reforming the federal environmental assessment and review process

Canadian Public Policy

Reforming the Federal Environmental Assessment and Review ProcessAuthor(s): Terry Fenge and L. Graham SmithSource: Canadian Public Policy / Analyse de Politiques, Vol. 12, No. 4 (Dec., 1986), pp. 596-605Published by: University of Toronto Press on behalf of Canadian Public PolicyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3550669 .

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TERRY FENGE Tungavik Federation of Nunavut and L. GRAHAM SMITH Department of Geography, University of Western Ontario

REFORMING THE FEDERAL

ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

AND REVIEW PROCESS

e gouvernement federal entreprenait en 1984 la r6forme du processus

d'6valuation et de surveillance de I'environnement. L'auteur de I'article s'est demande dans quelle mesure les reformes ont reussi a surmonter les faiblesses des anciens

mecanismes. II rappelle les pressions, parfois oppos6es, qui agissaient en faveur d'une r6forme et en particulier les rivalit6s entre

agences qui ont fourni le contexte des correctifs retenus. Rappellant I'evolution de

processus de r6forme, I'auteur montre comment certains amendements ont ete adoucis ou meme 6limines par les agences federales menacees par les changements proposes. II conclut que les reformes

adoptees sont bien souvent de pure facade et

que, si necessaires et attendues soient-elles, elles ne feront pas grand chose pour corriger les d6fauts fondamentaux du processus d'evaluation de I'environnement.

Introduction

n July 1984 the federal government an- nounced major revisions to its Environmen-

tal Assessment and Review Process (EARP). This paper outlines the key events from 1979 that culminated in reform of EARP with special emphasis on the interagency fighting, largely in Ottawa, that bedevilled attempts to revise the process.

n 1984 the Environmental Assessment and Review Process (EARP) was reformed

by the federal government. This paper examines the extent to which the reformed EARP may overcome the weaknesses of its forebear. The focus is upon the conflicting pressures to remodel EARP and, in particular, the interagency rivalry that provided the context for the eventual reforms. Tracing the

progress of the reform process, the paper illustrates how desired amendments were

variously softened and/or eliminated by federal agencies that were threatened by the

proposed changes. It is suggested that the final reforms are largely cosmetic and, whilst

both needed and welcome, they will do little to change the basic flaws inherent in EARP.

Environmental and aboriginal groups, aca-

demics, and civil servants within the federal

Department of Environment (DOE) pressed in

the late 1970s and early 1980s for profound changes to EARP. This advocacy became en-

tangled in a number of reviews of environmental and social impact assessment and its role in decision-making by the federal government. These reviews were conducted by the Senate Committee on the Northern Pipeline, the

Canadian Public Policy - Analyse de Politiques, XII:4:596-605 1986 Printed in Canada/lmprime au Canada



Northern Regulatory Review, the Task Force on Pipeline Construction Costs, the National

Energy Board (NEB), and the Department of the Environment. It became clear from these reviews that many federal government agencies were ignoring EARP, and that project evaluations conducted by the National Energy Board and by some government departments were duplicating EARP. Fuelled by the desire to 'streamline' and to 'simplify' decision-mak-

ing, key government agencies including the

departments of Energy, Mines and Resources (EMR), Fisheries and Oceans (DFO), Indian Af- fairs and Northern Development (DIAND) and others objected to wholesale reform and

strengthening of EARP. Consequently, the 1984 revisions to EARP are relatively minor.

The Environmental Assessment and Review Process: Before 1984

The federal Cabinet established EARP through directives in 1973 and 1977. Its purpose is:

to ensure that the environmental conse-

quences of all federal projects, programs and activities are assessed before final decisions are made and to incorporate the re- sults of these assessments into planning, decision-making and implementation. (FEARO, 1983:9)

The process functions at two levels: environmental screening by the initiating federal de-

partment, and formal public review by a panel appointed by the Minister of the Environment. The process is based on a 'self-assessment'

approach, whereby federal departments and

agencies assess the environmental conse-

quences of their own projects and the signifi- cance of those consequences (FEARO, 1979). Early in the planning process, initiating departments are supposed to screen all projects for

potential adverse environmental effects. If significant effects are identified the executive chairman of the Federal Environmental As- sessment and Review Office (FEARO) is

requested to establish a panel to publicly review the project. No project should

proceed until the review is completed and recommendations regarding its environmental

acceptability are forwarded to the Minister of the Environment.

Each EARP panel is responsible for issuing guidelines for the preparation of an environmental impact statement (EIS) by the proponents, for reviewing the EIS, and for obtaining public input to assist in the review (FEARO, 1979). A panel reports to the Minister of the Environment on the acceptability (or other-

wise) of the environmental effects identified in the review. The Minister of the Environment, in conjunction with the minister of the initiat-

ing department, then decides what action to take in response to a panel report. Implemen- tation of panel recommendations remains the

responsibility of appropriate ministers and as- sociated proponents (FEARO, 1979). EARP was established as an administrative proce- dure but was not given a legislative basis. It is reliant upon the co-operation of proponent/initiating departments for compliance with its

procedures, and to implement the recommendations of panels.

Public review of proposed development projects by EARP panels are surprisingly rare. Since its inception in 1972 only 30 such reviews have been held (FEARO, 1986). Major capital projects in the hydrocarbon and hydro- power industries, and transportation projects, are favoured for full public reviews. EARP

panels have, on occasion, examined truly mas- sive proposed developments such as hydrocarbon production in the Beaufort Sea region and transportation of frontier oil and gas to markets in southern Canada (FEARO, 1984b). Public awareness of EARP is confined largely to public reviews conducted by panels, but hundreds of projects are screened every year for potential environmental impacts. This part of the process is handled by government agencies and is largely hidden from public view. Nevertheless, the screening stage is, perhaps, the most important phase of EARP, for smaller

development projects, which are dealt with in the screening stage alone, can have significant cumulative impacts on the environment (Lang and Armour, 1980).

Reforming EARP 597



Criticisms of EARP

Since its inception, EARP has been the subject of much commentary, most of which has been critical of the process, its administrative rather than legal basis, and its general lack of clarity and precision (Lucas and McCallum, 1975; Lang and Armour, 1977; Emond, 1978; Cana- dian Environmental Advisory Council, 1979). Rees (1979; 1980) summarized much of this criticism and identified the following weaknesses that undermine EARP's efficiency and effectiveness: 1. The intended scope of EARP reviews is not

clear. 2. There is no obvious rationale for the exclu-

sion of federal regulatory agencies or Crown Corporations from routine participation in EARP.

3. There is the possibility of bias in the com-

position of review panels. 4. FEARO has failed to develop or enforce

consistent rules of conduct for public review; guidelines or terms of reference for the EIS vary; provisions for public participation are not always made; deadlines for submissions are ignored; and meeting schedules and agendas are altered without notification.

5. The lack of a legal mandate weakens reviews: panels have no power of subpoena; the chair cannot enforce participants to

comply with requests; and participants cannot require panelists to pursue lines of

questioning. 6. EARP often occurs late in the planning

process and is pushed to meet project deadlines.

7. EIS guidelines seem to preclude the 'no go' option.

8. An absence of implementation studies leaves the question of compliance open and the real impact of EARP unknown.

Most of these criticisms are directed to EARP's

public review phase. Rees, however, noted that 'infrequent recourse to formal review ob-

viously imposes an immense burden upon environmental screening procedures, since the bulk of EARP-related activity unfolds in this

phase' (Rees, 1980:363). Yet Rees found this

phase to be obscure and secretive, and

charged that the procedures used by initiating departments were 'ad hoc, undocumented and

impossible to evaluate' (Rees, 1980:365). In June 1982 an internal evaluation of the federal

government's implementation of the screening phase of EARP confirmed these criticisms

(DOE, 1982). This evaluation of 11 programs in six federal agencies (departments of Energy, Mines and Resources (EMR), Environment

(DOE), Indian Affairs and Northern Develop- ment (DIAND), National Defence, Public

Works, and Transport) found a 'general lack of

implementation of EARP except for some se- lected capital projects and mega projects' (DOE, 1982). The evaluation noted that EARP suffered from a lack of agreement on what

types of proposals require screening, slow and ad hoc implementation, a duplication of effort and inefficient use of resources. These program evaluations revealed that nearly a dec- ade after Cabinet directed its establishment, EARP was being ignored by many federal

agencies with nonchalance and impunity. By the late 1970s many environmental

groups in the provinces and aboriginal groups in northern Canada were pressing the federal

government to strengthen EARP and to provide it with a statutory base. These groups used the analyses of EARP conducted by aca- demics and lawyers, referred to previously, as the basis for their demands. On occasion, EARP's ill-defined role in the federal government's decision-making dominated panel reviews of proposed projects. For example, in 1979 the Canadian Arctic Resources Commit- tee (CARC), an Ottawa-based public interest

group, questioned vehemently a panel review-

ing proposed hydrocarbon drilling in Lancaster

Sound, Northwest Territories, claiming it to be

poorly organized and to be perpetuating ad hoc decisions in the face of a demonstrated need for planning to determine resource uses (Ca- nadian Arctic Resources Committee 1978). This line of criticism was repeated in CARC's

analysis of the 1984 report of the EARP panel inquiry into hydrocarbon production in the Beaufort Sea region (Fenge, 1984a, 1984b).

This type of criticism proved difficult to answer. Essentially commentators and critics

598 Terry Fenge and L. Graham Smith



were asking how EARP contributed to federal

decision-making. Not only was EARP itself criticized, but it became to some a symbol of the federal government's overly complex de-

cision-making. In sum, more and more groups both within and outside the federal government expressed dissatisfaction with EARP.

Following this, FEARO moved to put reform of EARP on the political agenda.

FEARO's Reform Proposal

FEARO's efforts to reform EARP were first outlined in detail in a September 1980 back-

ground paper sent to federal agencies for comment (DOE, 1980). This paper noted Cabinet's intent in 1973 that EARP be enshrined in legislation after a period of experimentation and evolution, and argued that the time had come for this step to be taken. An impressive array of reforms were proposed although it was claimed they would not alter existing procedures to any 'significant degree'.

The 1980 paper proposed that FEARO be

replaced by an Environmental Impact Review

Agency (EIRA) based in law. This agency, it was suggested, should have the authority to

negotiate with provincial and foreign govern- ments, and to inquire into the implementation of environmental screening and referral processes by federal government departments. Crown corporations were to be required to participate in EARP and provision was to be made for Parliament to refer to EIRA 'nation-

ally important private sector undertakings' that 'may not involve a federal initiative'. A legis- lated definition of 'environment' was proposed to include social and economic varia- bles, as was 'legislative recognition to panels and to their public meeting process as well as the self-assessment operations of initiatives'. The paper succinctly stated that the proposed legislation 'would constitute a very considera- ble move towards answering public criticism of the present vaguely defined operation'.

The 1980 background paper circulated by FEARO proposed sweeping changes to, and

strengthening of, EARP at the screening, referral and panel review stages. If implemented, the reforms would have invested EARP and

EIRA with political authority to ensure that all federal agencies were rigorously carrying out EIA as part of everyday decision-making, and would have greatly enlarged the scope of federal EIA. As such, it was a radical proposal that responded quite fully to the welter of criticism levelled at EARP. Indeed, it reflected

closely the advocacy of environmental and ab-

original groups and in particular the position of the Canadian Environmental Advisory Council. Had this background paper been adopted as

public policy, Canada would have attained a first class, perhaps a world class, process for environmental impact assessment.

Barriers to Reforming EARP: The Ottawa Scene

Many observers articulated EARP's weaknesses and some outlined methods to reform it, but very few acknowledged the ideological and institutional barriers that make such reform a difficult task. These barriers were only partially overcome during the four years of effort that it took to overhaul the process. Chief

among these barriers was the uncompromis- ing attitude of certain federal agencies reluc- tant to increase EARP's authority at their own

expense, and the growing acceptance by government of the hydrocarbon industry's claim that inadequate co-ordination between federal

government agencies was leading to unwarranted delay in approval of development projects and was causing unnecessary cost over- runs. The hydrocarbon industry claimed that EARP contributed to these problems and articulated this position in 1982 in briefs presented by Dome Petroleum Ltd., Panarctic Oils Ltd., and other groups before the Special Commit- tee of the Senate on the Northern Pipeline (Senate of Canada, 1983). This position was

repeated in 1983 in testimony to a federally appointed task force on pipeline construction costs that reported to the Minister of Energy, Mines and Resources (Horte, 1983).

The Special Committee of the Senate on the Northern Pipeline admitted it was 'over- whelmed' by the 'regulatory maze' facing de-

velopers, the absence of policy to guide deci-

sion-making, and the lack of co-ordination

Reforming EARP 599



between federal government agencies charged with regulating northern development. Dupli- cation of EARP and National Energy Board (NEB) inquiry processes was cited by the committee as unnecessary and wasteful:

The tendency is for the same material to be

presented by the same parties using the same arguments ... such repetition only frustrates the process and does not contrib- ute to protection of the environment. (Sen- ate of Canada, 1983:68).

The committee recommended a full-scale review of northern regulation and environmental

management and the elimination of 'obvious redundancies'. This recommendation set the scene for infighting between FEARO and the NEB.

The Task Force Report on Pipeline Construc- tion Costs also criticized the costly delays in

project timing and unnecessary expense caused by NEB-EARP overlap. The report noted:

...sponsors of pipeline projects north of 60

degrees tend to regard [the] EARP process as unstructured, time consuming, repeti- tive, and unnecessary for projects which are certified by the NEB (Horte, 1983:46).

From this forthright position the task force recommended:

The FEARO administered EARP process should not be invoked in respect of pipeline facilities over which the NEB has certifica- tion and regulatory jurisdiction.... Environ- mental and socio-economic factors can be

fully addressed by the NEB under its present legislative mandate (Horte, 1983:52).

The NEB expressed 'strong support' for the broad thrust of the Horte report and noted with 'particular interest' the recommendation that EARP not be invoked in the case of pipeline projects subject to regulatory approval by the NEB. This is not surprising as the task force's recommendation, if adopted, would

support the NEB's role and make it pre-

eminent in environmental and social impact assessment relating to most energy development on federal Crown land. However, in let- ters to the deputy minister of the Department of the Environment and to the executive chairman of FEARO, the NEB took a much firmer line. Starting from the position that overlap between the NEB and EARP should be eliminated or at least minimized, the board charac- terized itself as fully equipped to handle environmental and socio-economic matters, and the only body able to weigh these concerns to serve the public interest:

In the view of the Board, the public interest would best be served by having environmental matters relating to projects under the Board's jurisdiction dealt with solely by the NEB through the Board's hearing process. Environmental matters, though important, are not the only considerations to be examined in arriving at a decision as to whether a particular project should be ap- proved. An informed decision requires the careful balancing of all interests. The Board

already deals with all aspects of such projects including environmental concerns. We believe the public interest is best served by preserving this 'one window' approach (Slader, 1983).

The reports by the Special Senate Commit- tee on the Northern Pipeline and the Task Force on Pipeline Construction Costs, plus the NEB's

enthusiastic reception of them, added urgency to the EARP reform process. Not only were

FEARO and the Minister of the Environment

trying to improve EARP and to provide it with

a more secure and authoritative footing, they now also had to justify and defend it from the

rival and expansion-minded NEB. In response to the task force report and the critical com-

ments by the senate committee, the Minister of the Environment outlined his position clearly to the Minister of Energy, Mines and Re-

sources:

While I am whole-heartedly in favour of

minimizing unnecessary government con-

trols, I believe EARP is more a part of the




solution than it is of the problem and that

abandoning it in this context would be un- wise.... EARP is not intended to regulate detailed proposals ... [it] is more effective as a planning tool. I am firmly convinced that proper management of timing and sub-

ject matter for EARP and NEB, would not

only streamline decision-making but also serve to reduce the degree of duplication that has occurred in the past. In response to a recent Cabinet decision I will be bring- ing forward in the near future proposals for

improving the effectiveness and credibility of EARP in government decision-making. I

plan to address concerns relative to EARP and the regulatory process in this context to ensure that all aspects of the matter are addressed (Caccia, 1983).

Notwithstanding the minister's reaffirma- tion that EARP should be reformed and that it should become an integral part of the federal

government's decision-making, the recommendations of the Senate Committee on the Northern Pipeline and Horte's report on pipeline construction costs prompted civil servants in developmentally inclined agencies to harden their opposition to radical reform of EARP. In 1980 the policy and interdepartmental context in Ottawa seemed to be favourably disposed to significant reform of EARP. By 1983 this context had changed. Faced with growing opposition by various federal government agencies to strengthen EARP, FEARO and the Min- ister of the Environment accepted far less fundamental reforms, even though new analyses by Beanlands and Duinker (1983) pointed out the need for strong policy and institutions to underline a more scientific and rigorous EARP.

The New EARP

The September 1980 background paper identified a broad range of desirable reforms of EARP. Little of this ambitious proposal sur- vived the rough and tumble of interagency pol- itics. A much watered-down version of EARP reform eventually was authorized by the federal Cabinet in the spring of 1984, followed in

June 1984 by an order in council providing 'guidelines' for EARP under the Government

Organization Act 1979 (Canada Gazette, 1984).

When announcing the new EARP, Charles Caccia, Minister of the Environment, released the 12 April 1984 version of the EARP discussion paper considered by the federal Cabinet (Caccia, 1984a; 1984b). Certain sections included in the version presented to the federal Cabinet were deleted from the version released to the public. Among the deletions was a section outlining the views of federal government agencies toward EARP reform. The deleted passage shows that many federal

agencies objected to EARP being based in law, for this would have required them to implement its provisions. Instead, these agencies favoured the status quo in which they could

apply EARP loosely and with little rigour, but still claim to be adhering to the cabinet policy directives of 1973 and 1977. The deleted passage illustrates the institutional and policy barriers in Ottawa working against reform of EARP and the difficult task that FEARO and the Minister of the Environment faced in gain- ing the necessary support of federal agencies to revamp EARP:

In February 1984, a draft of this Submis- sion ... was distributed to over 15 departments and agencies.

Without exception, there was support expressed for the basic principles of EARP.... With respect to the other policy issues which constitute the remaining recommendations in this Submission, the con- sensus was less complete. There was little

specific opposition to the concept of issu-

ing guidelines as an Order-in-Council..., but the idea of further enhancing EARP author-

ity through specific legislation met resist- ance from Transport Canada, COGLA, DRIE, EMR, AECB, DPW, DIAND and DFO who either did not believe a strong enough case had been made for legislation or ex-

pressed concern that legislation would

hamper the success of EARP by reducing its flexibility. Also, there is a general appre- hension about being bound by law to do

Reforming EARP 601



what most departments consider they are doing adequately now without legislation. In the words of one correspondent: "... you may wish to reconsider [legislation] since any legislation in this respect will essentially create a legal obligation on federal de-

partments to adhere to the review process" (Minister of the Environment, 1984).

The main contribution of the EARP Guidelines is to spell out more clearly the roles and re- sponsibilities of all concerned in implementing EARP from initial project screening through to public reviews. Tightening up EARP's admin- istration and putting the in-house screening stage on a firmer, more authoritative footing is the major intent. In so doing, the process should be easier to verify by non-governmen- tal interests, and this may ensure that initiat-

ing agencies and proponents comply with EARP. Self-assessment, however, remains the core of EARP and this has been reiterated

through the guidelines, not reformed. The scope of EARP has been broadened to

include 'the potential environmental effects of the proposal and the social effects directly related to those environmental effects' (Canada Gazette, 1984:2). This curious turn of phrase grounds EARP in the biophysical environment but admits social factors into the process when they are an outgrowth of a project's environmental effects. Only with the approval of both the Minister of the Environment and the minister of the initiating department can

'general socio-economic effects of the proposal and the technology assessment of and need for the proposal' be included in the review. It would seem that alcohol and drug abuse, spouse beating, and other social problems that result from industrialization but are not channelled through its impact on the bio-

physical environment, are outside the purview of the new EARP. Initiating departments are

likely to have differing views on this question and these could translate into EARPs of vary- ing scope and would perpetuate the lack of both consistency between and comparability of EARPs.

No changes have been made to the applica- tion of EARP. Crown corporations remain

outside the process although they are asked to apply it as a matter of corporate policy. FEARO's 1980 suggestion to apply EARP to

nationally important private sector projects is not included in the guidelines, so the process is limited to actions of federal government agencies or to situations in which federal land or money is used in private developments. The

guidelines deal at some length with screening procedures, which is entirely appropriate given the revelations of the 1982 program evaluations outlined earlier in this paper. FEARO is to

provide procedural screening guidelines to ini-

tiating departments, but decision-making au-

thority to determine whether and to what extent potential projects affect the environment and whether to refer projects to FEARO is confirmed in initiating departments. These agencies are now required to establish written procedures for screening and to provide FEARO with information on how screening is being carried out.

Little change has been made in the public review phase of EARP. Public hearings are to be conducted in a 'non-judicial and informal but structured manner,' and witnesses may be 'questioned but may not be sworn or subpoe- naed'. Panel members are to be unbiased, free of conflict of interest relative to the proposal, free of any political influence and to have special knowledge relevant to the proposal. As before, initiating departments are to decide on 'the extent to which the [panel] recommendations should become a requirement of the Government of Canada prior to authorizing the commencement of a proposal,' and to ensure that 'suitable implementation, inspection and environmental monitoring programs are established'.

The guidelines acknowledge the need to avoid duplication of environmental review and

regulatory procedures, and therefore require the initiating department to use EARP 'as a

planning tool at the earliest stages of devel-

opment of the proposal rather than as a regulatory mechanism'. This is not new, for EARP is still an advisory and evaluative process that

may or may not be of assistance to project regulators. What is important here is that FEARO and the Minister of the Environment




feel the need to state the obvious in order to

preserve the niche in which EARP operates.

Summary and Conclusions

In summary, many of the procedural criticisms of EARP outlined earlier are addressed in the 1984 Guidelines, but it is questionable whether

they answer fully these criticisms. For exam-

ple, the EARP recently completed on proposed hydrocarbon drilling near the Queen Charlotte Islands off the coast of British Columbia illustrates one of the deeper problems EARP still faces. Petro-Canada, the major proponent of

hydrocarbon drilling off the west coast, pulled out of this EARP claiming that information re-

quirements placed upon it by the EARP panel were too broad and onerous. Neither FEARO nor the panel could force Petro-Canada to participate in the process.

EARP is now based, not in Cabinet directives, but in 'guidelines' promulgated under the Government Organization Act 1979. These

guidelines can be altered without parliamen- tary consideration (Elder, 1985). As the 1982 EARP evaluation studies made clear, many federal agencies ignored EARP with impunity between 1973 and 1982 because the process did not include sanctions to compel compliance. This was possible because the process was based in cabinet directives, not legislation. It is now connected to an omnibus stat- ute, but guidelines apparently have no legal force to ensure compliance from intransigent departments. Little seems to have changed. Should we believe that federal government agencies are now prepared to implement EARP

voluntarily? It would be reassuring to think so but is unlikely given their behaviour from 1973 to 1982 and the negative reaction of many federal agencies to FEARO's EARP reform proposals of 1980.

To many students of federal government de-

cision-making, the case of EARP reform during 1980-84 should illustrate the centrality and

importance of civil servants in policy-making. Notwithstanding broad support for radical reform and strengthening of EARP by the environmental community allied with the Depart- ment of the Environment, and widespread

acknowledgement in the federal government of the need for some measure of EARP reform,

key government agencies were able to water down the recommendations for change taken to Cabinet by the Minister of the Environment.

Many government agencies seem to have been concerned little with improving federal implementation of EIA. Instead, they appear to have

perceived EARP reform as an unwarranted in- trusion on their authority and freedom of action and reacted to it accordingly. They could not scuttle completely the attempted reform but did a creditable job of emasculating it.

Postscript: Future Reform of EARP

It remains to be seen whether the 1984 EARP

guidelines order will provide a stable and en-

during base for federal EIA. The guidelines and the interagency mechanisms that preceded it were conducted under a Liberal administra- tion. The Progressive Conservative Party man- ifesto released during the 1984 election cam-

paign promised:

We will insist that all major industrial projects under federal jurisdiction be assessed beforehand not only for their economic benefits but also for their true costs to

present and future Canadians alike. Where there is prima facie evidence of potential serious harm to the environment, impact statements will be required by law. At present, such statements are only required when requested by the Minister (Progres- sive Conservative Party, 1984:46, emphasis added).

There has been little indication that the federal

government is moving to fulfil this campaign promise. However, in March 1986 the long- awaited reports of the Task Force on Program Review, conducted under the auspices of the

Deputy Prime Minister, were released to the

public. The volume dealing with regulatory reform reiterated much of the criticism of EARP outlined in this paper and provided the federal

government with three 'options': 1. Increase the visibility of the EARP process

before it reaches the panel stage to make

Reforming EARP 603



the public aware that the environmental

impacts have been assessed in all devel-

opment projects in which the federal government has a 'direct' interest.

2. Enact empowering legislation for the EARP

process with a view to eliminating duplication and setting out specific parameters for review, requiring all subsequent reviews to be bound by the recommendations of the EARP process and compliance therewith.

3. Provide in enabling EARP legislation that reviews may take place only where the

project will not be subject to any other

comprehensive environmental impact assessment. (Minister of Supply and Serv- ices, 1986:219).

These 'options' may well put reform of EARP back on the political agenda.

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Progressive Conservative Party of Canada (1984) Campaign Handbook.

Rees, W.E. (1979) Reflections on the Environ- mental Assessment and Review Process (EARP): A Discussion Paper. Working Paper Number 1 (Ottawa: Canadian Arctic Re- sources Committee).

(1980) 'EARP at the Crossroads: Envi- ronmental Assessment in Canada,' Environ- mental Impact Assessment Review, 1:4:355-77.

Senate of Canada, Report of the Special Com- mittee on the Northern Pipeline (1983)

Marching to the Beat of the Same Drum (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada).

Slader, G.Y. (1983) Secretary to the National

Energy Board in a letter to R. Robinson, Executive Chairman, Federal Environmental Assessment and Review Office.

Reforming EARP 605



reforming the federal environmental assessment and review process

Documents