recentralizing while decentralizing: how national ...arunagra/papers/recentralizing while... ·...

World Development Vol. 34, No. 11, pp. 1864–1886, 2006� 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved

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www.elsevier.com/locate/worlddevdoi:10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.11.020

Recentralizing While Decentralizing:

How National Governments Reappropriate

Forest Resources

JESSE C. RIBOTWorld Resources Institute, Washington, DC, USA

ARUN AGRAWALUniversity of Michigan, MI, USA

and

ANNE M. LARSON *

Center for International Forestry Research, Managua, Nicaragua

Summary. — Decentralization initiatives have been launched in the majority of developing coun-tries, but these rarely lay the foundations necessary to reach decentralization’s purported efficiencyand equity benefits. This paper uses a comparative empirical approach to show how centralgovernments in six countries—Senegal, Uganda, Nepal, Indonesia, Bolivia, and Nicaragua—usea variety of strategies to obstruct the democratic decentralization of resource management and,hence, retain central control. Effective decentralization requires the construction of accountableinstitutions at all levels of government and a secure domain of autonomous decision making atthe local level.
� 2006 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Key words — decentralization, natural resource management, forestry, local government,accountability, democratization

* The authors would like to thank the Rockefeller

Foundation for funding the conference on Decentral-

ization and the Environment at Bellagio where this

article was first drafted. Final revision accepted:

November 10, 2005.

1. INTRODUCTION

A prolonged period of institutional reformshas followed the fiscal crises of the developmen-tal state in the 1980s, and the collapse of socia-list economies since 1989. If one were to choosea single word to characterize the nature of insti-tutional changes that governments have insti-tuted across many different sectors, that wordwould likely be ‘‘decentralization.’’ The major-ity of national governments in Africa, Asia, andLatin America claim to have launched decen-tralization initiatives in policy arenas as diverseas development, environmental management,healthcare, welfare, education, and credit pro-vision (OECD, 1997, p. 47). This article focuseson the environmental management sector via

186

forestry cases and examines institutionalchanges that six national governments havepursued: in Senegal, Uganda, Nepal, Indonesia,Bolivia, and Nicaragua. The article shows thatthese reforms are incomplete in many ways andidentifies specific mechanisms through whichdecentralization reforms are attenuated. Thetwo main strategies central governments useto undermine the ability of local governments tomake meaningful decisions are (1) by limiting

4

RECENTRALIZING WHILE DECENTRALIZING 1865

the kinds of powers that are transferred, and (2)by choosing local institutions that serve andanswer to central interests.

Governments, donors, NGOs, and theoriststypically defend decentralization reforms ongrounds of improved efficiency, equity, andresponsiveness of bureaucracies to citizen de-mands (Blair, 1998; Manor, 1999; Oates,1972; Tiebout, 1956; Webster, 1992). Theunderlying logic is that local institutions havebetter knowledge of local needs, and, when en-dowed with powers, are more likely to respondto local aspirations. The belief in greaterresponsiveness is based on the assumption thatlocal authorities have better access to informa-tion about their constituents, and are moreeasily held accountable by local populations.Transfer of significant powers and ‘‘downwardaccountability’’ of local authorities are thuscentral to this formula (Agrawal & Ribot,1999; Ribot, 1995a, 1996). Decentralizationadvocates also believe that the greater efficiencyand equity along with local people’s ‘‘owner-ship’’ of local decisions and projects will resultin more effective local investments andmanagement and ultimately in more sociallyand environmentally sustainable development.

But case studies of decentralization reformssuggest that the necessary institutional arrange-ments for the desired outcomes are rarelyobserved (Agrawal, 2001; Agrawal & Ribot,1999; Larson & Ferroukhi, 2003; Ribot, 2002,2003, 2004; Ribot & Larson, 2005). Most decen-tralization reforms are either flawed in theirdesign, or encounter strong resistance from avariety of actors that erodes their effectiveness.We illustrate this observation by analyzing sixdifferent experiences of decentralization in theforestry sector. The cases we have selected arecounted among the most important or innova-tive of efforts to decentralize. Our objective isto examine comparatively the structure and out-comes of decentralization in these critical casesin relation to the justifications advanced forpursuing them, and show how calculations ofpolitical–economic gains affect decentralizationprocesses. We document how central govern-ments—ministries and front line agents—oftentransfer insufficient and/or inappropriatepowers, and make policy and implementationchoices that serve to preserve their own interestsand powers. Our comparative analysis suggeststhat fundamental aspects of decentralization,including discretionary powers and down-wardly accountable representative authorities,are missing in practice.

This article is broadly empirical and com-parative, identifying common patterns andregularities across diverse cases from three con-tinents. Our case discussion contributes to amore informed theoretical discussion of thereasons for the failure of decentralization initia-tives. To frame the presentation of our casestudies, we first provide a working definitionof decentralization, and outline the major justi-fications of decentralized decision making. Thesecond part of the paper examines the mainfeatures of decentralization of forestry policyin the six cases, two each from Africa (Senegaland Uganda), Asia (Nepal and Indonesia), andLatin America (Bolivia and Nicaragua). Ineach case, we review articulated justificationsof decentralization, the extent to which govern-ments have actually decentralized decisionmaking and other powers regarding the envi-ronment and natural resources, the actorswho have come to gain new powers, and someobservable social and environmental outcomes.The ensuing section draws on the case evidenceto examine the attenuation of decentralizationinitiatives and maintenance of centralized con-trol. We conclude by focusing on key factorsthat would make decentralization reforms moreeffective.

2. DEFINITIONS AND JUSTIFICATIONSOF DECENTRALIZATION

We define decentralization as any politicalact in which a central government formallycedes powers to actors and institutions at lowerlevels in a political-administrative and territo-rial hierarchy (see Mawhood, 1983; Smith,1985). Devolving powers to lower levels in-volves the creation of a realm of decision mak-ing in which a variety of lower-level actors canexercise a certain degree of autonomy (Booth,1985; Smoke, 1993). Deconcentration (oradministrative decentralization) 1 is said tooccur when powers are devolved to appointeesof the central government in the local arena. Incontrast, political decentralization (also calleddemocratic decentralization) 2 involves thetransfer of power to actors or institutions thatare accountable to the population in their juris-diction. Typically, elections are seen as themechanism that ensures this accountability.

We propose a definition of political decen-tralization that treats local accountability anddiscretionary powers centrally. If local authori-ties, whether appointed or elected, are made

1866 WORLD DEVELOPMENT

accountable to their superiors, the resulting re-form can be termed deconcentration. This is be-cause elections and funding arrangements areoften structured so as to make elected officialsupwardly accountable. When powers aretransferred to lower-level actors who are down-wardly accountable, even when they are ap-pointed, the reform is tantamount to politicaldecentralization. Critical to understanding theprocess, then, is an empirical examination ofthe structures of accountability in which actorsare located (see Agrawal & Ribot, 1999).

The ability of accountable local authoritiesand governments to make and implement deci-sions is in some sense the key feature of anyeffective decentralization. This ability, whichdefines the responsiveness of local authorities,requires discretionary powers. Accountabilityor sanction beckons leaders to respond; respon-siveness is a function of discretionary powers(see Ribot, 2004). If local governments alwaysmust seek approval from superiors beforeundertaking an action, their downwardaccountability and ability to respond are atten-uated. Discretionary authority for local govern-ments is an integral part of responsiveness inany decentralization reform. If central govern-ments grant local governments the rights tomake and implement decisions but in practicewithhold resources or otherwise check localability to do so, then discretionary powers havenot been effectively transferred. As the ensuingcase analyses will show, central governmentsmay use many different strategies to obstructthe real transfer of power.

Decentralized institutions are viewed as likelyto perform better on the criteria of efficiencyand equity for several reasons. Local authori-ties are presumed to have better time- andplace-specific information which lead to bet-ter-targeted policies and lower transaction costs(World Bank, 1997). Decentralization improvescompetition among jurisdictions and promotesgreater political participation. 3 By channelinggreater benefits to local authorities and localpeoples, decentralization is believed to provideincentives for local populations to maintainand protect local resources. Bringing govern-ment decision making closer to citizens,through decentralization, is widely believed toincrease public-sector accountability and there-fore effectiveness (Fox & Aranda, 1996; WorldBank, 1997).

These arguments imply that the purportedbenefits of decentralization are achievedthrough the establishment ‘‘of democratic

mechanisms that allow local governments todiscern the needs and preferences of their con-stituents, as well as provide a way for these con-stituents to hold local governments accountableto them’’ (Smoke, 1999, p. 10). When thesedownwardly accountable local authorities alsohave discretionary powers—that is, a domainof local autonomy—over significant localmatters, there is good reason to believe thatthe positive outcomes suggested by the previoustheories will follow (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999).We can infer, then, that if institutional arrange-ments include local authorities who representand are accountable to the local populationand who hold discretionary powers over publicresources, then the decisions they make willlikely lead to more efficient and equitable out-comes in comparison to the outcomes of deci-sions made by central authorities that are lessrepresentative or accountable.

Fundamentally, decentralization aims toachieve one of the central aspirations of justpolitical governance—democratization, or thedesire that humans should have a say in theirown affairs. 4 In this sense, decentralization isa strategy of governance to facilitate transfersof power closer to those who are most affectedby the exercise of power. In the rest of the pa-per, we use ‘‘decentralization’’ as a shorthandfor its political/democratic form.

3. CASE STUDIES OFDECENTRALIZATION/

RECENTRALIZATION IN THEFORESTRY SECTOR

A common narrative framework guides thefollowing case descriptions of forest policychange so as to facilitate comparison. The exactpresentation of the country case materials variesas a result of differences in timing and sequenceof reforms, causal mechanisms, contextual fac-tors, and identity of actors. Typically, however,the history and context of decentralization setsthe stage for a brief examination of its originsand justifications. We then describe the natureof reforms by identifying the local actors receiv-ing powers and reviewing the kinds of powersthey acquired. Each case then discusses existingaccountability mechanisms and provides avail-able evidence about outcomes of reforms. Thecases also describe the mechanisms throughwhich the ability of local authorities to makedecisions is undermined or limited. The processof reforms typically reveals central government


priorities that differ significantly from the rhe-torical claims defending the need for decentral-ization. Only rarely do the cases provideevidence for the emergence of downwardlyaccountable local decision makers who are ableto effectively exercise their powers.

We should add that the cases we have se-lected are not the only ones that could havehelped make our point about limits on decen-tralization reforms and the mechanismsthrough which these limits are put in place.Studies in many other countries reveal similarfindings. 5 Nor did we select the cases with aview to cherry pick those that would best illus-trate our argument. In significant measure, theselected cases are among the more importantexamples of decentralization in the developingworld. Nepal, for example, is seen as a leaderin initiating innovative decentralization re-forms, after decades of experiments with differ-ent institutional arrangements. In the late 1990sand the early years of this century, Indonesiaintroduced among the most thoroughgoingdecentralization of forest-governance-relateddecision making to the district level. Ironically,the level of decentralization is widely seen asbeing correlated with increased deforestation(Curran et al., 2004). Uganda and Bolivia havebeen held up as shining examples of democraticdecentralization by the international develop-ment community. The World Bank classifiesNicaragua among the Third World countrieswith the highest levels of ‘‘political decentral-ization’’ (Mearns, 2004). And, finally, Senegalis considered a beacon of African democracywith one of the longer-standing decentraliza-tion processes—starting in the 1970s.

(a) Senegal: Decentralization to upwardlyaccountable local government

For much of the previous century, commer-cial access to Senegalese forests was mediatedthrough concessions and permits directlyhanded out by the government ministries andagencies responsible for forests (Ribot,1995a). Local authorities had no rights in thesematters. Senegal’s first forestry law to promotelocal ‘‘participation’’ was passed in 1993, aim-ing to integrate villagers into commercial for-estry development, signaling a major changein past practices (RdS, 1993, 1994). The 1993law specified that ‘‘the rights to exploit forestsand forest lands in the national domain belongto the State which can exercise them directly orgrant them to third parties [concessions to pri-

vate firms] or local collectives [elected local gov-ernments]’’ (RdS, 1993, p. 1). Specifying localcollectives was a radical step forward. It gaveelected Rural Councils the right to participateas concessionaires in forest exploitation andmanagement. 6

But, the conditions for participation gaverural councils little discretion. Rural councilscould ‘‘participate’’ in the commercial exploita-tion of local forests if they agreed to implementimposed labors of forest management (a kindof participatory corvee). If they chose not toparticipate, they could or lose their forests toconcessions (Ribot, 1995a). 7 They had no rightto choose to conserve their forests. Later in thedecade, the Forest Service rewrote the forestrylaws to conform with decentralization lawspassed in 1996. The resulting 1998 forestrylaw ‘‘intends first to transfer to local electedauthorities power to manage forests’’ (RdS,1998, preamble). This progressive new lawturned the situation around by decentralizingto the elected rural councils the right to stopproduction within their jurisdiction.

(i) Actors involved in decentralization and theirnew powers

The 1998 forestry code places the country’snonreserve forests (called communal forests inthis law) under the jurisdiction of the electedcouncils of Regions and Rural Communities. 8

Under the 1998 law, the Rural Councils of theRural Communities (the most-local level ofgovernment) gained the rights to: develop man-agement plans for the forests within their juris-dictions; determine whether or not commercialexploitation will take place within their jurisdic-tions; determine who can exploit commercialforest resources within their jurisdiction 9—ifthey develop management plans (if they donot, the law is ambiguous as to whether theforest service can allocate or sell exploitationrights to others); 10 collect 70% of revenuesfrom fines and the sale of products confiscatedwithin their jurisdiction; 11 and add speciesto the protected species list. 12 The newcode decentralizes significant authority bytransferring commercial exploitation rights tothe Region or Rural Council, 13 and requiringapproval of the President of the Rural Councilbefore any exploitation can take place.

The new law gives the Forest Service and itsagents the right to: determine whether a man-agement plan or a work plan is valid withinthe specifications of the forest code; stop pro-duction if a plan does not conform to the forest


code; allocate all production, storage, andtransport permits for commercial forest prod-ucts; allocate professional licenses required forall commercial exploitation of wood or gumproducts; and give permission before ruralcouncils or local producers can sell wood cutin forests under management plans and in non-managed forests. 14 In contradiction to the newrights specified for the Rural Councils, theForest Service can auction off plots within theforests of local collectivities. 15 The Ministerresponsible for forests 16 has the right to settax levels for all forest exploitation and to allo-cate access to the National Forestry Fund—which is fed by income from auctions and thesale of commercial exploitation plots. 17

(ii) Powers devolved in practiceBy law, local elected authorities now have the

right to say no to commercial production. Theyalso have significant rights to allocate access toproductive opportunities. But, in practice, theyexercise neither of these prerogatives. Despitethe 1998 code, the Minister and the Forest Ser-vice have retained almost all powers over com-mercial forestry decisions—they still decidehow much production, where, when, and bywhom. Quota setting and allocation and theallocation of licenses and permits are the criti-cal functions that determine who benefits fromcommercial extraction. These functions remainwith the Minister and the Forest Service. 18

From its date of promulgation, the 1998 lawrequired the forest service to transition withinthree years (by February 2001) from a quotafixed by the Forest Service and Minister in con-sultation with commercial merchants to a quo-ta based on the estimated potential of eachrural community forest based on an inventorydone for the Rural Community’s managementplan (RdS, 1998, arts. L76, R66). The law statesthat after the initial three-year period, commer-cial production in nonmanaged areas (thoseareas not under a management plan in an areawhere the president of the rural council hassigned) is illegal ‘‘except in exceptional and lim-ited cases’’ (RdS, 1998, art. L77). These excep-tional cases, however, remain the rule. As ofmid-2005, only one forest was under a forest-serviced-ratified management plan. Severalmore had draft or experimental plans. All man-agement plans were drafted with the assistanceof international donor projects. Further, thecode states that in all cases where exploitationor sale of forest products takes place in non-managed areas (without plans), preference is

to be given to the local populations (RdS,1998, art. L78). In current practice, the vastmajority of Rural Communities—all but oneof which have nonmanaged forests—still haveno say. 19

In practice, the Forest Service and Ministrydetermine: a national charcoal productionquota, where production will be permitted,when, and who has production rights. The quo-ta is set well below urban demand, leaving agap for the allocation of unofficial quotas thatis later filled in by allocations made by the Min-ister and by the Forest Service or by front lineforestry agents. For these actors, the differencebetween the quota and consumption representsa significant patronage resource. The officialquota is divvied up among commercial cooper-atives and firms by the Minister with the coun-cil of the forest service and these (mostly urban-based) commercial actors. Representatives ofthe rural councils, including the RegionalCouncil Presidents or their representatives arepresent in the official quota-fixing meeting,but they have no influence over its outcome.Their presence is consultative. 20 The RegionalCouncil representatives are then asked to goback to the region and to call a meeting ofRural Council Presidents to ‘‘announce’’ thequota and its allocation—by cooperative, firm,and by Rural Community. 21 Despite wide-spread local opposition to commercial produc-tion, the Rural Council Presidents all sign offand permit production to begin. This procedureis the inverse of the bottom–up process outlinedin the 1998 law.

(iii) Accountability and outcomesLegally, the Rural Council Presidents could

refuse to allow for production in their jurisdic-tions. But none have done so despite that therural populations are widely against productionin their zone (Ribot, 1995b, 2000; Thiaw, 2002;Ribot & Thiaw, 2005). Interviews with ruralcouncil presidents revealed that they all feelcompelled to sign off when the Forest Serviceasks them to. Councilors are members of theirpolitical party, elected on party slates. 22 Theyappear to be accountable to the Forest Serviceand their political party, rather than the peoplewho elected them. When asked why he did notexercise the rights he had under the new law,one rural council president explained: ‘‘thelaw is the state, the Forest Service is thestate—what can we do?’’ Another gave an al-most identical response, saying ‘‘the law is thestate, the party is the state,’’ and then threw


up his hands. Yet another council president, inan area where popular resistance to forestexploitation had led to violence, told us thathe did not want to sign. He refused to signfor three weeks. Then, they ‘‘made me under-stand that it is better to sign.’’ He refused to ex-plain this statement. The president of anotherRural Community explained that he has neverbeen consulted concerning the fixing of thecharcoal quota, its distribution within his com-mune, or who could have permits. He said hejust signed the papers because ‘‘I knew I hadno choice.’’ 23

Forest Service agents felt very ambivalentabout local management. The Regional ForestInspector in Tambacounda explained: ‘‘the leg-islation says that the Rural Council can refusecharcoal producers. But, charcoal is a nationalgood. It is a strategic resource that is importantfor the government. There will be marches inDakar if there are shortages.’’ 24 There is, how-ever, little risk of shortages since there areplenty of other areas charcoal could be pro-duced—at worst, the price may go up. Further,it is easier to explain widespread forest serviceresistance to local management by examiningthe long history of practice and the politics ofpatronage, payoffs, and profit in the sector(Ribot, 1998). There are clearly vested interestsin the political and material gains at every levelof forest management and exploitation. It isharder to understand how local elected ruralcouncilors, the national association of electedlocal authorities, international donors and theirproject personnel all tolerate or fall into linewith the forest service and the party in power.By not screaming ‘‘foul’’ every day, they sup-port—via denial—the gaping inconsistenciesbetween forestry law and practice and betweenthe spirit and practice of decentralization.These obvious but unspoken contradictionsreflect strong upward accountability.

(b) Uganda: Decentralized powers, disappearingterritorial jurisdication 25

Uganda is widely cited as a model of decen-tralization in Africa (Bazaara, 2002a; Saito,2000). During Uganda’s civil war (1981–86),the National Resistance Movement (NRM)set up a system of elected local governmentscalled ‘‘Resistance Councils’’ (RCs). In 1987,after the NRM (now the ruling, and only,party) won the civil war, the Ugandan legisla-ture gave the RCs official status as localgovernments (RoU, 1987). The 1993 Local

Governments (Resistance Councils) Statute, 26

the centrepiece of Uganda’s decentralization re-forms, aimed ‘‘to increase local democratic con-trol and participation in decision making, andto mobilize support for development which isrelevant to local needs’’ (RoU, 1993). 27 Inaddition, the Ugandan constitution states thatthe decentralization of government functionsand powers will be a guiding principle for thestate, with the express purpose of ensuring peo-ple’s participation and democratic control indecision making (Muhereza, 2001, p. 3).

Uganda has a number of large forest areas.Following donor (mainly USAID) pressures,a large area of forests was transformed intonational parks in 1991. Several of the new na-tional parks are quite well known: Mt. Elgon,Kibale, Mgahinga, and Bwindi ImpenetrableForest National Park are examples. They serveas nature conservation reserves in which com-mercial logging is forbidden. In 1995, the LocalGovernments (Resistance Councils) Instrumentof 1995 was amended so that all Forest Re-serves with an area of more than 100 ha, mines,minerals, and water resources were defined ascentral government resources. 28 The amend-ment effectively centralized the managementof all forest reserves. 29

(i) Nature of powers devolvedIn 1998, the Forest Reserves (Declaration)

Order divided forests into Central Forest Re-serves (CFRs), the control of which was re-tained by the Central Government and LocalForest Reserves (LFRs) whose control waspassed to the Local Governments. 30 Thepowers of Local Governments are limited tomanagement and control functions in LocalForest Reserves. 31 All CFRs are ‘‘protected’’areas in which commercial activities are notpermitted. In buffer zones around CFR, wherecommercial activities are permitted, the privatesector, civil society organizations, and localgovernments can enter into co-managementagreements at the discretion of the ForestDepartment.

The districts have powers to issue licenses forcutting, taking, working, or removal of forestproduce from open land, that is not a centralforest reserve. In addition, they can, with theapproval of the minister, convert lands occu-pied by a community as a village forest. Villageforests are controlled by people appointed bythe local authorities, and the authority alsohas the right to make rules for using, protect-ing, and managing the forests within its


jurisdiction (Muhereza, 2001, p. 18). Revenuesfrom these forests are part of the funds of localauthorities, and are supposed to be used forcommunity welfare. These powers were a resultof the 1964 Forest Act. But all unallocatedprivileges, rights, title, interest, or easementsin forest reserves, embodiments of absoluteownership, are vested in the central state.

About 70% of Uganda’s forested area fallsoutside of parks and reserves (personal commu-nications, Bill Fischer, DfID, 2001). Much ofthis area is private forests (Muhereza, 2001, p.20). But nongazetted and nontitled lands, forthe most part, are effectively in the ‘‘public do-main.’’ The Draft National Forestry and TreePlanting Bill (2002) has recognized this prob-lem and permitted the creation of private natu-ral or plantation forests in accordance with the1998 Land Act.

(ii) Mechanisms that limit local authority overforests

The translation of the different pieces oflegislation into practice opens up spaces forcentralized control even in the context of rhe-torical claims about decentralization. The caseof Masindi District 32 illustrates the point. Fol-lowing the differentiation of the forest estateinto central and local forest reserves in 1995,and a subsequent re-centralization of all forestsdesignated as Central Forest Reserves, localauthorities in Masindi became apprehensiveabout the loss of revenues from licenses, fees,fines, and other royalties generated fromcentral reserves. Their apprehensions were notunfounded. The 1997 Local Government Acttransferred management functions over localforest reserves to the District and Sub-countycouncils (Muhereza, 2003, p. 6) These 1998Forest Reserves Order further restricted theirfunctions by reducing Local Government terri-torial jurisdiction.

The order affected the management of 17 for-ests in Masindi that were re-classified as centralforest reserves. 33 By May 2000, only two of thelocal forest reserves—Kirebe (49 ha) andMasindi Port (18 ha)—remained under districtcouncil jurisdiction. Six other local reserveswere returned to the Kingdom of Bunyoro–Kit-ara in May 2000. In 2001, the Kingdom alsogained the Masindi Port eucalyptus plantation,leaving only the Kirebe Forest to the MasindiDistrict Council. 34 One new village forest wasestablished in 1999 in Alimugonza village withthe help of a USAID-funded conservationand development project. In 2002, the forest

still did not have clear rules of use and manage-ment and was being governed in an ad hoc fash-ion (Muhereza, 2001, pp. 17–19).

As the Masindi case illustrates, decentraliza-tion initiatives in Uganda have granted localgovernment significant forest use and manage-ment powers, but often left them with virtuallyno forests. Centralization of some forests,privatization of others, commercial concessionsover yet others, and slowness in the passage ofrules to manage local forests have severely cur-tailed the territorial jurisdiction over whichlocal authorities can exercise their decentralizedpower. 35

(iii) Accountability and outcomesMuhereza also points out that many of the

meaningful powers in commercial forestry wereprivatized or given to customary authorities—reducing the scope for public accountability(2003, p. 11). In the Bunyoro–Kitara Kingdom,the king appointed loyal elders to a ‘‘CulturalTrust’’ to manage the kingdom’s forests. Sincethe Trust was accountable to the King, peopleliving around the forests in question found theirneeds routinely ignored. Forest villagers ex-pressed resentment in many ways, even goingas far as burning trees in protest against greaterlimits on access to the forests (see also Bazaara,2002b, p. 20).

The revenues of local authorities have in-creased to a significant extent in some parts ofthe country as they have gained rights over rev-enues from fees for reserves and commercialactivities. The revenues of sub-counties have in-creased less since many sub-county councilorsare not aware that they can gain a share ofthe revenues (Muhereza, 2003, pp. 21–22). Butit is commercial groups who have gained signif-icant power through privatization. Some ofthem have even been able to influence forestmanagement policies in specific localities (Muh-ereza, 2003). It must also be noted that evenwhen the laws and the forest service do not givelocal councils clear rights, decentralization re-forms have emboldened local governments tocontest policy. Bazaara (2002b, p. 15) describeslocal governments as being ‘‘locked in conflictswith the central government over who shouldwield the power to issue permits and what pro-portions of the resources generated from feesand taxes should go to the local government.’’Overall however, the discretionary powers oflocal governments remain low. Changes onpaper have not been matched by on-the-groundrealities, and subsequent legislation has often


served to undermine the extent of territorialcontrol that local governments can exercise. 36

(c) Nepal: Subsistence as the rationale forcommunity forestry

The kingdom of Nepal nationalized allNepali forests in 1957 in a centralizing effortto control actions and outcomes related toforests. This assertion of control was cementedthrough a series of measures during 1961–70when the state tried to curtail even the userights of rural residents. In the absence ofeffective monitoring and enforcement systems,however, the new laws had perverse effects.They undermined existing local systems ofmanagement and led to widespread deforesta-tion as people came to view forests as stateproperty. 37 The overwhelming evidence ofdeforestation showed that the existing policyneeded rethinking.

Today Nepal is often seen as a leader amongdeveloping countries in setting conservationgoals and priorities, and creating progressiveprograms and legislation related to resourcemanagement and conservation (Heinen & Kat-tel, 1992). New steps toward decentralization offorest control began in the late 1970s. The pre-cursors of current community forestry legisla-tion were the Panchayat Forest Rules of 1978and the Community Forestry program of1980. 38 The limited conservation objectives ofthese initiatives were revised when the govern-ment realized that deforestation was approach-ing epidemic proportions. The pace of reformsaccelerated with the widespread movement fordemocratization, and the restoration of democ-racy after 1990. The current framework forcommunity forestry legislation is representedby the Master Plan for the Forestry Sector in1989, the Forest Act in 1993, and the new For-est Regulations of 1995. Under the impact ofthese new pieces of legislation, the area of for-ests managed by local user groups and thenumber of these groups has increased exponen-tially. International donor NGOs and the fundsthey have made available for the pursuit ofdecentralized forestry in Nepal have been cru-cial to the new reforms.

(i) Nature of the powers devolvedThe major objectives of the new legislation

are to provide forests to willing communitygroups, especially in the hill areas, and establishand promote community plantations in openand degraded areas. The overall goal of decen-

tralization of forestry policy is to (1) reducedeforestation, (2) provide greater benefits tolocal users and managers, (3) reduce costs ofadministration, and (4) enhance participationby common Nepali villagers in the process offorest management.

The creation of local authorities to manageforests takes place with a significant involve-ment of the forest department. Communityuser group members are identified by the Dis-trict Forest Officers. These user groups thenprepare their own constitutions that governday-to-day functioning and management. Fol-lowing the demarcation of a forested area thatcan be handed over to a community, a 5-yearoperational plan is prepared for the forest. Usergroups frequently play a direct role in prepar-ing and implementing the plan. 39 The DistrictForest Officer can hand over any part of anational forest to a user group in the form ofa community forest, entitling it to develop, con-serve, use, and manage the forest, and to selland distribute forest products by independentlyfixing the price in the market. User groups canthus legally use their forests for subsistence,cultivating nontimber forest products, growingtrees, and harvesting forest products forcommercial processing and sale. Users are notpermitted to clear the forest for agriculturalpurposes. But control over commercial profitsfrom sale of timber products is already a majordeparture from forestry policies around theworld.

Executive committees of 10–15 members areelected by the general membership of the ForestPanchayat Committees. They undertake mostof the everyday tasks associated with the man-agement of the community forest. These tasksinclude protection of the forest (either directlyor by a guard the user groups appoints), alloca-tion of both commercial and subsistence bene-fits from the forest, steps to improve thecondition of vegetation cover, and sanctioningrule breakers. Rural residents in many areashave begun to generate substantial benefitsfrom their community forests, including cashrevenues. Revenues are not taxed, but usergroups are required to spend 25% of all cashincome on collective development activities. 40

(ii) Accountability and outcomesThe main mechanism of accountability of

local decision makers to users is the election pro-cess through which committees are constituted.Elections are highly politicized. Many of thepanchayat elections have been characterized by


political polarization and infighting among com-munity-level decision makers.

By 1999, the new legislation had led to theformation of 8,500 community forest usergroups comprising nearly a million households.These user groups were managing more than6,200 sq kms of forests. This is about 10% ofthe total forest area of Nepal. Unofficial esti-mates of these numbers are even higher. Newuser groups are being formed at the rate ofnearly 2000 a year and they are now active in74 out of the 75 districts of Nepal. In someareas of Nepal hills, a slow reversal of earlierdeforestation can also be witnessed (Maha-patra, 2000; Varughese, 2000).

Community-level decision makers are able touse all the products from their forests, buy andsell in markets, manage how the forest is to beused, and finally, change everyday rules formanaging forests. In the Middle Himalaya inNepal, where the Community Forestry Pro-gram is the most widespread, rural householdshave begun to rely on forests to a greater extentfor their livelihoods. But a potential problem isthe question of succession. At present mostgroups, mainly because they have been formedrelatively recently, have the same leaders thatwere selected at the time of their creation. Asthe groups grow older, issues of who will leadthe group, and how transitions will occur willbecome increasingly important.

(iii) Mechanisms limiting local authorityAlthough there has been widespread appreci-

ation of the Nepalese effort to decentralizecontrol over forests through its CommunityForestry program, some significant problemshave emerged since the late 1990s. The programhas been implemented mostly in the middle hillsof Nepal. The lower plains in the Terai region,which contain more valuable timber trees, havefew forest panchayat committees, and the gov-ernment seems not to have any intentions ofextending the spatial scope of community for-estry legislation.

An important development in Nepal commu-nity forestry is the emergence of a nationwidefederation of community user groups (FECO-FUN or Federation of Community ForestryUsers of Nepal), that seek to lobby the govern-ment on behalf of its members, and to dissem-inate information about community forestrymore widely (Britt, 2000). It has already led ac-tive protests against government signals thatusers’ rights to commercial profits from forestsmay not be available in the Terai region of

Nepal (because Terai forests are commerciallymore valuable). Indeed, efforts by the govern-ment to limit commercial use of communityforest products to only the Hill regions ofNepal signify the limits of the willingness offorest departments to devolve control. Theyalso demonstrate that, in the absence of influ-ence at the national level, the ability of localuser and manager groups can be limited quiteeasily. The presence of strong commercial inter-est in the valuable timber trees in the Terai hashelped limit the extension of community for-estry. Government hopes of foreign exchangeand revenues from large timber harvestingcompanies operating in the region have meantthat claims of communities to these same for-ests have found little attention among govern-ment officials.

(d) Indonesia: The limits of regionalautonomy 41

Decentralization of forestry policy in Indone-sia has taken place in the context of a history ofhighly centralized commercial exploitation offorest resources, widespread demands for regio-nal autonomy by various provinces, and thepresence of many different actors competingfor revenues from timber-rich forests. Recentlegislation for decentralization is embodied intwo main acts concerning regional governanceand sharing of funds. Both these laws havecome into force in the last two years and arebeginning to have a profound impact on howdifferent actors use and attempt to appropriatebenefits from forests.

(i) Main actorsThe main actors involved in decentralization

are the central government and its agencies, re-gional governments and legislative bodies, andNGOs and media organizations. Decentraliza-tion of decision-making powers over forestshas sought to include district-level municipali-ties rather than provincial governments asimportant partners because many provinceshave made secessionist demands, and districtsare seen as less likely to have separatist aspira-tions. Local capacity at the district level is lim-ited.

Most of the decision-making authority forforests has been transferred to the districtsrather than the provinces, based on the justifi-cation that district governments are closer tothe people. Hence, they are seen as betterplaced to make decisions and provide public


services that would be in accordance with citi-zens’ needs and aspirations. District leaders,bupatis, instead of reporting to provincial gov-ernments, are now elected by and accountableto local legislative assemblies, which havebecome more powerful. Changes have alsooccurred at the village level, with the creationof the Village Representative Body.

(ii) Nature of powers transferredSome of the dynamics of reforms are easy to

understand. The local bodies that have beenempowered are uncertain about the perma-nence of their powers in light of the long his-tory of centralized government. This is in partbecause of conflicting interpretations of thelaw. For example, it is not clear who actuallyhas authority over which forests: article 7 ofthe 1998 Regional Governance law suggeststhat authority remains with the central govern-ment, while article 10 states that regions areauthorized to manage natural resources withintheir territories. The ministry of forests has ar-gued that local governments do not have theexpertise or capacity to manage the country’sforests. Clarifications outlined by the imple-menting regulation (no. 25/2000) have onlyset out the responsibilities of the provincialand central governments, the implicit assump-tion being that authorities beyond thosementioned in the regulation belong to districtgovernments.

One of the most controversial powers handedover to district governments was the right toauthorize small-scale (100 ha) logging licenses.The response by many local governments wasto offer a proliferation of such licenses, evenin areas where it was prohibited to do so, suchas in the designated areas of large concession-aires. Protests by concessionaires led the Minis-try of Forestry to repeal their earlier decision.

Indeed, many of these issues are still in theprocess of being clarified as provinces resistthe stripping of their powers, central ministriescontest the extent to which district authoritiesare autonomous, and district officials enterthe process of transition toward a more decen-tralized political decision making.

The new decentralization laws have alsoexpanded the regulatory functions and politi-cal powers of district authorities, and alsoenabled them to raise taxes to meet budgetaryand development needs. Scores of districtgovernments have come together to form anassociation called the APKASI 42 to shareinformation, improve communications, and

strengthen their position through the process ofregional autonomy. For their part, provincialgovernments have also created a new organiza-tion called the APPSI with similar objectives atthe provincial level. These associations takeup various administrative issues in addition toforestry.

(iii) OutcomesSharing of revenues from natural resources

has proved a highly contentious issue, espe-cially in resource-rich regions with oil, gas,and forests. In contrast to the earlier revenue-sharing formula where the center retained30% of revenues and 70% went to the prov-inces, the current legislation provides for 64%of revenues for the districts (with 32% for theproducing district and the remaining 32% forother districts and towns in the province),20% for the center, and only 16% for the prov-inces. Disputes also surround the allocation ofthe lucrative reforestation funds. Districts havecomplained about the amount they are allo-cated, the calculation of specific allocations,and delays in receiving their share of payments.

Decentralization reforms, in addition toproducing disputes over revenue raising andallocation, have also generated new timber re-gimes at the district level. Districts have usedtheir new authority to authorize small-scaleconcession permits and timber extraction andutilization rights, to charge taxes on goodstransiting through their territory and on forestenterprises, and to attract new investment.The net result of contradictory laws and decreesis that each actor defends its position based ona different law. For example, despite the revo-cation of the power of district governments toissue 100-ha permits, some district governmentshave continued to issue them. Since the bupatisat the district level are no longer located in ahierarchy below provincial governors, lobbyingby large concessionaires at the provincial levelto limit the issuance of these permits has failed.These permits generate significant revenues,sometimes in the range of millions of dollars.In the race to gain as much revenue as possiblein this uncertain period, it seems the goal ofenvironmental conservation or forest protec-tion is fast sliding into oblivion.

District authorities have little interest in for-est conservation in comparison to their interestin expanding their income sources and increas-ing the level of funds to which they have access.They favor logging and deforestation evenwhen illegal: these activities still provide


employment and generate second order growth.With legal rights to hand out logging conces-sions, they prefer enacting their preferencesover the diffuse influence of conservationNGOs or conservation-minded officials. Pro-tected areas represent a foregone opportunityfor raising revenues. Since decentralizationhas for the most part helped local populationsgenerate greater revenues through exploitationrather than conservation, it is difficult to seehow it will lead to better protection. Conserva-tion through decentralization to the districtsfaces major challenges: illegal logging, reclassi-fication of land, and conversion to agriculture(Resosudarmo, 2002, p. 12).

The experience of decentralization as it hasoccurred until now suggests that additionalmonitoring capacity and regulatory agencieswill be needed to convert the potentially higherprotection capacity of local governmentsinto greater protection. Decentralization hasincreased some tangible economic benefits tolocal communities, but only because of the min-ing of natural resources. Greater access of localgroups to forests, higher revenues to districtgovernments, and more authority to exercisedecision-making powers have been achievedwithout adequate controls over what happensto forests and without any incentive structuresthat might encourage longer-term sustainableuse and management patterns.

It is evident that decentralization in Indone-sia has happened without sufficient upward ordownward accountability. It is not surpris-ing that district authorities feel neither thepressure to protect forests in accordance withguidelines laid down by higher authorities,nor to incorporate local preferences into theirdecisions, except those that encourage earningrevenues from forest resources that have beenoff-limits to locals for decades.

(e) Bolivia: The limits to popular pressure 43

Bolivia has undertaken one of the mostextensive decentralizations in Latin America(Ferroukhi, 2003). Reforms began in the mid-1980s under the auspices of an economic struc-tural adjustment program, and were followedby policies aimed at shrinking the centralgovernment apparatus and promoting privateinvestment. In the mid-1990s, the governmentpassed the Popular Participation Law to insti-tutionalize social participation as part of abroader process of municipal reform. Together,these policies led to the concurrent implementa-

tion of privatization, decentralization, and re-forms to laws governing ‘‘strategic economicsectors’’ such as forestry.

The justification for this process was multi-fold. The goals included redistributing nationalresources more equitably and eliminatingregional and social exclusion; promoting citizenparticipation regardless of social or ethnicbackground; and attacking poverty by improv-ing conditions for economic growth and socialinvestment at the local level.

The decentralization of forest managementspecifically was shaped by the increased politi-cal importance of local governments in general,and also provided a response to regional move-ments demanding local access to forests andtimber royalties since the 1970s (Kaimowitz,Flores, Johnson, Pacheco, & Pavez, 2000). Per-haps most important for the central govern-ment, forestry reforms were aimed at makingthe sector more competitive.

(i) Main actorsThe Popular Participation Law established

the election of municipal representatives, ex-panded their legal jurisdiction from urban-onlyinto surrounding rural areas and allocated 20%of the national budget to municipalities accord-ing to population. 44 This provision dramati-cally changed national resource distribution,since prior to the reform almost 92% of na-tional spending went to the three largest citiesalone. Nevertheless, the electoral process ismediated by national political parties whichpresent all candidates. Hence, local peoplewho want to run for office must negotiate withpolitical party leaders, and elected officials maybe more accountable to those leaders than tothe electorate.

At the same time, reforms to forest andagrarian laws gave private landowners legalownership of the trees and forest on their land.Indigenous people won the right to manage theresources located within their territories. Localforest user groups won the right to apply forlocal forest concession areas, and new mecha-nisms were established for citizen participationin local government.

(ii) Nature of the powers transferredMunicipal governments can now request the

allocation of up to 20% of the total public for-est in their jurisdiction to local user groups,which must be approved by the Ministry ofSustainable Development and Planning. Whilemeeting the demand for forest access, this


mechanism also served to keep small-scale log-gers, commonly known as ‘‘pirates,’’ out of for-est concession and protected areas.

Municipal governments should receive 25%of the fees charged for concessions and clear-cutting. Changes from a volume- to an area-based fee structure for logging led to a declinein area under concessions from 21 million to6 million ha ($1 per hectare under concessionper year), vastly increasing the area availablefor new concessions. All commercial logging re-quires a forest management plan, which mustbe approved by the Forest Superintendence(SF), which is also in charge of allocating con-cessions, collecting forest taxes, and controllingillegal logging. Local governments are expectedto support the SF in the monitoring of loggingactivities and inspection of raw materialsupplies and processing. To undertake theseactivities, they are required to create municipalforestry units (UFMs), by hiring local foresters,which should provide services to local forestusers particularly for the development of man-agement plans.

(iii) Outcomes and mechanisms of accountabilityLocal organizations can register as territori-

ally based grassroots organizations (OTBs),which then gives them the right to participatein municipal planning processes. To improveaccountability, these OTBs may also elect aVigilance Committee to oversee municipalmanagement. In addition, municipal councilscan remove mayors on an annual basis if theyhave performed poorly.

The actual implementation of these mecha-nisms and the outcome of these apparently fun-damental shifts in local power relations havebeen varied. The allocation of public foresthas moved slowly because of an overlybureaucratic process, particularly related toland titling and unresolved problems with over-lapping indigenous, public and private landclaims. The Forest Superintendence has autho-rized concessions on lands disputed by indige-nous groups, though this is presumablyillegal. And UFMs have done little more thanattempt to delineate municipal reserves andnegotiate the process by which those shouldbe allocated to local groups.

The planning process has not been very par-ticipatory, in spite of the law, nor do vigilancecommittees always work in practice. Wherethey do, they tend to be biased toward urbaninterests or toward local political parties.Councilors often remove mayors for political

reasons, rather than based on their perfor-mance. The income generated from forestconcessions, and hence the portion redistrib-uted to municipalities, has dropped substan-tially because concessionaires refused to paythe established taxes. 45 Some of the resourcemanagement policies established by forestrylaws create incentives for forest clearing, espe-cially for smallholders, as well as problems forindigenous groups developing commercialoperations. Chainsaw restrictions not only limitlogging waste but also limit access to the forestby poor users. Forest management plans arecumbersome and expensive to prepare.

The failure to address fundamental land ten-ure issues has prevented local governmentsfrom clearly establishing the municipal reservesfor local forest users. In other words, manylocal authorities have not been able to takeadvantage of the only area in which local gov-ernments have been devolved direct authorityover forests. Agrarian conflicts have also beenused as a justification to hold back part of themunicipalities’ share of royalty payments. Oneresult of this, combined with the overall dropin fees, is that funds for UFMs have been toolow, and many require NGO or project supportto operate effectively.

On the other hand, though marginal groupshave not always been able to take advantageof the opportunities provided by decentraliza-tion, in some cases small farmers and indige-nous people have been voted into public officefor the first time, and in others, though localelites are clearly dominant, they have beenforced to take marginal groups and their inter-ests into account. In addition, local govern-ments have supported and helped win thenegotiation of land claims for some marginal-ized local groups.

In the final analysis, however, though localgovernments in Bolivia have greater powers inforest management than ever before, forestrydecentralization has been a top-down processthat has left little room for local discretionarydecision making. The central government stillcontrols key decisions, such as the definitionof forest resources rights and regulations, theallocation of concessions, and tax collectionfor forest uses. Local people and governmentshave had no input into the forest regulationsthemselves, which many claim are biasedagainst them. Funding for UFMs is limited,and local governments have no say over theremaining 80% of public forests. The centralgovernment’s priority appears to be large-scale


concessionaires, who perceive local govern-ments as unfavorable to their interests.

Even in allocated forest reserve areas, localgovernments have limited room for autonomy.Pacheco (2004) concludes, ‘‘The legislation sawthem as rule followers, not as rule makers, asmere agencies of implementation’’.

(f) Nicaragua: A centralist government underdonor and grassroots pressure

Under President Daniel Ortega’s Sandinistagovernment, Nicaragua’s new 1987 Constitu-tion re-established the principle of municipalautonomy, eliminated in 1939, as well as directelection of local authorities, which have sincetaken place in 1990, 1996, and 2000. Since thosefirst elections, municipal governments, 46 withimportant support from their civil society allies,have fought for, and won, an increasing degreeof responsibility and power. The successes ofthis grassroots process were made possible inpart by the concurrent implementation, partic-ularly after 1990, of broad structural adjust-ment policies aimed at vastly reducing thestate apparatus. A poorly defined ‘‘decentral-ization’’ was part of that process.

Decentralization in Nicaragua was initiallypromoted primarily by international donors.In broader terms, decentralization was seenas improving resource allocation, efficiency,accountability, and equity ‘‘by linking the costsand benefits of local public services more clo-sely’’ (World Bank, 1988, p. 154). In particular,since Ortega’s revolutionary government lostthe national elections in 1990, decentralizationin Nicaragua was presented by these donors,and later in the rhetoric of the new governmentand of civil society movements, as part of abroader process to increase popular participa-tion and establish and strengthen post-revolu-tionary democracy.

(i) Nature of the powers transferredWith regard to natural resources and the

environment, the 1997 Municipalities Lawgrants local governments the responsibility‘‘to develop, conserve, and control the rationaluse of the environment and natural resourcesas the basis for the sustainable developmentof the Municipality and the country,’’ as wellas ‘‘responsibilities in all matters that affect’’socioeconomic development, conservation, ornatural resources in their jurisdiction (LawNos. 40 and 261). These broad statements havebeen outlined more specifically in laws relating

to natural resources and protected areas, mostof which require ‘‘coordination’’ with theappropriate line ministry and gives almost nodiscretionary authority to local governments.

The central government retains the right tocreate contracts for natural resource exploita-tion throughout the country; it is required onlyto solicit the local government’s opinion andtransfer to it 25% of the tax income from thosecontracts. But for several years, local govern-ment opinion was not always requested, andfew municipalities were transferred the requiredfunds. In addition, financial transfers from thenational treasury to municipal governmentswere among the lowest in Central America upuntil 2003, representing less than 2% of thenational budget. Most local governments thathave begun to assume natural resource respon-sibilities have done so by applying taxes, fines,and fees (of which at least some are illegal) onresource-related activities.

In spite of their limited powers and funds,over half of the country’s municipalities hadformed Municipal Environmental Commis-sions (CAMs) as of mid-2003, comprised ofcentral and local government and civil societyrepresentatives, to serve as advisory commit-tees. A few of these have served as effectivefor to negotiate resource conflicts, develop mu-nicipal regulations, and monitor resource use,though many others exist only on paper. Somemunicipalities have opened technical offices,usually with the financial support of an NGO.Many have promoted fire prevention brigadesduring the season when peasants traditionallyburn their fields prior to sowing. Still othershave successfully challenged central govern-ment concessions, particularly in cases wheregrassroots actors and the local governmentunite.

Local governments are responsible for devel-oping land use plans and many have also devel-oped some kind of environmental plan. Severalhave written and passed comprehensive naturalresource ordinances establishing local normsand rules for resource use. Nevertheless, it isnot always clear which local norms are legallybinding, or what mechanisms local govern-ments have to enforce these ordinances.

(ii) Outcomes and mechanisms of accountabilityPerhaps more important are the gains that lo-

cal governments have won through politicalpressure and important civil society support(Larson, 2004). For example, in some munici-palities, the Forestry Institute (INAFOR) no


longer issues permits for which the local gov-ernment has given an unfavorable opinion,though legally that opinion is not binding. In2003, the growing political pressure of themunicipalities won the passage of the first mu-nicipal transfer law, guaranteeing 4% of the na-tional budget in 2004, increasing gradually to10% in 2010. On the other hand, a new forestrylaw passed in late 2003 appears less favorable.Though municipal representatives won theinclusion of several important clauses favorableto local governments when the bill was dis-cussed before the floor vote, the implementinglegislation decreed by the executive branchshortly thereafter, with apparently little consul-tation, was a clear attempt to block municipalparticipation. For example, it included veryfew mechanisms through which to institutional-ize the required ‘‘coordination.’’

The primary legal mechanism through whichlocal people can hold their governmentsaccountable is through elections, though theuse of party lists limits alternatives (in 2000,the possibility of promoting local write-in can-didates was removed and the legal requirementsfor establishing a political party were made ex-tremely restrictive. This was the result of a pactbetween the country’s two most powerful par-ties). The municipal council is also required tohold two open meetings a year with constitu-ents, principally to present budgets and hearlocal concerns, though these meetings do notalways take place.

Other, more informal accountability mecha-nisms include the media and grassroots mobili-zation, such as blocking logging roads and inone instance, burning down a sawmill. Council-ors can also request an investigation into theactivities of the mayor, and in some cases thesehave been recalled for corruption, though per-haps more often they have given into pressureto resign. Public outcry, often from influentialNGOs, has also promoted investigations ofboth mayors and line ministry officials. In par-ticular, after years of public criticism, INAFORwas undergoing an extensive audit under a newdirector in late 2003, and numerous officialshad been identified with corrupt or suspiciousactivities. 47

(iii) Limits on local authorityIn the opinion of many local government offi-

cials, central authorities have only transferrednatural resource burdens rather than benefitsto the local level. Minimal budgets and lackof alternatives encourage municipalities to pro-

mote resource extraction in order to exact taxincome. In addition, the laws are often unclearand contradictory and/or establish overlappingauthority. Coordination with line ministries isminimal, with the latter usually simply settingthe standard that local authorities are expectedto follow. There are few, if any, institutionalmechanisms through which local authoritiescan hold central government authoritiesaccountable.

The central government’s priority is to createconditions favorable to private industry andinvestment. Where civil society or local govern-ments are seen as a risk, because they may op-pose extractive enterprises altogether or simplywant a greater share of the benefits, their par-ticipation and authority is undermined. Theway local government participation has devel-oped in the forestry sector—where the role oflocal governments has largely involved dupli-cating rather than complementing the role ofINAFOR 48—logging companies have com-plained of increased bureaucracy and costs.Hence, INAFOR’s response is again to mini-mize the local government’s role rather thantransform it—which would require giving upits own power, benefits, and control over theprocess.

4. DISCUSSION: COMPROMISINGDECENTRALIZATION REFORMS

The case analyses above show that the config-uration of actors, powers, and accountabilityrelations that may constitute an effective decen-tralization reform in the forestry sector is hardto find in practice (also see Agrawal & Ribot,1999; Larson & Ribot, 2005; Ribot, 1999,2004). The cases suggest that the politicaldynamics related to policy reforms play a cru-cial debilitating role in the divergence betweenthe rhetorical claims for decentralization andthe institutional changes that actually takeplace. Consider briefly the principal dynamicswe have outlined. In Senegal, the 1998 decen-tralized forestry code enables local councils todetermine whether or not commercial produc-tion takes place and to determine who can ex-ploit the forests. But, the central government(the party, ministry responsible for the environ-ment, and the forest service) forces councils tocontinue commercial production even againstthe expressed will of those who elected them. 49

Further, despite contrary provisions in Sene-gal’s new code, production quotas are still set


and allocated by central authorities who areusing them to reward supporters of the new rul-ing party. 50 Local councilors appear primarilyaccountable to their political and administra-tive superiors.

In Uganda, changes in central governmentled to significant initial steps toward decentral-ization of authority. But the center reassertedcontrol by severely curtailing the territorialjurisdiction of local authorities (also see thecase of Mali, Agrawal & Ribot, 1999). Withonly insignificant areas of forests over whichto exercise their newly gained power and gover-nance functions, local governments remain dis-enfranchised—what is given by one law is takenback by other means. Some of them earnedrevenues at the beginning, but the gains wereshort-lived.

In Nepal, the government decentralized avariety of powers over forests in the MiddleHimalayas. These forests were very importantfor the subsistence needs of villagers. But thegovernment was unwilling to decentralize con-trol over terai forests that contain commerciallyvaluable timber. The presence of internationalcorporate timber interests that were willing toprovide lucrative revenues to the national gov-ernment reduces the likelihood of transfer ofcontrol over commercial revenues. Again,decentralization has remained incomplete interms of the resources of local governments,and the areas of forests they control.

In Indonesia, the national state undertookdecentralization reforms in the context ofincreasing demands for regional autonomyfrom the provinces. To undercut the ability ofthe provinces to raise revenues from sale ofvaluable timber resources, it created thorough-going legal instruments that empower district-level authorities. It has installed mechanismsof accountability that further weaken provin-cial executive authority by making districtexecutive authorities horizontally accountableto legislative assemblies at the same level ratherthan upwardly accountable to provincialauthorities or downwardly accountable to theirconstituents. The multiple, competing, andsometimes violently conflicting claims over for-ests in the entire country, eviscerate the abilityof any authority to protect timber. The politicsof national cohesion has undermined any envi-ronmental public goods that new decentraliza-tion policies supposedly produce.

In Bolivia, the institutional framework ofdecentralization was shaped by a combinationof economic and political forces. Municipal

governments were given the right to allocatethe use of 20% of local public forests, but donot have any say over the rest. The forest ser-vice maintains tight controls over all loggingthrough strict regulations that discriminateagainst smaller-scale loggers. The central gov-ernment has dragged its feet in addressingland-tenure conflicts and has also ignored legalprohibitions and granted concessions in dis-puted areas. Likely the government’s primarygoal, forestry reforms did increase competitive-ness and free up vast new areas for concessions.The decentralization of some forest manage-ment, then, is the result of an effort broadlyaimed at pacifying long-held local demandsover resource control as well as stopping illegalincursions into concession areas (Pacheco, pers.comm.).

In Nicaragua, the central government wasnever as committed to decentralization asinternational donors, municipal governments,or civil society. Verbal support notwithstand-ing, the process throughout the 1990s consistedof deconcentration and privatization. Decen-tralization was consistently obstructed innumerous ways. Under a highly centralist pres-ident who was in power through the end of thelast decade, the government maintained its con-trol over commercial forest resources not onlyto increase government revenues but also thepersonal incomes of high-level officials with tiesto both legal and illegal logging.

It is clear, then, that in many of the cases, theunderlying reasons for the initiation and imple-mentation of decentralization reforms are quitedifferent from the stated objectives and goalsof reforms. While the ostensible reason topursue decentralization lies in greater efficiency,more-thoroughgoing equity, and more-demo-cratic local participation, it is political–eco-nomic calculations and pressures that actuallyprompt—and thus shape—reforms (Agrawal,1999). In Indonesia and Uganda, decentraliza-tion was designed at least in part to undermineprovincial secessionist movements and politicalleaders whose goals were at cross-purposes withthose of central-level actors.

In Senegal, Nepal, Bolivia, and Nicaragua,donor pressures played an important role in ini-tiating decentralization reforms. Donors havebeen far less effective in ensuring adequateimplementation of transfer of powers becauseneither donors nor governments want closesupervision of the reform process. In Indonesiaand Nepal, central governments wanted to usedecentralization as a means to promote indus-


trialization based on forest products at least asmuch as they wanted to empower local govern-ments. Such differences between intent andpractice account in significant part for thedivergence between the positive rhetoric thatdefends the launching and implementation ofdecentralization and the negative experiencesone encounters on the ground.

The cases highlight the specific mechanismsthat central governments use to limit the scopeof reforms and ensure that outcomes of reformswill not threaten existing political authority.These specific mechanisms can be grouped intotwo structural types. The first concerns thekinds of powers that local actors gain and theconstraints on these powers; the second con-cerns the type of local actors who gain powers,and the accountability relations within whichthey are located (Ribot, 2003; Ribot & Oyono,2005).

(a) Powers and constraints

Our case studies show that even seeminglycomprehensive decentralization reforms areconstrained. Among the most important limitson local authority is the lack of control overraising or spending significant levels of reve-nues, or deciding about the fate of high-valuedresources. That is, few local governments havethe right to allocate revenue-rich commercialrights to exploit forests; more often, they gainthe power to allocate commercially irrelevantuse rights for products such as fodder and non-commercial firewood. Where they have rights toa share in timber revenues, gaining access to thelocal share, which usually passes through cen-trally controlled funds, is typically cumbersome.Central governments seldom give up controlover the allocation of lucrative opportunities,even when central expertise is unnecessary forsuch allocation (Bazaara, 2003; Fairhead &Leach, 1996). Transfers of revenues from parksand natural resources fees sometimes seem to bean exception to the rule that central govern-ments are averse to giving up control over com-mercial revenues. But it should be kept in mindthat these fees usually represent a small fractionof resource profits, even if they comprisesignificant amounts of income for poorlyfunded local governments. And, in practice,we often find that central governments fail to re-turn the local share in its entirely, or do so aftersignificant time lags (Larson, 2002).

Decentralizations are also constrained by thelack of information provided to local govern-

ments about the new reforms. This compro-mises their ability to make demands on thecentral government and also their capacity tomanage resources effectively. In Nicaragua,for example, where logging contracts are man-aged by the state Forestry Institute, municipalcouncils are often unaware of the number andextent of logging operations operating in theirjurisdictions. But municipal governments mayalso be unaware of their rights and responsibil-ities—a problem compounded by the lack oflegal clarity. Indeed, if municipal governmentsare sometimes unaware of their rights, the sameis even truer for local populations. In Senegal,few villagers even know that local leaderscan make decisions over forests (Ribot, 2004).Such lack of information makes a mockery ofaccountability even where local leaders aredemocratically elected.

The problem of lack of resources at the locallevel is compounded by the extent to whichlocal governments typically get saddled withnew responsibilities and tasks—the odium ofmanagement. The devolution of managementresponsibilities without corresponding fundsto carry them out is common (Larson, 2002;Ribot, 1995a). Unfunded mandates and failureto turn over mandated funds means that man-agement tasks, instead of helping increase thediscretionary powers of local governments, re-duce their ability to undertake even those tasksthat they had been carrying out prior to decen-tralization.

Central governments limit the scope of pow-ers they transfer by instituting new patterns andsystems of oversight, such that local authoritiesneed permissions and clearances before theirdecisions can be implemented. Local powersover forest resources are often so highly cir-cumscribed by supervision, or pre-determinedthrough management planning requirements,that they hardly remain a ‘‘power.’’ Instead ofestablishing a field of local discretion, centralguidelines create new controls over implemen-tation.

Spatial limitations on the jurisdiction oflocal authorities are another major way inwhich the effects of decentralization reformsare contained. All natural resources are locatedin space. By controlling the amount of space orterritory over which local authorities canexercise even extensive powers, and effectively,it becomes possible to control the extent ofdecentralization. This is exactly what a numberof governments have done in the cases wehave described. While local authorities, as in


Uganda, may have great powers over forests inthe ‘‘local domain,’’ the local domain may notcontain much forest. In Bolivia this domain islimited to 20% of public forests, in Nepal tothe less-lucrative forests of the middle hills;and in Indonesia to 100 ha concessions (overwhich several local authorities may have aclaim). Control over the remaining territory isusually retained by the central government. Inother words, in those cases where local govern-ments can exercise real powers, we find thattheir powers apply only to very small areas offorests or to low valued products from forests.

Finally, central governments limit the abilityof local authorities to exercise power by eithercreating ambiguity in their reforms, or byexploiting ambiguities inherent in all policymeasures. Lack of legal clarity or a requirementthat the local authority should coordinate itsdecisions with higher-level officials make it easyfor central departments and ministries to main-tain control and ignore local government input.Legal ambiguities also make it very difficult fora local governments to act because it may betaken to task for having undertaken an illegalaction (Larson, 2002).

On a case-by-case basis, the limitations on lo-cal powers that we describe may be seen asdeviations or aberrations. But their presenceacross the different cases, and the similar effectsthat produce for local governments suggeststhat the story is not that simple. Rather thanrepresenting technical failures of adjustmentin newly developed decentralization frame-works, they seem to be intentional, even if notself-conscious, mechanisms to serve the inter-ests of those who are already in control.

(b) Actors and accountability

Another set of limitations on the effectivenessof decentralization reforms can be attributed tothe nature of the local authorities that come toexercise decentralized powers, and, in particu-lar, their accountability relations. In the nameof decentralization, powers are transferred torepresentative local governments, local admin-istrative bodies of the central state, elected orappointed single-sector or single-purposeauthorities or committees, NGOs, customaryauthorities or private organizations or individ-uals. But if the fruits of decentralization dependon the extent to which these local bodies areaccountable, competitive, participatory, or wellinformed, then surely the identity of the localauthority makes a significant difference. Cus-

tomary authorities, NGOs, appointed officials,and private organizations are not elected andmay not be particularly accountable (Ribot,2004). Certain groups may encourage partici-pation, but more often they do not. Some areno better informed than central governmentsabout locality-specific information. There isno reason to suppose that such local authori-ties, when they gain powers to make decisions,will perform well. But most importantly, thedegree to which the empowerment of any ofthese local actors constitutes decentralizationdepends on the degree to which they areaccountable to local populations.

In all of the case studies presented here, somemanagement authority has been transferred toelected local bodies, although this is not thecase in many other countries. This may, in fact,be one of the reasons that these six cases countamong and stand out as examples of demo-cratic decentralization, even if we find that thepractice of decentralization does not meet itspromise.

One important problem is that, though theelectoral process certainly establishes a degreeof accountability, the depth of accountabilityrelations depends on the type of elections andthe extent to which they are competitiveand regular. In Nicaragua, Bolivia, Indonesia,and Senegal, local government officials arenot elected as individuals but by party slate.In Uganda as well, local government candi-dates are selected by higher-level political lead-ers. Hence, elected leaders are at least as—if notmore—upwardly accountable to these officialsas they are downwardly accountable to localconstituents. With the dissolution of democracyin Nepal, the local level electoral process hasbeen severely compromised. In addition, evenwhere other accountability mechanisms exist,such as the vigilance committees in Bolivia,they do not work in practice if marginalizedgroups are unable to take advantage of them.

In any event, given the newness of the decen-tralization reforms we have discussed, and thefrequent lack of familiarity of local populationswith the electoral process, a full sense ofaccountability will emerge only as electionsbecome institutionalized. The rough ‘‘two-changes-of-power rule’’ may apply as well tolocal elections—if so, there is little reason tosuppose that, at this point in time, electionsconstitute a meaningful accountability mecha-nism. As the case studies show, other mecha-nisms of accountability that might supplementelectoral ones—such as ombudsmen, active


media reporting, and effective judiciaries—aretypically absent from the contexts we have de-scribed.

5. CONCLUSION

Decentralization reforms are being attenu-ated via insufficient power transfers and in-appropriate local institutional arrangements.The choice of powers and of institutionalarrangements form the basis of central govern-ment actions that compromise the process ofdecentralization in practice. Our comparativeanalysis of the complex ways in which decen-tralization reforms have unfolded across sixcountries, reveals the combinations of mecha-nisms that various interested actors use toundermine decentralization reforms. The analy-sis shows that the political–economic context ofdecentralization cannot be ignored. Our studyalso raises doubts about the underlying inten-tions of central government officials and politi-cians when they claim to decentralize andsimultaneously provide arguments that justifythe slow pace of decentralization. Such argu-ments reflect a lack of faith in the capacitiesof the very people who are supposed to beempowered by decentralization reforms.

There may be some truth in arguments aboutlack of local capacity, absence of technicalexpertise to govern forests, and low levels offinancial aptitude at the local level. But thesearguments also seem to be more than a littleself-serving. After all, the ‘‘science’’ of forestryin practice is often not so much science as muchas a complex collection of bureaucratic proce-dures that can confuse the most capable of sil-vicultural experts. In any case, technical expertscan be hired or consulted (one need not be amechanic to drive a car), if necessary, werelocal government to have access to sufficientfinancial resources. And finally, the record ofcentral governments in managing finances orforests is scarcely one that elicits admiration.

At the same time, the case descriptions wehave provided implicitly show that the centralstate is not a monolithic actor. While some ele-ments within the state pursue decentralizationpolicies, others find their interests better servedby resistance to decentralization. Indeed, thepolitics inherent in decentralization reformsmeans that alliances among different politicalactors can be formed across administrativelevels of the state, and that actors at the samelevel—central, provincial, or local—are not

necessarily united by a common set of interests(Agrawal, 1999). In this sense our comparativestudy of six cases illustrates the need for morecareful attention to the many rivalries that setdifferent groups within the state apart fromeach other. The literature on decentraliza-tion can gain important insights from institu-tional ethnographies of the decentralizingstate. It is also important to note that resistanceto decentralization comes from outside the gov-ernment as well (see Ribot, 2004; Ribot &Oyono, 2005). NGOs and donors, by steeringaway from the local government and emphasiz-ing private and ‘‘civil society’’ institutions, canencourage institutional choices that compro-mise the establishment of the local democraticinstitutions that are the basis of effective decen-tralization.

To sum up, our case studies show clearly thatthe experiments in decentralization of forest-re-lated decision making have not yet taken root,let alone bore fruit. We see that central govern-ments, regardless of official rhetoric, policy,and legislation, erect imaginative obstacles inthe path of decentralized institutions andchoices. However, decentralization reformsmay be made more comprehensive by attendingto four important issues. The first step is to beaware of the ways in which specific argumentsand mechanisms are used to compromise dem-ocratic decentralization, and to recognize thatthe real reasons behind those arguments andmechanisms are not the ones being stated.

Second, ‘‘downwardly accountable institu-tions’’ should be constructed at various levelsof government. Mechanisms of accountabilitygo beyond the electoral process. Multipleaccountability mechanisms—providing infor-mation and enabling sanction—can be applied.At a minimum, they should include ‘‘informa-tion sharing’’ across governmental levels andwith the general population, and civic educationof local peoples and authorities so that peopleknow what they can demand—what they canhold local authorities accountable for—and solocal authorities know what they can offer(see Ribot, 2004).

Third, accountable local officials shouldpossess discretionary powers that offer a securedomain of autonomous decision making, andfunding that allows these decisions to be imple-mented. Those powers, and the limits to them,should not be seen as simple technocratic orscientific judgments, but rather recognized aspolitical decisions (Bazaara, 2003). Hence, a‘‘broadly participatory political–institutional


process’’ should be constructed through whichsuch decisions could be debated.

Finally, in order to overcome central gov-ernment resistance, ‘‘broad coalitions’’ thatbring together a diversity of interest groupsfrom different sectors of society and govern-ment could provide an effective institutional

forum for the promotion of democraticdecentralization. Such coalitions could helpcounter-balance the centralizing tendencies ofnational governments, and as such might serveas important political allies for the long-termdevelopment of a real, democratic decentraliza-tion.

NOTES

1. ‘‘Bureaucratic decentralization’’ is another name fordeconcentration. See Rolla (1998). Adamolekun (1991)points out that deconcentration often takes place in thename of decentralization. The two need not however beconfused.

2. See Manor (1999) and Blair (1998). When govern-ments cede powers to nonstate bodies such as privateindividuals or corporations, the process can be termedprivatization, and we do not consider it decentralization.When, under governmental supervision, powers andspecific responsibilities are allocated to public corpora-tions or any other special authorities outside of the regularpolitical-administrative structure, it is called delegation.

3. See Breton (1996), Tiebout (1956), and Oates (1972).Webster (1992) is only one of the later figures to arguethat decentralization can be seen as a means by whichthe state can be more responsive, more adaptable, toregional and local needs than is the case with aconcentration of administrative powers.

4. Agrawal (1999). Several authors (Nzouankeu, 1994;Souza, 1996) discuss the relationship between decentral-ization and democracy.

5. See Ribot and Larson (2005) for cases from Mon-golia, China, Brazil, India, Indonesia, Bolivia, Camer-oon, South Africa, and Nicaragua. Ribot (2004) extractsfrom the above cases along with cases from Senegal,Mali, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. Also see Mapedza andMandondo (2002) on Zimbabwe, Bazaara (2003), andMuhereza (2003) on Uganda, Ferroukhi and Echeverrıa(2003) on Guatemala, and Vallejo (2003) on Honduras.

6. The 1993 code that was designed to make forestmanagement more ‘‘participatory’’ is thus the inclusionof local governments as possible recipients of forest usepermits. RDS, ‘‘Projet de Decret Portant Code Forestier(Partie Reglementaire)’’ (Ministere de l’Environnementet de la Protection de la Nature, 1994, p. 1).

7. The state practiced a double standard in that therural councils were obligated to manage forests follow-ing detailed management plans while the commercial

concessionaires did not have to conduct follow up work.Further, the councils could not sell to anyone other thanthe commercial concessionaires who held professionallicenses. See Ribot (1995a, forthcoming).

8. Regional and Rural Councils govern these levels oflocal government, with the Rural Community being themost-local unit.

9. They can engage individuals or any legally recog-nized group to exploit forests. Individuals, cooperatives,corporations, and interest groups recognized by thegovernment can apply to rural councils for permission towork in commercial forestry.

10. RdS (1998). Art. R29 allows the forest service toallocate the third parties. It is not clear in what cases thisright applies.

11. The fiscal incentives here are perverse. RuralCouncils have no right to tax the resource. Localcouncils can only profit from the control of illegal legalactivities—which will give it an incentive to have illegalactivities in its jurisdiction. If the council cleans upillegalities, it loses its income.

12. RdS (1998). Code Forestier, Loi No. 98/03 du 8Janvier 1998, Decret No. 98/164 du 20 Fevrier 1998.Ministere de l’Environnement et de la Protection de laNature, Direction des Eaux, Forets, Chasse et de laConservation des Sols. Art. L7, L8, L10–17, L74, L77;and R63, R66. Also see art. R29 which contradicts someof these new powers.

13. There is no discussion of how the relevant level isdetermined, however, the only two levels mentioned inthe code are the Region and the Rural Community.

14. After an initial three-year period from the enact-ment of the forestry code, commercial production innonmanaged areas is illegal ‘‘except in exceptional andlimited cases’’ which can be authorized by the director ofthe Forest Service. RdS (1998, art. L77). At present theseexceptional instances represents the vast majority of


cases (personal communications with forest serviceagents and projects in Senegal).

15. This disposition is ambiguous. It is not clear fromthe code whether they need permission from the PCR todo so. See RdS (1998, art. R29).

16. The ministry has changed names several times.

17. Access to the National Forestry Fund will bedefined by ministerial decree (RdS, 1998, art. L6).

18. Observations based on field research and numerousinterviews of foresters, rural councilors and rural councilpresidents, ministry of environment agents, forestrymerchants, woodfuel wholesalers, and donors in Senegalduring 2002–4.

19. Interviews with rural councilors in 2003.

20. Personal communication with a participant in lastNovember’s meeting. This participant, who wishes to beanonymous, mentioned that several merchants objectedto the distribution of quotas, but were ignored. Also seeBa (2006).

21. Personal communications with the deputy to thePresident of the Regional Council of Tambacounda, andinterviews with rural council presidents in the Tambac-ounda Region, November 2003.

22. Senegal’s rural councils who receive most of thenewly transferred powers are elected. These elections,however, do not make the councils representative of noraccountable to local populations. Candidates for RuralCouncils can only be presented for election by nationallyregistered political parties. The role of political parties inlocal government needs more in depth examination. SeeCowan (1958, p. 221). This is not a new phenomenon. Avillager (in Koumpentoum, June 1994) explained thatthe Councilors are chosen by Deputies in the NationalAssembly. Deputies choose people based on those whosupport them in their elections—‘‘The Councils arechosen by the parties’’ (Ribot, 1999). Hesseling (n.d., p.17) writes, based on her research in Senegal in 1983, thatcouncils ‘‘. . . are at times nothing more than sections ofthe Socialist Party [the party in power at the time] . . .’’Indeed, in 1994, the ruling Socialist Party dominatedover 300 of Senegal’s 317 rural councils. Elections inSenegal are structured to create upwardly accountablerural councils.

23. Personal communication, November 2003.

24. Personal communication, M. Faye. November2003.

25. The research for this case was conducted andwritten up by Muhereza (2003).

26. The Local Government (Resistance Councils)Statute, 1993, Uganda Gazette No. 55, Vol. LXXXVI,December 31, 1993.

27. Bazaara (2002b) explains this decentralization asthe result of attempts to resolve regional conflicts andpressure from the World Bank, IMF, and otherprograms.

28. Correspondence from Mr. E.D. Olet, Commis-sioner for Forestry, to all District Forest Officers, April26, 1995, Statutory Instrument 1995, No. 2; The ForestReserves (Declaration) Order of 1998 (Statutory Instru-ment No. 63), Statutory Instruments Supplement No. 23of 11 September 1998.

29. Local Governments (Resistance Councils)(Amendment of Second Schedule) (No. 2) Instrumentof 1995.

30. Statutory Instrument No. 63 of 1998 revoked theForest Reserves (Declaration) Order of 1968 or Statu-tory Instrument No. 176 of 1968.

31. Section 5(i) of the 1964 Forest Act.

32. Although many of the dynamics found in thisdistrict are reported elsewhere, generalizations arealways subject to caution and qualification. We presentthe information from this case to show how it is possibleto manipulate decentralization-related legislation.

33. The Forest Department provided for some revenuesharing and forest uses with local populations under apilot scheme for comanagement. In Masindi, collabora-tive forest management is occurring in some communi-ties around the Budongo Central Forest Reserve.

34. Ironically, the National Forest Authority (whichreplaced the Forest Department in 1998) reduced theirstaff in 2000, crippling their ability to manage forestresources effectively (Muhereza, 2003, p. 7).

35. A similar story unfolded in Mali where thegovernment gave new powers to local authorities butalmost no territorial jurisdiction over which to exercisethe newly granted powers (Ribot, 1999).

36. Muhereza (2003, p. 33) points out that not alloutcomes may be attributable uniquely to decentraliza-tion policies since many other socio-economic changesare also ongoing in Uganda.


37. Arnold and Campbell ‘‘Collective Management,’’pp. 440–444.

38. Literally, a panchayat in rural south Asia refers to adecision-making collective or council of five persons.Many government regulations for rural organizationbuilding seek to empower such informally existingbodies, or to create them de novo. The actual member-ship of the council, usually an odd number, can compriseup to nine persons.

39. As with any policy of this kind, the manner ofimplementation of the law is sometimes more arbitraryand less participatory than it is at other times. A 1995study of 419 ‘‘chairpersons’’ of forest committeesuncovered that ‘‘most of them did not know if theywere members of a forest committee, or what they wereexpected to do’’ (Britt, 2000, p. 22).

40. There is an initiative currently under considerationto tax the revenue that user groups obtain under thisprogram; see Mahapatra, 2000, pp. 7–8.

41. Based on Resosudarmo (2005).

42. APKASI is the Asosiasi Pemerintah KabupatenSeluruh Indonesia (or, the Association of RegencyGovernments of Indonesia); APPSI is the AsociasiPemerintah Provinsi Indonesia (or, Association of Pro-vincial Governments of Indonesia).

43. Unless otherwise stated, the information providedhere was taken from Pacheco (2002, 2003), and forth-coming. The Bolivian study is based on the analysis of 12

lowland municipalities with humid and semi-humidtropical forests.

44. Previously ‘‘municipal government’’ referred tourban area government. The term is now used inter-changeably with ‘‘local government’’ to refer to the entireurban–rural district, which is called a municipality.

45. In response to their protest, the law was reformedin 2003 to reduce the fee of $1 per hectare per year tocover only the area being logged annually.

46. As in Bolivia, the municipality encompasses boththe urban and rural area in a single district, andmunicipal government here is used interchangeably withlocal government.

47. The Forestry Institute has been in turmoil for severalyears, in part due to heavy questioning by citizens and themedia. A new director hired in late 2003 has finally beguna serious attack on internal corruption (see, e.g., La

Prensa January 10, 2004 and January 22, 2004).

48. Local governments have issued their opinion basedon site visits, which are still also undertaken byINAFOR; the two institutions do not always coordi-nate.

49. Senegal’s previous ‘‘participatory’’ code producedan image of local inclusion under a system thateffectively allowed the forest service to mobilize locallabor in a kind of ‘‘participatory corvee’’ (Ribot, 1995a).

50. Interviews with charcoal merchants 2003.

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