effective reconnaissance of the scene, concentrating on planning for the collection of items of 19
evidence. The team leader should, in line with the evidence collection plan and with the aid of any 20
images, maps, plans or drawings that have been produced, determine the sequence of the forensic 21
retrieval and discuss with the team the best equipment and packaging to use for the collection of the 22
evidence or other samples within the time frame allotted to the mission. 23
Specific team roles and responsibilities are assigned to the primary evidence collector and to the 24
assistant evidence collector. They both follow techniques to avoid the inadvertent transfer of 25
radioactive material during the evidence collection process. 26
The primary evidence collector is the individual on the radiological evidence recovery team who 27
is responsible for gathering evidence and placing it into a bag or other receptacle. 28
The assistant evidence collector is the individual on the radiological evidence recovery team who 29
is assigned the role of opening and holding a bag or other receptacle known to be free of nuclear or 30
other radioactive material. (Such a bag is occasionally referred to as a “clean bag” in that it is clean of 31
any foreign material.). This person works closely in support of the primary evidence collector. 32
On entering the radiological crime scene, the assistant evidence collector establishes an area to 33
work within the scene. The assistant requests that another member of the radiological evidence 34
36
recovery team place a drop sheet onto an area (preferably a clean or less contaminated area) and then 1
put the box, bucket or other suitable container that holds the material to be used to package evidence 2
onto the clean surface of this drop sheet. This container has not be put down onto a contaminated 3
surface until the drop sheet has been placed to avoid containing the material use to package the 4
evidence. A bag is placed nearby for the disposal of contaminated wastes, such as gloves and 5
discarded packaging. The contents of this bag should be recorded and disposed according to national 6
guidelines. 7
The assistant evidence collector should prepare the packaging for the primary evidence collector 8
to place the exhibit or sample into once it has been collected. Good practice is to start rolling down 9
the packaging from the inside before the primary evidence collector has collected the exhibit or 10
sample. This will allow the primary evidence collector to place the item directly in the packaging bag 11
without touching the outside of it. 12
Once the evidence is placed in the first bag, the assistant evidence collector can gently unroll the 13
bag making sure that his or her hands do not touch the inside of the bag. This process serves to 14
minimize cross contamination as well as the spread of radioactive material. The assistant evidence 15
collector then seals the packaging, placing any labels, etc., onto it, ensuring that the same description 16
written on the bag is written down by the scene modeller and photographer. This first bag or other 17
receptacle is then placed into another clean bag in a clean area at the decontamination station.11 A 18
swipe sample of the outermost bag is taken and measured with a portable radiation detection 19
instrument to assess surface activity concentration. If the surface activity concentration is above 20
background levels, the item is placed into yet-another clean bag (that is, a third bag or other 21
receptacle). 22
Personnel need to avoid cleaning or decontaminating the bag out of concern that such actions 23
might compromise the evidence. A dose rate survey needs then to be conducted in a low dose area to 24
measure the item. The dose rate survey should be conducted and survey results should be noted on the 25
evidence recovery log (See Appendix I, Section I.7 and Figures I.7 and I.8). 26
Once the evidence is collected, the evidence collectors should change their outer pair of gloves, 27
disposing of them as contaminated waste and using a fresh pair of gloves to continue with the 28
evidence collection. This step minimizes the prospects for contamination. Having changed their outer 29
gloves, the evidence collectors are ready to move on to the next sample or exhibit. Once it has been 30
collected, the process begins again with another fresh pair of gloves etc. PPE of the evidence 31
collectors should be monitored regularly for contamination with radioactive material. This is also a 32
way for the radiological assessor to monitor the extent of the radioactive contamination. 33
11 This process is referred to as “double-bagging”, because each item of evidence that is collected is contained within two bags or other receptacles
37
The clean packaged evidence is then placed in a suitable container, which will be placed on the 1
drop sheet (or another drop sheet if space permits) to prevent the exhibit or sample packaging being 2
contaminated on the outside. An assistant evidence collector then carries the collected evidence and 3
samples through the decontamination station. 4
4.5.4. Initial forensic examination at the scene 5
If the criminal investigation calls for an immediate initial evaluation by forensic examiners on 6
evidence contaminated with radioactive material (e.g., mobile telephones, paper notebooks, or latent 7
fingerprints), then this initial examination could be carried out in a mobile glove box or in a 8
designated hazard control area at, or near, the radiological crime scene. These initial examinations 9
should be conducted under the supervision of the evidence recorder, the safety specialist and the 10
radiological assessor. After the initial examinations are completed, the evidence should be re-11
packaged for transportation and submitted to the designated laboratory, as described in Section 4.5.6. 12
4.5.5. Evidence packaging, transportation and submission 13
All evidence from a radiological crime scene should be collected, packaged12 and submitted in 14
accordance with the evidence collection plan. This applies to all three types of evidence: 15
— The nuclear or other radioactive material itself; 16
— Other items of potential evidentiary value containing nuclear or other radioactive 17
material; and 18
— Other items of potential evidentiary value. 19
All packaged items of evidence containing nuclear or other radioactive material will be marked 20
to identify them as a radioactive hazard13. The label will also indicate all data that are known 21
concerning the radiation hazard (for example, dose rate, isotope, activity, type (s) of radiation. A form 22
used for this purpose is described in Appendix I, Section I.8, and a generic radioactive material 23
(RAM) label is given in Appendix I, Figure I.9). Most items collected for submission with some level 24
of shielding (in particular respecting the transportation personnel) should be transported [10] in 25
accordance with national transportation guidelines or recognized exceptions 26
4.5.6. Interim Evidence Storage Site 27
At some radiological crime scenes, it will be necessary to safely and securely store the evidence 28
at an interim location, known as the interim evidence storage site prior to its further transportation to 29
12 The practice of using a collector and assistant will be applied during packaging of the evidence. 13 Solid evidence, e.g. a closed container or a sealed source, may need to be imaged using X-ray radiography to understand the nature of the evidence and to confirm the absence of hidden explosives or other dangers within the container.
38
the designated laboratory. This will be necessary to ensure national regulations and laboratory 1
procedures are followed or simply to facilitate arrangements with the receiving laboratory, 2
particularly in cases where international assistance is needed. This interim evidence storage site needs 3
to have security measures in place to prevent evidence tampering, while also having the appropriate 4
radiological, chemical and/or safeguards permits necessary to store the quantity of nuclear or other 5
radioactive material present. The interim evidence storage site will also need to operate in accordance 6
with the applicable rules of evidence, including maintaining the chain of custody for handling of 7
evidence. 8
If material categorization was not performed at the scene, it should be performed at the interim 9
evidence storage site before transportation to the designated laboratory (ies). Even if material 10
categorization was performed at the scene, it may be useful to confirm the categorization, perhaps 11
using more advanced instrumentation, e.g. gamma ray spectrometry with a germanium detector rather 12
than a sodium iodide detector. The additional categorization can provide further information, as well 13
as an evaluation of the efficacy of the on-scene categorization. As noted above, all categorization 14
measurements need to be recorded in writing and be communicated to the designated laboratory (ies). 15
4.6. RELEASE OF SCENE 16
Once collection of evidence has been completed, the scene may be released from law 17
enforcement control. The mechanism for release of any radiological crime scene to relevant 18
competent authorities should be addressed in the national plan or as dictated by all relevant laws and 19
regulations. 20
4.7. AFTER-ACTION REVIEW 21
A useful activity to undertake once operations have concluded at a radiological crime scene is to 22
conduct an after-action review. The intent of this review is to determine the actions that took place 23
that met or exceeded expectations as well as those actions that failed to meet expectations in part or in 24
whole. The development of the after-action review represents an important opportunity to learn from 25
experience and feed back into the planning process. The results of the after-action review should be 26
communicated to all personnel having responsibilities for radiological crime scene operations as well 27
as to other agencies that are supported by or that lend support to these operations. The results should 28
be incorporated into plans and procedures as applicable. 29
The after-action review should be prepared by or at the direction of the on-scene/operational 30
commander and should include input from all personnel who participated in radiological crime scene 31
operations. Development of the after-action review is often an iterative process, with input to the 32
review being provided while radiological crime scene operations are underway. Additional input 33
39
should be provided from outside the radiological crime scene operational personnel, such as the 1
designated laboratory (ies) receiving the evidence and other law enforcement personnel as well as the 2
prosecutor’s office that used information from the radiological crime scene to support the 3
investigation and prosecution. 4
Those actions at the radiological crime scene that met or exceeded expectations merit further 5
consideration to identify the measures that contributed to their success. For example, additional 6
consideration might identify the extent to which success might be attributed to some combination of 7
proper planning, effective training, and frequent exercising of the operations at a radiological crime 8
scene. Alternatively, additional consideration might identify the availability of international assistance 9
as a key element of successful radiological crime scene operation. Such information might prove 10
useful in that it can reinforce those measures as part of preparations for operations at future 11
radiological crime scenes and it can be used to augment applicable sections of the national plan for 12
managing nuclear security events. 13
Those actions at the radiological crime scene that fell short of expectations merit further 14
consideration to identify the primary cause as well as any additional causes for these shortfalls. The 15
review should identify concrete measures to be taken to improve operations at any future radiological 16
crime scene. Such measures could include enhanced training, development of new tools, acquisition 17
of additional or improved equipment, and clarification of roles and responsibilities. 18
40
5. PREPAREDNESS 1
5.1. GENERAL 2
Preparedness for radiological crime scene operations is essential to building confidence that the 3
mobilisation of resources should be managed, controlled and coordinated effectively in a multi-4
disciplinary environment. The practical goal of preparedness is to ensure that arrangements are in 5
place for a timely, managed, controlled, coordinated and effective mobilisation of resources at the 6
national/strategic command level; the local/tactical command level and the on-scene/operational 7
command level. 8
Commensurate with their respective roles and responsibilities of each competent authority 9
involved with managing radiological crime scenes should establish and maintain adequate 10
preparedness programs. Such programs are necessary to ensure that competent authority have 11
identified the necessary resources and have made preparations and arrangements to deal with any kind 12
of radiological crime scene. A consequence of this planning and preparation may result in a 13
competent authority’s selecting and acquiring appropriate personal protective equipment, tools 14
(having extendable or expandable reach) and/or remotely-controlled robotic platforms. These 15
preparations should be included in the actions that need to be taken before, during and after a 16
radiological crime scene operation, by all competent authorities involved in managing the radiological 17
crime scenes including the undertaking of training, drills and exercises. 18
Additionally, competent authorities should ensure that appropriate training is provided for the 19
management of and operations at a radiological crime scene. These capabilities for all levels of 20
command should be exercised periodically. 21
5.2. BASIS FOR PREPAREDNESS 22
Consideration should be given to the integration of the management of operations at a 23
radiological crime scene as an extension of operations at a conventional crime scene and should 24
include considerations based on the specific demands for managing the crime scenes involving 25
radioactive material having regard to the national/strategic, local/tactical and on-scene/operational 26
levels. Once the capability for managing a radiological crime scene is established, it should be 27
exercised at time intervals in accordance with the national plan. 28
Competent authorities should ensure the preparedness of the specialized resources for 29
radiological crime scene operations, including the availability of appropriate procedures. In 30
undertaking preparations for operating in a radiological crime scene, considerations should be given 31
to the possibility of having to manage multiple radiological crime scenes simultaneously or nearly 32
41
simultaneously; or a crime involving nuclear or other radioactive material and response to other, high-1
priority criminal events. 2
All necessary arrangements should be in place to ensure the availability of the personnel needed 3
for radiological crime scene management, the associated personnel demanded for such endeavours as 4
well as the training of these personnel consistent with their assigned roles and responsibilities. The 5
various competent authorities with roles and responsibilities for response should ensure that they have 6
appropriate arrangements in place for selecting and equipping personnel as well as for delivering 7
training. These arrangements should include provisions for periodic refresher training on an 8
appropriate schedule. 9
Attention should be given to the training of appropriate personnel in: 10
— Procedures to be followed in a radiological crime scene; 11
— Conduct of site surveys for and categorization of radiation hazards; 12
— Establishment, maintenance and control of hazard control areas; 13
— Protection of personnel against radiation hazards; 14
— Radiation risk reduction; 15
— Decontamination of personnel, equipment, and areas, following monitoring and as 16
needed; 17
— Decontamination of evidence in a manner that avoids compromising its value to the 18
associated criminal investigation; 19
— Containment and treatment of liquids, such as decontaminating solutions, in a manner that 20
minimizes pollution; 21
— Proper disposal of contaminated waste items in accordance with national guidelines. 22
— Use of radiation detection instruments and PPE; 23
— Identifying, handling, recovering, packaging and transportation of evidence; 24
— Command, control, coordination and communications; 25
— Safety of personnel; and 26
— Procedures for communicating to and maintaining effective relations with the various 27
levels of the local authorities and national government, the news media, and the general 28
public. 29
5.3. PLANS AND PROCEDURES 30
5.3.1. National plan to manage nuclear security events 31
In order to facilitate the management of a radiological crime scene, a comprehensive national 32
plan to manage nuclear security events is needed. This plan should have clear interface with, inter 33
42
alia, the national and local level plans for response to conventional and/or nuclear or radiological 1
emergencies [3, 18]. The national plan should serve as: 2
— A basis for establishing compatible operational tools needed for a prompt and effective 3
radiological crime scene management; and 4
— A guide for the competent authorities who should ensure that all necessary tasks are given 5
the appropriate resources and support. 6
Usually, this national plan, outlining the various response measures and standard operating 7
procedures is developed and implemented coherently by various competent authorities, ideally 8
coordinated by the national coordinating body or mechanism [3, 18]. 9
5.3.2. Inter-agency arrangements 10
Arrangements should be made on an inter-agency basis for an integrated command, control, 11
coordination and communication system to facilitate the management of a radiological crime scene. 12
These arrangements should include, among others, functions, responsibilities, authorities, allocation 13
of resources, coordination of activities, priorities and interoperability, logistic support and facilities, 14
plans and procedures, and training, drills and exercises. In addition, arrangements should be in place 15
for notifying States and relevant international intergovernmental organizations in accordance with 16
international agreements and/or national policy. 17
5.3.3. Competent authority’s specific procedures 18
Procedures for managing a radiological crime scene should be written and updated as necessary. 19
Such procedures should contain provisions for: 20
— Integrated command, control, coordination and communications; 21
— Interoperability; 22
— Scene safety; 23
— Physical and operational security of the scene; 24
— Minimization of any radiation hazard and other hazards posed by a nuclear security event 25
to the general public and to those personnel who need to gain access to the radiological 26
crime scene for legitimate purposes; 27
— Establishment and maintenance of effective control over the nuclear or other radioactive 28
material; 29
— Identification and rendering safe of explosives, explosively-configured items, and booby 30
traps; 31
— Preservation of items of potential evidentiary value, both those that contain nuclear or 32
other radioactive material and those without such material; 33
— Decontamination of personnel, radiation detection instruments, evidence, etc.; 34
43
— Incorporation of mechanisms for requesting assistance, both domestically and 1
internationally, when necessary; 2
— Arrangements for informing the local and national levels of the government, the news 3
media, and the general public, as appropriate, in a coordinated, accurate, clear and 4
consistent manner; 5
— Maintenance of capabilities for radiological crime scene operations, including periodic 6
testing of these capabilities; allocation of personnel to replace those lost by retirement, 7
resignation or movement to other positions; refresher training of all personnel; and 8
resupply of equipment and instrumentation that have passed their service life or are 9
otherwise no longer suitable for use; and 10
— Periodic exercising of all procedures, personnel and equipment. 11
Each relevant competent authority develops procedures, in accordance with its role, as specified 12
in the national plan. Relevant personnel from a competent authority should be trained in those 13
procedures and subjected to periodic drills and exercises. 14
5.4. EQUIPMENT 15
5.4.1. General 16
Planning for the acquisition of equipment for use at radiological crime scene should be guided by 17
technical specifications that reflect the concepts of operations at such scenes. These specifications 18
should adhere to national or international standards. Determining the technical specifications should 19
consider the type of radiation that is expected to be encountered as well as functional requirements 20
such as: 21
— Ability to withstand exposure to environmental factors (such as range of temperatures, 22
humidity, and adverse weather conditions); 23
— Ease of installation, use, decontamination and removal under deployment considerations; 24
— Ease of training personnel in use, calibration, and maintenance; and 25
— Ability to be sustained. 26
Periodic drills and exercises should be conducted with all items of equipment intended for 27
radiological crime scene operations to ensure both that items perform according to specifications and 28
that personnel are familiar with proper use. Technical specifications should be reviewed and modified 29
periodically to reflect changes in the state-of-the-art as well as to incorporate lessons-learned during 30
these drills and exercises. Finally, the specifications should be updated to reflect the experience 31
gained during actual radiological crime scene operations, as given in the After-Action Review (see 32
Section 4.8). 33
44
5.4.2. Radiation detection instruments 1
Preparation for radiological crime scene operations should include the selection of radiation 2
detection instruments. Representative types of radiation detection instruments suitable for use at a 3
radiological crime scene are presented in Annex I. Prior to initial use, instruments should be calibrated 4
according to national regulations/procedures and be subject to an acceptance test to confirm 5
performance to the technical specifications. A maintenance plan for the instrument should be 6
established at the time of acceptance and should be based on national or international standards and 7
advice of the manufacturer. In addition, calibration, performance testing and preventive maintenance 8
should be carried out periodically by qualified experts, based on international or national standards as 9
well as the advice of the manufacturer of the instrument. Results of calibrations, performance testing 10
and preventive maintenance should be recorded, and these records should be retained. 11
5.4.3. Personal protective equipment 12
Preparation for radiological crime scene operations should include the selection of personal 13
protective equipment (PPE). Items of PPE should include: 14
— Respiratory protective equipment (RPE); 15
— Gloves; 16
— Footwear; 17
— Undergarments, such as vests worn to reduce heat load; and 18
— Overgarment. 19
One goal in selecting PPE is minimizing the hindrance caused by the items of PPE while also 20
maximizing the protection afforded against both exposure to radiation and the range of possible on-21
scene hazards (e.g., toxic vapours and blood-borne pathogens). Factors to be considered in achieving 22
this goal include ability to afford protection for the anticipated duration of operations; compatibility 23
with various body types (such as height, weight, and physique); ability to withstand damage during 24
operations; ability to withstand loss of normal human sensitivities to speech, sight, and touch; and 25
ease of dressing and undressing in each item. 26
In addition, radiation dosimeters, which are a type of radiation detection instrument, are also an 27
item of PPE. 28
Representative types of PPE suitable for use at a radiological crime scene are presented 29
in Annex I. 30
5.4.4. Ancillary equipment 31
Preparation for radiological crime scene operations should include the selection of ancillary 32
equipment. Examples of ancillary equipment include: 33
45
— Communications equipment, 1
— Decontamination equipment; 2
— Evidence collection, packaging and transportation containers; 3
— Manipulators for remotely moving objects such as evidence; and 4
— Specialized equipment for interrogating objects such as portable x-ray units. 5
Representative types of ancillary equipment suitable for use at a radiological crime scene are 6
presented in Annex I. 7
5.5. INFORMATION RESOURCES AND MANAGEMENT 8
Resources for inflow as well as outflow of information to and from competent authorities should 9
be identified within the national plan for managing a nuclear security event. Methods for management 10
of these resources should be implemented and exercised in accordance with this plan. 11
5.5.1. Points of contact 12
Predefined points of contact among the various competent authorities that are responsible for 13
receiving notifications of the occurrence of a nuclear security event should be established. These 14
points of contact should be available continuously. 15
5.5.2. Routine communications 16
Effective communication in the planning, execution and follow-up is essential to effective 17
radiological crime scene management. In preparation for such operations, various participants from all 18
levels (strategy, tactical and operational) may be asked for input based on their different fields of 19
expertise. In this way, early engagement of participants could broaden the support base for the 20
radiological crime scene management. 21
It is essential that robust routine communication between all competent authorities be efficient. 22
This routine communication should be established on the basis of either radio systems or telephone / 23
internet networks, recognizing that in a nuclear security event or other large-scale emergency, some 24
methods of routine communications may become compromised or unavailable owing to heavy 25
civilian demand or damage associated with the event. 26
5.6. TRAINING 27
Relevant competent authorities should assist each other with planning and training activities 28
designed to improve preparedness. Each relevant competent authority is encouraged to coordinate its 29
46
training programs through a coordinating body14 to avoid duplication and make its training available 1
to others. 2
An effective training mechanism is a critical component in developing the skills and knowledge 3
of radiological crime scene personnel. However, given the diverse nature of conditions/demands and 4
activities within a radiological crime scene, the challenges of formulating a rigorous training approach 5
are significant and should reflect the following: 6
— National needs assessment, such as requisites for training facilities; 7
— Awareness efforts; 8
— Roles and personnel; and 9
— Continuous evaluation of training programs. 10
5.7. DRILLS AND EXERCISES 11
A drill and exercise program should be designed to continually improve the competencies and 12
capabilities of personnel operating at a radiological crime scene. Program officials should use the 13
results of such drills and exercises to identify strengths and address deficiencies in instrumentation, 14
operations and training [20]. 15
5.8. SUSTAINABILITY 16
Comprehensive planning and commitment of sufficient financial, material and human resources 17
are needed to ensure the long-term effectiveness of national capabilities for managing a radiological 18
crime scene [25]. Attention to day-to-day operations, maintenance, quality control and continuous 19
system improvements, as well as to the flexibility to adapt to an evolving threat is needed. 20
Sustainability of human resources should take into account personnel rotations and attrition 21
within different competent authorities, as well as the necessity for continuous training of all 22
personnel. Planning efforts should ensure that there will be a sufficient numbers of qualified personnel 23
to operate and maintain equipment and assess instrument alarms and information alerts. States should 24
consider the possibility of dual or multiple radiological crime scenes or the combination of a 25
radiological crime scene with other, high-priority national events. In considering such possibilities, 26
States might seek out arrangements for bilateral, regional or multilateral mutual assistance if their own 27
radiological crime scene management capabilities become overwhelmed. 28
The objectives to promoting sustainable resources for radiological crime scene management and, 29
more specifically, sustainable programs and practices, include: 30
14 An example of a coordinating body is a committee with representatives of all relevant competent authorities.
47
— Building and maintaining political will by promoting a nuclear security culture within 1
programs; 2
— Encouraging long-term effectiveness by containing cost and fostering resources and 3
information sharing; and 4
— Sustaining operations by accounting for the life-cycle cost of the equipment and by 5
ensuring the continuous availability of trained and motivated personnel. 6
48
6. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE 1
6.1. GENERAL 2
Radiological crime scenes have the potential to involve trans-boundary issues. For example, 3
material associated with the nuclear fuel cycle may have been mined and milled in one country, then 4
transported across international borders for manufacture into the requisite form for use as nuclear fuel, 5
and finally moved across other international borders for ultimate use in a power reactor. Similarly, 6
radioactive sources may have been produced in one country and then transported across one or more 7
international borders to another country for use or resale. All these trans-boundary moves may have 8
been done in full accord with national and international laws governing such transfer and use of these 9
materials. However there is a possibility for material to become out of regulatory control at any step 10
associated with these trans-boundary movements. Additionally, the dispersal of radioactive material 11
from a radiological crime scene may cross national boundaries. 12
The experience in 2006 with a case involving polonium-210 demonstrated how this material 13
could cross national boundaries and how a nuclear security event detected in one State can have 14
consequences for neighbouring States owing to the ability of individuals and materials to move across 15
borders. In this case, detection of polonium-210 in Great Britain led to discovery of polonium-210 in 16
Germany, with the conclusion that the two events may have been related [26, 27]. 17
Consequently, international cooperation and assistance are essential to the effective management 18
of any radiological crime scene from which nuclear or other radioactive material out of regulatory 19
control is collected, packaged, and transported. Furthermore, cooperation and assistance might be 20
initiated in advance of any nuclear security event, such as through joint participation in training and 21
exercises in preparation for any specificity in managing a crime scene involving radioactive material. 22
Finally, States may have incurred certain obligations relative to cooperation and assistance as a 23
result of being party to a bilateral agreement or international legal instruments. For instance, States 24
Parties to the Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material are obligated to render 25
assistance to another States Party if requested on matters where nuclear material is lost or stolen [2]; 26
such an event could involve a known or suspected radiological crime scene. 27
Because of the universal need to strengthen the means of responding to nuclear security events, 28
sharing lessons-learned from actual events or from exercises with international counterparts is 29
expected and desirable. Such sharing allows counterparts to consider whether their own procedures 30
need to be revised. 31
49
6.2. AREAS OF COOPERATION AND ASSISTANCE 1
Assistance on matters related to managing a radiological crime scene may be facilitated by the 2
international community or may be requested directly on a bilateral or multilateral basis [14, 16, 19]. 3
Assistance during a response may be requested for activities either conducted at the scene of the 4
known or suspected crime (that is, “on-scene”) or removed from the scene (that is “off-scene”). 5
In order to expedite the provision of bilateral or multilateral assistance, arrangements should be 6
made in advance for promptly and directly notifying any State in which urgent protective actions 7
might need to be taken. States are individually responsible for arriving at such arrangements [14, 16, 8
21]. 9
Additionally, conducting joint training and exercises will aid in optimizing the integration of 10
cooperation and the rendering of assistance during an actual incident [20]. Such training and exercises 11
events will aid in identifying possible additional areas in which the cooperation and assistance might 12
be desired and in developing enhanced means by which the cooperation and assistance are provided. 13
A known or suspected radiological crime scene may require requests for additional resources or 14
expertise from another State. Consequently, cooperation and assistance may be needed to ensure the 15
actions taken on the scene protect public health and safety while also preserving items of potential 16
value as evidence during any investigation. The precise nature of the cooperation and assistance will 17
depend on various factors associated with both the requesting State itself and the radiological crime 18
scene. Possible areas in which cooperation and assistance might be requested include: 19
— Identifying and subsequently obtaining and operating equipment for radiological crime 20
scene operations. This equipment could be personal protective equipment to be worn by 21
or carried by on-scene operators; vehicles or specialized equipment needed to gain access 22
into and within the site and to control scene ingress and egress; and radiation detection 23
instruments; 24
— Assisting with rendering safe an IND or an RDD; 25
— Providing experts to assist with on-scene operations, such as command, control and 26
communication; categorization; processing the radiological crime scene for evidence; 27
mitigating non-radioactive on-scene or near-scene hazards, such as utilities, flammable 28
liquids, compressed gases, and energetic materials (explosives); medical assistance to 29
victims of exposure to radiation and to any other injuries associated with the scene; 30
decontamination of personnel and equipment; and remediation of the scene to permit 31
reoccupation; 32
— Identifying and applying procedures for collecting, packaging, and transporting evidence 33
that are best suited to the environment associated with the radiological crime scene, the 34
surrounding community, and the situation within the effected State; and 35
50
— Assisting with bringing the seized nuclear or other radioactive material under regulatory 1
control [16, 22]. 2
In addition to requesting and receiving cooperation and assistance with on-scene activities, a 3
State might take similar steps for activities removed from the radiological crime scene. Such off-scene 4
activities might be proximate to or distant from the radiological crime scene, depending upon such 5
factors as the nature of the nuclear security event and the needs of the requesting State. 6
In many respects, the off-scene cooperation and assistance is similar to the on-scene cooperation 7
and assistance with the important distinction that off-scene activities require no presence in the area 8
directly associated with the recovery of the nuclear or other radioactive material. Therefore, the risk to 9
the health and safety of any individual, team or group rendering assistance may be deemed to be more 10
manageable. Possible areas in which off-scene cooperation and assistance might be requested include: 11
— Assessment of the potential consequences of a nuclear security event; 12
— Development of specifications for, identifying potential sources, and aiding in the 13
delivery of equipment to be used in managing the radiological crime scene; 14
— Provision of experts and equipment to assist with off-scene screening and treatment of 15
victims of exposure to radiation or to other injuries related to the incident; 16
— Provision of experts to assist with locating, identifying and gathering off-scene items of 17
potential evidentiary value, such as cellular phones and other digital recording devices; 18
— Provision of knowledgeable personnel who can give direction, advice and support in 19
regard to the taking of statements from witnesses or the follow-up of investigative leads 20
related to events associated with the radiological crime scene; 21
— Identification of interim or permanent storage sites for the nuclear or other radioactive 22
material so that it might be brought under regulatory control; 23
— Identification and coordination with potential locations for analysis to support any follow-24
on nuclear forensic investigation needed to assist in attribution of the nuclear or other 25
radioactive material; and 26
— Development of strategies for communicating to the public, other States and relevant 27
International Intergovernmental Organizations [14, 21]. 28
One example of off-scene cooperation and assistance that might be afforded to States is that 29
offered by INTERPOL. Its “Operation Fail Safe” takes advantage of INTERPOL’s Notice System to 30
generate the issuance of Green Notice regarding individuals involved in the smuggling of nuclear or 31
other radioactive material. Additionally, its Project GEIGER involves the development and sharing of 32
analytical products on illicit trafficking and other events (see Annex II). 33
51
6.3. DEVELOPMENT OF ARRANGEMENTS FOR ASSISTANCE 1
In developing or in responding to a request for assistance, considerations should be given for 2
establishing a firm understanding of the basis of the request for assistance. Issues to consider include: 3
— Whether payment is to be offered or is expected for the assistance and, if so, the amount, 4
method and timing of that payment; 5
— Whether testimony will be required on the part of personnel from the donor(s) to the State 6
receiving assistance and, if so, under what conditions and laws that testimony is to be 7
provided and whether or not the expertise of the donor(s) expert would be recognized in 8
the national legal system of the requesting State; 9
— How security of sensitive information associated with the donor(s) and the recipient State 10
will be managed; 11
— The exact roles and responsibilities of any individual, team or group providing assistance, 12
and in circumstance where that individual, team or group were involved in the 13
management of a radiological crime scene or has a role at the radiological crime scene, 14
the arrangements for command and control of that individual, team or group The 15
provisions that exist or that may be made available for medical assistance provided by the 16
donor(s) to anyone from another State who is present on-scene or otherwise in the State 17
and is in need of medical aid (to include the expectations relative to payment for this 18
medical assistance); 19
— The arrangements that exist or that are to be made available for logistical support (such as 20
lodging, meals, and transportation) and for personal security (if needed) for any 21
individual, team or group from the donor(s) that is rendering assistance; 22
— Whether visas might be required and, if so, what assistance might be provided by the 23
requesting State in obtaining these visas; 24
— Whether and how any individual, team or group from the donor(s) might be indemnified 25
against any unintentional acts that are deemed harmful by an individual, private group or 26
governmental entity in the State receiving the assistance; and 27
— The expectations that exist or that will exist on the parts of the receiving State and the 28
donor(s) with regard to sharing of any information regarding the assistance being 29
provided, including having it known that assistance is being provided by an individual, 30
team or group from another country or other countries and including who is authorized to 31
speak publicly on behalf of the assisting country or countries (if anyone). 32
One means of dealing with the need to formalize these arrangements is to develop a bilateral or 33
multilateral assistance agreement or Memorandum of Understanding or like instrument in advance of 34
any nuclear security event where such assistance might be required or desired. Some of the issues 35
listed above may have been agreed-upon in more general mutual assistance agreements and, 36
52
consequently, could be included by reference. The existence of an approved agreement might expedite 1
any response to a request for assistance by ensuring all parties understand expectations and limitations 2
that apply to the individual, team or group providing assistance to the requesting State. 3
States are encouraged to refer to the IAEA Implementing Guide on Nuclear Forensics in Support 4
of Investigations for guidance on matters related to the conduct of nuclear forensic analyses [9]. 5
53
Appendix I 1
SAMPLE FORMS USED FOR RADIOLOGICAL CRIME SCENE MANA GEMENT 2
This appendix provides samples of some of the forms that might be used for radiological crime 3
scene management. Each form is described in terms of its intended use, the essential elements of 4
information to be recorded on the form, and the crime scene personnel routinely associated with its 5
preparation. All forms, once used, become part of the record of the crime scene and, therefore, should 6
be retained in accordance with national arrangements. The forms given in Figures I.1 to I.10 are 7
generic in nature. Member States might alter or otherwise adapt each form as needed to suit their 8
national requirements or preferences. 9
I.1. CRIME SCENE ENTRY LOG 10
The crime scene entry log is used to record each person entering or exiting the scene. Essential 11
elements of information include (a) name of the agency having responsibility for managing the scene 12
or for maintaining the entry log; (b) the unique identifier associated with the case, event or incident, 13
such as its name or number; (c) scene location; (d) name of each person entering or exiting the scene; 14
(e) date and time of entry; (f) date and time of exit; and (g) reason for entering the scene. Local 15
practices might dictate inclusion of additional information, such as the title and agency of each person 16
entering or exiting the scene, or might require that each person record his or her signature on the entry 17
log. A sample entry log is given in Figure I.1. 18
19
Fig. I.1. Partial Generic Crime Scene Entry Log Sheet. 20
54
I.2. ADMINISTRATIVE WORKSHEET 1
The administrative worksheet is used to record general information regarding both the crime 2
scene and the duties of personnel responding to the scene. Essential elements of information include 3
(a) the unique identifier associated with the investigation, such as its name or number; (b) 4
geographical location of the scene; (c) conditions at the scene on arrival (d) weather; (e) lighting; (f) 5
personnel involved at the scene and their respective duties; and (g) notes and observations regarding 6
the scene itself, such as preliminary survey results (if any) and special conditions or situations (if 7
any). A sample administrative worksheet is given in Figure I.2. 8
9
Fig. I.2: Generic Administrative Worksheet. 10
11
55
I.3. CHAIN OF CUSTODY 1
Chain of custody for evidence begins at the crime scene. Each item of evidence has its own chain 2
of custody and, hence, its own form. Essential elements of information given on this form are: (a) 3
description of the item; (b) from whom or from where it was obtained; (c) name and signature of the 4
person who obtained the item; (d) date on which it was obtained; and (e) the unique identifier 5
associated with the case, event or incident, such as its name or number. Each transfer of the item is 6
recorded, giving the location, date of transfer; name and signature of the person releasing the item and 7
name and signature of the person receiving the item. This form remains with the item as 8
documentation of its provenance. A sample chain of custody document is given in Figure I.3. 9
10
Fig. I.3: Partial Chain of Custody Form. 11
56
I.4. RADIATION SURVEY MAP 1
The radiation survey map provides a record of the radiation at the radiological crime scene. It 2
records the results of a survey conducted of the scene. It is prepared by or at the direction of the 3
radiological assessor (Section 3.3.4), under advisement from the evidence recovery personnel 4
regarding the particular areas to be swiped. Essential elements of information given on this map are 5
(a) location; (b) date: (c) name of the person preparing the survey; (d) radiation detector associated 6
with each survey result; and (e) the result, in terms of dose rate for radiation field and in count rate for 7
surface activity. In addition, the form records the position of swipe samples. The map also notes the 8
background dose rate. A sample radiation survey map is shown in Figure I.4. 9
10
Fig. I.4: Generic Radiation Survey Map. 11
57
I.5. SCENE DIAGRAM 1
The scene diagram or sketch provides a rendering of the radiological crime scene as found prior 2
to collecting evidence. It is typically tied to the photographic log and the evidence recovery log. It is 3
prepared by the scene modeller (Section 3.3.5). Essential elements of information given on this 4
diagram are: (a) date; (b) the unique identifier associated with the case, event or incident, such as its 5
name or number; (c) name of the scene modeller and of any other personnel assisting in preparing the 6
diagram; and (d) reference data, such as scale, compass orientation, fixed objects (such as 7
geographical features or structures), and the location of any items of evidence that are recovered. A 8
sample scene diagram is given in Figure I.5. 9
10
Fig. I.5: Generic Scene Diagram Form. 11
58
I.6. PHOTOGRAPHIC LOG 1
The photographic log provides a record of images taken at the radiological crime scene. It is 2
typically tied to the scene diagram and the evidence recovery log. It is prepared by the photographer 3
(Section 3.3.7). Essential elements of information given on this log are: a) date; (b) the unique 4
identifier associated with the case, event or incident, such as its name or number; (c) name of the 5
photographer and of any other assisting with photographing the scene; and (d) a unique identifier and 6
description for each photograph or other image that is taken. A sample photographic log is given in 7
Figure I.6. 8
9
Fig. I.6: Partial Generic Photographic Log Sheet. Each sheet is numbered separately. 10
59
I.7. EVIDENCE RECOVERY LOG 1
The evidence recovery log provides a record of both the personnel collecting evidence at a 2
radiological crime scene and the items of evidence collected. It is prepared by the evidence recovery 3
recorder/custodian (Section 3.3.8). It is typically prepared in two parts: a cover sheet and a listing of 4
the items of evidence, which is the evidence recovery log. 5
Essential elements of information on the evidence recovery log cover sheet are: (a) date; (b) the 6
unique identifier associated with the case, event or incident, such as its name or number; (c) location; 7
and (d) identifying information, signature, and initials of all personnel involved in collecting items of 8
evidence. A sample cover sheet is given in Figure I.7. 9
10
Fig. I.7: Generic Cover Sheet (this sheet accompanies the evidence recovery log). 11
Essential elements of information on the evidence recovery log are: a) date; (b) the unique 12
identifier associated with the case, event or incident, such as its name or number; (c) location; (d) 13
name of the personnel preparing the log; and (e) information on each item of evidence recovered. This 14
information includes the unique identifier assigned to each item, a description of the item, the location 15
where it was collected, identity of the personnel who collected it, the unique identifier for any 16
photographs taken of the evidence, and the method used to package the item. A sample evidence 17
recovery log is given in Figure I.8. 18
60
1
Fig. I.8: Generic Evidence Recovery Log Sheet. This sheet is accompanied by a cover sheet 2
detailing the evidence recovery personnel. 3
61
I.8. RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL (RAM) LABEL 1
The radioactive material (RAM) label is affixed to each item of evidence collected at a 2
radiological crime scene when that item is determined to have a level of radiation in excess of limits 3
allowed by national or local standards. Essential elements of information given on this label are: (a) 4
the evidence item number (an identifier that is unique to that item); (b) description of the item; (c) 5
location where it was collected; (d) the unique identifier associated with the case, event or incident, 6
such as its name or number; (e) date collected; (f) the personnel who collected the item; (g) radiation 7
survey data describing the nature of the radiation associated with the item. A generic RAM label is 8
shown in Figure I.9. 9
10
Fig. I.9: Generic RAM Label. 11
I.9. PERSONAL EXTERNAL RADIATION MONITORING LOG 12
The personal external radiation monitoring log records the external radiation dose received by 13
each person in the radiological crime scene. The radiological assessor is responsible for ensuring that 14
this log is maintained, with assistance from the evidence recovery team leader and/or scene safety 15
officer. Essential elements of information given on this form are for each individual operating in the 16
62
hazard control area: (a) the unique identifier associated with the case, event or incident, such as its 1
name or number; (b) date; (c) name of the individual; (d) model and serial number of the personal 2
radiation monitoring device carried by this individual; (e) the time that the individual entered and 3
exited the hazard control area; (f) duration; and (g) calculated external radiation dose. The log also 4
provides data on background radiation dose rate and the action level. A sample radiation monitoring 5
log is given in Figure I.10. 6
7
Fig. I.10: Generic Personal External Radiation Monitoring Log Sheet. 8
63
Appendix II 1
HAZARDS COMMONLY ENCOUNTERED AT CRIME SCENES 2
This appendix briefly describes examples of hazards that might be encountered at any crime 3
scene and, thus, that are to be considered in preparing the Common-Hazards Risk Assessment 4
(Section 4.3) and in developing scene-specific danger-reduction procedures (Section 4.4). The 5
hazardous materials operations specialist (Section 3.3.2) and the safety specialist (Section 3.3.3) 6
collaborate in conducting this assessment and in developing danger-reduction procedures. The 7
assessment and the plan for danger-reduction become part of the record of the crime scene. These 8
examples are: 9
— Chemical storage tanks, such as those used for chlorine, fuel oil, liquefied natural gas 10
(LNG), petrol, propane, and other commercial chemicals. The presence of such storage 11
tanks might be of particular importance if the scene has been disrupted owing to an 12
explosion tied to the nuclear security event or to causes independent of the event; 13
— Confined spaces, such as an empty swimming pool, the interior of a storage tank or of a 14
grain silo, a tunnel, or an underground vault such as those used for utilities. Such spaces 15
are inherently unsafe and present hazards such as the possibility of a low-oxygen 16
atmosphere and the presence of harmful gases; 17
— Debris, such as concrete, broken or intact glass, construction materials and timber that 18
might be on the ground or suspended above the site. The presence of such debris might 19
require special planning to ensure on-scene personnel can manoeuvre safely, including 20
avoiding comprising their personal protective equipment. Debris might also interfere with 21
the operation of remotely controlled robotic devices used to aid in processing the scene; 22
— Explosives, such as those that happen to be at the scene for use in legitimate industrial 23
purposes (for example, blasting caps and dynamite) or by the military, as well as any 24
explosives that might be associated with the nuclear or other radioactive material, as 25
might be the case for a RDD; 26
— High-voltage lines or exposed utilities, such as downed overhead electrical lines. Their 27
presence might require coordination with personnel qualified to shut off electrical service 28
to the scene; 29
— Natural gas lines, petroleum pipelines, as well as water and sewer lines. As with electrical 30
utilities, the presence of such lines might require coordination with national or local 31
authorities to have the flow through such lines shut off; 32
— Potentially adverse weather, such as heavy rain, thunderstorms, high winds or snow. Such 33
weather events might limit visibility by on-scene personnel, obscure the presence of items 34
of potential evidentiary value and cause the uncontrolled spread of radioactivity within 35
64
and beyond the scene. These events might also pose a risk to the health and safety of the 1
on-scene personnel, for example by adding to the thermal load (heat burden) or by 2
limiting traction for pedestrian or vehicular traffic; 3
— Weapons and ammunition, especially if these items might fall into the hands of 4
individuals on the scene whose interests are opposed to the orderly processing of the 5
scene; and 6
— Animals, such as livestock, feral animals, birds and pets. The presence of animals needs 7
to be assessed relative to their potential to harm personnel directly, most likely by 8
attacking them, as well as the prospect that they might harbour diseases that could be 9
spread to or by on-site personnel. The known or suspected presence of harmful animals or 10
of animals that might spread radioactivity if they attempt to exit the scene may require 11
that the inclusion of traps as part of the on-scene operations or may necessitate the 12
services of an animal control technician, veterinarian or other expert in animal control. 13
65
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During a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, EPR-Medical, IAEA, Vienna (2005). 32
66
[14] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Convention on Early Notification of a 1
Nuclear Accident and Convention on Assistance in the Case of a Nuclear Accident or 2
Radiological Emergency, Legal Series No. 14, IAEA, Vienna (1987). 3
[15] INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, Missing People, DNA Analysis and 4
Identification of Human Remains, A Guide to Best Practice in Armed Conflicts and Other 5
Situations of Armed Violence, Second Edition, ICRC, Geneva (2009). 6
[16] FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 7
INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR 8
ORGANISATION, OECD NUCLEAR ENERGY AGENCY, PAN AMERICAN HEALTH 9
ORGANIZATION, UNITED NATIONS OFFICE FOR THE CO-ORDINATION OF 10
HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Preparedness and 11
Response for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. GS-R-2, 12
IAEA, Vienna (2003). 13
[17] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Manual for First Responders to a 14
Radiological Emergency, EPR-First Responders, IAEA, Vienna (2006). 15
[18] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Method for Developing Arrangements for 16
Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, EPR-METHOD 2003, IAEA, Vienna 17
(2003). 18
[19] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Response and Assistance Network, EPR-19
RANET (2010), IAEA, Vienna (2010). 20
[20] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Preparation, Conduct and Evaluation of 21
Exercises to Test Preparedness for a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, EPR-Exercise, IAEA, 22
Vienna (2005). 23
[21] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Operations Manual for Incident and 24
Emergency Communication, EPR-IEComm 2012, IAEA, Vienna (2012). 25
[22] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Communication with the Public in a 26
Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, EPR-Public Communications, IAEA, Vienna (2012). 27
[23] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Generic procedures for assessment and 28
response during a radiological emergency, IAEA-TECDOC-1162 2000, IAEA, Vienna (2000). 29
[24] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Radiation Protection and Safety of 30
Radiation Sources: International Basic Safety Standards, Interim Edition, IAEA Safety 31
Standards Series No. GSR Part 3 (Interim), IAEA, Vienna (2011). 32
67
[25] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Nuclear Security Systems and Measures 1
for Major Public Events, IAEA Nuclear Security Series No. 18, IAEA, Vienna (2012). 2
[26] KROEGER, E., Developing a Communication Strategy for Illegal Acts involving Radioactive 3
Materials - Drawing on Experience obtained during the Polonium-210 Incident in Hamburg in 4
2006", pp 427-434 in Proceedings of an International Conference on Illicit Nuclear Trafficking: 5
Collective Experience and the Way Forward, held in Edinburgh, 19-22 November 2007, 6
STI/PUB/1316, IAEA, Vienna (2007). 7
[27] BUNDESAMT FÜR STRAHLENSCHUTZ, Der Polonium-210-Zwischenfall in Hamburg 8
(2006): Vertiefte Analyse, pp 38-44, in Jahresbericht 2007, Salzgitter (2007). 9
68
Annex I 1
TYPES OF EQUIPMENT SUITABLE FOR USE AT A RADIOLOGIC AL 2
CRIME SCENE 3
This annex discusses representative types of radiation detection instruments, personal protective 4
equipment and ancillary equipment suitable for use at a radiological crime scene. Selected examples 5
of specific types of instruments and equipment are presented. However, these examples are for 6
illustration purposes only. Both the variety of types and the identities of manufacturers of such 7
instruments and equipment are extensive and are subject to change; therefore, the examples offered 8
are limited and may, on occasion, no longer be current. More comprehensive listings of instruments 9
and equipment are available from internet sources and publications such as [I-1]. Member States 10
should select instruments and equipment that best suit their national arrangements and resources. 11
I-1. RADIATION DETECTION INSTRUMENTS 12
Once the presence of nuclear or other radioactive material has been confirmed at the scene of a 13
nuclear security event, a more comprehensive effort is required both to assess the radiation safety 14
hazards and to categorize the nuclear or other radioactive material. Table I-1 describes radiation 15
detection instruments suitable for use in assessing radiation safety. Table I-2 describes instruments 16
suitable for use in material categorization. 17
Figure I-1 illustrates examples of instruments suitable for use in performing on-scene assessments of 18
radiation safety. 19
20
Fig. I-1. Various models and types of hand-held instruments are available for use in assessing a scene 21
for radiation hazards. 22
69
TABLE I-1. EXAMPLES OF RADIATION DETECTION INSTRUMENTS SUITABLE FOR USE 1
IN ON-SCENE ASSESSMENT OF RADIATION SAFETY 2
Function Instrument Comments
Monitor source and area
dose rates, map radiation
fields, determine types of
radiation emitted
gamma and neutron dose rate
meters (may require a
telescopic arm for high dose
rate situations),
The radiation safety assessment should
be determined by the radiological
assessor. It is the basis for specification
of personal protective equipment,
dosimetry, contamination controls and
decontamination. The assessment also
determines any off-scene risks requiring
mitigation or monitoring. In situations
where airborne radioactive material is
present, additional internal dosimetry
measurements or bioassay monitoring
should be considered. The radiation
safety assessment may be part of the
common-hazards assessment used to
quantify all hazards present at the scene.
Monitor personnel
dosimetry
Monitor personnel,
equipment and scene for
contamination, identify
contaminated areas and
source locations
Passive dosimeters (e.g.
thermo luminescent (TLD),
film badge, etc.), electronic
personal dosimeters
Alpha/beta contamination
monitors, swipe or smear
material
Monitor for airborne
radioactive materials
Continuous air monitor or air
sampler with filters that can
be measured with a survey
meter / a spectrometer
3
70
TABLE I-2. EXAMPLES OF RADIATION DETECTION INSTRUMENTS SUITABLE FOR USE 1
IN ON-SCENE MATERIAL CATEGORIZATION 2
Function Instrument Comments
Identify gamma-emitting
radionuclides; perform
quantitative analysis of
radionuclides (estimate
mass, activity, etc.)
Low/medium resolution
gamma-ray spectrometer
(e.g., sodium iodide NaI(Tl)
or cadmium zinc telluride
(CZT))
Categorization of nuclear and other
radioactive material at the scene requires
expertise in the use of field-portable non-
destructive analysis instrumentation. The
information obtained during the radiation
safety assessment is also relevant to
material categorization. In some cases, it
may be necessary to reach out to experts
to help interpret data, such as personnel
at laboratories routinely using similar
instruments. In addition to identification
of nuclear and other radioactive material,
non-destructive analysis should be used
to estimate the amount of material
present. This estimation is necessary to
determine specifications for both
physical protection and transportation.
Finally, results should be communicated
to the nuclear forensics laboratory that
will receive the material.
High-resolution gamma-ray
spectrometer (e.g., high-
purity germanium detector
(HPGe))
Specialized, expert-level
software for radionuclide
identification
Characterize uranium and
plutonium, through
analysis of isotopic
compositions and
through quantitative
analysis (estimation of
mass, activity, etc.)
High purity germanium
(HPGe) gamma and X ray
spectrometer with U/Pu
isotopic analysis codes (e. g.
MGA / MGAU, FRAM) or
other relevant methods
Figure I-2 illustrates examples of instruments suitable for use in performing on-scene material 3
categorization. Additional information on radiation detection instruments is provided in [I-2]. 4
71
1
Fig. I-2. Various models and types of instruments are available for use at a scene in performing 2
material categorization of radioactive materials. 3
I-2. PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT 4
As noted in Section 5.4.3, preparation for radiological crime scene operations includes the 5
selection of personal protective equipment (PPE). Items of PPE include: 6
— Respiratory protective equipment (RPE); 7
— Gloves (two layers of outer gloves optimal); 8
— Footwear (can include over-boots or shoe covers); 9
— Undergarments, such as vests worn to reduce heat load; and 10
— Protective suits or other outer clothing (e.g. lead aprons). 11
Radiation dosimeters are also items of PPE and are described in [I-2]. All personnel entering the 12
operational control area should wear suitable dosimeters in order to provide a record of the 13
accumulated dose. The personnel should be equipped with self-reading (for example, electronic) 14
dosimeters with a range up to at least 250 mSv, as specified in [I-3]. 15
PPE can be described in terms of the different levels of protection. A typical scheme ranges from 16
Level A (greatest level of protection) to Level D (least level of protection). The level of protection for 17
the PPE to be worn at the scene is decided upon by the on-scene / operational commander under 18
advisement from the hazardous materials operations specialist, the safety specialist and the 19
radiological assessor. The PPE chosen could represent equipment with different levels of protection 20
(e.g. a Level B RPE coupled with a Level C suit), depending on the hazards present and the tasks to 21
be undertaken at the scene. 22
Regardless of the level of PPE that it is worn, its use imposes limits on operational capabilities. 23
These limits include: 24
72
— Restricted mobility and dexterity; 1
— Reduced vision (in terms of both field of vision and visual clarity); 2
— Degraded ability to communicate; and 3
— Degraded ability for prolonged operations, especially in view of the thermal (heat) stress 4
attendant to wearing protective suits. 5
Additional factors to consider are the potential difficulties in obtaining a proper fit with certain 6
designs of respiratory protection devices for individuals having facial hair; the burden associated with 7
the weight of the PPE ensemble; the limited supply of breathable air associated with a self-contained 8
breathing apparatus (SCBA); the completion of regular medical checks for personnel prior to the use 9
of RPE, depending on national health and safety regulations; the limited shelf-life of certain items of 10
PPE, which makes procurement and quality assurance a priority; and the prospect that wearing PPE 11
may cause psychological stress in those wearing it, owing to the induced sensation of claustrophobia. 12
I-2.1. Level A 13
Level A affords the highest level of respiratory, dermal, eye and mucous membrane protection. 14
The Level A PPE ensemble includes: 15
— Fully-encapsulating, vapour-tight suit, with integral (that is, built-in) chemical-resistant 16
hand and foot protection; 17
— Positive-pressure (pressure demand), self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA); 18
positive-pressure supplied air respirator with escape SCBA; or a closed-circuit breathing 19
apparatus (CCBA) (any one of which is typically worn inside the suit); 20
— Chemical-resistant gloves, inner and outer (depending on the suit glove construction); and 21
— Chemical-resistant boots, with steel toe and shank (worn either inside or outside the suit, 22
depending on the suit boot construction) 23
An example of a closed-circuit breathing apparatus is given in Figure I-3. 24
73
1
Fig. I-3. A closed-circuit breathing apparatus (CCBA) is one option for respiratory protection when 2
on-scene conditions require the highest level of respiratory protection. 3
Optional items worn with Level A include: 4
— Undergarments, cotton; 5
— Radiation shielding, such as lead-lined aprons and garments; 6
— Coveralls (worn under suit); 7
— Safety helmet (worn under suit); 8
— Specialty over-garments for protection from fire or other high-thermal load hazards; and 9
— Specialty undergarments to assist in either reducing heat-load or providing warmth, as 10
dictated by local environmental circumstances. An example of individuals wearing Level 11
A PPE ensembles is given in Figure I-4. 12
• 13
Fig. I-4. Level A PPE ensemble, as shown on these individuals during a training exercise, affords 14
the highest level of respiratory, dermal, eye and mucous membrane protection. 15
74
1
I-2.2. Level B 2
Level B affords the highest level of respiratory protection but a reduced level of dermal, eye and 3
mucous membrane protection. The Level B PPE ensemble includes: 4
— Chemical (splash)-resistant clothing (not vapour-tight) (such as overalls and long-sleeved 5
jacket, coveralls, hooded two-piece chemical splash suit) and 6
— Positive-pressure (pressure demand), self-contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) or 7
positive-pressure supplied air respirator with escape SCBA 8
— Chemical-resistant inner and outer gloves; and 9
— Chemical-resistant boots, with steel toe and shank and worn outside the suit. 10
Optional items worn with Level B include: 11
— Coveralls (worn under the suit); 12
— Chemical-resistant boot-covers; 13
— Radiation shielding, such as lead-lined aprons and garments; 14
— Safety helmet; 15
— Specialty over-garments for protection from fire or other high-thermal load hazards; and 16
— Specialty undergarments to help to either reduce heat-load or provide warmth 17
An example of individuals wearing Level B PPE ensembles is given in Figure I-5. 18
19
Fig. I-5. Personnel wearing Level B PPE ensemble with SCBA undergoing equipment check prior to 20
entering a hazard control area. 21
22
75
I-2.3. Level C 1
Level C affords a reduced level of respiratory, dermal, eye and mucous membrane protection. 2
The Level C PPE ensemble includes: 3
— Chemical-resistant clothing (such as one-piece coverall, hooded two-piece chemical 4
protective (splash) suit, chemical-resistant hood and apron, disposal chemical-resistant 5
coveralls); 6
— Full-face or half-mask, air purifying respirator; 7
— Chemical-resistant inner and outer gloves; and 8
— Chemical-resistant boots with steel toe and shank and worn outside the suit. 9
Examples of half-mask air purifying respirators are shown in Figure I-6. 10
11
Fig. I-6. Half-mask respirators, such as those depicted here, include both the face-piece (upper 12
portion of the figure) and the filter. Various options are available for the filter, and selecting the 13
proper configuration of face-piece and filter is dictated by local conditions plus national standards. 14
Optional items worn with Level C include: 15
— Face-shield; 16
— Coveralls (worn inside chemical protective clothing); 17
— Safety helmet; 18
— Chemical-resistant boot covers; 19
— Radiation shielding, such as lead-lined aprons and garments; 20
— Specialty undergarments to help to either reduce heat-load or provide warmth; 21
— Specialty over-garments for protection from fire or other high-thermal load hazards; and 22
— Escape mask (that is, a full-face or half-mask designed to provide interim respiratory 23
protection so that personnel might safely exit an environment where a toxic chemical 24
vapour is encountered). 25
76
An example of individuals wearing Level C PPE ensembles is given in Figure I-7. 1
2
Fig. I-7. An individual wearing Level C PPE ensemble, including a powered air purifying respirator 3
(PAPR) and safety helmet, is shown prior to entering a hazard control area. 4
I-2.4. Level D 5
Level D affords the lowest level of respiratory, dermal, eye and mucous membrane 6
protection. The Level D PPE ensemble includes the normal work uniform, coveralls or overalls plus 7
safety glasses, safety helmet, and safety shoes (having steel toes and shanks). Other items, such as 8
gloves, specialty garments for protection from fire or other high-thermal load hazards, and radiation 9
shielding aprons and garments, may be required in accordance with the specific situation. 10
I-3. ANCILLARY EQUIPMENT 11
As noted in Section 5.4.4, preparation for radiological crime scene operations includes the 12
selection of ancillary equipment. Examples of ancillary equipment include: 13
— Communications equipment; 14
— Decontamination equipment; 15
— Equipment for evacuating casualties; 16
— Evidence collection, packaging and transportation containers; and 17
77
— Manipulators and remotely operated vehicles for grasping or moving objects, such as 1
evidence. 2
I-3.1. Communications equipment 3
While effective and timely communications are essential for all crime scene operations, 4
special condidions exist for communications at a radiological crime scene. For example, the need to 5
monitor and report levels of radioactivity encountered in the hazard control areas means personnel 6
operating within these areas should routinely communicate such levels to the radiological assessor, 7
scene safety officer or other on-scene personnel. Similarly, the radiological assessor, scene safety 8
officer and other on-scene personnel may need to communicate with personnel in the hazard control 9
areas to ensure they exit the areas before reaching their turn-back dose rate or cumulative radiation 10
dose limit. Finally, on-scene personnel may need to communicate with outside parties, such as subject 11
matter experts at nuclear forensics laboratories, regarding unfamiliar items or unusual radioactive 12
materials that are encountered. 13
Several challenges regarding communications confront personnel conducting operations whilst 14
wearing PPE in a radiological crime scene. For example, RPE presents a challenge owing to the 15
degradation in voice communications. Additionally, PPE may include protective clothing that covers 16
the ears. Additionally, any communications equipment should be: 17
— Compatible with the PPE ensemble, such that it does not degrade the protection otherwise 18
afforded by the PPE; 19
— Designed for ease of operations for personnel wearing PPE; and 20
— Intrinsically safe, meaning that the communications equipment will not prevent alarm 21
recognition, will not spark, and will have a limited output of energy. These non-sparking 22
and limited energy features are needed to avoid the accidental ignition of flammable 23
gases or dust or the accidental activation of an explosive device. 24
I-3.2. Decontamination equipment 25
Decontamination is the process of using chemical and/or physical means to remove or otherwise 26
contain radioactive materials, thus limiting their unintentional spread beyond the radiological crime 27
scene. In some cases, the careful removal of PPE from personnel and the correct packaging of 28
evidence, together with contamination controls for open radioactive material, will be sufficient to 29
effectively limit the spread of radioactive materials from the scene. In other cases, the removal of 30
radioactive materials from animals, areas, equipment, evidence and personnel may be necessary to 31
effectively manage the radiological crime scene operations. Various tools and procedures have been 32
developed for this purpose. Many of these tools reflect a low-technology approach to removal or 33
containment of radioactive material. Such low-technology tools include: 34
78
— Hand-held survey meters (alpha, beta, gamma, see Table I-1) for contamination controls 1
before, during and after decontamination; 2
— Hand-held sprayers (such as those used for house plants) filled with water or glycerol 3
solution or hairspray to fix small areas of surface contamination on PPE prior to removal; 4
— Tape, scissors and extra protective suits for covering up small contaminated areas on 5
protective suits prior to removal; 6
— Backpack and hand-held pump-operated pressure sprayers (such as those used for 7
applying liquids in gardens and to lawns) for washing down large areas; 8
— Brooms, brushes (including nail brushes), and mops; 9
— Buckets; 10
— Inflatable wading pools; 11
— Plastic or rubber sheeting (for ground cover); 12
— Water storage bags, tanks and similar containers, including those that are portable or 13
collapsible; 14
— Watering hoses; 15
— Large waste disposal sacks; and 16
— Clothing for personnel to change into after the decontamination measures. 17
Slightly higher-technology tools include portable showers, shelters, and tents. These units can be 18
used as a decontamination station for personnel and equipment or for decontamination of selected 19
items of evidence or equipment. 20
It is important that personnel at the decontamination station are familiar with all deployed PPE 21
and know in which order and how the PPE should be removed. RPE should generally be left on as 22
long as possible to prevent inhalation of airborne radioactive material (particles). The PPE should be 23
removed with the outer surface turned inwards to prevent the spread of radioactive material. In the 24
case that a skin contamination with open radioactive material has occurred, with or without injuries to 25
the person involved, the radiological assessor should be consulted for advice on the correct 26
decontamination measures. 27
I-3.3. Equipment for evacuating casualties 28
Operations at a radiological crime scene may require evacuation of casualties. These casualties 29
might be victims or perpetrators of the nuclear security event associated with the crime scene. They 30
might also be personnel operating in the operational control areas or the hazard control areas. 31
Casualties who are ambulatory (that is, who can move with minimal assistance) might be able to 32
process themselves through the decontamination station. Casualties who are unconscious, who have 33
limited ability to move about, or who have open wounds may require special procedures and 34
equipment for decontamination. In all cases, life-saving measures take precedent over 35
79
decontamination measures. Guidance on providing medical care to victims of a nuclear security event 1
is given in [I-4]. 2
I-3.4. Evidence collection, packaging and transportation containers 3
Evidence collection, packaging and transportation may be subject to national and international 4
regulations, such as those given in [I-5, I-6]. These regulations establish standards of safety for 5
radiation, criticality and thermal hazards to persons, property and the environment associated with 6
transport of radioactive material. Various items of equipment have been developed to ensure 7
compliance with these regulations in particular and with best practices for containers used in evidence 8
collection, packaging and transportation in general. 9
Figure I-8 depicts various smaller-sized evidence transportation containers. 10
11
Fig. I-8. Various sizes and configurations of evidence transportation containers have been developed, 12
as shown here by these examples which are suitable for smaller items of radioactive material. Note 13
that the container on the left bears a Radioactive Material (RAM) label, such as the one described in 14
Appendix I. 15
I-3.5. Manipulators and remotely operated vehicles 16
Manipulators and remotely operated vehicles afford a means of limiting the time spent by 17
personnel in the hazard control area and maximizing the distance between individuals and radiation 18
hazards. Manipulators can be low-technology tools, such as short- or long-handled manipulating tools 19
used to grip objects or to move objects, such as debris that might be an obstacle to the collection of 20
evidence. These manipulators can also be used to grasp the evidence itself. Figure I-9 depicts a pair of 21
such manipulators; in this case, the manipulators are also referred to as tongs or tweezers. 22
80
1
Fig. I-9. Tweezers and tongs, as such those depicted in this figure, can be used to grasp evidence or to 2
move objects that present obstacles to collecting the evidence. The tweezers on the left of the figure 3
are capable of locking in position once the item of interest has been grasped. The tongs on the right of 4
the figure have extended handles to add distance between the individual and the item of interest to be 5
collected or moved. 6
By contrast, remotely operated vehicles are typically higher technology equipment, such as 7
robotic platforms that have been developed for the explosive ordnance disposal community. 8
REFERENCES TO ANNEX I 9
[I-1] Jane’s Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence 2011-2012, 24th edition, Jane’s Information 10
Group, Alexandria, Virginia, USA (2011). 11
[I-2] EUROPEAN POLICE OFFICE, INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, 12
INTERNATIONAL POLICE ORGANISATION, WORLD CUSTOMS ORGANISATION, 13
Combating Illicit Trafficking in Nuclear and Other Radioactive Material, IAEA Nuclear 14
Security Series No. 6, IAEA, Vienna (2007). 15
[I-3] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Method for Developing Arrangements for 16
Response to a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, IAEA EPR-Method 2003, IAEA, Vienna 17
(2003). 18
[I-4] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Generic Procedures for Medical Response 19
During a Nuclear or Radiological Emergency, EPR-Medical, IAEA, Vienna (2005). 20
[I-5] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Regulations for the Safe Transport of 21
Radioactive Material, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. TR-R-1, STI/PUB/1384, IAEA, 22
Vienna (2009). 23
[I-6] INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY, Advisory Material for the IAEA Regulations for the 24
Safe Transport of Radioactive Material, IAEA Safety Standards Series No. TS-G-1.1, 25
STI/PUB/1109, IAEA, Vienna (2002). 26
27
81
Annex II 1
INTERPOL CBRNE TERRORISM PREVENTION PROGRAMME 2
INTERPOL is the world’s largest international police organization, with 190 member countries. 3
Created in 1923 and headquartered in Lyon, France, it facilitates cross-border police cooperation, and 4
provides assistance to all organizations, authorities and services whose mission is to prevent or 5
combat international crime. 6
INTERPOL’s I-24/7 global police communications system connects law enforcement officials in 7
all of its member countries, providing them with the means to share crucial information on criminals 8
and criminal activities 24 hours a day, seven days a week. Using INTERPOL’S I-24/7 system, 9
National Central Bureaus (NCBs) can search and cross-check data in a matter of seconds, with direct 10
access to databases of information on suspected terrorists, wanted persons, fingerprints, DNA profiles, 11
lost or stolen travel documents, stolen motor vehicles, stolen works of art, etc. These multiple 12
resources give law enforcement officials instant access to potentially important information, thereby 13
facilitating criminal investigations. 14
INTERPOL is able to support law enforcement operations, which includes analysis, information 15
exchange, incident response, and coordination of national authorities for the full spectrum of 16
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, and Explosives (CBRNE) threats and investigations. 17
The INTERPOL CBRNE Terrorism Prevention Programme is engaged in a wide range of 18
activities to combat cross-border smuggling of CBRNE weapons and materials by non-state actors, 19
including criminals and terrorists. INTERPOL is engaged in capacity building and training of 20
member country authorities, development of guidance documents & manuals, and active 21
investigations. 22
Operation Fail Safe 23
INTERPOL is uniquely positioned to engage in the global counter nuclear smuggling efforts 24
through use of its internationally-recognized Notice System15. INTERPOL’s Operation Fail Safe 25
addresses non-state actors and is being implemented to generate the issuance of INTERPOL Green 26
Notices16 regarding individuals involved in the smuggling of radioactive or nuclear material. Upon 27
query by law enforcement officials at border crossings or other locations, an alert will be generated in 28
response to the query based upon the Green Notice 29
15 INTERPOL Notices are international requests for cooperation or alerts allowing police in member countries to share critical crime-related information. 16 A Green Notice is issued to provide warnings and criminal intelligence about persons who have committed criminal offences and are likely to repeat these crimes in other countries.
82
The INTERPOL Command & Coordination Centre, staffed 24/7/365, will be notified of the 1
country location and identity of the individual subject of the query and will subsequently notify the 2
INTERPOL CBRNE Programme. This alert and notification process creates a new capability to 3
detect transnational movements of known individuals who are engaged in this activity and facilitates 4
contemporaneous operational coordination by the INTERPOL CBRNE Programme with, and at the 5
discretion of, law enforcement in the affected countries, consistent with their laws and policies. 6
If a country has established a Counter Nuclear Smuggling Team, which combines specific 7
expertise across relevant disciplines, the coordination will be greatly facilitated, thereby maximizing 8
the opportunity to address a situation effectively. 9
The liaison conducted through Operation Fail Safe expands the network of countries engaged in 10
the international counter nuclear smuggling effort and supports the transition from national policy to 11
positive operational engagement, with the goal of prevention. 12
Project GEIGER 13
Intelligence is essential in order for INTERPOL and police services worldwide to tailor their 14
operations to specific threats and to drive prevention programmes. Project GEIGER focuses on 15
collating and analysing information on illicit trafficking and other unauthorized activities involving 16
Radioactive/Nuclear materials. The Project GEIGER database combines IAEA’s Illicit Trafficking 17
Database (ITDB)17 with additional open-source reports and law enforcement data collected through 18
INTERPOL’s secure channels. 19
The analytical products that are published through Project GEIGER are highly valuable to both 20
the international law enforcement community and other international organizations working to 21
prevent Radiological/Nuclear crimes. These products include Project GEIGER monthly reports that 22
assess the current Radioactive/Nuclear material trafficking threat and other reports that address more 23
specific issues, usually at the request of member countries or partner international organizations. The 24
database contains a large number of cases involving all types of illicit Radiological/Nuclear activity. 25
Cases include those involving movement across international borders. 26
27
17 The IAEA Illicit Trafficking Database was renamed the Incident and Trafficking Database in July 2012.
83
DEFINITIONS 1
Action level - A radiation dose rate or accumulated radiation dose that alerts personnel to unknown or 2
changing conditions in the radiation environment resulting in an increase in the radiation level. The 3
action level is used to signal a need to exit the environment and seek an area having a lower dose rate. 4
Booby traps - A device that is designed to harm or surprise a person who unknowingly triggers the 5
device by his/her presence or his/her actions. An example might be a hidden pressure-sensitive switch 6
that, when activated, will cause an explosive to detonate. An alternate term used for a booby trap is 7
“access denial device”. 8
Categorization - The process of assessing a specific incident involving nuclear or other radioactive 9
material by making a preliminary determination of the relevant radionuclides present to identify the 10
risk to health and safety; provide insight into whether the incident involves nuclear or other 11
radioactive material out of regulatory control, criminal activity or a threat to national security; and to 12
determine appropriate response and follow-on actions. 13
Chain of custody - The procedures and documents that account for the integrity of physical evidence 14
by tracking its handling and storage from its point of collection to its final disposition. Other terms for 15
this process are “chain of evidence,” “chain of physical custody,” and “chain of possession”. 16
Competent authority - A governmental organization or institution that has been designated by a 17
State to carry out one or more nuclear security functions. Example: Competent authorities include 18
regulatory bodies, law enforcement, customs and border control, intelligence and security agencies, 19
health agencies, etc. 20
Confined space - A place which is substantially enclosed (though not always entirely) and where 21
serious injury can occur from hazardous substances or conditions within the space or nearby (for 22
example, lack of oxygen). 23
Contamination - The direct or indirect transfer of extraneous material to a forensic sample or scene 24
of crime (Also referred to as “cross contamination”). 25
Crime scene - A site containing records of activities, alleged to be a crime. 26
Crime scene investigation - A process that aims at recording the scene as it is first encountered and 27
recognizing and collecting all relevant physical evidence. 28
Hazard control area - A geographical area used to control access into, within and out of an area 29
representing the maximum extent of all hazards within a radiological crime scene. 30
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Improvised nuclear device (IND) - A device, incorporating fissile materials, designed or constructed 1
outside an official government agency and which has, appears to have, or is claimed to have the 2
capability to produce a nuclear explosion. 3
Information alert -Time sensitive reporting that could indicate a nuclear security event, requiring 4
assessment, and may come from a variety of sources, including operational information, medical 5
surveillance, accounting and consigner/consignee discrepancies, border monitoring, etc. 6
Initial assessment – The process of analysing systematically and evaluating an information alert or 7
an instrument alarm to determine whether a nuclear security event has occurred. 8
Initial entry – The first controlled entry made into a crime scene, conducted for purpose of gathering 9
data regarding the nature and extent of on-scene hazards. Data are gathered by personal observations, 10
taking images (still photographs and video-photography) and making measurements using assorted 11
types of detection instruments. Because the hazards at the crime scene have not been completed 12
assessed, an initial entry is a hazardous operation requiring careful planning and monitoring. 13
Instrument alarm - Signal from radiation detection instruments that could indicate the occurrence of 14
a nuclear security event, requiring assessment. An instrument alarm may come from devices that are 15
portable or deployed at fixed locations and operated to augment normal commerce protocols and/or in 16
a law enforcement operation. 17
Interim evidence storage site – A physical facility for the safe and secure storage of evidence from a 18
radiological crime scene prior to its transport to the designated nuclear forensics laboratory. An 19
interim evidence storage site needs to have security measures in place to prevent evidence tampering, 20
while also having the appropriate authorizations/licences/permits necessary to store the quantity of 21
radioactive material present. The appropriate rules of evidence, including maintaining the chain of 22
custody for handling of evidence, will need to be ensured at the interim evidence storage site. 23
Nuclear security - The prevention and detection of, and response to, theft, sabotage, unauthorized 24
access, illegal transfer or other malicious acts involving nuclear material, other radioactive substances 25
or their associated facilities. 26
Nuclear security event - An event that has potential or actual implications for nuclear security that 27
must be addressed. 28
Operational control area - A geographical area used to control access into, within and out of an area 29
representing the maximum extent of the area to support the management of a radiological crime scene 30
in general and the nuclear security event in particular. 31
Radiation detection instrument - A device that detects and displays the characteristics of ionizing 32
radiation with a certain level of confidence. 33
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Radiological assessor - A person, who in the event of a radiological crime scene assists by 1
performing radiation surveys, performing dose assessments, assisting with the control of 2
contamination, ensuring the radiation protection of crime scene personnel and formulating 3
recommendations on protective actions. 4
Radiological crime scene - A crime scene in which a criminal act or other intentional unauthorized 5
act has taken place or is suspected, with nuclear security implications and involving nuclear or other 6
radioactive material. 7
Radiological dispersal device (RDD) - Any device, including any weapon or equipment, other than a 8
nuclear explosive device, specifically designed to employ radioactive material by disseminating it to 9
cause destruction, damage, or injury by means of the radiation produced by the decay of such 10
material. 11
Radiation exposure device (RED) - A device whose purpose is to intentionally expose people to 12
radiation, with the intent of causing injury by means of this radiation. 13
Regulatory control – Any form of institutional control applied to nuclear material or other 14
radioactive material, associated facilities, or associated activities by any competent authority as 15
required by the legislative and regulatory provisions related to safety, security, and safeguards. 16
Explanation: The phrase ‘out of regulatory control’ is used to describe a situation where nuclear or 17
other radioactive material is present without an appropriate authorization, either because controls have 18
failed for some reason, or they never existed. 19
Response system - Integrated set of response measures including capabilities and resources necessary 20
for assessing the alarms/alerts and response to a nuclear security event. 21
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