ORIGINAL PAPER

Region-building and critical juncture: Europeand Northeast Asia in comparative perspective

Sam-Sang Jo

Received: 11 October 2011 /Revised: 4 March 2012 /Accepted: 9 March 2012 /Published online: 28 March 2012# Springer-Verlag 2012

Abstract China, Japan, and Korea have begun to engage one another vigorouslysince the 1997 crisis. As intraregional economic ties have further deepened andbroadened, interconnectedness in cultural and political aspects has risen rapidly in avariety of forms. Decision-makers and intellectuals in China, Japan, and Korea havebeen floating ideas and interests for establishing various types of Northeast Asiancommunity formation. New security dialogues and co-operation frameworks alsoemerge. Accordingly, the rapidly growing Northeast Asia is likely to emerge as anidentifiable regional community. With the incipient emergence of regional commu-nity in Northeast Asia, Northeast Asian region-building becomes a salient issue ofmajor academic and policy debates. Yet, in spite of the recent mushrooming ofresearch in and attention to the region-building, the questions regarding within whatsurrounding and under what situation regional community can be built, as well aswhat motivates people to choose region-building, and when and how state system canbe transformed into a regional community remains only partly resolved. In order tosolve this puzzle, this paper will compare the current Northeast Asian region-buildingwith the early stage of European region-building, arguing that while there areimportant differences in evolution, format, and kind of region-building in Europeand Northeast Asia, critical juncture is influential in region-building.

Introduction

Since in the mid-1970s when Ernst Haas declared the “obsolescence of regionalintegration theory”, the study of region-building had occupied a small, if not

Asia Eur J (2012) 10:1–20DOI 10.1007/s10308-012-0320-8

S.-S. JoInstitute of Korean Studies, Pusan National University, Jangjun-dong Kumjung-ku, Busan 609-735,South Korea

S.-S. Jo (*)School of Information and Communication, Meiji University, 1-1, Kanda-Surugadai, Chiyoda-ku,Tokyo 101-8301, Japane-mail: samsangjo@gmail.com

insignificant, place in international relations. Yet, while “globalization” has once beenthe mantra of international relations in describing the emerging world order, “region-alization,” “regional integration,” “regional institution-building,” or “region-building”is the today’s buzzword. It is because not only have regions acquired substantialautonomy from the system-level interactions of the global powers but they have alsogrown steadily more interdependent, interconnected, and cohesive in socioeconomicterms, becoming substantially more important sites of cooperation than in the past(Hettne et al. 1999; Fawcett and Hurrell 1995; Gamble and Payne 1996; Hettne andSöderbaum 2002). Northeast Asia, for example, had once conspicuously lackedregion-building. Yet, since the 1990s it has become a substantially more consolidated,assimilated, and interconnected region. Northeast Asia is not substantial only in geo-economic terms, but it also is increasingly becoming an identifiable economic,political, and social region—a globally significant yet little recognized, new devel-opment. There are two positive developments for region-building among NortheastAsian states.

Firstly, the virtual end of the Cold War in Northeast Asia has opened up vitalopportunities for region-building. The traditional triangular alliance between China,North Korea, and Russia versus Japan, South Korea, and the USA has been obviouslyfading out. This brought a more favorable situation for region-building because of theabsence of confrontation due to ideological differences. Secondly, and more signif-icantly, the critical juncture of the 1997 crisis led to the increasing interconnectionsamong the Northeast Asian countries. Since then, region-building has been quietlyproceeding, in spite of the existence of serious territorial, historical, or sovereigntyissues which have still not been resolved. There has been the emergence of a greaterwillingness on the part of regional leaders and elites to collectively manage affairs at aregional level. This is an important sign of one of the long-term consequences onNortheast Asian community formation. Furthermore, China, Japan, and Korea havebegun to interconnect one another vigorously in political, cultural, and economicaspects. Ideas and interests for establishing various types of Northeast Asian com-munity formations are afloat. New security dialogues and co-operation frameworks,such as the trilateral summit meeting and ministerial dialogues, also emerged. As aconsequence, suffice it to say that a new regional community is gradually springingup in Northeast Asia.

With the increase of region-ness in Northeast Asia, Northeast Asian region-building becomes a salient issue of major and continuous academic and policydebates (Rozman 2008; Aggarwal and Koo 2008; Kim 2009; Calder and Ye 2010)which now contrast with scholarly interest in region-building that has long beenfocused on Southeast Asia, with its comparatively advanced institutional structures ofthe Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Yet, in spite of the recentmushrooming of research in and attention to the region-building, the questionsregarding within what surrounding and under what situation regional communitycan be built, as well as what motivates people to choose region-building, and whenand how state system can be transformed into a regional community remains onlypartly resolved. In order to solve this puzzle, I will compare the current NortheastAsian region-building with the early stage of European region-building. This article isstructured in four sections. The article begins with a description of region-buildingprocesses and types. I draw the outlines of my subject from Karl Deutsch and Donald

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Puchala’s region-building approach: regional community formation and regionalpolitical amalgamation. The penultimate section provides a concept of critical junc-ture. This is followed by a discussion of region-building in Europe and NortheastAsia. It is argued that while there are important differences in the evolution, format,and kind of region-building in Europe and Northeast Asia, critical juncture isinfluential in region-building. The final section offers some reflections on some ofthe conspicuous remarks of region-building for the future of Northeast Asia.

Types and sine qua non of region-building

Although the study of region-building, paying attention to a rise in regional institutions allover the world in response to the challenges of globalization, emerged in Northeast Asia inthe late twentieth century, theoretical analyses of region-building originally began in about1950 with the works of Viner (1950), Byé (1958) and Giersch (1949) (admittedly alleconomists) and Haas (1958), and Lindberg and Scheingold (1970) (all internationalrelations scholars). They provided substantial literature on region-building amongnations—exploring what it is and how it is formed. Leading figures among them inthe development of scholarly perspectives concerning region-building, both empiri-cally and normatively, are Deutsch et al. (1957), and one of his students, Puchala(1970). Deutsch’s work on region-building, Political Community and the NorthAtlantic Area, and Puchala’s several works including “International Transactionsand Regional Integration” were motivated by their belief that violent conflict couldbe eliminated from international relations through region-building if its conditionswere understood and nurtured rather than conventional practices such as balance ofpower, collective security, or military deterrence.

According to them (Deutsch et al. 1957, 5–8; Puchala 1981: 155), region-buildinghas at least two major dimensions: (1) regional community formation: the looseinterconnection of governments as well as the interconnection of peoples througheconomic interaction, information exchange, policy coordination, bonds of mutualtrust, identification, and social assimilation and (2) regional political amalgamation:the intimate interconnection of governments through supranational institutions andpolicymaking processes. Specifically speaking, community formation includes astrongly increasing economic integration; the disappearance of intraregional commu-nication barriers; the voluntary collective actions among states to tackle specificcommon problems in an open-ended and less complex manner; the heightening ofmutual awareness, attentiveness and responsiveness at all societal levels; and thegrowth of “we-feelings” and mutual deference and esteem between peoples. Politicalamalgamation means the complex and deep commitments by the states in a givenregion to pursue the resolution of common problems with measures that affect thestates’ sovereignty; the emergence and expansion of supranational institutions inter-connecting governments; the emergence and increasing efficacy of political interestarticulation and aggregation in a supranational arena; and increasing frequency, ease,and efficacy in intergovernmental accommodation in a “consensus finding” or “con-flict resolving” process. As Table 1 shows, “community formation” and “amalgam-ation” may occur separately to produce either “regional community” or “empire,”respectively. Or the two processes may occur together to produce “region-state”. In

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other words, from their classification, four entities can be defined: (1) state system(non-community formation and non-amalgamation), (2) regional community (com-munity formation but non-amalgamation), (3) empire (non-community formation butamalgamation), and (4) region-state (community formation and amalgamation).

In a state system, a region is firmly rooted in territorial space: a group of peopleliving in a geographically bounded community, and united through a certain set ofcultural values and nationalism. Regional community refers to the entity whereby theregion increasingly turns into a community with a distinct identity and interconnec-tion of institutionalized or un-institutionalized actors, in relation with a more or lessresponsive regional civil society, transcending the old state borders. Empire indicatesa geographically extensive group of states and peoples amalgamated and ruled by anemperor or empress—for example, the Roman Empire, the British Empire, and theMongol Empire etc. Empire’s rule, authority, and policymaking processes are cen-tralized and maintained by either direct conquest and control with force or indirectconquest and control with power. Region-state constitutes a voluntary evolution of agroup of formerly sovereign nation states into a new form of political entity, wheresovereignty is pooled for the best of all, and which is radically more democratic thanother international polities (Hettne and Söderbaum 2002: 37–45).

European and Northeast Asian region-buildings, as Table 2 demonstrates, areorganized along different lines. Europe would be an example of an intermediateentity between a regional community and region-state, pursuing regional politicalamalgamation (although political amalgamation has been from time to time resistedin Europe), while Northeast Asia is between a state system and regional community,experiencing the incipient emergence of regional community formation. Europeanregion-building emerged since the state system was blamed for a major catastrophicwar, while Northeast Asian region-building is shaped at a time when the mainconcern of regional actors is to preserve the state system as a last resort of well-

Table 1 Region-building processes and types

Amalgamation Non-amalgamation

Community formation Region-state Regional community

Non-community formation Empire State system

Table 2 Region-building processes and types

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being and security. European region-building is distinguished by the complex anddeep commitments to political amalgamation to resolve common problems, whileNortheast Asian region-building is distinguished by the summit level intergovern-mental cooperation—where heads of state and government have talked and negoti-ated cooperative initiatives—as well as the voluntary collective actions and intensivepeople-to-people interconnections which lead to community formation. Europe illus-trates with particular clarity the formal, legalistic, political, and sovereignty poolingaspects of region-building; Northeast Asia, the informal, non-legalistic, economic,and sovereignty comforting aspects. Europe seems to be determined to construct agreater European unity, that is region-state, by further surrendering or pooling ofnational sovereignty, making common fiscal policy and promoting regional politicalamalgamation. Northeast Asia appears to support a gradual strengthening of regionalcommunity formation through interconnectedness, voluntary collective actions, andpolicy coordination.

But, within what environment and under what condition did Europe opt forpolitical amalgamation and why does Northeast Asia choose regional communityformation? Critical juncture can account for the environment and condition of theregion-building in Europe and Northeast Asia. A critical juncture is a crucial histor-ical point at which there are appealing alternative paths to the future. In other words,the periods surrounding a major crisis are described as the critical juncture, whenlong-established patterns in a region are suddenly called into question, and new,unusually enduring relationships are forged (Calder and Ye 2010: 45–48, 160–161).In years of turbulence such as the Second World War in Europe and the AsianFinancial Crisis in 1997—that is, periods when old relationships crumble and newones are forged—long-standing and often routinized institutions and systems in theregions are recast. The new institutions and policy patterns fashioned during thecritical juncture often persist long after the original pressures that forged them havedied away. Ironically, region-building requires a crisis or other critical event as acatalyst to implement the regionalist ideas, to dramatize national interests to beconverged, and to inspire cross-regional collective action. Critical juncture is impor-tant in helping decision-makers mobilize domestic support within their respectivecountries for broader region-building. Decision-makers sacrifice the goods only whencrises convince them that they can survive in office only by promoting region-building. Crisis typically weakens that resistance by generating urgency aboutchange.

Regional political amalgamation and critical juncture in Europe

The origin of the European region-building aiming towards regional political amal-gamation can be drawn to the occurrence of a noteworthy series of “critical junc-tures.” The European political amalgamation is the invention of traumatic sharedexperiences, which sprung from the critical juncture of the Second World War.“Desire for peace and fear of war” were at the heart of the European politicalamalgamation which is a means to achieve a guarantee of peace and security. Thedesire for peace and the fear of war have always been present during the wholeEuropean history but have dominated the twentieth century.

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Millions of Europeans had experienced their continent’s rapid decline and tragedy.The inability of the nation states to provide peace and security within their own borderswas obvious during the critical juncture. The ghostly presence of the total war’s deadhad completely shattered the ideal of the nation state and had confirmed the view that theEuropean nations, outclassed in military technology, economically impoverished, anddwarfed by the new superpowers, were bound to unite. Only if they combined andunited could the nations of Europe have a future. Europeans who had suffered tragedyand total collapse as a result of the war saw no hope for their countries other than in theregional political amalgamation. Europeans were convinced that the war as criticaljuncture marked a fundamental historical discontinuity in which the values and attitudesof the nineteenth century were utterly destroyed (Jo 2007: 41–42).

Once the latest, most destructive, and most tragic war as critical juncture of thenation-states was finally over, disillusioned individuals voiced their anger—someunited in pressure groups, like the European Movement—and sought to establish anew, integrated Europe, inhabited not by French, Germans, or Britons, but by Euro-peans. Many people viewed nationalism and the nation-state as the main causes of thedisasters that were again sweeping over Europe, proving to be a catastrophic creed. ANew Europe had to be created in which the nation-states would merge for theircommon good. Feelings of European-ness had to be stimulated; loyalties had to beshifted from the smaller nation-states to a greater common European unity, that is tosay region-state. Europeans intended “to lay the foundations of an ever closer unionamong the peoples of Europe” and called “upon the other peoples of Europe whoshare their ideal to join in their efforts” (European Economic Community 1957).

France: Europe invented by free men and independent states

France was destabilized by the national trauma created by wartime collaboration and thestructural weaknesses of the government of the Fourth Republic, and was to suffer blowsto its national pride with the Hitler’s occupation. Three times in less than a century shehad gone to war with Germany, and three times had suffered substantial losses; there wasno certainty that the defeat of Nazism meant the removal of the German threat. Evenafter the Second World War, the degree of French distrust towards Germany was stillastounding (Klein 1996: 31–32). Therefore, France’s concerns about her own securityand fears about the revival of German political and economic power were whollyunderstandable, given that they had failed to control Germany after the First WorldWar. France recognized that although the divided post-war Germany was not animmediate security threat, German destiny was at the heart of Europe’s future. Indeed,France was determined not to fail again after the Second World War, believing that itwas their vital concern to secure lasting peace in Europe by constraining Germanywithin the European amalgamation framework. As a consequence, France, hauntedby the trauma, held the active position among the six participating states in the earlystage of European political amalgamation.

As a matter of fact, until he was well over 50, the French president Charles deGaulle did not seem to have had any idea about “Europe” except as a geographicalexpression (Gladwyn 1969: 32–33). However, the Second World War changed deGaulle’s ideas on Europe, even though they differed markedly from those held by thefounders of the European Communities, most noticeably Jean Monnet. De Gaulle

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found old-fashioned national patriotism reactionary. Instead, nationalism was blamedfor Europe’s decline. It was Hitler’s nationalism that had plunged Europe into ruinouswar. Thus, even for de Gaulle, the prospect of a purely national renewal seemedunimaginable. He had more support for the European political amalgamation thanever before, convinced that the European political amalgamation was an ineluctableconsequence of the general evolution of affairs. His troubles with the Anglo-Saxonallies led him to the European political amalgamation led by France: “a sort ofWestern grouping” which would constitute a major world center for production,trade, and security (Calleo 1965: 82–83). When in 1947 de Gaulle launched hisnew political party, the Rassemblement du Peuple Français, the European politicalamalgamation was a major element in its platform. In a series of speeches and pressconferences he elaborated on the European political amalgamation for a “Europemade up of free men and independent states, organized into a whole capable ofcontaining all possible pretension to hegemony and establishing between the tworival masses the element of equilibrium without which peace will never come about”(Calleo 1965: 84). Therefore, his policy aimed at the European political amalgam-ation whose solidarity would increase as they developed links of all kinds that ledEuropeans to put into effect the Economic Community of the Six and to organizepolitical cooperation among them.

Germany: Political Amalgamation as a Healing Force

After the First World War, Europe failed to restrain Germany within a regional frame-work, in particular supranational institution. Rather, Germany had again engaged indestructive nationalist rivalries and repeated war. Following the Second World War, toprevent another war and create a lasting peace, Konrad Adenauer, the leader of a westernGerman state, had his eye firmly fixed on the Federal Republic’s amalgamation withEurope rather than on the reunification of Germany. Adenauer believed that Europeanpolitical amalgamation was necessary in order for Germany to become a player thatwould be taken seriously in European politics. Adenauer wanted to amalgamate WestGermany politically and psychologically with theWest (Osterheld 1996: 20). Adenauerconsidered the Germans to be an ailing people. The last generations had been forcedto go through too much: two lost wars involving incredible adversity, millions dead;totally disparate forms of government; and the most contradictory value systems—allof this, Adenauer believed, would have proved too much for any German andEuropean. He felt it was important that the people have a chance to rest, that healingforces be allowed to develop so that the Germans could recover from within (Klein1996: 66). Thus, one of Adenauer’s most important ideas was that the Europeanpolitical amalgamation could prevent another war and create a lasting peace. Aboveall, he wanted to end permanently the deadly rivalry between Germany and Franceand was willing to sacrifice a great deal to gain his objective, including economicconcessions.

Meanwhile, Germany’s motivations to European political amalgamation can beseen in two major concessions that accompanied its apology for the past. The firstwas in 1950 when the French suggested that the steel and coal operations become ajoint effort between Germany, France, Italy, and Benelux to form the European Coaland Steel Community, to which Germany agreed. If Germany was not a defeated

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nation, this joint effort might have been more difficult to be carried out. The secondcompliance was Germany’s agreement to the French proposal for Common Agricul-tural Policy (CAP), even though it did not benefit Germany. The policy allowed formore French agricultural products to be exported especially to Germany without tariffbarriers. The subsidies from the CAP were also most beneficial to farmers in France(Kim 2009: 300–301). In sum, the reasons for Germany’s concessions were becausethe war trauma dampened any German selfish interests and Germany considered theburden of its substantial contribution to the European Union (EU) budget as a kind ofwar reparation as the defeated nation in the Second World War.

Britain: the building of the United States of Europe

Britain, one of the Big Three of today’s EU, did not participate in the founding stagesof European political amalgamation process. Britain initially had been compelled bygeography, history, and tradition to be something different from Europe. Indeed,Britain distanced herself from the European continent, not only on political, econom-ic and strategic grounds, but also on the basis of a complex of British difference,which meant Britain’s political, and one might add, “moral”, superiority, based on thefollowing factors: a sound and healthy political system, an “Imperial” density, and agreat power role confirmed by her wartime experience (Varsori 1998: 138, 145).Continental Europe was, during the 1940s and 1950s, mainly regarded by bothBritish decision-makers and public opinion as a source of trouble and the symbolof uncertainty and political crisis. Therefore, Britain would support European polit-ical amalgamation, in particular a rapprochement between France and Germany, butwould itself definitely stay outside as a benevolent sponsor, along with the USA andthe Soviet Union. Britain might have helped the Western Europeans solve theirproblems, but owing to her different character she had been careful to avoid anyinvolvement (Deighton 2002: 155–169).

Despite the myth of Britain’s “difference”, no leaders and activists raised a strongvoice in favor of European political amalgamation until Winston Churchill, thedistinguished wartime prime minister of Britain, spoke in Zurich on September1946. Churchill postponed participation into the European political amalgamationbecause the UK was already a member of British Commonwealth as a powerfulglobal organization, Nevertheless, Churchill overwhelmingly influenced the postwarEuropean political amalgamation by arguing that Europeans should unite before waragain demolishes Europe, its glorious civilization, and perhaps much of the rest of theworld and that Europe’s reconstruction would be possible only after the reconciliationof France and Germany. For Churchill, battles had ceased but risks still prevailed, andpeace should be promoted through the European political amalgamation in theconstruction of the United States of Europe by countries capable of doing so.Churchill also stated that although Britain would itself definitely stay outside as abenevolent sponsor, the continent absolutely had to achieve the political amalgam-ation through extended nationalism and a common citizenship. He called for Europeto pursue the European political amalgamation to guide its future. Such efforts byChurchill ultimately led to the Hague Congress of May 1948 and to the foundation ofthe Council of Europe in 1949. Both actions remain landmarks in the Europeanpolitical amalgamation (James 1974).

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Movement towards an ever closer Europe

Jean Monnet, as a pragmatic government official and a founding-father of Europeanpolitical amalgamation, established the High Authority that integrated and amalgam-ated Europe. The particular set of problems facing France in 1949 and 1950 offeredMonnet a unique opportunity for the regional political amalgamation. What emergedwas a supranational High Authority, the institutional depository of shared nationalsovereignty over the coal and steel sectors. Indeed, the proposal was revolutionary inthe sense that Europe was offering to sacrifice a measure of national sovereignty in theinterest of building a new supranational authority through regional political amalgamationthat might end an old rivalry and help build a new European peace (McCormick 1999:66–67). The High Authority would be responsible for formulating a common marketin coal and steel and for supervising such related issues as pricing, wages, investment,and competition. The road to the European region-building would follow the un-glamorous path of functional amalgamation. Close cooperation between countries inspecific economic sectors held the key to overcoming national sovereignty andultimately achieving the European political amalgamation (Dinan 1994: 13–14).

Buoyed by Monnet’s initiation, Dean Acheson’s endorsement, and Adenauer’sapproval, French Foreign Minister Schuman had little difficulty convincing hiscabinet colleagues to support the scheme. On 9th May 1950, Schuman delivered adeclaration that aimed to eliminate all possibilities of war between France andGermany by creating a single authority regulating two relevant industrial fields: coaland steel. He claimed that Europe underwent war because it failed to achieve theregional political amalgamation. Accordingly, by having a single authority managingthe coal and steel that had been materials for weapons and munitions, Europe couldrecover its peaceful status without further war. Schuman foresaw that the Europeanregion-building could be achieved not by a unilateral plan, but by amalgamation. Withefforts of Schuman and Monnet, the two carriers of the Schuman declaration, sixEuropean countries (France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg)made an agreement leading to the European region-building, that is to say the foundationof the European Steel and Coal Community, the very foundation of the EU.

An institutionalized process of political amalgamation has been progressed. TheRome Treaty, establishing the European Community was signed in 1958. SingleEuropean Act, ratified in 1986–1987, set the goal of a single European market forgoods, labor, and capital by 1992. It also streamlined collective decision-making byallowing for a qualified majority to pass some EC legislation, without the previouslyrequired consensus. From November 1993, the implementation of the MaastrichtTreaty transformed the European Community into a tighter EU, while strengtheningcooperation on foreign and security affairs, justice, and police matters. It alsobroadened the reach of the European Commission in industrial policy, consumeraffairs, health, and education. Furthermore, supranational institutions have had aprofound effect on the Europeanization of European state identity. Even in spite oftoday’s global economic recession and the crisis of Euro zone, Europe is not revertingto Hobbesian anarchy. Rather more and more, they seem to be determined toconstruct a greater European unity, that is region-state, by further surrendering orpooling of national sovereignty, promoting regional political amalgamation, andmaking common fiscal policy.

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Regional Community formation and critical juncture in Northeast Asia

The movement towards Northeast Asian community formation was born from thecritical juncture of the 1997 crisis, as the European political amalgamation stemmedfrom the critical juncture of the Second World War. A highly contagious financialcrisis swept through the economies in East Asia in 1997, resulting in a free fall oftheir respective currency values and causing serious damage to the economies of EastAsia. The crisis subsequently led to bulging unemployment rates and a generaleconomic downturn. Even though the recovery was quite swift and robust, this shockof the crisis was profound for the region. The depth and consequences of the 1997crisis shattered confidence and alarmed many people in the governments and thebusiness sector and the academia who had touted the remarkable success of the EastAsian economies as the “Asian miracle” (World Bank 1993).

Northeast Asia was a weak region in that it underdeveloped political and socialcohesion. Lingering suspicion and animosity have disturbed the development oftrustworthy relationships between Japan, China, and Korea. However, the criticaljuncture of the 1997 crisis ultimately moved the Northeast Asian to act against theirsuspicion and distrust. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 as a critical juncture, duringwhich the dearth of regional cooperative mechanisms both exacerbated a seriousregional crisis and impeded its resolution, galvanized intellectuals and nationalgovernment into action for regional community formation. The 1997 crisis “hastaught a harsh lesson to all believers in weak, voluntary and informal cooperation”(Murray 2005: 208–209) provoking a dramatic change in thinking among bothpolitical and business leaders as well as intellectuals and people in general acrossNortheast Asia. The crisis cleared the way for much clearer thinking about region-building. Awareness that crisis can no longer be tackled by any country on anindividual basis increased. The old concept of one country’s independent solutionsthus no longer was satisfactory, which spurred a growing realization of the need forNortheast Asian community formation to deal with similar crises in the future, so asto help sustain the economic growth of Asia as a whole (Cai 2001: 11). The crisisprovided, in short, a catalyst for major change in the Northeast Asian region. Onlythrough crisis at a critical juncture were the Northeast Asian countries able to achievethe cohesion to stabilize their region in the face of financial hurricanes gusting acrossthe globe. And crisis, in particular, drew long-suspicious neighbors in Northeast Asiatogether seriously for the first time.

The movement towards the regional community formation in the aftermath of thecrisis was ubiquitous throughout Northeast Asia. During the critical juncture, theNortheast Asian community formation drew attention because it seemed to providebetter economic prosperity. Northeast Asia’s community of leaders and intellectualsfound expression in the upsurge of regional community formation, which aimed tocreate an institutional structure intending to prevent a recurrence of the financialcrisis.

China: “Kaifang de hezuo” (inclusive regionalism)

Since the revolution of 1949, Beijing had lacked the capability to lead any multilat-eral initiatives in the Northeast Asian region, and had been wary of any potential

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infringement on its own sovereignty by intergovernmental or supranational institu-tions. It was unable to trade with its neighbors for years, after its bitter confrontationwith the USA during the Korean War. Then, when China finally established diplo-matic ties with Japan and the USA during the 1970s, it conveniently adopted a “hub-and-spokes” bilateral structure centering on Washington, remarkably similar to thosein Tokyo and Seoul.

Yet, China, although less directly touched by the 1997 crisis than its neighbors, feltthe need to insulate regional economies from global forces through regional commu-nity formation, whereas Northeast Asian economies increasingly gravitated towardsrising China. Accordingly, China began to transform itself from a passive participantinto a proactive actor, both in East Asia generally and within Northeast Asia inparticular. The 1997 Asian financial crisis marked a critical juncture for China’sregional policies. China’s shift to support for community formation in Northeast Asiawas historic and influenced heavily by both its perception of the 1997 crisis andsubstantive changes in Beijing’s regional role that the crisis provoked. For the firsttime, China initiated several important regional frameworks on its own (Calder andYe 2010: 90, 164), but in the regional community formation process, China guardedcarefully its own national interests: an imperative to develop the national economyand strategic calculation to maintain regional stability, particularly in Hu Jintao’speaceful rise strategy.

Since the 1997 crisis, China’s embrace of regional community formation has beenevident in its involvement in ASEAN Plus Three (APT). China has gradually playedan important role in advancing Northeast Asian regional community under APTframework. When Japan proposed the creation of the Asian Monetary Fund inSeptember 1997, China took the same stance as the USA to break down the proposal.Afterwards, however, Beijing became willing to promote regional community for-mation. In November 1999, for instance, Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji had aninformal breakfast meeting with Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi and KoreanPresident Kim Dae-jung on the sidelines of the APT summit meeting in Manila. Thiswas the first meeting between the heads of the three countries in modern times. ZhuRongji agreed to undertake joint research in ten fields including trade, tariffs and theenvironment, while the three leaders consented to cooperate in helping China’saccession to the World Trade Organization at the earliest possible date. The summithas since gradually changed into a more formal and substantial event.

China’s substantial commitment to regional community building was also seen in acritical initiative for closer economic cooperation. In 2002, Chinese premier ZhuRongji proposed to establish a China–Japan–Korea free-trade area. It was not easy tostart formal talks on the Northeast Asia FTA. However, the Chinese governmentbelieved that the preconditions to establish a regional community formation werefully developed (Li 2005: 153–154). In addition, at the first East Asia Summit inKuala Lumpur, Malaysia, on December 2005, Wen Jiabao, recognizing that it is therise of China that causes neighboring countries’ anxiety and fear as well as thatprovides opportunities for the Northeast Asian community formation, emphasizedthat China supports Northeast Asian community formation and that China advocatesa “touming” (transparent) and “kaifang de hezuo (inclusive regionalism),” whileopposing a closed, exclusive one. Wen Jiabao proposed the idea of three principlesof “inclusive cooperation”: only inclusive cooperation can help promote the regional

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community formation; only inclusive cooperation can make an equal distribution ofregional benefits; the method to form regional community in this century is notexclusive but inclusive one (Tang 2011: 143–144).

Meanwhile, at the summit of Northeast Asian local governments in September2006, China played a key role in developing ideas for a unified economic communityin Northeast Asia. At the second Northeast Asian Economic Cooperation Forum, alsoin September 2006, Chinese Vice Premier Wu Yi highlighted the importance ofNortheast Asian economic ties and urged deepening cooperation in infrastructure,trade and investment and proposed three suggestions for Northeast Asian EconomicCooperation. In 2007, China’s State Council affirmed the China’s commitment to ahigh-level Northeast Asian Economic-Trade Cooperative Forum. In 2008, when theTrilateral Summit was held in Fukuoka, Prime Minister Wen Jiabao underlined theimportance to the Chinese of trilateral ties with Japan and Korea, putting forwardconcrete proposals for enhancing them. “China, Japan, and South Korea are countriesof major influence in East Asia,” said Wen, adding, “Developing peaceful andfriendly relations is not only a common wish of the three nations, but a conditionfor realizing regional stability and prosperity” (BBC 2008).

Japan: “Re-Asianization”

While Germany has been determined to play a key role in European politicalamalgamation, Japanhas been reluctant to be deeply entangled with Northeast Asiancommunity formation (Katzenstein 2005: 103). For Japan, the dominant nationalinterest for over a century has been to “escape Asia and enter Europe”—to borrow thenineteenth-century Enlightenment thinker Fukuzawa’s imagery. Japan has distanceditself from Northeast Asian community formation, identifying with the economicallyadvanced countries of the West (Jo 2011: 20–21). The relationship between Japan andthe rest of Asia remains uneasy.

After the war’s end, a chastened Japan, mindful of the bitter historical heritage,was reticent about promoting Northeast Asian community formation and structurallyhandicapped by its domestic political fragmentation to do so. As a matter of fact, fromthe 1950s through the early 1990s, Japan focused on developing deep political-economic ties, predominantly with the USA and Southeast Asia. Yet, Japan sufferedeconomically from the macroeconomic downturn that followed the 1997 crisis, whilebecoming more active in promoting the Northeast Asian community formation(Asahi Shimbun Sha 2002: 93). Even though its proposal for an Asian MonetaryFund was rejected by American financial officials, Japan had enthusiastically con-tributed to promote Northeast Asian community formation at times.

Since the critical juncture of the 1997 crisis, Japan’s traditional ties have beensteadily shifting towards Northeast Asia, reinforced by economic tectonics. Japan hasexperienced a dramatic rising economic interdependence with the Northeast quadrantof the continent. Japan’s exports to China rose sharply from 6.3 % of overall totals in2000 to 16.0 % in 2008. China’s share of total Japanese imports conversely rose from14.5 % in 2000 to 18.8 % in 2008. By 2006, almost the same amount of Japaneseexports were flowing to Korea and China alone as to the entire USA (IMF 2007). Andin 2007 the total volume of Japanese trade with China surpassed that with the USA.As trade interdependence within the Northeast quadrant of the continent is rising,

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increasingly elaborate transnational production networks are being fused amongMainland China, Korea, and Japan. Financial coordination and intellectual exchangeare also intensifying. Powerful winds on the continent of Northeast Asia, blowingoutward from China, are driving Japan to find her national interests, especiallyeconomic gains, in a more interdependent and coherent Northeast Asia.

Meanwhile, Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro strove for regional communityformation that, under the name of “East Asian Community”, aims to create a value-based community with distinctive membership in 2002. Even though his policy wasconsidered to counter the rapidly increasing Chinese influence, to reassert Japan’sleadership role in regionalism, and to reassure the USA that a regional communityformation will not undermine core US interest in the region, Koizumi included thecreation of a “community that acts together and advances together”, pursuing afunctional approach in the areas of trade, finance, energy, the environment and humansecurity (Koizumi 2002). After the Democratic Party of Japan came to power in 2009,Hatoyama improved the previous regime’s (the Liberal Democratic Party) policy onthe regional community formation. Hatoyama highlighted his policy to assuagesensitivities over Tokyo’s history of invasion and occupation in the region beforeand during the Second World War, emphasizing democracy strengthened by fraternalspirit (yuaiminshushugi). Furthermore, he emphasized the importance of NortheastAsian community formation, calling for an East Asian Community, while describingChina, Japan and Korea as its collective core and the USA as its equal partner. “Untilnow, we have tended to be too reliant on the USA … The Japan–USA allianceremains important, but as a member of Asia, I would like to develop policies thatfocus more on Asia,” he said after a trilateral summit meeting in 2008 (New YorkTimes 2009). China, Japan, and South Korea would form the core of the envisionedcommunity, he said. Hatoyama’s emphasis of regional community formation was notonly his personal preferences, but also reflected powerful sectors in Japan’s politicaland economic elites. Therefore, despite his resignation in June 2010 and NodaYoshihiko’s inauguration as Prime Minister in 2011, who stresses importance ofJapan-US relationship, Northeast Asian community formation based on a China–Japan–Korea partnership is likely to stay relevant for Japan (Funabashi 2011).

Korea: a bona fide regional community

Once known as the “hermit kingdom”, the Koreans traversed the twentieth century inthe unappealing, brutalized roles of “colony,” “battlefield,” and “divided state frozenin time.” After the liberation of Japanese occupation in 1945, Korean leaders andelites have had consistent tendency to rely on the USA, which insisted on using itsunparalleled global power to shape relations in Northeast Asia. Since the 1997 crisis,however, Korea has become an increasingly enthusiastic and effective advocate ofNortheast Asian community formation. The critical juncture of the 1997 crisis had anincalculable shock impact on Korea, which deepened Korean consciousness of thenecessity for community formation. Among Northeast Asian countries, Korea wasone of the hardest hit by the crisis. Surging in abruptly, like a sudden, uninvitedhurricane, the political-economic tumult shattered sanguine regional expectations ofboth growth and prosperity, giving birth to a new and unsettling sentiment: distrust ofglobal institutions. The International Monetary Fund was roundly condemned within

Region-building and critical juncture: Europe and Northeast Asia 13

Korea, as the bogeyman that had savaged Korean prosperity and unjustly opened thecountry to scavengers from abroad (Kirk 2000). Many Koreans consequently beganto believe more strongly than before in Northeast Asian community formation, as abuffer against the shocks conveyed by global institutions. The crisis showed Korea’sNortheast Asian neighbors to be more empathetic than their Western counterparts.Both psychologically, in the form of ambivalence towards US policy and gradualreconciliation with Japan, and economically, in the shape of rising interdependenceon China, Korea was increasingly encouraged to support—and indeed in many waysto lead—the Northeast Asian community formation.

Most importantly, because President Kim Dae-jung was aware that East Asia wasunable to mount an effective collective response when the 1997 crisis devastated severaleconomies, at the APT Hanoi Summit of November 1998, he raised the need for an EastAsian Community and proposed the establishment of the East Asian Vision Group(EAVG) to discuss long-term community formation within the broad Asian region. TheEAVG met five times from second half of 1999 to May 2001 and, eventually, in 2002produced a set of the most important visions: “establishing an East Asian Free TradeArea; holding East Asia Summits, bringing together leaders in the region; workingtowards monetary integration; setting up a regional cooperative organization; andestablishing the ultimate goal of building an East Asian Community” (ASEAN+3Summit 2002). President Kim Dae-jung, striving to enhance Northeast Asia’s rolewithout alienating the Southeast Asians, suggested that the existing APT organizationbe transformed into an “East Asian Summit.” The East Asian Summit, Kim Dae-jungcontended, could evolve into a viable and increasingly integrated regional commu-nity, leading ultimately to a coherent East Asian unity (Kim 2006: 10–11).

President Rho Moo-hyun and Lee Myung Bak saw that the Northeast Asiancommunity formation could ultimately become the vehicle for, on the one hand,producing much needed reconciliation at the fractious Northeastern core of the regionby resolving the nuclear threat from the North Korea and, on the other hand,protecting and promoting their national interests by expanding Korea’s positiverelations with China and managing its long-standing economic and security relationswith Japan. In particular, Roh Moo-hyun, while maintaining the USA–Korea alliance,shifted the main focus of his foreign policy from the US to Northeast Asia, demon-strating his willingness to form the Northeast Asian community along with China andJapan. To Roh Moo-hyun, who believed Korea should be a balancer between tworegional leaders, the regional community formation was essential in promotingKorea’s peace and prosperity. In 2003, Roh Moo-hyun launched its “peace andprosperity policy” as the new government’s major policy goal, which aimed topromote peace and mutual prosperity on the Korean peninsula and Northeast Asiathrough “trust, cooperation, and mutual gains.” The Presidential Committee on theNortheast Asian Cooperation Initiative, reporting directly to President Roh, putparticular emphasis on the idea of enhancing Korea’s role as a logistical and financialhub for the Northeast Asian community. In order to boost its idea, it defined Korea’srole as catalytic in three levels: “as a ‘bridge nation’, linking continental and maritimepowers: as a ‘hub nation’, emerging as a center of ideas to ensure peace andprosperity in the region and for interregional networks; and as a ‘cooperative nation’,serving as a catalyst to build a peaceful regional community” (Presidential Committeeon Northeast Asian Cooperation Initiative 2004).

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Efforts towards building a Northeast Asian community

In Northeast Asia, historical legacies, a lack of common identity and great-powerpolitics impeded political cooperation and economic integration. However, althoughthey have not reached the stage of integration under thick institutions, China, Japan,and Korea have exhibited a growing interest in regional community formation sincethe critical juncture of the 1997 crisis, developing various initiatives and programs.Initially, the APT mechanism provided the Northeast Asian countries with valuableopportunities to develop their own institutions. The epoch-making event for regionalcommunity formation between China, Japan, and Korea was the holding of a trilateral“side summit” meeting in November 1997 by taking advantage of the APT frame-work. In the meantime, while Northeast Asian countries participated in the APT, EastAsian Summit and the Chiang Mai Initiative, they themselves had not been able tofashion one for their own regional community formation. In this context, one shouldpay considerable attention to the annual trilateral summit meetings between China,Japan, and Korea since 2008 (Kesavan 2011). Indeed, December 2008 saw a water-shed occasion, when the first Northeast Asian summit was held. The leaders agreed tohold such meetings annually and signed an action plan for promoting regionalcommunity formation. Although unlike the 1997 crisis, the 2008–2009 global eco-nomic crisis, triggered by the collapse of Lehman Brothers, did not reinforce theleaders’ movement towards regional community formation as strongly as regionalintegrationists hoped, their trilateral summit meeting which intended to overcomepolitical animosities focused on a joint Asian response to the global economic crisis(Fackler 2008). Since then, four summits of the trio have taken place. In 2010 at theirthird meeting three leaders adopted a blueprint for future economic cooperation,environmental protection, and expansion of personnel and cultural exchanges, show-ing their willingness to develop East Asian community formation (Japan-China-ROKTrilateral Summit 2010). They also agreed to establish a permanent secretariat inSouth Korea, which finally launched in Seoul in September 2011. Last year’s summitwas held against the backdrop of the terrible earthquake-tsunami-nuclear reactorcrisis of 11 March in Japan. Recognizing the need to help each other in times ofdisaster and adversity, they promised to work towards building a comprehensiveregional framework to prevent the recurrence of a similar nuclear disaster (Kesavan2011). It is clear that trilateral summit offers an easy and natural opportunity for thegathering of the three leaders. It also mitigates the skepticism of extra-regionalcountries about new initiatives among the three influential states in East Asia. Threecountries that were hostile, distrustful and recriminated towards each other show theirwillingness to enter into relatively intimate and institutionalized regional community(Pempel 2008: 244).

Parallel to top-down initiations such as the summit meetings, bottom-up intercon-nections have proceeded rapidly since the 1997 crisis. Korean and Japanese popculture is avidly consumed throughout the region. Millions of Chinese, Koreans andJapanese visit each other’s countries as students, tourists, and business professionals.Economic and industrial linkages between China, Japan, and South Korea havegradually deepened since the 1997 crisis. Japanese and Korean firms have shown agrowing interest in China as a production base with cheap labor and enormousmarkets for their products. Commercial transactions between China, Japan, and

Region-building and critical juncture: Europe and Northeast Asia 15

Korea increased rapidly with China’s economic expansion. China surpassed the USAas Korea’s primary trade partner in 2004, and became Japan’s primary trade partner in2006. In 2004, Korea became the top investor in China after Hong Kong. In addition,networks of think-tanks including the Network of East Asia Think-thank, which was setup with a website in Beijing after its first meeting there in 2003, deepens betweengovernmental agencies. Transnational networking forums like Boao, Jeju, and Nikkei,together with defense-related exchanges, are proliferating. Less constrained by politicsand the shadows of history than their national counterparts, local governments are alsoincreasingly involved in social, cultural, and economic cooperative projects involvingChinese, Japanese, and Korean cooperation (De Prado 2008: 319–320).

Conclusion

It may be appropriate to conclude this article with a few over-all considerationsbearing on region-building in Europe and Northeast Asia. Let me set forth some ofthe salient points suggested in this article:

Firstly, many elites and scholars appear to deal with political, cultural, strategic,and economic aspects of the Northeast Asian region-building with a bit of skepticism,claiming that community formation in Northeast Asia is neither possible nor desirablebecause of its hegemonic regional order, incompatible antagonistic nationalism, andterritorial disputes surrounding Dokdo/Takeshima and Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands.According to them, exclusive national identities, mutual mistrust, and lack of aregional idea are militating against the emergence of regional community. NortheastAsian region-building, however, is now at a critical transition point. Northeast Asia isbecoming more deeply interconnected, integrated and more closed, after the 1997crisis. Northeast Asia has been evolving in an incipient regional community. A studyof the US American Congressional Research Service in 2005 concluded, “While theeconomic, political, and military relations in northeast Asia occur largely on separatetracks, the sheer magnitude of the economic flow is affecting relations at other strataof interaction. Already, economic interest has included more cooperation on politicaldisputes between China and Japan and South Korea” (Nanto and Chanlett-Avery2005: 29–30). Although the region-building in Northeast Asia has had a late startcompared with Europe, Northeast Asia is gradually witnessing the emergence of aregional community with a multilateral architecture.

Secondly, as Jean Monnet (1978: 286) mentions, “People only accept changewhen they are faced with necessity, and only recognize necessity when a crisis isupon them.” Only great crisis, as he believed, moves men to act against their cautiouspolitical instincts. Indeed, the EU has formulated its political amalgamation agenda inresponse to the total collapse as critical juncture, while the momentum of communityformation in Northeast Asia has accelerated as a result of the 1997 crisis. In otherwords, in the aftermath of the crisis, there had been certain preoccupations withregion-building since appropriate region-building was considered a key element ofsuccessful regional stability and well-being. The crisis pushed European and North-east Asian countries to think about how best to build a region. However, differentkinds and scopes of critical juncture can result in different outcomes of region-building. In contrast to the entire European continent, which had suffered the total

16 S.-S. Jo

collapse and tragedy due to the two world wars, in Northeast Asia Korea experienceda severely unexpected suffering during the 1997 crisis, while recovering from itsooner or later, and Japan and China were less directly affected by the crisis. Owingto the extent of dreadful devastation and suffering, Europe has become reflective andcooperative, facing their dark and traumatic past. The critical juncture in Europe ledthem to be deeply aware that the nation-states were not able to offer peace andsecurity. They had high hopes of making regional political amalgamation. On thecontrary, given the scope of hardship and shock, the critical juncture in NortheastAsia did not lead to fundamental change in their inward-looking, narrow and irratio-nal nationalistic attitudes and identities. Regional community formation never chal-lenges the state system. Rather, Northeast Asian nation-states are the driving forcesfor regional community formation.

Thirdly, and more importantly, in spite of current positive developments in North-east Asia, the movement towards a deeper community formation of Northeast Asia isnot likely to take place easily and smoothly. While European political amalgamationshows equal participation in the process and reciprocal respect for balanced relationsbased on a multilateral tradition, the process of regional community formation inNortheast Asia is likely to be faltering and unpredictable, because of their asymmetricstrength and, in particular, China’s status as a big country and big power. As a matterof fact, China’s past idea in Northeast Asia, such as Sino-centrism, is still an essentialpoint to bear in mind when considering Northeast Asian community formation.Today, the ancient notion of China being the center of the world appears to be re-emerging. The philosopher Zhao (2005) wrote a popular book, Tianxia tixi (TheTianxia system), which fascinated China’s scholars. The historical East Asian regionalorder centering on China, Zhao contended, provides an almost perfect model for thefuture world and regional order because traditional Chinese thought, by virtue of itsemphasis on peace and harmony, is superior to Western thought. This kind of Chinesenationalist discourse is likely to give little room for genuine regional communityformation; rather, regional community formation is more likely to be used as a tool tobuild the Chinese sphere of interest. As a consequence, China, in initiating regionalcommunity formation, needs to draw the appropriate lessons from Japan’s pastimperialistic experiences. A century ago, Pan-Asianism was appealing to many inNortheast Asia. Yet, China and Korea were so volatile that they could not build agenuinely equal and peaceful region with Japan. Accordingly, the idea of regionalcommunity formation was confiscated by the Japanese military group. Massivebacklash on the Northeast Asian continent against Japan’s so-called Greater NortheastAsian Co-prosperity Sphere provides lessons for China that the current regionalcommunity formation has to be based on equality and mutual respect. Either Japanor Korea alone could not balance China. In order to reduce neighbor’s fears, asGermany had done during the unification period in 1989, China must commit thatChina’s own leadership in Northeast Asia will happen within a regional framework.In addition, it is necessary for China to recognize the role of bridge countries. Themost important bridge is ASEAN, which can serve as a kind of Benelux bridging thegap between France and Germany, allowing the Northeast Asian countries to makeprogress towards regional community formation. Another bridge is the USA, whomust be the supporter in regional community formation, as she had been the promoterto European political amalgamation.

Region-building and critical juncture: Europe and Northeast Asia 17

Fourthly, Germany and Japan’s routes and roles in region-building are different.Because of the scope of devastation and the guilt and remorse over its aggressions toneighbors, Germany had become inward-looking. Germany searched for the rebuild-ing of cooperative relations with the other European states. In doing so, Germanyembraced modestly her destiny as a defeated state while not avoiding facing itsembarrassing past. Contrary to Germany, the Japanese relied on an image of self asvictim. The conservative Liberal Democratic Party, which dominated Japanese pol-itics from 1955 to 1993, appropriated the rhetoric of Japanese war victimhood so thatthey could position themselves apart from the militarist period and evade discussionof Japanese war responsibility. In addition, the low level of regional interdependenceand the authoritarian character for much of the Cold War in Northeast Asia providedgovernments little leverage to pursue the history issue with Japan. Although the endof the Cold War, the collapse of the 53 system in Japan, the rise of a democraticregime in Korea, and the intensification of economic interconnections in this regioncould help contain frictions over historical issues, Northeast Asia is still disturbed bythe often-cited “history problem.” Political authorities in Japan, China, and Koreahave attempted to invent the official historical narratives that legitimize their exis-tence and mobilize historical resources to serve their interests. This causes a deep andlasting gulf between the ways in which the Japanese and their neighbors understandthe history. Therefore, addressing this issue, which will in the end, nurture thebuilding of trust among them, must be the key task for the future of communityformation in Northeast Asia.

Lastly, a genuine “historical learning process” and a continuous public deliberationabout the past are embedded in a new political culture of the Europe. A new politicalculture in Europe is based on a sharp break with the past, due to traumatic experi-ences, painful memories and disastrous policy failures, from which the appropriatelessons have been drawn. The events of the Second World War as critical juncturerepresented a seminal episode that profoundly changed European traditional politicalculture and opened a window of opportunity. In keeping with the general abhorrenceof hostility and aggression in the wider culture, a new culture of cooperation becomesfirmly ensconced both in the European psyche and in its policy-making process. Incontrast to Europe, the movement towards community formation is still plagued bymutual mistrust, prejudice, ignorance, and nationalism. Indeed, Northeast Asia hasnot so much had the opportunities of accumulating a culture of friendship, mutualtrust, and responsiveness. Region-building has been purely tactical in nature, aimed atproviding short-term solutions to specific problems, usually economic in nature.Therefore, the ‘region-ness’ such as the interconnection of governments and peoplesthrough information exchange, policy coordination, bonds of mutual trust, identifi-cation, and social assimilation is still low in Northeast Asia. As a consequence, it ishighly imperative to construct a new political culture. Before doing anything else,Northeast Asia must put forth an effort to learn and understand each other’s inter-pretations of history, society, politics, economics, and culture and each other’spurposes and intentions. If this “learning and understanding” is increasingly sharedand disseminated across national borders, a new political culture will be laid for adeeper and genuine regional community formation.

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Acknowledgments This work was supported by Center for Korean Studies, Fudan University, ChineseAcademy of Social Science, Department of Politics and International Studies, University of Cambridge, theEast–West Center, Hawaii, and the Korea Research Foundation Grant funded by the Korean Government(KRF-2009-327-B00050). I would like to express my gratitude to Donald Puchala, Geoffrey Edwards,Hongguang Luo, Denny Roy, Inoguchi Takashi, Clark Scott, Liping Shi, the editor-in-chief, and twoanonymous reviewers for their keen comments and supports.

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