RATIO:Section 2.The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The foregoing constitutional proscription is not without exceptions. Search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible in the following instances: (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations.[67]The first exception (search incidental to a lawful arrest) includes a valid warrantless search and seizure pursuant to an equally valid warrantless arrest which must precede the search.In this instance, the law requires that there be first a lawful arrest before a search can be made the process cannot be reversed.As a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest.The Rules of Court, however, recognizes permissible warrantless arrests. Thus, a peace officer or a private person may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a) when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense (arrestin flagrante delicto); (b) when an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it (arrest effected in hot pursuit); and (c) when the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or a place where he is serving final judgment or is temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another (arrest of escaped prisoners).[68]

in cases ofin flagrante delictoarrests, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.Clearly, to constitute a validin flagrante delictoarrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[70](Emphases supplied.)

The arresting officer, therefore, must have personal knowledge of such fact or, as recent case law adverts to, personal knowledge of facts or circumstances convincingly indicative or constitutive of probable cause.

As discussed inPeople v. Doria, probable cause means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense, is based on actual facts,i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest. the Court did not consider "eyes . . . darting from side to side . . . [while] holding . . . [one's] abdomen," in a crowded street at 11:30 in the morning, as overt acts and circumstances sufficient to arouse suspicion and indicative of probable cause.According to the Court, "[b]y no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in [the arresting officers'] presence

WRIT OF AMPARO (ELEMETS)(a)that there be an arrest, detention, abduction or any form of deprivation of liberty;(b)that it be carried out by, or with the authorization, support or acquiescence of, the State or a political organization;(c)that it be followed by the State or political organizations refusal to acknowledge or give information on the fate or whereabouts of the person subject of theamparopetition; and,(d)that the intention for such refusal is to remove subject person from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time.

5. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, MONTILLA yaccused-appellant.REGALADO,J.:MARIJUANA CASE- Montilla was apprehended by police officers while he was allegedly transporting from Baguio City to Cavite marijuana bricks contained in a traveling bag and a carton box. The police officers were able to arrest Montilla through the aid of an informer.Appellant denied ownership of the prohibited drugs.He further averred that when he was interrogated, he was never informed of his constitutional rights.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN CRUZ,J.:Idel Aminnudin was arrested shortly after disembarking from the M/V Wilcon 9. The police officers who were in fact waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him.

7. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NASARIO MOLINA MARIJUANA CASESometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino Paguidopon received an information regarding the presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in Davao City.7The first time he came to see the said marijuana pusher in person was during the first week of July 1996. SPO1 Paguidopon was then with his informer when a motorcycle passed by. His informer pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused-appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to accused-appellant Molina, SPO1 Paguidopon had no occasion to see him before the arrest. Moreover, the names and addresses of the accused- appellants came to the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only after they were arrested.8On August 8, 1996, while his team were positioned in the house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad" carrying the accused-appellants passed by. At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed to the accused-appellants as the pushers. Thereupon, the team boarded their, vehicle and overtook the "trisikad."11SPO1 Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty meters from where the accused-appellants were accosted.12The police officers then ordered the "trisikad" to stop. At that point, accused-appellant Mula who was holding a black bag handed the same to Molina. Subsequently, SPO1 Pamplona introduced himself as a police officer and asked accused-appellant Molina to open the bag.13Molina replied,"Boss, if possible we will settle this."14SPO1 Pamplona insisted on opening the bag, which revealed dried marijuana leaves inside. Thereafter; accused-appellants Mula and Molina were handcuffed by the police officers.15

8. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. NG YIK BUNOn August 24, 2000, around 9pm, Capt. Danilo Ibon of Task Force Aduana received information from an operative that there was an ongoing shipment of contraband in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon Province. Upon instructions from his superior, Major Carlo Magno Tabo, Capt. Ibon formed a team then proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya.The members of the team were able to observe the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters. They spotted six Chinese-looking men loading bags containing a white substance into a white van. Having been noticed, Capt. Ibon identified his team and asked accused-appellant Chua Shilou Hwan (Hwan) what they were loading on the van. Hwan replied that it was shabu and pointed to accused-appellant Raymond Tan as the leader. A total of 172 bags of suspected shabu were then confiscated.Accused-appellants claim that no valid in flagrante delicto arrest was made prior to the seizure and that the police officers placed accused-appellants under arrest even when there was no evidence that an offense was being committed. Since there was no warrant of arrest, they argue that the search sans a search warrant subsequently made on them was illegal. They contend that a seizure of any evidence as a result of an illegal search is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose.ISSUE: Whether there was a valid warrantless search.RULING:YES.A settled exception to the right guaranteed in the aforequoted provision is that of an arrest made during the commission of a crime, which does not require a warrant. Such warrantless arrest is considered reasonable and valid In the instant case, contrary to accused-appellants contention, there was indeed a valid warrantless arrest in flagrante delicto.Consider the circumstances immediately prior to and surrounding the arrest of accused-appellants: (1) the police officers received information from an operative about an ongoing shipment of contraband; (2) the police officers, with the operative, proceeded to Villa Vicenta Resort in Barangay Bignay II, Sariaya, Quezon; (3) they observed the goings-on at the resort from a distance of around 50 meters; and (4) they spotted the six accused-appellants loading transparent bags containing a white substance into a white L-300 van.The arresting police officers had probable cause to suspect that accused-appellants were loading and transporting contraband, more so when Hwan, upon being accosted, readily mentioned that they were loading shabu and pointed to Tan as their leader. Thus, the arrest of accused-appellantswho were caught in flagrante delicto of possessing, and in the act of loading into a white L-300 van, shabu, a prohibited drug under RA 6425 is valid.

9. PEOPLEOF THE PHILIPPINES,plaintiff-appellee, vs.NARITO ARANETA,accused-appellant.D E C I S I O NPUNO,J.:Joebert Araneta, Samuel Aronda-in, Joesel Araneta, Marvin Deogluis, and Narito Araneta were charged with the crimes of MURDER and FRUSTRATED MURDER for the death of Mansueto Datoon, Jr. and the injury sustained by Hilario Malones in two separate informations, which read:MURDERThat on or about the 6th day of December, 1989, in the Municipality of Anilao, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another to better realize their purpose, taking advantage of their superior strength and number, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill, armed with unlicensed firearms, with treachery and evident premeditation and without any justifiable cause or motive, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack, strike and shoot with the firearms they were then provided one MANSUETO DATOON, JR., inflicting upon the latter gunshot wounds on the different parts of his body, which caused the immediate and instantaneous death of said Mansueto Datoon, Jr.[1]Criminal Case No. 34643FRUSTRATED MURDER------------------------------That on or about the 6th day of December, 1989, in the Municipality of Anilao, Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, taking advantage of their superior strength and number, with deliberate intent and decided purpose to kill and without justifiable cause or motive, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and shoot one HILARIO MALONES with the firearms they were then provided, thereby hitting the latter on the stomach, thus performing all the acts of execution which would have produced the crime of murder as a consequence but which, nevertheless, did not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused, that is, the timely and able medical assistance given to said Hilario Malones which prevented his death.[2]Accused Narito Araneta posted a bond and pled not guilty.The other accused, Samuel Aronda-in, Joesel Araneta and Marvin Deogluis, remain at large.The charges against Joebert Araneta, an active member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over his person.The trial records show that Hilario Malones, Fe Malones, Ma. Paz Datoon, Dr. Elizabeth D. Altamira and Dr. Giovanni Delos Reyes testified for the prosecution.They established that at about 8:30 in the evening of December 6, 1989, Fe was preparing to go to sleep when she heard a noise in front of their house as if a sledge was being dragged.She stood up, listened, and heard somebody shout, Noy Lario, help me.She recognized the voice as that of Mansueto Datoon, Jr.She opened the window and saw the accused Narito pulling Mansueto to the ground.Frightened, she woke up her husband, who immediately stood up and peeped through the open window.Hilariohimselfsaw all the accused beating Mansueto.With Fe on his trail, he rushed out of the house and pleaded to the accused to take pity on Mansueto.They ignored him at first, but they stopped beating Mansueto when Hilario insisted that they free the victim.Finding Mansueto incapable of standing up, Hilario helped him lean on a kapok tree.It was then that Candelaria Araneta arrived.She advised Hilario not to get involved.Hilario replied, As a mother, you should advise or pacify your children; instead, you consent to what they are doing.Joebertthen shot Hilario with a .38 caliber revolver.Joebert turned his attention to Mansueto and shot him too.He put the guns muzzle on Mansuetos shirt and shot him again.As if that was not enough, Naritoand the other accused resumed beating Mansueto.Fe decided to look for help.On the way to her parents house, she met Ma. Paz Datoon.She briefed Paz who repaired to the scene of the crime.She saw Samuel turning Mansuetos lifeless body around while Joebert ordered, Hurry, lets go,we will be caught.Paz, however, testified that she did not see the other accused there.For her husbands burial, she spent aboutP35,000.00.Hilario was brought to the West Visayas State University Hospital where Dr. Giovanni Delos Reyes treated him for a 1.0 cm. gunshot wound, umbilical area, penetrating abdominal cavity, perforating multiple loops of jejunum and transverse colon.Dr. Delos Reyes opined that the timely operation done on Hilario saved him from death.Hilarios hospitalization costP37,000.00.Narito interposed alibi as defense.He averred that on December 6, 1989, he went to bed at 7:30 p.m.He learned about the incident at 8:30 p.m. when his wife and Joebert Araneta arrived home.He listened to their story,turned off the lights and went back to sleep.Joebert left immediately after changing his clothes.Narito claimed that they had a visitor by the name of Nelson Salo that night.Nelson Salo testified that on December 6, 1989, at 5 p.m., he arrived at the Aranetas house to invite Narito to his farm.He found Narito, Candelaria and their three children there.As he had done in the past, he stayed with the Aranetas that night.He had dinner with them at 7 p.m. and slept afterwards.At 8:30 p.m., Joebert came to get his clothes.The following day, at 4:00 a.m., he left for Brgy. Hinalinan Nuevo with Narito.On the way, Narito told him that Joebert figured in a fight the night before.Salo claimed that after they slept, Narito never left the house that fateful evening.Naritos wife, Candelaria, also corroborated his story.Candelaria is a dressmaker.On December 6, 1989, at 4:00 p.m., she was in school taking measurements.Her daughter came and told her that Nelson Salo was in their house looking for Narito.Narito was then at their farm in Bgy. Siniba-an.Candelaria ordered her daughter to tell Salo to wait for her.She followed shortly but forgot all about Salo.At 5:00 p.m., Joebert came.He informed Candelaria about his disagreement with Mansueto Datoon, Jr.He left thereafter.Narito came at 7:00 p.m.He ate dinner and went to bed.Joebert returned at 8:00 p.m. with Samuel Aronda-in.He requested Candelaria to pack his clothes for him.Candelaria claimed that she was the only one awake at that time.After dinner, Joeberttold Candelaria that he was going to buy beer.Candelaria tried to dissuade him because they had a visitor who was already sleeping.Joebert was heedless and bought beer with Aronda-in.Before long, Candelaria heard somebody shout, You are going to kill me.She recognized the voice as that of her son, Joebert.She went out to look for Joebert.She saw Hilario, Fe, Joebert, Nono and Mansueto in front of Hilarios house.She claimed that Hilario and Mansueto were carrying guns.She asked Hilario what he planned to do with his gun as she reminded him that Joebert was unarmed.Mansueto then fired his gun at Joebert but hit Hilario instead.Joebert pushed Mansueto to the ground and they wrestled for the gun.Candelaria heard another shot which hit Mansueto.All the while, Aronda-in stood still in the middle of the road and did not help Joebert.Hilario then shot but missed Joebert.Joebert stood up and with Candelaria ran home.On May 3, 1991, the trial court convicted accused-appellant Narito Araneta but only for the crimes of homicide and frustrated homicide:Accused Narito appealed to the Court of Appeals and continued to be free on the same bailbond he had posted with the trial court.On May 24, 1996, the Court of Appeals modified the decision of the trial court.It found the accused-appellant guilty of murder in Criminal Case No. 34642 and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua but acquitted him in Criminal Case No. 34643, viz.:On December 23, 1996, we received the First Indorsement dated December 5, 1996 of Action Officer Homobono Lachica, Jr. of the Bureau of Corrections stating that they have no record of confinement of accused-appellant in the Bureau of Corrections.[5]On April 10, 1997, we received a copy of the return of the warrant of arrest signed by SPO4 Morito Muyco Tuarez.It stated that the police failed to effect thealiasorder of arrest issued by Judge Gustilo as they could not locate accused-appellant and his whereabouts were unknown.[7]On July 30, 1997, we directed Judge Gustilo to issue anotheraliaswarrant of arrest against accused-appellant to be served by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).[8]Judge Gustilo issued an alias warrant of arrest on September 11, 1997.[9]The NBI has not made a return of said warrant to this day.After a painstaking review of the records of the case, we find the accused-appellant guilty of murder in Criminal Case No. 34642 as recommended by the Court of Appeals.Hilario and Fe Malones positively identified accused-appellant as one of those who beat Mansueto before and after the latter was shot by Joebert Araneta:In light of such positive identification, accused-appellants alibi must fall.It is settled that alibi is the weakest of all defenses. In the case at bar, Nelson Salo testified that he arrived at the Aranetas at 5:00 p.m. on December 6, 1989 and found accused-appellant Narito, Candelaria and their three children there.[17]In contrast, Candelaria said that she and Narito were not at home when Salo arrived.She declared she was in school, while Narito was at their farm in Bgy. Siniba-an.Narito came home only at 7:00 p.m.[18]Salo further alleged that he saw Joebert Araneta arrive home at 8:30 p.m. on December 6, 1989 to get his clothes.[19]Yet, on re-direct examination, he averred that he slept continuously from 7:00 p.m. to 3:30 a.m. the following day.[20]In addition, he claimed that Narito did not leave the house that evening after they went to sleep.[21]It is evident that if he was asleep from 7:00 p.m. to 3:30 a.m., he could not be certain whether Narito left the house that night or not.Well-established is the doctrine that conspiracy The crime committed by accused-appellant is murder.The killing of Mansueto was qualified by abuse of superior strength.Mansueto was clearly overwhelmed by the combined efforts of five (5) assailants which included accused-appellant.Worse, the assailants used guns against the unarmed Mansueto.The numerous wounds sustained by Mansueto indisputably show that the group of accused-appellant took advantage of their superior strength in perpetrating the crime at bar.There being no mitigating circumstance, accused-appellant should be imposed the penalty ofreclusion perpetua.accused-appellant Narito Araneta guilty of murder

10. UMIL VS. RAMOS

InUmil vs.Ramos27this Court, applying the last sentence of Section 4 of Rule 102, held that the writ ofhabeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court.

FACTS: This consolidated case of 8 petitions for habeas corpus assails the validity of the arrests and searches made by the military on the petitioners. The arrests relied on the confidential information that the authorities received. Except for one case where inciting to sedition was charged, the rest are charged with subversion for being a member of the New Peoples Army.

RULING: The arrests were legal. Regarding the subversion cases, the arrests were legal since subversion is a form of a continuing crime together with rebellion, conspiracy or proposal to commit rebellion/subversion, and crimes committed in furtherance thereof or in connection therewith. On the inciting to sedition case, the arrest was legal since an information was filed prior to his arrest. Lastly, the arrests were not fishing expeditions but a result of an in-depth surveillance of NPA safe houses pinpointed by none other than members of the NPA.The right to preliminary investigation should be exercised by the offender as soon as possible. Otherwise, it would be considered as impliedly waived and the filing of information can proceed. This sort of irregularity is not sufficient to set aside a valid judgment upon a sufficient complaint and after a trial free from error.

DISSENT: (Sarmiento, J.) The confidential information was nothing but hearsay. The searches and arrests made were bereft of probable cause and that the petitioners were not caught in flagrante delicto or in any overt act. Utmost, the authorities was lucky in their fishing expeditions.

2. The Bill of Rights can only be invoked only against the state.People vs. Marti --Marti and his wife went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and Export Forwarders" carrying with them four (4) gift-wrapped packages. Marti informed the owner that the packages simply contained books, cigars and gloves as gifts to his friends in Zurich and refused to allow the owner to examine and inspect the packages. However, before the delivery of the box to the Bureau of Customs, the owner's husband inspected the package and found marijuana which was later turned over to the NBI. A case was filed against Marti. Marti invoked his right against illegal searches and seizure. Held: The constitutional proscription against unlawful searches and seizures therefore applies as a restraint directed only against the government and its agencies tasked with the enforcement of the law. Thus, it could only be invoked against the State to whom the restraint against arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power is imposed.

Corollarily, alleged violations against unreasonable search and seizure may only be invoked against the State by an individual unjustly traduced by the exercise of sovereign authority. To agree with appellant that an act of a private individual in violation of the Bill of Rights should also be construed as an act of the State would result in serious legal complications and an absurd interpretation of the constitution

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,VSROLANDO S. DELOS REYES, alias Botong

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,J.:accused-appellants Rolando S. delos Reyes and Raymundo G. ReyesWAS arrested for illegal possession, sale, delivery, distribution, and/or transportation of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, probable cause to indict accused-appellants resolved to continue the preliminary investigation in so far as Lantion-Tom was concerned.I.THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE WARRANTLESS ARREST OF ACCUSED-APPELLANT RAYMUNDO REYES AS UNLAWFUL.II.ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE WARRANTLESS ARREST WAS VALID, ACCUSED-APPELLANT RAYMUNDO REYES CANNOT BE CONVICTED FOR VIOLATION OF R.A. 6425[57]

DISPUTE:Accused-appellants additionally argued that even the prosecutions version of the arrests of the suspects and seizure of theshabushows that the same were effected in violation of accused-appellants fundamental rights.The arrests were executed without any warrant or any of the exceptional circumstances to justify a warrantless arrest.The suspects, including accused-appellants, were arrested without warrants based on a mere tip from a confidential informant and not because of any apparent criminal activity.A tip does not constitute probable cause for a warrantless arrest or search and seizure incidental thereto.Thus, theshabuallegedly seized from accused-appellants is inadmissible in evidence.Plaintiff-appellee, on the other hand, stand by the convictions of accused-appellants, maintaining that:Ppl0oPlaintiff-appellee avows that accused-appellants were caught while in the commission of a crime orin flagrante delicto, which justifies their warrantless arrests under Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.Accused-appellants were arrested while in possession and in the act of distributing, without legal authority, a total of 980.9 grams of methamphetamine hydrochloride orshabu, on the night of February 17, 2000 at the parking area of Shangri-La Plaza in Mandaluyong City.In addition, in the absence of satisfactory proof to the contrary,the warrantless arrests executed by the police officers enjoy the presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.RULING:

We grant the appeal and reverse the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals.

The Court of Appeals, on appeal, refused to consider the subsequent acquittal of Emmanuel de Claro by the RTC.Instead, the appellate court upheld the earlier ruling of the RTC giving absolute credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and convicted accused-appellants of the crime charged.Despite the varying judgments of the RTC, the Court of Appeals speciously ratiocinated in its assailed decision that when the issue involves the credibility of a witness, the trial courts assessment is entitled to great weight.[62]

Indeed, the testimonies of prosecution witnesses SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul are unreliable and suspiciously fabricatedThere are also material inconsistencies between the police-witnesses sworn statements following accused-appellants arrest and their testimonies before the RTC.The police officers attested in their Joint Affidavit of Arrest dated February 18, 2000 thatupon sensing suspicious transactions being undertaken thereat, team leader thru hand signaled immediately accosted the suspects and introduced themselves as Police Officers and after that, subject persons deliberately admitted that they have in their possession illegal drugs and thereafter showed the same to the herein undersigned arresting officers thus they were placed under arrest.[66]Yet, during trial before the RTC, the police officersuniformly testified that they broughtaccused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro and Lantion-Tomto the police office after arresting the four suspectsin flagrante delicto, without mention at all of the suspects purported admission.We also consider the fact that Lantion-Tom was never charged with any criminal involvement even when, according to the prosecutions version of events, she was the first person to deliver theshabu.This seriously dents the prosecutions sequence of events on the night of February 17, 2000.In contrast, accused-appellants presented clear and convincing evidence in support of their defensesFurthermore, even assuming that the prosecutions version of the events that took place on the night of February 17, 2000 were true, it still failed to establish probable cause to justify thein flagrante delictoarrests of accused-appellants and search of accused-appellants persons, incidental to their arrests, resulting in the seizure of theshabuin accused-appellants possession.

Section 2, Article III of the Constitution provides:Section 2. (2)Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. (Emphases supplied.)Clearly, to constitute a validin flagrante delictoarrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.[70](Emphases supplied.)Aclose examination of the testimonies of the police officers reveal that theysimply relied on the information provided by their confidential informant that an illegal drug deal was to take place on the night of February 17, 2000 at Shangri-la Plaza in Mandaluyong City.Without any other independent information, and by simply seeing the suspects pass from one to another a white plastic bag with a box or carton inside, the police team was already able to conclude that the box containedshabuand sensed that an illegal drug deal took place.Evident from the foregoing excerpts that the police officers arrested accused-appellants and searched the latters persons without a warrant after seeing Rolando delos Reyes and Emmanuel de Claro momentarily conversing in the restaurant, and witnessing the white plastic bag with a box or carton inside being passed from Lantion-Tom to Emmanuel de Claro, to accused-appellant Rolando delos Reyes, and finally, to accused-appellant Reyes.These circumstances, however, hardly constitute overt acts indicative of a felonious enterprise.SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul had no prior knowledge of the suspects identities, and they completely relied on their confidential informant to actually identify the suspects.None of the police officers actually saw what was inside that box.There is also no evidence that the confidential informant himself knew that the box containedshabu.No effort at all was taken to confirm that the arrested suspectsactually knew that the box or carton inside the white plastic bag, seized from their possession,containedshabu.The police officers were unable to establisha cogent fact or circumstance that would have reasonably invited their attention, as officers of the law, to suspect that accused-appellants, Emmanuel de Claro, and Lantion-Tom has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime, particularly, an illegal drug deal.Finally, from their own account of the events, the police officers had compromised the integrity of theshabupurportedly seized from accused-appellants.In the instant case, SPO1 Lectura, PO3 Santiago, and PO3 Yumul uniformly testified before the RTC that they brought the arrested suspects to the police office for investigation.SPO1 Lectura and PO3 Santiago were vague as to how they ascertained asshabuthe contents of the box inside the white plastic bag, immediately after seizing the same from accused-appellant Reyes and before proceeding to the police office; while PO3 Yumul explicitly testified on cross-examination[76]that he saw theshabufor the first time at the police office.At any rate, all three police officers recounted that theshabuwas marked by SPO1 Benjamin David only at the police office.

CATCH!Without valid justification for thein flagrante delictoarrests of accused-appellants, the search of accused-appellants persons incidental to said arrests, and the eventual seizure of theshabufrom accused-appellants possession, are also considered unlawful and, thus, the seizedshabuis excluded in evidence as fruit of a poisonous tree.Without thecorpus delictifor the crime charged, then the acquittal of accused-appellants is inevitable.The constitutional guarantee against warrantless arrests and unreasonable searches and seizures cannot be so carelessly disregarded WHEREFORE, the Decision dated July 12, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 01733 is herebyREVERSEDandSET ASIDE.Accused-appellants Rolando delos Reyes and Raymundo Reyes areACQUITTED

12. ROGER POSADASvs. OMBUDSMAN, MENDOZA,J.:Dennis Venturina, a member of Sigma Rho at the University of the Philippines, was killed in a rumble between his fraternity and another fraternity on December 8, 1994.In a letter dated December 11, 1994, petitioner Roger Posadas, then Chancellor of U.P. Diliman in Quezon City, asked the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation for assistance in determining the persons responsible for the crime.In response to the request, respondent Orlando V. Dizon, Chief of the Special Operations Group of the NBI, and his men went to U.P. on December 12 and, on the basis of the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, Leandro Lachica and Cesar Mangrobang, Jr., attempted to arrest Francis Carlo Taparan and Raymundo Narag, officers/members of the Scintilla Juris Fraternity, as suspects in the killing of Venturina.It appears that the two suspects had come that day to the U.P. Police Station for a peace talk between their fraternity and the Sigma Rho Fraternity.DISPUTE:Petitioners Posadas,Marichu Lambino, and Rosario Torres-Yu, also ofU.P., and a certain Atty. Villamor, counsel for the suspects, objected on the ground that the NBI did not have warrants of arrest with them. Posadas and Atty. Villamor promised to take the suspects to the NBI Office the next day.As a result of their intervention, Taparan and Narag were not arrested by the NBI agents on that day.[1]However, criminal charges were filed later against the two student suspects.[2]Dizon then filed a complaint in the Office of the Special Prosecutor, charging petitioners Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Col. Eduardo Bentain, Chief of the Security Force of the U.P. Police, and Atty. Villamor with violation of P.D. 1829,[3]which makes it unlawful for anyone to obstruct the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders.On May 18, 1995, an information[4]was filed against them, alleging that:That on or about December 12, 1994 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, namely:ROGER POSADAS, Chancellor; ROSARIO YU - Vice Chancellor; ATTY. MARICHU LAMBINO - Asst. Legal Counsel; and COL. EDUARDO BENTAIN - Chief, Security Force, all of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon City, all public officers, while in the performance of their respective official functions, taking advantage of their official duties and committing the crime in relation to their office, conspiring and confederating with each other and with a certain ATTY. VILLAMOR, did then and there wilfully, knowingly and criminally obstruct, impede and frustrate the apprehension of FRANCIS CARLO TAPARAN and RAYMUNDO NARAG, both principal suspects involved in the brutal killing of DENNIS VENTURINA, a U.P. graduating student and Chairperson of the UP College of Administration, Student Council, and delaying the investigation and prosecution of the said heinous case by harboring and concealing said suspects thus, leading to the successful escape of suspects Narag and another principal suspect JOEL CARLO DENOSTA; that said above acts were done by the above-named accused public officials despite their full knowledge that said suspects were implicated in the brutal slaying of said Dennis Venturina, thus preventing the suspects arrest, prosecution and conviction.CONTRARY TO LAW.Later, on motion of petitioners, the Special Prosecutor's Office recommended the dismissal of the case.But the recommendation was disapproved.In a memorandum, dated September 8, 1997, the Office of the Ombudsman directed the Special Prosecutor to proceed with the prosecution of petitioners in the Sandiganbayan.Hence this petition forcertiorariand prohibition to set aside the resolution of the Ombudsman's office ordering the prosecution of petitioners.Petitioners contend that:I.THE HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN HE RULED THAT: 1) STUDENTS COULD BE ARRESTED WITHOUT WARRANT ON MERE SUSPICION; 2) PD 1829 INCLUDES ARRESTS WITHOUT WARRANTS ON MERE SUSPICION; AND WHEN HE REVERSED THE FINDINGS AND RESOLUTION OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER, THE DEPUTY SPECIAL PROSECUTOR AND THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, WHO CONDUCTED THE REINVESTIGATION OF THE CASE; AND FINALLY WHEN HE RESOLVED THAT PETITIONERS SHOULD BE SUBJECTED TO PUBLIC TRIAL WHEN THERE IS NO PROBABLE CAUSE AND NO BASIS.II.SECTION 1, PARAGRAPH C OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1829 IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.[5]

ISSUES:

Two issues are raised in this case, to wit:(1) Whether the attempted arrest of the student suspects by the NBI could be validly made without a warrant; and (2) Whether there was probable cause for prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829.We answer these questions in the negative.RULINGFirst.In view of Art. III, 2 of the Constitution, the rule is that no arrest may be made except by virtue of a warrant issued by a judge after examining the complainant and the witnesses he may produce and after finding probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has committed the crime.The exceptions when an arrest may be made even without a warrant are provided in Rule 113, 5 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:(a)When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;(b)When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it;(c)When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.There is no question that this case does not fall under paragraphs (a) and (c).The arresting officers in this case did not witness the crime being committed. Neither are the students fugitives from justice nor prisoners who had escaped from confinement.The question is whether paragraph (b) applies because a crime had just been committed and the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts indicating that Narag and Taparan were probably guilty.Respondents contend that the NBI agents had personal knowledge of facts gathered by them in the course of their investigation indicating that the students sought to be arrested were the perpetrators of the crime.[6]They invoke the ruling inPeople v. Tonog, Jr.[7]in which it was held:It may be that the police officers were not armed with a warrant when they apprehended Accused-appellant.The warrantless arrest, however, was justified under Section 5 (b), Rule 133(sic)of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure providing that a peace officer may, without a warrant, arrest a person "when an offense has in fact just been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it." In this case, Pat. Leguarda, in effecting the arrest of Accused-appellant, had knowledge of facts gathered by him personally in the course of his investigation indicating that Accused-appellant was one of the perpetrators.In that case, the accused voluntarily went upon invitation of the police officer who later noticed the presence of blood stains on the pants of the accused.Upon reaching the police station, the accused was asked to take off his pants for examination at the crime laboratory.The question in that case involved the admissibility of themaongpants taken from the accused.It is clear thatTonogdoes not apply to this case.First, the accused in that case voluntarily went with the police upon the latter's invitation.Second, the arresting officer found blood stains on the pants of the accused, on the basis of which he concluded that the accused probably committed the crime for which reason the latter was taken into custody.Third, the arrest was made on the same day the crime was committed.In the words of Rule 113, 5(b), the crime had "just been committed" and the arresting officer had "personal knowledge of the facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed it."In contrast, the NBI agents in the case at bar tried to arrest Narag and Taparan four days after the commission of the crime.They had no personal knowledge of any fact which might indicate that the two students were probably guilty of the crime.What they had were the supposed positive identification of two alleged eyewitnesses, which is insufficient to justify the arrest without a warrant by the NBI.We have already explained what constitutes "personal knowledge" on the part of the arresting officers:"Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without a warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." The grounds of suspicion are reasonable when, in the absence of actual belief of the arresting officers, the suspicion that the person to be arrested is probably guilty of committing the offense is based on actual facts,i.e.,supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested.A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest.[8]Indeed, at the time Dennis Venturina was killed, these agents were nowhere near the scene of the crime.When respondent Dizon and his men attempted to arrest Taparan and Narag, the latter were not committing a crime nor were they doing anything that would create the suspicion that they were doing anything illegal.On the contrary, Taparan and Narag, under the supervision of the U.P. police, were taking part in a peace talk called to put an end to the violence on the campus.To allow the arrest which the NBI intended to make without warrant would in effect allow them to supplant the courts.The determination of the existence of probable cause that the persons to be arrested committed the crime was for the judge to make.The law authorizes a police officer or even an ordinary citizen to arrest criminal offenders only if the latter are committing or have just committed a crime.Otherwise, we cannot leave to the police officers the determination of whom to apprehend if we are to protect our civil liberties.This is evident from a consideration of the requirements before a judge can order the arrest of suspects.Art. III, 2 of the Constitution provides:The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.RULINGFor the failure of the NBI agents to comply with constitutional and procedural requirements, we hold that their attempt to arrest Taparan and Narag without a warrant was illegal.Second.In ordering the prosecution of petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829, 1(c), the Office of the Ombudsman stated in its memorandum dated September 8, 1997:From the facts adduced, it is submitted that respondents had reasonable ground to suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested participated in the clubbing of Dennis Venturina, eventually leading to the latter's demise.It must be remembered that these SJ members were positively identified by two eyewitnesses.A reasonably prudent mind could not just ignore this positive identification.In fact, respondents do not dispute the identification made on the alleged participants in the clubbing of Dennis Venturina.Respondent U.P. officials justify their act of barring the apprehending officers from arresting the SJ members on the ground that the warrantless arrest sought to be effected did not conform with Sec. 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court; thereby averting, what would be in their opinion, an illegal arrest.While this justification may, at best, show their good faith, it does not detract from the fact that they had reasonable ground to suspect that the SJ members sought to be arrested committed the heinous crime of murder as a result of the positive identification made by two eyewitnesses.Besides, the reliance on the alleged illegality of the arrest just shows the clear intent, on respondents' part, to wilfully obstruct, frustrate or, at the least, delay the apprehension and investigation and prosecution of the SJ members positively identified.To be sure, respondents knew fully well that inquest proceedings follow warrantless arrests.It is in this forum where the prosecutor conducting the inquest may rule on their opinion on whether or not the warrantless arrest effected was valid; he having the quasijudicial authority to rule on this matter.Of course, there are various remedies under the law which respondents may have likewise availed of or resorted to in order to secure the liberty of the SJ members had the latter been arrested, without prejudice to any criminal or administrative actions that they may have filed against the arresting NBI agents.However, it appears that they took the law into their own hands in a manner that obstructed and delayed the investigation being conducted by a law enforcement agency like the NBI.They facilitated the escape of the two SJ members pinpointed by eyewitnesses as among those who clubbed to death Dennis Venturina.[9]The question is not whether petitioners had reasonable grounds to believe that the suspects were guilty.The question is whether the suspects could be arrested even in the absence of a warrant issued by a court, considering that, as already explained, the attempted arrest did not fall under any of the cases provided in Rule 113, 5.Regardless of their suspicion, petitioners could not very well have authorized the arrest without warrant of the students or even effected the arrest themselves.Only courts could decide the question of probable cause since the students were not being arrested inflagrante delicto.As the Special Prosecutor stated in his memorandum, dated May 18, 1995, in recommending the dismissal of the case against petitioners:All told, the evidence adduced in this case do not show that on the night of December 12, 1994, the accused knew or had reasonable ground to believe that the students who were then at the U.P. police headquarters had committed a crime.Neither were the warrantless arrest being sought to be made on campus that night, legal.The U.P. officials then present had every right to prevent the commission of illegal arrests of students on campus.Based on all the foregoing, the obvious conclusion is that, there is no probable cause to charge Posadas, Torres-Yu, Lambino, Bentain and Atty. Villamor of violating Section 1(c) of P.D. 1829.Probable cause is defined as "sufficient ground to engender a well founded belief that a crime cognizable by the court has been committed and that the respondents are probably guilty thereof and should be held for trial" (Section 1, Rule 12, Rules of Court).The absence of an arrest warrant, the absence of knowledge or reasonable ground on the part of the accused to believe that the students had committed a crime, the absence of any law punishing refusal to attend an investigation at the NBI, all show that there is no sufficient ground to charge the accused with Obstruction of Justice.On the contrary, the circumstances show that the accused, in safeguarding the rights of students, were acting within the bounds of law.[10]Third.Petitioners are being prosecuted under the following provision of P.D. No. 1829:The rule, of course, is that a criminal prosecution cannot be enjoined.[11]But as has been held, "[i]nfinitely more important than conventional adherence to general rules of criminal procedure is respect for the citizen's right to be free not only from arbitrary arrest and punishment but also from unwarranted and vexatious prosecution."[12]As we held in the similar case ofVenus v. Desierto:[13]Conformably with the general rule that criminal prosecutions may not be restrained either through a preliminary or final injunction or a writ of prohibition, this Court ordinarily does not interfere with the discretion of the Ombudsman to determine whether there exists reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information with the appropriate courts.There are, however, settled exceptions to this rule, such as those enumerated inBrocka v. Enrile, to wit:a.To afford protection to the constitutional rights of the accused (Hernandez vs. Albano, et al. L-19272, January 25, 1967, 19 SCRA 95);b.When necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions (Dimayuga, et al. vs. Fernandez, 43 Phil. 304; Hernandez vs. Albano,supra; Fortun vs. Labang, et al., L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607);c.When there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice (De Leon vs. Mabanag, 70 Phil. 202);d.When the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority (Planas vs. Gil, 67 Phil. 62);e.Where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation (Young vs. Rafferty, 33 Phil. 556; Yu Cong Eng vs. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 385, 389);f.When double jeopardy is clearly apparent (Sangalang vs. People and Alvendia, 109 Phil. 1140);g.Where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense (Lopez vs. City Judge, L-25795, October 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 616);h.Where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution (Rustia vs. Ocampo, CA-G.R. No. 4760, March 25, 1960);i.Where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance (Recto vs. Castelo, 18 L.J. (1953),citedin Raoa vs. Alvendia, CA G.R. No. 30720-R, October 8, 1962; Cf. Guingona, et al. vs. City Fiscal, L-60033, April 4, 1984, 128 SCRA 577);j.Where there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and amotion to quash on that ground has been denied (Salonga vs. Pao, et al., L-59524, February 18, 1985, 134 SCRA 438); andk.Preliminary injunction has been issued by the Supreme Court to prevent the threatened unlawful arrest of petitioners (Rodriguez vs. Castelo, L- 6374, August 1, 1953)citedin Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium, p. 188, 1988 Ed.)In this case, petitioners' objection to the arrest of the students cannot be construed as a violation of P.D. No. 1829, 1(c) without rendering it unconstitutional.Petitioners had a right to prevent the arrest of Taparan and Narag at the time because their attempted arrest was illegal.Indeed, they could not have interfered with the prosecution of the guilty parties because in fact petitioner Posadas had asked the NBI for assistance in investigating the death of Venturina.On the other hand, just because petitioners had asked for assistance from the NBI did not authorize respondent Dizon and his men to disregard constitutional requirements.The Office of the Ombudsman, however, found that the intervention by petitioners resulted in the escape of the student suspects as petitioner Posadas and Atty. Villamor failed in their undertaking to surrender the students the following day.[14]Hence, the information against them charged that petitioners willfully obstructed the apprehension of the suspects Taparan and Narag, leading to the successful escape of these students and another principal suspect, a certain Joel Carlo Denosta.[15]The student suspect mentioned by both the resolution dated May 18, 1995 and the information, a certain Joel Carlo Denosta, was not one of the students whose arrest by the NBI agents petitioners prevented on December 12, 1994.Moreover, whether or not petitioner Posadas surrendered the student suspects to the NBI agents the following day is immaterial.In the first place, they were not sureties or bondsmen who could be held to their undertaking.In the second place, the fact remains that the NBI agents could not have validly arrested Taparan and Narag at the U.P. Police Station as they did not have a warrant at that time.Hence, only the NBI agents themselves could be faulted for their inability to arrest Taparan and Narag. If the NBI believed the information given to them by the supposed eyewitnesses, the NBI should have applied for a warrant before making the attempted arrest instead of taking the law into their own hands.That they chose not to and were prevented from making an arrest for lack of a warrant is their responsibility alone.Petitioners could not be held accountable therefor.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Ombudsman and his agents are hereby prohibited from prosecuting petitioners for violation of P.D. No. 1829 1(c) as a result of the incident complained of in Criminal Case No. 22801 and the Sandiganbayan is ORDERED to dismiss the information in Criminal Case No. 22801 against petitioners.

13. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJASCRUZ,J.:Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote was convicted of illegal possession of firearms on the strength mainly of the stolen pistol found on his person at the moment of his warrantless arrest. In this appeal, he pleads that the weapon was not admissible as evidence against him because it had been illegally seized and was therefore the fruit of the poisonous tree. The Government disagrees. It insists that the revolver was validly received in evidence by the trial judge because its seizure was incidental to an arrest that was doubtless lawful even if admittedly without warrant.The incident occurred shortly before noon of August 8, 1987, after the Western Police District received a telephone call from an informer that there were three suspicious-looking persons at the corner of Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to the place. As later narrated at the trial by Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto Juan,1they there saw two men "looking from side to side," one of whom was holding his abdomen. They approached these persons and identified themselves as policemen, whereupon the two tried to run away but were unable to escape because the other lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects were then searched. One of them, who turned out to be the accused-appellant, was found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson revolver with six live bullets in the chamber. His companion, later identified as Nicanor Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his front right pants pocket. The weapons were taken from them. Mengote and Morellos were then turned over to police headquarters for investigation by the Intelligence Division.On August 11, 1987, the following information was filed against the accused-appellant before the Regional Trial Court of Manila:The undersigned accuses ROGELIO MENGOTE y TEJAS of a violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866, committed as follows:That on or about August 8, 1987, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and under his custody and control a firearm, to wit:one (1) cal. 38 "S & W" bearingSerial No. 8720-Twithout first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from the proper authorities.Besides the police officers, one other witness presented by the prosecution was Rigoberto Danganan, who identified the subject weapon as among the articles stolen from him during the robbery in his house in Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly reported the robbery to the police, indicating the articles stolen from him, including the revolver.2For his part, Mengote made no effort to prove that he owned the firearm or that he was licensed to possess it and claimed instead that the weapon had been "Planted" on him at the time of his arrest.3The gun, together with the live bullets and its holster, were offered as Exhibits A, B, and C and admitted over the objection of the defense. As previously stated, the weapon was the principal evidence that led to Mengote's conviction for violation of P.D. 1866. He was sentenced toreclusionperpetua.4It is submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the revolver should not have been admitted in evidence because of its illegal seizure. no warrant therefor having been previously obtained. Neither could it have been seized as an incident of a lawful arrest because the arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful, having been also effected without a warrant. The defense also contends that the testimony regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's house was irrelevant and should also have been disregarded by the trial court.The following are the pertinent provision of the Bill of Rights:Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.There is no question that evidence obtained as a result of an illegal search or seizure is inadmissible in any proceeding for any purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution. This is the celebrated exclusionary rule based on the justification given by Judge Learned Hand that "only in case the prosecution, which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will the wrong be repressed." The Solicitor General, while conceding the rule, maintains that it is not applicable in the case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and search of Mengote and the seizure of the revolver from him were lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court reading as follows:Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant when lawful. A peace officer or private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person;(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.We have carefully examined the wording of this Rule and cannot see how we can agree with the prosecution.Par. (c) of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as Mengote was not an escapee from a penal institution when he was arrested. We therefore confine ourselves to determining the lawfulness of his arrest under either Par. (a) or Par. (b) of this section.Par. (a) requires that the person be arrested (1) after he has committed or while he is actually committing or is at least attempting to commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the arresting officer.These requirements have not been established in the case at bar. At the time of the arrest in question, the accused-appellant was merely "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen," according to the arresting officers themselves. There was apparently no offense that had just been committed or was being actually committed or at least being attempted by Mengote in their presence.The Solicitor General submits that the actual existence of an offense was not necessary as long as Mengote's acts "created a reasonable suspicion on the part of the arresting officers and induced in them the belief that an offense had been committed and that the accused-appellant had committed it." The question is, What offense? What offense could possibly have been suggested by a person "looking from side to side" and "holding his abdomen" and in a place not exactly forsaken?These are certainly not sinister acts. And the setting of the arrest made them less so, if at all. It might have been different if Mengote bad been apprehended at an ungodly hour and in a place where he had no reason to be, like a darkened alley at 3 o'clock in the morning. But he was arrested at 11:30 in the morning and in a crowded street shortly after alighting from a passenger jeep with I his companion. He was not skulking in the shadows but walking in the clear light of day. There was nothing clandestine about his being on that street at that busy hour in the blaze of the noonday sun.On the other hand, there could have been a number of reasons, all of them innocent, why his eyes were darting from side to side and be was holding his abdomen. If they excited suspicion in the minds of the arresting officers, as the prosecution suggests, it has nevertheless not been shown what their suspicion was all about. In fact, the policemen themselves testified that they were dispatched to that place only because of the telephone call from the informer that there were "suspicious-looking" persons in that vicinity who were about to commit a robbery at North Bay Boulevard. The caller did not explain why he thought the men looked suspicious nor did he elaborate on the impending crime.In the recent case ofPeople v. Malmstedt,5the Court sustained the warrantless arrest of the accused because there was a bulge in his waist that excited the suspicion of the arresting officer and, upon inspection, turned out to be a pouch containing hashish. InPeople v. Claudio,6the accused boarded a bus and placed the buri bag she was carrying behind the seat of the arresting officer while she herself sat in the seat before him. His suspicion aroused, be surreptitiously examined the bag, which he found to contain marijuana. He then and there made the warrantless arrest and seizure that we subsequently upheld on the ground that probable cause had been sufficiently established.The case before us is different because there was nothing to support the arresting officers' suspicion other than Mengote's darting eyes and his hand on his abdomen. By no stretch of the imagination could it have been inferred from these acts that an offense had just been committed, or was actually being committed, or was at least being attempted in their presence.This case is similar toPeople v. Aminnudin,7where the Court held that the warrantless arrest of the accused was unconstitutional. This was effected while be was coming down a vessel, to all appearances no less innocent than the other disembarking passengers. He had not committed nor was be actually committing or attempting to commit an offense in the presence of the arresting officers. He was not even acting suspiciously. In short, there was no probable cause that, as the prosecution incorrectly suggested, dispensed with the constitutional requirement of a warrant.Par. (b) is no less applicable because its no less stringent requirements have also not been satisfied. The prosecution has not shown that at the time of Mengote's arrest an offense had in fact just been committed and that the arresting officers hadpersonal knowledgeof facts indicating that Mengote had committed it. All they had was hearsay information from the telephone caller, and about a crime that had yet to be committed.The truth is that they did not know then what offense, if at all, had been committed and neither were they aware of the participation therein of the accused-appellant. It was only later, after Danganan had appeared at the Police headquarters, that they learned of the robbery in his house and of Mengote's supposed involvement therein.8As for the illegal possession of the firearm found on Mengote's person, the policemen discovered this onlyafterhe had been searched and the investigation conducted later revealed that he was not its owners nor was he licensed to possess it.Before these events, the Peace officers had no knowledge even of Mengote' identity, let alone the fact (or suspicion) that he was unlawfully carrying a firearm or that he was involved in the robbery of Danganan's house.In the landmark case ofPeople v. Burgos,9this Court declared:Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must havepersonal knowledgeof the fact.The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view.(Sayo v. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859). (Emphasis supplied)xxx xxx xxxIn arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime.A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed.The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. (Emphasis supplied)This doctrine was affirmed inAlih v. Castro,10thus:If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a falsification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b),the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground thereforas stressed in the recent case ofPeople v. Burgos.(Emphasis supplied)It would be a sad day, indeed, if any person could be summarily arrested and searched just because he is holding his abdomen, even if it be possibly because of a stomach-ache, or if a peace officer could clamp handcuffs on any person with a shifty look on suspicion that he may have committed a criminal act or is actually committing or attempting it. This simply cannot be done in a free society. This is not a police state where order is exalted over liberty or, worse, personal malice on the part of the arresting officer may be justified in the name of security.There is no need to discuss the other issues raised by the accused-appellant as the ruling we here make is sufficient to sustain his exoneration. Without the evidence of the firearm taken from him at the time of his illegal arrest, the prosecution has lost its most important exhibit and must therefore fail. The testimonial evidence against Mengote (which is based on the said firearm) is not sufficient to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the crime imputed to him.We commend Atty. Violeta Calvo-Drilon for her able and spirited defense of the accused-appellant not only in the brief but also in the reply brief, which she did not have to file but did so just the same to stress the constitutional rights of her client. The fact that she was acting only as a counselde oficiowith no expectation of material reward makes her representation even more commendable.The Court feels that if the peace officers had been more mindful of the provisions of the Bill of Rights, the prosecution of the accused-appellant might have succeeded. As it happened, they allowed their over-zealousness to get the better of them, resulting in their disregard of the requirements of a valid search and seizure that rendered inadmissible the vital evidence they had invalidly seized.This should be a lesson to other peace officers. Their impulsiveness may be the very cause of the acquittal of persons who deserve to be convicted, escaping the clutches of the law because, ironically enough, it has not been observed by those who are supposed to enforce it.WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellant is ACQUITTED and ordered released immediately unless he is validly detained for other offenses. No costs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Appellee,vs.JACK RACHONACHURA,J.:On appeal is the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 affirming the Regional Trial Court2(RTC) Joint Decision3dated July 8, 2004 finding appellant Jack Racho y Raquero guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 5, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.The case stemmed from the following facts:On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent later reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team composed of member of the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA), the Intelligence group of the Philippine Army and the local police force to apprehend the appellant.4The agent gave the police appellants name, together with his physical description. He also assured them that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora the following day.On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent and informed him that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora, anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members then posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora. At around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with earlier. Having alighted from the bus, appellant stood near the highway and waited for a tricycle that would bring him to his final destination. As appellant was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station on suspicion of carrying shabu. Appellant immediately denied the accusation, but as he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.5The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation. The confiscated specimen was turned over to Police Inspector Rogelio Sarenas De Vera who marked it with his initials and with appellants name. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.6Appellant was charged in two separate Informations, one for violation of Section 5 of R.A. 9165, for transporting or delivering; and the second, of Section 11 of the same law for possessing, dangerous drugs, the accusatory portions of which read:"That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully have in his possession five point zero one (5.01) [or 4.54] grams of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "Shabu", a regulated drug without any permit or license from the proper authorities to possess the same.CONTRARY TO LAW."7"That at about 3:00 oclock (sic) in the afternoon on May 20, 2003 in Baler, Aurora, the said accused did then and there, unlawfully, feloniously and willfully transporting or delivering dangerous drug of 5.01 [or 4.54] grams of shabu without any permit or license from the proper authorities to transport the same.CONTRARY TO LAW."8During the arraignment, appellant pleaded "Not Guilty" to both charges.At the trial, appellant denied liability and claimed that he went to Baler, Aurora to visit his brother to inform him about their ailing father. He maintained that the charges against him were false and that no shabu was taken from him. As to the circumstances of his arrest, he explained that the police officers, through their van, blocked the tricycle he was riding in; forced him to alight; brought him to Sea Breeze Lodge; stripped his clothes and underwear; then brought him to the police station for investigation.9On July 8, 2004, the RTC rendered a Joint Judgment10convicting appellant of Violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. 9165 and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine ofP500,000.00; but acquitted him of the charge of Violation of Section 11, Article II, R.A. 9165. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision.11Hence, the present appeal.In his brief,12appellant attacks the credibility of the witnesses for the prosecution. He likewise avers that the prosecution failed to establish the identity of the confiscated drug because of the teams failure to mark the specimen immediately after seizure. In his supplemental brief, appellant assails, for the first time, the legality of his arrest and the validity of the subsequent warrantless search. He questions the admissibility of the confiscated sachet on the ground that it was the fruit of the poisonous tree.The appeal is meritorious.We have repeatedly held that the trial courts evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is entitled to great respect and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this is not a hard and fast rule. We have reviewed such factual findings when there is a showing that the trial judge overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact or circumstance of weight and substance that would have affected the case.13Appellant focuses his appeal on the validity of his arrest and the search and seizure of the sachet of shabu and, consequently, the admissibility of the sachet. It is noteworthy that although the circumstances of his arrest were briefly discussed by the RTC, the validity of the arrest and search and the admissibility of the evidence against appellant were not squarely raised by the latter and thus, were not ruled upon by the trial and appellate courts.It is well-settled that an appeal in a criminal case opens the whole case for review.1avvphi1This Court is clothed with ample authority to review matters, even those not raised on appeal, if we find them necessary in arriving at a just disposition of the case. Every circumstance in favor of the accused shall be considered. This is in keeping with the constitutional mandate that every accused shall be presumed innocent unless his guilt is proven beyond reasonable doubt.14After a thorough review of the records of the case and for reasons that will be discussed below, we find that appellant can no longer question the validity of his arrest, but the sachet of shabu seized from him during the warrantless search is inadmissible in evidence against him.The records show that appellant never objected to the irregularity of his arrest before his arraignment. In fact, this is the first time that he raises the issue. Considering this lapse, coupled with his active participation in the trial of the case, we must abide with jurisprudence which dictates that appellant, having voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his arrest, thus curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. The legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over his person. Appellants warrantless arrest therefore cannot, in itself, be the basis of his acquittal.15As to the admissibility of the seized drug in evidence, it is necessary for us to ascertain whether or not the search which yielded the alleged contraband was lawful.16The 1987 Constitution states that a search and consequent seizure must be carried out with a judicial warrant; otherwise, it becomes unreasonable and any evidence obtained therefrom shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.17Said proscription, however, admits of exceptions, namely:1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest;2. Search of evidence in "plain view;"3. Search of a moving vehicle;4. Consented warrantless search;5. Customs search;6. Stop and Frisk; and7. Exigent and emergency circumstances.18What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable warrantless search or seizure is purely a judicial question, determinable from the uniqueness of the circumstances involved, including the purpose of the search or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the articles procured.19The RTC concluded that appellant was caught in flagrante delicto, declaring that he was caught in the act of actually committing a crime or attempting to commit a crime in the presence of the apprehending officers as he arrived in Baler, Aurora bringing with him a sachet of shabu.20Consequently, the warrantless search was considered valid as it was deemed an incident to the lawful arrest.Recent jurisprudence holds that in searches incident to a lawful arrest, the arrest must precede the search; generally, the process cannot be reversed. Nevertheless, a search substantially contemporaneous with an arrest can precede the arrest if the police have probable cause to make the arrest at the outset of the search.21Thus, given the factual milieu of the case, we have to determine whether the police officers had probable cause to arrest appellant. Although probable cause eludes exact and concrete definition, it ordinarily signifies a reasonable ground of suspicion supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man to believe that the person accused is guilty of the offense with which he is charged.22The determination of the existence or absence of probable cause necessitates a reexamination of the established facts. On May 19, 2003, a confidential agent of the police transacted through cellular phone with appellant for the purchase of shabu. The agent reported the transaction to the police authorities who immediately formed a team to apprehend the appellant. On May 20, 2003, at 11:00 a.m., appellant called up the agent with the information that he was on board a Genesis bus and would arrive in Baler, Aurora anytime of the day wearing a red and white striped T-shirt. The team members posted themselves along the national highway in Baler, Aurora, and at around 3:00 p.m. of the same day, a Genesis bus arrived in Baler. When appellant alighted from the bus, the confidential agent pointed to him as the person he transacted with, and when the latter was about to board a tricycle, the team approached him and invited him to the police station as he was suspected of carrying shabu. When he pulled out his hands from his pants pocket, a white envelope slipped therefrom which, when opened, yielded a small sachet containing the suspected drug.23The team then brought appellant to the police station for investigation and the confiscated specimen was marked in the presence of appellant. The field test and laboratory examinations on the contents of the confiscated sachet yielded positive results for methamphetamine hydrochloride.Clearly, what prompted the police to apprehend appellant, even without a warrant, was the tip given by the informant that appellant would arrive in Baler, Aurora carrying shabu. This circumstance gives rise to another question: whether that information, by itself, is sufficient probable cause to effect a valid warrantless arrest.The long standing rule in this jurisdiction is that "reliable information" alone is not sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest. The rule requires, in addition, that the accused perform some overt act that would indicate that he has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense.24We find no cogent reason to depart from this well-established doctrine.The instant case is similar to People v. Aruta,25People v. Tudtud,26and People v. Nuevas.27In People v. Aruta, a police officer was tipped off by his informant that a certain "Aling Rosa" would be arriving from Baguio City the following day with a large volume of marijuana. Acting on said tip, the police assembled a team and deployed themselves near the Philippine National Bank (PNB) in Olongapo City. While thus positioned, a Victory Liner Bus stopped in front of the PNB building where two females and a man got off. The informant then pointed to the team members the woman, "Aling Rosa," who was then carrying a traveling bag. Thereafter, the team approached her and introduced themselves. When asked about the contents of her bag, she handed it to the apprehending officers. Upon inspection, the bag was found to contain dried marijuana leaves.28The facts in People v. Tudtud show that in July and August, 1999, the Toril Police Station, Davao City, received a report from a civilian asset that the neighbors of a certain Noel Tudtud (Tudtud) were complaining that the latter was responsible for the proliferation of marijuana in the area. Reacting to the report, the Intelligence Section conducted surveillance. For five days, they gathered information and learned that Tudtud was involved in illegal drugs. On August 1, 1999, the civilian asset informed the police that Tudtud had headed to Cotabato and would be back later that day with a new stock of marijuana. At around 4:00 p.m. that same day, a team of police officers posted themselves to await Tudtuds arrival. At 8:00 p.m., two men disembarked from a bus and helped each other carry a carton. The police officers approached the suspects and asked if they could see the contents of the box which yielded marijuana leaves.29In People v. Nuevas, the police officers received information that a certain male person, more or less 54" in height, 25 to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the upper right hand, and usually wearing a sando and maong pants, would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. While conducting stationary surveillance and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking, they saw the accused who fit the description, carrying a plastic bag. The police accosted the accused and informed him that they were police officers. Upon inspection of the plastic bag carried by the accused, the bag contained marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped in a blue cloth. In his bid to escape charges, the accused disclosed where two other male persons would make a delivery of marijuana leaves. Upon seeing the two male persons, later identified as Reynaldo Din and Fernando Inocencio, the police approached them, introduced themselves as police officers, then inspected the bag they were carrying. Upon inspection, the contents of the bag turned out to be marijuana leaves.30In all of these cases, we refused to validate the warrantless search precisely because there was no adequate probable cause. We required the showing of some overt act indicative of the criminal design.As in the above cases, appellant herein was not committing a crime in the presence of the police officers. Neither did the arresting officers have personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested had committed, was committing, or about to commit an offense. At the time of the arrest, appellant had just alighted from the Gemini bus and was waiting for a tricycle. Appellant was not acting in any suspicious manner that would engender a reasonable ground for the police officers to suspect and conclude that he was committing or intending to commit a crime. Were it not for the information given by the informant, appellant would not have been apprehended and no search would have been made, and consequently, the sachet of shabu would not have been confiscated.We are not unaware of another set of jurisprudence that deems "reliable information" sufficient to justify a search incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. As cited in People v. Tudtud, these include People v.Maspil, Jr.,31People v. Bagista,32People v. Balingan,33People v. Lising,34People v. Montilla,35People v. Valdez,36and People v. Gonzales.37In these cases, the Court sustained the validity of the warrantless searches notwithstanding the absence of overt acts or suspicious circumstances that would indicate that the accused had committed, was actually committing, or attempting to commit a crime. But as aptly observed by the Court, except in Valdez and Gonzales, they were covered by the other exceptions to the rule against warrantless searches.38Neither were the arresting officers impelled by any urgency that would allow them to do away with the requisite warrant. As testified to by Police Officer 1 Aurelio Iniwan, a member of the arresting team, their office received the "tipped information" on May 19, 2003. They likewise learned from the informant not only the appellants physical description but also his name. Although it was not certain that appellant would arrive on the same day (May 19), there was an assurance that he would be there the following day (May 20). Clearly, the police had ample opportunity to apply for a warrant.39Obviously, this is an instance of seizure of the "fruit of the poisonous tree," hence, the confiscated item is inadmissible in evidence consonant with Article III, Section 3(2) of the 1987 Constitution, "any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding."Without the confiscated shabu, appellants conviction cannot be sustained based on the remaining evidence. Thus, an acquittal is warranted, despite the waiver of appellant of his right to question the illegality of his arrest by entering a plea and his active participation in the trial of the case. As earlier mentioned, the legality of an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the accused. A waiver of an illegal, warrantless arrest does not carry with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest.40One final note. As clearly stated in People v. Nuevas,41x x x In the final analysis, we in the administration of justice would have no right to expect ordinary people to be law-abiding if we do not insist on the full protection of their rights. Some lawmen, prosecutors and judges may still tend to gloss over an illegal search and seizure as long as the law enforcers show the alleged evidence of the crime regardless of the methods by which they were obtained. This kind of attitude condones law-breaking in the name of law enforcement. Ironically, it only fosters the more rapid breakdown of our system of justice, and the eventual denigration of society. While this Court appreciates and encourages the efforts of law enforcers to uphold the law and to preserve the peace and security of society, we nevertheless admonish them to act with deliberate care and within the parameters set by the Constitution and the law. Truly, the end never justifies the means.42WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 22, 2008 in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00425 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Jack Raquero Racho is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is directed to cause the immediate release of appellant, unless the latter is being lawfully held for another cause; and to inform the Court of the date of his release, or the reasons for his confinement, within ten (10) days from notice.No costs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,appellee, vs.NERIO SUELAD E C I S I O NPANGANIBAN,J.:In this Decision, the Court visits and applies existing jurisprudence on the right to competent and independent counsel of persons under custodial investigation.It also reiterates the long-standing judicial policy that procedural laws which are favorable to the accused shall be given retroactive effect.Inasmuch as the aggravating circumstance ofdisguisewas not alleged in the Information, it cannot now be appreciated to increase the penalty to death, notwithstanding the fact that the new rule requiring such allegation was promulgated only after the crime was committed and after the trial court had already rendered its Decision.The CaseFor automatic review by this Court is the Decision[1]datedJanuary 26, 1998of theRegional Trial Court ofQuezonCity, (Branch 95), finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide and simple robbery.Thedecretalportion of the Decision reads as follows:WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the following:1. InCrim. Cases Nos. Q-96-64616 and Q-96-65071, the Court finds the accusedNerioSuelayHembraand EdgarSuelayHembraandEdgardoBatocanGUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide defined in and penalized by paragraph I, A