READING LIST TAX POLICY – FALL SEMESTER 2015

Niels Johannesen Preliminary version - 12 August 2015

Entries marked with * are required readings that we will cover thoroughly in class. Other entries are readings from which we will discuss selected parts in class. 1. Tax incidence * Salanie, 2011, “The Economics of Taxation”, MIT Press, section 2.1 * J. Doyle and K. Samphanthrak, 2008, “$2.00 Gas! Studying the Effects of a Gas Tax Moratorium”. Journal of Public Economics 92, 869-884 K. Rosen, 1982 “The Impact of Proposition 13 on House Prices in Northern California: A Test of the Interjurisdictional Capitalization Hypothesis” Journal of Political Economy 90(1), 191-200 J. Gruber, 1994, “ The Incidence of Mandated Maternity Benefits”, American Economic Review 84(3), 622-641 2. Taxes and economic efficiency * Salanie, 2011, section 1.2 * E. Saez, 2010, “Do Tax Payers Bunch at Kink Points?”, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2(3), 180-212. Salanie, 2011, rest of chapter 1. M. Feldstein, 1999, “Tax avoidance and the deadweight loss of the income tax”, Review of Economics and Statistics 81(4), 674-680 M. Feldstein, 1995, “The effect of marginal tax rates on taxable income: A panel study of the 1986 tax reform act”, Journal of Political Economy 103(3), 551-572 Auerbach, A., Hines, J.R., 2003. “Taxation and economic efficiency” from the Handbook of Public Economics, p. 1349-1355. 3. Tax salience * R. Chetty, A. Looney and K. Kroft, 2009, “Salience and Taxation: Theory and Evidence”, American Economic Review 2009, 99:4, 1145–1177 A. Finkelstein, 2009, “E-ZTAX: Tax Salience and Tax Rates”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 969-1010 J. Abeler and S. Jäger, 2015, “Complex Tax Incentives”, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 7(3), 1-28.

4. Commodity taxation * Salanie, 2011, chapter 3 5. Paternalism * T. O’Donoghue and M. Rabin, 2003, “Studying Optimal Paternalism, Illustrated by a Model of Sin Taxes”, American Economic Review, 93(2), 186-191 * J. Gruber and B. Mullainathan, 2005, “Do Cigarette Taxes Make Smokers Happier?”, Advances in Economic Analysis & Policy 5(1), 1-43 6. Income taxation * Salanie, 2011, section 4.1 * P. Diamond and E. Saez, 2011. “The Case for a Progressive Tax: From Basic Research to Policy Recommendations”, Journal of Economic Perspectives 25(4), 165–190 * E. Saez, 2002, “Optimal Income Transfer Programs: Intensive Versus Extensive Labor Supply Responses”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1039-1072 * H. Kleven and C. Kreiner, 2003, “A note on optimal income taxation”, section 4 G. Mankiw and M. Weinzierl, 2010, “The Optimal Taxation of Height: A Case Study of Utilitarian Income Redistribution”, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 2(1), 155–176 Salanie, 2011, rest of chapter 4 and chapter 9. 7. Firm taxation * R. Chetty and E. Saez, 2010, “Dividend and Corporate Taxation in an Agency Model of the Firm”, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 1–31 * R. Chetty and E. Saez, 2005, “Dividend taxes and corporate behavior: Evidence from the 2003 Dividend Tax Cut”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 791-833 * Keen, M., Konrad, K., 2013, “The Theory of International Tax Competition and Coordination” from the Handbook of Public Economics, p. 258-275. 8. Evasion and enforcement * H. Kleven, M. Knudsen, C. Kreiner, S. Pedersen and E. Saez, 2011, “Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a Tax Audit Experiment in Denmark”, Econometrica 79, 651–692 * Hindricks and Myles, 2006. Intermediate public economics, sections 16.1-16-4+16.6. * N. Johannesen and G. Zucman, 2014, ”The End of Bank Secrecy? An Evaluation of the G20 Tax Haven Crackdown”, American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 6(1), 65-91