Reconciling the State and Society in Somalia:

Reordering Islamic Work and the Clan System

Abdurahman M. Abdullahi (Baadiyow)

and Ibrahim Farah1

Introduction

Somalia remains one of the world’s hot spots that attract news coverage on

failed and collapsed states, African civil wars, cyclic droughts and floods,

abuses of human rights, religious extremism, global war on terrorism, and

military interventions. Successive regional and internal attempts to

reconstitute the Somali state and numerous peace and reconciliation

conferences had failed to bring neither peace nor functioning institutions.

Approaches used in these conferences were swinging: from warlord

conferences (1991-99) to civil society-driven (2000) and to warlord-dominated

processes (2003-04).2 The emergence of the Union of Islamic Courts (UIC) in

2006 and their encounter with the allied forces of the Transitional Federal

Government (TFG) and those of Ethiopia added more agony to the Somali

tragedy.

Evidently, during wars and calamities, most people took refuge and solace in

their faith and protection from their ethnic enclaves and clans. Subsequently,

1 The authors are PhD candidates in Islamic and international studies respectively and are engaged in consultancies in regional political analysis on Somalia and the Horn. This paper was presented in the 10th Somali Studies International Association (SSIA) conference held in Ohio State University on 15-18 August, 2007.2 “The first ‘Somali’ reconciliation conference in which all faction leaders participated was held in Addis Abba in March 1993 under the sponsorship of the UN and funded by the Swedish NGO Life and Peace Institute (LPI). The other three major conferences were held in Kenya (1994), Ethiopia (1996), and Egypt (1997). Participation in all these conferences was limited to the warring political factions. See Abdullahi, Abdurahman. “Penetrating Cultural Frontiers in Somalia: History of women’s Political Participation during four Decades (1959-2000).”African Renaissance. 4:1 (2007), 44.

Islam and clan attachments, the basics of ‘Somaliness,’ developed gradually

into high position in the society that should be reckoned in any new power

configurations.3 The balance of power that determines state-society relations

has also shifted towards society in the aftermath of state collapse and the

establishment of the ‘Somaliland’ and ‘Puntland’ administrations. The same

phenomenon was observed during Somali Reconciliation Conference in

Djibouti in 2000.4 In these local administrations and Djibouti conference,

preliminary reconciliation of the state and society was launched on the basis of

mutual recognition. Conversely, the IGAD-sponsored conference in Kenya

(2003-2004) had reversed the reconciliation trend and instead, the conference

was hijacked and manipulated by the warlords relegating all other

stakeholders into the periphery.5 As a consequence of this faulty process, the

Somali conflict shifted to a more knotty stage. Almost three years have passed

since current TFG was formed in 2004 and the people of Somalia are more

divided and attached to the interests of foreign powers. Moreover, protracted

conflicts based on social, political and resources have added up new violent

conflict on the interpretation of Islam with the emergence of the UIC.

As the title implies, the paper points out the need to reconcile the state and

society in Somalia although this process faces two main challenges: Islamic

extremism on one side and radicalization of clans on the other, both of which

are contentious and widely misused as instruments of the conflict. This will be

done from a scholarly perspective and by provoking policy makers on Somali

affairs. This paper, therefore, aims to study the impact of the breakdown of the

indigenous systems and authorities and alerts the increasing level of threat to

the very existence of Somalia. The fundamental assumption is that organized

3 See Abdullahi, Abdurahman. “Tribalism and Islam: The basics of Somaliness.” Muddle Suzanne Liluis, ed. Variations on the theme of Somaliness. Finland: Centre of Continuing Education, Abo University, 2001.4 This new relationships became visible in the civil society-driven Arta peace process held in Djibouti in 2000, where both the Somali Islamic institutions and the clans were recognized.5 ‘Somaliland’ had established “Golaha Guurtida” similar to the Senate form in other countries while in Puntland the Issimo similar to the Guurtida is also very active in the management of conflict just like Islamic organizations and civil society groups.

clan system and legitimate and authoritative interpretation of Islam will

contribute to the stability of the Somali state, and bolsters regional and global

security.

1. Theoretical Framework

Just to refresh the memory of the reader, there are three important theoretical

definitions to bring forth on the state and the society and their relationships:

1.1. The state: The state as defined by political scientists and jurists is a

community occupying a specific territory which has a functioning government

and recognized as such by other governments.6 In public perceptions, however,

the meaning of the state, regime and government are not quite discernable.

Particularly, Somalis express these three terms as “dawladda.”7 The state in

this paper means the institutions which enforce a public good and its capability

is measured by its ability to “penetrate society, regulate social relationships,

extract resources, and appropriate or use resources in determined ways.”8

Post-colonial states in the Muslim societies, and Somalia is not different, are

fashioned to be secular in essence with some religious coloring; putting these

states in conflict with the basic value system of its population.

1.2. The society: The society is “the aggregate of people living together in a

more or less ordered community” or “a particular community of people living

in a country or region, and having shared customs, laws, and organizations.”9

In this paper, society means the people living within jurisdiction of the Somali

Republic organized traditionally as clans and religious brotherhoods.10 In the

6 See Garner, Wilford, Political Science and Government (American Book Company, 1928), p.52.7 Lately, technical terms were coined such as qaranka (the state), xukuumadda (the government) and rejiimka (the regime) while the term dawladda remains a general term for all. 8 See Joel S. Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak states: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World (Princeton: Princeton University press, 1988), p.4.9 See more at http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/society.10 There are four major clans and a group of minority sub-clans making a clan on their own: Darod, Hawiye, Dir, and the Digil-Mirifle, the minorities (or others as was adopted during the Arta peace process. These clan groupings were formed during Arta peace process in 2000 into a 4.5 clan distribution formula. Moreover, the Sufi brotherhoods of Qaderia, Ahmadiya,

modern era, besides traditional organizations of the society, “Ururada

Bulshada Rayidka ah” (civil society organizations) have emerged that include

registered charities, developmental organizations, Islamic organizations and

professional associations.11

1.3. State-society relations: According to Tracy Kuperus, relationship

between the state and society represented by the civil society institutions

(traditional and modern) are assumed to be conflcitual. However, these

relations can be described in six possible scenarios ranging from extreme

cooperation to extreme conflict: 1) mutual collaboration; 2) mutual

engagement; 3) conflictual engagement; 4) mutual disengagement; 5) enforced

disengagement; and finally 6) resistance-revolutionary disengagement.12

Historically, this relation in the Somali context shifted with the change of the

nature of the state from quasi democratic (1960-1969) to authoritarian (1969-

1990).

2. Historical Background:

Historically, state-society relations in Somalia are characterized as conflictual

since state institutions were formed by the colonial powers without the

participation of the community leaders (clan elders and Islamic scholars).

Gradually, the state encountered two major internal conflicts and rebellions.

These are the rebellion based on clan sentiments and insurgence in the name

of Islam. Consequently, Islam and the clan, which are the two common

denominators of the Somalis, were used as ideologies of conflict and

instruments of struggle for political power.

2.1 Clans vs. the State: Clash and Compromise

Salihiya and other smaller brotherhoods are rampant throughout the country.11 Traditional and modern civil society organizations in Somalia are classified in these two categories. See Abdullahi, Abdurahman. “Non-State Actors in the Failed State of Somalia: Survey of the Civil Society Organizations in Somalia during g the Civil War.” Darasaat Ifriqiyayyah, 31 (2004), p.59.12 See Tracy Kuperus, Frameworks of State-Society Relations, accessed at: http://www.acdis.uiuc.edu/Research/S&Ps/1994-Su/S&P_VIII-4/state_society_relations.html.

Some clans began their overt armed rebellion when some of them have

dissented widening imbalances of military regime’s power-sharing modality or

losing previous political privileges. Clanism as political factor was taking roots

in the early formation of the political parties in 1950s, even though official

state policies were consistently vilifying and suppressing clan sentiments

through variety of legislations and harsh policies.13 Yet, policies and

approaches used during the military regime to suppress clan sentiments have

not only nurtured the clan system but it also polarized and to some extent

radicalized. As a result, armed opposition along these clan and sub-clan lines

had emerged one after the other mainly in the 1980s: for example, the

Majerten-dominated Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) which was

formed in 1978, the Isaq-led Somali National Movement (SNM) in 1981, the

Hawiye-based United Somali Congress (USC) in 1986, and the Ogaden-

dominated United Somali Patriotic (USP) formed in 1989. These armed

factions have gradually weakened the state and finally succeeded to topple the

regime and the state in the early 1991. Unfortunately, in the absence of the

national vision, low capacity of leaderships and Ethiopian strategic agenda that

nurtured these factions, internal conflicts exacerbated and brutal civil war

broke out reverting Somalia into pre-state primitive conditions.

In the southern regions, Somalia remained in turmoil as fiefdoms in the hands

of many ever fighting warlords answerable to no authority. On other hand,

‘Somaliland’ and ‘Puntland,’ succeeded to overcome challenges of the armed

factions and established peaceful and thriving but fragile administrations on

clan-based power-sharing models. It can be argued that the official recognition

of the roles of clan elders and Islamic scholars in the rebuilding institutions

13 Three important laws were passed prior to 1969. The first was intended to reduce the authority of the tribal chiefs, the second to lessen tribal solidarity and the third resulted in banning political parties that utilized tribal names. The military regime enacted laws to liquidate dabar-goynta charged to eliminating clanism in Somalia; abolishing the Diya (blood money) system, renaming clan chiefs in the rural areas; and introducing compulsory auto insurance and local government responsibility for funeral expenses. Above all, massive propaganda against clanism was conducted in the name of the ‘socialist transformation’ of Somali society.

while at the same time eliminating extremist tendencies have saved these

communities.14

On the other hand, after more than twelve failed conferences, a new approach

for reconciliation was set into motion in the Djibouti-sponsored peace initiative

in 1999. This conference had adopted officially a clan power sharing formula

based on the famous 4.5 system. This means that the clan factor was

recognized and affirmed in the Transitional National Charter (TNC). The

change of the elite’s views on state-society relations has not only practical

relevance in the absence of modern political institutions, but also was a sealing

victory of traditionalist approach over sophomoric modernist’s mythology.15

2.2. Islam vs. the State: Marginalization and Conflict

Although Islam is the common religion of the people of Somalia, nonetheless,

its practical application was limited and played a peripheral role in the modern

Somali state. This means that despite the societal Islamic practice in ages

throughout Somalia, the post-colonial state has been cilmaani Uyaal, meaning

quasi-secular in the post-independence era and cilmaani, meaning secular

during the military regime.16 As a result, Islamic organizations started to

emerge in the late 1960s to express protestation against growing tendency of

14 Islamists participated in the formation of Somaliland and their influence is evident in the adopted flag and constitution. With respect to Puntland, they disbanded SSDF armed faction and weakened Al-Itixaad Islamic organization the bloody war of 1992.15 4.5 formula of power sharing adopting during Djibouti Reconciliation Conference in 2000 were strongly criticized by many scholars like Omar Enow, Mohamed Enow, Abdi Samatar and Ahmed Samatar. However, these scholars failed to come up with acceptable practical approach of power sharing in the absence of political institutions. Also, it is important to note that 4.5 formula offered women and minority clans more seats in the parliament while so called dominant clans received less seats comparatively. In the final analysis, 4.5 was a temporary measure of democratization of traditional society and never intended to be used as permanent approach for future political model. See Mohamed A. Enow. “Inclusive but unequal: the enigma of the 14th SNRC and the Four point five (4.5) factor” in Abdullahi A. Osman and Issaka K. Souare (edited), Somalia at the crossroads: Challenges and Perspectives on Reconstituting a Failed State (London: Adonis and Abby publishers Ltd, 2007). 16 Constitutions of 1960 indicate that the state was not secular; nevertheless, the way of life continued secular treats prevalent during colonial era. On the other hand, ideology of socialism adopted during military regime that negates Islamic values qualify military regime to be characterized as secular.

secularization and westernization in the society.17 Although a number of

Islamic organizations were covertly organized during the military rule (1969-

1990), nonetheless, three major Islamic movements, namely Al-Islah, Al-Ittihad

and Al-Tablig appeared to the public scene after the collapse of the state.18

Evidently, these three organizations took different approaches and means in

achieving their programs and strategic goals.19 Also, other splinter groups or

smaller organizations showed activism during the civil war including some

extremist groups.

During the civil war, Islamic organizations succeeded to outreach Somali

communities in the Diaspora and inside the country. Moderate elements of the

Islamists have actively participated in Buroa and Borama Conferences of

‘Somaliland’ and in the Growe Conference of ‘Puntland’. The Islamist inputs in

these conferences are evident in the adopted constitutions of the two

administrations.20 Moreover, in the Somali Reconciliation Conference in

Djibouti in 2000, the role of Islam was placed high as the supreme reference

for all state laws.21 Moreover, Islamic organizations and Ulama not only fully

participated in the conference as part of their clans, but in the name of Ulama,

five special seats were allocated in the Transitional National Assembly (TNA).22

Conversely, the IGAD-sponsored Eldoret/Mbagathi peace process

1717. The most active Islamic organization in the early years of the Islamic movement was “Al-Nahda Movement” founded in 1967 by Sheikh Abdul-Gani and Sheikh Mohamed “Geryare”. For more details, see Abdullahi, Abdurahman. “Political Islam in Somalia.” Middle Eastern Affairs Journal. 1:3 (1993): 44-55. 18 The famous Al-wahda movement in the Northern regions “Somaliland” was incessantly breaking into sub-groups unifying with other movements. Names such as Al-Ittihad (1981), Al-Tajamuc(1992) and al-Ictisam (1996) were adopted by the Salafia movement originally established under the name of Jama Islamiyah (1979) . 19 See Abdullahi, Abdurahman. “Recovering the Somali State: the Islamic Factor.” In Somalia: Diaspora and State Reconstitution in the Horn of Africa, edited by A. Osman Farah, Mamo Mushie, and Joakim Gundel. London: Adonis & Abby Publishers Ltd, 2007. See also Andre Le Sage, "Al-Islah in Somalia: An analysis of modern political Islam," unpublished manuscript; and Roland Marchal, "Islamic political dynamics in the Somali civil war," in Alex de Waal (ed.), Islamism and Its Enemies in the Horn of Africa (Indiana University Press, 2004).20 See for example the flag of ‘Somaliland’ and its constitution. The same is true in ‘Puntland.’21 See the Article 2.2 and Article 4.4 of transitional National Charter adopted in the conference. 22 These five seats were offered mainly to the Ulama of the clan-based Islamic Courts from Mogadishu constituency. Delegates of the Somali Reconciliation Conference mandated the president of Djibouti to allocate 20 parliamentary seats outside of 4.5 power sharing formula.

discriminated against and excluded almost Islamic organizations and

renowned Islamic scholars.23

As a result, the exclusive warlord-dominated conference was concluded with

the formation of the TFIs. Moreover, with US financial and political support,

the warlords formed an anti-terror alliance against Mogadishu-based Islamists,

notably the UIC and its allegedly Mogadishu-based backers in February 2006.

However, this undertaking did provoke unprecedented upsurge of Islamic rage

in Mogadishu under the UIC leadership and the US-backed warlord program

was aborted. Thus, the political environment of Somalia had changed

dramatically with the outright victory of UIC over the warlords and their

uncontested power in Mogadishu and the surrounding regions. Nevertheless,

the jubilation of UIC lasted short with the impasse of the peaceful dialogue and

escalation into a total war participated by the Ethiopian military with US tacit

support.

This is evident in the fact that Islamic and clan sentiments -- if aroused as

political agenda -- are capable of crashing the Somali state. It was so in 1991

regarding clan extremism and the same scenario repeated itself in 2006 vis-à-

vis religious extremism inclinations. The major difference between 1991 and

2006 with respect for the Somali state is post-9/11 developments which

changed the landscape and language of international relations. Because of that

change, any armed Islamic movement is at risk to be labelled to have links with

global terrorist networks. In the Somali case, the United States and its

regional ally in the Horn, Ethiopia, claimed that the UIC has terrorist elements

in its ranks and in that pretext, Ethiopia with US military backing intervened

militarily in Somalia and defeated the UIC forces.

23 For example, among excluded Islamic scholars from the conference after their invitation was Dr. Sheikh Ahmed Hassan Al-Qutubi because of his affiliation to Al-Islah movement. Many prominent Islamic scholars were absent from the conference because they were not invited at all. Interview with Dr. Al-Qutubi on 21 July, 2005, Mogadishu, Somalia.

3. Chaos of the Islamic Work

Islam is a complete way of life that provides guidelines for the political, social

and economic life of Muslim communities and states. Historically, Somali

people confronted external threats using the concept of “Jihad” against infidels

as resistance ideology against all colonial powers. Conscious of the strong

presence of unreceptive culture of nomadism combined with the ideology of

Islamic Jihad, colonial power offered due consideration to Islam and did

acquiescence lately with the leading Ulama.24 As a result, the role of Islam was

well placed in the first constitution of the Somali Republic in 1960.25 The

constitution affirms that “Islam is the religion of the state” and that “the

doctrine of Islam shall be the main source of laws of the State.”26 Moreover,

“laws and provisions having the force of law shall conform the constitution and

to the general principles of Islam.”27 The post-colonial Somali government also

adopted a law restricting the spread of other religions within Somali territory

in 1963.28 In order to do justice to the founding fathers of Somalia, general

policy of the government (1960-1969), as recorded in the constitution, was to

preserve the general ethical values of Islam, promote the unity of Islamic

Ummah and encourage Islamic education in the public schools.29 Nevertheless,

the inertia of colonially inherited political, social and economic systems

24 This policy was adopted after long confrontation with Ulama leading Jihad since 1990. In particular after the emergence of Darwish Movement led by Sheikh Abdullah Hassan (1990-1921). Moreover, Italian Fascist policy was to forge alliance with the Islamic communities in his war against Ethiopian Empire in 1935. As a result, Italy had built Islamic institutions such as Mosques in the town of Baidoa Furthermore, though Italian colonial administration supported Christian Missionaries, nevertheless, they were restrained in order to avert conflict with the Muslim communities. 25 Please note the political connotation involved in the terms “Somali Republic,’ and the “Republic of Somalia.” The first signifies the unity of Somalia, i.e. both northern and southern Somalia while the latter shows the former southern Somalia before independence and unification.26 See for example Article 50 of the 1960 Somali Constitution.27 See Article 98, para 1 of the 1960 Somali Constitution; See also Paolo Contini, The Somali Republic: an Experiment in Legal Integration (London: Frank Cass & Company LTD., 1969), p.58.28 See Article 29 of the 1960 Somali Constitution which states that “Every person shall have the right to freedom of conscience and freely to profess his own religion .... However, it shall not be permissible to spread or propagandize any religion other than the religion of Islam.” Restricting the spread of other religions was adopted on 29 June 1963.29

continued and remained intact. Moreover, colonial laws and westernized

culture of the elites were also sustained as part of the status quo.

Furthermore, westernized urban culture such as night clubs and alcohol

drinking and selling in the public spaces were not restrained. In the nutshell,

the capacity of the state to initiate any reform program was very slim and

therefore the status quo was sustained.

At the national level, the national institution designated for the Islamic affairs

was the Ministry of Religious Affairs. The office of Mufti, an expert of Islamic

jurisprudence, designated to offer official religious fatwa for the public and

appointed as such by the state had never existed in Somalia. Moreover, an

Islamic Council issuing collective fatwa on the Islamic matters through

research and deliberations was also never established. Traditional Islamic

institutions such as mosques, mawli’is and Qur’anic schools were initiated and

maintained by charitable individuals and non-governmental organizations

(NGOs). Practically, the Somali state considered Islamic institutions as

belonging to the private realm and never allocated any budget for its

promotion and development.

On the other hand, Islamic education was limited to the traditional Halaqa

education in the historical Islamic centers, mosques, and mawli’ics and

Qur’anic schools. Traditional Islamic education primarily focuses, after the

memorization of the Qur’anic text, on specific curriculum of Shafi’i

Jurisprudence, Sufism and Arabic Grammar. However, that tradition began to

change with the appearance of the schools administered by Egypt’s Al-Azhar

University by 1953 and government school of Islamic Studies aimed to train

Islamic judges for the elementary courts. Few graduates of these schools were

offered scholarships to Al-Azhar University before the independence in 1960.

Also, Islamic universities in Saudi Arabia graduated few Somali students after

the independence. In the subsequent years of 1960s and 70s, many Somali

students graduated from the Islamic universities in the Arab world.30 Locally,

the Faculty of Shari’a and Arabic Language was one of the last faculties of the

former Somali National University (SNU) inaugurated in 1985.31 Beyond that,

Islamic education was limited and only confined to the graduates from the

Islamic universities in the Muslim world, mostly from the Kingdom of Saudi

Arabia.32 Many of the graduates of these universities were offered jobs by

Islamic Institutions like Dar-Al-Ifta in the kingdom of Saudi Arabia and were

sent back to Somalia as preachers to spread what nowadays termed as

Salafism. Only few Somalis received post-graduate degrees in Islamic studies

as post-graduate opportunities in Islamic studies and in research were and

remain scanty.

As part of the cultural interaction with the wider Islamic world, religious

practices have nevertheless witnessed tremendous change since the 1970s.

Besides traditional Shafi’i Jurisprudence prevailing in Somalia for centuries,

other schools of jurisprudence have registered some presence. With the

emergence of Islamic revival by the 1970s, a new phenomenon of non-

complete-affiliation to the historical school of jurisprudence -- the prevailing

Shafi’i school -- became visible in Somalia.

The interpretations of other schools have been introduced and some of these

practices and advocacy of some of these schools of thoughts have created

disorder and conflict in the spaces of worship and Islamic studies. In

particular, the Salafiya movement and other graduates from the Kingdom of

Saudi Arabia emphasised on the selected aspects of Hambali Jurisprudence, a

30 New Islamic scholars began to graduate from the Islamic universities such as Al-Azhar in Egypt, Al-Iman University in Saudi Arabia. Among these are Sh. Abdulqani Sh, Ahemb, Sh. Mohamed Ahmed Nur “ geryare”, Sh. Mohamed moalim and others. These scholars had founded Al-Nahda society in Mogadishu. For more detailed account see Abdurahman Abdullaahi, “ political Islam in Somalia”. Middle eastern affairs jounal. 1:3 (1993):46-4731 The 1969/1990 military regime looked at Islamic organizations as an impediment to its socialist programs and the regime did not promote Islamic education and institutions.32 As a reaction to the Somali socialist programs, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia offered hundreds of scholarship to Somali students in their universities and particularly admitted most of them in Islamic universities.

school which is widely practiced in Saudi Arabia but is more alien to the

Somalis. The impact of the Salafiya movement was so great that religious

conflicts were mounting all over Somalia and the Sufiya vs. Salafiya

confrontations were evident in all religious spaces. As time went, both groups

radicalized and religious tolerance has been waning. Ideologically affiliated

groups to the evolutionary approaches of Muslim Brotherhood like Al-Islah, Al-

Wahda and Al-Ikhwan played a moderating and soothing role of the mounting

conflictual religious debates.33 On the other hand, parts of the Hanafi

jurisprudence spread in the Indian subcontinent and made inroads with the

appearance of the Tabliq group in Somalia especially in the last two decades.

Nonetheless, one should keep in mind that the four Sunni schools of

jurisprudence, Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi'i and Hanbali, are identical in most of their

legal conclusions. Differences in the remaining questions are traceable to

methodological differences which most of the Islamic workers in Somalia do

not master. Moreover, most of the scholars agree that non-experts on Islam,

which means Muslim masses, should follow one of the schools of jurisprudence

and do not allow flip-flopping for one school to another.

The reaction of the military regime to the activities of the Islamic movements

was brutal and violent. It was a denial of the basic rights to freedoms in all its

forms. As a result, like all the other dissident political organizations in the

early 1970s, Islamic activists in Somalia were pushed to underground

activities.34 These harsh policies included banning the Islamic Hijab,

imprisoning and executing Islamic scholars, adopting laws that go against

Islamic Sharia such as the law of inheritance and the family laws in general.35

33 Al-Islah is an Islamic organization ideologically affiliated to the approaches of the International Muslim Brotherhood networks. Al-Wahda is a local organization historically well-known in “Somaliland” that follows the same ideology of non-conflict with the traditional Sufi Orders. Al-Ikhwan is similar to Al-Wahda and concentrated in the South and affiliated to the renowned Islamic scholar sheikh Mohamed Moallim. 34 Because the military government banned other political parties and social organizations, all dissidents therefore resorted to the underground option or exile.35 Somali religious scholars had voiced their concerns with respect to the regime’s interference in the family law by introducing articles equalling genders in the inheritance. This legislation directly contravenes Islamic law and indicated lack of respect that the regime retains to the

Naturally, religious extremism mostly developed as a reaction to the ruthless

state repression of these Islamic movements. Conversely, after the collapse of

the Somali state in the early 1991, Islamic political institutions emerged and --

as a result of this vacuum -- became completely free from state control.

However, within the chaotic situation, some individuals and groups interpreted

Islam in extreme forms. In fact, in first time in the history of Somalia, Islamic

armed groups were engaged in bloody confrontations with the clannish

factions and new phenomena known as Salafia Jihadist had shown presence in

Somalia.36

At the national level, Islamic consciousness had reached its height during the

civil war. The constitutional debate during Somali Reconciliation Conference in

Djibouti produced an interim Charter regarded as the most Islamized

constitution in the history of Somalia. It included two important provisions. For

example, in Article 2.2, the Charter reinforced that “Islam shall be the religion

of the state and no other religion or ideas contrary to Islam may be propagated

in its territory.”37 Similarly, Article 4.4 stated that “the Islamic Sharia law shall

be the basic source for national legislation. Any law contradicting Islamic

Shari’a shall be void and null.”38 These two articles were rewritten in the

Transitional National Charter of 2004 with slight modifications.

All above said is a manifestation of the chaos in the Islamic works that

constantly generate conflicts within communities and society at large.

Moreover, this chaotic situation provoked religious conflict among Islamic

workers too. Furthermore, armed and extreme ideologies had led to the bloody

Islamic laws and values.36 The ideology of Salafia Jihads calls for wagging continuous Jihad against regimes that claim to be Islamic because they do not follow Shari’a Law. Some of these organizations are part of the global networks of Jihadists known as Al-Qaida. Al-Itihad Islamic organization adopted this ideology in 1992 and accordingly confronted armed factions in many regions of Somalia ( Juba, Puntland and Gedo)37 See the Transitional National Charter (TNC) adopted in 2000 in Arta, Djibouti.38 Ibid.

confrontations with local administrations and state institutions provoking

regional and international intervention in Somalia.

4. Anarchy and the Breakdown of the Clan Authority

4.1. Anarchy in the Clan System: Since 1980s, individuals claiming to

represent their clans called “warlords”, constantly appropriated authority from

the legitimate clan elders. They claimed to defend the interest of the clan,

waged wars, established sparo, looted, collected legio, confiscated properties

and lands, killed at will and signed alliance pacts with other warlords.39 In

doing so, they never consulted legitimate leaders of their clans. Sometime,

they even punish legitimate leaders who refuse to conform some of their

policies and actions. Often, these warlords created new loyalist elders of the

clan and demoted legitimate elders by splitting sub-clans or diya-paying

groups and marginalizing the legitimate clan leaders. They have mastered how

to manipulate clan sentiments and as a result, received the support of the

uneducated youth recruited to their armed militia. They also received financial

support from the business men and women of the clan who considered them as

protectors of clan political interest and grantors of security, dignity and

prestige. Moreover, in more than 10 years (1991-2000), these warlords

succeeded to hijack national agenda representing their clans in the failed

reconciliation conferences and were accepted as such by the international

community. In the last Reconciliation Conference in Kenya (2003-2004), these

warlords were erroneously privileged to select members of the Transitional

Federal Parliament. Consequently, the whole Impagathi reconciliation process

was deceptive and forgery of the national political agenda. This process

remains in the historical records as a hallmark of shame for those who coached

and offered legitimacy.

39 Sparo is known as the road block used by the militias to control streets. Legio is the money collected from the people as taxation of the militias.

Moreover, in the Somali Reconciliation Conference in Djibouti in 2000, new

traditional elders appeared to the scene claiming that they represent their

clans. These new traditional elders were created during the conference to

represent their clans in the selection process of the members of the

parliament. Some clans claimed new identity and affiliation to new clan

groups by joining alliance or the cluster of so called minority clans. This new

rearrangement gave them more members in the parliament unattainable if

they had stayed in their traditional clan groups. From this conference, the new

political vocabulary of “Duub Carte” meaning traditional elder of Arta had

appeared.

Furthermore, in March 2007, Hawiye Elders Committee appeared to political

arena in Mogadishu articulating what is termed as “Hawiye Political Agenda

and grievances”. They expressed opposition to the Transitional Federal

Government and Ethiopian military intervention. Often, these elders seemingly

represented political agenda of the opposition groups. The leader of this group

was Haji Abdi Imam, a brother of Imam of Abgal sub-clan, Imam Mohamud

Imam Omar. The group claimed that they represent Hawiye clan interest and

the international community had dealt with them as such.40 In reality, however,

they were not the legitimate traditional leaders of Hawiye nor were elected as

such by any Hawiye clan conference. They were self-appointed group claiming

to speak in the name Hawiye clan-lineage. Later, the group had splintered into

two factions and each faction claimed that their group represent legitimacy of

the group. One of the splinter group joined the National Reconciliation

Congress while the other group remained in the opposition. The formation of

this politically motivated group in the name Hawiye is part of the continuous

and illegitimate use of the clan names as the warlords did earlier.

40 On March 22, a day after the newel of fighting in Mogadishu, Hawiye Elders Committee was publicly announced. Ethiopian officers and international community were negotiating with the group for cease firing and other issue concerning reconciliations processes. See www.garoweonline.com/artman2/publish/Somalia_27/Somalia_leaders_Ethiopian_commanders_meet_with_Hawiye_elders_printer.shtml.

Three above examples shows how clan system and authority broke down and

how its fragility is exploited by the political elites. The same phenomena occur

in the all regions of Somalia including “Puntland” and “Somaliland”.

Notwithstanding the natural erosion and breakdown of the clan system by

splinting into smaller groups mostly without any new social contract between

the clans, the illegitimate use of the clan name is indicative to the breakdown

of the traditional authority. And, manipulation and contra manipulation of clan

system by the political elites and their continuous forgery of the social reality

remains one of the biggest challenges in Somalia.

4.2 Literature Review: Many scholars have written about the origins,

processes, types and different management approaches of the Somali conflict.

For the purposes of this paper, three scholars stand out of the crowd:

Bradbury, Samatar and Clark and in all perspectives, the role of the clan,

and/or the kinship system is mentioned. For example, Bradbury argues that

there is no single factor, which can explain the causes of the Somali civil war.41

He, however, points out that the legacies of European colonialism, the Somali

kinship system, contradictions between a centralised state and a pastoral

culture, Cold War politics, militarization and uneven development, ecological

decline, lack of power-sharing, corruption, oppression and the cumulative

impact of decades of armed conflicts have all contributed. Bradbury further

argues that the common use of ‘anarchy’ and ‘madness’ to describe the war

and state of disintegration in Somalia, demonstrates an ignorance of Somali

society and the nature of the civil war, by the outsiders. To him, this ignorance

was evident in the massively expensive and controversial UN military

intervention in Somalia in the early 1990s.

Samatar, on the other hand, argues that the Somali society was torn apart

because their blood ties without the Xeer,42 was manipulated by the elite so as

41 See Bradbury, Mark Somaliland Country Report (Totton: Hobbs Printer Ltd., 1997), p.1.42 Xeer is the Somali traditional or customary law, which is more of social conventions/contracts. It serves very important roles in managing not only social life but also

to gain or retain access to resources.43 He traces the conflict to two major

historical benchmarks in the evolution of Somalia: the commercialisation of the

subsistence economy; the imposition of a colonial structure and the creation of

post-pastoral democratic nodes of power. While Samatar agrees with other

analysts that it was the unseating of President Siyad Barre that finally pulled

the trigger that sparked off the Somali conflict, he comes up with two

components which should be part of the task to restructure Somalia if it is to

come back to normal: the creation of an economy in which productive

investments; and crafting political order which is accountable, representative

and entrepreneurial, and which does not allow for the personal appropriation

of public resources. Clark, on the other hand, takes a different stand and links

the problem of the Somali people partly to the nature of their social and

political organization, which is based on a decentralized culture.44

The above summary of the literature reviewed shows the centrality of the clan

system and its significance in the conflict and attempts to manage.

4.3. The Somali Clan System: History vs. Reality

As much of the contemporary conflict in Somalia can only be understood in the

context of its history, historical claims and grievances by most Somali clans

and sub-clans play an important and powerful role in the current political

debates in Somalia. Also, although the interpretation and misinterpretation of

Somali history is itself a contentious political issue due to its clan-based

nature, it is important to carefully examine the significance and/or implication

of the clan system in the Somali conflict and its management.

There are a number of issues that need to be looked at: 1) the historical fact

that the movement by Somali clans is a major source of production and

present day Somali politics in this new era of statelessness an anarchy.43 See for example Samatar, A., Somalia: A Nation in Turmoil, Minority rights Group, London, 1991.44 See Clark, J. “Debacle in Somalia,” Foreign Affairs Vol.72, No.1, pp.109-123.

dominance of the Somali culture, lineage identity and adherence to Islam

throughout the Eastern Horn of Africa; 2) that the history of pre-colonial

Somali migration shows the scattered nature of clan settlement throughout

Somalia;45 3) that Somalia was a stateless society except for very few

exceptions. As Roland argues like most broad generalizations, this one merits

qualification. Some parts of Somalia did at different points in history sustain

Sultanates and quasi-state polities.46 Customary law and/or Xeer47 evolved to

manage relations within and among Somali clans, sub-clans and sub sub-clans.

It is also still one of the few conflict management elements that survived to the

present day.

Historically, there was a decentralized political authority vested in the

community elders and clan leaders who had to negotiate disputes and conflicts

with other community elders and clan leaders by relying on customary law.

There was also the diya system or blood compensation, which was part of the

Xeer but mainly derived from the Islamic Sharia law.48 Generally, the Somali

customary law, Xeer, and the diya system helped prevent not only communal

conflicts and criminality but also served and contained lawlessness in pre-

colonial Somalia. To-date, however, the 4.5 clan distribution formula took over

the place and the role of the clan. In other words, everything is to be done

according to the famous 4.5 clan system: from recruitment; to political power-

sharing to cooperatives in wealth creation. Although it is meant to safeguard

the interests of the group at any one time, it is making a very negative

45 A good example for this is the Ogaden/Darod sub-clan members who are also found in Ogaden, Ethiopia; southern Somalia and Kenya’s northeastern region.46 See for example Roland Marchal, “A Few Provocative Remarks on Governance in Somalia,” Nairobi, UNDOS Discussion Paper, November 1997; See also Lee Cassanelli, The Shaping of Somali Society (Philadelphia: University of Philadelphia Press, 1982).47 Throughout Somalia, a combination of Islamic Sharia law, customary law and the pre-1991 penal code is widely used.48 Diya system or blood compensation was negotiated and members of the group that committed the crime had to pay what was agreed with the other group. In Islamic Sharia law, the diya is 100 camels for men and 50 for women. This is paid to the aggrieved clan as compensation. Presently, due to the Somali customary law Xeer, clans pay whatever they agree. This also becomes another binding Xeer when the same is done to any of their members.

contribution to the historical cycles of Somalia at such a critical time. Despite

the fact that this has been the fruits of the Somali Reconciliation Conference in

Djibouti, it has nonetheless been very useful during the process.49 It, however,

left a bad legacy: one of exclusion; misrepresentation; and nepotism. It was

also explained within the confines of Somali politics.

In real terms, today’s Somalia is ‘no man’s’ land. One can see an

internationally-respected but impotent Transitional Federal Institutions (TFIs)

that lacks total control of the country. Islamic insurgencies with some support

from Hawiye clan continue to fight against TFG and its Ethiopian supporters.

In addition to that, ‘Somaliland,’ claims to have seceded from the rest of the

country while ‘Puntland,’ which used to claim that it was an autonomous

regional state waiting for a future federal government to share power with, is

yet to be brought onboard. Instead, the ‘Puntland’ administration is dealing

with the outside world, printing new Somali currency notes and working on oil

exploration. There is a clan dispute over Kismayu where each and every Somali

clan claims at least partial ownership. While the Digil-Mirifle clan is yet to fully

reconcile, there is a rift emerging in Beletweyne over the administration of

Hiran region. In all the above fragile social relations the Somali people are

divided over their religious groups’ affiliations: from traditional Sufist Ahl

Sunna Wal Jama’ah; to Al Ittihad Al Islami; to Al Islah and so on. The same

differences and wrong perceptions exist among the Somali clans. For example,

Somali politics is widely believed to be between the Hawiye and Darod while,

interestingly enough, the rest are marginalized and are helplessly watching

from afar.

5. Conclusions

The paper offered a brief background of the state versus the clan system and

Islamic work in Somalia. It examined the disintegration of the clan system and

explored the chaotic situation of the Islamic work and the misuse of the legal

49 For example, it created the concept of the Somali 6th clan: the Somali women.

fatwa. The paper finally provided some suggestions for the reordering of the

clan system and the reorganization of the work of Somali Islamic institutions.

For example, from the above brief literature survey, the kinship system argued

by Bradbury; the traditional Xeer by Samatar; and the social and political

organization by Clark all point out to the fact that the clan played an important

role in conflict prevention and/or management from pre-Colonial Somalia. This

also witnesses that Somalia’s long history of migration, conquest and

assimilation, coupled with the colonially imported ‘nation-state’ system, has

made a serious impact upon the social, and in this case the clan system, the

political and administrative health of the nation; so much so, that conflict has

become almost a recognized part of daily life. It is also true to say that the

rootless ‘pastoralist’ nature of the majority of the Somali people has even

further exacerbated the already difficult situation.

A pertinent illustration of this premise lies in the work of two Africanist

scholars, Richard Burton and Ian Lewis, both of whom carried out extensive

research on Somalia. The conclusions they drew from their studies, though in

apparent contradiction, clearly illustrate the contradictory and conflicting

nature of the Somali psyche. Richard Burton characterized the Somali people

as ‘fierce republicans’; Ian Lewis, meanwhile, dubbed them ‘pastoral

democrats’. Both, perhaps, are correct. The fact that one cannot be a fierce

‘republican’ and a pastoral ‘democrat,’ at the same time, calls for a reordering

of the clan system. This is based on the notion that the clan system is the root

cause and/or trigger of the Somali conflict; and that it can be used positively

and constructively to manage the conflict if carefully approached. The paper

calls for a return to the positive use of the clan and/or kinship system; the

traditional Xeer and the social and political organization Somalia and Somalis

have had for long.

Similarly, comprehensive reconciliation in Somalia could only be realized when

the current clan conflicts are resolved; Somali Islamic institutions reorganized

and state-society relations improved. This means that a holistic approach

needs to be used in all the processes towards the achievement of this goal: for

example bringing all Somali actors onboard from the TFIs, the opposition, civil

society, the Somali Diaspora, and other regional administrations. However,

reaching this goal demands reorganizing society without which the state is

exposed to cyclical destabilization and collapse.50 In the last two decades, the

role of Islam – particularly the misinterpretation given -- and the clan system,

as the basis of Somali society, had been changing from being shared societal

norms to a means for divisive political agenda. Thus, self appointed warlords

were waging wars in the name of their clans and sub-clans while religious

clerics were also engaged in Jihadist tendency toward the issuance of fatwas

thus letting the country fall into a more serious trap especially in the absence

of a recognized and functional Somali government with weak traditional

authorities and interested groups exploiting Islam and the clan system.

Religious extremism in Somalia is part and parcel and an extension of similar

phenomena in other Muslim countries. Moreover, the current chaotic situation

in the country is part of the civil war syndrome and lack of a visionary and

responsible state authority. The plethora of literature produced about this

worldwide phenomenon is too general for the Somali case. It was apparent

that most Somalis do not comprehend the severity of extremism in their

countries. Hence, the research and comprehension of the problem is highly

needed. Although this paper attempted to raise the awareness of the problem,

it does not aim to offer ready-made answers to the complex question: what are

the major causes of religious extremism?

Three major causes could be summarized as follows. There is a growing

influence of the “takfir” doctrine in the society, a dangerous doctrine whose

proponents judge other Muslims to be non-Muslim. There is also a prevalent

50 There is a possibility of cyclical collapse where weak state institutions (1960-1969) leads to a military takeover (1969-1990) and civil war (1990-2004), and back to the starting point of weak state. Current TFIs represent the beginning of instituting the weak state.

illiteracy and strong emotional attachment to Islam in Somalia where

superficiality in understanding Islam, strong emotional attachment, the failure

of other solutions, and perpetuation of violence in the name of Islam projected

in the media, all contributed to the nurturing of excessiveness towards Islam.

And finally, there is absence of a credible Somali Islamic authority. Most of the

Muslim countries have a national authority charged with Islamic affairs. This

kind of authority could be vested on a Mufti and/or a consultative council who

can interpret Islam and issue legal fatwa on any disputed matters. Somalia

never had such a Mufti or a consultative council and this vacuum lets non-

qualified clreics to decide on such sensitive matters and without proper

authority from the Somali people whose behalf they issue fatwas.

Finally, the question remains on why reconcile the state and society? First, the

state is both artificial and it is imposed. Its nature, structure and functions are

also alien to the culture of the Somali society and this led to state collapse;

secondly the argument that the society can not live without a state no longer

holds especially in the Somali case as the 17-year old absence of the Somali

state serves a good example; and finally any Somali state will not return nor

will it be able to sustain without resolving its original conflict with its society.

In other words, unless the Somali state becomes a state by the people and for

the people, the chance of cyclic collapses is very high.

The imperative of reconciliation between the state and society therefore lies on

four key foundations: 1) promoting and abiding Islamic principles and values;

2) grassroots reconciliation between and among the Somalis; 3) attaining and

sustaining of minimum level good governance; and 4) building on equality of

all citizens with no reference to the 4.5 clan power-sharing formula anymore

an no monopoly of religion by one group.

From the above, the ultimate reconciliation of the state and society will be

realized only when the roles of Islam and that of the clan system are well

demarcated vis-à-vis the borders of the state, and when both the state and

society respect these boundaries.

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