why did mexico become a violent country? · 2017. 2. 23. · 1 why did mexico become a violent...

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Why did Mexico become a violent country? The role of illegal American firearms and other alternative hypotheses Following a pattern observed in developed countries, Mexico experienced a substantial drop in crime and violence throughout the second half of the XXth century. However, after the 2004-2007 period, the observed decline ceased and homicides began to increase, whilst other crimes such as violent robberies, extortions and kidnappings appeared for the first time in previously-considered non-violent regions. By comparing the explanatory power of several hypotheses used to date, this paper suggests that more illegal firearms being trafficked from the U.S. after the Assault Weapon Ban (AWB) expired in 2004 is the best predictor for homicide rise in Mexico after then. Keywords

Mexico, U.S, Assault Weapons Ban, homicide, violence, crime, guns, firearms, trafficking

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

AWB Assault Weapons Ban (U.S.) Ley de Prohibición Federal de Armas de Asalto

CONAPO National Council of Population (Mexico) Consejo Nacional de Población ICESI Citizens' Institute for Security Studies (Mexico)

Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios Sobre la Inseguridad IFAI Institute of Access to Information and Data Protection (Mexico)

Instituto Federal de Acceso a la Información Pública y Protección de Datos INEGI National Institute of Statistics and Geography (Mexico) Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía SNSP National Public Security System (Mexico)

Sistema Nacional de Seguridad Pública SEDENA Secretariat of National Defense (Mexico)

Secretaría de la Defensa Nacional – Mexican Army

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Introduction Following a pattern observed in other countries around the world (Farrell, Tseloni, Mailley and Tilley,

2011), Mexico experienced a substantial drop in crime and violence over the last decades of the

twentieth century. This trend is clear in the case of homicides for which the rate per 100,000 inhabitants

fell from around 40-50 homicides in the mid-1950s to 17.9 in 1997, and around 11.5 by mid-2000s

(SESNSP, 2014; CONAPO, 2014). By 2004, the incidence of crime in Mexico was at the lowest level

recorded.

Nevertheless, after 2004, violence generated by criminal organisations began to increase. This occurred

particularly in Mexico’s northern states (which border the U.S.) where authorities started to be

challenged, policeman and Mayors were killed for the first time, and society witnessed a dramatic

expansion of violent crimes such as kidnapping, robberies and extortion (Ríos, 2011 and SNSP 2013).

Alongside these sudden changes in crime, increases in other forms of violence such as confrontations

in public spaces in which innocent victims were injured, the rising prevalence of powerful guns in

criminal hands, and an increase in the fear of crime -as measured by victimization surveys- generated

the perception that Mexico was becoming a ‘failed state’ (ENSI2010; ENVIPE, 2012; USJFCOM;

2008).

These changes naturally raise many questions. A first one is about explaining the ‘big picture’. In other

words, how criminological theories might enlighten why a country that was experiencing a decline in

crime (with the size and population of Mexico) suddenly changed trajectory to witness a clear increase

in violence. A second one is about the ‘tactic behind the violence’. This is relevant given that Mexico

has had one of the strictest gun policies in the world. Certainly, an analysis about the illegal gun supply

is lacking and its inclusion would help to comprehend if criminal opportunity actually changed and how

this fact could have triggered violence in the country.

Overall, the aim of this study is to explore some of the most widespread hypotheses used when trying

to explain the spike in violence in Mexico during the last decade. The main argument presented here is

that homicide increase cannot be empirically elucidated by using the traditional ‘criminological

explanations’. By contrast, it proposes an additional hypothesis: due to the timing of these criminal

changes in Mexico and the geography involved, one possible explanation may be found in modifications

to gun legislation in the U.S. This research particularly explores how the expiration of the U.S. Assault

Weapon Ban (AWB) in 2004 might explain the rise of homicide in Mexico after then.

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The study is organised as follows. Section 1 outlines a general background -the rationale behind the

paper- suggesting how gun prevalence in the U.S. is linked with illegal guns in Mexico (gun seizures is

considered a proxy) on one hand, and its possible impact: homicides in Mexico, on the other. Section 2

presents the statistical analysis: a fixed effect panel data model linking homicides with gun seizures in

Mexico, controlling by other explanations for violence. Section 3 explores two additional robustness

techniques: a first one to reconfirm the temporal role of AWB expiration in homicides increase, and

some exploratory ideas for a possible instrumental variable. Finally, Section 4 presents some general

findings and further implications.

1. Background

Graph 1: An input-ouput-outcome model

Source: Author’s elaboration, 2014

1.1 Input: More guns (prevalence) in the U.S. On September 13, 1994, U.S. President William Clinton signed into law the Public Safety and

Recreational Firearms Use Protection Act, commonly known as the Federal Assault Weapons Ban

(AWB). This federal law included a ten-year prohibition on the manufacture and import of specific

semi-automatic firearms for civilian use that were defined therein as "assault weapons" (GPO, 1994).

From an analytical perspective, this policy of restricting military-style guns had two main objectives.

On one hand, it aimed to reduce the social costs -morbidity and mortality- associated with the public

shootings, accidents and murders occurring all over the U.S. On the other, it also intended to contribute

1. More available guns in the U.S. as possible input

2. More seized firearms in Mexico as possible output

3. More homicides in Mexico as possible outcome

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in stopping the violent crimes experienced in cities such as New York, Los Angeles, Detroit, Baltimore,

D.C., Boston and others (Presidential Libraries, 1994).

Although there is no absolute consensus regarding if this ten-year ban was actually successful or not in

achieving these goals, most of the studies suggest some positive externalities. By restricting high calibre

and large amounts of guns to unreliable users (such as gangs and straw purchasers), this policy could

have contributed to re-empower police forces, on one hand, and to reduce social harm previously caused

by high gun prevalence, on the other (Roth and Koper, 1999).

In any case, ten years later in 2004, the AWB expiration removed the restrictions to private contractors

for manufacturing, importing and selling for civilian use most of the semi-automatic weapons that were

prohibited ten years ago. In addition to a quantitative raise in prevalence, guns also increased its

destructive power (lethality). In fact, ATF (2013) data shows that more 9mm pistols and rifles started

to be produced at higher rates after 2004, coincidentally the preferred weapons by criminal organisations

operating in Mexico (Goodmand and Marizco, 2010).

Graph 2: Gun prevalence in the U.S.

Source: Perez Esparza and Weigend, 2014

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Implementationof the AWB

Removal fo the AWB

Obama'sadministration

Mass shootings in Aurora and

Newtown

Net number of firearms =(manufactured + imported firearms) - exported firearms

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1.2 Output: More illegal guns (confiscations) in Mexico

Mexico has had a highly restrictive gun policy for almost 100 years. One of the clearest keys for

understanding this regulation is the 1972 Federal Law of Firearms and Explosives, which basically

reconfirmed two historical bases. On one hand, it fortified the legal and administrative system to control

the proliferation of guns in the country while heavily limiting and restricting the access for civilians,

(and even to the civil police forces). On the other, it granted exclusivity and the constitutional mandate

to the federal government to strictly enforce this policy throughout the Mexican Army (SEDENA).

As a result of these foundations, manufacturing for civilian use has been almost inexistent in Mexico.

Production for government agencies has been rare and, when it has occurred, it has been carried out

monopolistically by the Army, for the Army itself. The rationale behind was to restrict the supply to

civilians under the ‘least-guns-as possible’ paradigm.

In terms of civil possession, for instance, Mexican citizens who want to acquire a gun have to register

to be granted with a license, only possible after completing an intense legal and medical background

check also carried out by the Mexican Army (Vega, 2011). Even when passing these exams, private

handgun ownership has been restricted to ‘justified causes’ (such as hunting) and to low caliber weapons

(.38 or below). In any case, law does not allow citizens to carry guns in public places, either openly or

concealed (UNODC, 2013). By 2013, there were only 3,140 private users with a legal valid license in

all Mexico (Aviles, 2013), a fact that may indicate the low gun-demand from most Mexican citizens1.

Then, where are the firearms coming from? The idea of American guns illegally being trafficked to

Mexico is not new. Analysts have studied, for instance, how firearms producers in the U.S. participated

and enriched during the 1910 Mexican Revolution. More recently, by 1994 when AWB was aiming to

reduce prevalence in the U.S., American guns were already associated with the Zapatista uprising

(UNODC, 2013) and with Mexican Presidential Candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio murder committed

with a .38 revolver acquired in San Francisco, California (Brito, 2011). Still, all these cases were more

or less isolated until some years ago when the amount and lethality of guns being trafficked increased,

starting to concern some NGOs2. In any case, data suggests that:

1 If legal demand has been relatively low and stable, it is possible to assume then that there has been a growing demand for illegal guns. Besides the expansion in demand probably associated with the ‘Merida Initiative arms race’ and other changes in criminal equilibriums, it is likely to infer that some citizens could have acquired guns for self-defence purposes, as perceived in the ‘Michoacán Autodefensas’ case

(Martinez and Mayorga, 2014). 2 The Washington’s Office on Latin America (WOLA), the Brady Campaign against Gun Violence, and the Violence Policy Center have raised this point in the U.S. In Mexico, [Des]arma México is the leading organization. The 2014 #No+Armas #No+Guns report elaborated by the Mexican organizations Instituto para la Seguridad y Democracia (INSYDE) and Movimiento por la Paz in partnership with the Americans Global Exchange and Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR) is the best example of binational cooperation in this security issue.

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The U.S. is the largest exporter of weapons to developing countries (Grimmet and Kerr, 2012).

There have been some cases of American actors supplying guns and getting involved with

international conflicts, as demonstrated in the Iran-Contra affair (Brown, 2013).

The U.S. has been recognized as the largest source of guns being trafficked to Mexico. A study

from United Nations has estimated that 20,000 American firearms are illegally introduced every

year to Mexico, accounting for $20 million per year and no less than 10% of all the global

illegal market (UNODC, 2013). Further studies have concluded an amount ten times larger:

212,887 firearms trafficked annually, representing nearly 2.2% of all U.S. domestic arms sales

(McDougal, Shirk, Muggah, R. and Patterson, 2014).

The U.S. has been proved to be the largest supplier for criminal organizations operating in

Mexico. From all the firearms that Mexican authorities confiscated to criminal organizations

and were later sent to the ATF, between 70% and 90% of them were positively traced back to

gun-shops operating in the U.S. (U.S. ATF-b, 2012; GAO, 2010).

This data, however, should be understood in a broader picture of cases occurring alongside the border.

Situations that are not only associated with organized criminals, but also with American authorities

failing to follow Mexican and international law. In 2011, one New Mexico’s Mayor and his County

Police chief were both busted in a scheme to supply guns to criminals in Mexico (Caulfield, 2011). In

2014, U.S. Marine Sgt. Andrew Tahmooressi was arrested after accidentally crossing the Mexican

border with guns in his truck (Daily Mail, 2014). Later, a Californian Senator was accused of trafficking

firearms in exchange for substantial campaign contributions (Bernstein, 2014).

In any case, perhaps the most dramatic case of trafficking with officials involved became public in early

2011. Back then, the World Net Daily, Fox News and The Washington Times were the first mass media

enterprises in reporting that, as a result of the “Fast and Furious Operation” 3, the U.S. Bureau of

Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF) motivate gun sellers to retail about 2,000 weapons

to “straw” buyers, often young kids lured by a reported $100 per transaction. According to further

inquiries, the official idea was to implement an undercover operation for detecting this illegal network.

Nevertheless, Mexican authorities have suggested that they were never informed, ATF lost track of an

estimated 1,700 of all guns and none of the high-level smugglers had been arrested (Reasoned Politics,

2012; De Luca, 2012).

3 The first "gun walking" investigation by ATF was Operation Wide Receiver (2006-2007). Fast and Furious (2009-2011) was the second one under Project Gunrunner which started in 2005.

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Not surprisingly, some of these American firearms were later recovered from 170 crime scenes all over

Mexico (Serrano, 2011). Some of them were actually linked to the homicide of the U.S. Border Patrol

Agent Brian Terry in December 2010 and to the one of the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement

Agent Jaime Zapata in 2011 (Univision, 2012). Although ATF was accused of targeting whistleblowers

for avoiding revealing information of these operations (Lott, 2011), one fact became clear: Americans

firearms smuggled by ATF killed not only Mexicans but also American agents.

Firearms’ trafficking from the U.S. to Mexico has been politically recognized on both sides of the

border. From the Mexican side, former President Felipe Calderón presented this concern to the U.S.

Congress during 2010 (Sheridan, 2010) and even lead a protest in Ciudad Juárez, near the border with

El Paso Texas, where he witnessed the destruction of thousands of American firearms seized (Martinez-

Cabrera, 2012). Following his position, Alejandro Poiré, Former Secretary of Interior, stated that

Mexico was doing its job undertaking a historic confiscation of drugs going north, and it was now time

for the U.S. to make a historic confiscation of illegal firearms going south (CNN, 2011).

Recently, during his 2013’s speech at the National Anthropology Museum in Mexico City, U.S.

President Barack Obama recognized that American firearms have had a negative effect on the recent

spike in violence experienced in Mexico. This goes along with some hypotheses suggested by the

Mexican authorities. The idea of this paper is to provide further evidence to assess these arguments.

In spite of this growing evidence from academics, historians and international organizations, there have

been other rival hypotheses stating that firearms used in crime in Mexico could have a different origin

instead of the U.S. Some American analyst have speculated that firearms have come from Russia, China

and other Eastern European nations and that they may be entering from the southerner border that

Mexico has with Guatemala and Belize (Cook, Cukier and Krauze, 2009).

Evidence, however, is not strong in this sense. For instance, the amount of seizures in the northern

bordering with the U.S. has no comparison with the confiscations occurring in the south. During the

Calderón administration, the federal government seized almost 150,000 firearms (CNN, 2011). From

all of them, only 1% were seized in southern state of Chiapas (UNODC, 2013).

An alternative hypothesis has suggested that most firearms used by criminals have been stolen or came

from corrupt Mexican Army or police officers. Nevertheless, this idea also lacks of evidence. In fact,

national and international data suggests that no more than 1.74% of all firearms seized could be linked

with this phenomenon (UNODC, 2013). Evidence, therefore, is strong enough to support that most of

guns have illegally trafficked to Mexico from the U.S.

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How many illegal guns are in Mexico? Although data on illegal ownership is naturally inexistent, one

Mexican Congressman recently stated that Mexico became now the 5th country with more trafficked

guns in its territory, whilst some years ago it was in the 22ndplace. This report also suggests that from

all illegal guns existing in Mexico, 35% are possessed by citizens looking for self-defence and 65% are

owned by organized criminal groups (Arvizu, 2014). Only 14% of all guns being trafficked to Mexico

are confiscated (Robledo and Rios Piter, 2015).

Graph 3: All gun seizures in Mexico

Source: Mexican Federal Government. State of the Union report, 2012

Graph 3 shows how confiscation of illegal firearms dropped between 1995 and 2004, following the

years in which AWB was operating. Similarly, once the AWB expired, the number of confiscated

firearms reported by the Federal Government in Mexico started to increase4. Even accepting that

confiscation does not necessarily mean illegal prevalence and that other factors might also explain the

sudden escalation of seizures, some similarities between these trends draws particular attention that

requires further research.

4 A sample of American guns seized in Mexico revealed that: a) in 21% of the cases guns were bought in the U.S. between 1 and 3 months before, b) in 12% of them between 4 and 6 months, c) in 22% between 7 and 12 months and d) in 18% between 13 and 18 months (#No+Armas #No+Guns, 2014).

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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

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1.3 Outcome: more violence (homicide) in Mexico

Previous two sections have pointed out how a higher prevalence of guns in the U.S. seems to follow a

similar temporal pattern of higher rates of gun confiscation in Mexico. Whilst trying to link both to a

possible outcome, Graph 4 shows the general trend of homicides in Mexico. It is remarkable how the

year 2004 seems to have stopped the previous declining trend, on one hand, and how it follows a similar

“u” form as the previous two graphs, on the other.

Graph 4: Total homicide in Mexico

Source: INEGI, 2012

Victimisation surveys could shed some additional light that more illegal guns have been actually used

to commit crimes in general, and homicides, more specifically. Data from available exercises5 reveal

that, after 2004, gun-use for criminal purposes has increased substantially as shown in Graphs 5, 6 and

7.

5 The ICESI (Instituto Ciudadano de Estudios sobre la Inseguridad) carried out the ENSI (Encuesta Nacional sobre Inseguridad) from 2002 to 2010. Later, the INEGI (Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía) became the responsible of this task with the ENVIPE (Encuesta Nacional sobre Victimización y Percepción sobre Seguridad).

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1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

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Graph 5: Percentage of all crimes associated with firearms

Source: ICESI and INEGI

Graph 6: Total homicides committed with firearms and without firearms

Source: SNSP

Graph 7: Total homicides committed with firearms

Source: SNSP

43%

58%64%

78%

2 0 0 2 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 7 2 0 1 1

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1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Firearm was Not used Firearm was used

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1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

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Section 1 provides several arguments to support that after AWB expired in 2004: a) gun prevalence in

the U.S. augmented, b) gun seizures in Mexico enlarged, and c) homicides and firearms use in crime in

Mexico also increased. Furthermore, the three follow more or less a similar “u” pattern.

If a simple correlation is used to assess an association between these three variables for the 1999-2011

period (3 variables, 13 years of observation), the input-output-outcome argument expressed above can

be ratified as follows:

Graph 8: Evidence for an input-ouput-outcome model

Source: Author’s elaboration, 2014

1. More available guns in the U.S. as possible input

2. More seized firearms in Mexico as possible output

3. More homicides in Mexico as possible outcome

Input-Output (93%)

Output-Outcome (95%)

Input-Outcome (87%)

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2. Method: Illegal guns as determinant of homicides

Leaving this exploratory correlation (and the U.S.-Mexico input-output-outcome model) behind,

Section 2 particularly focuses on testing the specific explanatory power of the X variable gun seizures

in Mexico (as a proxy of all illegal guns in the country)6 when it comes to enlighten the Y variable

homicides in Mexico. In other words, a model that uses only national data from Mexico for the 1999-

2011 period. For this purpose, Table 1 shows a simple regression of homicides and firearms seized.

Following this logic, Table 2 presents a fixed effect panel data model considering the 32 Mexican states

as units of analysis7. Both exercises show a positive and significant role of firearms in homicides.

Table 1: Homicides explained by firearms seizures (regression)

Table 2: Homicides explained by firearms seizures (panel A)

6 Given that the State of the Union report does not include disaggregation of gun seizures per state, this Model A alternatively uses a sample elaborated by the Mexican Army through the Transparency Report initiative (IFAI-Infomex). Overall, this random sample is strong whilst representing 65% of all the cases suggested by the State of the Union report. 7 For both cases, the independent variable, Homicide Y(h), was built using information from INEGI. The dependent one Guns X1(g) was constructed using information provided by the Mexican Army through the Transparency Report initiative (IFAI-Infomex). Both variables were considered and both transferred into a Log function to reduce excessive dispersion.

_cons 3.833308 .103754 36.95 0.000 3.629334 4.037282

ln_firearmssum .397186 .0235991 16.83 0.000 .3507915 .4435804

loghominegi Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]

Total 525.675777 399 1.31748315 Root MSE = .87842

Adj R-squared = 0.4143

Residual 307.102328 398 .771613888 R-squared = 0.4158

Model 218.57345 1 218.57345 Prob > F = 0.0000

F( 1, 398) = 283.27

Source SS df MS Number of obs = 400

. reg loghominegi ln_firearmssum

F test that all u_i=0: F(31, 367) = 58.85 Prob > F = 0.0000

rho .85714786 (fraction of variance due to u_i)

sigma_e .37435737

sigma_u .91700327

_cons 4.545099 .0629115 72.25 0.000 4.421387 4.668811

ln_firearmssum .2184866 .015079 14.49 0.000 .1888344 .2481387


corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.3841 Prob > F = 0.0000

F(1,367) = 209.94

overall = 0.4158 max = 13

between = 0.4135 avg = 12.5

R-sq: within = 0.3639 Obs per group: min = 6

Group variable: id Number of groups = 32

Fixed-effects (within) regression Number of obs = 400

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Rival hypotheses – control variables

Traditional criminology has suggested a set of theories/hypotheses when trying to explore the possible

determinants of rising violence in a certain place. As a matter of robustness, this subsection has two

goals. The first one is to include three categories that have been presented by the literature (e.g.

structural economic factors, social factors and violence factors). The second one is to evaluate their

explanatory power when compared with the firearms seizures variable in three fixed effects models.

Every model will consider the linear unobserved effects model for N observations and T time periods:

for and

where is the dependent variable observed for individual at time is the time-variant

regressor matrix, is the unobserved time-invariant individual effect and is the error term. All

three factors and their associated hypotheses are presented as follows:

I. Economic factors

a) Hypothesis: Poverty is associated with higher homicide.

Rushke and Kichheimer (1939) are amongst the pioneers in exploring the role of poverty in violence.

During the 1970s, the popularisation of statistical techniques to empirically test this assumption

enlarged the availability of studies in favour and against it. The research developed by Nettler (1978);

Hindelang et. al. (1979); Elliott & Ageton (1980); Clelland & Carter (1980); Braithwaite (1981); Kleck

(1982); Thomberry & Farnworth (1982) and Tittle (1983) are examples of this trend.

The prominence of this variable became so strong that Schafer (1969) noted that hardly any research

studying the causes of criminality omitted poverty or economic conditions (e.g. GDP-Gross domestic

product) as elements of their analysis. In any case, after all these years, systematic reviews have not

find a clear or coherent conclusion (Hsieh & Pugh, 1993). For explaining the recent rise of violence,

poverty in Mexico should have grown substantially since 2004-2006. Evidence challenges this

perspective: Mexico is richer now than it was before. Therefore, this variable cannot explain the recent

rise in violence.

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b) Hypothesis: Inequality is associated with higher homicide.

Marx (1849) may be the first one to have explored the relationship between inequality and the rise in

violence. In his classical example, social tensions arise when a ‘palace is built next to a relatively smaller

house’. By contrast, peace is stable in a society -no matter if houses are large or small-, as long as the

neighbouring ones are likewise in size.

During the 1930s, Merton (1938) predicted a future rise in crime in the U.S. once the ‘American dream’

proved to increase inequality and social dissatisfaction. Later, Blau & Blau (1982) found an empirical

strong association between inequality and homicide rates in large metropolitan areas. Others, however,

have suggested mixed results as a more accurate association (Land, McCall, & Cohen, 1990). In any

case, although there is always a problem of how to measure inequality [e.g. segregation across vs.

within: Kang, 2014], based on the U.S. and international data, empirical studies generally find that

inequality and some crimes are positively linked (Kelly 2000; Fajnzylber, Lederman & Loayza 2002;

Soares 2004).

Following these arguments, inequality in Mexico should have increased over the analysed period.

Nevertheless, using Gini index8, evidence suggests that this variable appears unlikely to explain the

recent variation in homicides.

II. Social factors

c) Hypothesis: Inter-state migration is associated with higher homicide.

Globalisation observed during recent decades has created a highly inter-connected globe. ‘World

becoming flat’ (Friedman, 2007), has also induced deep social transformations inside Mexico:

urbanisation and the pursuit of efficiency associated with free trade agreements.

Nonetheless, it has also generated ‘unintended consequences’. One of them is the increasing facility in

which people can move from one place to the other, seeking for better opportunities. Naturally, the

problem here is not the movement of people itself, but how emigration reduces social auditing,

undermine the ability and willingness of communities to exercise informal control over their members,

and leaves areas without surveillance (Shaw & McKay, 1942; Kornhauser, 1978; Sanchez, 2006).

8 Gini index is a measure of statistical dispersion created by Corrado Gini (1912) to represent the income distribution of a given place or society. A Gini coefficient of zero expresses perfect equality while a coefficient of one (or 100%) expresses maximal inequality.

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Emigration, at the end, creates more unguarded places, less informal surveillance and less defensive

spaces: risk-factors that have been associated by the environmental criminology with more crime9.

Contrarily, places receiving Mexicans from other states also generates challenges. For instance

‘immigrant communities’ enhance secondary group relationships (e.g. neighbours, co-workers and

strangers) instead of primary group ones (e.g. family). The issue here is how anonymity and distance

among new neighbours also enlarge opportunities for crime (Wirth, 1938).

For the context of Mexico, migration could be also associated with violence10. Theoretically, more

emigrants due to rising violence would create a perverse cycle in which emigration itself allows more

criminal operations, and more crime pushes more emigrants (Schultz, 1971; Morrison, 1993; Morrison

& Pérez Lafaurie, 1995). Evidence from Mexico, however, reveals that emigration from one state to

another has declined over time, being this effect strongest in the Centre region and marginally positive

only in the case of the Northwest one.

d) Hypothesis: International migration is associated with higher homicide

Following Newman’s ‘natural surveillance’ and ‘defensible space’ arguments (1972 & 1975) presented

in previous hypothesis, it would be expected that places with rising inter-national emigration are

associated with increasing homicides.

Data from Mexico suggests that Inter-national emigration has diminished steadily since 2000. From

525,000 Mexicans that were leaving their country each year to live in the U.S, at the present there are

less than 100,000. In fact, if only net migration is considered, emigrant figures have fallen to zero: the

lowest level recorded in history (MPP, 2009; Sheridan, 2011; Passel, Cohn and González-Barrera,

2012). Given that this phenomenon is quite recent and most reports from elsewhere have been unable

to conclude association (Apodaca, 1998; Schmeidl, 1997; Elias and Massey, 2010) this reports

considers the case of international remittances as the better proxy of international migration.

9 Newman (1972 & 1975) argues that an area is safer when people feel a sense of ownership, territoriality and responsibility for that piece of a community. Under this logic ‘defensible space’ is an environment whose physical characteristics -building layout and site plan- function to allow inhabitants themselves to become key agents in ensuring their security. ‘Natural surveillance’ is the link between an area's physical

characteristics and the residents' ability to see what is happening. 10 Rios (2012) has suggested that the number of unoccupied dwellings in Mexican northern cities is strongly associated with the rates of organised crime homicides. In some cases, this forced emigration impacted smaller, rural towns to the point of creating de facto ghost towns.

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e) Hypothesis: Unemployment is associated with higher homicide

Criminological literature has also suggested that there is a concurrence between crime and labor market

trends. Freeman (1983), for example, has advocated that more people taking active part in the economy

would predict less delinquency.

Despite the intuitive appeal of this argument, empirical research has been unable to consistently

document a strong association between them (Raphael and Winter‐Ebmer, 2001). On one hand, Levitt

(2004) and Farrell, Tseloni, Mailley & Tilley (2011) have agreed that economy is not a major

determinant of crime. On the other, Cook & Zarkin (1985) and Chiricos (1987) have concluded that

recessions (and growing unemployment) has some degree of association with crime: higher for property

crime motivated by economic gain and weaker in homicide. Evidence from Mexico suggests that,

although not as dramatic as in other countries, unemployment has actually increased after the

international 2008-2009 crisis.

III. Violence factors

f) Hypothesis: Unreported crime is associated with higher homicide

Unrecorded crime (or dark figure) has several consequences in terms of encouraging more delinquency,

and eventually, more homicides. For instance, it contributes to the misallocation of police resources, it

limits the deterrent capability of the criminal justice system, it renders victims ineligible for

public/private benefits and it weakens police’s reputation in society (Skogan, 1977). For these reasons,

if a region is experiencing a growth in under-reporting, this may be an indication of a reduced legitimacy

in the security sector bureaucracy and a dangerous ‘social capital’ weakening between government and

citizens.

According to this logic, theory wold predict a positive association between under-reporting and

homicide in Mexico after 2006-2007, when this crime increased. Nevertheless, evidence suggests that

an increase in under-reported crimes occurred in 2002 and after that, it remained basically stable. From

this perspective, the statistical association with homicide seems unlikely.

18

g) Hypothesis: Institutional inefficiency in reported crimes is associated with higher homicide

For the purpose of explaining many human activities -even crime-, rational choice theory has integrated

economic models into criminal decision-making. The idea is simple but powerful: people will commit

crime only if it is rational to do so (Becker, 1968). Hence, if a person has decided to become a criminal,

this choice is based on the idea that expected benefits (the utility or gains of the crime) exceeds the

expected costs (the probability of being caught and punished).

Considering this theoretical assumption, some empirical studies have tested the deterrent or

incapacitation effects of the efficiency in the security-justice system in terms of murder. In Colombia,

one study found that impunity (low cost of crime) was significantly associated with homicides

(Montenegro & Posada, 1994). In the U.S. researchers have used Becker’s approach to conclude that

incarceration rates significantly reduced crime (Levitt & Miles, 2006). Other studies have found similar

results (Grogger, 1991; Levitt 1999, 2004; Tauchen, Witte, & Griesinger, 1994; Freeman, 1996;

Ehrlich, 1996).

Following these arguments, it would be conceivable to hypothesise that an increase in homicides in

Mexico would be associated with a more inefficient security system. The argument behind is that if

someone decides to commit crime and the legal system fails to respond to it, police and government

will paradoxically give the reason to offenders believing that there are no consequences for committing

wrongdoings. If this happens, the perceived likelihood of arrest and conviction would decrease, the rule

of law would be diminished and more offenders would be attracted to commit criminal activities. At

the end, these unpunished crimes would vanish the ‘social contract’, creating an impunity vicious circle

for more homicides to happen, as suggested by Hope (2013) when considering the Mexican case.

Although these arguments are sensible, evidence challenges them. The Mexican security system is

highly inefficient (Zepeda Lecuona, 2004; Madrazo & Guerrero, 2012): true. However, it has always

been like that. In fact, the latest changes resulting from the 2008 Judicial Reform seems to show positive

outcome, increasing the system’s efficiency. At the end, this suggests that although relevant, impunity

has a reduced explanatory power when it comes to enlighten the recent rise in homicides.

h) Hypothesis: Corruption is associated with higher homicide

Corruption is a broad concept. However, from the criminological perspective, it could be explained as

any deviation from the general established rules. The spectrum of corrupt behaviour encompasses all

types of characters, building a complete social system that goes from the low level bureaucrats, passes

19

by law enforcers becoming law breakers, and reaches high-levels of politicians and entrepreneurs

(Punch, 2009). Not surprisingly, corruption and crime are related. Theoretical and applied research have

shown interdependent links. Societies with increasing corruption shows communities where the rule of

law is decreasing, henceforth, more crime is expected (Van Dijk & Nevala, 2002).

Empirically, Buscaglia & Van Dijk (2003) have ratified this argument after studying a sample of 70

countries. In any case, to be considered a variable able to explain an increase in homicides, corruption

would have to show a clear upward trend. Evidence, challenges this perspective. If the annual survey

conducted by Mexican Transparency (following Transparency International’s methodology) is

considered as the best available estimate, data reveals that corruption has been stable, hence seems very

unlikely to explain homicide increase.

i) Hypothesis: Drug market size is associated with higher homicide

Goldstein (1985) suggested that drugs and crime (or homicides) can be related in three possible ways.

Firstly, psycho-pharmacologically. This means that, as a result of ingestion, some individuals react

violently to specific drugs. Secondly, in terms of economic compulsivity: some users engage in profit-

oriented violent crime to support costly drug use (or abuse). Thirdly, systematically: cartels and gangs

fight each other over territories, violently resolving their disputes in the absence of another available

mechanism (see: Snyder and Duran-Martinez, 2009).

If violence and homicides increase in a given place, (e.g. Mexico) this paradigm would estimate, ceteris

paribus, that more drug production, trafficking and/or consumption is occurring. In other words, to

account for the homicide increase seen in the last decade, drug markets in Mexico should have changed

dramatically in at least one of three conditions to attract more actors -and presumably, more violence.

Evidence challenges all these possibilities.

For the first assumption to be true, Mexico should have witness an increase on the size/value of the

domestic market. Evidence contradicts this argument: consumption of all illicit drugs in Mexico remains

statistically stable (ENA, 2011). Furthermore, prevalence is comparatively low: sometimes fifteen times

smaller than the American, Canadian, Australian or European markets (Rogers, 2012). Commercially,

this makes sense: Mexican cartels prefer to export drugs to richer markets. Culturally, this also finds an

explanation: ENA (2011) revealed that most of Mexicans have never consumed illicit drugs, probably

due to the intensity of educational campaigns implemented for decades. In any case, there is not a

growing national demand that has attracted more competitors and violence.

20

A second possibility would be an expansion of the 'international market' in the drugs in which Mexican

cartels participate. Evidence also contradicts this idea. In one hand, Mexican marijuana -which has been

trafficked to the U.S for decades- is now being replaced by domestic American production. Nowadays,

50% of all the cannabis consumed in the U.S. is produced domestically (Fainaru & Booth, 2009), an

irreversible trend given the growing number of states in America creating legal markets. On the other,

Mexican non-medical opiate consumption in the U.S. has also decreased (Di Salvo, 2014). Altogether,

this fact dismiss this possible scenario.

A third option is that, although global drug markets remain stable, Mexican cartels may have increased

their relative global-market participation (perhaps by shifting to other drugs), creating more incentives

for violence. For this argument to be likely, other international actors would have necessarily decreased

its participation. The typical idea here would be the Colombian cartels’ weakening and the assumption

that Mexican cartels replaced them in cocaine or methamphetamine. Evidence, again, challenges this

perspective. For instance, Colombian cartels still exist. Secondly, consumption of both drugs in the U.S.

has reduced (Di Salvo, 2014). Thirdly, this idea is unable to explain why if drug markets have existed

in Mexico during the last century they were not violent then (Astorga, 1996, 2003; Valdés, 2013).

Altogether, this reinforces the slight likelihood of this hypothesis to be true.

Evidence from Mexico suggests that, considering the best available proxy for assessing drug markets

(production, consumption and trafficking), it does not follow the same pattern than homicide, hence,

cannot mathematically account for them.

j) Hypothesis: Calderón strategy is associated with higher homicide

President Felipe Calderón (2006-2012) implemented a security strategy using the Army to violently

confront and arrest organised criminals. Until now, many policy analysts and officials believe that if

drug markets cannot explain the rise in homicides per se, this ‘hard strategy’ can actually does it.

Guerrero Gutiérrez (2011) has used crime data to suggest that Calderón’s strategy contributed to

increased violence based on two reasons. On one hand, given that indiscriminate arrests created

incentives for cartels to confront (internally and among each other) while defining new leaderships and

power equilibrium. On the other, assuming that this dispersion promoted smaller organisations (those

lacking enough logistic capabilities to participate in drug exports) to diversify into other domestic

crimes such as kidnapping, extortion or rivals’ executions, naturally generating larger spirals of

violence.

21

Empirically, this section aims to assess if the Army presence (soldiers) per state/year is associated with

homicides. Available evidence gathered from the author from IFAI suggests that, although presence

increased after 2006-2007 as murders, it fails to explain the rise in homicides that occurred previously

around 2004.

Table 3: Rival theories (control hypotheses)

Argument Variable argument Variable Source

I. Economic factors

a) Poverty Gross domestic product (GDP)

INEGI

b) Inequality

Gini index

INEGI

II. Social factors c) National migration

Interstate migration CONAPO

d) International migration

Remittances INEGI

e) Unemployment Unemployment

INEGI

III. Violence factors

f) Impunity Dark figure of crime

INEGI (ENVIPE); ICESI (ENSI)

g) Institutional inefficiency in reported crimes

Percentage of reported crimes satisfactorily resolved

INEGI

h) Corruption Corruption perception

Transparencia Mexicana

i) Drug market size All drug crimes (production, possession and others)

State of the Union, Presidential Report

j) Calderon’s strategy Soldiers deployed

IFAI – Infomex

22

Table 4: Homicides explained by illegal firearms, controlling by economic factors

Table 5: Homicides explained by illegal firearms, controlling by social factors

.



sigma_e .36426493

sigma_u .5070075

_cons -13.30863 6.812798 -1.95 0.052 -26.70602 .0887535

gini 2.567482 .8956203 2.87 0.004 .8062423 4.328722

gdp_ln .2722344 .0947931 2.87 0.004 .0858236 .4586453

pop_ln .9199209 .491309 1.87 0.062 -.0462395 1.886081

ln_firearm~m .1836657 .0172707 10.63 0.000 .1497028 .2176287


corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.1604 Prob > F = 0.0000

F(4,364) = 61.34


between = 0.7876 avg = 12.5






sigma_e .3371621

sigma_u 1.0627496

_cons 7.903121 7.105386 1.11 0.267 -6.070026 21.87627

unemployment .1427999 .0203443 7.02 0.000 .1027916 .1828082

remmitances -.0001918 .0000809 -2.37 0.018 -.0003509 -.0000328

interstatemig .0000105 6.73e-06 1.56 0.120 -2.75e-06 .0000237

gini 2.130477 .8636332 2.47 0.014 .4320935 3.828861

gdp_ln .3609644 .1013598 3.56 0.000 .1616346 .5602942

pop_ln -.6102957 .5190881 -1.18 0.240 -1.631112 .4105207

ln_firearmssum .1235992 .01776 6.96 0.000 .0886732 .1585252


corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.0987 Prob > F = 0.0000

F(7,361) = 50.04


between = 0.0567 avg = 12.5




23

Table 6: Homicides explained by illegal firearms, controlling by violence factors



sigma_e .33615992

sigma_u 1.1239628

_cons 8.359461 7.332996 1.14 0.255 -6.061976 22.7809

calderon .0000119 .0000229 0.52 0.602 -.000033 .0000569

drugsum .0000145 .0000146 0.99 0.321 -.0000141 .0000431

corruption -.0068169 .0090811 -0.75 0.453 -.0246764 .0110425

efonlyreportedcrime .0397745 .0162367 2.45 0.015 .0078427 .0717064

darkfigurenonreported .0000508 .0026759 0.02 0.985 -.0052117 .0053134

unemployment .1383388 .0208026 6.65 0.000 .0974273 .1792503

remmitances -.0002073 .0000956 -2.17 0.031 -.0003952 -.0000193

interstatemig 8.20e-06 7.16e-06 1.15 0.253 -5.87e-06 .0000223

gini 1.946169 .8738521 2.23 0.027 .2276078 3.66473

gdp_ln .2837364 .1187376 2.39 0.017 .0502212 .5172516

pop_ln -.5635759 .5319163 -1.06 0.290 -1.609669 .4825173

ln_firearmssum .112695 .0191394 5.89 0.000 .0750545 .1503355


corr(u_i, Xb) = -0.2136 Prob > F = 0.0000

F(12,356) = 29.96


between = 0.0016 avg = 12.5




24

3. Additional support and robustness

This section aims to provide two additional ideas in favour of the argument and methodology presented

herein. The first one constitutes a second fixed model, now including a dummy variable for all cases

(states) after year 2005, being the first year in which AWB was not in operation. This variable is

regressed with HomicidesLog as follows:

Table 6: Homicides explained by AWB expiration

Whilst table 6 provides an additional argument for supporting the idea that AWB expiration may be

associated with homicide, this section also aims to reduce possible critiques in terms of one of the most

important variables itself. Here, the most relevant in terms of methodology is how we avoid the variable

gun seizures in Mexico to have a potential ‘reverse causation’ problem. In other words, how do we

know that more illegal guns in Mexico (being proxy of more gun seizures) is not a simple consequence

of more homicides? Or how can we disregard the possibility that more homicides simply push more

guns seizures? Although space is limited, this research presents some initial thoughts for reducing this

possible effect by including an instrumental variable.

For achieving this goal, at least at an exploratory level, this research uses Two-Stage least squares

(2SLS) regression considering: a) distance between the state’s capital and the closest entry border with

the U.S. in a Log function, b) regional component, considering the official distribution of Mexican

states (northeast, northwest, west, centre and southeast) and c) the Calderon variable, the amount of

soldiers per state. Results shows that using firearms seizures is technically feasible to be incorporated

in the original model.



sigma_e .43413381

sigma_u 1.0915323

_cons 5.243972 .0313309 167.37 0.000 5.18237 5.305574

awbbeg2005 .3044126 .0426968 7.13 0.000 .2204631 .3883622


corr(u_i, Xb) = 0.0000 Prob > F = 0.0000

F(1,383) = 50.83


between = . avg = 13.0




25

Table 7: Distance to border as relevant

Table 8: Distance to border as exogenous

Instruments: km2borderLOG

Instrumented: ln_firearmssum

_cons 3.542013 .3076972 11.51 0.000 2.938937 4.145088

ln_firearmssum .4670242 .0743917 6.28 0.000 .3212192 .6128293

loghominegi Coef. Std. Err. z P>|z| [95% Conf. Interval]

Robust

Root MSE = .89658

R-squared = 0.3892

Prob > chi2 = 0.0000

Wald chi2(1) = 39.41

Instrumental variables (2SLS) regression Number of obs = 387

_cons 9.476918 1.036396 9.14 0.000 7.439213 11.51462

km2borderLOG -.8198973 .1511914 -5.42 0.000 -1.117162 -.5226331

ln_firearm~m Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]

Robust

Root MSE = 1.8093


R-squared = 0.0645

Prob > F = 0.0000

F( 1, 385) = 29.41

Number of obs = 387

First-stage regressions

. ivregress 2sls loghominegi (ln_firearmssum=km2borderLOG), robust first

_cons 8.269367 1.226296 6.74 0.000 5.711359 10.82737

norhwest -2.646818 .2734531 -9.68 0.000 -3.217232 -2.076405

northeast 0 (omitted)

west .3222716 .3805283 0.85 0.407 -.4714964 1.11604

centre -1.613914 .4182178 -3.86 0.001 -2.486301 -.7415266

southeast -1.144504 .5376084 -2.13 0.046 -2.265936 -.0230728

km2borderLOG .0278597 .2180014 0.13 0.900 -.4268832 .4826026

ln_calderon Coef. Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf. Interval]

Total 44.0998861 25 1.76399545 Root MSE = .4341


Residual 3.76889831 20 .188444916 R-squared = 0.9145

Model 40.3309878 5 8.06619757 Prob > F = 0.0000

F( 5, 20) = 42.80

Source SS df MS Number of obs = 26

note: northeast omitted because of collinearity

. reg ln_calderon km2borderLOG southeast centre west northeast norhwest

26

4. Findings What is the role of American guns with higher illegal prevalence and more homicides in Mexico?

Given the similarities between analysed trends, Graph 8 provides a general foundation to assume that

gun prevalence in the U.S. (input) is correlated with illegal gun seizures in Mexico (output) in 93%.

Likewise, gun seizures in Mexico (output) are correlated with homicides in Mexico (outcome) in 95%.

Overall, although imperfect, this first exercise reinforces the growing empirical evidence on this regard.

When only national data of Mexico is analysed to understand domestic determinants of homicide, Table

1 (simple linear regression) shows that FirearmsLog (all guns being confiscated, as a proxy of all illegal

guns in the country) is positive and significantly associated with HomicidesLog (β=.39, p<.001). Table

2 (when fixed effects panel data with no controls is used) suggests that this association stays positive

and significant (β=.21, p<.001).

When controls (rival hypotheses) are added to the formula, this association follows a similar pattern.

Table 4, which includes economic controls (GDP and gini), suggests that FirearmsLog remains positive

and significant (β=.18, p<.001). When social controls are added to the formula, FirearmsLog keeps a

positive and significant association (β=.12 p<.001), even with the inclusion of GDP (β=.36, p<.001)

and unemployment (β=.14, p<.001).

Table 5 suggests that, contrary to what could be expected, none of the violence controls included is

significant. FirearmsLog, however, remains positive and significant (β=.11, p<.001). Overall, all these

models suggests that FirearmsLog can be considered as a relevant variable when explaining

HomicidesLog in Mexico.

Further robustness methods suggest, on one hand, that variable FirearmsLog surpasses general

requirements when instrumental variable is assessed (relevance and exogeneity). On the other, it also

suggests that U.S. AWB expiration in 2004 is an essential factor to explain the rise in homicides in

Mexico after then.

27

Conclusions

During the twentieth century, many developed countries experienced a sustained decline in homicide.

Most developing countries, by contrast, witnessed how crime increased. In this dynamic, Mexican case

is anomalous: it contrasts with both of them. First, homicide rate declined substantially until 2004. Then

this process ceased, and after 2007, killings began to increase. This empirical research aims to explore,

for the first time, the reasons behind this unexpected behaviour.

Normally, criminology would suggest social, economic and violence factors to explain this

phenomenon. This research suggests that, as Laycock (2001) would predict, with only few exceptions,

most of these explanations fail to explain this rise in violence.

By contrast, this paper provides an input-output-outcome model suggesting how more guns in the U.S.

after AWB expired might be associated with more illegal guns in Mexico, on one hand, and more

homices there, on the other.

This evidence, however, should not be analysed in an isolated way. By contrast, it supports prior

research that explored some parts of the input-output-outcome chain:

Goodman and Marizco (2010) who presented a report describing how more guns from the U.S.

are being trafficked into Mexico in recent years.

Chicoine (2011) who concluded how the expiration of the AWB may be responsible for at least

16.4% of homicide increase in Mexico between 2004 and 2008.

Pérez Esparza and Weigend (2013) who noted how the expiration of the AWB increased

weapons’ production in southern U.S. states, and how this was clearly associated with

homicide, violent robbery, extortion and kidnapping in the north of Mexico after 2004.

Dube, Dube and García Ponce (2013) who concluded that AWB expiration led to immediate

violence increases within areas of Mexico located close to American states where assault

weapons sales became legal, and estimated homicide increases were greater in towns with more

political competition and high-drug trafficking areas.

Mc Dougal, Shirk, Muggah and Patterson (2014) who suggested that gun trafficking to Mexico

seems to be so relevant now, that only if the 2010-2012 period is analysed, nearly 2.2% of all

U.S. domestic arms sales are attributable to this illegal trafficking.

28

Even when all econometric models developed in this particular research could have some limitations

(e.g. they rely on the quality of the data and they may be unable to ‘prove causation’), this document

suggests that firearms trafficking from the U.S. is the best predictor of the recent spike of violence in

Mexico. Given the strength of the evidence presented here, ad hoc policies should be implemented both

sides of the border, to mitigate -in short term- the high social costs behind this phenomenon.

29

Appendix 1. Homicides in Mexico

Appendix 1.1: Decline in homicides in Mexico during the XXth century

Year Rate

1930 77.4

1940 67.4

1950 48.0

1960 31.9

1970 17.5

1980 17.5

1990 18.7

Source: Kumate et. al. (1993)

Appendix 1.2: Homicides in Mexico: an international comparative perspective 1985-2003

Source: Elaborated by the author considering SNSP (2014), González et. al (2009), U.S. UCR (2014),

Murray et. al. (2013) and Cardona et. al (2005).

0

10

20

30

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

19

85

19

86

19

87

19

88

19

89

19

90

19

91

19

92

19

93

19

94

19

95

19

96

19

97

19

98

19

99

20

00

20

01

20

02

20

03

HO

MIC

IDE

RA

TES

YEAR

Mexico, national

Baltimore, MD, U.S.

Detroit, MI U.S

Brazil, national

Colombia, national

30

Appendix 1.3: Homicides in Mexico per 100,000 inhabitants

Source: Elaborated by the author using González et. al (2009) and SNSP (2014)

Appendix 1.4 Total homicides in Mexico per region 1999-2011

Source: Elaborated by the author using SNSP data (2014)

0

5

10

15

20

25

1990 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011RA

TE P

ER 1

00

,00

0 I

NH

AB

ITA

NTS

YEAR

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

TOTA

L H

OM

ICID

ES P

ER R

EGIO

N

YEAR

Southeast

Centre

West

Northeast

Northwest

% Region / National 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Northwest 13 11 12 13 13 15 18 16 22 34 35 37 27

Northeast 8 7 7 7 7 7 9 8 10 11 12 16 21

West 12 11 11 11 11 11 12 13 14 13 13 13 16

Centre 44 45 44 44 42 44 42 43 32 28 28 22 26

Southeast 23 26 25 25 27 23 20 19 22 15 12 11 10

Declining crime phase Declining stops Increasing crime

31

Appendix 1.5: Homicide average decrease 1998-2004

Appendix 1.6: Homicide average growth 2005-2011

Source: Elaborated by the author using SNSP data (2014)

32

Appendix 2. Traditional causes/hypothesis of homicide and crime

Average GDP per region 1999-2011

Source: Elaborated by the author using INEGI data

Average Gini index per region 1999-2011


0

100000

200000

300000

400000

500000

600000

700000

800000

1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1

gdp

in m

exic

an p

eso

s (T

HO

USA

ND

S)

year

Northwest

Northeast

West

Centre

Southeast

0.4

0.45

0.5

0.55

0.6

1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1

GIN

I IN

DEX

YEAR

Northwest

Northeast

West

Centre

Southeast

National

33

Percentage of unemployed population per region 1999-2011


Average percentage of dark figure in all crimes per region 1999-2011

Source: Elaborated by the author using ICESI and INEGI data

0

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1

PER

CEN

TAG

E O

F U

NEM

PLO

YED

PO

PU

LATI

ON

YEAR

Northwest

Northeast

West

Centre

Southeast

40

50

60

70

80

90

100

1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1

PER

CEN

TAG

E O

F U

ND

ER-R

EPO

RTE

D C

RIM

ES

YEAR

Northwest

Northeast

West

Centre

Southeast

34

Percentage of reported crimes satisfactorily resolved per region 1999-2011


Average perceived corruption per region 1999-2011

Source: Elaborated by the author using Mexican Transparency data

0.000

1.000

2.000

3.000

4.000

5.000

6.000

1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1

% E

FFIC

IEN

CY

IN R

EPO

RTE

D C

RIM

ES

YEAR

Northwest

Northeast

West

Centre

Southeast

0

2

4

6

8

10

12

14

1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1

PER

CEI

VED

CO

RR

UP

TIO

N IN

DEX

YEAR

Northwest

Northeast

West

Centre

Southeast

35

Total inter-state national emigrants per region 1999-2011

Source: Elaborated by the author using CONAPO data

Total inter-national emigrants per region 1999-2011 (substituted by remittances)

Source: Elaborated by the author using CONAPO data

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

300000

350000

400000

450000

1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1

TOTA

L EM

IGR

AN

TS

YEAR

Northwest

Northeast

West

Centre

Southeast

0

50000

100000

150000

200000

250000

300000

350000

1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1

TOTA

L EM

IGR

AN

TS

YEAR

Northwest

Northeast

West

Centre

Southeast

36

Total drug crimes per region 1999-2011

Source: Elaborated by the author using First Year Presidential Report

Military anti-drug presence (soldiers) per region 1999-2011

Source: Elaborated by the author using IFAI Transparency Report (a)

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

40000

1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1

TOTA

L D

RU

G C

RIM

ES

YEAR

Northwest

Northeast

West

Centre

Southeast

0

2000

4000

6000

8000

10000

12000

14000

1 9 9 9 2 0 0 0 2 0 0 1 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 3 2 0 0 4 2 0 0 5 2 0 0 6 2 0 0 7 2 0 0 8 2 0 0 9 2 0 1 0 2 0 1 1

SOLD

IER

S

YEAR

Northwest

Northeast

West

Centre

Southeast

37

Appendix 3: Firearms seized by the Army 1999-2011

Total pistols seized in Mexico 1999-2011 per region

Source: Elaborated by the author using IFAI Transparency Report (b)

Total revolvers seized in Mexico 1999-2011 per region


38

Total shotguns seized in Mexico 1999-2011 per region


Total rifles seized in Mexico 1999-2011 per region


39

Total other firearms seized in Mexico 1999-2011 per region


40

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