Realism Not Relationships: A Study of the US-Saudi Alliance under

President George W. Bush

Colleen Shea

School of Politics and International Relations

MA International Security and Terrorism

Submitted on 27th

August 2015

Student ID: 4221001

Word Count: 16,444

I have read and understood the relevant information on plagiarism and the penalties that may be

imposed where an academic offence is committed, as stated in the Postgraduate Handbook.

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Table of Contents

Abstract ...................................................................................................................................... 2

Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 3

Chapter 1: Literature Review ..................................................................................................... 6

Liberalism and Realism .......................................................................................................... 6

Impact on Foreign Policy ....................................................................................................... 9

Liberalism, Realism and Rhetoric ........................................................................................ 14

Chapter 2: History of US-Saudi Alliance ................................................................................ 16

US-Saudi Alliance and the Cold War .................................................................................. 16

US-Saudi Alliance and the Gulf War ................................................................................... 20

Chapter 3: Methods .................................................................................................................. 23

Drawbacks ............................................................................................................................ 24

Chapter 4: Case Study .............................................................................................................. 26

Financial Ties ....................................................................................................................... 26

Personal Ties ........................................................................................................................ 29

Counterterrorism .................................................................................................................. 32

9/11 Commission Report Classification ........................................................................... 38

Arms Sales............................................................................................................................ 39

Oil ......................................................................................................................................... 43

Reforms ................................................................................................................................ 47

Conclusion ............................................................................................................................... 53

Future of US-Saudi Relations .............................................................................................. 55

Works Cited ............................................................................................................................. 57

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Abstract

This study examines the validity of the claim that the Unites States-Saudi Arabia alliance

under the Bush administration was driven by its financial and personal ties to the kingdom.

To determine the motivations of the Bush administration, a case study that explores the US-

Saudi alliance under Bush, Clinton, and Obama is used. The implications of realism and

liberalism, theories of international relations that often have divergent foreign policy

recommendations, are considered as alternative motivations driving the Bush foreign policy

towards Saudi Arabia. The policies of the three administrations are both consistent with each

other, and demonstrate a primacy of realist principles over liberal ideals. Due to the

coherence of the Saudi policies of the three presidencies, it indicates that realism, not

relationships, motivated the US-Saudi partnership under Bush.

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Introduction

In 2014, a Saudi blogger named Raif Badawi was sentenced by religious court to ten

years in prison, one thousand lashes, and a substantial fine for an online post encouraging

religious and political debate (Black 2015). The Badawi case illustrates the wide gap in the

values between the United States and its long-time ally, Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia jails

dissident individuals, such as Badawi, but the United States protects the freedom of speech

through its Constitution. While the judicial system of Saudi Arabia is based upon a strict,

Wahhabi interpretation of Islamic law, the United States values the separation of church and

state (Khatib 2015; Unger 2006: p. 84).

Despite these difference, Saudi Arabia and the United States have maintained a close

partnership throughout recent history (Bronson 2006: p. 3). The disparity between the two

systems of governments leads to scrutiny about the foundation of the relationship. Within

international relations, there exists two major, but often conflicting, schools of thought that

have divergent implications for foreign policy. While the two strands of thought may be

reconciled in some instances of international affairs, they often remain in conflict.

Liberalism, which places an emphasis on human rights and political participation, is fully

incompatible with the US-Saudi alliance. On the other hand, realism focuses on the self-

interested pursuit of security and prosperity by states. Because the US-Saudi partnership in

counterterrorism, regional security, and the procurement of oil is beneficial to American

security and economic well-being, the alliance is more consistent with the realist

interpretation of foreign policy.

During the presidency of President George W. Bush, there was speculation that the

American policy towards Saudi Arabia was guided by neither realism nor liberalism. Instead,

there was the allegation that the close alliance between the two countries was driven by his

personal and financial relationships with the Saudi royal family. A narrative developed that

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Bush disregarded crucial security concerns of the United States while simultaneously

supporting a repressive government that was the antithesis of American liberal principles.

Because of those relationships, the Saudi policy under Bush was supposedly guided by

selfish, personal motives rather than a realist or liberal interpretation of international

relations.

To examine the validity of this claim, this study compares the US-Saudi alliance

under Bush as well as his predecessor, President Bill Clinton, and his successor, President

Barack Obama. Using both primary and secondary sources from the public domain, the

policies of Clinton, Bush, and Obama in key areas of the partnership—counterterrorism, arms

sales, oil, and reforms—are examined. Because diplomatic relationships contain an element

of secrecy, the study may exclude relevant information of the Saudi policy under the three

presidents. Additionally, when examining the sources, it is important to incorporate a degree

of scepticism to account for bias. Because authors often have a particular motivation for

writing, it is necessary to consider their viewpoint when analysing documents. Despite these

drawbacks, the study is able to construct a comprehensive overview of the foreign policy

towards Saudi Arabia under each administration.

Of the three presidents, Bush had the strongest personal and financial ties to the

kingdom, and as a result, the largest potential for a conflict of interest. Despite the existence

of these relationships, the Saudi policy under Bush in the areas of counterterrorism, arms

sales, oil, and reforms did not deviate significantly from that of either Clinton or Obama. At

the same time, US-Saudi cooperation in these areas benefited both American security and

economic strength. The personal and financial ties of the Bush administration to Saudi

Arabia did not significantly alter his foreign policy towards the kingdom. Consistent with

Clinton and Obama administrations, the Saudi policy under Bush was guided by realist

interests.

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While the American policy towards the kingdom persistently aligns with the realist

viewpoint, it remains a difficult partnership. Not only is the kingdom’s cooperation erratic,

but the fundamentalist interpretation of Islam the kingdom sponsors often breeds extremism

within the Middle East detrimental to American security (Gause 2009; Shapiro and Sokolsky

2015). At the same time, the liberal United States is charged as being hypocritical by

supporting the repressive Saudi government.

Despite these difficulties, it is likely the partnership will continue in the foreseeable

future due to entwined interests of counterterrorism, regional stability, and economics.

Understand the true foundation of the partnership is important in order to determine how to

proceed in the future. Putting a misplaced emphasis on the links of the Bush administration to

Saudi Arabia obscures the true nature of the bilateral relationships. Without a proper

understanding, it would be difficult for the United States to design a proper Saudi policy.

This study is broken down into five sections. The first chapter briefly overviews the

tension between realism and liberalism, as well as their implications for foreign policy. The

second chapter provides background information on the history of the US-Saudi alliance prior

to the Clinton administration, detailing the relationship throughout both the Cold War and the

Gulf War. Within the third chapter, the methods of the study are outlined, including both its

benefits and drawbacks. The fourth chapter consists of the case study examining the US-

Saudi relationship under all three presidencies. Lastly, the final section discusses the

overarching conclusions of the case study, as well as implications for the future of the

relationship.

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Chapter 1: Literature Review

Within American foreign policy, a tension exists between the pursuit of ideals and

interests (Morgenthau 1948: p. 12; Mandelbaum 1996:p. 17; Gholz et al. 1997: p. 40). That

tension is closely mirrored in the conflict between the realist and the liberal paradigms of

international relations (Keohane and Nye 1987: p. 729; Litwak 2000: p. 24; Mowle 2003: p.

561; Dueck 2004: p. 525; Atlas 2012: p. 353). Realism and liberalism are both incomplete

theories that fail to fully describe all aspect of international relations (Waltz 1979: p. 9; Nye

1988: p. 242; Walt 1998: p. 30; Legro and Moravcsik 1999: p. 49; Mowle 2003: p. 571;

Mearsheimer 2005: p. 149). As a result, each may accurately describe American foreign

policy in particular situations. Because of inherent contradictions between the two research

traditions, American foreign policy may appear inconsistent in certain situations.

The US-Saudi alliance represents this conflict between American interests and ideals

(Atlas 2012: p. 357). Continued cooperation with the Saudi Arabia is necessary for the

security and prosperity of the United States. Yet, because Saudi Arabia is a historically

repressive monarchy, these interests are not easily reconcilable with American ideals of civil

liberties and democracies. The United States chastises many neighbours of Saudi Arabia in

the Middle East for their lack of freedom, yet American criticism pointed at the kingdom is

significantly muted. As a result, there is an apparent inconsistency underlying the

relationship.

Liberalism and Realism

Within realist tradition, there is an emphasis on the role of the state, anarchy, and

power (Doyle 1983a: p. 218; Mearsheimer 1990: p. 12; Gilpin 1996: pp. 7-8; Walt 1998: p.

31; Mowle 2003: p. 566; Mearsheimer 2005: p. 139). States are both the main actors and

assumed to act in a rational manner. Anarchy describes the structure of international

relations; there exists no higher authority to enforce rules within the interactions between

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states (Waltz 1979: p. 61). In the anarchical condition, states compete for power. Although

most often seen as military capabilities, “power” can also refer to economic strength

(Morgenthau 1948: p. 31; Gilpin 1996: p. 8). Conflict, which arises as a result of insecurity

and constant competition for power, is considered both common and difficult to mitigate

within the realist paradigm.

Realism, however, is not a unified tradition (Gilpin 1996: p. 6; Legro and Moravcsik

1999: p. 9). Distinct strands emphasise the different roles of anarchy and power. Classical

realism believes that anarchy is a constraint and power is an end (Morgenthau 1948: pp. 5,

29; Waltz 1988: p. 616). While anarchy is important, classical realism contends that inherent

human selfishness plays a major role in conflict (Morgenthau 1948: p. 4; Nye 1988: p. 241;

Gilpin 1996: p. 6). Because humans are selfish, they will attempt to secure as much power as

possible, and will never be constrained by moral principle. Anarchy allows states, which are

controlled by humans, to pursue that selfish course of action (Waltz 1988: p. 616). Conflict

stems from the simultaneous and unrestrained pursuits of power by states.

On the other hand, neorealism holds that anarchy dictates conflict and power is a

means of security (Waltz 1979: p. 66; Nye 1988: p. 241; Waltz 1988: p. 616; Gilpin 1996: p.

6). Anarchy creates an inherently unsafe world. Since states are unable to rely on a higher

power to guarantee their security, they aim to increase their own power to either deter or

secure themselves from an attack (Waltz 1979: pp. 106-107). Despite the different emphasis

on the role of anarchy and power, classical realism and neorealism have a consistent

conception of competition among states for limited resources (Legro and Moravcsik 1999:

pp. 14-15).

In contrast, liberalism places an importance on certain principles within international

relations (Doyle 1986: p. 1152; Doyle 1983a: p. 206). Liberalism promotes many core values

at the international level that it does at the domestic level (Doyle 1986: p. 1152; Fukuyama

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1989). Within the liberal worldview of international politics, human rights, political

participation, and institutional restraint are considered important (Doyle 1983a: p. 206; Doyle

1986: p. 1152; Nye 1988: p. 245; Fukuyama 1989). Opposed to realism, liberalism recognises

factors outside of power, including domestic politics and international institutions, as playing

a larger role within international relations (Nye 1988: p. 238; Moravcsik 1997: p. 514).

Similar to realism, liberalism has several variations. The different subsects of

liberalism are more diverse than the realist tradition (Doyle 1986: p. 1152; Moravcsik 1997:

p. 514; Mowle 2003: p. 566). While debate remains about what constitutes a liberal theory

(Moravcsik 1997: pp. 514-515), three main strands are consistently identified: economic

interdependence, democratic peace theory, and regulatory liberalism (Nye 1988: p. 246; Walt

1998: p. 32).

Economic interdependence asserts that the growing interconnectedness of the

international market helps mitigate conflict (Nye 1988: p. 246; Moravcsik 1997: p. 530). If

the future economic prosperities of states are linked, there is less incentive to resort to war

(Mearsheimer 1990: p. 41; Walt 1998: p. 32). The second strand of liberalism, the democratic

peace theory, premises that democracies are less likely to wage war against one another. As a

result, the spread of democracy is linked to increasing peace (Doyle 1986: p. 1151;

Mearsheimer 1990: p. 41; Smith 1995: p. 65; Lake 1998: p. 13; Walt 1998: p. 32). Lastly,

regulatory liberalism examines how institutions and norms can mitigate conflict within the

international realm (Nye 1988: p. 246). Within this approach, a broad concept of international

regimes, consisting of norms, procedures, or rules, dictate expectations in international

relations (Keohane and Nye 1987: p. 741; Nye 1988: p. 240; Jervis 1999: p. 53). The United

Nations, for example, provides a formal framework for states to resolve conflicts peacefully.

As a result of formal institutions or informal norms, states can either lower the costs of

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cooperation or actually modify their preferences (Keohane and Nye 1987: p. 743; Powell

1994: pp. 326-327; Walt 1998: p. 32; Jervis 1999: p. 54; Mowle 2003: p. 566).

Though there is disparity within both the liberal and realist tradition, points of

contention can be discerned. Liberalism holds that there is more opportunity for cooperation

within international relations (Nye 1988: p. 250; Moravcsik 1997: p. 520; Jervis 1999: p. 47;

Mowle 2003: p. 561). While realism is not inherently violent, it is less optimistic about the

conditions of anarchy being overcome (Mowle 2003: p. 561). Connected closely to the liberal

emphasis on the possibility for cooperation is the perspective that forces beyond the

capabilities of a state can alter the international structure (Powell 1994: p. 338; Dueck 2004:

p. 517). All strands of liberalism contend that an outside force, whether it is interconnected

economies, democratic norms, or international institutions, can help mitigate anarchy

(Keohane and Nye 1987: p. 729; Powell 1994: p. 315; Moravcsik 1997: p.518). Realism does

not discount that these factors exist, but rather rejects the liberal conclusion that they can

affect relations between states (Waltz 1979: pp. 26, 88; Doyle 1983a: p. 219; Powell 1994: p.

325; Mearsheimer 1990: p. 44; Gilpin 1996: p. 6). From the realist perspective, only the share

of power of a state dictates whether it will pursue its interests.

Another point of contention revolves around the major concerns of states. While

realism is characterised by the self-interest of a state (Waltz 1979: p. 91), liberalism

recognises broader concerns within the international realm (Mowle 2003: pp. 567-568;

Mearsheimer 2005: p. 145). As a result, liberalism places a larger emphasis on issues such as

collective security and human rights. These points of contention demonstrate that the realist

perspective is a more static, narrower, and self-interested viewpoint than liberalism.

Impact on Foreign Policy

Liberalism emphasises the link between the promotion of American values,

particularly open markets and democracy, and American security (Dueck 2004: p. 532).

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Through open markets, states can develop mutually beneficial financial relationships that

underpin the economic interdependence strand of liberalism (Doyle 1983a: pp. 231-232;

Doyle 1986: p. 1161). The spread of democratic values is associated with the democratic

peace theory. If larger segments of the world embrace democratic principles, it is argued that

the world broadly, and the United States specifically, will be more secure (Doyle 1986: p.

1151; Layne 1994: p. 46; Lake 1998: p. 13; Dueck 2004: p. 516; Kurth 2005: p. 636; Cram

2015: p. 376). Adherents to the liberal theory contend that principles of free markets and

liberal democracies represent the “end of history,” (Fukuyama 1989). Since the end of the

Cold War, no other ideology presents a feasible alternative system of government to a liberal

democracy. Conflict is inevitable, but the world is slowly transitioning to states which

consistently adhere to liberal values (Doyle 1983a: p. 230; Fukuyama 1989). In such a world,

the opportunity for conflict is reduced.

Democratic peace theory offers implications for how a liberal state may interact with

its autocratic counterparts. Under this theory, alliances between democratic and autocratic

states are considered both unstable and inconsistent. The theory posits that because repressive

states act in an illegitimate manner with respect to their own citizenship, they will act in a

similar unlawful manner in international affairs (Doyle 1986: p. 1161; Homolar 2010: p.

710). As a result, this fosters mistrust between democratic and autocratic states (Doyle 1986:

p. 1157). Because of this mistrust, alliances between democratic and non-democratic states

are unsustainable (Doyle 1986: p. 1162). While recognising the pragmatic difficulties, Doyle

(1983b) also argues that for states to have a foreign policy fully aligned with the liberal

ideals, an alliance between an autocratic and a democratic state is impossible. The liberal

state cannot accept the human rights violations associated with illiberal state for any reason

(pp. 344-345).

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The perceived illegitimacy of autocratic regimes (Doyle 1983b: pp. 324-325; Doyle

1986: p. 1162; Moravcsik 1997: p. 527) also brings two subsets of liberal theory into conflict

(Doyle 1983b: p. 330; Nye 1992). Under regulatory liberalism, there is an emphasis on

codified norms and settlements through international institutions (Nye 1992). International

law protects the sovereignty of states, highlighted in Article II of the United Nations Charter

that guarantees sovereignty among all member nations (United Nations 1945). Interpretations

of democratic peace theory, however, argue that autocratic states are not exempt from

interference when they fail to respect the rights of their own citizens (Doyle 1986: p. 1162;

Waltz 1991: p. 669). Conceivably, liberal states may forcibly export democratic principles

(Doyle 1986: p. 1162; Layne 1994: p. 47; Daalder and Lindsay 2003; Dueck 2004: p. 527).

The 2003 War in Iraq conducted by the United States is one of the most recent, and most

prominent, examples of using military power to bring about liberal changes (Dueck 2004: p.

527).

Both proponents of liberalism, and realist critics, note that the forcible promotion of

democracy can be detrimental to the liberal state itself, local populations affected by war, and

the stability of the world order (Nye 1992; Layne 1994: p. 47; Gholz et al. 1997: p. 10). The

2003 War in Iraq reinforces that notion; it has failed thus far in its ultimate goal to establish a

functional democracy in Iraq (Cockburn 2014: p. 8). It also fostered resentment across the

local population against the United States, and created a power vacuum in the state.

Currently, Iraq suffers from sectarian violence and the rise of the Islamic State (Gause 2014a;

Cockburn 2014: p. 8). While Saddam Hussein was guilty of massive human rights violations,

American military intervention decreased stability within the region. Rather than using

forcible military intervention to promote democracy, other adherents to the liberal viewpoint

argue for the spread of democracy via peaceful means, such as through institutions (Dueck

2004: p. 516).

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Both the empirical evidence and the theoretical explanation behind the idea of

democratic peace are rejected by the realist viewpoint. Realists argue that, throughout history,

there have been relatively few democracies (Mearsheimer 1990: p. 50). The liberal theory of

democratic peace, therefore, rests on little evidence. The definition of democracies is often

debated as well. If Germany in 1914 is classified as a democracy, then World War I would be

a significant anomaly within the democratic peace theory (Layne 1994: p. 44; Mearsheimer

1990: p. 51; Waltz 1991: p. 669).

Realists also contend that the domestic structure of states fails to impact their

international dealings. Layne (1994) argues that in “near-misses” in wars between

democracies, the interests of and the relative balance between the two states played a larger

role in avoiding war than shared democratic norms (pp. 14, 38). The domestic structure of a

state cannot mitigate the competition between states in an anarchical world. Any changes to

the structure of international realm result from the alterations in the distribution of power

(Morgenthau 1948: p. 30; Waltz 1979: pp. 93, 97; Nye 1988: p. 241; Waltz 1988: p. 618;

Mearsheimer 1990: p. 12; Waltz 1991: p. 668; Legro and Moravcsik 1999: p. 34). States are

not constrained by norms or other factors, but rather the capabilities of more powerful states

within the system (Waltz 1979: p. 72; Doyle 1983a: p. 219; Mearsheimer 1990: pp. 6-7;

Gilpin 1996: p. 8; Moravcsik 1997: p. 521).

Besides rejecting the implications of liberalism, realists find liberal thought to be

dangerous in some instances (Mearsheimer 2005: p. 143). While liberal thought has gained

traction since the end of the Cold War, it remains relatively untested. Today, America is the

sole superpower in the world. In the future, power may be more evenly distributed between

states. By assuming that other democracies are non-threatening, the United States may not

adequately prepare for a rising power (Layne 1994: pp. 48-49). If American foreign policy

emphasises liberalism over realism, it could be disastrous for future security implications.

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Realism advocates that American foreign policy is best shaped by the distribution of

capabilities and the definition of its interest (Morgenthau 1948: pp. 34-35; Waltz 1979: p.

113; Gilpin 1996: p. 7; Dueck 2004: pp. 523-524). The first priority of the United States is its

survival (Gilpin 1996: pp. 7-8; Gholz et al. 1997: p. 5; Kunniholm 2002: p. 432). After

security, the next most prominent American interest is economic prosperity (Gholz et al.

1997: p. 9; Kunniholm 2002: p. 432). While American security is aided by geographical

location, realism does not dictate an isolationist policy. The United States has a vested

interest in regions where these two fundamental interests are relevant (Dueck 2004: p. 515).

Notably, the Persian Gulf remains important in the realist perspective because oil is crucial to

the American economy (Smith 1995: p. 62; Gholz et al 1997: p. 26; Dueck 2004: p. 515).

From a realist viewpoint, a substantial military commitment for solely humanitarian

intervention or collective security would represent an overextension of power that could

endanger both security and prosperity (Gholz et al. 1997: pp. 40, 43).

The necessity of choosing between liberal and realist approaches is often rejected

(Lake 1998: p. 11; Schuker 2002: p. 581; Mearsheimer 2005: p. 142; Boyle 2008: p. 207;

Brose 2009; Lizza 2011; Atlas 2012: p. 360; Cram 2015: p. 368). It is argued that the United

States can find an effective balance between these two theories. In some cases, that may be

possible. During World War II, the United States fought for its own security and against

Nazism (Mearsheimer 2005: p. 142).

Combing realism and liberalism, however, is more the exception than the rule

(Mearsheimer 2005: p. 142; Boyle 2008: p. 207). In particular, promoting democracy within

larger segments of the Middle East is significantly risky. Currently within this geographic

region, Islamist organisations garner the most public support and have the most anti-

American outlook. If democratic reforms were to happen quickly, it is likely that more radical

groups would gain power (Huntington 1993: p. 32; Gause 2009; The Economist 3 February

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2011; Pressman 2009: p. 161; Montgomery and Pettyjohn 2010: p. 529; Lizza 2011; Atlas

2012: p. 379). In Egypt, for example, after the fall of Hosni Mubarak, the Muslim

Brotherhood was elected. The episode illustrates the difficult choice the United States would

face in a rapidly democratising Middle East. It must choose between engaging with a regime

potentially hostile to its interests or rejecting a government that was democratically elected.

While the implications of realism and liberalism can be reconciled in some cases, the current

political atmosphere of the Middle East makes it difficult.

Liberalism, Realism and Rhetoric

The tendency by leaders to justify actions that are consistent with the realist paradigm

with liberal rhetoric complicates the relationship between liberalism and realism in foreign

policy (Walt 1998: p. 43; Litwak 2000: p. 20; Schuker 2002: p. 581; Leffler 2005: p. 407;

Mearsheimer 2005: p. 143; Pressman 2009: pp. 175-176; Homolar 2010: p. 714; Atlas 2012:

p. 264; Byman 2013: p. 306). President George H.W. Bush’s invasion of Iraq in 1991 was

framed as an international effort to preserve Kuwaiti sovereignty and promote a “new world

order” that renounced aggression (Nye 2002). At the same time, the war also ensured that

Hussein would not invade Saudi Arabia, and jeopardise American access to oil (Brands 2004:

p. 118). The United States had an economic interest in preserving its supply of reasonably

priced oil, but Bush Sr. appealed to more lofty reasoning to justify the war.

Similarly, international relations is often portrayed as a simplistic conflict between

“good” and “evil,” (Litwak 2000: p. 63, 75; Hunter 2007: p. 497). Clinton deemed

troublesome countries, including Iran, Iraq, and North Korea, as “rogue” (Litwak 2000: p. 2).

Under Bush, these three states were once again demonised as the “axis of evil” (Kunniholm

2002: p. 435; Pollack 2002: p. 90; Wright 2004: p. 34; Hunter 2007: p. 497; Homolar 2010:

p. 706). Appealing to American ideals and using simplistic generalisations can help

consolidate domestic support for foreign policy (Nye 1992; Litwak 2000: p. 63; BBC News

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12 December 2001; Leffler 2005: p. 396; Byman 2013: p. 306; Cram 2015: p. 369). Issues

arise, however, when a state such as Saudi Arabia that does not fit the mould of a “good”

state under the liberal tradition can serve American interests as defined by realism.

Because liberalism and realism may be incompatible, American foreign policy is

often perceived as inconsistent (Schuker 2002: p. 581; Boyle 2008: p. 206). This is also

illustrated in the different approaches towards democratisation in the Middle East. Because

most governments within the Middle East are autocratic governments with a history of

human rights violation, the support of those governments conflicts with a liberal foreign

policy in a democratic America. Based on both the appeals to American principles within

foreign policy as well as the simplistic categorisation of states, it would be expected that

Middle Eastern states would be treated comparably with respect to democratisation (Morey et

al. 2012: p. 1186). Both Bush and Obama, however, have been criticised for promoting

democracy more strongly in unfriendly Middle Eastern countries than in purported allies

(Gordon 2003: pp. 159-160; Pressman 2009: pp. 175-176; Jones 2011; Morey et al. 2012: p.

1186). The discrepancy in the push for democracy within the Middle East is likely the result

of how different countries serve American realist interests (Jones 2011).

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Chapter 2: History of US-Saudi Alliance

US-Saudi Alliance and the Cold War

During the Cold War, the alliance between Saudi Arabia and the United States was

less complicated. Because the security landscape was defined by the overarching threat of the

Soviet Union (Mandelbaum 1996: p. 28; Boyle 2008: p. 194; Yetiv 2008: p. 18; Teitelbaum

2010: p. 1), the strategic interests of the two countries largely aligned during this era; the

United States and Saudi Arabia shared a common enemy of the Soviet Union (Pollack 2002:

p. 77; Gause and Chanin 2003: p. 121; Long 2004: p. 27; Bronson 2005: p. 123; Bronson

2006: p. 5; Gause 2011: p. 2; Haass 2011: p. viii; Gutfeld and Zumbrunnen 2013: p. 636).

While the opposition of both countries to the Soviet Union was consistent with realism, the

Cold War environment also overshadowed the contradiction of the alliance with liberalism.

The United States was committed to the containment of the communist ideology, particularly

in the oil rich Middle East (Kunniholm 2002: p. 428; Kurth 2005: p. 636; Yetiv 2008: p. 28).

At the same time, a moral opposition to communism that was compatible with the liberal

tradition existed in the United States. As a theocracy, Saudi Arabia shared the aim of

preventing the spread of the “godless” communism (Campbell and Yetiv 2007: p. 138). The

security of the kingdom was also threatened by Soviet proxies in the region, including Egypt

and Yemen (Pollock 2002: p. 79; Bronson 2006: p. 34).

Saudi Arabia was a key ally in protecting American realist interests during the Cold

War (Bronson 2006: p. 4). A cornerstone of the United States-Saudi Arabia partnership was

oil (Pollack 2002: p. 78; Unger 2004: pp. 58-59; Long 2004: p. 26; Bronson 2005: p. 133;

Bronson 2006: p. 15; Yetiv 2008: p. 28; Gause 2011: p. 26; Byman 2013: p. 293; Baxter and

Simpson 2015: p. 141). When Saudi Arabia took control of its oil industry in the 1970’s from

American companies (Gause 2011: p.23; Long 2004: p. 28), it was vital to the American

economy to maintain a strong relationship with the kingdom. Not only home to the world’s

17

largest known reserves, Saudi Arabia also had the ability to act as a “swing” producer, and

increase production during oil shortages (Pollack 2002: p. 81; Long 2004: p. 28; Bronson

2006: p. 3; Gause 2011: p. 26 Atlas 2012: p. 357; Bahgat 2013: p. 566; Byman 2013: p. 294;

Blanchard 2014: p. 9). By cultivating a relationship with Saudi Arabia, the United States

secured its own access to reasonably priced oil (Pollack 2002: p. 78; Unger 2004: p. 83).

Saudi Arabia also had a geostrategic security importance during the Cold War (Unger

2004: p. 59; Bronson 2006: p. 25). After World War II, the anticolonial legacy was strong in

the Middle East (Bronson 2006: p. 33). As European powers withdrew, a resulting power

vacuum held the potential for Soviet expansion (Kunniholm 2002: p. 429; Yetiv 2008: p. 29).

The Saudi and American fear of the growing influence of Moscow resulted in cooperation to

stem the communist threat in the Middle East (Bronson 2004: p. 120). When Britain officially

withdrew from the Persian Gulf in 1971, the United States was embroiled in Vietnam, with

limited options to ensure Middle Eastern stability. As a result, President Nixon relied heavily

on arming and supporting regional governments—in particular Iran and Saudi Arabia—to act

as counterweights to the Soviet client states in the Middle East (Litwak 2000: p. 57;

Kunniholm 2002: p. 429; Yetiv 2008: p. 31; Teitelbaum 2010: p. 10).

During the Cold War, the increasing oil wealth and anti-communist outlook of Saudi

Arabia enabled it to fund various proxy conflicts to prevent the spread of communism

(Bronson 2006: p. 158). When the American government was restrained from supporting

anti-communist movements by Congress or public opinion, Saudi Arabia, as an autocracy,

was not subject to those pressures. In those instances, Saudi Arabia supported proxy conflicts

that served both American and Saudi security, but were politically unfeasible for the

American government (Unger 2004: p. 61). The Saudi funding of proxy conflicts aligned

with American security concerns in the Cold War era, but ironically threatened the United

States in the long-term. During the 1980’s, Saudi Arabia, along with American help,

18

supported Islamic extremist groups that eventually defeated Soviet forces in Afghanistan

(Bronson 2006: p. 2003; Fisher 2013a). Those same groups, often with continued support

from Saudi nationals, later directed attacks at the United States (Unger 2004: p. 177;

Cockburn 2014: p. 104).

The US-Saudi cooperation on security issues during the Cold War was not limited to

funding proxy conflicts. At the end of World War II, President Truman assured King Saud

that the United States would protect Saudi Arabia against external aggression (Yetiv 2008: p.

28). The kingdom faced varying threats from Iraq, Egypt, Yemen, and Iran, but lacked the

military means to protect itself (Long 2004: p. 27). The United States initially tried to arm

regional allies, but eventually provided explicit guarantees to Persian Gulf allies via the

Carter Doctrine (Litwak 2000: p. 27; Kunniholm 2002: p. 430; Gutfeld and Zumbrunnen

2013: p. 638). Announced in 1980, the Carter Doctrine stated that any aggression in Persian

Gulf was considered an attack on American interests, and would necessitate a military

response (Stork 1980: p. 3). Beyond security guarantees, the United States also became the

primary supplier of weaponry for the kingdom (Pollack 2002: p. 83; Bronson 2006: p. 34;

Gutfeld and Zumbrunnen 2013: pp. 637-638; Blanchard 2014: pp. 8-9).

Before 1980, the United States had insufficient capability to deploy its military in the

Gulf region (Yetiv 2008: p. 47). Under Carter and continuing afterwards, the United States

undertook efforts to create a military infrastructure in Saudi Arabia to allow the United States

to project military power in the region (Campbell and Yetiv 2007: p. 142; Yetiv 2008: p. 79;

Gutfeld and Zumbrunnen 2013: p. 635). The improved infrastructure was consistent with

realist principles for both countries. While allowing the United States to improve its military

capabilities, it provided Saudi Arabia with increased protection from regional military threats.

Despite the close alignment of American and Saudi strategic interests, the Arab-Israeli

conflict remained a point of tension between the two countries (Pollack 2002: p. 77; Gause

19

and Chanin 2003: p. 116; Long 2004: p. 28; Bronson 2006: p. 54; Campbell and Yetiv 2007:

p. 141). From the outset, the Saudi monarchy felt betrayed by American support for the

creation of the Israeli state. That discord in the US-Saudi alliance was evident during the oil

embargo of 1973. Angered by the American material support for Israel during the Arab-

Israeli War of 1973, the kingdom cut off the American oil supply (Lacey 2009: p. 72; Gutfeld

and Zumbrunnen 2013: p. 628-629). The resulting rise in oil prices caused significant strain

on the relationship (Pollack 2002: p. 81; Lacey 2009: p. 3; Gutfeld and Zumbrunnen 2013: p.

627).

While the Arab-Israeli conflict caused recurring strain, the threat of communism

remained the most pressing concern (Bahgat 2009: p. 181; Pollack 2002: p. 80). Besides

necessitating a series of shared strategic interests consistent with realism, the opposition to

communism overshadowed the contradiction of the Saudi-American relationship with

liberalism. Partly, this resulted from an emphasis on practical interests over morality during

the Cold War. Because the Soviet Union was deemed to be such a substantial threat, the

human rights abuses associated Gulf allies were downplayed (Yetiv 2008: p. 37). Beyond

realist interests, communism itself was considered immoral by the American government

(Leffler 2005: p. 411; Boyle 2008: p. 194; Cram 2015: pp. 367, 375). Because Saudi Arabia

was opposed to the communist ideology, its autocratic nature may not have been as

controversial.

In addition to its opposition to the Soviet Union, the Saudi religiosity was not a

hindrance during this era, but rather an asset (Bronson 2005: pp. 122-123; Bronson 2006: pp.

35, 241; Hunter 2007: p. 505). Because communism was an atheist ideology, it was

incompatible with the Saudi theocracy (Saikal 2004: p. 22). As the home to two of the three

holiest cities in Islam, Saudi Arabia possessed a certain amount of religious authority in the

largely Muslim Middle East (Bronson 2006: p. 7; Smith 2006: p. 102; Campbell and Yetiv

20

2007: p. 138; Yetiv 2008: p. 38; Bahgat 2013: p. 567). During this era, the United States

believed it could leverage that religious authority to combat communism (Saikal 2004: p. 25;

Bronson 2006: p. 133). The shared antipathy against the communist ideology, and the

usefulness of Islam as a counterweight to communism, made the incompatibility of the

alliance with liberalism less important.

US-Saudi Alliance and the Gulf War

While the Cold War created an alignment of American and Saudi interests, Hussein’s

invasion of Kuwait in 1990 and the subsequent Gulf War offered another opportunity for

cooperation. Despite the crippling Iran-Iraq War that raged in the 1980’s, Iraq still

maintained the strongest conventional army in the Gulf arena (Smith 2006: p. 94; Yetiv 2008:

p. 25). By gaining control of Kuwait, Hussein demonstrated expansionist tendencies, secured

access to additional oil supply, and freed Iraq from the burden of paying Kuwait wartime

debts. Hussein’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait had troubling implications for other

vulnerable countries in the Middle East (Moberly 1992: p. 1037; Brands 2004: p. 117). Saudi

Arabia’s position was particularly precarious (Brands 2004: p. 117; Yetiv 2008: p. 80). Not

only did the kingdom border Iraq, but the Saudi substantial oil reserves would have allowed

Hussein to dominate the Gulf oil supplies (Brands 2004: 118; Yetiv 2008: p.80). Saudi

Arabia feared it would be the next target.

An Iraqi expansion into Saudi Arabia would have endangered American interests

based on the realist worldview. Most notably, an annexation of Saudi Arabia would have

threatened the supply of reasonably priced oil (Moberly 1992: p. 1038). The addition of Saudi

oil to the Iraqi and Kuwaiti reserves would have resulted in Iraqi control over seventy percent

of Gulf oil (Brands 2004: p. 118). If Hussein consolidated the Gulf oil, he could have easily

manipulated both price and production (Moberly 1992: p. 1038; Gholz et al. 1997: p. 27;

Yetiv 2008: p. 7). Limiting American access to reasonably priced oil would have had

21

devastating economic consequences (Gholz et al. 1997: p. 25; Litwak 2000: p. 56; Brands

2004: p. 131; Yetiv 2008: p. 81). Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and possible aggression towards

other Gulf states, was viewed as a threat to American prosperity.

American and Saudi security interests closely aligned in the Gulf War, resulting in a

partnership consistent with realism. The threat to Saudi territorial integrity allowed for much

closer cooperation. Because Saudi Arabia lacked the means to forcefully expel Iraq from

Kuwait, it was necessary for America to intervene militarily. While the United States had

undertaken efforts in previous years to build substantial military infrastructure in the

kingdom, there were concerns about religious objections from stationing American forces

within Saudi Arabia. Despite his apprehension, King Fahd allowed American troops on Saudi

territory during the first Gulf War (Moberly 1992: p.1042; 9/11 Commission Report 2004: p.

57; Bronson 2006: p. 195; Campbell and Yetiv 2007: p. 142; Yetiv 2008: pp. 81-82). Saudi

Arabia also took on the financial burden of war effort (Gutfeld and Zumbrunnen 2013: p.

640). The close cooperation during the Gulf War has been noted as the high point of the

alliance (Bronson 2006: p. 203; Campbell and Yetiv 2007: p. 142).

The obvious American economic interest in securing access to oil was consistent with

realism, but Hussein’s blatant transgression of international law allowed for the American

intervention to be framed as aligning with liberalism as well. Hussein’s violation of Kuwaiti

sovereignty provided a morally justifiable reason to intervene (Moberly 1992: p. 1038;

Litwak 2000: p. 56; Yetiv 2009: pp. 84-86; Homolar 2010: p. 714). At the same time, the

nature of the intervention was consistent with the liberal interpretation of foreign policy.

During the Gulf War, the United States did not act unilaterally. Instead, it obtained a United

Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution for the use of force, and gathered a coalition of

thirty-four partners (Klare 1998: p. 14; Yetiv 2008: p. 86; Homolar 2010: p. 713). By

utilising a multilateral strategy in the Gulf War, the United States demonstrated how the

22

UNSC could deter blatant aggression (Moberly 1992: p. 1038; Homolar 2010: p. 713). Both

the rationale and the conduct of the war were considered appropriate under international law.

As a result, the Gulf War was consistent with both the liberal and realist conceptions of

international affairs.

23

Chapter 3: Methods

A case study methodology is used to analyse the validity of the claim that the Saudi

policy of the Bush administration was guided by personal motives. Alternatives to the theory

that Bush was guided by his personal and financial relationship are that his policy was

motivated by the implications of the liberal or realist theories. Based on the fundamental

differences in the system of governments and values of the two nations, the liberal theory is

less likely to play a role. In contrast, the historically intertwined economic and security

relationships between the two countries suggests that the Saudi policy under Bush may have

been guided by realism.

The Saudi connections to the Bush administration are supposedly unique. As a result,

if they had played a substantial role in the policy formation under Bush, then there should be

a corresponding variation in the relations under the three administrations (Tepperman 2004).

Conversely, if the policies of the three presidents remain relatively consistent, it suggests that

an alternative explanation behind the US-Saudi alliance under Bush was responsible.

To gather a clear picture of the US-Saudi alliance under Clinton, Bush, and Obama,

primary and secondary sources are used. Statements by all three presidents and

representatives of their administrations are analysed, particularly from the Public Papers of

the President Archive and the White House site. Other critical primary sources are the

national security strategies of all three presidencies, the 9/11 Commission Report, and

congressional testimony. Primary sources are supplemented with secondary sources,

including newspaper articles, journal articles, and books, all of which help formulate a more

comprehensive picture of the Saudi policy under all three presidents.

The narrow scope and the focus on causal mechanisms of this investigation make the

case study an appropriate research method. Within a case study, generalizations are often

sacrificed to explore the unique factors of the case (George and Bennett 2004: p. 22;

24

Steinberg 2007: p. 185; Gerring 2013: pp. 10, 48-49). Because the focus of this study centres

on the motivations of three administrations, the in-depth knowledge of the small selection of

cases is appropriate. Case studies also provide insight into what causal mechanisms are at

play, while more general, larger sample studies focus on the measured causal effect (George

and Bennett 2004: p. 21; Steinberg 2007: pp. 182, 185; Falleti and Lynch 2009: p. 1144;

Gerring 2013: pp. 43-44). Lending itself to a case study format, the aim is to determine if the

Saudi ties to the Bush administration, or alternative explanations, are the causal mechanism

in the formation of the policy.

Drawbacks

Both the methodology and the evidence of the study presents obstacles. Despite the

suitability of the case study method, it inherently sacrifices generalizability (George and

Bennett 2004: p. 31; Gerring 2013: p. 76). Implications surrounding the foundation of the

alliance are limited to the three administrations examined. While a consistent theoretical

explanation between the policies of Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations would point to

a larger trend in the US-Saudi relationship, further study to substantiate that generalization

would be needed.

In addition to difficulties with the methodology, the sources gathered present another

complication. Identifying causal mechanisms within case studies is often easier in older cases

because larger amounts of information are available (Tannenwald 2015: p. 221). Within this

study, the focus is on American presidents whose administrations recently ended, or are still

in office. Because the study focuses on current cases, there is potential for deficits in the

information from documents remaining classified. Additionally, because certain aspects of

international relations occur clandestinely, relevant documents may never be available

(George and Bennett 2004: p. 104). Despite this hurdle, large amounts of information on all

three administrations are identified and analysed. Due to the prominence of the Middle East

25

in American foreign policy, especially after the September 11th

attacks, there is a substantial

amount of information in the public domain about the relationship of the three

administrations and Saudi Arabia. A later examination may benefit from access to new

sources, but the study is able to establish a comprehensive overview of the US-Saudi alliance

under the three administrations.

Bias is another drawback to the sources used in the case study (Bennett 2015: p. 231).

Within this study, both the primary and secondary sources are examined with a degree of

scepticism. Public statements by politicians are often tailored to a particular audience. In

addition, authors of secondary sources may have underlying motivations for writing (George

and Bennett 2004: pp. 100-103; Atkinson and Coffey 2011: p. 78). While the potential for

bias does not invalidate any of the sources, one must account for the viewpoint of the authors

when examining documents. Careful analysis by the researcher, as well as drawing from a

large range of resources, helps mitigate this risk (George and Bennett 2004: p. 102; Prior

2011: p. 98).

26

Chapter 4: Case Study

The results of the case study strongly suggest that the financial and personal ties of

the Bush administration did not significantly alter the US-Saudi partnership. Instead, while

the partnership remains inconsistent with the liberal paradigm, realist implications played the

major role in the US-Saudi alliance under Clinton, Bush and Obama.

This chapter is divided into six sections. In the first two sections, the personal and

financial ties between Saudi Arabia and the administrations of Bush, Obama, and Clinton are

explored. While the monetary relationships of the three presidents with Saudi Arabia varied

greatly, Bush had the strongest financial links to the kingdom. Bush also had the closest

personal ties with members of the Saudi royal family, but those relationships have been

overemphasised.

The next four sections examine the approach of the three administrations to crucial

areas of the US-Saudi relationship—counterterrorism, arms deals, oil, and reforms. Among

all four policy areas, there is continuity between the policies of Bush and that of his successor

and predecessor. The US-Saudi alliance was consistently guided by realist, not liberal,

principles under all three presidents.

Financial Ties

In the United States, monetary relationships between public officials and businesses

and foreign governments are scrutinised to prevent undue influence. Foreign governments are

banned from directly contributing to governmental campaigns (Helderman and Hamburg

2015), but are allowed to lobby the American government. Saudi Arabia has spent millions of

dollars in lobbying the United States (Lacey 2009: p. 73). The Saudi embassy spent $1.9

million in payments to a lobbying firm in 2013 alone (The Sunlight Foundation).

Beyond direct lobbying, the “revolving door” between the public and private sector

raises serious ethical questions. Individuals that move from the public to the private sector

27

have the ability to leverage their contacts to produce government business (Unger 2004: pp.

225-226; Cillizza 2015). The shift from private firms to government service also holds the

same potential for a conflict of interest. Associates of the Bush administration had ties to two

private industries connected to Saudi Arabia—the oil and defence industries (Unger 2004: p.

199).

While the financial relationships of the Bush administration held the potential for

personal gain for Bush and his associates, the existence of these ties alone are not a sufficient

indication that the Saudi policy under Bush was financially motivated (Kuhn 2004;

Tepperman 2004). From 1987 to 2003, Unger (2004) estimated that $1.4 billion was

exchanged between those close to the Saudi royal family and those associated with Bush (p.

200). While these financial relationships deserve scrutiny, these links revolve around two of

the traditional cornerstones of the US-Saudi relationship—oil and defence. Because these

industries have been major partners with the Saudis before Bush ascended to office, the

financial transactions do not necessarily indicate corruption.

Both Bush and Bush Sr. amassed significant personal wealth in the oil industry (Cave

2001). During their tenure in the oil business, Saudis invested in the ventures of both the

elder and younger Bush (Tepperman 2004). The connections with the energy sector extended

into Bush’s cabinet, as the vice-president, national security advisor, and secretary of

commerce were all highly placed executives of oil or gas companies prior to their positions in

the Bush administration (Cave 2001; Unger 2004: p. 222).

In addition to oil, associates of the Bush administration had ties to the defence

industry, largely stemming from the private equity firm, the Carlyle Group (Cave 2001;

Unger 2004: pp. 169, 199). After Bush Sr. left office, both he and his Secretary of State,

James Baker, began working for this investment firm. While Bush Sr. and Baker never

directly participated in arms deals, it is alleged that their position at the firm helped garner

28

more Saudi defence business (Unger 2004: p. 167). The Carlyle Group held significant shares

in defence contractors, which often sold arms to Saudi Arabia (Unger 2004: p. 169).

Obama has taken a strong stance against the potential influence of financial

relationships on public policy decisions. When a member of the United States Senate, Obama

pushed for stricter regulations concerning ethics and lobbying (Birnbaum 2006). While

campaigning for president, Obama criticised the relationship between oil companies and then

Vice-President Dick Cheney (Obama 2007; Obama 2008). Obama’s condemnation of Cheney

focused on a perceived disregard for the environment, and not foreign policy. But, it

demonstrated Obama’s discomfort with the possible influence of financial relationship on

public policy.

After his election, Obama continued to pursue limitations on the influence of business

relationships. In January 2009, he signed an executive order that required all executive post

appointees to sign an ethics agreement that limited gifts from lobbyists and attempted to close

the “revolving door” between government and the private sector (Obama 2009a). In his 2012

State of the Union address, Obama once again highlighted the importance of limiting the

“corrosive influence of money in politics,” calling for a ban on public officials owning stocks

in industries they influenced (Obama 2012).

Any perceived conflict of interest between Saudi money and the Obama

administration would arise from the appointment of Hillary Clinton, his first Secretary of

State and wife of Bill Clinton. The foundation formed by H. Clinton and her husband

received donations from foreign governments, including Saudi Arabia. When she accepted

her post, H. Clinton agreed to discontinue donations from foreign government, except those

that were approved by the State Department (Grimaldi and Ballhaus 2015; Helderman and

Hamburger 2015). Saudi Arabia donated between $10 and $25 million to the foundation, but

discontinued donations once H. Clinton assumed her post (Grimaldi and Ballhaus 2015;

29

Helderman and Hamburger 2015). Speculation remained that prior donations influenced H.

Clinton’s approval of weapons sales to Saudi Arabia in her role as Secretary of State (Sirota

and Perez 2015).

With respect to financial ties, the Clinton administration falls between the two poles

of the Bush and Obama administrations. Clinton was not associated with any businesses that

had significant involvement with Saudi Arabia like Bush nor was he as outspoken against the

influence of financial donations on public policy as Obama. Clinton solicited the Saudi

government for a donation to the University of Arkansas when he was governor, and in 1989,

secured a $23 million to establish a Middle East Centre (Weiner 1993; Lacey 2009: p. 214).

While the donation was more direct than the financial relationships of the Bush

administration, it did not personally enrich Clinton.

Personal Ties

Personal ties between the Bush family and the Saudi royal family have also been

questioned. In particular, the close relationship between the former Saudi ambassador to the

United States, Prince Bandar bin Sultan, and Bush Sr. has been seen as an avenue for the

Saudi government to obtain greater influence. The focus on the Bandar-Bush connection

obscures many of the nuances of the Saudi relationship. Close personal friendships may hold

the potential for undue influence, but they can also ease diplomatic relationships (Brown

2015). Moreover, Bandar was only one member in the royal family, albeit in a crucial role.

Bandar did not perfectly reflect Saudi interest, nor did the status of his relationship with an

American president dictate that of other members of the royal family. Lastly, Bandar stepped

down from his post as ambassador in 2005, and therefore, his influence upon the Bush

administration was limited to half the time Bush was in office.

Although Bandar was a close personal friend to Bush Sr., that did not translate into a

strong relationship with his son. When Bush ascended office, the US-Saudi partnership was

30

tested (Ottaway 2009: p. 160). It was strained first by an American bombing of Iraq, in which

warplanes launched from the kingdom without Saudi consent (Ottaway 2009: p. 160). Later

in the first year, King Abdullah was infuriated by the apparent lack of interest in the

Palestinian-Israeli conflict by the Bush administration (Unger 2004: pp. 241-242; Bronson

2006: p. 234; Lacey 2009: p. 218; Ottaway 2009: pp. 161-164).

Bandar’s influence failed to stop Bush from taking actions contrary to Saudi interests

that benefited the United States. Both American actions were consistent with a realist view of

foreign policy. The airstrike was a retaliatory response to Iraqi attempts to shoot down

American planes, so it aligned with principles on security. On the other hand, the deliberate

disassociation from the Arab-Israeli conflict resulted from Bush’s contention that the peace

process was a futile attempt that did not directly impact upon American security or prosperity

(Bahgat 2009: p. 185; Ottaway 2009: p. 159).

Still, Bandar served Bush well in some cases. When King Abdullah threatened to end

Saudi relations, Bandar was shocked by the aggressive tone he was ordered to deliver

(Ottaway 2009: p. 164). Bandar delivered the content of the message, but tailored it to be

more effective to the American audience (Lacey 2009: p. 220). Bush responded quickly with

a letter to King Abdullah, and relations improved. It was Bandar’s familiarity with the Bush

administration that proved to be an asset in preventing a complete break between the two

countries.

In contrast, Clinton appeared to have professional relationships with members of the

Saudi government, but not personal friendships. Clinton is often noted as having a distant

relationship with Bandar (Lacey 2009: p. 214; Ottaway 2009: p. 122). Some claim that the

strain was the result of an apparently more forceful approach to counterterrorism under

Clinton. The difficulties in the relationship between Clinton and Bandar can also be the result

of Bandar’s demonstrated preference for Bush Sr. (Lacey 2009: p. 215). On the night Clinton

31

was elected, Bandar was with Bush Sr., despite diplomatic tradition that ambassadors should

remain neutral (Lacey 2009: p. 215). Bandar’s clear partiality would not have endeared him

to the Clinton administration.

Clinton had a better, albeit professional, relationship with other Saudi royal family

members. When he visited the kingdom in 1994, King Fahd awarded Clinton the highest

honour, the King Abdul Aziz Medal (Ottaway 2009: p. 129). Had Clinton’s troublesome

relationship with Bandar been the result of increased pressure on the kingdom, it is likely that

all members of the royal family would have distanced themselves.

Bandar resigned from his post as the American ambassador in 2005, and has not been

a factor in the Obama administration. Despite the departure of Bandar, Obama recognised the

value of cordial relationships to foreign policy. When King Abdullah passed away in early

2015, Obama shortened a trip to India to pay respects to the late King and meet the new

monarch, King Salman (The Guardian 24 January 2015). The importance of the visit was

highlighted by it following shortly after the contentious decision by the Obama

administration to not send any representatives to the memorial honouring those killed in the

Charlie Hebdo terrorist attacks (Buncombe 2015; The Telegraph 12 January 2015; The

Guardian 24 January 2015). Obama’s statement after Abdullah’s death also specifically

mentioned that Obama “valued King Abdullah’s perspective and appreciated our genuine and

warm friendship,” (Obama 2015c). While public statements should be taken with a degree of

scepticism, the sentiment indicated a recognition by the Obama administration of the

importance to American policy of amicable relationships with Saudi Arabia.

Compared to Bush, the Saudi relationships with Clinton and Obama appear

professional rather than personal. Despite this discrepancy, the role of personal friendships in

the Bush policy towards Saudi Arabia are often overemphasised. The influence of Bandar, a

close friend of Bush Sr., failed to stop Bush from taking actions counter to Saudi interests,

32

but that friendship also helped alleviate tension in some cases. While there is a discrepancy

between the personal ties of Bush and that of Clinton and Obama, it appears that the Saudi

friendships of Bush associates did not negatively impact American policy towards Saudi

Arabia.

Counterterrorism

The revelation that fifteen of the nineteen hijackers of the September 11th

attacks were

Saudi nationals raised profound questions within the United States about the utility of a

continued partnership with Saudi Arabia. (The International Institute for Strategic Studies

2001: p. 1; Pollack 2002: p. 89; Bronson 2006: p. 5; Baxter and Simpson 2015: p. 146).

Allegations were made that Bush failed to pursue a tough counterterrorism policy towards

Saudi Arabia because of his financial and personal ties (Unger 2004: pp. 200-201, 284-285).

This criticism fails to withstand scrutiny when the conduct of the Bush administration is

compared to Clinton and Obama. Despite the inconsistency of the values between the two

nations, collaboration on counterterrorism continued under all three presidencies because it

provided security benefits. The realist tradition, not liberalism or the relationships of the Bush

administration, best explains the counterterrorism policies of Bush, and those of Clinton and

Obama.

Throughout the tenures of Clinton, Bush, and Obama, the Saudi counterterrorism

partnership provided flawed results. The difficulties of the partnership did not occur because

Bush was lenient, but rather, were the result of the motivations behind Saudi cooperation.

There was an underlying logic behind US-Saudi counterterrorism cooperation that was

consistent with realism. Because many Islamic fundamentalism ideologies designate both

Saudi Arabia and the United States as enemies, it represents a danger to the security of both

nations (9/11 Commission Report 2004: p. 372; Blanchard and Prados 2007: p. 2; Lacey

2009: p. 228; al-Saud 2010: p. 74; Teitelbaum 2010: pp. 22-23; Gause 2011: p. 28; Fisher

33

2013b; Gause 2014; Blanchard 2015: p. 8). Despite this shared threat, the United States and

Saudi Arabia did not necessarily align on the approach to counterterrorism (Bronson 2006: p.

6; Fisher 2013a; Blanchard 2015: p. 20). Saudi counterterrorism cooperation occurred when

the end results served the security of the kingdom as well as America, and became more

tentative when the expected outcome negatively impacted the kingdom. Despite the erratic

nature of Saudi cooperation, it served American efforts against terrorism.

During all the three administrations, the level of cooperation from the Saudi

government fluctuated. In the Clinton era, the Saudi government was not forthcoming about

information surrounding the Khobar Towers bombing within the kingdom that killed nineteen

Americans (Pollack 2002: p. 85; Unger 2004: p. 176; Bronson 2006: p. 216; Blanchard and

Prados 2007: p. 22; Ottaway 2008: p. 134; Lacey 2009: p. 215) On the other hand, the Saudi

government was an active partner in the American attempt to extradite Osama bin Laden

from Afghanistan prior to the September 11th

attacks (9/11 Commission Report 2004: p. 115).

After September 11th

, the Saudi government played a more significant role in intelligence

sharing during both the Bush and Obama administrations (Prados 2005: p. 2; Gendron 2010:

p. 499; Obama 2013). The Bush administration also praised Saudi law enforcement agencies

for pursuing and detaining terrorists (Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism 2005;

The White House 2006b: p. 11). During the Obama administration, Saudi Arabia served as a

drone base to undertake strikes against al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (Stone 2012; Fisher

2013b). Despite these benefits to American security, Saudi Arabia continues to promote a

radical strain of Islam that threatens the West (Gause and Chanin 2003: p. 123; Bronson

2006: p. 148; Gendron 2010: pp. 495, 499; Shapiro and Sokolsky 2015). An aspect of

counterterrorism cooperation that encompasses many of these contradictions of the

inconsistent, but beneficial, partnership is terrorism financing.

34

The role of Saudi nationals in funding terrorist activities came under intense scrutiny

after the September 11th

attacks. Al-Qaeda was largely funded by private donations, many of

which originated from Saudi Arabia (9/11 Commission Report 2004: p. 170; Unger 2004: p.

177; Bronson 2006: pp. 236-237; Blanchard and Prados 2007: p. 1; Basile 2010: p. 17;

Financial Action Task Force 2010: p. 19; Gendron 2010: p. 491). While there was no

evidence that the Saudi government purposefully funded al-Qaeda, the broader issue of the

failure of the kingdom to stem the flow of donations to extremist organisations remained

(9/11 Commission Report 2004: p. 171; Unger 2004: p. 272; Bronson 2006: p. 237). Rather

than contributions being directed to terrorist networks themselves, funds were instead given

to charities or nongovernmental organisations (9/11 Commission Report 2004: pp. 55, 170;

Basile 2010: p. 173). Money was then diverted to fund terrorist activity (9/11 Commission

Report 2004: p. 170; Blanchard and Prados 2007: p. 1). Several factors make Saudi Arabia an

ideal country to solicit contributions to terrorist organisations. Not only is the Saudi financial

system difficult to monitor, but charitable donations are considered to be elemental to the

Islamic faith (9/11 Commission Report 2004: p. 372; Blanchard and Prados 2007: p. 1; Basile

2010: p. 175).

The claim that the Clinton administration pressured Saudi Arabia more forcefully in

the role of terrorism financing appears to be unsubstantiated (Bronson and Unger 2004).

Throughout the Clinton administration, there were attempts to broadly combat terrorism

financing (The White House 2000). These initiatives, however, were slow to be implemented

officially, and did not focus extensively on Saudi Arabia. Clinton’s counterterrorism

coordinator, Richard Clarke, established a plan to combat al-Qaeda in 1998 that included

targeting its financial sources. While Clarke continued to be guided by this plan, it was never

formally adopted (9/11 Commission Report 2004: p. 120). It was only in 1999 that the

National Security Council (NSC) designated the need to curb terrorism financing as a major

35

initiative (9/11 Commission Report 2004: p. 185). The NSC focused largely on bin Laden’s

personal wealth, and not the flow of donations from the kingdom. It was only discovered in

2000, the last year of Clinton’s tenure, that al-Qaeda was not personally funded by bin Laden

(9/11 Commission Report 2004: pp. 170, 186). Upon that discovery, the Central Intelligence

Agency suspected that al-Qaeda was dependent upon private donations and charities, but

failed to identify concrete sources (9/11 Commission Report 2004: p. 186; Bronson 2006: pp.

225-226).

Upon taking office, the Bush administration had other defence policy priorities than

al-Qaeda (Bronson and Unger 2004; 9/11 Commission Report 2004: p. 199). As a result, the

administration was slow to recognise the threat of terrorism (Bronson and Unger 2004; 9/11

Commission Report 2004: p. 205). Despite that lack of focus, by June 7th

of Bush’s first term,

there was a presidential directive draft aimed at combating al-Qaeda that included an

instruction for the Treasury Department to curb terrorism financing (9/11 Commission Report

2004: pp. 204-205). After the September 11th

attacks, there was naturally an increased

urgency to counter al-Qaeda. The June 7th

draft was transformed into National Security

Presidential Directive 9, signed on October 25, 2011. This directive mandated a disruption of

funds to al-Qaeda and other organisations (9/11 Commission Report 2004: pp. 333-334).

Throughout the Bush administration, the emphasis on terrorism financing continued (The

White House 2002: pp. 5-6; The White House 2003: p. 11; The White House 2006a; The

White House 2006b: p. 8). Based on documents regarding counterterrorism policy, the Bush

administration was concerned with terrorism financing both immediately and consistently

after the September 11th

attacks. Terrorism financing posed a significant threat to the security

of the United States, and Bush’s actions to mitigate its effects were consistent with the realist

school of thought.

36

Despite Bush’s efforts, Saudi Arabia was slow to cooperate with American efforts to

combat terrorism financing in the kingdom (Bronson and Unger 2004; 9/11 Commission

Report 2004: p. 373; Blanchard and Prados 2007: p. 23; Gendron 2010: p. 491). The slow

pace of reform did not reflect a capitulation by Bush to Saudi Arabia. Rather, it demonstrated

the role of Saudi preferences in the counterterrorism partnership with the United States, and

the limited options at the disposal of the American government to alter the kingdom’s

behaviour. Because charitable donations are one of the five pillars of Islam, governmental

oversight can be interpreted as an obstruction to practicing Islam (9/11 Commission Report

2004: p. 372). Since the legitimacy of the Saudi regime is based on its religious credentials,

there are domestic pressures against auditing charitable donations (9/11 Commission Report

2004: p. 372; Blanchard and Prados 2007: p. 28; Campbell and Yetiv 2007: pp. 140, 146).

Cooperating on terrorism financing with the United States had the potential to undermine

Saudi internal security, and therefore, its initial reluctance aligned with realist implications.

The turning point in terrorism financing, and Saudi cooperation terrorism in general,

was similarly driven by realist concerns. In May 2003, al-Qaeda perpetrated an attack on

Saudi soil, underscoring the danger the organisation posed to the kingdom (Black 2004;

Bronson 2006: p. 243; Blanchard and Prados 2007: p. 22; Stone 2012). Because the threat to

the kingdom was now apparent, the government became cooperative in stemming the funds

to al-Qaeda (9/11 Commission Report 2004: p. 373; Bronson 2006: p. 243). In 2004,

congressional testimony to the House of Representatives Subcommittee on the Middle East

and Central Asia highlighted several achievements the kingdom made—including the

establishment of a Joint Task Force on terrorist financing with the Federal Bureau of

Investigation, and additional oversight of charitable donations (Black 2004). The new

motivation, combined with improved training provided by the United States, brought marked

improvement in terms of terrorist financing cooperation (Black 2004; Bronson 2006: pp. 244-

37

245; Blanchard and Prados 2007: p. 22). The improved cooperation enhanced American

abilities to stem terrorist financing, providing security benefits to the United States. The

cooperation in countering terrorist financing continued, despite difficulties, because both

nations were motivated by realist concerns about security.

The Bush administration made significant progress in stemming terrorism financing,

but problems remained (9/11 Commission Report 2004: p. 383; The White House 2006a;

Blanchard and Prados 2007: p. 25; al-Saud 2010: p. 76; Gause 2011: p. 29). New regulations

were implemented, but the actual prosecution of suspected terrorist financers in the kingdom

was lacklustre (Roth et al. 2005: p. 116; Blanchard and Prados 2007: p. 26; Gendron 2010: p.

493). Additionally, concerns about Saudi cash carriers in terrorist financing continued

(Bronson 2005: p. 129; Bronson 2006: p. 245; The White House 2006a; Blanchard and

Prados 2007: p. 27; Basile 2010: pp. 169-170; Financial Action Task Force 2010: p. 8).

In the Obama administration, both the focus on terrorism financing (The White House

2010: p. 20), and the halting cooperation with Saudi Arabia continued. In 2010, the Financial

Action Task Force (FATF) report recognised that the kingdom prosecuted and convicted

terrorism financers with some success (2010: p. 40). Despite these efforts by the kingdom,

major concerns about donations remain (Blanchard 2015: p. 10). The same 2010 FATF report

cited issues with the Saudi framework for freezing terrorism funds as well as dealing with

cash transfers (pp. 7-8). There was also substantial evidence that Saudi Arabia financially

supported Sunni extremist groups within the Syrian civil war (Atlas 2012: p. 374; Cockburn

2014: pp. 34-37; Baxter and Simpson 2015: p. 147). The partnership continues despite

difficulties because the limited assistance diminished the financial support of terrorist

organizations. Similar to the Bush administration, the terrorism financing policy towards

Saudi Arabia remained based on realist motivations under Obama.

38

Initially after the September 11th

attacks, Saudi Arabia was slow to reform the

financial system that allowed al-Qaeda to gather funds. Bush was characterised as neglecting

American security by not pressuring the kingdom to staunch terrorism financing more

quickly (Unger 2004: pp. 261-263). Upon examination of all three administrations, none of

them were fully successful in cutting off all sources of funding within the kingdom. There

was an increased focus on terrorism financing under Bush and Obama, but that reflected the

security needs after September 11th

. The difficulties faced by all three reflected the reality of

limited options to coerce the Saudi government to cooperate when the kingdom deemed the

action counterproductive to its own security. The results from Saudi cooperation, when it did

occur, aided American anti-terrorism efforts. The joint counterterrorism efforts under all

three administrations continued because of those mutual security benefits, indicating that the

policies under all three presidents conform to realist principles.

The policies towards terrorism financing and the amount of pressure towards Saudi

Arabia is relatively consistent among the three administrations. The strongest resistance

towards the Saudi change of policy concerns the kingdom’s own security. The consistency

across the three administrations indicates that Bush was not deferential to the kingdom in

terms of terrorism financing. Rather, it demonstrates that the kingdom is an imperfect but

useful partner that is strongly motivated by its own security in counterterrorism. As a result,

the counterterrorism partnership between the United States and Saudi Arabia is consistent

with the realist paradigm.

9/11 Commission Report Classification

In addition to criticism surrounding the Bush administration’s terrorism financing

efforts, controversy arose from Bush’s decision to classify a section of the 9/11 Commission

Report. Twenty-eight pages of the report supposedly detail financial relationships between

Saudi royalty and al-Qaeda (Jacoby 2004). Bush censored those pages by citing national

39

security concerns, which has been characterised as evidence of his deference to the Saudis

(Jacoby 2004; Unger 2004: pp. 280-281; Wright 2014). Under Obama, those pages remain

classified (Wright 2014) despite Obama’s commitment to balance national security concerns

with increased transparency (The White House 2010: pp. 38-39). That suggests that there

were other considerations for the classification besides Bush’s relationship with Saudis.

An alternative theory is that, while those pages did indicate a financial relationship

between Saudi Arabia and al-Qaeda hijackers, those claims are unsubstantiated (Wright

2014). Because those twenty-eight pages are not verifiable, it is argued that Bush and Obama

did not release them for fear it would strain the bilateral relationship which, while difficult,

benefits American security and its economy (Wright 2014). Based on the American system

for classifying information, records should remain secret if deemed damaging to foreign

relations (Office of the Press Secretary 2009). Ultimately, it may have been determined that

interfering with the US-Saudi relationship would be more detrimental to American interests

than classifying those pages. Because the decision was consistent across both administrations

and aligns with realism, it is unlikely that Bush had an ulterior motive.

Arms Sales

Arms sales to the kingdom have been characterised as another instance of financial

relationships intruding upon foreign policy. During the Bush administration, there were

suggestions that Saudi arms deals resulted from associates of the Bush administration

benefiting financially from Saudi defence contracts (Unger 2004: pp. 200-201). A similar

conflict of interest arose during the Obama administration. When H. Clinton was Secretary of

State, she approved millions of dollars of arms deals to the Saudis. Because of large Saudi

donations to her foundation before she assumed the Secretary of State position, there were

allegations that she was swayed in her decision by that financial connection (Sirota and Perez

2015). While Saudi arms sales are inconsistent with the liberal paradigm, they conform to the

40

realistic approach. Consistently throughout the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations,

arms sales continued to Saudi Arabia because of military and economic benefits.

Saudi Arabia appears to be an unsuitable recipient of American arms under the liberal

interpretation of international relations because of the repressive nature of the Saudi regime

and its Wahhabi ideology (Unger 2004: p. 201; Sirota and Perez 2015). When the United

States government approves an arms deal, one factor it considers is the record on human

rights of the recipient country (Office of the Press Secretary 1995; Office of the Press

Secretary 2014a; Sirota and Perez 2015). The Saudi record on human rights has been

consistently poor (Atlas 2012: p. 357; Fisher 2013a). In 2014, Saudi Arabia received the

lowest possible rating from The Freedom House in terms of political and civil rights, one of

only nine nations to receive that score (The Freedom House 2014; Taylor 2015).

Though Saudi arms deals are inconsistent with American values, arms sales serve

American economic and military interests aligned with realism. Arms sales to Saudi Arabia

have been an aspect of the US-Saudi partnership since its inception (Bronson 2006: p. 34).

During the oil embargo of 1973, the Nixon administration attempted to increase Saudi

investment in the American economy. The aim of that effort was to regain part of the

substantial amount of money spent on Saudi oil and to link Saudi prosperity to the American

economy to deter another embargo (Bronson 2006: pp. 125-127; Gutfeld and Zumbrunnen

2013: pp. 634, 636-637). As part of the initiative, the United States encouraged Saudi

investment in the defence industry (Bronson 2006: p. 127; Gutfeld and Zumbrunnen 2013: p.

635).

The economic importance of arms exports became even more crucial after the Cold

War. Without the threat of the Soviet Union, defence contractors faced declining domestic

demand. Exports to outside countries, such as Saudi Arabia, served as an opportunity to

bolster the market of American defence contractors (Lancaster 1994; Stork 1995: p. 17;

41

Pollack 2002: p. 84; Bronson 2006: p. 208). During the 1992 presidential campaign, both

Bush Sr. and Clinton supported a $5 billion sale of F-15’s to Saudi Arabia because it would

sustain jobs and stimulate the economy (Stork 1995: p. 16). Saudi arms purchases declined

midway through Clinton’s tenure, but that resulted from the Saudi struggling economy rather

than any reluctance by Clinton to provide weapons (Grimmett 2001: p. 4; Pollack 2002: p.

83). Despite that decline, Saudi Arabia was the largest arms market during the Clinton

administration (Grimmett 2001: p. 47; Federation of American Scientists 2002). Under Bush

and Obama, Saudi Arabia remained the top purchaser of American arms (Grimmett 2009: p.

43; Grimmett and Kerr 2012: p. 45).

Beyond the economic dimension, arms deals with Saudi Arabia provided security

benefits (Mason 2014: p. 34). Selling arms to Saudi Arabia increased the interoperability of

equipment if the American military needed to base an attack from the kingdom (Stork 1995:

p. 17). The document outlining arms sales throughout all three administrations consistently

noted interoperability as a primary principle (Office of the Press Secretary 1995; Ruggiero

2008; Office of the Press Secretary 2014a). During the Clinton and Bush administrations,

Saudi bases were crucial in actual military operations. Though Clinton struggled to gain

Saudi approval for each military mission in the Middle East during his tenure (Bronson 2006:

p. 231), Saudi air bases were instrumental to the enforcement of the no-fly zone over Iraq.

Under Bush, the compatible infrastructure of Saudi Arabia was once again vital to American

military operations during the Iraq War of 2003 (Bronson and Unger 2004).

Figure 1 below depicts military purchases, including arms and defence services, by

Saudi Arabia under the three presidencies. Throughout the three administrations, military

sales remained relatively consistent. The one anomaly occurs not during the Bush

administration, but rather under the Obama administration in 2012. Had Bush administration

42

been motivated financial relationships, there would have likely been a corresponding increase

in military transfers during his tenure that the data does not reflect.

The outlier during 2012 in Figure 1 represents a portion of the US-Saudi arms

agreement worth $60 billion—the largest arms deal in American history (Black 2010).

Despite the donations to H. Clinton’s foundation, other factors outside this financial

relationship explain the arms deal. The economic and security benefits of the sale are the

likely motivation (Ukman 2011). Not only did the arms agreement sustain 75,000 American

jobs, but the delivery of weapons to Saudi Arabia bolstered its ability to militarily counter

Iran (Black 2010; Tepperman 2010; Ukman 2011).

Source: Defence Security Cooperation Agency (2013: pp. 340-341)

Within the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations, there have been significant

economic and military advantages to Saudi arms deals. As a result, their policies towards

arms transfers with Saudi Arabia have been fairly consistent with both each other and

realism. The continuity in policy between the administrations, as well as the benefits to

American interests, contradicts the claim that Bush was motivated by financial relationships.

0

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Figure 1: Annual US Military Sales to Saudi Arabia during the Clinton,

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Clinton

Bush

Obama

43

Oil

Similar to arms sales, significant relationships between members of the Bush

administration and the oil industry were perceived as influencing the policy formation

towards Saudi Arabia (Bronson and Unger 2004; Unger 2004: p. 223). In particular,

Cheney’s former employer, Halliburton, conducted business with Saudi Arabia (Unger 2004:

pp. 225-226). Throughout the history of the US-Saudi partnership, however, oil was a main

component (Pollack 2002: p. 78; Gause and Chanin 2003: p. 116; Long 2004: p. 26; Unger

2004: pp. 58-59; Gause 2011: p. 2; Haass 2011: p. viii; Byman 2013: p. 293; Gutfeld and

Zumbrunnen 2013: p. 636; Fisher 2013a; Baxter and Simpson 2015: p. 139). Oil was

inextricably linked to American economic prosperity, and securing a stable oil supply at a

reasonable price was a pressing national concern. Because of the importance of oil to

American prosperity, the US-Saudi alliance in this area conforms to realist principles.

All three presidents deemed energy security as a key national interest (The White

House 1998: p. 27; The White House 1999: p. 44; The White House 2000; The White House

2002: p. 19; The White House 2006: pp. 26-28; The White House 2010: p. 10; Furman and

Sperling 2013; The White House 2015: p. 2). Because oil accounted for between thirty-five

and forty percent of all American energy needs during each administrations (United States

Energy Information Administration 2015a), it was a necessary component of energy security.

The United States relied on imports to account for between forty and fifty percent of its oil

consumption, exposing the American economy to price hikes and supply disruptions of the

commodity (The White House 1994: p. 17; The White House 2000; Pollack 2002: p. 78;

Brands 2004: p. 123; The White House 2006: p. 28; Bush 2008b: p. 83; United States Energy

Information Administration 2013).

Saudi Arabia plays an instrumental role in meeting American oil needs. It consistently

remains the second largest petroleum supplier to the United States (Bronson 2006: p. 249;

44

United States Energy Information Administration 2013; Mason 2014: pp. 33-34). In Figure 2

below, the petroleum imports from Saudi Arabia under the three administrations are shown.

Imports remained fairly consistent throughout the Clinton and Bush eras. The spikes in 2001

and 2003 under Bush do not represent the influence of personal and financial relationships,

but rather illustrate the Saudi role in stabilising world oil prices. Due to its large oil reserves

and spare production capacity, Saudi Arabia can produce more oil to keep energy prices from

rising (Pollack 2002: p. 81; Gause and Chanin 2003: p. 122; Bronson 2006: p. 3; Gause 2011:

p. 26; Atlas 2012: p. 357; Bahgat 2013: p. 566; Byman 2013: p. 294; Blanchard 2014: p. 9;

Baxter and Simpson 2015: p. 141). Both after the September 11th

attacks, as well as the lead

up to the Iraq War of 2003, Saudi Arabia produced more oil to moderate prices in the United

States. Because the Saudi partnership served the American economy in both in the supply and

the price of oil under the three presidencies, the alliance is consistent with realism.

Despite the relative similarity of Saudi oil imports during the Clinton and Bush

administrations, there was a significant drop in 2009, the year Obama was inaugurated. The

discrepancy in imports between the first year of the Obama presidency and the prior years of

the Bush administration is explained by factors beyond the Saudi ties with the Bush

administration. Due to the global financial crisis that occurred during this time, the demand

for crude oil decreased, leading to lower imports in 2009 (Sheppard and Raval 2015). Since

2009, American petroleum imports from Saudi Arabia began to rise once again. The

subsequent decline beginning in 2013 represents the growing domestic oil production in the

United States from the development of the shale oil industry (Bahgat 2013: p. 578; Furman

and Sperling 2013; Blanchard 2014: p. 9; Obama 2014; Mason 2014: pp. 33-34). As of 2014,

the United States became the world’s leading oil producer, and moved closer to eliminating

the burden of dependence on foreign oil (The White House 2015: pp. 5, 16).

45

Source: United States Energy Information Administration (2015b)

Saudi Arabia similarly benefited from stable oil prices. While high oil prices increase

pressure for conservation and alternative sources of energy, moderate prices are necessary to

preserve a long-term market for oil (Gause 2011: p. 26; Blanchard 2014: p. 9). Since oil

revenue is the main source of income for the kingdom (Bahgat 2013: p. 566; Blanchard 2014:

p. 9), Saudi Arabia aims to protect the future market (Pollack 2002: p. 82; Long 2004: p. 30;

Gause 2011: p. 26). Oil revenue supports domestic programs integral to Saudi internal

stability; maintaining the flow of money from oil sales is critical to Saudi security as well. In

terms of moderating prices, American and Saudi interests align, and cooperation results.

Because of the simultaneous benefits to both countries in the realm of economics and

security, the oil partnership is consistent with realism.

Because of this dependence on oil, Clinton, Bush, and Obama all emphasised the need

to both conserve energy resources and seek alternative sources of energy (The White House

1994: p. 17; The White House 2000; Bush 2006: p. 151; Bush 2008a: p. 1014; The White

House 2002: p. 20; The White House 2010: p. 10). But, Clinton stressed the growing role

Persian Gulf oil would play in the future of American energy security, and the necessity to

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Figure 2: Annual US Petroleum Imports from Saudi Arabia during the

Clinton, Bush, and Obama Administrations

Clinton

Bush

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46

protect American interests in that region (The White House 1997; The White House 1999: p.

44; The White House 2000). While Bush and Obama noted the immediate need to secure

moderately prices oil from the Persian Gulf (Bush 2008b: p. 83; The White House 2010: p.

24; Obama 2011c; The White House 2015: pp. 5, 26), both administrations departed from

Clinton’s long-term policy by aiming to decrease American dependence on Middle Eastern

oil in the future (Bush 2006: p. 151-152; The White House 2006b: pp. 27, 29; The White

House 2010: p. 2). Both administrations emphasised American advancements in alternative

energies, as well as increasing domestic oil production to accomplish energy independence

(Bush 2006: p. 152; Bush 2008a: pp. 1014-1015; BBC News 18 June 2008; The White House

2010: p. 30; Obama 2011c; Sperling and Furman 2013; White House 2015: p. 5). The push

for American energy independence under Bush and Obama runs counter to Saudi economic

interests. Without the American market, Saudi oil revenue would decline. The support by the

Bush administration for alternatives to Middle Eastern oil undermines the claim that Bush

was deferential to Saudi interests.

Despite the recent advancements of domestic oil production, the United States

remains reliant on foreign, and in particular Saudi, oil to meets its energy needs (The White

House 2015: p. 5). Saudi oil plays a role in setting the market price of oil, and affected the

cost of all American oil imports, not just imports from the kingdom (The White House 1999:

p. 44; The White House 2000; Gause and Chanin 2003: p. 121; Gordon 2003: p. 163; Bush

2008b: p. 83; Gause 2011: p. 2; Bahgat 2013: p. 578; Fisher 2013b; Baxter and Simpson

2015: p. 141). There was no viable alternative to Saudi oil under the three administration, and

as a result, the short-term policies of the Clinton, Bush, and Obama towards protecting

American oil interest are consistent. Petroleum exports from Saudi Arabia are slightly lower

under Obama than under Clinton and Bush, but that trend is attributed to factors outside of

the Saudi associations with the Bush administration. While both alternative energy sources

47

and domestic production are attractive, the reality of replacing Middle Eastern oil remains a

long-term prospect (BBC News 18 June 2008; al-Saud 2010: p. 78).

Both Bush and Obama departed from Clinton’s long-term policies by aiming to

decrease American reliance on Middle Eastern oil. In both administrations, the Middle

Eastern region was fraught was conflict, and as a result, threatened American access to oil. It

served American interests to seek alternatives, and, ultimately, energy independence. The

similarities in the long-term approach to energy security between the Bush and Obama

administration is counterintuitive to the claim that Bush was unduly influenced by Saudi

Arabia in energy policy formation. Decreasing the dependence of America on foreign oil hurt

the Saudi economy, but served American interests consistent with the realist interpretations

of international relations.

Reforms

The Saudi theocracy has been associated with the rise of Islamist terrorism (Unger

2004: pp. 200-201; Campbell and Yetiv 2007: p. 140), and the repressive nature is

antithetical to American ideals of democracy. The perceived lack of concern about the Saudi

system of government under Bush has been linked to the various relationships between Bush

and Saudi Arabia (Unger 2004: pp. 200-201). But, neither the Clinton nor Obama

administrations exerted additional pressure on Saudi Arabia to enact reforms. Rather than

reflecting deference to Saudi Arabia on the part of the Bush administration, the pragmatic

acceptance of the Saudi regime by all three administration was a recognition that the

alternatives may pose an increased danger to American security and prosperity. With respect

to American pressure on the kingdom to reform, American security implications of realism

appear to have been deemed more important than the inconsistencies of the alliance with

liberalism.

48

Pressure for reforms in Saudi Arabia is both difficult and must account for the impact

upon American security (Bronson 2006: p. 240; The Economist 3 February 2011; Obama

2015a). A 2014 poll indicated that eighty-four percent of Saudi Arabia had either a “fairly

negative” or “very negative” opinion of the United States (Pollock 2014). Due to the low

public opinion of the United States, rapid democratisation in Saudi Arabia would likely

install a regime hostile to American economic and security concerns (Campbell and Yetiv

2007: p. 153; Gause 2009; Atlas 2012: pp. 354, 378-379).

Reforms must also account for the Saudi role in regional security (Bronson 2006: p.

252; Campbell and Yetiv 2007: p. 143). The Clinton administration highlighted the

importance of the ability of American forces to rapidly deploy to the Persian Gulf to counter

the threat of Iran and Iraq. Part of the strategy centred on long-term American military

deployments to the Persian Gulf, aided by access to Saudi bases (The White House 1994: p.

25; The White House 1995: p. 30; The White House 1996: pp. 14-15; The White House

1998: p. 52; Campbell and Yetiv 2007: p. 149; Baxter and Simpson 2015: p. 146). Under

Bush, Saudi bases were used in the Iraq campaign, despite Saudi misgivings regarding the

conflict (Bronson 2006: pp. 252-253; Campbell and Yetiv 2007: pp. 145, 151-152). During

the Obama administration, Saudi Arabia serves as a point of stability in a tumultuous Middle

East as well as a partner in combating the Islamic State (Office of the Press Secretary 2014b;

Saul 2014; United States Department of Defence 2014; Baxter and Simpson 2015: p. 148).

Increased condemnation about the Saudi human rights record could endanger these security

concerns (Wittes 2008: p. 21).

Not only does substantial pressure for democratisation threaten American security,

but there are limited avenues to enact reform within a sovereign nation short of military force.

The use of military force to enact regime change is both controversial, and incompatible with

the respect for sovereignty enshrined in liberal theory. The Bush administration faced

49

significant criticism abroad for its efforts to impose democracy on the Middle East forcefully

(Kessler 2006). Apparently cognizant of this critique, the Bush administration tempered calls

for democracy in its second term with qualifications that “America will not impose our own

style of government on the unwilling,” (Bush 2005: p. 67; Rice 2005). Obama never

supported the Iraq war, and did not have the same association with the intervention as the

Bush administration. Nevertheless, he similarly distanced American foreign policy from

forced democratisation (The White House 2010: p. 5; Obama 2011a: pp. 120-121; Obama

2011b: p. 554). Criticisms towards Bush for the lack of reform in Saudi Arabia ignores the

reality that it difficult achieve in practice as well as in a manner consistent with liberalism.

Despite these limitations, the three administrations emphasised that American ideals

and interests could be combined—the spread of democracy was often linked to increased

security (Clinton 1994a: p. 132; The White House 1994: p. i; The White House 1995: p. iii;

The White House 2000; The White House 2002: p. 1; Bush 2003b: p. 412; The White House

2006b: p. 3; The White House 2010: p. 5; Obama 2011b: p. 554; The White House 2015: p.

19). While the three administrations generally encouraged democratic reform that was

consistent with liberalism, specific calls for reform were applied selectively to nations. The

discrepancy regarding pressure for reforms aligns with realism. Cognizant of the difficulties

of democratisation in partners such as Saudi Arabia, nations deemed threatening to American

security and prosperity were more harshly criticised than allies.

Prior to the September 11th

attacks, democracy promotion was not a central feature of

American foreign policy in the Middle East (Wittes 2008: p. 25). While Clinton encouraged

democracy promotion in other regions, such as Eastern Europe, Middle Eastern liberalisation

was not a priority (The White House 1994: pp. 19, 25; The White House 1995: p. 23; The

White House 1997; The White House 2000; Wittes 2008: p. 25). Despite the lack of focus on

reform in the Middle East, the human right abuses of Iran and Iraq were repeatedly

50

emphasised in the Clinton era (Clinton 1994b: pp. 3-4; The White House 1994: p. 25; Clinton

1995: p. 178; The White House 1995: p. 30; The White House 1996: p. 43; The White House

2000). Both Iran and Iraq were constantly featured within Clinton’s national security

strategies as a threat to American security and their own populations. In contrast to Iraq and

Iran, Saudi Arabia was not subject to the same denouncements despite its poor human right

record and religious intolerance. Clinton differentiated democracy promotion based on

benefits to American economic and security interests consistent with realism (Lagon 2011).

While Iran and Iraq were deemed threats, Saudi Arabia was a useful partner.

After September 11th

, there was an increased scrutiny of the impact of American

support for autocratic governments on the rise of Islamic terrorism (Wittes 2008: p. 26). The

Bush administration demonstrated a consistent rhetoric to reform in the Middle East. Under

Bush, the Iraqi and Iranian human rights records were again repeatedly denounced (The

White House 2002: p. 14; Bush 2003a: p. 275; The White House 2006b: p. 20) Part of the

rationale of the Iraq War in 2003 was the establishment of a stable Iraqi democracy that

would encourage further democratic reforms in the larger Middle East (Bush 2004: p. 697;

Campbell and Yetiv 2007: p. 153). Despite the increased focus on Middle Eastern reform,

Saudi Arabia was not subject to the same condemnation as Iran and Iraq. Instead, the Bush

administration provided muted criticism and praise for modest reform (Rice 2005; The White

House 2006b: pp. 2, 38). While Saudi Arabia was treated differently than Iran and Iraq, the

selectivity of criticism under the Bush administration was coherent with that of Clinton. The

inconsistent treatment of Saudi Arabia under the Bush administration did not result from

financial or personal relationships, but rather realist principles. The Saudi government

benefited American security and prosperity while Iran and Iraq were deemed threats.

Similar to Bush, Obama emphasised reforms in the Middle East in a selective manner.

In 2009, Obama noted a need for cooperation based on “mutual interests” in the Middle East,

51

but he also highlighted his commitment to universal human rights (Obama 2009b: pp. 760,

765). Two years later in the midst of the Arab Spring, Obama asserted that the United States

had “a stake not just in the stability of nations, but in the self-determination of individuals,”

(Obama 2011b: p. 554). During the Arab Spring, however, the Obama administration had a

varied response. Bahrain, considered to be a Saudi client state, experienced violent uprisings

by its Shi’ite majority population (Fisher 2011; Blanchard 2014: p. 7). While Obama

encouraged other autocratic leaders experiencing uprisings to step down, he did not pressure

the Bahraini government to do so (Fisher 2011; Jones 2011; Obama 2011b: pp. 555-556;

Obama 2011d; Atlas 2012: p. 352; Morey et al. 2012: p. 1186). When Saudi Arabia sent

troops to Bahrain in an attempt to quell the uprising, Obama’s Press Secretary said the

measure was “counterproductive,” but stopped short of harshly criticising the incursion

(Carney 2011; Sanger and Schmitt 2011). In the midst of democratic movements within the

Middle East, Obama did not apply substantial pressure to Saudi Arabia or its client state

Bahrain to make the transition to a democracy. After the Arab Spring, Obama continues to

encourage the slow-moving reform in Saudi Arabia without denouncing the regime (Obama

2015a; Obama 2015b). This is consistent with the policy of the Bush administration towards

realist implications of security outweighing the liberal interpretation of affairs that would

advocate for substantial reforms within the kingdom.

Due to the increased emphasis on reform in the Middle East, as well as the obstacles

to achieving it, Bush and Obama noted that reforms may be a case of slow, measured change

(The White House 2006b: pp. 3, 6, 33; The White House 2010: p. 5). Praise for Saudi Arabia

that emanated from both administrations revolved around these changes—including King

Abdullah’s decision to hold elections for an advisory council. Because of the realities within

Middle East, modest changes were the best any administration could do to serve values

52

associated with the liberal tradition while still respecting American security implications of

the realist viewpoint.

The issue of reforms in Saudi Arabia brings liberalism and realism into direct conflict.

While the Saudi system of government is repressive and promotes a strain of fundamentalist

Islam, the monarchy itself does not directly threaten the United States in the same way as

other hostile regimes in the region. Not only does the relationship serve American prosperity

and security, but there are also limited options to enact reform in a sovereign country. The

consistent approach by the Clinton, Bush, and Obama administrations to moderate their

criticism towards the kingdom represents the dominance of realism in the Saudi partnership.

53

Conclusion

The financial and personal ties of the Bush administration did not unduly influence

the American partnership with Saudi Arabia. Consistent with Clinton and Obama, the Saudi

alliance under Bush represents a dominance of realist concerns over liberal principles. As a

theocratic, repressive monarchy, Saudi Arabia is antithetical to American values. Despite this

discrepancy, the difficult relationship provided benefits to American security and prosperity

that are consistent with the realist school of thought throughout the three presidencies.

Because of this continuity, it indicates that the alliance with Saudi Arabia under Bush was

guided by realist implications, and not by personal and financial ties.

To determine the motivations behind the US-Saudi alliance under Bush, a case study

methodology is used. During the study, the policies of Clinton, Bush, and Obama are

compared using both primary and secondary sources. Due to the lack of access to classified

documents, some information about the policies of the three presidencies may be lacking. At

the same time, the documents examined are analysed carefully because of the potential for

bias. Despite these difficulties, the study establishes an inclusive overview of the policies of

the three administrations. While the case study method provides in-depth knowledge

necessary for the narrow focus of the study, it sacrifices the ability to make generalizations

about the partnership of the United States and Saudi Arabia beyond the three administrations.

While the results of this study indicates that realism has persistently guided this partnership,

further study would be needed to validate this claim beyond the administrations of Clinton,

Bush, and Obama.

Based on the results of the case study, the Bush administration had the most potential

of the three for a conflict of interest. While the personal relationships may have been

overstated, associates of the Bush administration conducted substantial business in Saudi

Arabia. Due to the consistency between the Saudi policies of the Bush administration and

54

those of Clinton and Obama, it indicates that those financial links played a negligible role.

Ultimately, the focus on the personal and financial relationships between the Bush

administration and Saudi Arabia obscures the motivation behind the bilateral relationship.

While the Saudi partnership was not compatible with liberal ideals, it served many of the

fundamental security and economic concerns of United States, indicating it was guided by

realist principles.

Within the realist school of thought, the security and prosperity of a state are stressed

as crucial factors. The Saudi partnership serves these most basic interests. Saudi

counterterrorism cooperation was irregular under all three administration, but nevertheless

provided crucial intelligence and law enforcement coordination that helped protect America

against future terrorist attacks. Through arms deals, the United States increased the

interoperability between American and Saudi armed forces, resulting in a stronger American

military position in the Gulf region. Under all three administrations, a military presence in the

region was critical to American security strategies.

Arms deals provided a simultaneous economic benefit. Through arms exports to Saudi

Arabia, the United States sustained its domestic defence industry. Because of the economic

benefits in jobs and export revenue, substantial arms exports to Saudi Arabia were a hallmark

of the three presidencies. Oil, however, remained the most crucial economic benefit of the

partnership. During all three administrations, oil remained a key resource to the sustainment

of the American economy. All three administrations pushed for the development of

alternative energies, but Bush and Obama focused more substantially on reducing

dependence on Middle Eastern oil. Throughout the tenure of the three presidents, alternatives

were both limited and long-term prospects. Until there are viable energy alternatives to oil,

American foreign policy will be inextricably linked to its energy policy.

55

While the foreign policy implications of realism and liberalism may be combined in

some cases, a truly liberal policy towards Saudi Arabia would be disastrous for American

interests. The US-Saudi alliance would not exist under the liberal paradigm, but the United

States would significantly hinder its security and economy if it severed ties with the kingdom.

On the other hand, were the United States to push for immediate democratisation, the result

would likely be a government with an anti-American outlook. The current reality of Saudi

Arabia prevents the combination of realism and liberalism.

Future of US-Saudi Relations

The partnership between the United States and Saudi Arabia is far from perfect.

Currently, the alliance is subject to severe strains. Under the Obama administration, the

Iranian nuclear deal has caused Saudi Arabia significant anxiety about its security (Elanger

2013; Ignatius 2013; Gause 2014a; Riedel 2015; Weinberg 2015). The kingdom has

expressed its displeasure, but it is not an indication the partnership will disintegrate.

Throughout the history of the alliance, the partnership has been subject to conflict

(Fisher 2013b). Historically, the Arab-Israeli conflict is a point of contention. The Clinton

administration also faced difficulties with using Saudi facilities to bomb Iraq. Similarly,

under Bush, the Saudi government was hesitant to allow the United States to stage the

invasion of Iraq from its territory. The relationship weathered these disputes, and it is

unlikely that the current discord indicates its demise (Fisher 2013b).

Between the two countries, there remains many areas of cooperation regarding

economy and security. While the benefits to the United States are highlighted, the partnership

provides similar dividends to the kingdom. Terrorism threatens the kingdom, and it relies on

the United States for protection in the case of a regional aggressor. At the same time, the oil

market in the United States provides crucial revenue to the kingdom.

56

While the American and Saudi governments appear inclined to continue the

relationship, Saudi public opinion of the United States remains low. Coincidently, the

kingdom has been deemed to be unfit to rule by some extremist organisations. Both the

dissatisfaction with the royal family, as well as the repressive nature of the government, may

leave the kingdom vulnerable to an uprising (Gause 2013a; Obama 2015d). During the Arab

Spring, Saudi Arabia faced relatively little discord. At the moment, however, the Saudi

government provides social services that potentially limited the unrest (Baxter and Simpson

2015: p. 140). If the government is unable to provide those, the kingdom may be susceptible

to internal threats. While the Saudi royal family has survived periods of unrest, revolutions

have been historically difficult to predict (Savitz 2009). The US-Saudi Arabia partnership

may end not because of a conscious decision by either of the current regimes, but a revolution

that installs an anti-American government.

57

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