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Regional Maritime RegimeBuilding: Prospects inNortheast and Southeast AsiaMark J. Valenciaa East-West CenterPublished online: 29 Oct 2010.

To cite this article: Mark J. Valencia (2000) Regional Maritime Regime Building:Prospects in Northeast and Southeast Asia, Ocean Development & InternationalLaw, 31:3, 223-247, DOI: 10.1080/009083200413145

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Ocean Development & International Law, 31:223–247, 2000Copyright ã 2000 Taylor & Francis0090-8320/00 $12.00 + .00

Regional Maritime Regime Building:Prospects in Northeast and Southeast Asia

MARK J. VALENCIA

East-West CenterHonolulu, Hawaii, USA

Maritime issues are rising to the forefront of Asian security concerns. But maritimemanagement regimes can constrain conflict and create confidence in co-operation. Suchregimes can define the range of permissible state behavior and resolve dilemmas stem-ming from the sharing of common resources. Regimes originate through imposition,spontaneous processes, or negotiation and are supplied when there is sufficient demandfor the functions they perform. Integrative forces that support regime formation are theexistence of other international arrangements in the region; ethnic, cultural, or his-torical interstate relationships; and clear indications of benefits to be gained. Often ashock or crisis enhances regime formation or its robustness. Disintegrative forcesinclude political or territorial differences, competition for leadership, and oppositionto regionalism. In regional co-operation on maritime issues, Southeast Asia is clearlymore advanced than Northeast Asia. However, the absence of robust multilateral mari-time regimes in Asia reflects state perceptions that the costs outweigh the benefits. Theprimacy of dis-integrative factors argues strongly for an ad hoc, issue-specific, evolu-tionary process for multilateral maritime regime building in Asia.

Keywords Asia, maritime regime building, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia

Scientific and technological advances combined with economic need and nationalismhave stimulated almost all coastal countries in Asia to claim 200 NM exclusive eco-nomic zones. One consequence of this “sea enclosure” movement has been a recogni-tion that global standards and regimes may not adequately address the special circum-stances of some national maritime needs and interests. Thus, marine regionalism hasdeveloped where groups of countries have perceived that some of their mutual needsand interests based on physical geography, complementary uses, or policy distinguishthem from other countries and that these needs and interests are best satisfied by aregional approach. This article sets out the conceptual basis and framework for the ini-tiation and development of such regional regimes, and then, in this context, assesses theprospects for regional maritime regime building in Asia.

Received 16 December 1998; accepted 23 January 2000.This article is based in part on Mark J. Valencia, A Maritime Regime for Northeast Asia

(Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1996). It was presented to the Council for Security Co-operation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) Maritime Co-operation Working Group Meeting, 17–18 No-vember 1998, Maritime Institute of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur.

This research was assisted by a grant from the Abe Fellowship Program of the Social SciencesResearch Council and the American Council of Learned Societies with funds provided by the JapanFoundation Center for Global Partnership, and was also supported by the East-West Center.

Address correspondence to Mark. J. Valencia, Senior Fellow, Research Program, East-WestCenter, 1601 East-West Rd., Honolulu, Hawaii, USA.

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224 M. J. Valencia

The Growing Prominence of Maritime Issues in Asia

Maritime issues are rising to the forefront of Asian security concerns.1 The Conventionon the Law of the Sea has introduced new uncertainties and conflict points into Asia,particularly in regard to EEZ and continental shelf claims and boundaries. Many emerg-ing regional security concerns—such as piracy, pollution from oil spills, safety of sealines of communication, illegal fishing, and exploitation of others’ offshore resources—are essentially maritime. The addressing of issues like environmental protection, illegalactivities at sea, and resource management necessitates acceptance of broader responsi-bilities and different priorities by military authorities, both for force structure develop-ment and their operations and training.2 These concerns, together with the requirementsfor defense self-reliance and force modernization, are reflected in the significant mari-time dimension of the current arms acquisition programs in the region—for example,the maritime surveillance and intelligence collection systems, multi-role fighter aircraftwith maritime attack capabilities, modern surface combatants, submarines, anti-ship mis-siles, naval electronic warfare systems, and mine warfare capabilities. Unfortunately,some of these new capabilities tend to be more offensive, inflammatory, and, in conflictsituations, prone to inadvertent escalation. It is increasingly recognized that regionalmechanisms must be instituted to address these issues. Such mechanisms can in turncontribute to tactical learning—in which the behavior of states towards cooperation ischanged—and eventually to complex learning in which values and beliefs about reach-ing goals through cooperation are changed.3

The growing acceptance of the notion of comprehensive security4 is a positive de-velopment for maritime regime building. Comprehensive security implies that securityshould and can be achieved through a web of interdependence including cooperation ineconomic development and scientific research and a general enhancement of humaninteractions. In this perspective, military might alone does not define security norgenerate long-term peace. Indeed, the failure to comply with basic standards of goodneighborliness—for example, preventing or notifying neighbors about transnational pol-lution, or carrying out transboundary environmental clean up and impact assessmentscan cause significant tension. The concept of “comprehensive security” is gaining cur-rency among policymakers in the Asia region and in Washington.

Asian specialists list the following maritime problem areas as requiring greater co-operation: piracy, smuggling, illegal immigration, transnational oil spills, incidents atsea, search and rescue, navigational safety, exchange of maritime information, illegalfishing, and management of resources in areas of overlapping claims.5 These issues areall maritime safety problems of a civil, as opposed to a military, nature. Proposals formaritime cooperation can be formulated not against a single adversary but rather to dealwith common problems of crime, human depredation, pollution, and natural disaster.Progress on the harder issues may well depend on successful development of a softer,essentially civil, maritime safety regime. Indeed, successful cooperation in the marinerealm can build the confidence necessary for initiatives in other spheres and for thejump from tactical to complex learning.

Arguably, the most significant of the current proposed maritime confidence andsecurity building measures is the concept of regional oceans management.6 There hasbeen considerable progress in this regard in the Pacific, particularly for environmentalprotection (the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme)7 and fisheries (the SouthPacific Forum Fisheries Agency).8 In Southeast Asia, although numerous organizationshave been proposed or established for this purpose, most progress in ocean management

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Regional Maritime Regime Building 225

has tended to be bilateral rather than multilateral. Managing Northeast Asian seas willbe especially complicated. Although the lateral states share the same historical and cul-tural background, they differ in internal political systems, external economic alignments,and levels of economic development. Indeed, relations among the states bordering thismarine region have been tenuous or even estranged. For the past half century, the politi-cal environment in the Northeast Asian region has inhibited multilateral ocean manage-ment programs. But now—for the first time in two generations—Northeast Asia has anopportunity for lasting peace. For both Southeast and Northeast Asia, the muting of theCold War, the concomitant warming of relations in most of the region, the extension ofmaritime jurisdiction, and the coming into force of the Law of the Sea Conventionprovide a narrow window of opportunity to forge a new order for regional seas beforeresurgent nationalism further complicates these issues. Needed now is a process—orfirst, a framework and a blueprint—for developing multilateral regional marine policyregimes.

Regime Theory and Maritime Regime Building

In order to assess the prospects for maritime regime formation in Asia, we must firstexamine the general principles, definitions, context, and demand for regimes. Coopera-tion is a process that governments enter because they believe that the policies of theirpartners can facilitate realization of their own objectives through policy collaboration orcoordination. 9 Although cooperation can develop on the basis of complementary inter-ests, it is more often viewed by policymakers as a means to other objectives than an endin itself. Cooperation requires adjustment of policies to meet the demands of others, thatis, it emerges from a pattern of discord or potential discord such as exists in the marineenvironment and the fisheries sectors in Asia. Indeed, cooperation occurs when actorsadjust their behavior to actual or anticipated preferences of others, thus facilitating real-ization of each other’s objectives. Cooperation is a necessary but not sufficient conditionfor the formation of a regime.

What is a regime, what are its functions and why would governments want to formand participate in them? Formally, regimes are sets of implicit or explicit principles(beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude), norms (standards of behavior defined in termsof rights and obligations), rules (specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action), anddecision-making procedures (prevailing practices for making and implementing col-lective choice) around which actor expectations converge.10 A more applied definitiontreats regimes as multilateral agreements among states that aim to regulate national ac-tions within an issue area.11 Implicit in this definition is that regimes can define therange of permissible state action by outlining explicit injunctions. This definition allowsa sharp distinction between the concept of regime, and that of cooperation, that is, re-gimes are subsets of cooperative behavior and facilitate it, but cooperation can existwithout a regime. Regimes are also distinguished from the broader concept of institu-tions that arise from the intersection of convergent expectations and patterns of behavioror practice.12

Regimes are created to solve dilemmas of collective goods. The optimal provisionof international collective goods, for example, a protected environment, shared naturalresources or collective security, can only be assured if states eschew the independentdecision making that would otherwise make them “free riders”and would ultimately re-sult in either the suboptimal provision or the nonprovision of the collective goods. Twodifferent bases of regime formation are the dilemmas of common interest and common

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226 M. J. Valencia

aversion.13 Regimes established to deal with the dilemma of common interests requirecollaboration while those created to solve the dilemma of common aversion requirecoordination .14 Most issues of maritime management are dilemmas of common interestand thus require collaboration.

A major function of international regimes is to facilitate the making of mutuallybeneficial agreements among governments and thus to avoid structural anarchy and aclimate of “each against all.”15 Specific agreements are usually neither random nor adhoc but are nested within more comprehensive agreements covering a plethora of issues.This makes it easier to link issues and thus facilitates trade-offs and side payments.Within these multilayered systems, international regimes facilitate the convergenceof government expectations. Thus, regimes develop because states believe that sucharrangements will enable mutually beneficial agreements that would otherwise be un-attainable, and that the results of repetitive ad hoc joint action would be worse or morecostly than negotiation within the context of a regime. Further, some agreements thatwould be beneficial to all parties are not consummated and thus international regimescan help correct this “market failure.” Thus, for regimes to be formed, there must besufficient complementary or common interests in agreements benefiting the essentialmembers. Clearly, governments that find their fundamental interests to be empatheticallyinterdependent will find it easier to form international regimes.

Regimes fill one or more of three critical needs: (1) they establish a clear legalframework with liability for actions; (2) they improve the quality and quantity of infor-mation available to states; and (3) they reduce transaction costs. They also provide avaluable mechanism for formulating and presenting a united stand on issues vis-à-visoutside actors. Regimes thus create the conditions for orderly multilateral negotiations,legitimate and de-legitimate different types of state action and facilitate linkages amongissues. By clustering issues together in the same fora over a period of time, they fostercontinuous interactions between governments, thus reducing incentives to cheat, raisingthe costs of defection, and enhancing the value of reputation. And the marginal cost ofdealing with an additional issue is less with a regime, which is one reason why regimesoften expand in scope.16

Indeed, regimes alter the international environment so that cooperation is more likely.By establishing mutually acceptable standards of behavior for states to follow and byproviding ways to monitor compliance, regimes create the basis for decentralized en-forcement based on the principle of reciprocity. “Reciprocation”17 is the golden rule,with a reward. It is the belief that if one helps others, or at least fails to hurt them, theywill reciprocate when the tables are turned. Implicit in this formulation is that statespersonsshould avoid maximizing their interests in the short-term for the sake of expected long-run gain.

Although it depends on the issue, there are several general reasons why multilateralismcan be preferable to bilateralism. Development of a multilateral mechanism is organiza-tionally cheaper than a web of bilateral contacts.18 Multilateral processes or mechanismscan also mute bilateral tensions and disputes. But for management of the maritime envi-ronment and mobile resources that are shared or claimed by several nations, multilateralismis not only more efficient, it is politically and ecologically essential.

The Origin of Regimes

Regimes originate through a combination of imposition, spontaneous processes, ornegotiation. There are four main theories as to why regimes develop and change: struc-

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Regional Maritime Regime Building 227

tural, functional, game-theoretic, and cognitive.19 Each captures important features ofreality but none offers a satisfactory explanation for the full range of observable phe-nomena. The structural theory of hegemonic stability links regime creation and changeto a dominant power’s existence, for example, in Northeast Asia, Japan or China, andthe weakening of regimes to the decline of a hegemon. In a negative view, the hegemonprovides coercive leadership, and enforces regime rules with positive and negative sanc-tions. In a positive mode, the hegemon is willing to originate and sustain a regimebecause it benefits from a well-ordered system even if the weaker nations “free-ride.”

With the waning of American hegemony, leadership in the Asian region may be-come joint hegemonic (Japan and China) or alternative hegemonic.20 Or there may emergea set of like-minded regional policymakers with a common set of values committed tocooperation, for example, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). Com-mitment to a regime reduces the flexibility of governments by limiting their ability toact in their narrow self-interest. In this situation, it is important for small powers tomake their support for cooperative endeavors genuine and credible, that is, to providepublic goods and thus refute free rider implications. Indeed, small states can help pro-vide the forum to mitigate major power conflict.

But international behavior cannot be predicted or explained solely by interests andthe distribution of power, it must also be understood within its functional context. Insti-tutions determine the patterns of cooperation. Although the form and content of regimeswill inevitably be strongly influenced by their most powerful members pursuing theirown interests, regimes can also affect powerful state interests by altering state expecta-tions and values. Abstract plans for morally worthy international regimes that do notconsider the reality of self-interest are not practical. But the critical factor here is thestate’s definition of self-interest. Although realism must be a basis for analysis of coop-eration and discord, it fails to take into account that a state’s definition of its interestsdepends not only on national interest and the distribution of world power, but on thequantity and quality of information and its access to it. Regimes thus thin the “veil ofuncertainty,” and reduce transaction costs, facilitating interstate agreements and theirdecentralized enforcement.

The value of regimes lies not only in their service of the present national interestbut also in their potential contribution to the solution of problems that cannot yet beprecisely defined. Anticipation of future use of existing regimes with the same countriesacts as an incentive to keep commitments even when it is difficult to do so. If a countryviolates regime norms and rules, it may make it difficult to make self-beneficial agree-ments in the future. Thus, maintaining unrestricted flexibility can be more costly thanentering and complying with regimes. This means that the realpolitik model of anautonomous, hierarchical state that keeps its options open and its decision-makingprocesses closed is contradicted by the value of a reputation for reliability and the needto supply and receive high quality information as a basis and incentive for mutuallybeneficial agreements. For example, North Korea may be slowly removing the obstaclesto cooperation posed by its autarkic behavior.

Actors will make agreements on the basis of their expectations of a nation’s will-ingness and ability to keep their commitments. Indeed, for cooperation to succeed, eachcooperative act must be perceived as embedded in a chain of such acts. The essenceof international regimes is injunctions that are sufficiently specific that violations areidentifiable and changes observable. Thus, a good reputation is advantageous for form-ing and entering into international agreements. A government’s reputation is also animportant asset in persuading others to enter into agreements with it. Moreover, interna-

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228 M. J. Valencia

tional regimes help governments to assess others’ reputations by providing standards ofbehavior against which performance can be measured, by linking these standards tospecific issues, and by providing fora, often through international organizations, in whichthese evaluations can be made. For certain types of activities, such as sharing researchand development information, weak states with much to gain but little to give may havemore incentive to participate in regimes than strong ones, but less incentive to spendfunds on research and development. But without the strong states, the enterprise as awhole will fail.

Events external to the bargaining process can precipitate a credible crisis providinga window of opportunity to create a regime. Examples of crises in the resource andenvironment sectors that produced regimes include the precipitous decline in fur-sealpopulations in the Bering Sea in the early twentieth century, the alarming drop in blue-whale stocks in the 1930s, and the discovery of an ozone hole over Antarctica in the1980s. The revelation of Russian and Japanese nuclear waste dumping in the Sea ofJapan produced just such a credible crisis in the marine environment sector in North-east Asia. It has already led to a modification of the London Dumping Convention toinclude a ban on all ocean disposal of radioactive material.21 Similarly, the increasinglyobvious decline in fish stocks in Northeast Asia, the changes in the nature of the catch,the extension of jurisdiction, and the increased incidence of poaching are producing aweb of bilateral arrangements. This increasing issue density may lead to a multilateralregime.

The windows of opportunity created by credible crises do not last long and thusthose advocating regimes and institutions must be able to recognize and seize suchopportunities. This means that it is necessary to devote time and intellectual energy tothinking systematically about the nature and relative merits of alternative regimes inspecific issue areas even when there seems little possibility of positive movement in theimmediate future.

Spontaneous regimes often exhibit longevity and flexibility even when the structureof relationships change. This is because the costs to individual actors, even leadingmembers, of not complying or defecting from established regimes are generally high22

and the alternatives are limited. For example, what is the alternative for a particular statethat objects to an emerging regime for marine fisheries management? This observationtends to undermine the realist contention that collective behavior at the internationallevel is a reflection only of prevailing interests and will last only as long as those inter-ests are met. However, it should be recognized that defection can occasionally occurdespite its high costs. For example, Japan is apparently considering defecting from In-ternational Whaling Commission quotas and practices.23

Game theory suggests that in the real world of complex and consecutive interac-tions, such as in international ocean management in Asia, the costs of defecting in anyparticular situation must be considered in relation to the opportunity costs of foregonefuture interactions.24 Iterative interaction can limit the number of players, increase thetransparency of state action, and alter the payoff structure. Game theory shows thatcooperation among self-interested parties is possible even in the absence of commongovernment.

Cooperation may be enhanced when central players in the region form an epistemiccommunity that coordinates their activities and attempt to translate their beliefs intopublic policies furthering cooperation.25 The influence of such communities on decisionmakers grows under conditions of uncertainty such as currently pertain in Asia. Suchcommunities are identified by the presence of

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Regional Maritime Regime Building 229

a broadly shared set of normative and principled beliefs, combined with aninternalized and self-validating set of causal and methodological principlesand a common policy goal operating within a set of formal, semiformal andinformal institutions and networks that, in a period of dramatic historicalchange and uncertainty, provide the framework within which to broker a setof policy options drawn from their normative beliefs and amenable to theircausal and explanatory principles.26

These communities have enormous value for international and regional organiza-tions because their loyalties are more to the production and application of their knowl-edge than to any particular government. Through networks and “invisible colleges” thesecommunities seek to promote cooperation across national boundaries. Often, the epistemiccommunities are able to introduce values and visions that can capture the imagination ofdecision makers who, on the basis of their new understanding, may redefine strategicand economic interests so as to enhance collective human interests across national bor-ders. Such a community exists and is gaining strength in the marine policy arena inAsia. Leadership is important to the formation of successful regimes. Leaders seize op-portunities, initiate and structure the bargaining process, set the focus on integrativerather than distributive issues, and facilitate package arrangements.

In sum, regimes reduce asymmetries of information by upgrading the general levelof available information. They reduce uncertainty and minimize disagreements based onmisapprehension and deception. They establish patterns of legal liability and reduce thecosts of negotiations and bargaining. In short, regimes are formed because governmentsanticipate they will facilitate cooperation. Costs of reneging on commitments, both fortheir reputations and because of the effects of retaliation, are increased, and the costs ofoperating within these frameworks are reduced. International regimes can and are fre-quently altered, and regime rules are changed, bent, ignored, and broken. Nevertheless,because regimes are so difficult to construct actors usually prefer to obey the rulesrather than have the regime completely dissolve.

Uncomplicated regimes that produce the desired results are much preferable to looseor complex regimes. Loose regimes that leave much to be worked out in administrativearenas often founder on the bureaucratic politics of implementation. Regimes that re-quire an elaborate administrative structure like the proposed international deep seabedregime often do not command sufficient support to come into existence. And arrange-ments that make verification of compliance difficult often breed distrust rather than con-fidence or cooperation.

The Demand for and Evolution of Regimes

Regimes are supplied when there is sufficient demand for the functions they perform.27

Increasing issue density, as in the ocean sector in Asia, is likely to lead to increaseddemand for international regimes.28 The incentives to form international regimes willalso be greater when different issues are closely linked to one another. This is becausead hoc agreements will begin to interfere with one another and raise the costs of con-tinually considering the effect of one set of agreements on others. Cooperative regimesin one issue area may also arise as an unintended consequence of cooperation in anotherarea. As issues and the realization of their interdependence grow, so will the demand forinternational regimes. The situation in the fisheries and environment sectors in Asia israpidly approaching this point.

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Regimes evolve. For example, the global regime for the oceans evolved in thiscentury from imposed, to spontaneous, to negotiated. Rapid change in the internationalpolitical environment often erodes spontaneous regimes without creating conditionsconducive to the formation of new arrangements. Thus, negotiated and even imposedregimes are attractive and more durable during times of rapid social change.

Further, regimes are influenced by shifts in the structure of power in internationalsociety as a whole and in the region in particular. For example, the decrease of U.S. andRussian influence in Northeast Asia and the expansion of Chinese and Japanese influ-ence will affect the formation and evolution of regimes. Technological change, such asadvances in fish capture techniques and equipment, and detection and understanding ofthe effects of pollution on human health are undermining the existing common propertyfisheries and environmental regimes in favor of restricted access or use regimes. Majorshifts in domestic priorities, such as demand for resources due to population growth orconsumer tastes, can render regimes obsolete.

Nevertheless, once established, many regimes are resistant to change even when theexisting arrangements are inefficient and unfair. Common property regimes for renew-able resources like fisheries and environment are particularly difficult to change. Thisis because individual agencies within governments often define their roles in terms ofadministering and maintaining the provisions of international regimes. Also, interna-tional regimes commonly give rise to nongovernmental interest groups committed todefending the provisions of specific regimes and prepared to press governments to com-ply with their rules. In fact, the establishment of a regime can stimulate the growth ofpowerful interest groups in the member states, which then form transnational alliancesin order to persuade responsible agencies to comply with the requirements of the re-gime. Indeed, the key variable accounting for policy change in the environment arena isthe degree of domestic environmentalist pressure.29

Compliance with Multilateral Regimes

Noncompliance obviously limits the effectiveness of any regime and resource and envi-ronmental agreements in particular. It also undermines the international legal processand contributes to conflict and instability in the international system. Noncompliancecan occur for a variety of reasons, including a lack of institutional, financial, or humanresources, and differing interpretations as to the meaning or requirements of a particularobligation. Therefore, despite the prevalence of rules in resource and environment re-gimes, unilateral actions, bargaining, and coercion remain central to the processes ofarriving at choices within these regimes.

There appear to be four types of national policy responses to resource and environ-ment regimes: avoidance of commitment; commitment but noncompliance; commitmentand compliance; and commitment and compliance beyond that required.30 Countries inthe first two categories are referred to as “laggards.” Laggards usually have a low levelof concern regarding the issue, a lack of capacity to fulfill the obligations of the regime,or domestic political resistance to collective action. Laggards also usually have weakerstandards and typically agreed to the regime hoping to gain assistance in capacity build-ing. Rich laggards can be prodded to compliance by political embarrassment or pressurefrom their own scientists and public. Poor laggards require financial assistance to com-ply. However, implementation of policies is seldom a matter of compliance alone, butmore often involves a combination of binding international law, public exposure of non-compliance, normative persuasion, scientific facts, and where necessary, financial aidand technical and scientific assistance.31

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Regional Maritime Regime Building 231

Marine Policy Regimes

A marine policy regime is a system of governing arrangements, together with a collec-tion of institutions (formal or informal) for the implementation of these arrangements, ina given social structure or marine region. More specifically, a marine policy regime is aset of agreements among a defined group of actors specifying: (1) the distribution ofpower and authority for the marine geographical region; (2) a system of rights andobligations for the members of the group; and (3) a body of rules and regulations thatare supposed to govern the behavior of members.

It is a system of governance. As such, it has structure, objectives, functions, powers,processes, and programs.32 Structure includes the activity for which an arrangement isdesigned, geographic coverage, membership, administrative framework, and institutionalaffiliation. The objectives of marine regional arrangements can be divided looselyinto three major categories—conservation, management, and development. Conservationmay include maintenance of water quality, or protection of living marine resources,wetlands, marine sanctuaries, endangered species, and scenic areas. Management impliesthe planning and execution of programs whereby maritime activities may be carried outmore effectively. It also involves managing conflicts between and among ocean users.Development focuses on the use of such resources as fish, hydrocarbons and minerals,shoreline space, shipping lanes, and ocean space. Development also involves acquiringknowledge and understanding of marine areas, as well as skills and equipment for theirmanagement. It may also include improved systems within the member countries formarine-related action and multi-state regional systems for dispute settlement or othergoals.

At the state level, there are other objectives of regional action, such as the protec-tion of national interest, for example, by denying access to competitors. At times, ma-rine regional arrangements may have more than one stated objective, as well as severalhidden objectives such as the strengthening of regional ties or aiding the quest by oneor more states of the region for a leadership position. To be fully effective, regionalorganizations, including those dedicated to marine affairs, should be linked to othernational, regional, and global objectives.33

Functions and powers are the heart of maritime regimes and include the scope ofthe system and the degree of integration achieved. Functions operate at four levels, eachof which might entail ever more politicization and controversy. A first level involvesservice, that is, information exchange, data gathering and analysis, consultation, facilita-tion and coordination of programs, and joint planning.34 Most maritime regimes performthis function. Regimes at this level usually avoid controversy but concentrate on lowpriority issues. Nevertheless, within a geographic region, a proliferation of such organi-zations may build the web of interrelationships necessary to move to the next higherstep of successful regional arrangements.

A higher functional level involves norm creation and allocation, which includes theestablishment of standards and regulations and the allocation of costs and benefits. Onlya few regional marine organizations have achieved this level, for example, the SouthPacific Forum Fisheries Agency. The third level, “rule observance,” includes the moni-toring and enforcement by the regional organization of the norms and agreed standards.At the highest functional level are “operational” multilateral organizations concernedwith implementing the norms for management of resource exploration and exploitationactivities, technical assistance, research analysis, and development. An example—onpaper—might be the Enterprise, the international mining arm of the International SeabedAuthority proposed in the Law of the Sea Convention.

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Approaches to Regional Marine Policy Cooperation

There are several different approaches to regional cooperation in the maritime sphere:joint activities, regional organizations, treaty arrangements, harmonization of laws andpolicies, and informal contacts.35 The most demanding of these approaches is joint activi-ties involving sustained interaction in specific enterprises or projects such as joint scien-tific research programs, joint ventures in fisheries, or joint hydrocarbon development.Regional cooperation can proceed progressively from policy consultation, or discussionof common or mutual policy problems, to policy harmonization, or elimination of contra-dictory or conflicting national policies, to policy coordination, or national policy adjust-ments in pursuit of common policy goals, and finally to integration, or the implementationof common policies and structural adjustments to eliminate barriers to interaction amongthe region’s economies.36

Participation in regional organizations can range from symbolic to substantial withinthe framework of larger multinational organizations such as the Intergovernmental Oceano-graphic Commission, the Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, orthe United Nations Environment Programme. When an organization undertakes exten-sive activities, possibly including management functions, participation can become costly,particularly for developing countries. Treaties generally are concluded only after diffi-cult negotiations relating to specific problems. And they often result in firm obligationsthat are not readily adapted to changing circumstances.

Harmonization may be defined as the deliberate alignment of the laws and policiesof different nations for the purpose of fulfilling their national interests in the contextof cooperation. In shipping, fishing, and most other sectors, this can take the form ofmodest adjustments in national laws and policies that yield significant benefits to allconcerned. Harmonization is likely to be less demanding than the other more obviousinstruments of international cooperation. Informal contact is the least costly and the leastrisky method of undertaking regional cooperation. It does not get the recognition itdeserves. With informal communication it may be possible to find fruitful arenas forcooperation on a modest scale. This may begin with the sharing of information.

The distribution of power and authority in a regime is a primary concern of States.Fisheries regimes, for example, can vary along a continuum from extreme centralizationto extreme decentralization.37 Extreme decentralization includes voluntary acquiescencein which member states are free to comply or not with rules established by the majorityof members. At the other extreme is consensus, which means that any member statemay veto a proposal even if it is approved by a majority of the other members. Inbetween are various forms of a “binding majority.” Power and authority can vary inde-pendently, although stability seems to require their approximate congruence. Neverthe-less, for fisheries regimes, it should be possible to combine centralized authority withdecentralized power and vice versa. Rights and obligations in a resource regime consti-tute a set of economic and social relations defining the position of each actor withrespect to the use of the resource or environment. Variations in rights and obligationswill have substantial implications for dealing with externalities, solutions for use of spe-cific resources, and the distribution of values among the members.

The term process as used here means: (1) the interplay between forces of inte-gration and disintegration within a regional system; (2) the growth or decline of theorganization; (3) the establishment of links between one regional system and otherswithin the same geographic location; and (4) the impact of organizations on the natureand use of the ocean space over which their activities extend.38

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Among the integrative forces within a region that support regional action are: (1)the existence of other international arrangements among the member states that couldcontribute to the regional consciousness of the participants; (2) ethnic, cultural, histori-cal, or other ties among the region’s countries; and (3) clear indicators of economicbenefits or other advantages to be gained through regional action, or clear indicators ofcommon costs that might be avoided through regional cooperation. Disintegrative forcesinclude: (1) political, territorial, ideological, or other differences among countries of theregion; (2) competition for positions of leadership among two or more states of theregion; and (3) opposition to regionalism in the area by one or more regional or outsidepowers. Growth and decline of regional arrangements may be measured by total mem-bership, functions and powers of the organization, new programs, and expansion of theinstitutional region.

Lessons Learned

Full or partial marine regionalism has been attempted or proposed in several semi-en-closed seas, the Baltic,39 the Mediterranean,40 the North Sea,41 and the Arctic.42 Lessonsfor the creation and design of an “ideal” regime can be gleaned from these and otherregimes.43 For a maritime regime to form, several conditions must be met.44

· First and foremost, a positive perception of cooperation must exist throughout theregion. Public and private institutions must have established regional links and acommunity must have developed that is committed to the concept of regionalism.The regime can, therefore, be supported by a significant political constituency.

· The member countries must perceive that the benefits of participation outweighthe costs. Such benefit and cost considerations include direct benefits like betteruse of marine resources, as well as indirect benefits such as the advancement ofstate aspirations for regional leadership. In the initial stages of cooperation, theeconomic and political costs should be kept as low as possible.

· The regime must be widely perceived as equitable, however measured. The dis-tributive consequences of the regime over time should be difficult to predict.This ambiguity will mute the positional and distributive aspects of bargainingand encourage the singling out of a few key problems and approaches to themthat each participant can accept as a package, rather than as discrete elements.Expanding the contractual zone allows participants to perceive themselves asoccupying different roles, for example, as both sources and sufferers of pollu-tion, or as perpetrators and victims of overfishing. De-emphasizing or avoidingdistributive issues enhances regime formation by enabling the participants tofocus their attention on the search for mutually beneficial solutions.

· A shock or crisis outside the negotiating process would enhance regime forma-tion or speed it along once the process has begun, and the participants should beprepared to make the most of such “windows of opportunity.” Such an event canstimulate the emergence of political will to address the issues in integrative bar-gaining and thus open windows of opportunity so that the regime will form.Such factors might include broad shifts in values and ideas (such as a growingenvironmental consciousness), changes in the political system (such as the end ormuting of the Cold War), or specific events (such as an environmental crisis, thejoining of ASEAN by Vietnam, or a clash between claimants in the South ChinaSea).

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Once initiated, a regime may evolve in content and robustness if some of the fol-lowing conditions are met:

· Expectations of progress should be reasonable. Progress should be slow but steadyand perceptible; otherwise the movement toward cooperation could be weakenedor its objectives altered.

· The regime should form in stages beginning with a limited and temporaryregime—perhaps a “maritime council”—and move eventually to a broader conven-tion. It should initially place priority on innocuous sectors so as to minimizecontroversy and politicization of issues. Informal or supplementary interpretationsof the regime should evolve over time. To prevent misunderstanding among theparticipants as to which track they are on, the distinction between institutionalbargaining and pre-negotiation should be clarified.

· Objectives and functions should be clear. Objectives could include conserva-tion, management, and development; protection of state interests; or attainmentof greater equity. Others could be linked to regional or global objectives. Func-tions could initially include service, information exchange, data gathering andanalysis, consultation, facilitation and coordination of programs, joint planning,and technical assistance. Eventually they might involve operation of an organi-zation; management of resources; and exploration and exploitation. Ultimatelythe functions could include norm creation, compliance, allocation, and ruleobservance.

· The regime should be uncomplicated but not loose. It should define geographicscope, membership, rules and regulations, procedures, decision making, and—ifan organization is necessary—financial matters and staffing.

· Geographically, the regime should fit the natural system on which it focuses,although its exact boundaries could be ambiguous to mute jurisdictional con-cerns. And it should initially be a sub-regional effort rather than attempting com-prehensive regionalization.

· Decision making should be decentralized. A coordination regime should estab-lish rules and procedures while leaving each member free to implement them intheir own way.

· The regime should concentrate on policy questions and should be negotiated byskilled diplomats.

· Negotiations should produce one or more explicit agreements.· The issues should be defined at the outset rather than depending on the process

to correct faulty initial formulations.· Alternative regime designs should be available, new ways of understanding the

problem should be introduced, and the participants should be willing and able toentertain new ideas. Solutions should be creative, simple, and easily grasped bypolicymakers, journalists, and the public.

· Member states should not make explicit or unsubtle attempts to use power ininstitutional bargaining. A hegemon can use its dominance in scientific researchor diplomatic expertise to impose its preferred outcome, but such efforts maybackfire. Power must be used with care, even by a hegemon. The distribution ofpower and authority within the regime must be clear.

· The regime should have access to willing and able national leadership. Butsome countries should also be prepared to play the role of effective followerin order to make the process work. Strong leadership is both affected by and

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affects power relationships, and also shapes values and ideas. But a desire forcontrol will not necessarily produce a successful regime. As long as participantssharply disagree as to who will control what, regime formation will be difficult.

· A strong leader or leaders should provide impetus and direction for the regime.

With regard to Asia-Pacific maritime confidence and security building measures inparticular, it should be remembered that:45

· Asia-Pacific is not itself a homogeneous region;· Asians tend to prefer informal structures and place greater emphasis on personal

relationships;· Consensus-building is a key prerequisite;· Asians have a general distrust of outside “solutions”; and· Asians have a genuine, but weakening, commitment to the principle of noninter-

ference in one another’s internal affairs.

Why do Regimes Fail?

There are both obvious and subtle reasons why some marine regional efforts do notsucceed. Obvious problems include inadequate leadership, limited management author-ity, lack of effective enforcement powers, non-binding effects on non-parties, disagree-ment among member states, shortage of funds, and shortage of trained personnel orequipment. More subtle problems can include limited information and the ability to useit, jurisdictional uncertainties and limitations, differing time horizons, and “freedom”costs.46 Information shortcomings regarding scientific knowledge relevant to effectiveocean management can cause disagreements between governments and inhibit the gen-eration of sound national and international policy. Boundary disputes or uncertaintiesretard implementation of jurisdictional control, and without this, cooperation is mademore difficult. Furthermore, existing jurisdiction may not encompass the entire ecosys-tem and thus critical elements of that unit requiring management may be beyond statecontrol. Ironically, although segmented or sectoral approaches to cooperative ocean man-agement are much more likely to gain the political support necessary for progress, thisapproach may ultimately be unsuccessful in resolving the problem, particularly if itinvolves conflicting uses and users.

There is obviously a time gap between the average length in office of ministers andthe decades required to implement and sustain successful cooperation. This dilemmafavors multiple short-term programs that may be insufficient to achieve long-termresults.

“Freedom” costs at both individual and state levels may ultimately block successfulcooperation. Both individuals and states will have to surrender their absolute “freedomof the seas,” that is, their absolute rights to use the ocean environment at any time forany purpose and to do so without regard for the interests and well-being of anyone else.Such freedoms will be surrendered with considerable reluctance in the absence of any-thing less than a clear, overwhelming, and immediate need. However, formal sover-eignty is different from operational sovereignty—the legal freedom of action. The lattercan be eroded in the interest of effective collective action. Indeed, environmental inter-dependence and related international negotiations reinforce formal sovereignty whileresulting in self-limitation of operational sovereignty.47

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Prospects for Maritime Regime Formation in Asia

General Integrative and Non-Integrative Factors

Now that all the major coastal nations of the Asian region have formally extended theirmaritime jurisdictions to 200 NM or more over resources and many activities, almost nomarine area is left unclaimed and many areas are claimed by two or more countries.Clearly, the countries bordering the Asian seas are trying to identify and pursue theirnational interests in the oceans. But many ocean resources and activities, such as fishand fishing, pollutants and environmental protection, sea-lanes and shipping, and hydro-carbon-bearing basins and hydrocarbon exploration—are transnational in character. Thereis insufficient understanding and consideration of the transnational and interdependentcharacter of the ocean environment and the resources and activities that it harbors andsupports. But there is also a growing recognition that to improve this understanding, co-operation is necessary.

What currently passes for national, and particularly regional, ocean policy is primi-tive both conceptually and analytically.48 The major impediment is the widespread in-ability to formulate and implement ocean policy as an integrated whole, balancing theoverall interests of the nation and the region in the short- and long-term. The reason forsuch widespread fragmentation in national policymaking structures and processes for theoceans seems to be a result of the development of ocean uses largely in isolation fromeach other. Different technologies have given rise to separate networks, agencies, laws,and ways of thinking and acting. These interests have matured into fully autonomoussectors with weak or no inter-sectoral links. This situation was less of a problem whenthe pace of technological change was slow and human use of the seas was limited. Butthis is now dysfunctional since the rate of technological change is high, human use ofthe seas is rapidly increasing and diversifying, and different uses and users have begunto generate adverse impacts on each other and across national boundaries.

The need is thus apparent for increased bilateral and multilateral consultations as wellas for an enhanced degree of coordination to meet the challenge of changes in marineuse patterns and concepts. Indeed, the extension of national jurisdictions, by a curiousdialectical process, increases the need for international cooperation. When nations ex-tended their jurisdiction, they assumed that they had also simultaneously extended theirability and authority to unilaterally manage the seas they acquired. But what had been leftunmanaged in the past must now be managed, and purely national management is inmany cases frustrated by the overlapping of political and ecological boundaries and bythe high costs of exploitative and managerial technologies and infrastructures. Thesefactors encourage regional cooperation. Thus, just as the extension of jurisdiction createsan opportunity for the reexamination of national ocean management, it also presents anopportunity for reexamining a nation’s relationships with its neighbors.

With the signing of the historic Convention on the Law of the Sea by 119 nationsin December 1982, and its coming into force in November 1994, the venue for address-ing issues of ocean law and policy has moved from the global to the regional andbilateral level. The 1982 Convention heralds a new era of transnational rule-makingregarding national rights and responsibilities in the world’s oceans. It already serves as aframework within which nations carry out their ocean management rights and responsi-bilities. The Convention and customary international law now acknowledge sovereigntyover resources out to 200 NM and most valuable marine resources have thus now beenencompassed by national jurisdiction.

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Article 122 of the Convention defines an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea in twoways: geographically, on the basis of its narrow physical connections with nearbybodies of water, and legally, that it consists entirely of the territorial seas and EEZs oftwo or more countries. All Asian seas—the East Sea/Sea of Japan, the East China Sea,the Yellow Sea, the South China Sea, the Andaman Sea, the Sulawesi Sea, and theArafura Sea—are semi-enclosed based on one or both criteria. The importance of en-closed or semi-enclosed seas in the management of marine regions is emphasized inArticle 123 of the Convention, which states that:

States bordering an enclosed or semi-enclosed sea should cooperate witheach other in the exercise of their rights and in the performance of theirduties under this Convention. To this end they shall endeavor, directly orthrough an appropriate regional organization:

(a) to co-ordinate the management, conservation, exploration and ex-ploitation of the living resources of the sea;

(b) to co-ordinate the implementation of their rights and duties with re-spect to the protection and preservation of the marine environment;

(c) to co-ordinate their scientific research policies and undertake, whereappropriate, joint programmes of scientific research in the area;

(d) to invite, as appropriate, other interested States or international orga-nizations to co-operate with them in furtherance of the provisions ofthis article.

The Convention provides the international legal framework within which regional prob-lems should be solved. The fact that all Asian States except Cambodia, Thailand, andNorth Korea have ratified the Convention legitimizes regional cooperation in marinematters and puts pressure on these States to abide by the Convention’s provisions.

Another integrative factor may be the United States’ public position that multi-lateralism is the key to Asia’s future. Washington now supports multilateral securitydialogues, including such a forum in Northeast Asia, based on Track Two Initiatives.49

And the United States maintains that it will remain engaged as an active player in theeconomic, security, and political affairs of the Asian region. Indeed, America’s interestscompel any administration in Washington to help shape the emerging Pacific Commu-nity.50 The United States has significant influence in the region and its encouragementand support of regional co-operative efforts may enhance the likelihood of their takingroot there and growing in degree and kind. The political environment thus created couldhave positive implications for marine regionalism in Asia.

However, a major impediment to regional maritime co-operation in both regions isa conceptual dichotomy inherent in the Law of the Sea Convention. On the one hand theTreaty enjoins its ratifiers to cooperate in managing semi-enclosed seas. However, onthe other, Article 56 gives the coastal state: (1) sovereign rights over the natural re-sources, whether living or nonliving, and over other activities for the economic exploita-tion of the zone; and (2) jurisdiction as to the establishment and use of artificial islandsand other structures and installations, marine scientific research, the preservation of themarine environment, and other rights and duties provided at the Convention. Becausemost, if not all, of the waters of Asian seas have been partitioned into the territorial seasand EEZs of the littoral states, the provisions of Article 56 represent a serious obstacleto regional cooperation unless and until the littoral states agree to yield some of theirnewly won rights to a regional body.

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238 M. J. Valencia

Southeast Asia

There is a web of ASEAN efforts regarding marine matters.51 Permanent ASEAN com-mittees of marine importance include Fisheries (as a part of food production and sup-ply), Meteorology (as part of air traffic service), Science and Technology, and Shipping.The Federation of ASEAN Shippers’ Council sponsored the formation of a Federationof ASEAN Shipowners Association, presumably to present a united bargaining positionvis-à-vis the European-dominated Far Eastern Freight Conference, which controls tradeand sets rates for transport of goods between Europe and Asia. There is also a 1975ASEAN Agreement for the Facilitation of Search for Ships in Distress and Rescue ofSurvivors of Ship Accidents in which the contracting parties undertake to provide assis-tance to ships in distress in their territories and neighboring seas.

The ASEAN Committee on Science and Technology (COST) Subcommittee on MarineSciences has discussed the possibility of a cooperative approach to extra-regional accessfor marine scientific research and has approached the European Community (EC) andthe United States for assistance in funding cooperative marine scientific research. COSTalso spawned an informal committee on pollution and an ASEAN Sub-regional Environ-ment Programme. The ASEAN Committee on Petroleum (ASCOPE) has, within its termsof reference, the development of sub-regional contingency plans for oil spills. ASCOPEhas been discussing standardization of environmental and safety regulations concerningoffshore oil exploration. UNEP’s Regional Seas Programme for East Asian Seas has asits goal a Mediterranean-type protocol for the “ASEAN Seas” and to upgrade awarenessand capabilities for its implementation.52 However, the Strait of Malacca Safe Naviga-tion Scheme between Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia and the concomitant U.S.$1.3million revolving fund established by Japanese shipping interests and these nations tocover costs of cleaning up and preventing oil spills from tankers are the most concreteexamples of indigenous Southeast Asian maritime regime building to date.

Finally, there is growing military cooperation among ASEAN members, althoughmostly on a bilateral basis at present. Indonesia has conducted joint air, naval, and armymaneuvers with Malaysia, and the two countries have cooperated in patrolling theircommon South China Sea border areas. Indonesia has conducted joint naval surveillancein the Celebes Sea with the Philippines. Moreover, Thailand and Malaysia have a bilat-eral defense pact and in addition to the 1954 Manila pact, Thailand and the Philippineshave agreed to cooperate on security matters.

There are also several marine-relevant international organizations operating in theregion, such as the Indo-Pacific Fisheries Commission, the Southeast Asia FisheriesDevelopment Centre, the International Center for Living Aquatic Resources Manage-ment, The Committee for Co-ordination of Joint Prospecting for Mineral Resources inAsian Offshore Areas, and the Working Group for the Western Pacific of the Intergov-ernmental Oceanographic Commission.53 These organizations are not indigenouslyderived or funded and include among their membership both extra–ASEAN and South-east Asian states. Nevertheless, these organizations may serve as models, platforms, orstimuli for indigenously initiated marine regional arrangements.

Several specialized United Nations agencies whose terms of reference include ma-rine problems also have offices in the region, such as the UNESCO Regional Office forScience and Technology for Southeast Asia in Jakarta, the United Nations EnvironmentProgramme Regional Office in Bangkok, and divisions of the Economic and Social Com-mission for Asia and the Pacific concerned with transportation and natural resources.The many UN–sponsored or supported national projects and bilateral assistance pro-grams in the marine sphere also have helped to stimulate and support national marine

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Regional Maritime Regime Building 239

awareness in the region. The NGO Southeast Asian Program on Ocean Law and Policyhas also helped to build capacity and understanding regarding Law of the Sea matters inSoutheast Asia.

In Southeast Asia, there are already several multilateral regimes with maritime rel-evance. These include the 1995 ASEAN Nuclear Weapons Free-Zone Treaty,54 the 1976ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co-operation,55 and ASEAN’s 1971 declared goal of aZone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality.56 More fundamental to a specific managementregime for the South China Sea are the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South ChinaSea,57 and the repeated Indonesian South China Sea Workshop Statements signaling agree-ment by the claimants to resolve any territorial or maritime disputes through peacefulmeans. However, the immediate prospects are poor for moving beyond these generalframeworks to detailed management regimes.

An integrative by-product of the sometimes divisive decades-long Law of the Seanegotiations was the development of a cadre of law-of-the-sea experts from the regionwho had frequent contacts and thus opportunities to discover their mutual interests. Thisepistemic community is reinforced when former Law of the Sea specialists assumemajor roles in their governments.58 In Southeast Asia, such elites recognize the necessityof co-operation in the management of transboundary resources like fish and the environ-ment, and a web of bilateral arrangements has arisen to address these issues.

For the South China Sea the driving force for co-operation has been the potentialfor conflict. The Mischief Reef incident between Vietnam and China in 1995 galvanizedASEAN into a solid front and spawned a formal appeal by ASEAN Foreign Ministersurging all claimants to refrain from taking actions that could destabilize the region,including possibly undermining the freedom of navigation and aviation in the affectedareas. Indonesia’s former Foreign Minister Ali Alatas and his Ambassador-at-Large forLaw of the Sea, Hasjim Djalal, exercised leadership in launching the Canadian Inter-national Development Agency—funded South China Sea Workshops to try to preventconflict and foster co-operation.

The Committee for Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific, a Track-Two confi-dence building exercise has a Working Group on Maritime Co-operation. This workinggroup’s efforts, particularly its Guidelines for Regional Maritime Co-operation,59 is pro-viding the foundation for a process of comprehensive maritime security regime building.Indeed, ASEAN is now attempting to formulate a code of conduct for the South ChinaSea that will be acceptable to China, as well as extra-regional maritime powers.60

However, in Southeast Asia, nation building has primacy. With the exception ofThailand, all nations in and around the region have achieved independence or haveexperienced society-transforming movements within the past quarter-century.61 Many arestill struggling with the basic problems of nationhood, thus inserting a nationalistic fer-vor into regional and maritime affairs. Within ASEAN itself, relations are cordial butcompetitive and perhaps unstable in the long-term. The ASEAN nations produce manyof the same raw materials, and the resulting direct competition for credit, investmentmarkets, and development assistance may increase with advancing economic develop-ment. Southeast Asian nations only now are beginning to perceive clearly their ownnational marine interests and how these differ from those of neighboring states or out-side maritime powers. At this juncture, commonalities are neglected and differencestend to be emphasized. The maintenance of newly acquired national sovereignty overocean resources and jurisdiction over ocean space has underlying national security con-notations, and thus any proposed coordination or cooperation might be perceived insome quarters as impinging on national security.

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With the extension of maritime jurisdiction by the Southeast Asian littoral nations,geography dictates that there are inequities and imbalances in marine endowmentsimposed upon an already economically and politically competitive milieu. The marinearea and attendant resource base of Singapore, Cambodia, Laos, and Brunei are negli-gible compared with the great gains of Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam. Thai-land perceives that it has lost access to important fishery resources that made its largefleet profitable. Ironically, the windfall increases in area and resources for Vietnam andIndonesia raise the possibility of competition and conflict between these new maritimeneighbors. This redistribution of area and potential wealth, as well as the concomitantpotential for conflict, could endanger ASEAN’s progress in cooperation.

The foremost obstacles to multilateral maritime management regime formation inthe South China Sea are the conflicting territorial and maritime claims and the concomi-tant lack of confidence and trust between some of the claimants. Settlement or the set-ting aside of jurisdictional boundary disputes may be a prerequisite for cooperation onother issues. Moreover, with the financial crisis absorbing national attention, there is lesslikelihood of multilateral initiatives in the maritime sphere. And with its internal prob-lems, Indonesia’s role as a leader in the search for a solution to the South China Seadisputes and more generally within ASEAN will certainly be diminished and may dis-appear all together. Regional co-operation in the South China Sea must overcome oraccommodate 62 the conflicting sovereignty claims to features and the need to demilita-rize them; the conflicting claims to maritime space; the conflicting definitions of thearea that might be subject to a resource management agreement; the claimants’ primaryinterest in the petroleum potential of the area; and the interests of non-claimant SouthChina Sea countries.

Northeast Asia

In Northeast Asia regional cooperation is at a much earlier stage of development. Butmarine policy problems will play an increasingly important role in the region’s interna-tional relations. Indeed, there are numerous indications that the entities concerned arebeing drawn slowly but surely into what may become a continuing dialogue throughwhich constructive and mutually beneficial regional marine arrangements may be initi-ated and developed.63

There are also serious obstacles to marine regionalism in Northeast Asia. NorthKorea remains a steadfast socialist country juxtaposed to the capitalism of Japan, SouthKorea, and Taiwan. In political terms, there are four countries with six governments,with little history or experience in multilateral cooperation. In this context, a primaryobstacle to truly regional cooperation is the difficulty of involving both China and Tai-wan in a multilateral marine policy regime covering areas claimed by both, particularlygiven the increasing tension in their relationship.64 However, China and Taiwan haveoccasionally formed a united front regarding South China Sea issues and have agreed tojointly explore for petroleum in the East China Sea.65

Another difficulty for Northeast Asia is the isolation and pugnacious, non-participa-tory stance of North Korea. Since North Korea borders and claims continental shelf,“security zones,” and EEZs in the Japan and Yellow Seas, its eventual participation infunctional marine policy regimes is important. There is also the problem of a destabilizedand near-anarchical Russia. It will not be clear for some time who speaks for Russian FarEast maritime policy and how stable and steadfast that policy is or will be. Although theparticipation of the major powers, China and Japan, is critical to a successful regime in

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Northeast Asia, both may be reluctant to participate unless they can dominate. In general,most big powers prefer to avoid multilateral regimes in which the smaller nations canform blocks against them. Thus, it will be necessary to present a convincing argument thatsuch major powers can benefit more from a multilateral regime than from bilateral agree-ments that they can dominate.

Another complicating factor in Northeast Asia is the island and concomitant mari-time boundary disputes that plague the region:66 the southern Kuriles/Northern Territories,Tok Do/Takeshima, and Senkaku/Diaoyutai. There are also the overlapping continentalshelf claims of China/South Korea/Japan/Taiwan in the East China Sea.

Maritime issues are generally only a ripple in the great ebb and flow of economicand political relations in Northeast Asia. But many national frontiers are now maritimein nature and nationalism can elevate these issues into symbols of national pride andintegrity. Indeed, some maritime issues may be so crucially situated in time or substancevis-à-vis the balance of much greater issues that they could act like a rouge wave orsurge that significantly disturbs political relations in the region. Disputes over islands orboundaries in areas of great petroleum potential could belong to this category. Consider-ing the tenuous or even hostile relations between most of the states in the region and thelikelihood of petroleum in disputed continental shelf areas, maritime issues could be-come the “tail that wags the dog” of international relations in Northeast Asia.

Other than such issues that stimulate nationalism, there is a rather low marine “aware-ness” in Northeast Asia. Despite growing interest and obvious need, Northeast Asianstates continue to ignore most of the opportunities currently available in the marinesphere. The states seem incapable of resolving the growing multiple use conflicts intheir EEZs, let alone those conflicts that are truly transnational in character. Further-more, the ocean as a whole continues to play a role in the national and regional devel-opment process far below its potential for most of the coastal states of Northeast Asia.These countries are simply not yet sufficiently aware of the serious need for a multi-lateral maritime regime that focuses on the management of fisheries resources and mari-time environmental protection. In terms of maritime affairs as a whole, China’s priorityseems to be the South China Sea. And Japan seems to pay more attention to the fate ofits “Northern Territories” than to any maritime issue. North Korea has yet to demon-strate convincingly that its interests extend beyond its land borders. For China, environ-mental protection has generally been viewed as a domestic concern or, at most, asa worthwhile but trivial aspect of international co-operation.67 And South Korea, likeJapan, tends to be more concerned about air pollutants that originate in the deserts ofwestern China than with marine pollution. Indeed, when thinking maritime, the tendencyof Northeast Asian countries is to think about boundary disputes, not protection of thedeteriorating marine environment or management of fisheries. It is these perceptions thatmust change.

Conclusions

The absence of robust multilateral maritime regimes in Asia reflects political calculationsby the nation-states regarding the rewards and risks and losses and benefits of maintainingthe status quo versus developing regimes acceptable and beneficial to all sides involved.Asian countries are simply not yet sufficiently aware of the seriousness of the need formultilateral maritime regimes that focus on the management of fisheries resources andmaritime environmental protection. Taken together, this situation argues strongly for anad hoc, issue-specific, evolutionary process for multilateral maritime regime building.

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To move the process forward in Northeast Asia, the entities concerned might agreeto begin discussing objectives and principles for multilateral maritime regimes in North-east Asia. Indeed, there appears to be a confluence of incentives for such a dialogue.Russian foreign ministry officials are concerned that the United States may engage in“adventures” regarding North Korea and are exploring ways and means to enhance multi-lateral dialogue in the region, specifically including maritime co-operation. Thus Russiawould certainly support such an initiative. Meanwhile, South Korea’s revamped Minis-try of Maritime Affairs and Fisheries is also supportive of such a dialogue. And evenChina appears to be willing to consider limited multilateral approaches on a sea-by-seabasis. Although Japan would be reluctant to lead such an effort, it would probably par-ticipate if it is initiated by another state or a UN agency.

With extension of jurisdiction, several bilateral agreements on fisheries have alreadybeen renegotiated. They set the stage and form the basis for a more comprehensive regionalagreement harmonizing the bilateral agreements and expanding the regime to include allthe region’s nations. Although progress has been slow regarding a regional marine envi-ronmental protection regime, a multilateral dialogue could speed up the process.

As an example, the building of an environmental protection regime for the Sea ofJapan (East Sea) might proceed as follows. It would begin as it is now with a limited andtemporary focus on a specific environmental problem, for example, monitoring and pos-sible clean-up of dumped radioactive materials, or combating a particular oil spill. Butpolicymakers should be prepared to move rather quickly beyond this limited ad hocarrangement to a broader coordination regime that would agree on rules and procedureswhile leaving each member free to implement them in their own way at their own pace.This more advanced arrangement would focus on service functions, for example, informa-tion exchange, data gathering and analysis, consultation, coordination of research pro-grams, and planning for joint action in emergencies. Gradually and incrementally address-ing ever more competing uses of the seas can produce a more coherent, comprehensive,balanced set of arrangements. The trend from a use-oriented to a resource-oriented ap-proach can move successively from pollution protection to species conservation, to col-lective management and more refined monitoring and research. Eventually the partiescould agree on pollution reduction targets as well as on reporting on implementation, andon improved public access to information.68

In Southeast Asia, regional cooperation on marine issues is clearly more advancedthan in Northeast Asia. But even there it is incipient at best. It may be premature tohope for extensive cooperation in a region composed of increasingly nationalistic devel-oping states. Perhaps necessity will be the mother of cooperation.69 Although politicalconstraints limit the possibilities for cooperation with regard to marine issues, politicalrelationships can and have improved over time. The underlying economic potential ofthe marine resources of the region remains a part of its geography. With improvedpolitical conditions an increasing share of this potential might become available to betapped. Clear analysis of these possibilities may help to motivate and to accelerate theimprovement of political relationships throughout Southeast Asia.

Notes

1. See Desmond Ball, “A new era in confidence building: The second-track process in theAsia/Pacific region,” Security Dialogue 25, no. 2 (1994): 164.

2. See Jack McCaffrie and Sam Bateman, “Maritime confidence and security building mea-sures in Asia-Pacific: Challenges, prospects and policy implications,” paper presented to the firstmeeting of the CSCAP Working Group on Maritime Co-operation, Kuala Lumpur, June 1995, 1, 5, 11.

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3. See, generally: Richard Higgott, “Economic cooperation: Theoretical opportunities andpo-litical constraints,” The Pacific Review 6, no. 2 (1993): 105; and Vinod K. Aggarwal, “Build-ing international institutions in Asia-Pacific,” Asian Survey 33, no. 11 (November 1993): 1029–1042.

4. Robert W. Barnett, Beyond War: Japan’s Concept of Comprehensive National Security(Washington, DC: Pergamon, Brassey’s, 1984); and John Lancaster and Barton Gellman, “Na-tional security strategy paper arouses Pentagon, State Department debate,” Washington Post, 3March 1994, A-14.

5. David I. Hitchcock, Jr., “East Asia’s new security agenda,” The Washington Quarterly17, 1 (1994): 95, 96, 103; Paik Jin-Hyun, “Strengthening maritime security in Northeast Asia,”paper presented to the 8th Asia-Pacific Roundtable on Confidence Building and Conflict Reduc-tion in the Pacific, ASEAN Institute for Strategic and International Studies, Kuala Lumpur, 5–8June 1994, 1–17; Stanley B. Weeks, “Law and order at sea: Pacific co-operation in dealing withpiracy, drugs, and illegal migration,” paper presented to the first meeting of the CSCAP WorkingGroup on Maritime Co-operation, Kuala Lumpur, June 1995, 1–15; and Charles Meconis andStanley B. Weeks, “Co-operative Maritime Security in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Strategic ArmsControl Assessment Report,” Department of Defense Report, July 1995, 75–80.

For background and specific proposals for co-operation in a variety of maritime sectors, seeAtlas for Marine Policy in East Asian Seas, Joseph R. Morgan and Mark J. Valencia (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1992), 152; Mark J. Valencia, ed., International Conference onthe Sea of Japan, Occasional Paper of the East-West Environmental and Policy Institute, No. 3,165; Mark J. Valencia, “Sea of Japan: Transnational marine resource issues and possible coopera-tive responses,” Marine Policy 14, no. 6, (1990): 507–525; Mark J. Valencia, “Northeast Asianperspectives on the security-enhancing role of CBMs” in Confidence and Security-Building Mea-sures in Asia (New York: Department of Disarmament Affairs, United Nations, 1990): 12–18;and Mark J. Valencia, “The Yellow Sea: Transnational marine resource management issues,”Marine Policy 12, no. 4 (1988): 382–395.

6. McCaffrie and Bateman, supra note 2, at 10.7. Agreement Establishing the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP),

Apia, Western Samoa, 1993, found at <//sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/acrc/SPEnviro.txt.html>.8. South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency Convention, Honiara, Solomon Islands, 1979,

found at <//sedac.ciesin.org/pidb/texts/acrc/SPFishAg.text.html>.9. Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy

(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 243.10. Drawn from Stephen D. Krasner, “Structural causes and regime consequences: Regimes

as intervening variables” in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner (Ithaca: Cornell Uni-versity Press, 1983), 1–21; and Robert O. Keohane, “The demand for international regimes,”International Organization 36, no. 2 (1982): 325.

11. Oran R. Young, International Co-operation for Natural Resources and the Environment(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1989), 196–198.

12. Ibid., 103; and Oran R. Young, Resource Regimes: Natural Resources and Social Insti-tutions (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), Vol. 2, 16.

13. Arthur Stein, “Coordination and collaboration: regimes in an anarchic world” in Neorealismand Neoliberalism: The Contemporary Debate, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 1993), 309–311.

14. Ibid.15. Stein, supra note 13 and Keohane, supra note 10.16. Keohane, supra note 9, at 103–106.17. Robert Jervis, “Security Regimes” in International Regimes, ed. Stephen D. Krasner

(Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press, 1983), 364.18. Vinod Aggarwal, Liberal Protectionism: The International Politics of Organized Textile

Trade (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 28.19. Stephan Haggard and Beth A. Simmons, “Theories of international regimes,” Interna-

tional Organization 41, no. 3 (1987): 498; and Young, supra note 12, at 202.

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20. Richard Higgott, “Economic cooperation: Theoretical opportunities and political con-straints,” The Pacific Review 6, no. 2 (1993): 109.

21. Mark J. Valencia, “Engaging North Korea in regional economic co-operation,” Trends,Institute of Southeast Asian Studies 25, no. 6 (December 1993): 10.

22. Young, supra note 11, at 203.23. In September 1992, Norway, Iceland, and other whaling nations established the North

Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission as a possible alternative to the International Whaling Commis-sion (IWC), and may defect from the IWC altogether. Japan is considering establishing a similarorganization in the Pacific. See: Tsuneo Akaha, “Balancing developmental needs and environ-mental concerns, domestic and international interests: Japan’s Ocean Policy in the Post Cold WarEra,” draft manuscript (1993), 84.

24. Haggard and Simmons, supra note 19.25. Peter M. Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic communities and international policy coordina-

tion,” International Organization 46, no. 1 (Special Issue, 1992): 31–32.26. Higgott, supra note 20, at 114. Michel Foucault may have invented the term “epistemic

community” in The Order of Things (New York: Random House, 1970). However, as Ernst Haashas argued, Foucault’s usage is indistinguishable from what might be called “ideological com-munities.” For the meaning, definition, role, value, and examples of who may or may not consti-tute an epistemic community, see Burkhart Holzner and John H. Marx, Knowledge Application(Boston: Allyn and Baron, Inc., 1979), 108; Ernst Haas, When Knowledge is Power (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1990), 40–46; Haas, supra note 25, at 1–36. The term epistemiccommunity was first applied to international relations by John G. Ruggie, “International responsesto technology, concepts and trends,” International Organization 29, no. 3 (1975): 569–570. Seealso Peter M. Haas, “Do regimes matter? Epistemic communities and Mediterranean pollutioncontrol,” International Organization 43, no. 3 (1989): 377–403.

27. Haggard and Simmons, supra note 19, at 507.28. Robert O. Keohane, supra note 9, at 79.29. Keohane et al., “The effectiveness of international environmental institutions,” in Insti-

tutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective Environmental Protection, ed. Peter M. Haas, RobertO. Keohane, and Marc Levy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 14.

30. Ibid., at 16–17.31. Peter Sand, ed., The Effectiveness of International Environmental Agreements. A Survey

of Existing Legal Instruments (Cambridge: Grotius Publications, Ltd., 1992).32. Lewis Alexander, “Marine regionalism in Southeast Asian Seas,” East-West Environ-

ment and Policy Institute Report No. 11 (1982): 8–10.33. Muthiah Alagappa, “Regionalism and the quest for security: ASEAN and the Cambo-

dian conflict,” Journal of International Affairs 46, no. 2 (Winter, 1993): 442.34. Eugene B. Skolnikoff, The International Imperatives of Technology: Technological De-

velopments and the International Political System (Berkeley: University of California, Institute ofInternational Studies 1972), 13–16, 102–110.

35. Mark J. Valencia and George Kent, “Co-operation: opportunities, problems and pros-pects,” in Marine Policy in Southeast Asia, ed. George Kent and Mark J. Valencia (Berkeley:University of California Press, 1985), 370.

36. Tsuneo Akaha, “Northeast Asian economic cooperation: national factors and future pros-pects,” paper presented to the International Studies Association, Monterey, 1993.

37. Young, supra note 11, at 51.38. Alexander, supra note 32, at 3.39. For background, analysis, and proposals for co-operation in the Baltic Sea, see Matthew

Auer, “Prospects for environmental cooperation in the Yellow Sea,” Emory International LawReview 5 (1991): 163–208; Ton Ijlstra, “Development of resource jurisdiction in the EC’s re-gional seas: National EEZ policies of EC member states in the Northeast Atlantic, the Mediterra-nean Sea, and the Baltic Sea,” Ocean Development and International Law 23, 2–3 (1992); BaruchBoxer, “Mediterranean Action Plan: An interim evaluation,” Science 202, 10 (November 1978):

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585–590; Gunnar Kullenberg, “Long-term changes in the Baltic ecosystem,” in Variability andManagement of Large Marine Ecosystems, ed. Kenneth Sherman and Lewis M. Alexander, AAASSelected Sympoium 99 (Boulder: Westview Press, Inc., 1986); B. I. Dybern and S. H. Fonselius,“Pollution in the Baltic Sea,” in Elsevier Oceanography Series 30, ed. A. Voipio (Amsterdam:Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, 1986), 351–382; ICES, Assessment of the Marine Envi-ronment of the Baltic Sea Cooperative Research, Report XX, Copenhagen, 1986; F. B. Pedersen,“The sensitivity of the Baltic Sea to natural and man-made impact,” in Hydrodynamics of SemienclosedSeas, ed. J. C. J. Nihoul, Elsevier Oceanography Series 24 (Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Pub-lishing Company, 1982), 385–399; and Aoano Voipio, The Baltic Sea, Elsevier OceanographicSeries (Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, 1981).

40. For background, analysis, and proposals for co-operation in the Mediterranean Sea, seeAldo Chircop, “The Mediterranean Sea and the quest for sustainable development,” Ocean Devel-opment and International Law Journal 23, 2–3 (1992): 17–30; Norton Ginsburg, Sidney Holt,and William Murdoch, The Mediterranean Action Plan and The Maritime Development of aRegion, Pacem in Maribus III, Proceedings of a Conference, Split, Yugoslavia, April 28–30,1972 (The Royal University of Malta Press, 1974); Adalberto Vallega, A Human GeographicalApproach to Semienclosed Seas, The Mediterranean Case in Regional Development (Chicago:The University of Chicago Press, 1988); S. J. Holt, “Mediterranean: International cooperation fora sick sea,” Environment 16 (1974): 29–33; United Nations Environment Programme, “Activitiesfor the Protection and Development of the Mediterranean,” Ocean Yearbook 1 (1978): 584–597;United Nations Environment Programme, “Recommendation for the Future Development of theMediterranean Action Plan,” in Ocean Yearbook 2 (1980): 547–554; “Protocol for the Protectionof the Mediterranean Sea against Pollution from Land-based Sources,” Ocean Yearbook 3 (1982):489–496; “MARPOL 73/78: The International Convention Concerning Pollution and the Mediter-ranean,” Ocean Yearbook 6 (1986): 572–573; and United Nations Environment Programme, “TheMediterranean Action Plan: Retrospect and Prospects,” presented at the Fourth Ordinary Meetingof the Contracting Parties to the Convention for the Protection of the Mediterranean Sea AgainstPollution and its Related Protocols, Genoa, 9–13 September 1985, published as Document UNEP/IG. 56/4, 26 June 1985.

41. For background, analysis, and proposals for co-operation in the North Sea, see S. Andresenand Brit Flostad, “Sea using planning in Norwegian waters: National and international dimen-sions,” Coastal Management 16 (1988): 183–200; H. Carison, “Quality status of the North Sea.International Conference on the Protection of the North Sea,” in Law of the Sea: NeglectedIssues, ed. John King Gamble. Proceedings of the Law of the Sea Institute Twelfth AnnualConference held at The Hague, The Netherlands 23–26 October 1978; Gerard Peet, Techniquesand methods for sea use planning and management in selected areas, Report of a LiteratureStudy, commissioned by Directie Noordzee, Rijkswaterstaat, 1986; Second Chamber of the StateGeneral, The Netherlands, Harmonization of Netherlands North Sea Policy 1989–1992, 44–45,SDU uitgeverij; A. J. Smith, Elizabeth Kennet, and M. B. F. Ranken, Britain and the Sea: Fur-ther Dependence—Further Opportunities (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press Limited, 1984);H. D. Smith and C. S. Lalwani, The North Sea: Sea Use Management and Planning (Cardiff:University of Wales Institute of Science and Technology, 1984); Elizabeth Young and Peter H.Fricke, eds., Sea Use Planning (London: Fabian Society, 1975); Steiner Andresen, “The environ-mental North Sea regime: A successful regional approach” in Ocean Yearbook 7 (1989): 378–401; and Steiner Andresen, “The ‘effectiveness’ of regional environmental co-operation in theNorthern Seas,” paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the International Studies Association,Chicago, 23–25 February 1995.

42. Young has devoted an entire book to a proposal for co-operation in Arctic resourcemanagement: Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko, eds. Polar Politics: Creating EnvironmentalRegimes (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993).

43. Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko, “International regime formation: findings, researchpriorities, and applications,” in Polar Politics: Creating International Environmental Regimes,ed. Oran R. Young and Gail Osherenko (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1993),

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223–262. Young and Osherenko coordinated a project in which five Arctic or Arctic-relatedenvironmental and resource regimes were selected for a careful case study analysis of establishedhypotheses of regime formation. The regimes chosen were the regime for the conservation ofNorth Pacific fur seals, the Svalbard regime, the regime for conservation of polar bears, theregime for the protection of the stratospheric ozone, and a comparison of the problem of Arctichaze produced by air pollutants with the regime for long-range transboundary air pollution amongindustrialized Northern Hemisphere countries. The project confirmed some hypotheses and dis-proved others, and drew important lessons for successful regime formation that are useful to thisstudy of maritime regime building in Northeast Asia.

44. Mark J. Valencia, Jon Van Dyke, and Noel Ludwig, Sharing the Resources of the SouthChina Sea (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1997).

45. Ralph Cossa, “Moving from confidence building to preventative diplomacy: The possi-bilities,” paper presented at the 13th Asia-Pacific Roundtable, 30 May–2 June 1999, Kuala Lumpur.

46. Lawrence Juda and R. H. Burroughs, “The prospects for comprehensive ocean manage-ment,” Marine Policy 14, no. 1 (1990): 33–34.

47. Marc A. Levy, Robert O. Keohane, and Peter M. Haas, “Improving the effectiveness ofinternational environmental institutions,” in Haas et al., supra note 29, at 416.

48. Edward L. Miles, “Concept, approaches, and applications in sea use planning and man-agement,” Ocean Development and International Law 20 (1989): 215.

49. Winston Lord, “A New Pacific Community: Goals for American Policy,” opening state-ment at confirmation hearings for Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of East Asian Affairs,United States Congress, 31 March 1993; “Group Therapy,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 15April 1993, 10–11; and Department of Defense, Office of International Security Affairs, UnitedStates Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, Washington, February 1995.

50. Richard H. Solomon, “Asian architecture: The US in the Asia-Pacific community,” HarvardInternational Review (Spring 1994), 60.

51. Mark J. Valencia, “National marine interests in Southeast Asia’ in Marine Policy inSoutheast Asia, ed. George Kent and Mark J. Valencia (Berkeley: University of California Press,1985), 55–57.

52. United Nations Environment Programme, Regional Seas Programme; <http://www/unep.org/water/regseas.htm>.

53. J. C. Marr, Fishery and Resource Management in Southeast Asia, Paper no. 7 (Wash-ington, DC: The Program of International Studies in Fishery Arrangements, Resources for theFuture, 1976); and International Center for Living Aquatic Resource Management, “Report of theFirst Meeting of the ICLARM Program Advisory Committee,” Manila, March 1977 (ICLARM,July 1977), 18.

54. Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear-Weapons-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty); <http://www.unog.ch/frames/disarm/distreat/asean.htm>.

55. Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, 24 February 1976, found at <www.aseansec.org>.56. ASEAN Zone of Peace Freedom and Neutrality, 1971 found at <www.aseansec.org>.57. ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, Manila, Philippines, 22 July 1992, found

at <www.asean.or.id/politics/pol_AGR5.htm>.58. For example, in Singapore, S. Jayakumar and Tommy Koh (Foreign Minister and

Ambassador-At-Large, respectively), and in Indonesia, Mochtar Kusumaatmadja and Hasjim Djalal,former Foreign Minister and Ambassador-at-Large for Law of the Sea, respectively.

59. CSCAP Memorandum No. 4, “Guidelines for Regional Maritime Co-operation Annex,”in Regional Maritime Management and Security, ed. Sam Bateman and Stephen Bates, CanberraPapers on Strategy and Defence, No. 124 (1998), 187–198.

60. Mark J. Valencia, “Six governments compete for Pacific reefs,” Washington Times, 22October 1999, A14; “Malaysia, Philippines propose Code of Conduct for Spratlys,” BBC Moni-toring Asia Pacific-Political, London, 4 November 1999; and “Vietnam and Taiwan reportedlyfortifying structures in disputed islands,” BBC Monitoring Asia Pacific-Political, 21 September1999.

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61. Mark J. Valencia and George Kent, “Co-operation: Opportunities, problems and pros-pects” in Kent and Valencia, supra note 51, at 381–383.

62. Valencia et al., supra note 44, at 100–101.63. Examples of relevant dialogue in Northeast Asia include the following meetings: Inter-

national Conference on East Asian Seas: Cooperative Solutions to Transnational Issues, Seoul,21–23 September 1992; East China Sea: Transnational Marine Policy Issues and Possibilities ofCooperation, Dalian, China, 27–29 June 1991; International Conference on the Japan and OkhotskSeas, Vladivostok, Russia, September 1989; International Conference on the Sea of Japan, Niigata,Japan, 11–14 October 1988; International Conference on the Yellow Sea, Honolulu, 23–27 June1987; “Japan to seek regional meeting to look at water pollution, other problems,” InternationalEnvironment Reporter, 4 December 1991; and Northeast Asian Conference on EnvironmentalCooperation, Environment Agency of Japan and Niigata Prefecture, 13–16 October 1992. Japanhas also established a center to elaborate the concept of regional cooperation and to preparespecific proposals for cooperation around the Sea of Japan. See Russia in Asia Report No. 15,July 1993, Center for Russia in Asia, University of Hawaii, Honolulu, 44.

64. Asia Wall Street Journal, 11–12 August 1995, 1; Julian Baum, “Pressure cooker,” FarEastern Economic Review, 24 August 1995, 16–17; and Julian Baum, “Mind Games,” Far East-ern Economic Review, 12 August 1992, 22.

65. “China and Taiwan plan cooperative exploration of the South China Sea,” World Jour-nal, 17 January 1994, 1; Mark J. Valencia, “The South China Sea issues: Context, conjecture anda cooperative solution,” paper presented at the VIII Asia-Pacific Roundtable, Institute for Strate-gic and International Studies, Kuala Lumpur, June 1994.

66. For a review of these boundary disputes, see Douglas Johnston and Mark J. Valencia,Pacific Ocean Boundary Problems: Status and Solutions (London: Martinus Nijhoff, 1991), 104–120; and J. R. V. Prescott, “Maritime Jurisdiction in East Asian Seas,” Environment and PolicyInstitute East-West Center, Occasional Paper, No. 4, 1987.

67. This is implied by the recommendations of Han Guogan et al., “China’s environmentalprotection objectives in the year 2000,” International Journal of Social Economics 18, nos. 8/9/10 (1991): 180–192.

68. Steiner Andresen, supra note 41 and Peter Haas, “Protecting the Baltic and North Sea”in Haas et al. supra note 29.

69. Mark J. Valencia, “National marine interests in Southeast Asia,” supra note 51, at 55–57.

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