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A altruism, 86-93

and cooperation, 93-98 and internal reasons, 90-92 and noncompliance in a prisoners'

dilemma,96 and noncompliance in a symmetric

chicken game, 98 and noncompliance in an asymmetric

prisoners' dilemma, 96 and second-order reasons, 92-93 and the argument from introspection,

99 and the efficiency objection, 99 and tranfers rate, 87 and utilitarianism, 97-98 as a cooperative virtue, 99-102 as an independent reason, I 02 indifferent altruism, 95 insufficient altruism, 94 reciprocal altruism, 195-99 reciprocal altruism and mimicry,

198-99 reciprocal altruism and the repeated

prisoners' dilemma, 196-97 reciprocal atruism and the one-shot

prisoners' dilemma, 197-98 sacrificing altruism, 90 soft altruism, 189 sympathetic altruism, 89-90

asymmetry in equilibria, 22 in strategies, 21, 34, 36

autonomous effects. See strategic intentions

INDEX

c chicken game, 31

division game, 34 war of attrition, 33

cobweb cycle, 27 collective action. See goods commitment, 257

and changing preferences, 245-46 and emotions, 199 and evolution, 199-205 and the indeterminacy problem, 257 external, 179 internal, 179-81

compliance, 1 contractarianism, 10 conventionalism

conformity, 10 definition of, 9-10 reductionism, 9 scope of, 11-16 spontaneous order, 11

conventions definition of, 24 of coordination, 24 of property, 30-35 of reciprocity, 35-40, 35-40

cooperation unconditional, 123

cooperative virtues, 4 and benefit, 176 andjustice, 151 and restraint, 161 evolutionary justification, 214-15 fairness, 4 rationality of, 263 trust, 4

coordination, 24

284

impure, 20 in the crossroads game, 19

D deviance

and mistakes, 52-53 and weakness of will, 53-54 dilemma of rational deviance, 52 rational deviance, 55

dynamic choice, 218 and changing preferences, 245-46 and consequentialism, 236-37 and dynamic consistency, 231-33 and feasibility, 230-31 and normal/extensive form

coincidence, 229-31 and pragmatic arguments, 234-35 and separability, 231-33 dynamic consistency, 220 incompatibility of conditions of

dynamic choice, 222-25 minimax regret chooser, 222 myopia, 243 normal-forrnlextensi ve-form

coincidence, 219 rejection of separability, 237-39 resoluteness, 243 separability, 220 separability and personal identity,

239-43 simple reductionism, 219 sophistication, 243

dynamic consistency (DC). See dynamic choice

E epigenetic rules, 187-88 evolution

and kin-selection, 192-94 and reliability in the commitment

model, 208-11 and reputation in the commitment

model, 211-13 and signals, 214 and the commitment model, 199-205 and the unit of selection, 185-87 as an indirect justification, 182 conditions of, 183-85 definition of, 183

INDEX

fitness, 183, 185 group selection, 189-91 inclusive fitness, 192 kin-selection and recognition, 193-94 of reliable signals, 208-11 reciprocal altruism, 195-99 reciprocal altruism and mimicry,

198-99 reciprocal altruism and the repeated

prisoners' dilemma, 196-97 reciprocal atruism and the one-shot

prisoners' dilemma, 197-98 Robert Frank on the evolution of

cooperation, 199 signals and the commitment model,

206-8 the commitment model as an

evolutionary model, 213 evolutionary stable strategy (ESS), 22-24 exploitation

and conventions, 149 and free riding, 149 and parasitism, 149 and reciprocity, 152-53 characterization, 146-48 definition of, 147 non-exploitation as a cooperative

virtue, 150-51 of trust, 148

F free riding

definition of, 145

goods collective, 13 externalities, 14

G

impossibility of exclusion, 12 jointness of supply, 12 public, 12

I intentions

and cooperative virtues, 253-55 as plans, 249-53 strategic, 249, 259-63 the toxin puzzle, 259-60

interdependence, 11, 12, 16

K kantianism

and hypothetical consequences, 119 and ideal rule-utilitarianism, 107-10 and risk-aversion, 114 and the argument from efficiency, 119 and the argument from introspection,

119 and universalization, 114-18 as a cooperative virtue, 119-21 as a rule of recognition, 106 as an independent reason, 119 everyday kantianism, 106--12

L learning by experience, 25-30

N normal/extensive form coincidence

(NEC). See dynamic choice norms, 1

and coordination, 24 and deviation, 17 and learning, 17 and recognition of deviant behavior,

17 and regularity in behavior, 17 and sanctions, 17, 56--65 characteristics of social norms, 5,

16--18 individual, 1 of property, 30-35 of reciprocity, 35-40 private, 11, 28 social, 1

p

parametric fallacy, 26 parasiting

definition of, 146 plan

conditions of admissibility, 218-22 definition, 218

prisoner's dilemma and assurance, 266

INDEX

and temptation, 266 prisoners' dilemma, 3-4, 35-40

and assurance, 256 and temptation, 256 sequential, 257 synchronous, 266

property, 30

R rationality

and the redescription of outcomes, 226--28

as consistency, 226

285

defending simple reductionism, 228 instrumental, 2 justification of a theory of rationality,

270-71 promisekeeping and the revised theory

of rationality, 268-69 reasons

distinction between outcome-oriented and process oriented reasons, 103

internal, 91 outcome oriented, 102 process-oriented, 106

reciprocity and cooperation, 130-31 and exploitation, 152-53 and fairness, 126, 153 and public goods, 131-34 and rule of recognition, 126 and trust, 137-40 as a cooperative virtue, 134 characterization of, 35-40 principle of, 127-30

resentment, 5, 65-67 and indignation, 69 and moral force, 73 and regard-seeking, 143-45 as a secondary mechanism, 145 characteristics of, 68 mechanism of, 65

rules. See norms

s salience, 40-44

and confidence, 47 and precedence, 42 and simplicity, 43

286

conventionalist theory of, 49-50 in payoffs, 44-48 nature of, 48-51 psychological theory of, 48-49

sanctions and compliance, 5

selection. See reciprocal altruism group, 6 kin, 6

separability (SEP). See dynamic choice simple reductionism (SR). See dynamic

choice

T tit-for-tat, 37-38

with mistakes, 38-39 toxin puzzle, 259-60

Kavka on the toxin puzzle, 260-62 trust

and communication, 141 and prediction, 135 and reciprocity, 137-40 and regard-seeking, 143-45 and reliability, 135

INDEX

and vulnerability, 135 as a default assumption, 137 characterization of, 134-37 definition of, 137

trustworthiness as a backward-looking reason, 137 as a default mechanism, 140 definition of, 137

v virtues

and benefit, 177-79 and moral sense, 168 and restraint, 165-66 and second-order reasons, 162 and spontaneity, 161 and sympathy, 169 Aristotle on the virtues, 160-62 artificial virtues, 169 as correctives, 172 Foot on the virtues, 170-75 Hume on the virtues, 166-70 Kant on the virtues, 162-166 natural virtues, 169

THEORY AND DECISION LffiRARY

SERIES A: PHILOSOPHY AND METHODOLOGY OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

Editors: W. Leinfellner (Vienna) and G. Eberlein (Munich)

1. G. Zecha and P. Weingartner (eels.): Conscience: An Interdisciplinary View. Salzburg Colloquium on Ethics in the Sciences and Humanities (1984). 1987

ISBN 90-277-2452-0 2. R.W. Scholz: Cognitive Strategies in Stochastic Thinking. 1987 ISBN 90-277-2454-7 3. H. Nurmi: Comparing Voting Systems. 1987 ISBN 90-277-2600-0 4. M. Schmid and F.M. Wuketits (eds.): Evolutionary Theory in Social Science. 1987

ISBN 90-277-2612-4 5. C.L. Sheng: A New Approach to Utilitarianism. A Unified Utilitarian Theory and Its

Application to Distributive Justice. 1991 ISBN 0-7923-1301-1 6. F. Fonnan: The Metaphysics of Liberty. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0080-7 7. G. Bernard: Principia &onomica. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0186-2 8. J.W. Sutherland: Towards a Strategic Management and Decision Technology. Modern

Approaches to Organizational Planning and Positioning. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0245-1 9. C. Vlek and G. Cvetkovich (eels.): Social Decision Methodology for Technological

Projects. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0371-7 10. P. Hoyningen-Huene and F.M. Wuketits (eels.): Reductionism and Systems Theory in the

Life Sciences. Some Problems and Perspectives. 1989 ISBN 0-7923-0375-X 11. K.G. Grunert and F. Olander (eels.): Understanding &onomic Behaviour. 1989

ISBN 0-7923-0482-9 12. G. Antonides: The Lifetime of a Durable Good. An Economic Psychological Approach.

1990 ISBN 0-7923-0574-4 13. G.M. von Furstenberg (ed.): Acting under Uncertainty. Multidisciplinary Conceptions.

1990 ISBN 0-7923-9063-6 14. R.L. Dukes: Worlth Apart. Collective Action in Simulated Agrarian and Industrial

Societies. 1990 ISBN 0-7923-0620-1 15. S.O. Funtowicz and J.R. Ravetz: Uncertainty and Quality in Science for Policy. 1990

ISBN 0-7923-0799-2 16. J. Gotschl (ed.): Erwin SchrOdinger's World View. The Dynamics of Knowledge and

Reality. 1992 ISBN 0-7923-1694-0 17. R. von Schomberg (ed.): Science, Politics and Morality. Scientific Uncertainty and

Decision Making. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-1997-4 18. J. Baron: Morality and Rational Choice. 1993 ISBN 0-7923-2276-2 19. M. Allais and 0. Hagen (eels.): Cardinalism. A Fundamental Approach. 1994

ISBN 0-7923-2398-X 20. E. Carlson: Consequentialism Reconsidered. 1995 ISBN 0-7923-3547-3 21. J. GOtschl (ed.): Revolutionary Changes in Understanding Man and Society. 1995

ISBN 0-7923-3627-5 22. A. Camacho: Division of Labor, Variability, Coordination, and the Theory of Firms and

Markets. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-3832-4 23. R. Hegselmann, U. Mueller and K.G. Troitzsch (eels.): Modelling and Simulation in the

Social Sciences from the Philosophy of Science Point of View. 1996 ISBN 0-7923-4125-2

THEORY AND DECISION LIBRARY: SERIES A

24. J. Nida-Riimelin: Economic Rationality and Practical Reason. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4493-6

25. G. Barbiroli: The Dynamics of Technology. A Methodological Framework for Techno-Economic Analyses. 1997 ISBN 0-7923-4756-0

26. 0. Weinberger: Alternative Action Theory. Simultaneously a Critique of Georg Henrik von Wright's Practical Philosophy. 1998 ISBN 0-7923-5184-3

27. A. Carsetti (ed.): Functional Models of Cognition. Self-Organizing Dynamics and Semantic Structures in Cognitive Systems. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6072-9

28. J. Nida-Riimelin and W. Spohn (eds.): Rationality, Rules, and Structure. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6326-4

29. J. Kliiver: The Dynamics and Evolution of Social Systems. New Foundations of a Mathematical Sociology. 2000 ISBN 0-7923-6443-0

30. V.A. Lefebvre: Algebra of Conscience. Revised Edition with a Second Part with a new Foreword by Anatol Rapoport. 2001 ISBN 0-7923-7121-6

31. J. Gotschl (ed.): Evolution and Progress in Democracies. Towards New Foundations of a Knowledge Society. 2001 ISBN 1-4020-0063-4

32. N.J. Saam and B. Schmidt (eds.): Cooperative Agents. Applications in the Social Sciences. 2001 ISBN 1-4020-0190-8

33. B. Verbeek: Instrumental Rationality and Moral Philosophy. An Essay on the Virtues of Cooperation. 2002 ISBN 1-4020-0639-X

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