arab spring causes & consequences

7/30/2019 Arab Spring Causes & Consequences

1/58

Arab Spring

Riots, Rabble and Revolutions:

Causes and Consequences


2/58

Outline of talk

I. What is a revolution? Does the Arab Springconstitute a revolution?

II. The Arab Spring in comparative perspective

A. Causes

B. The fate of revolutionary movementsIII. The possible outcome of the Arab Spring Scenarios

for the future


3/58

I. What is a revolution? What is in a

name?

Industrial revolution (Britain 1750s on) Social revolution (the 1960s)

Cultural revolution (again the 1960s; China)

Political revolutions (American 1776, French 1789;

USSR 1917, etc.etc.)

Revolution in military affairs (todays high tech

warfare)


4/58

Narrowing the field: Revolutions that

involve political change

A working definition of political revolution (JackGoldstone)

"an effort to transform the political institutions and the

justifications for political authority in society..

accompanied by formal or informal mass mobilization and noninstitutionalized actions that undermine

authorities."


5/58

But even then

Types of Political Revolutions:

Republican revolutions

(English 1640; American 1776; French 1789)

Marxist

(Russia 1917, China 1949)

Against dictatorship

(Iran 1979)

Against communism (East Europe, USSR 1989)


6/58

Mapping revolutions is thus complex: Multiple dimensions are involved

Revolutions are short and intensebut what is the

relevant time frame?

Sometimes multiple revolutions within the same time span(6 in France 1789-1800)

We only get a full picture in hindsight. Thus: The owl of

minerva


7/58

II. Revolutions in Comparative

Perspective

Thinking about the Arab Spring by reflecting onclearcut cases of revolution:

England 1640-1649;

American Revolution 1776-1783

French Revolution (1789-?) Russian Revolution 1917 (March and October);


8/58

A. Causes of Revolutions

1. External context and pressure: Economic pressures and taxation (American;

French; English 1640)

International war (English 1640, Russian 1917),

Turkish WW I); Colonial intrusion (Japan and Meji transformation

post 1853)

Globalization today? (USSR 1991)


9/58

2. Existing internal structural tension Economic divisions (class tensions; unemployed, etc)

Groups that lack political voice (Colonies vs. Metropole)

Inherited privilege vs. meritocracy (French bourgeois vs.

feudal prerogatives, 1789) Groups excluded from economic opportunity or

appointments (corruption)


10/58

B. What is at stake in revolutionary

episodes?

Moments of Madness(Aristide Zolberg)

Everything appears possible because political events

change human consciousness

The world turned upside down

(Christopher Hill on English Revolutionthe rise of

Ranters, Levellers, Diggers)


11/58

Two important interim conclusions

1. Revolutions create space for alternativeconceptions of social, political, and cultural order

fundamental transformation of society, culture and

politics


12/58

2. Revolutions create opportunities for a) Charismatic leaders

Non-routine, not rule bound, and not beholden to their

followers

The charismatic leader advances an alternativecomprehensive world view, a new future

The leader re-defines the realm of the possible


13/58


14/58


15/58

b) Organizations and institutions that have acomprehensive alternative view

The Communist partys Iron Vanguard of the Revolution

Religious organizations (Islamic theocracy in the wake of

Iranian Revolution 1979)

C f


16/58

C. The Fate of Revolutionary

MovementsExternal Pressure and Structural tensions

Discontented groups

Demands on govt.

Govt. reforms or resists

Revolutionary movement wins the struggle

Success then disunity


17/58

Revolutionary stages

Impetus behind the revolution: External pressureplus pre-existing internal disaffected groups

Often not the poor or dispossessed but intermediate or

rising groups without voice


18/58

1

st

phase: limited demands: e.g. 1789 French bourgeois revolution. (anti-feudal)

Broad alliance of disaffected groups

Easy to define what one is against

The monarchy, dictatorship, absolutist rule, since they bundle allauthority


19/58

2

nd

phase. Various scenarios Government meets demands (controlled reform)

revolution is averted

Government succeeds in repressionrevolution is

suspended but latent Government falls--moderates ascend3rd phase

commences


20/58

3rd phase: Moderates cannot fulfill demands. Challenges by conservatives and radicals

Difficulty in re-aligning with conservatives or crushingrevolutionary comrades

Moderates have broad membership (loose alliance) vs.

radicals with unifying ideology (sometimes charismaticleadership)

Short time frame for moderates to demonstrate change


21/58

4th phase: Radicals ascend E.g.: Cromwell; Robespierre in French Revolution).

Agitation against counter-revolutionaries; revisionists

Rhetorical and political moves against the moderates.Political Outbidding Language of the Chinese Cultural Revolution revisionist

dogs=USSR; imperial lackeys=those accused of being prowestern or pro-dtente; public trials; public self criticism;neighbor surveillance


22/58

5

th

phase: Dictatorship but less radical in intent. Radicals turn on each other and the revolution burns itself

out

Revolution turns external (nationalist fervor)


23/58

D. Where does the Arab Spring fit?

Is it a revolution? Yes (multiple dimensions; large group mobilization;

existing political hierarchy has been challenged)

Self description by the participants as a revolutionary

movement: The intent to overthrow the regime and

transform society, culture


24/58

E. Causes of the Arab Spring?

1. External pressure: economic retardationRank of some MENA countries in economic

development

Rank in unemployment rate (CIA 2010): Egypt 101;

Tunisia 136; Libya 176; Yemen 181; Gaza strip 183; But particularly high among the young and educated

Inflation: Algeria 128;Tunisia 128; Syria 129; S.Arabia

155; Gaza 163; West Bank 168; Egypt 205 (11 %)

Perception of relative stagnation


25/58

2. Internal dissatisfactionCorruption rankings (Transparency International)

Tunisia 73: Morocco 80; Algeria and Egypt 112 (tied);

Yemen 164; Libya 168;

Age distribution (Egypt 33% younger than 14years, Syria 35 % compare US 20%; Germany

13%)

Lack of democratic input (Syrian Assad family in

power since 1970)


26/58

Unrest due to the gap between rising expectationsand outcomes Educational opportunities improved in some countries but

not economic upward mobility.

In Tunisia in 2001 those with higher education (college)

and those with no to little education faced an 11 %unemployment rate.

By 2010 almost 25 % of those with higher education wereunemployed, compared to 6 % of those will littleeducation.

E What next? What might unfold in the


27/58

E. What next? What might unfold in the

MENA region?

Politicians and predictions


28/58


29/58

Do political scientists fare better?

Steven Weber on business cycles (1997) crisis

Global capital markets are increasingly efficient

at managing risk, and providing shock

absorbers that cushion economic fluctuations.

And the wider array of funding sources and moresophisticated risk management techniques are

stabilizers for a globalizing economy.


30/58

Oops

Nevertheless: can we integrate the Arab Spring in a

wider understanding of revolutionary movements

and ask intelligent questions about the future?


31/58

III. Possible outcomes of the Arab

Spring. Concerns for Democracy General point made earlier: Charismatic leaders andstrong organizations win out in revolutionary

struggles

Who are the leaders and institutions with alternative,comprehensive views?

Who are well organized?


32/58

Islamic groups, e.g. Egypt: Muslim Brotherhood (Sunni) 77 of 156 parliamentary

seats

Salafists (Sunni but traditionalist) Salafi alliance 33 of 156seats

Salafists tend not to be politically involved as long as the leaderadheres to the faith. If the leader does not then violentopposition is legitimate.

There is no clear line of distinction between Salafists and themembership of the Muslim Brotherhood. (Jonathan Brown)


33/58

Tunisia: Ennahda party 89 of 217 seats

But prior to elections polled only at 20 %

Conclusion: ability to mobilize the vote

(Other parties 2nd

largest CPR, Center-Left-Secular 29seats, Aridha-former govt?- 26)

Why have Islamic groups been


34/58

Why have Islamic groups been

successful?

Natural organizational structure (religiousleadership; historical roots)

Comprehensive world view in many aspects

Cross link with multiple social functions

(charities, etc.)

Discipline and voter turn out

Ennahda polled 20 % in Tunisia but got almost 40% of

the vote, similar development in Egypt with Muslim

Brothers and Salafi alliance


35/58

The Military Algerian response to Islamic parties

Traditionally highly respected

In Egypt: external wars with Israel

Residue from colonial liberation struggles (Tunisia, Morrocco,

Algeria)

Both Islamic parties and Armed Forces mightbecome obstacles to fundamental democratic reform

B ) Why should we care about


36/58

B.) Why should we care about

democratic reform in MENA?

1. Democratic Peace Theory

2. Normative concern with human rights

Richard Williamson: the Freedom Agenda.

3. The effects of repressive regimes spill across

borders Refugee flows

C D l ti h t d i


37/58

C. Do revolutions have to end up in

radicalism or authoritarianism ? Can

Democracy take root?The American Revolution !

But is the U.S. an exception given the exit of the

opposition? Opponents left.

American Revolution does provide other insights Content of ideas? Presence of alternative conceptions

of order

Institutional design

Role of third parties?

Other positive scenarios for the future?


38/58

Other positive scenarios for the future?

Another wave of democracy ? (East European

transformation)

But there:

Consensus on available alternative model (liberal

democracy and capitalism) Existing societal networksrapid party formation

Third party support (US, EU extension)


39/58

Many of the East European characteristics are not

present

multiple rival conceptions of order in MENA

societal capital available (Putnams Bowling clubs and

democracy)but not proto democratic institutions instead

religious groups etc.

Limited role for western third parties


40/58

Models?

Algerian model ?

Military rule with oil rents

Turkish model?

Some questions about future of democracy there

(journalists in prison; roll back of womens rights; policytowards Israel, Iran)

Theocracy ? (Iran, some groups in Iraq)

D Conclusions from Political Science


41/58

D. Conclusions from Political Science

Research (A. Roberts)

1.Economic wealth correlates with democracy

2. Less clear conclusions on which institutions lead

to economic development


42/58

3. Competing arguments whether external

intervention can help create democracy

4. A slight majority believes Islam does NOT harm

prospects for democracy

E) Factors that influence possible


43/58

E). Factors that influence possible

democracy in MENA

1. One Arab Spring? The diversity in the MENA region

2. Some key differences Monarchical dynasties (Gulf states, Saudi Arabia,

Morocco)

Homogeneity (Egypt) vs. multiple identities (religious,linguistic, ethnic, tribal, clan)

Natural resources (oil haves and have nots)

Role of the military

Secular nature of government (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya)and religious standing (Saudi Arabia)


44/58

Monarchical dynasties

Limited reforms in Jordan, Morocco, Gulf and Saudi

Arabia in response to limited demands

One exception: Bahrain (Sunni minority and Shia

majority)


45/58

Homogeneity of the population

Homogeneity is not a pre-condition for democracy.Heterogeneous countries can be democratic (US,Canada, India, etc.)

However this depends to some extent on: Overarching national identification

Crosscutting rather than overlapping and reinforcingcleavages (e.g. economic differences should not overlapwith religious)

Political power sharing among different groups

Natural resources (oil) curse or


46/58

Natural resources (oil) curse or

blessing?

Economic consequences of oil The Dutch disease:

Inflationary pressures

Displaces investment in manufacturing, production, etc

Forestalls fiscal adjustment (overly generous welfare

payments) Of 23 developing countries reliant on natural resource

exports, only 2 had annual growth rates over 2% between1970-1995.


47/58

Political consequences of oil rents

1. Can lead to conflict if unequally distributed

(Nigeria)

2. Allows for poor economic policy as long as oil

prices remain high (Venezuela)

3. Can entrench oligarchy


48/58

Political consequences of oil rents The long shadow of Magna Carta !!

What??

(61) SINCE WE HAVE GRANTED ALL THESE THINGS

for God, for the better ordering of our kingdom, and toallay the discord that has arisen between us and ourbarons, we give and grant to the barons the followingsecurity:

The barons shall elect twenty-five of their number tokeep, and cause to be observed with all their might, thepeace and liberties granted and confirmed to them by thischarter.


49/58

Taxation and representation

Baronial control over the monarch, the royal councils

prerogative to confer and discuss (parler)

No taxation without parliamentary approval

Baronial tax exemption absolutism

(Absolutist France, Spain, Eastern Europe)


50/58

Oil rents limit the need for taxation, thus limited

demands for input and voice

Oil rents allow rulers to make sidepayments toopponents (Saudi Arabia) or concede economicbenefits while limiting political reform

Oil (natural resources) correlates negatively withdemocracy

No taxation no representation !!


51/58

The role of the military

Egypt:

military controls 5-40% of the economy (Marina Ottoway)

Dominant political position

Affinity with U.S. armed forces (positive)

If democratic reform diminishes their role in favor ofIslamists their support for democratic reform might

weaken (Algerian scenario)


52/58

E) New revolutionary dynamics

1. The collective Action Problem

Rebellion comes at individual cost, overall social

benefit free ride

Overcoming the collective action problem: leadership

and prior organization

Knowledge of co-actionists; knowledge of central

governments reaction

The role of new technology?

2. Tipping points and cascade effects:authoritarianism is easier to challenge


53/58

Is communications technology a sufficient glue for a

loose revolutionary movement?


54/58


55/58

Home Secretary Theresa May was to chair a

discussion with companies including BlackBerry,

whose encrypted instant chat service took much

of the blame for allowing rioters to coordinate the

four nights of unrest in EnglandSocialnetworking sites Facebook and Twitter would

also be represented at the central London

meeting, said a statement from the Home Office.

(Associated Press August 2011)


56/58

New communications can serve as a means of

mobilization, but also undirected mobs.

They might serve as a check on undemocratic

developments but perhaps not as a long term

organizing force


57/58

Final observations

Historically most revolutions get captured by well

organized groups led by charismatic leaders

Who will be these organized groups in MENA?

How do various Islamic movements comport with

democracy?

Outcomes across the MENA region will


58/58

g

differ

Monarchical dynasties with oil, will likely engage in limited

reforms

Heterogeneous societies (Libya) will face multiple

challenges

Heterogenous societies with oil might be particularly

difficult to govern (Iraq; Sudan)

External interventions can bring regimes down but not

necessarily create a democracy

arab spring causes & consequences

Documents