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CHAPTER VII

REGIONAL SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

This chapter examines the security architecture of the Asia Pacific region.

It highlights the emergence of a new "quadrile" centred on India, China, Japan and

the United States. It discusses the ambitions and aspirations of the members of the

quadrile and the balance of power equation in the region. It is argued here that the

quadrile members are engaged in the acquisition of advanced weaponry that has

the potential to disturb peace and stability in the region.

The chapter begins by examining the maritime security environment in the

Asia Pacific region and highlights the main players in the region. It then goes on to

examine the strategic interests of India, China, Japan and the United States and

how the balance of power equation in the region is under transformation with India

and China carving out a major role for them.

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

In the Asia Pacific region, the security environment is essentially maritime

in nature. Maritime developments occupy pride of place in the emerging regional

strategic architecture. A majority of the inter-state disputes relate to maritime

boundaries and territorial disputes brought about by l.JNCLOS. The disputes

continue to remain a source of tension, suspicion, misunderstanding and

confrontation. Besides, there is also a desire among several Asia Pacific states to

dominate regional affairs based on their economic and military strength. The

region, theretore, remains a fertile ground for conflict in the light of several

territorial flashpoints and ambitions.

201

In the emerging economic environment, the Asia Pacific has emerged as

the most dynamic part of the world. The countries of the region have experienced

extraordinary rates of growth and their economic vitality depends on long SLOCs .

Sir Walter Raleigh once observed, "whosoever comrnmds the sea, commands the

trade; who so ever commands the trade of the world commands the riches of the

world and consequently the world it self." 1 Unimpeded and sa:e sea-lanes are

therefore crucial for economic prosperity and regional security. China, India, Japan

and the ASEAN states have emerged as major players on the global economic

scene and have larger stakes in the safety and security of their SLOCs.

A central feature of the regional security environment is a general sense of

insecurity. Geo-strategically, this insecurity is compounded by the decline in the

presence and influence of the former superpower, Soviet Union Russia. Among the

several regional uncertainties, none is more compelling than that surrounding the

regional balance of power. In this regard what has preoccupied the attention of

most of the states of the Asia Pacific region is the emergence of a new quadrile in

the region involving the United States, People's Republic of China, India and

Japan. Most of the states want a favourable and amicable balance of power for

peace and stability in the region. Presently, the members of the quadrile appear to

be undergoing a transformation of some kind and are engaged in peace and

cooperation with the prime objective of a stable securi~· environment for economic

growth. The most disturbing aspect of the current security environment is that the

quadrile members are engaged in the acquisition of adYanced weaponry. The

acquisition is either through imports or indigenous efforts. These states have re-

examined the post Cold War security environment and the emerging balance of

Reynold B. Peele, "The Importance of Maritime Chokepoims", Parameters, Summer 1997, p.61.

202

power in the region. The ongoing acquisitions are only indicative of the fact that

the environment is fragile and has the potential to turn into a conflict.

INDIA

Being a dominant power in South Asia, it is natural for India to consider the

Indian Ocean as its own sphere of influence. In addition, New Delhi's strategic

geography now extends far into the Pacific Ocean in the east and to the Red Sea in

the west. Securing control/influence over this area is one oflndia's main strategic

objectives. This strategic thinking is based on long-range naval operations and

exercising influence around the strategic choke points ofthe Strait ofHormuz, the

Strait ofMalacca and the Sunda Strait. India's naval strategy can be thought ofas a

"naval forward strategy".

Aspart of this strategy, the Indian navy has been expanding its area of

operations east into the South China Sea and the Pacific Rim, west towards the

Strait of Hormuz, and, in the south, deep into the Indian Ocean towards the Cape

of Good Hope. India's Minister of Defence, George Fernandes, confirmed India's

shifting strategic geography and its naval areas of interests in April 2000 at the

launching of the Indian warship Brahmaputra.: The minister noted that India's

"area of interest ... extends from the north of the Arabian Sea to the South China

Sea."3 Soon after, the Indian navy announced plans for naval exercises in the South

China Sea.4 The decision to conduct exercises was clearly aimed to project the

2

3

4

See 'India Challenges China in South China Sea', at homepage of Stratfor at http://www.stratfor.com/ dated April26, 2000.

Ibid.

Ibid.

203

extended operational areas of the navy's reach into the South China Sea. 5 Recent

acquisitions, particularly the Delhi class destroyers, Krivak class frigates and TV-

144 long range maritime patrol aircraft, point to the fact that the Indian navy has

the capability to undertake distant operations as far as South China Sea.

Another rationale for exi:ending the naval strategic reach is in part to counter

the growing threat of piracy in the Strait of Malacca. As noted earlier, in

November 1999, the Indian navy and coast guard vessels captured a hijacked

Japanese cargo ship M V Alondra Rainbow, after a 12-hour chase.6 Frequent

hijacking of Japanese merchant vessels prompted Japan to propose joint naval

patrols in areas around the Malacca Strait. 7 It sought cooperation from China,

India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and South Korea. 8 This proposal was not

acceptable to Beijing who viewed it as yet another Japanese step towards

extending the strategic reach of its naval operations. This in turn contributed to

5

6

7

8

Indian naval ships have, in the past, carried out exercises in the Asia Pacific waters, but the important aspect of recent exercises was that long-range maritime patrol aircraft based in India were to fly that far and carry out exerctses.

Vijay Sakhuja, "Maritime Order and Piracy, Strategic Analysis, February 200 I, p.2007.

The Japanese concern over piracy has become more serious following the disappearance of 4,200 ton M V. Tenyu, a Panama registered Japanese vessel owned by the Kobe-based Masumoto Kisen Shipping Co. The vessel was on its way from Kuala Tanjung, North Sumatra to South Korea with a cargo of aluminum ingots worth US$1.9 million. The ship apparently turned up under a new name and all fifteen crewmembers were reportedly missing or presumed killed or murdered. Unlike Tenyu , M V. Alondra Rainbow ,another Japanese owned vessel, was fortunately captured by Indian security forces in the Arabian Sea and subsequently handed over to its owners. These incidents have only added to Tokyo's concern about the vulnerability of Japanese owned shipping.

The Japanese government was keen to dispatch Maritime Safety Agency (Coast Guard) ships to the Malacca Strait for anti-piracy operations. The vessels were expected to form part of the multi-national anti-piracy patrol comprising of coast guard and naval vessels of China, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia.

204

Fernandes calling Japan and Vietnam key strategic partners in anti-piracy

operations. 9

Vietnam has a unique geographical and strategic location. Located on the

east side of peninsular Southeast Asia, in the north it lies at the southern border of

China and in the south it forms the hypothetical choke point between Sabah (on the

island of Borneo) and the southern tip of Vietnam. 10 Historically too, Vietnam has

always been on the sea-route from China to Southeast Asia and India. As far as

India is concerned, Vietnam offers a window to monitor Chinese naval activity in

the South China Sea and that serves as a strategic listening post for maritime

activity east of the Malacca Strait.

New Delhi's policy toward Vietnam attempts to expand both economic and

military ties. In April 2000, India signed a 14-article agreement for collaboration

with Vietnam. 11 Much of the agreement concerned security issues and India

offered military hardware and some training to the Vietnamese military and in

return sought Vietnam army's jungle combat training experience to improve its

ability to fight separatists in its northeast region. 12 According to the National

Security Advisor to the Indian Prime Minister Brijesh Mishra, "the programme

9 See 'India Challenges China in South China Sea', at homepage of Stratfor at http://www.stratfor.com/ dated April 26, 2000.

10 It is not a choke point per se but can be termed as a high seas strategic passageway. It is fairly wide and shipping traffic transit through this keeping well clear of the Spratly group of islands.

11 See 'India Aims for Influence in Southeast Asia' at homepage of Stratfor at http://www.stratfor.com/ dated March 29, 2000.

12 Ibid.

205

will be strengthened with Indian officers being trained (in Vietnam) in jungle

warfare." 13

In the broader strategic framework, maritime cooperation between New

Delhi and Hanoi helps India to increase its area of influence in Southeast Asia.

Cooperation with Vietnam also enables India to position itself astride the South

China Sea sea-lane. In the long run, India may get access to Cam Ranh Bay naval

base. 14 II).dian naval ships have on a regular basis visited Vietnamese ports on

goodwill visits. 15 These visits were useful in showcasing Indian naval shipbuilding

capability, and Hanoi has shown interest in purchasing naval vessels from India. In

2000, both Indian and Vietnamese navies carried out joint exercises. 16

The growing relationship between India and Vietnam in part aims to

contain Chinese influence throughout Southeast Asia. 17 This is bound to generate

increased tensions between India and China. China is the central geopolitical issue

for both India and Vietnam. For India, China is both a potential competitor for

regional hegemony and a potential threat to growing Chinese influence in South

13 Ibid. 14 See "Advantage: Hanoi in Intensifying Geo-strategic Game" at homepage of

Stratfor at http://www.stratfor.com/ dated February14, 2001 15 The author has visited the port city ofHo Chi Minh on two different occasions

in 1993 and 1995 .During discussions with senior officers of the Vietnamese navy in 1995, it emerged that they were keen to collaborate with the Indian navy in building ships. Both navies have a large component of Russian naval hardware in their inventories. Besides, they were also keen on joint exercises

16

particularly anti piracy.

JuliA. MacDonald," South Asia and South East Asia in 2001 ", National Strategy Forum Review, Spring 2001 at website ofNational Strategy Forum at http://www.nationalstrategy.com/nsr/v10n3Spring011100313.htm

17 During author's discussions with Vietnamese CSCAP members at Beijing in December 2000, it emerged that Vietnam was concerned about Chinese naval activity in the South China Sea. Though part of ASEAN, Hanoi believes that it will not be possible for any ASEAN country to challenge China all by itself. Vietnamese officers cite the example of clashes between the Philippines and the Chinese navy in the South China Sea.

206

Asia. For Vietnam, Chinese assertiveness and forcible occupation of Vietnam's

island territories are some of the security issues that present challenges to Hanoi.

These mutual concerns are potential grounds for greater military cooperation

between the two countries.

Since the mid 1990s, India and Japan have been discussing common security

concerns that relate to nuclear policies and maritime security issues. 18 Japan is

heavily dependent on Gulf oil for its energy requirements and its vessels have to

transit the Andaman Sea-Malacca Straits and the Arabian Sea before setting course

either to enter or exit the Strait ofMalacca. 19 With regard to maritime cooperation,

both Japanese and Indian war ships have visited each other's ports and participated

in the International Fleet Reviews. In 1995 and in 2000, Indian warships visited

Tokyo and Sasebo, respectively.20 This was in response to an earlier visit of the

Japanese naval ship in 1995. Another area of mutual interest between the two

maritime forces is search and rescue at sea. 21 .

Both India and Japan have taken strategic initiative to assert greater influence

in the Asia Pacific region. As noted, India held naval exercises in the South China

Sea in 2000, while Japan has stretched its area of defense out to 2,000 miles

18 Arpita Mathur, "Prospect for Indo-Japan Security and Political Cooperation: An Indian Perspective", Paper presented at the lliA-IDSA Bilateral Dialogue, Tokyo, May 14-15, 2002.

19 John H. Noer, Choke Points: Maritime Economic Concerns in South East Asia (Washington: NDU Press, 1996), p.18. In 1993, half of the crude oil tankers entering the Malacca Strait were bound for Japan.

20 The author has visited Tokyo in 1995 and was present during the official briefings.

21 Discussions with Indian navy officials at New Delhi in December 2002. In 1995, the Indian navy had provided navy assistance to a Japanese vessel for search and rescue in the Indian Ocean south of Sri Lanka

207

towards the Malacca Strait. Because of their geographic locations, the two

countries do not appear to compete with each other for influence. Instead, their

strategic geographic areas overlap, covering a large proportion of the South China

Sea. This clashes with Chinese interests in the same area, and from the Indian and

Japanese perspectives they should contain Chinese influence in the region.

India is expanding its role in Southeast Asia as part of its "Look East" policy

by building military and economic links with Indonesia and Vietnam, and Japan is

expanding its influence from Northeast Asia to Southeast Asia by gaining access to

Singapore's naval facilities for staging operations in the Malacca Strait to challenge

any Chinese initiatives in the region.22

According to J. Mohan Malik, Director of the Defence Studies Programme at

Deakin University, Victoria, Australia, the main aim of China's Asia policy is to

prevent the rise of a potential rival or a competitor. 23 Towards that end, Beijing's

strategy is aimed at "'restraining Japan and containing India'". He notes that" what

distinguishes China from its near-rivals, Japan and India, is its permanent

membership of the UN Security Council and declared nuclear weapon state (NWS)

status, making it a far more important player in international fora and the sole

22 Tokyo and Singapore concluded a bilateral military agreement in 2000 that permits Japanese patrol ships and aircraft to be stationed in Singapore to evacuate Japanese nationals in disturbed areas as also to assist UN peacekeeping operations in Southeast Asia. Earlier, during the Indonesian crisis leading to the fall of President Suharto, Tokyo had positioned aircraft and patrol vessels in Singapore on standby for evacuation duties. This agreement increase Japan's naval presence in the Malacca Strait and South China Sea, as far as two thousand miles from home. For more details see Weekly Global Intelligence Update, at homepage of Stratfor at http://www.stratfor.com.

23

dated May 3, 2000.

Mohan Malik , "China's Asia Policy: Implications for Japan and India" at the website of Virtual Forum on Asian Security at http://wwv.r.arts.monash.edu.au/mai/savirtualforum /PaperMalikl.htm

208

Asian negotiating partner of the United States on global and regional security

deliberations." 24 In order to counter the influence oflndia, Beijing has developed

close economic and military relations with Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and

Myanmar. 25 As regards Japan, the Chinese strategy is aimed at propping up North

Korea to challenge any Japanese regional ambitions.26

India's "China threat" and the naming of China as the threat that prompted its

1998 nuclear tests has been an important factor in Sino-India relations. A series of

verbal exchanges and the subsequent retraction of statements led to a better

diplomatic atmosphere between the two nuclear weapon states. In March 2000,

China's Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan grudgingly noted, "enerally speaking China

and India do not pose a threat to each other. ... ".27 And in July 2000, President

K.R. Narayanan noted that India and China were "not necessarily rivals". 28

24 Ibid. 25 Ibid. Malik notes that China expert, Alastair Johnston, points out "Chinese

diplomatic strategy i.s to negotiate from a position of strength to an enemy who is militariJy weak and/or tied down with multiple security concerns. The objective is to convince the enemy that the military situation has shifted to his disadvantage and thus to force him to concede." By building up the military capabilities of allies such as North Korea vis-a-vis Japan and Pakistan's and Burma's vis-a-vis India, Beijing seeks to tie Japan and India down with multiple security concerns.

26 Ibid. 27 During the 3rd Session of the Ninth National People's Congress,Foreign

Minister Tang Jiaxuan held a press conference in Beijing on March,lO, 2000 and noted that there are some disagreements and even some outstanding issues between China and India. But generally speaking, China and India do not pose threat to each other.

28 Satu P Limaye, "India-East Asia Relations: India's Latest Asian Incarnation", Occasional Analysis, Pacific Forum ,CSIS, 3rd Quarter 2000. During President K.R. Narayanan's May-June 2000 visit to China to mark the fiftieth anniversary of bilateral relations, Narayanan pressed for speedier progress on resolution of the border dispute. In response, Jiang Zemin, counseled patience, saying that the problem was "left over by history". Narayanan responded that it must not be "left over for history".

209

Notwithstanding these initiatives, both India and China view each other as rivals

and have engaged in aggressive geo-strategic initiatives to counter the other's

influence.

CHINA

China has long understood the strategic importance of the Indian Ocean.

The Indian Ocean figured in the strategic thinking of ancient mariners in China

who sailed in these waters first for trade and then suzerainty.29 The Chinese

maritime planners and practitioners are convinced that the Indian Ocean dominates

the commercial and economic lifelines of the Asia-Pacific region and this reality

prompted, Gen Zhao Nanqi, Director of the General Logistic Department of the

PLA, to issue a top-secret memorandum that explained in detail the PLA' s

strategic plans to consolidate control over the South China Sea and the India

Ocean. He noted," We can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as only an ocean of

the Indians". 30 Beijing has no doubt that India would oppose China's strategic

surge and Zhao stated, "We are taking armed conflicts in the region into

account". 31

In the naval realm, the PLA Navy appears to have defined its role within

the framework of its "offshore active defense" strategy. 32 As noted in previous

chapters, China has long been seeking an outlet into the Indian Ocean to safeguard

29 C.P. Fitzgerald, The Horizon History of China (New York: American Heritage Publishing Co., 1969), pp.239-242.

30 Y ossef Bodansky, " The PRC Surge for the Strait of Malacca and Spratly Confronts India and the US", Defence & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, Washington, September 30, 1995, p.6-13.

31 Ibid. 32 Interestingly, there is no conclusive definition of the extent of"offshore".

210

its oil supply routes from the Persian Gulf and the markets of the region.33 It is also

well aware of the importance of choke points in maritime strategy.34 Towards that

end it has consolidated itself in South East Asia and has encircled the Malacca

Strait by establishing a strategic staging/listening post to control the western

approaches of the Malacca Strait.35 In the east, the Spratly Islands, currently under

its control, offer a strategic location with respect to the sea-lanes.

China has begun to neutralise the domination of India by making

diplomatic, military and economic inroads into Myanmar, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka,

Maldives and Pakistan. In Myanmar, China has built strategic infrastructure that

includes roads, communications and intelligence networks, as well as military

33 In 1990, China's oil demand was pegged at 2.1 million barrels/day and is expected to rise to 6.3 million barrels/day thus registering a growth of nearly 2300 percent. In the period 1993-99, China's imports doubled from 313,000 barrels/day to 600,000 barrels per/day. For more details, see Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, India's Maritime Security (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2000). p.99.

34 Sun Tzu, the Chinese master strategist in his treatise, The Art of War noted: "We may distinguish six kinds ofterrain, to wit: (a) Accessible ground (b) entangling ground (c) temporizing ground (d) narrow passes (e) precipitous heights (f) positions at a great distance from the enemy. With regard to narrow passes, " If you can occupy them first, let them be strongly garrisoned and await the advent of the enemy. Should the army forestall you in occupying a pass, do not go after him if the pass is fully garrisoned, but only if it is weakly garrisoned." Sun' Tzu's discourse on battlefield tactics notes that maneuvering is an important component of warfare. It observes, "We may take it then that an army without its baggage-train is lost; without provisions it is lost; without bases of supply it is lost." Of particular importance is that for an army to succeed it must have assured logistic' lines and to that extent bases are an important component of warfare. These are words of wisdom for any military strategist and a tactical planner. As far as the Chinese ambitions are concerned, maritime and navy planners in Beijing have imbibed these words of wisdom and are practicing. For more details on Chinese understanding of Sun Tzu's Art of War see Vijay Sakhuja," Sun Tzu's Art of War and Chinese Maritime Ambitions "at the website of Peace Forum, Taiwan at http://www.dsis.org.tw/peaceforum/papers/2003-05/MM0305001e.htm

35 The South China Sea in the east and India and Indonesia in the west dominate the approaches to the Malacca Strait. By virtue of its geography, Myanmar sits astride the sea-lane that transits the Malacca Strait from the Indian Ocean into the Pacific Ocean.

211

bases. The Myanmar military inventory today includes fighter aircraft, radar and

radio equipment, surface-to-air missiles, rocket launchers and naval ships of

Chinese origin.36 One of the more alarming aspects of the military aid and sales

and development of infrastructure is its use in support of the PLA Navy's surge

into the Indian Ocean. As part of these strategic initiatives, several Chinese built

electronic intelligence systems have been established in Myanmar, particularly,

the maritime reconnaissance and electronic intelligence system at the Great Coco

Island in the Bay of Bengal to monitor Indian naval activity in the Andaman

Islands and maritime traffic in Malacca Strait.

China has also upgraded the road and rail network system from Yunan in

South China to several ports along the Myanmar coast in Bay of Bengal. 37 In 1992,

Beijing and Myanmar agreed that the PRC would provide major assistance in the

modemis~tion of the Myanmar naval facilities including Hainggyi Island and Great

Coco Islands. 38 The Hainggyi base is capable of providing facilities for much

larger ships than the Mynanmar navy has, and if the present pace continues it will

soon be capable of hosting large PLA Navy vessels including SSBNs and SSNs.

Meanwhile, the size of the Myanmar Navy has also grown, and facilities for their

support have been increasing. 39

36 Jane's Fighting Ships 2000-01, pp.80-85. 37 Since the early 1990s, China has been engaged in building and upgrading the

road and rail network system from Yunan in South China to several ports along the Myanmar coast in Bay of Bengal. Beijing has also shown interest in the land route from Kunmin in Yunan, southern China to Bhamo in Myanmar and from Bhamo along the Irrawaddy River to the Bay of Bengal. For more details see Vijay Sakhuja," Myanmar: A Chinese Satellite in the Indian Ocean" at the website of Peace Forum, Taiwan at http:/ /www.dsis.org. tw/peaceforum/papers/2003-0 1 I AP03 01001 e.htm

38 Ibid. 39 Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, India's Maritime Security (New Delhi: Knowledge

World, 2000), p.l 0 !.According to Roy-Choudhary, preliminary assessments

212

The Chinese approach to maintaining and promoting diplomatic linkages

with Bangladesh is also based on long-term maritime considerations. The geo-

strategic location of Bangladesh provides a useful territorial over-bridge in

reaching out to Myanmar, the Bay of Bengal and subsequently into the Indian

Ocean.

China has emerged as a major supplier of arms to the Bangladesh armed

forces, particularly the Navy and the Air Force. 40 Admiral Zhang Lian Zhong, the

erstwhile Commander of the PLA Navy, had reportedly assured his Bangladesh

counterpart of cooperation in the sophisticated management of the Navy. 41 Like

Myanmar, it. appears, that Bangladesh could provide facilities to the Chinese navy

as and when it begins to operate in the Bay of Bengal or the Indian Ocean. The

Chinese motivation in coming militarily closer to Bangladesh stems from the

perspective that Bangladesh could be used as one of its staging/listening posts in its

surge to the Malacca Strait and the Indian Ocean as is the case with the Coco

Island. This would facilitate a strategic listening post on Indian naval

developments in the Bay ofBengal.

At the same time, China is interested in maintaining a favourable balance in

terms of regional influence and security for its SLOCs. 42 China would not like to

indicate that Hianggyi base is too small to host Chinese frigates but in the long run it could be used to support Chinese submarine operations in the area.

40 Jane's Fighting Ships, 2000-2001,pp.42-49. Some frigates and a large number of patrol crafts of Bangladesh navy are of Chinese origin. Besides, the army's tanks and Air Force combat aircraft are all Chinese. In short, China has forged Bangladesh into a military-equipment client state like Pakistan.

41 R. Chakrabarti, "China and Bangladesh", China Report, vol.30.no.2, 1994, p.155.

42 Subhash Kapila, " Bangladesh-China Defence Co-operation Agreement's Strategic Implications: An Analysis", Paper No. 582,

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allow India to have a completely free hand in regional security matters.

Bangladesh, on its part, perceives India as a regional hegemon and looks up to

China as a countervailing power to thwart any Indian influence.43 It has improved

relations with Pakistan, and such irntiatives only support the Chinese overall

perception of the strategic encirclement of India. 44

Situated at the southern tip of India, Sri Lanka, though small in size and

population, has emerged as a major factor in Chinese strategic thinking. PLA

Navy ships, when transiting through the Bay of Bengal or the Arabian Sea, have in

the past, called on Sri Lankan ports. An important fallout of the ethnic conflict in

Sri Lanka has been the boost to the modernisation of Sri Lanka's armed forces.

From its beginning as a mere ceremonial military, today the Sri Lankan armed

forces are engaged in fighting the L TIE and have emerged as a professional force.

To meet some of its weapons requirements, China has emerged as a major

source of military equipment. The Chinese have also provided aid for military

infrastructure development. The Chinese appreciation of Sri Lanka's geographic

location in terms of its SLOCs as also a strategic base for scuttling any Indian

efforts to strangulate the umbilical cord of the Chinese economy in the Indian

Ocean need to be viewed carefully. Colombo, also offers yet another platform for

Beijing to prevent any dominance by lndia.45 Military aid and arms sales are only

January 14, 2003 available at website of South Asia Analyses Group at http://www.saag.org.

43 Ibid. 44 Ibid. According to Subhash Kapila, during his visit to Bangladesh in

2002, General Pervez Musharraf offered a ''tentative apology" for the 1971 Pakistani genocide of the Bengalis. Mutual discussions between the two sides centered on Pakistan's perceptions oflndia's military escalation and Bangladesh's strategic concerns.

45 V. Suryanarayan, "Sri Lanks's Policy Towards China", China Report, vol.30, no.2, 1994, ,p.203.

214

part of the stark realities ofthe large Chinese design as also the indication of an

enhanced naval interest in the Indian Ocean.

Beijing and Islamabad have established strategic links with each other.

Their cooperation now covers almost all facets of economy, defence, energy,

industry, intelligence sharing and infrastructure, with military cooperation at its

core. The nature and scope of Sino-Pakistan military and nuclear proliferation has

been an area of concern to India. Geo-strategicall y, China views Pakistan as an

outlet to the Indian Ocean and also as a land corridor to the Gulf and West Asia.46

The Gulf countries have emerged as a major market for Chinese trade and

military sales (Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia and Yemen). In return, the Persian Gulf is a

major source of Chinese energy requirements. China needs facilities for its navy as

and when they operate in the Persian Gulf in support of Chinese strategic

objectives. Sino-Pakistan naval co-operation has been a major thrust area. A large

component ofthe Pakistan naval hardware and naval infrastructure is of Chinese

origin.47 Pakistan has also evinced interest in purchasing nuclear submarines from

46 Sujit Dutta, "China and Pakistan: End of a Special relationship", China Report, vol.30, no.2, 1994, pp.l27-129.

47 Pakistan Navy Historical Section, Story of Pakistan Savy, 1947-72 Islamabad: Elite Publishers, 1991 ), pp.30 1-302. In September 1970, Vice Admiral Muzaffar Hasan, Commander-in Chief, Pakistan navy, led a delegation to China and had met Chairman Mao Tse Tung and Premier Zhao Enlai. Premier Zhao expressed his concern over the situation in East Pakistan and cautioned that the slogan of autonomy could get out ofhand and would affect the security interests of both Pakistan and China. The premier advised the Chinese Navy Commander-in Chief to let Pakistan take whatever could be supplied. He noted, "Helping friends could not be measured in terms of money". However, Premier Zhao did admit that the Chinese naval hardware was not as sophisticated as those of \\'estern origin. :l\evertheless, a large proportion of Pakistan's naval inventory includes Chinese ships and equipment. The Fuquing class tanker, missile vessels fitted with C801/802 surface-to-surface missiles and development of naval infrastructure at Gwadar and Onnara are some of the important examples of the growing nature of Sino-Pakistan military cooperation.

215

China.48 Thus, China is bolstering Pakistan's war-making capability against India

and also supporting its nuclear programme as a challenge to Indian dominance in

the region.

As a part of its aggressive strategy to encircle India and safeguard its long

and vulnerable energy sea-lane from Persian Gulf, China has taken economic and

military initiatives in the Maldives as well. It is negotiating with the Maldivian

government to construct a submarine base at Marao Island, a coral reef. 49 China

already has had extensive experience of operating submarines in the shallow

waters in the South China Sea. This initiative would enhance Chinese power

projection capabilities as also challenge US naval activity at Diego Garcia.

According to reports, China will lease Marao Island for 25 years and create jobs

for locals by building infrastructure for tourism and fishing. 50

JAPAN

Article 9 of Japan's post-war Constitution renounces war and the threat or

use of force to settle disputes. 51 However, there is widespread apprehension among

the Asia Pacific countries about the direction in which the Japanese security

48 "Nuclear Deal on Han", Far Eastern Economic Review, April 6, 1990, pp.20-21.

49 A B Mahapatra," China Acquires a Base in Maldives Against India With Some Help From India", at the website of News Insight.Net at http:/ /www.indiareacts.com.

50 Ibid. 51 Article 9 of the Japanese constitution reads as "Aspiring sincerely to an

international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized". See Constitution of Japan at the website of Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet at http:/ /www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/constitution _and _government_ of japan/ constit ution e.html

216

policies are heading. 52 It is becoming increasingly clear that Japan is no longer a

passive international security actor and virtually all of Japan's post war security

policies are being changed, i.e. Japan is engaging Kata Yabouri. 53 In the 1990s,

Japan undertook new roles for its maritime forces. These include: (a) mine

sweeping (Gulf War 1991), and (b) UN Peace Keeping (Cambodia and

Mozambique between 1992 and 1995).

In October 1976, Japan put forward its first, post World War II independent

military strategy, an exclusively defence-oriented strategy. The National Defence

Programme Outline 19 7 6 was adopted in 1977, and the goal of defence buildup

was made clear. 54 With the end of the Cold War and the demise of the East West

confrontation, Japan re-appreciated the international situation and from an inward

looking policy of "prevention of an invasion" it announced the new National

Defence Plan Outline 1995 (NDPO 1995) that reflected the outward looking role

52 In October 1976, Japan put forward its first, post World War II independent military strategy: an exclusively defence-oriented strategy. The National Defence Program Outline 1976 was adopted keeping in mind the international situation i.e. the East West relationship and tension on the Korean peninsula. From this point of view, the outline incorporated the concept of a basic defence. The main points of the strategy were to possess an adequate defence capability to prevent aggression, rely on the United States' nuclear capability against nuclear threat and repel limited and small-scale aggression without external assistance. In the event of indirect aggression or any unlawful military activity that may lead to aggression, Japan will take immediate responsive action in order to settle the situation at an early stage.

53 Peter J. Woolley and Commander MarkS. Woolley, "The Kata of Japan's Naval Forces", Naval War College Review, Spring 1996, p. 60. Kata can be translated as "model", "pattern", "style" or a "formula". In simple terms it means "a fixed pattern". Kata is exercised in every facet of Japanese activity, be it political, social or military. To be in Kata is something that the Japanese are proud of and to break form, i.e. Kata Yaburi is scoffed at. Kata Yaburi would be unconventional, unusual, extraordinary-all qualities problematic in Japan.

54 Edward L. Martin," Evolving Missions and Forces of the JMSDF", Naval War College Review, Spring 1995, p.47.

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for the Self Defence Forces. 55 The NDPO 1995 envisages Japan's participation in

activities under the UN to ensure world peace, engage in security dialogues and

military exchanges, assist various arms control and disarmament activities, and

prevent proliferation of armaments. The new strategy reflected an offensive

defensive strategy that envisages the deterrent function of military force, and an

expanded sea-lane defence up to I 000 nautical miles and defeat the enemy on the

high seas. 56

In 1997, the U.S. and Japanese governments completed a revision of the

1976 Guidelines for Defence Cooperation, paving the way for new Japanese

legislation and bilateral mechanisms designed to expand Japan's logistical and

military role in the event of regional contingencies. 57 This has resulted in bridging

the gap between being a self-defense force and a regional military power. The

transformation was formalized in 1997 when the US-Japan Defence Guidelines

were revised and the annual Defence White Paper addressed a regional strategy in

"areas surrounding Japan".58 It can therefore be argued that there is new thinking

in Japan regarding a more prominent role in regional security matters.

In 2000, the Japanese and US navies had undertaken 8 joint exercises

between them. 59 Besides, the Japanese navy engaged in joint exercises with the

Australian, Canadian, and other regional navies. However, the Japanese Defence

White Paper titled Defence of Japan, 2001 noted:

55 Japan Defence Agency, Defence of Japan ,1996, p.74. 56 Japan Defence Agency, National Defence Programme Outline at the website

of Japan Defence Agency at http://www.jda.go.jp/e/index_html. 57 Ibid. 58 Japan Defence Agency, Defence of Japan ,2001, p.81.

59 Ibid., p.333.

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... while the region [Asia Pacific] has not witnessed the dramatic changes in the security structure as seen in Europe, military forces remain present on an enormous scale, nuclear weapons included ... Unpredictable and uncertain elements remain in the region, with issues such as the continuing tension, even after the North/South summit of June 2000, on the Korean Peninsula, the unresolved territorial disputes over Japan's Northern Territories and Takeshima Island, the Spratly Islands and so on.60

Tokyo was considering deploying vessels to patrol the Strait ofMalacca

where shipping has been plagued by piracy. Maritime Safety Agency (coast guard)

ships were expected to form part of the multinational anti-piracy patrol consisting

of the coast guard and naval vessels of China, Indonesia, Malaysia, Republic of

Korea, and Singapore. Strong protests and non-acceptance of the proposal by

China resulted in Japan's putting the idea on hold.61

Japan's new emphasis on its security diplomacy and evolution beyond a

self-imposed self-defence role reflects Tokyo's search for a new position in the

international and regional security system. Emerging security trends in the Asia

Pacific region give Japan reasons to worry about its passive and inert role. It is

worried about China trying to fill the perceived void left by the declining US

presence. It is also worried about Chinese assertiveness in the Spratly islands,

Paracel Islands and the Senkaku Islands.

Japan already patrols the SLOCs to 1000 nautical miles from Tokyo. It

has an impressive inventory of 64 major combatants, 85 long-range maritime

patrol aircraft, 92 anti-submarine helicopters and mid-air refuelling capahility.62 It

has acquired the Boeing 767 Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) to

60 Ibid., p.3. 61 See "Japan Proposes to Patrol the Strait ofMalacca", at homepage of Stratfor

at http://www.stratfor.com/ dated 18 February 2000. 62 Jane's Fighting Ships 2000-01, pp.367-395.

219

monitor its airspace for enemy aircraft as well as incoming missiles.63 The Kongo

class destroyers, which are comparable to the US Aegis Cruisers, and Osumi class

Landing Ship Tank have further contributed to its power projection capability.

Japan has plans to acquire theatre-missile defence systems jointly developed with

the US.64 These adYanced system features space-based ballistic missile defence

linked to ground-based anti-missile systems.

The reverberations of Japanese maritime expansion are quite visible. The

positioning of aircraft and patrol vessels in Singapore on standby for evacuation

duties has increased Japan's naval reach well into the Malacca Strait, some 2000

miles from home, which is a clear indicator of the redefined maritime defensive

perimeter, currently restricted to 1000 nautical miles from the coast. The growing

debate in Japan on revising the Constitution from a passive to a more assertive one

is becoming more visible as also the changing role, reach and missions of the

Japanese navy.

THE UNITED STATES

With the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Soviet Union,

the United States remains the only superpower in the Asia Pacific region.

Whatever is the future strength of its presence and commitment, it remains deeply

involved in the region. Being both a Pacific and an Atlantic power, it cannot afford

to simply turn its attention away from such an important region.

During the Cold War, US military strategy was aimed primarily at

containing the Soviet Union, exercising deterrence and defeating the communist

63 Ibid. 64 David Arase~ "A ~ilitarised Japan?", The Journal of Strategic Studies, vol.18,

no.3., September 1995, p.80.

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forces of the Soviet Union, North Korea and even China .The US maritime strategy

ofthe 1980's (published in 1986) envisioned a global war that would be initiated

1:-y the Soviet Union. The war at sea would be won by sea control. 65 The post Cold

\Var CS maritime strategy is best illustrated by four documents that were published

during the 1990's. 66 The 1990 East Asia Strategic Initiative (EASI I) and the 1992

Srrategic Framework for the Asian Pacific Rim (EASI II) addressed the issue of the

draw cown ofUS forces, closure of military bases in the Philippines and

a:.--riculated US engagement in the Asia Pacific region for regional security and

stabiliry. In 1995, a report entitled United States Security Strategy for the East Asia

-Pacif.c Region (EASR) expressed growing concerns about the arms race in the

region and noted "insecure nations will build up their armaments. Arms races

could in tum foster fear and instability". The 1998 United States Security Strategy

for the East Asia -Pacific Region (EASR) asserted that the US military presence in

the region was important to prevent any security challenges and mitigates the

impact of regional tensions, manage potential threats and encourage peaceful

resoluton of disputes.

Close US economic ties with the Asia Pacific region serve its economic

interes-.s. The region 'is the main trading partner in Washington's trans-Pacific

trade.6- The US and Asia have become more interdependent, with foreign direct

65 "Power from the Sea", August 27, 1992, unpublished draft, cited in Charles A Me.:onis and Michael D. Wallace, East Asian Naval Weapons Acquisitions in the 1990s: Causes, Consequences and Responses (London : Praeger, 2000), pp.l55-156.

66 Ibici, pp.156-158. 67 In 1998, it was almost thrice that of Europe. Trade with the Asia pacific region

accounts for over $500 billion per year, approximately 35% of total U.S. trade, double the trade with Europe. Foreign direct investment is less but America's economic future remains merged with this region.See Admiral Joseph W. Prueher, USN, Commander-in-Chief, US Pacific Command Asia-Pacific

221

investment growing dramatically. The trade link is typically directed across the

Pacific to the US west coast. Maritime shipping originating from or arriving at

ports west of the South China Sea transits across the Indian Ocean and the Atlantic

to the United States.

Although only a small amount of US trade transits through these SLOCs,

this does not mean that they are not important routes to the United States. In fact,

US prosperity depends upon the prosperity of its trading partners, a vibrant world

economy and safe sea-lanes. US interests in the SLOCs of the South China Sea

appear indirect, but they are indeed very important. The US would feel the pain of

any disruption of SLOCs in the region. A study sponsored by the US Navy has

brought out that the US governments needs to commit itself to keeping the Asia

Pacific strategic sea-lanes open to commercial shipping.68 The study also notes that

extended closure of the~e strategic highways could seriously harm Asian

economies with which US has important trading links.69

Washington has been careful not to get embroiled in territorial disputes

arising out ofUNCLOS III and strongly opposes the use of force and is primarily

concerned about the safety of maritime traffic. It appears that unless the security of

its maritime traffic is threatened, it is not likely to be involved in the regional

contlicts.

Militarily, five of America's seven mutual defense treaties are with Asia-

Pacific nations, and six large militaries (China, North Korea, India, Indonesia,

Russia, and US) operate in this region. The US believes that it shares with the other

Security and China: A US. Pacific Command Perspective, remarks prepared for delivery at Fudan University Shanghai, China November 13, 1998.

68 John H. Noer, Choke Points: Maritime Economic Concerns in South East Asia (Washington: NDU Press, 1996).

69 Ibid., p.4.

222

nations in the Asia Pacific region an enduring objective in stopping the emergence

of a hostile coalition. It is therefore not in anyone's interest, including the United

States, to become a hegemon. 70

The US forces remain forward deployed in East Asia.71 The rationale for

this forward deployment is two fold- political and military.72 Politically, the US

wants a peaceful environment primarily for its economic vitality. The US economy

is more interdependent with the Asia Pacific than the Atlantic region. Besides, the

defence treaties with Asia Pacific countries are symbolic of US engagement with

the region.

On the military front, the forward deployed troops can be rapidly mobilized

in case of any regional contingency. The US remains conscious of the volatile

nature of the Korean Peninsula. It wants to prevent North Korea from threatening

or using weapons of mass destruction against its neighbours. At the same time, the

US is worried about the military modernization of China and wants to deter

Chinese from undertaking adventurism against Taiwan or any other country in the

region with whom it has security alliance.

CONCLUSION

This chapter has attempted to analyse the security architecture of the Asia

pacific region based on the ambitions and aspirations oflndia, China, Japan and

the United States. It has tried to show that the balance of power equation in the

region is under transformation, with India and China trying to carve out a major

70 Admiral Joseph W. Prueher.op.cit. 71 As of June 20, 2000, the number of US troops deployed in East Asia were:

Army 15,435; Navy, 8,367; Marine Corps 6,043; and Air Force 4,435. For more details see The National Institute for Defence Studies, Japan, East Asian Strategic Review, 2001 (Tokyo: NIDS, 2001), p.263.

72 Ibid., pp.269-270.

223

role for them. Both are engaged in building their naval capabilities that could result

in a clash in the future. Both the United States and Japan have watched the Indian

and Chinese maritime ambitions with interest and taken note of their ambitions.