reasons, rules and virtues in moral education

Reasons, Rules and Virtues in Moral

Education

COLIN WRINGE

Practical and theoretical shortcomings of an approach tomoral education based on the development of moral reasoningare noted and the alternative of promoting the virtues isconsidered. The identification of appropriate virtues withmodes of commitment and conduct supportive of a particularway of life is held to raise the further question of why aparticular way of life should be favoured, and how our ownway of life should be characterised. This latter, permittingsocial and geographical mobility, anonymity and valuepluralism, is contrasted with that of smaller, more traditionalcommunities paradigmatic of communitarian ethics. An ethicof respect for equal freedom is held to be compatible with thecurrent nature of society and to be favoured by the virtue ofappropriate self-assertion. The educational implications ofsuch a conclusion are explored.

INTRODUCTION

Increasing concern with the rising incidence of largely petty crime,particularly among the young, and reports of less than reputableconduct by members of some other social categories have recentlyheightened interest in the subject of moral education. In this context theSchool Curriculum and Assessment Authority has set up what it terms aNational Forum for Values in Education and the Community to takeforward issues arising from its 1996 conference entitled Education forAdult Life (School Curriculum and Assessment Authority, 1996a).Subsequently, the Authority has published a consultation document(School Curriculum and Assessment Authority, 1996b) containing anumber of value statements relating to four areas (society, relationships,the self and the environment) along with a number of principles foraction upon which it was hoped our society could agree. Regrettablyneither of these documents which, given their provenance, might beexpected to exercise a degree of influence upon those seeking to promotemoral education in schools, appears to have benefited from any rigorous

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Journal of Philosophy of Education, Vol. 32, No. 2, 1998

&The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 1998. Published by Blackwell Publishers, 108Cowley Road, Oxford OX4 1JF and 350 Main Street, Malden, MA 01248, USA.

consideration either of the nature of our moral understanding or of theconditions under which successful moral education might take place.

DEVELOPING MORAL REASONING

At a certain period it was an all but established orthodoxy amongphilosophers of education that the aim of moral education was tofamiliarise children with the prescriptive and universalisable form ofvalid moral statements and apply these to issues of current concern. Theultimate goal was to achieve that quality of moral autonomy identifiedby Piaget (1932) and later Kohlberg (1976) as the highest stage of moraldevelopment. This approach is well illustrated in the work of suchwriters as Stenhouse (Schools Council Nuffield Humanities Project,1970), Wilson (1972) and Straughan (1982a, 1982b) and may continue toinfluence personal and social education in some places. This approach,however, has a number of shortcomings in practical terms and is nowseen to be on much shakier theoretical ground than it once was.Moral educators seeking to develop moral reasoning have certainly

been aware of the importance of the affective and cognitive aspects ofmoral development and attempts to promote these are present in someof their proposals. It is widely recognised, however, that the link betweenthe conclusions of classroom discussion and actual behaviour may betenuous. The very discussion of moral issues may also suggest that wellestablished and perfectly sound moral assumptions are, in fact, mattersof doubt or even of taste and personal opinion, particularly if thediscussion is inconclusive, confused or ineptly handled. Teachers leadingsuch discussions may also find themselves in the difficult double-bindsituation of either seeming to approve morally unacceptable conclusionsexpressing, for example, intolerant or irresponsible attitudes or losingcredibility with their pupils by attempting to impose their own adult orpersonal views. The work of Kohlberg also suggests that the level ofratiocination involved in much moral reasoning is and may even remainbeyond the level of many pupils abilities while the development ofmoral reasoning at an intellectual level may also seem irrelevant to thekinds of event that have currently given rise to concern. It is unlikelythat the young mugger or joyrider will have asked herself Can I will themaxim of this act to become a universal law? and simply hit upon thewrong answer.There are a number of more theoretical objections to the basis of an

approach which rests upon the grasp of moral rules, the validity ofwhich has recently come under attack from a variety of quarters.Common to these is an assertion of the supposed failure of the so-calledEnlightenment Project, part of which was to ground moral obligation onrationality rather than religion or custom.Writers identified as postmodernist give a range of reasons for

believing that we can have no sufficiently general or reliable knowledgeof the world upon which to base our judgement (Lyotard, 1988; Fish,1989; Baudrillard, 1982) or that the form of reasoning leading up to such

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&The Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain 1998.

judgements is necessarily corrupted by frameworks of power (Foucault,1973) or are essentially contingent upon the linguistic usages ofparticular places and times (Rorty, 1989). In a somewhat differenttradition Williams (1985) argues that there can be no Archimedeanpoint outside the institution of morality which can serve as moralitysfoundation. Taking the various post-Enlightenment traditions of moralargument in turn, he seeks to demonstrate that each, including thatbased on the Kantian principle of universalisability, is ultimatelyincoherent and incapable, by itself, of producing a convincing answerto Socratess question How should life be lived? The attack byMacIntyre (1982, 1988) and other communitarians (e.g. Sandel, 1982;Taylor, 1971) on post-Enlightenment styles of moral reasoning based onuniversalisable principles resides in the claim that this is a misguided wayof looking at morality from the outset. Rather than seeking to establishuniversal rules and principles of right conduct, they argue, we shouldinstead look to the established values of a particular society and thevirtues and excellences by which its way of life is sustained.It must be said that though some of these criticisms of post-

Enlightenment achievements in the field of ethics are valuable inrendering us less complacent about our previous certainties, nonedemonstrates conclusively that we should, or indeed could, entirelyabandon the practice of moral reasoning. Though the postmodernistsare doubtless right to draw our attention to the fact that the world ismore complex and confusing than we have previously been prepared toadmit, and although the messages we receive about it may be subject tocontingency, corruption and distortion, their claims do not invalidateour continuing best efforts to achieve conviction and consistency in ourconclusions with regard to either metaphysical or ethical matters.Williamss detailed criticisms of post-Enlightenment moral doctrines

are somewhat less easy to dismiss. Even if we accept, however, that noneof these is conclusive, Socratess question of how life should be lived stillremains to be answered, as Williams himself points out. Reservationsabout the conclusive nature of any one doctrine of moral obligationopen up the possibility that such an answer must be tentative, and maybe different for different individuals. This is supported by Williamssown suggestion that strictly moral considerations will continue to play apart in the individuals reflections on this question, but alongside thoseof prudence, personal circumstance and preference.MacIntyre and other communitarians add a valuable dimension to

our understanding of moral life and the possible contribution of theirview to our thinking about moral education will be the main topic of theremainder of this paper. Their attempt to explain the whole of moralityin terms of virtues grounded in the practices and way of life of particularcommunities, however, leaves important moral questions unansweredand some communitarian criticisms of other approaches to morality areunconvincing. It will also be suggested that the communitarian accountof morality is inapplicable to the modern world without modificationswhich its adherents would certainly find unacceptable. It will therefore

Reasons, Rules and Virtues in Moral Education 227


be argued that though a radically adapted version of virtue ethics mayhave a key part to play in a possible programme of moral education,reflection and reasoning on ethical matters may not be dispensed withaltogether.

THE VIRTUES AND MORAL EDUCATION

An approach to moral education based on the virtues is adopted by,among others, Carr (1991), Putnam (1995) and Lickona (1996). Perusalof the writings of those advocating such an approach, however, yields analmost endless list of qualities we should all like to experience in others,and all like to be thought to possess ourselves. Honesty, truth-telling,loyalty, patience, perseverance, integrity, tolerance, fairness, courage,temperance, chastity, considerateness . . . the list may be continuedindefinitely with little indication of rationale, structure or priority. Theonly possible response is bland assent. MacIntyre at least has the meritof identifying the virtues explicitly with modes of behaviour thatpromote the flourishing of particular communities and showing howthey, and more especially the manner in which they are judiciously putinto effect, vary according to time and place. That values and virtues aregrounded not in universal principles but particular circumstances iscentral to his point of view and that of others adopting a similar stance,but raises two important questions if we seek to make promotion of thevirtues a significant element in the approach to moral education.

1. Why should we give our moral approval to traits of character andmodes of behaviour just because they support a particular way oflife?

2. Supposing we could justify so doing, how are we to characteriseour own society and its way of life as a preliminary to identifyingthe most important virtues its citizens need to develop and theproper manner of their exercise?

Only after exploring these issues shall we be in a position to makenon-vacuous proposals regarding the place of the virtues in the practiceof moral education. Carr himself makes the important point that thoughcourage, truth telling, generosity or whatever are virtues, moralexcellence lies in exercising them appropriately in given circumstances.

WHY SHOULD WE GIVE OUR MORAL APPROVAL . . .?

If I enjoy or benefit from certain features or activities in my society I amlikely to favour the modes of conduct that make them possible and mayinvest those modes of behaviour with moral approval. If I am an ancientfarmer I shall probably approve of the valour of those who help medefend my land. In like manner a sports fan may come to approve offitness and sportsmanship, a husband of chastity and the housewifelyvirtues in women, an industrialist of the industry, pliability and respect

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shown by the workforce and so on. But to suppose that it is right to giveour moral approval to such traits of character or modes of conductsimply because they support our way of life or practices within it isabsurdly naturalistic. To say that the trait or conduct is justified by thevalues inherent in the way of life it serves to support is simply to shift themoral question one stage back. We then have to evaluate the way of lifeitself. Communities are not hermetically sealed units of incommensur-able value systems but may themselves be criticised on moral grounds,both from within and without. We have no difficulty in approving ofoutstanding individuals who have been critical of their own commu-nities, and, in some cases, have paid for it with their lives. We are equallyunhesitating in our criticisms of societies with their own internalconstellations of virtues and values which seem plainly evil or perverse.The aristocratic code of honour that led a seventeenth-century Frenchnobleman to run his tailor through with his sword for presenting his bill,or the set of values that more recently led to the extermination of wholetrainloads of victims deemed decadent are example enough. MacIntyre(1982) quotes Nietzsches rejection of post-Enlightenment rationalmorality with approval but stops short of drawing the ultimateconsequence. Without criteria of appraisal external to particularsocieties we cannot even say with Milne (1968) that such acts representa perversion rather than the highest flourishing of a particular way oflife.We are no longer able to accept the teleologies by which MacIntyres

ancient Greeks or mediaeval Christians justified their way of life orindividual aspirations. In the relatively small communities whichMacIntyre takes to be the natural home of the virtues, individualshaving different social functions were conscious of their mutualinterdependence. The common interest would have been both evidentand genuine. It would have seemed, perhaps even correctly, that suchdiversity of social functions as existed was essential to the communityswell-being, as well as natural and inevitable. Excellence in theperformance of ones ascribed social role contributed to the commongood and would be appreciated by others as the best thing one could do,serving both the agents own as well as the common interest. In contrastto their counterparts in the modern world, the servant who served wellthinking only of his masters interest and the soldier who fought bravelythinking only of his country would not be a mug or a dupe sacrificing hisown true interest for the sake of others, needing to be pressured intodoing so by talk of virtue, duty and obligation.It is also relevant to our understanding of particular virtues and their

justification that those concerned with ethical matters in the ancientworld distinguish less clearly than we do between morality andprudence. An important part of Aristotles argument for the virtues isthat if one exercises them skilfully one is better off in consequence, morefully human and more worthy of the respect of others. On this view, it iseasy to understand how Plato could think that no one would knowinglydo wrong, or that the moral education of the young was a matter of



knowledge, or how Aristotle could regard moral education as partly amatter of training to overcome that weakness of the will which causedone to act in a way contrary to ones true interests. Once this view isaccepted there is no longer a problem about justifying morality to theperson whose conduct one is trying to guide. The answer to the questionWhy be moral? is simply Wed be fools not to.

WHAT OF OUR WORLD?

We no longer live in self-sufficient, self-contained communities smallenough for most of those affecting our lives and affected by our actionsto be known, if not actually related to us, where attitudes and beliefsmay be shared and each may be affected by or at least genuinelyconcerned for the fortunes and misfortunes of others. A modern couplesetting up house may have had no common acquaintances before theymet. Work may take them to live many miles from relatives and previousacquaintances. After breakfast they may set off to work in oppositedirections and they will not see each other until evening. Individuals mayhave no contact with even their most immediate neighbours. If my next-door neighbours mother-in-law dies I have no reason to share hisemotion. If he is made redundant courtesy may prompt me toexpressions of sympathy. My own interests will probably be unaffectedand convention does not permit me to offer material assistance. I do notacknowledge most of those I pass in the street and most of those withwhom I interact, even on a regular basis, mean nothing to me or I tothem. Outside the immediate area of our contact we may know nothingof each other and to enquire is to invite the reply Mind your ownbusiness.In contrast to those living in past ages I am not subject to the scrutiny

and control of the community. If my comings and goings are noted atall, others are in no position to interpret their significance and have nointerest in doing so. If I do not like my job, my neighbours or my familythere is nothing to stop me going elsewhere. Thanks to my opportunitiesfor conversation with people holding a range of different views,widening my knowledge via the media and perhaps a critical educationfor which I have reason to be grateful, I am unimpressed by coercivemoral doctrines which imply duties of loyalty, obedience, deference orservice on account of my race, gender or ancestry. I differ fromMacIntyres virtuous community member in that those around me are inno position to ascribe to me particular duties because of whose son,kinsman, spouse, employee or vassal I am, or dictate the narrative ofwhich my actions form a part.These things are the result not of some inexplicable moral decline

among human beings but of material change, population growth, theadvance of technology which has resulted in changed work patterns,urbanisation and above all increased opportunities for all members ofindustrialised societies for mobility and communication. Only those who

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hanker after the privileged status they think they would have enjoyed ina past age can do anything but rejoice in these changes.

WHAT KIND OF MORALITY IS NOW POSSIBLE?

Weber (1947) describes the way in which, as an organisation becomeslarger and more complex, particular established practices and implicitunderstandings and obligations have to be replaced by a bureaucratic setof rules. Something analogous has happened in the field of post-Enlightenment moral reasoning. In a world in which we can no longerexercise social control over each other through a network of dutiesascribed by tradition or, supposedly, by divine command we have beenobliged to devise other ways of co-ordinating our activities and reducingconflict. Moral philosophers have not only attempted the difficult taskof finding an ultimate ground of morality; they have also striven to giveconsistency to our moral insights and practice. In this, they have notbeen entirely unsuccessful. Whatever their ultimate status, principles ofpromoting the greatest good of the greatest number, responding withsympathy to the ills and aspirations of others and not cynically usinganother purely as a means must be recognised as indispensable rules ofthumb in our current practical reasonings.Legitimacy, previously conferred by power, hierarchy, tradition or

religious belief, has more recently depended on the appearance ofconsistency and reason. Equal treatment, or at least equal considerationwhere no grounds of difference can be maintained, is one principleunderlying others. This principle is most overtly encapsulated in thenotion of contractarian liberalism in which right action and right socialarrangements are defined in terms of those dispositions which rationalbeings would be bound to accept if their deliberations were undistortedby arbitrary inequalities of power or private interest.Traditional criticisms of such a view have been sharply focused by

MacIntyre (1982), Sandel (1982) and other communitarians. Theirobjections, however, are not entirely convincing. MacIntyres irreconcil-able clashes of rights are more capable of accommodation than hesuggests and, in any case, it is not obvious that, with due moralcircumspection (Wringe, 1981), rights may not sometimes be overruledwithout actually denying their validity. To attempt to resolve suchconflicts by a return to traditional systems of virtue and obligationwould simply not be acceptable to even moderately sophisticatedinhabitants of the modern world. Nor, in fairness it should be said, doesMacIntyre actually claim it would. Sandels criticism, though complexand extended in its exposition, essentially hinges upon the claim that thenotion of pre-social rational beings unaware of their social locations andunencumbered by pre-existing value commitments makes no sense. This,however, simply seems to treat the metaphor of a social contract in anaively literal-minded way.Stripped of its metaphorical trappings, the notion of a world in which,

in private as well as in public matters, it was accepted that adults at least



ought only to be restricted to protect the like freedom of others and thisrestriction was consistently enforced has a number of advantages inpragmatic terms. One of these is its appearance of equity, in that each ofus has but one life to live and no good reason can be found forsubordinating the aspirations of some individuals to those of others. Inthe present discussion, however, I am less concerned with the moraljustification than with the pragmatic advantages of such a moral order.This would not exclude individuals from accepting additional

constraints as a result of chance local groupings, associations voluntarilyentered into or the loyalties, value commitments, mutual sympathies andpersonal bondings consequently incurred and these might provide ameasure of the moral glue (Hollis, 1989) which some think necessary toa civilised life. Nor does it exclude the practice by individuals and groupsof those supererogatory virtues loving kindness, generosity, bravery,abiding patience, chastity and so on which may be admired andencouraged but which it is no ones business to enforce.The actual boundaries of someones proper freedom remain a matter

for debate and this is partly at the root of MacIntyres supposedlyirreconcilable conflicts of rights. Part of the solution lies in the furtherand more refined analysis of particular issues to determine, for example,the extent to which social or economic disadvantage is a barrier to equalfreedom requiring to be rectified. Communitarianism may also havesomething to contribute in that the boundaries of individual freedommay sometimes be determined contextually. In some places standards oftruth-telling, promise-keeping and consideration for others, for example,may be more rigorously required than in others, provided we observe thegolden rule of only doing unto others what we may expect them to dounto us.Part of the pragmatic justification for an approach to moral education

aimed at producing commitment to an adult society which both allowsmaximum freedom and non-interference and rigorously enforces (bothlegally and through expressed social disapproval) non-interference withthe freedom of others lies in the fact that without some such minimumframework of acceptable behaviour our society may indeed descend intothose conditions which currently give rise to public concern.Such a framework has the advantage of being limited and explicit and

of addressing present problems. It does not start from a list of virtuesand other desirable qualities plucked randomly from the air nor does itsanction constant surveillance and admonition to achieve ever higherstandards of moral perfection. It is not committed to the dehumanisingand impossible task of turning all young people into paragons, or settingtargets which humiliate with the constant realisation of our falling short.Unlike some programmes (Hyland, 1995) it may not be accused ofseeking to promote the qualities of industry, orderliness, respect andcompliance in support of powerful sectional interests. Even if it lacksany ultimate moral justification it shares with MacIntyres virtues therationale and authority of the individual and common interest, for,however atomised our society, it is in no ones interest for increasing

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numbers of citizens to go in fear for their safety or the security of theirhomes and belongings, or for young people to be so deprived of hope,aspiration and sense of a worthwhile life that the buzz of mindlessdestruction, intoxication or law-breaking provides their only relief. Sucha relationship between social conditions and approved conduct may beseen as a modern analogue of MacIntyres community-based virtues aswell as meeting Jonathans (1993) criticism of Carr for failing to takeaccount of the nature of modern society in composing his own list ofvirtues to be promoted through moral education.

WHAT KIND OF MORAL EDUCATION?

In the past it has fallen to writers concerned with political rather thanmoral education to suggest what virtues and qualities of character wouldbe appropriate to a society such as ours. This false distinction betweenpolitics and morality has led to the emasculation of our concept of moraleducation which, when not simply concerned with the discouragementof socially undesired behaviour, has focused on the intellectualtreatment of general moral issues rather than being concerned with allaspects of living rightly and living well.If it is recognised that in our world the most expedient moral regime is

that which we have indicated, living well in the classical sense,combining both morality and ones ultimate self interest, becomes amatter of recognising, asserting and managing ones own freedom whilerecognising and respecting its limits. This is clearly a better starting pointfor any programme of moral education than attempts to inculcatecertain duties, obligations and norms be these derived, in the words ofthe School Curriculum and Assessment Authority (1996b) document,from God or from human nature or some other political orphilosophical source. This coercive approach gets us off to a bad startsetting us in opposition to young people by suggesting that morality is amatter of curbing ones desires and, essentially, doing what suits otherpeople rather than oneself. Besides being morally suspect and ofdubious credibility, such a view poses obvious problems of motivationunless ones pupils are exceptionally compliant. To start from theproposition of using ones own freedom positively and responsibly onthe other hand has obvious appeal. Teaching someone to assert theirown legitimate freedom is also a good way of preventing others, bothpeers and overbearing adults, from over-stepping the limits of theirs. Italso avoids some practical problems in teaching the often negativetraditional morality, for which the main teaching strategies have beenadmonition, negative reinforcement and reliance on some ratherunconvincing narratives.To encourage the young to use their own freedom actively and

positively resembles the notion of empowerment widely used, thoughnot exempt from criticism (Heathcote, 1997; Fielding, 1997), in the fieldsof community development and vocational training. If part of the causeof our moral malaise lies in the fact that some young people are so



constrained by the parameters of their existence that they are only ableto feel in control of their lives, only truly living or doing something trulychallenging and worthwhile when they act anti-socially or illegally, thismay provide a previously unconsidered argument for regarding someform of autonomy as a goal of moral education. Whether or notautonomy is good in itself or something to which the individual isentitled, the individual for whom there is no possibility of controlling herown life within the bounds of social approval may seek to do so outsidethem.The good life for the individual requires that, at least for part of the

time, one is doing something that, in some sense, one chooses to do. Thisis no mere licence for caprice or irresponsibility, for to pursue onesaspirations with determination may involve self-discipline and restraintand one may certainly choose to do what one conceives of as ones duty.For many, choice in what one does with ones life has always beenlimited. This was certainly so while at school and afterwards optionswere often limited to domesticity for some and, for others, to work thatwas tedious, unchallenging and degrading, or was so regarded by theopinion formers of ones community. In recent times, the availability ofeven this work has become capricious and unreliable so that one can nolonger take pride in or conceive of ones identity as the member of aparticular occupation. When no work is available many may resentfullyperceive the only acceptable response as waiting patiently for whatevernew work it suits the interests of someone else to provide, and then onlyfor as long as it suits them to provide it.Potentially, human life offers a range of modes, vocational and

otherwise, through which an individual may find meaning andfulfilment. Ones life may revolve around the striving for some formof perfection in some craft or artistic, sporting or intellectual field, thepursuit of activity, excitement, risk and competition both physical and incommercial and professional occupations, or one may see fulfilment indevotion and caring for other people, animals or things, or in theexercise of authority and the guidance of others. Some may findsatisfaction in the quiet domestic life of relative ease and comfort andthe absence of conflict and stress. None of these ways of life may beintrinsically superior to others, nor are they necessarily subject to socialstratification or incapable of being accessed at various social levels. Thechoice between such modes of existence may, however, often beoverridden by the supposed economic imperative (Why train to be adressmaker when you can earn more now on the factory floor?),frustrated by ignorance of what possibilities are available, by failure toperceive oneself as a chooser, by self exclusion from certain occupations(which may involve downward as well as upward mobility), failure tothink through ones inclinations, preferences and priorities or, ofparticular relevance in the present context, because one is deflectedfrom ones would-be chosen course by an assertive parent or otheradviser. Some limited educational attempts to improve this situationhave been made under the various heads of careers education, personal

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and social education and life skills and so on and it is important thatthese should not be squeezed out of schools by more league-tableoriented demands on time and resources or, in the current mood ofmoral panic, by more coercive brands of moral education explicitlytargeted at controlling young peoples behaviour.If we agree that proper self-assertion and self-direction is an

important virtue in the modern world then, like Aristotle, we mayidentify two corresponding vices. On the one hand there is unduedependency, the lack of assertiveness and failure to do things throughindecisiveness or caving in to pressure from others. On the other, there isthe vice of excess: excessive or arbitrary self-assertion which may expressitself either in the tendency to make reckless or ill-considered choicesleading to abortive courses of action or sudden changes of plan, or in theover-assertion of ones own interests at the expense of others. The effectsof this failing range from mere discourtesy or lack of consideration tomore serious kinds of socially unacceptable behaviour including, at theextreme end of the spectrum, ruthlessness and crime. The young malewho robs an elderly pensioner of her savings or the entrepreneur whoruthlessly brushes aside all alternatives to build a cement factory in anarea of natural beauty may both be thought to suffer from the vice ofexcessive self-assertion.Moral independence, owning and taking possession of ones own life,

may be seen as a kind of master-virtue such as truth-telling, honesty,loyalty, co-operativeness, thrift, temperance and so on which also havecontrary vices in both directions. These are vices precisely because theyundermine or distort that independence which nowadays sustains atolerable mode of life. To give but few examples, the destructive effectsof lying both on the liar herself and others is commonly recognised butthe salesman who is sacked for naively pointing out to customers thatthe competitors product is both cheaper and better deserves criticismfor jeopardising his economic viability rather than praise for honesty,and young couples who can handle their emotions are surely wrong toworry the lives out of their parents by telling them exactly what stagetheir relationship has reached. Truth may be a force for ill as well asgood, and needs to be treated judiciously and with respect. That lazinessis one of the vices corresponding to industry goes without saying but anexcessive devotion to work that allows others to exploit ones good will,compromises ones health or leaves one dependent or vulnerable becauseones personal and social life has become impoverished likewise fails thetest of due attention to the master-virtue of independence and self-sufficiency.

CONCLUSION

If the notion of developing the virtues is to have a place in moraleducation it must be in ways that are both credible and appropriate toour age rather than a wistful hankering after those of other ages andother traditions. Independence/self-sufficiency has been presented as a



virtue to be developed in the modern context, having correspondingvices of deficiency and excess and containing elements of both moralityand prudence as we have come to understand these terms. Encoura-gingly, perhaps, this virtue is highly relevant to three of the four valueareas (society, self and relationships) indicated by the very general andtentative framework suggested in Values in Education and the Curriculumand is not entirely irrelevant to the fourth (environment).Just how this or other virtues are to be acquired naturally raises many

questions. It certainly cannot be explicitly taught in a discrete period ofthe school timetable but must be reinforced by the pupils whole learningexperience, though the task of enlisting the support of other institutions(home, work, youth-clubs, churches) for such an approach to moraleducation in the manner suggested by Lickona would be a challengingbut perhaps not a hopeless task.Such an approach obviously involves individual counselling to help

young people to identify their particular inclinations and encouragethem to make their own personal, educational, vocational and leisurechoices. Discussion and moral reasoning must also form a part of such aprogramme for the concept of equal freedom is susceptible tointerpretation and judgement in its applications. Such discussion andreasoning may even have something in common with that envisaged inearlier models of moral education but will focus on moral and prudentialconsiderations relevant to the actual lives of individual young peoplerather than attempting to apply foundational principles to more generalissues. In the light of arguments advanced above it will be clear that nosuch principles or considerations can be overriding, for how someoneshould live their life will partly depend on temperament, inclination andcircumstances. The exploration of these and the knowledge of oneself asan individual that results is central to the concept of virtue we havepresented, and radically distinguishes it from the impoverished virtues ofcompliance that have sometimes been advocated elsewhere.

Correspondence: Colin Wringe, Department of Education, KeeleUniversity, Keele, Staffordshire, ST5 5BG, UK.

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reasons, rules and virtues in moral education

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