Rehabilitating Islamist Extremists: Successful Methods

in Prison-Centred ‘De-radicalisation’ Programmes

Marc Jones

Abstract

Following the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the global “war on terror” led by the United States

resulted in the death and imprisonment of a large number of Islamist terrorists.

However, many states soon came to the realisation that traditional security efforts

alone were insufficient to effectively combat Islamic terrorism. Prison-centred de-

radicalisation programmes were thus launched in a number of Muslim majority in order

to address the ideological roots of Islamist extremism. Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and

Yemen have implemented such programmes in an effort to de-radicalise Muslim

extremists and facilitate their integration back into society. Through a comparative

analysis of the programmes, this dissertation ascertains the methods that are most

effective in disengaging Islamist extremists from terrorist behaviour. It finds that the

use of independent clerics in re-education, extensive post-release care and financial

incentives, effective surveillance and deterrence, family inclusion and a tailored

approach are central to the success of de-radicalisation programmes.

Acknowledgements

I am extremely thankful to my mother and father for their constant support, financially and

otherwise, which has allowed me to pursue my interest in security and terrorism related

subjects at the University of Leeds. I would also like to thank my supervisor Dr Alan Craig

who has given me valuable advice on how to focus my dissertation.

Introduction

Increasingly, states have sought alternative measures to contend with violent extremism

and as a result so called “softer” approaches have become key components of counter

terrorism policy throughout the world. Their adoption has emerged partly in response to

public backlash against military approaches to countering terrorism but can largely be

viewed as a recognition that “hard” approaches, whilst stifling terrorism on a number of

levels, “do not undermine its ideological appeal” (Ezzarqui, 2010:1). Policy makers have

realised that a military approach alone has inherent limitations; in order to greatly enhance

the effectiveness of existing national counterterrorism strategies it needs to be combined

with programmes that are able to address the ideological foundations that promote

violence. Further concern is raised by the capture and imprisonment process of both

convicted terrorists and their sympathisers since evidence exists to suggest that they can be

radicalised to a greater extent within the prison environment (ibid.).

Prisons have the potential to become ideal breeding grounds for radicalisation and

terrorism; they not only give extremists the opportunity to develop violent ideology but

provide a favourable setting in which proselytization efforts can be set in motion. As

Mulcahy, Merrington and Bell (2013:4) remark, “Prisoner radicalisation is not a recent

phenomenon”. History is replete with examples where prisons have served not only as

recruitment centres but as headquarters for various ideological extremists; both Adolf Hitler

and Joseph Stalin used their time behind bars to develop and refine their extremist

ideologies, as have key figures in the shaping of modern jihadist thought such as Sayyid

Qutb and Abu Mohammad al-Maqdisi. Similarly, any serious discussion of modern jihadist

movements like al-Qaeda would be remiss without reference to Abu Musab al-Zarqawi and

Ayman al-Zawahiri, both of whom academic observers believe were radicalised during their

imprisonment (Brandon, 2009:7). Prisons have played an enormous role in the narrative of

radical Islamist movements; their unsettling environment is one where individuals become

more likely to explore new associations and beliefs, and can become radicalised for myriad

reasons. Conversely prisons also provide an ideal location for state officials to implement

procedures that can assist with the process of de-radicalisation and rehabilitation;

procedures which are designed to tackle the underlying causes that led to the radicalisation

of extremist individuals and induce a renunciation of their violent ideology.

Whilst the struggle against Islamist terrorism does require the use of military force in

order to deny movements like al-Qaeda sanctuaries in places such as Afghanistan and Iraq,

defeating extremist Islam requires a multifaceted approach which necessarily includes

strategies to eradicate its roots and causes. Recognising this, several states have devised

“de-radicalisation programmes” that seek, through a range of techniques, to address the

ideological roots of extremists’ violent ideologies.

The structure of the de-radicalisation can differ greatly, some employ mechanisms

with a high level of pervasiveness, as in the case of Saudi Arabia, whereby new lives, jobs

and marriages are arranged for participants and some, as in the case of Malaysia, utilise a

more coercive element. However, despite variation in the techniques employed, they each

have in common the fundamental objectives of rehabilitating detained terrorists. The fact

that these programmes share a common goal enables their comparative success to be

assessed and hence best-practices to be observed.

Debate over whether or not genuine de-radicalisation can occur is not necessary;

that it can has been proven in several programmes and observers have now even witnessed

former terrorists assisting with research on the de-radicalisation process. However, as

Kruglanski, Gelfand and Gunaratna (2010:3) recognise; “Whether specific de-radicalisation

programs are effective and what makes them so is a different question [and] one in a dire

need of an answer”. This dissertation seeks to analyse the approaches and success of

prison-centred de-radicalisation programmes in three countries that attempt to counter

Islamic extremism; Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Yemen. In doing so, it identifies methods that

can help prevent policy makers elsewhere from making counterproductive mistakes when

engaging in the development of similar programmes.

Methodology

The programmes analysed exist in countries where Islam is a majority religion. These

countries have a vested interest in attempting to reform Islamist extremists, largely due to

the increasing pressure they have felt exerted by Western States, to implement effective

measures to minimise the threat. Whilst prison-centred programmes are not unique to

Islamic-majority countries they have seen a great of extremists pass through their doors;

they have accordingly been afforded ample subjects to test their methods on. Saudi Arabia

and Yemen were chosen specifically because they have received significant attention from

media outlets and research-focused organisations alike; Saudi, due its extensiveness and its

reported successes and Yemen due to its relative failure. Malaysia, on the other hand offers

an interesting case of a country that is purported to employ a level of state coerciveness as

an aspect to its programme.

Despite the religious demography of the states, the analysis allows for the

determination of methods that can be applied to other countries in a manner that accounts

for specific legal and cultural practice, and factors which have the potential to be conducive

to the success of de-radicalisation programmes generally. This dissertation engages in a

comparative analysis which seeks to examine the perceived successes and criticisms of the

procedures adopted by the programmes, to highlight programme similarities and

differences, to compare the results that they have produced and to determine methods that

appear to effectively disengage detainees from terrorist activity. In doing so attempt is

made to answer this dissertation’s research question: what are the most effective methods

de-radicalisation programmes can employ to disengage Islamists from terrorist behaviour?

Limitations

The most practical way to measure the effectiveness of a de-radicalisation programme is by

the rate of recidivism - i.e. the number of individuals that, after completion of the

programme, returned to terrorism (Porges, 2010a:1). Recidivism rates are frequently

inaccurate however, often reflecting the limited amount of what is known to intelligence

services on the matter. The development of adequate methods to calculate recidivism rates

is also hampered by the difficulties researchers encounter when attempting to gain access

to programme methods and statistics. Furthermore, the majority of de-radicalisation

programmes have not been in existence long enough for observers to determine with a high

level of certainty which strategies have the longest lasting impact upon the behaviour of

extremist individuals; Saudi Arabia’s programme, for example, was considered an absolute

success until the terrorist activity of eleven of its graduates was uncovered in 2009.

Terminology can prove deceiving in any study concerning de-radicalisation; the fact that it is

not an observable phenomena ensures that one can never be absolutely certain that an

individual has de-radicalised. It is for this reason that the success of the programmes is

determined by their ability to disengage extremists from terrorist acts. Similarly, since a

number of programmes involve extensive post release surveillance their apparent success in

the context of de-radicalisation may be a direct result of the deterrent quality of the

monitoring, equating to a strategic calculation by the individual to no longer engage in

terrorist activity rather than being directly attributable to de-radicalisation; hence the

decision to assess effectiveness based on programme ability to disengage. These hurdles

should not, however, prevent attempts to draw out common factors that appear to assist in

the de-radicalisation of extremist individuals, for such factors can prove useful to the

continuing development of programmes in states throughout the world.

Definitions and Concepts

Radicalisation

De-radicalisation, disengagement and social reintegration cannot be considered out of the

context of their precursor, radicalisation (Barelle, 2010:3). Given that this paper assesses

programmes which attempt all three processes, a brief overview of radicalisation and its

contributing factors will allow for a more informed analysis. Horgan (2009:152) provides an

effective working definition of radicalisation as a “social and psychological process of

incrementally experienced commitment to extremist political or religious ideology”, hence

discussion of alternate definitions and resulting implications is not warranted. Factors which

can lead to the radicalisation of individuals do, however, require mention. Knowledge of

how an individual came to be radicalised is crucial to his process of de-radicalisation; for

example, if radicalisation occurred primarily due to the lack of understanding of the core

principles of Islam then re-education will be pivotal. The success of any de-radicalisation

programme will, therefore, partly rely on its ability to identify and effectively address the

specific cause of radicalisation at the individual level. The European research project

Transnational Terrorism, Security and the Rule of Law (TTSRL, 2008:9) emphasises that the

causes of radicalisation are as many as they are varied but a number of common

contributing factors that promote the process have been identified by various government

funded projects.

A Dutch study published in 2005 and a study published by the UK government in

2007 noted the importance of self-identity as an aspect in the radicalisation process, such

that radicalisation is often preceded by a search for identity at a moment of crisis (Hannah,

Clutterbuck & Rubin, 2008:14). Those susceptible to radicalisation are believed to

experience a ‘cognitive-opening’, succinctly defined as a willingness to listen to other

(extreme) views, a central trigger for which can be a crisis that shakes certainty in previously

held beliefs and “renders an individual more receptive to the possibilities of alternative

views and perspectives” (Choudhury, 2007:21). Wiktorwicz (2005:19-20), remarks that

research on Islamic movements indicates that the main type of crisis that are conducive to

the creation of cognitive openings are social and cultural (such as experiences of

humiliation), economic (such as job loss or lack of opportunity), and political (such as

experiences of torture and repression). Brandon (2009, p.25) labels these ‘push factors’;

factors which push individuals away from mainstream society and towards extremist

groups. Barelle (2010:4) concurs with this understanding, stating that there are “a significant

number of common factors in the radicalisation process”. For example, when someone joins

a radical group, they often find that the group ideology explains a frequently disappointing

world and through membership gain a stronger sense of self, obtain skills and purpose, and

experience a sense of belonging and acceptance.

Hannah, Clutterbuck and Rubin (2008:5) insist that “Individuals do not commit

violent or criminal acts in a vacuum”. In this respect extremist offenders are no different;

their social contexts influence their behaviour and their backgrounds and opportunities

make them more or less likely to commit terrorism-related offences. Thus the effectiveness

of a country’s de-radicalisation programme will be determined by how well its methods are

able to effect a behavioural change in its participants and whether or not it is able to

prevent them from reverting to previous behaviour once they are released from the prison

environment. Clearly the de-radicalisation of some individuals will necessitate a different

approach to that which is required for the de-radicalisation of others; as radicalisation is an

inherently individual process, so too is de-radicalisation. The proceeding sections show that

in order for a programme to be successful it must adopt a variety of techniques, both

educational and incentives based, and ensure the implementation of approaches tailored to

accommodate the specific needs of the individual.

De-radicalisation vs. Disengagement – Two Distinct Processes

De-radicalisation and disengagement are two inextricably linked, yet inherently distinct

processes. There is a need for conceptual and terminological clarity as far as this

dissertation is concerned since “de-radicalisation” programmes more commonly achieve

“disengagement” of the individual than they do de-radicalisation, despite their potentially

misleading title. Each of the programmes employed by the countries analysed in this paper

and indeed those employed elsewhere appear to pursue a common objective, that of de-

radicalisation. However, when the processes and methods that they employ and the results

that they achieve are examined more closely, they appear to be less about de-radicalisation

and more about efforts to promote the disengagement of individuals from terrorist groups

and their cessation of terrorist activity.

Horgan (2008:3) asserts that “just because one leaves terrorism behind; it rarely

implies (or even necessitates) that one becomes ‘deradicalized’.” This observation is

particularly pertinent to a study of de-radicalisation programmes since the positive impact

they may appear to have on former radicals, witnessed through continued desistance of

violent and extremist activity following release from prison, is often due to their ability to

induce participant disengagement from terrorist groups.

For the purpose of this analysis, de-radicalisation can be defined as the social and

psychological process whereby an individual’s involvement in, and commitment to, violent

radicalisation is “reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of involvement and

engagement in violent activity” (Horgan, 2009:153). De-radicalisation can therefore be

viewed as a process, and one which implies a cognitive change which results in a

modification of an individual’s beliefs. Put simply, once de-radicalised, a person no longer

believes in the extreme ideology.

Disengagement, on the other hand, is a process that results in the voluntary or

involuntary separation of an individual from the direct or indirect participation in terrorist

activity. Individual disengagement does not, therefore, imply de-radicalisation. Bjorgo and

Horgan (2009:3) emphasise that individuals may walk away from an extremist group and its

violent means without relinquishing the principles of their faith that justify the lethal actions

of such groups. The crucial difference between the two concepts is that de-radicalisation

implies that the individual has renounced or changed his ideology, whereas disengagement

means he has left the terrorist group or former affiliations with terrorism but has not

necessarily altered his ideology.

It may seem inappropriate to refer to these programmes as de-radicalising when

more often than not they achieve disengagement, however, for the sake of brevity this

dissertation concurs with Horgan’s (2009:153) assertion that despite its definition, de-

radicalisation may also refer “to any initiative that tries to achieve a reduction of risk of re-

offending through addressing the specific and relevant disengagement issues”.

Disengagement – Contributing Factors

This dissertation carries out an assessment of the methods employed by the programmes

on their ability to disengage rather than their perceived ability to de-radicalise. The primary

reason for this is due to the difficulty that is encountered when one attempts to accurately

measure de-radicalisation. The physical nature of disengagement ensures it is an observable

phenomenon; individuals can be seen to have ceased terrorist activity or association with

terrorist groups whereas de-radicalisation lies within the realm of the intangible; individuals

cannot be physically seen to have renounced their violent ideologies. For instance, some of

the programmes studied herein employ incentives such as housing and financial benefits

that, whilst designed to prevent recidivism of released terrorists, essentially reward

successful participants. Saudi Arabia, uses a host of psychologists and other professionals to

assess participant suitability for release; offenders, however, whilst they may verbally

declare the renunciation of former beliefs and appear to be truly repentant, may do so

simply in order to receive such benefits; this describes what (Clubb, 2009) refers to as

“conditional disengagement”. Likewise their decision to cease terrorist-related activity may

be a conscious decision in order to continue receiving benefits or in response to external

factors employed by the programme, such as surveillance and monitoring techniques;

individuals can maintain a radical ideology but refrain from acting upon it. That being said,

many participants of de-radicalisation programmes probably have been genuinely de-

radicalised; the factors that support the process of disengagement can in some cases

support the process of de-radicalisation since disengagement can precede de-radicalisation

(Silke, 2011; Ezzarqui,2010:9). However, to remain accurate, this dissertation evaluates the

efficacy of the programmes through an assessment of the methods they employ which can

be seen to promote disengagement, whilst acknowledging that such methods may also

promote and lead to de-radicalisation.

Whilst they may not always succeed in de-radicalising extremists, the success of

terrorist de-radicalisation programmes will undoubtedly depend on their capacity to

implement methods that effectively promote disengagement from terrorist activity.

Effecting ideological shift in the extremist is the ideal outcome; however, this is not always

possible and therefore disengagement should be seen as a practical and efficient strategy to

countering violent terrorist acts.

In the context of de-radicalisation programmes, identifying the reasons why

individuals disengage from terrorism is extremely important. The first section of this section

noted a number of factors that promote radicalisation and push people towards extremists

groups. Just as these factors can promote radicalisation and push individuals towards

terrorist groups, so too can they be employed in the process of disengagement (Schmid,

2013:47). Consider Saudi Arabia’s programme; it offers to fund the education of its

successful graduates in order to enhance their skill-sets and future prospects. It also

finances weddings and encourages the building of a family, acknowledging that this will give

the individual a sense of purpose and responsibility and increase the likelihood that he will

desist from terrorist activity. The ‘push’ factors identified by Brandon (2009:56) are those

which make it unattractive for terrorists to remain in the group, whereas pull factors are

those that pull the individual towards alternative offers and/or opportunities (Ezzarqui,

2010:10). Whilst push factors tend to be observed in the context of individuals voluntarily

leaving the group, de-radicalisation programmes can certainly replicate this process. Losing

confidence in a group’s aims and ideology, for example, is a commonly observed push

factor; the efforts of programmes which successfully delegitimise and discredit the extreme

ideology of the group in the eyes of the offender can achieve the same effect. Likewise, de-

radicalisation programmes can encourage terrorists to disengage by providing appealing

alternatives such as the opportunity to start a family or a new job.

Horgan (2009:30) believes that disengaging from a terrorist group does not

necessarily entail leaving; merely by desisting from executing violent attacks a person can be

seen to disengage from terrorism, even if they remain affiliated with the group. However,

this role change does not necessarily preclude continuation of active support for the group

in ways which enable it to use violence. It is for this reason this dissertation diverges from

Horgan’s assessment and does not include role change among factors of disengagement.

The most basic types of physical disengagement include the death of an individual or his

imprisonment. Whilst obvious conclusions can be drawn from the finality of death, arrest

and imprisonment alone do not ensure that disengagement continues when offenders are

released from the prison environment. Prison-centred de-radicalisation programmes thus

represent an important aspect of soft counter-terrorism; acknowledging the assessment of

the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism (2013) that “Eventually, most convicted

*extremist+ offenders will be released” they equate to a necessary measure to ensure that

the disengagement of extremists continues after they are released.

De-Radicalisation in Saudi Arabia

Saudi Arabia’s de-radicalisation programme is unprecedented both in terms of what it offers

within the prison environment and the support provided to its participants after their

release. Whilst some observers have criticised a number of its employed methods and policy

makers involved in its creation have acknowledged some failures, it has largely been

deemed a success. The first section of this section briefly describes the situation of terrorist

attacks in Saudi Arabia which served as the impetus to its efforts that sought to counter

radical ideologies within the Kingdom. The second analyses the specific procedures it uses in

its overall effort to de-radicalise individuals espousing extremist ideology, in order to explain

which methods facilitate the disengagement process. Section three highlights the successes

and concerns of the programme.

The Programme in Context

In 2003, Saudi Arabia experienced the start of what was to be a brutal and protracted

terrorist campaign waged by al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). A major attack on

housing complexes in Riyadh was a harbinger of the violence to come; between May 2003

and December 2004 more than 30 major terrorism-related incidents occurred within the

kingdom which killed 132 Saudi civilians, foreign nationals and security force personnel and

injured a further 728 (Rabasa et al, 2010:56). The rise in extremist related terrorist attacks

that Saudi Arabia witnessed during this period has been attributed to such factors as

disapproval of its decision to allow American bases to remain in the region following the

Gulf War, the close relationship it continues with the United States and the perceived

corruption of the royal family. Miller (2003), remarks that they regard the regime as

"insufficiently Islamic and an unacceptable candidate to be the guardian of Mecca and

Medina," Islam's holiest sites; a view which resonates throughout many militant Islamist

organisations and individuals. Speckhard (2012:1) opines that another contributing factor

was “jihadists” who had “received military training and were ideologically indoctrinated in

Afghanistan” were returning to the kingdom in vehement opposition of the regime and

advocating for it to be overthrown.

The attacks such as those committed in Riyadh were purposely designed to

undermine the regime and formed part of a more general effort to destabilise the country

itself; however, many analysts believe that the specific targeting of Westerners and security

force members enabled the government to mobilise their security forces against AQAP

(Abedin, 2005). Indeed, by 2005 they had effectively dismantled the organisations hierarchy

through elimination of the group’s founder and numerous successive leaders (Rabasa et al,

2010, p.57). The existence of smaller groups more loosely affiliated to al-Qaeda, however,

and the recognition by Saudi authorities that traditional policing and intelligence measures

fail to undermine the radical ideology that leads individuals to commit acts of terror,

precipitated the launch of a comprehensive counterterrorism strategy designed not only to

eliminate the immediate threat but to undermine the appeal of terrorist ideology and drive

a wedge between extremists and the general Saudi population. The “soft” counterterrorism

element of the kingdom’s overarching and multifaceted policy hopes to prevent further

violent Islamism through addressing the underlying factors that facilitate extremism; it

entailed the creation of an entirely different strategic framework in order to confront this

modern challenge exhibited by Islamist groups and central to the strategy was its de-

radicalisation programme.

Analysis of the Programme

Organisation and Process

Of the separate yet interconnected components of the Kingdom’s Prevention, Rehabilitation

and After-Care (PRAC) strategy it is the latter two which have attracted most attention.

Implemented in 2005, they specifically target detained individuals and centre on a

counselling programme that seeks to re-educate violent extremists and terrorist

sympathisers through a process of religious debate and psychological counselling (Porges,

2011). The main objective is to de-radicalise inmates and encourage them to renounce

“terrorist ideologies”. It is based upon the presumption of benevolence, not vengeance or

retribution; that is, the state assumes that suspects were lied to, manipulated and misled by

extremists into straying away from true Islam (ISD, 2012:19). Counselling is thus presented

as a crucial means by which to rehabilitate and by which to help victims of radicalisation

rather than punish offenders.

A group called the Advisory Committee administers the counselling programme and

four subcommittees comprise the committee itself, each being tasked with a different

aspect of the counselling process. The Religious Subcommittee is composed of around one

hundred and fifty clerics, professors and scholars who are charged with engaging the

participants in dialogue about their experiences and Qu’ranic interpretations. The fifty

psychologists and psychiatrists that make up the Psychological and Social Subcommittee

gauge participant compliance with the counselling, and evaluate participation in order to

determine whether rehabilitation is genuine (Ezzarqui, 2010:25). The Security

Subcommittee assess detainees for security risks and suggest which prisoners are safe to be

released; they also provide a monitoring service after their release. The Media

Subcommittee focuses on education and outreach and produces the materials used in the

programme (Horgan & Braddock, 2010:277).

The Advisory Committee’s research has shown that the majority of the participants

did not complete formal education and thus were susceptible to extremist propaganda

because they did not learn the core tenets of their faith, leading to an incomplete

understand of Islam. Clerics seek to ameliorate the detainees’ education through the

dialogue process and to educate them on key topics and concepts within the faith; they

demonstrate that what the prisoners were tricked into believing was false and teach them a

state-sanctioned interpretation of Islam. The Advisory Committee stresses the importance

of relationship between cleric and participant and will replace them should they fail to

establish a rapport. Combes (2013) believes that the bond between detainee and state-

sponsored cleric “is crucial to a program that seeks to establish a new ideological framework

through *trust+.”

The process of rehabilitation does not end within the prison environment; those

considered to have renounced their former beliefs move into the after-care programme;

however, officials are keen to stress that not all prisoners who complete the counselling

programme are eligible for release; those with “blood on their hands” will serve out their

full sentence irrespective of whether and when they complete the programme (Boucek,

2008a:60; Ezzarqui, 2010:26).

Those who committee members deem to be suitable to leave are transferred to a

specialised Care Rehabilitation Centre (CRC) in order to ease their transition back to a

normal life. Brief and recurring exposure to life outside state custody is provided through

day trips with the centre’s staff and participants have the chance to engage in numerous

activities and sports. Such efforts are designed in order to “encourage acceptance and

develop notions of inclusion” but also afford staff members the opportunity to observe

detainees in various situations; this allows for the sincerity of their rehabilitation can be

evaluated (Boucek, 2008b:8). The Saudi government has placed much belief in the ability of

such centres to rehabilitate erstwhile extremists, indicated by the opening of a new centre

in the western port city of Jeddah and more recently this year, a complex in Riyadh which

boasts an Olympic style swimming pool, gym and television hall. The newest complex is the

first which utilises “luxury” as an incentive to moderate extremist beliefs (Benari, 2013).

Methods Conducive to Success?

From the examination in section one it is clear that when individuals disengage from groups

that espouse a violent ideology it does not necessarily mean that they have de-radicalised.

Disengagement can, however, be a stepping stone on the way to complete de-radicalisation

and the programme used by Saudi Arabia contains a number of methods which facilitate the

disengagement process. The simple fact that extremist offenders are arrested and

incarcerated constitutes the most discernible form of physical disengagement but efforts to

de-radicalise clearly need to go further than this initial process.

One basic yet pivotal method conducive to successful disengagement is the

considerable religious authority wielded by the state; this allows it to confer a high level of

legitimacy upon the counselling process. Committee members are also keen to stress to

prisoners that they are not government employees but independent academics which has

had the effect of detainees engaging more openly during counselling sessions (Boucek,

2008b:15). The presence of former militant figures who have renounced their former beliefs

on the Advisory committee reinforces this idea of legitimacy since it carries credibility with a

number of the programme’s participants.

Another element which helps prevent released detainees reverting to their previous

ways is the pervasiveness of the social care offered which the programme extends not only

to participants but also to their families. When a suspect is enrolled the committee ensures

that it provides their family with an alternate salary in order to offset difficulties brought on

by their incarceration. The income provided is calculated on an individual basis; however,

MEMRI (2007) observed that “prisoners’ families that are needy, receive monthly payments

of around 2000-3000 riyals”. Meeting the social needs of families is a prudent strategy

which the government has adopted in order to ensure lower-levels of resentment among

detainees which results not only in greater levels of co-operation with the programme but

also closes a gap which extremist elements may fill. Should other extremists decide to assist

the detainee’s family with financial support during his period of imprisonment he may

experience a feeling of gratitude and a sense of obligation upon release which could lead to

his reengagement with terrorist organisations. Similarly, the Advisory Committee remains

acutely involved in the post-release life of the detainees and offer them a sustainable future

through a monthly stipend, offers of employment and housing provision. This aspect

increases the likelihood of disengagement since the benefits are revoked should participants

become involved in any further illicit behaviour (El-Said, 2012:39). However, as the next

section elucidates, such incentive-based action is not necessarily conducive to de-

radicalisation and may mask the true reason behind absence of re-engagement.

The After-Care programme attempts to facilitate the transition of participants back

into Saudi society and employs a unique approach which is helpful in easing former

extremists into a life of non-violence. At the CRC they live communally in a far more relaxed

setting than their previous prison environment and engage in various activities and sports

that encourage teamwork; this is an important aspect of the de-radicalisation process and a

method likely to increase the prospect of disengagement. Horgan (2009:30) notes that a

recurring theme amongst those having undergone radical or extremist transformation is “a

sense of disillusionment with the individual’s…persona or identity”; exposing the detainees

to a range of these activities has the effect of replacing disillusionment with recreation and

entertainment and distracts the prisoners from discussing political and religious ideology

with one another.

The CRC exists as a logistical extension of the counselling programme and as such

treats participants on a highly individual basis; it recognises that just as individuals become

radicalised for different reasons, their de-radicalisation requires an approach tailored to

accommodate the specific needs of the individual. Whereas domestic offenders and those

either going to fight in or returning from Iraq participate in further dialogue with

counsellors, those who have been detained in Guantanamo Bay are additionally afforded

special instruction on how best to integrate themselves into a Saudi Arabia that may have

undergone some significant change since their incarceration (Horgan & Braddock,

2010:278). Unlike an entirely general approach, the bespoke nature is likely to result in

lower recidivism rates since it concentrates on the individual needs of participants, ensuring

they receive what is specifically required in order to help them assimilate back into society.

The use of tribal and family affiliations is another factor which is crucial in the

committee’s effort to prevent recidivism (Ezzarqui, 2010:28). Boucek (2008b:20) explains

that the process makes use of several important traditional customs such as notions of

honour, recognition of traditional hierarchies and social responsibility. For example, when

prisoners are released temporarily for events such as funerals and weddings, three family

members step forward and guarantee his return in an agreement that stipulates they will

take his place should he fail to do so. As of yet this opportunity has not been used by any

prisoner as a means of escape.

Horgan (2009:31) opines that a factor contributing to disengagement of a group can

be “changing and conflicting personal priorities (e.g. getting married, having children,

growing older)”. Acknowledging this theory, released prisoners are encouraged to settle

down, marry and have children so that they are less likely to engage in their pre-

incarceration practices given their greater obligations and responsibilities; the state

facilitates this process by covering the entire costs of the wedding.

One final method that encourages former offenders to disengage is the high level of

surveillance that the programme operates with released participants. Religious clerics

remain in contact with the graduates and they are also required to check in regularly with

the Security Subcommittee. Maintenance of a social network among tribes and family

members is also crucial to the Advisory Committee’s objective of round-the-clock

surveillance (Ezzarqui, 2010:28); this monitoring acts as a powerful deterrent and greatly

reduces the likelihood that new graduates will re-associate with old extremist connections

(IISS, 2008:2).

Successes & Problems

Successes

When measured in terms of terrorist incidents and recidivism (given the available data)

Saudi Arabia’s program has been overwhelmingly successful in helping prisoners repudiate

extremist ideology. Marisa Porges reported in 2010 that four thousand prisoners had gone

through the programme and reintegrated back into society (Porges, 2010b). A 2010 report

on terrorism published by the U.S State Department advises that Saudi Arabia’s Ministry of

Interior claimed a success rate of ninety percent for participants and eighty percent for

those having returned from Guantanamo Bay (USDS, 2010:104). Included in the ten percent

recidivism rate are both those that have completed the programme and have been

subsequently re-arrested as well as those who have either failed or refused to take part in

the rehabilitation programme. Given the relatively low number of reported re-arrests one is

compelled to deduce that the vast majority of “failures” are those that have not successfully

completed the programme or those that refused to participate from the outset. Indeed, as

the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) (2008:2) have noted, “The Saudi

government acknowledges that the rehabilitation programme has little impact on hard-core

jihadists”, most of whom would rather remain in prison than make compromises with what

they regard as an illegitimate regime. These individuals would rarely ever willingly

participate in such a programme; however, the fact that they are included amongst those

contributing to the ten percent recidivism rate, makes it a particularly impressive statistic

and is indicative of the success that the programme has achieved to date.

The program has implemented numerous methods which are conducive to

disengagement: financial, social and educational incentives, invocation of cultural and

familial customs and the involvement of religious scholars are all factors that foster

behavioural change. It is still too early to definitively evaluate the success of the programme

and it is difficult to deny the difficulty in knowing for sure what actions a graduate may be

involved in when released. It’s progressive nature, however, exemplified by the fact that

“radicalised men who previously rejected any type of visual art as forbidden by Islam” are

actively engaging in activities like art therapy can be considered a success in its own right

(Boucek, 2008b:18). The inclusion of so many disengagement-focused methods and the

tailored nature of the programme points to a promising future. However, whilst Saudi

Arabia’s de-radicalisation programme appears to have a promising future, it is not entirely

absent criticism.

Problems

One major criticism of de-radicalisation programmes generally and one from which Saudi

Arabia’s comprehensive scheme is not exempt goes back to the concepts of and distinction

between de-radicalisation and disengagement. Disengagement occurs more frequently than

de-radicalisation and whilst the Saudi programme employs numerous elements which

facilitate the disengagement process, actual de-radicalisation of extremists is much harder

to achieve, yet alone prove. Wagner (2010) broaches the issue when he notes that part of

the problem of determining the long-run success of a programme is “whether a militant

prisoner recants his destructive ideology”. De-radicalisation programs may be given credit

for a militant’s cessation of violent activity but their decision to retire does not

automatically mean they have de-radicalised.

Stern (2010:2) remarks that the apparent success of Saudi Arabia’s programme may

be the result of the “deterrent quality…of *its+ extensive post-release surveillance”;

participants are less likely to engage in acts of terrorism if they are monitored by their

family and the relevant authorities. Similarly, the financial incentives provided by the

government such as housing provision and monetary payments can have an equivalent

effect; former security offenders may simply relinquish terrorist activity and/or affiliation in

order to receive these benefits and remain on the right side of the law to prevent their

revocation, all the while maintaining their radical beliefs but simply not acting upon them.

However, from a practical standpoint recanting ideology may be considered less important

than behaviour modification; if the programme does not succeed in eradicating espousal of

extreme ideology in the individual, but through various measures and incentives prevents

them from acting on their beliefs and from engaging in further illicit or terroristic behaviour,

then it would be difficult for one to consider it anything less than generally beneficial to

society and an effective approach to countering terrorism.

A ten percent recidivism rate could be considered a staggering accomplishment for

any rehabilitation programme; however, Hamid (2009) deduces from this statistic the

existence of weaknesses in the security apparatus of the program. A valid point is made

since each participant undergoes a lengthy period of intensive follow-up and thus the return

to terrorism of ten percent of released extremists within a few years, whilst not particularly

indicative of programme ineffectiveness, does highlight possible flaws in the post-release

monitoring techniques that are adopted. The relatively high-profile re-arrest of nine of the

program’s graduates in 2009 for re-joining terrorist groups, at least one of whom reached a

leadership position, serves as illustration and calls into question the monitoring measures

employed which failed to prevent their initial relapse from gathering momentum (Worth,

2009).

A number of critics have condemned the incentive driven and rewarding nature of

the programme. For example, Al-Thiyabi (2010 cited in MEMRI, 2010) believes that those

who “undermine the security of *Saudi+ citizens deserve punishment rather than reward and

encouragement”. Whilst the financial support and care afforded to graduates currently

evinces results that suggest it is important to disengagement, it does leave open the door

for resentment from certain sectors of Saudi society, particular those young unemployed

Saudis who are unable to purchase housing for their own families. An approach that

provides former terrorists with free housing, education and other financial rewards has the

nascent capacity to entice disadvantaged young Muslims to engage in low-level terrorist

activity in the hope of a more promising future.

Saudi officials have admitted that whilst hard-core jihadists are not exempt from

participating in rehabilitation, those who have been released through the programme have

been relatively minor offenders (i.e. those possessing extremist propaganda or committing

offences over the internet). Boucek (2008b:22) asserts that whilst evidence suggests some

senior militants have participated in the programme, “…its relative success to date is no

doubt boosted by the involvement of minor offenders”. De-radicalisation programmes

elsewhere, however, encounter the same problem and to date no evidence of substantial

and successful rehabilitation of committed violent jihadis exists; many of these people

cannot and do not wish to be rehabilitated and whilst Saudi’s program has yet to face the

challenging test of being applied to the more committed extremists, the fact that their

participation is encouraged is somewhat promising.

Applicability to other countries

The Saudi approach to de-radicalisation is one which is unique to the political and cultural

context within which it operates; what may be conducive to successful disengagement and

de-radicalisation in one country may not necessarily be so in another. A number of methods

employed by Saudi officials that appear conducive to disengagement and de-radicalisation

within the Kingdom would undoubtedly fail to replicate the results elsewhere. Saudi

Arabia’s wealth has enabled it to construct extensive facilities for the sole purpose of

housing and de-radicalising extremist Islamists and to provide an extensive level of after-

care and provision for graduates. Less developed countries would find it difficult if not

impossible to dedicate the resources needed to replicate such an effort, but can still design

well-structured programmes that draw on some of the methods the Saudi scheme

promotes.

Carpenter, Levitt and Jacobson (2009:315) note the “tremendous pressure” the

programme puts on individuals’ families in order to achieve results. What the programme

utilises successfully in terms of the Saudi context: familial and tribal ties, tradition, and the

significant religious authority and influence wielded by the state and the ulema, could not

be easily replicated in more western states for reasons that may include detainees’ wider

families living outside of the country and state-specific traditions and customs which would

not facilitate such action. The use of independent clerics, financial incentives and extensive

post-release care, however, are methods that western nations can readily employ and even

family responsibility could be invoked on a level to suit the context of the specific country;

these approaches undoubtedly contribute to the success of de-radicalisation programmes

generally.

Conclusion

Saudi Arabia’s approach to de-radicalisation is showing much promise. It is the most

advanced and potentially most effective programme of its kind in existence today. Whilst it

is at present too early to determine with absolute certainty just how successful its de-

radicalisation efforts are, current assessments of recidivism rates are promising.

Furthermore its progressive nature and the innovative techniques employed in order to

induce disengagement, coupled with the willingness and determination of the Saudi state to

dedicate considerable amounts of money to ensure its progress all indicate that its

existence will continue to have a positive effect on countering Islamic extremism both

within and beyond its borders. It employs an extensive range of factors that facilitate the

disengagement process and which have the potential to de-radicalise. Whilst many of its

graduates may simply have disengaged from violence and extremism, and not be truly

repentant or de-radicalised, the programme has proven that it has the ability at a minimum

to prevent further radicalisation and put an end to extremist behaviour. If the state did not

step in to address this problem, then the opportunity to do so would remain open for others

with a far more sinister agenda. Although all of the methods used by Saudi’s de-

radicalisation programme are not replicable throughout the world, it does employ a number

of well-designed strategies that can be adopted and adapted to suit the context of other

states. Having independent religious clerics to re-educate those espousing extreme

ideology, encouraging the social reintegration of participants and aiding offenders to build

stable bonds with their spouse, family and within their community are among steps it has

taken which represent methods that effectively disengage are doubtless conducive to the

success of terrorist rehabilitation programmes.

De-radicalisation in Malaysia

The Programme in Context

Whilst terrorist attacks on Malysia’s home soil have been few and far between, it is the

country where Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), a South East Asian militant group with al-Qaeda links,

was first formed (BBC News, 2012). Given that JI purportedly seeks to install its vision of an

Islamic state encompassing the countries of the South East Asian region and that a number

of its members have been arrested in Malaysia, Malaysia has a strong incentive to promote

the disengagement of Islamist extremists. El-Said (2012:25) noted that Malaysia had not

experienced a major terrorist incident in the last twenty years but that it does have a long

history of terrorist insurgency involving a Communist insurrection waged by an ideologically-

driven group from 1948 to 1949. In response the state undertook initiatives such as the

revision of its Internal Security Act in 1960, to allow authorities extra-judicial powers to

detain potential security offenders for sixty days without trial and the ability to issue

indefinitely renewable two-year detention orders to those detainees it decided not to

release. It also implemented a de-radicalisation programme which attempted to reshape

the communist disposition of captured terrorists through counselling and offering support

to their families in order to alleviate their perceived sense of societal marginalisation

(Abuza, 2009:206). Malaysia has built on what it learned from this experience in its efforts

to de-radicalise individuals from Islamic militant groups such as JI.

Analysis of the Programme

Organisation and Process

The de-radicalisation programme which prisoners are subjected to has a number of similar

components to Saudi Arabia’s. It seeks to offer alternatives to the misguided ideology

espoused by detainees in an effort designed to ensure they come to an understanding that

their activities ran contrary to Islam. It also seeks to instil an appreciation of the

responsibilities individuals have regarding their religion and their loyalty to the nation

(Harrigan, 2012). Since the programme focuses on a large number of JI offenders it

addresses a number of issues specific to this group, such as their desire to establish an

Islamic state. Officials stress that the government already considers it as such and that

sharia is slowly becoming parallel to its secular legal system; by focusing on the rate of

implementation of sharia law they explain to detainees that their views on this matter only

diverge with the state in the sense that they want it to be implemented more quickly but

that ultimately they both share the same goal (Abuza, 2009:207).

Padil (2009:35) explains that the approach toward the programme is divided into

four components. Firstly, daily religious classes that provide Islamic studies are offered to all

within the main detention camp. Secondly, a Special Rehabilitation Programme focuses on

those who have responded positively towards the initial phase by showing a willingness to

renounce their militant struggle and consists of an intensive course, built around discussion

and debate with Islamic clerics. The groups are kept small at around five to seven inmates,

so that each has ample opportunity to engage personally in dialogue with the religious

scholars. Thirdly, Malaysian officials employ an Evaluating and Monitoring programme, run

by the police who conduct continuous checks in order to assess whether the programme is

being conducted correctly. The Department of Islamic Development (JAKIM) also undertakes

some responsibility in this area, engaging in bi-annual evaluations of participants that have

been released through the program, through personal visits to their homes. Finally, the

overarching programme, seeks to involve the wives of detainees through a subsidiary

channel which allows them to discuss issues regarding the incarceration of their husbands

with programme officials and the religious clerics that seek to rehabilitate them.

Rabasa et al (2010:105) assert that the government also grants financial assistance

to the families of the detainees so that they are not reliant on the welfare network of JI; a

method similarly employed within the Saudi programme in order to ensure that al-Qaeda

members do not support relatives of prisoners and thereby invoke a sense of obligation to

the terrorist organisation, a factor which can lead to recidivism. They also provide released

militants with a basic salary in order to ease their transition and allow them to start new

(violence free) lives. In an interview Bendeich and Kalbag (2005), Malaysia’s deputy Prime

Minister, Najib Razak commented on another crucial element of the de-radicalisation

programme, that of its monitoring and surveillance following a detainee’s release, stating

that those released are no longer deemed as much of a threat to national security since

“they are being watched, very carefully”. Abdullah (2011) stated that as of September, 2011

seventy five former members of terrorist groups like JI had passed through the programme

and that, owing to its effective use of disengagement methods the government claimed that

“none of the former detainees have returned to terrorist activities so far”. One example

which he cites in illustration of the programme’s success was the release of Wan Min Wan

Mat, a militant once branded JI’s Malaysian “treasurer” and a key component of its funding

network.

Methods Conducive to Success?

Malaysia has applied a number of methods that have been seen to effectively disengage

terrorists in Saudi Arabia’s programme. Its individual nature, focusing on the aims of groups

such as JI, of which many of the detainees are members, ensures a personal approach to

addressing the specific concerns they may have; as Horgan & Braddock (2010:278) imply,

focusing on the specific concerns and requirements of the individual is key to preventing

recidivism. In this respect Malaysia appears to be checking all the right boxes; religious re-

education is delivered on a one-to-one basis, where necessary, and psychologists are

brought in to discuss individual problems.

The post-release methods it employs as a deterrent to recidivism appear to be

relatively stringent; released inmates can expect to be visited by parole officers and face

restrictions such as curfews and limits on travel and who they can contact (USDS, 2013). This

tight supervision provides less opportunity and minimises the incentive for detainees to

resume extremist behaviour.

Post-release care of detainees can prove essential in the disengagement of

extremists and is among methods which the Malaysian government is keen to employ. Their

provision of jobs, if necessary, assistance to help participants start up a small businesses,

and continued counselling all help to facilitate societal reintegration. As of January, 2012 El

Said (2012:28), observes that of the 154 radicals detained under the ISA, all but six were

released, having been deemed to have successfully completed the programme, and none

had re-offended.

Problems

Although Malaysia’s government reports a high level of success with its programme, and

accordingly a very low recidivism rate, it is difficult to corroborate such assertions given that

its government is reluctant to allow independent journalists to speak to the graduates of its

programme. Rabasa et al (2010:106) explain that one ex-militant remarked that discussing

the programme would violate the terms of his release.

This governmental reluctance is likely an attempt to conceal from the wider public, a

coercive element employed within the de-radicalisation programme. Bon, Ikhwan and Maria

(2005) provide information on the tough treatment of ISA detainees and of numerous

reports that have been lodged against prison officials alluding to punishments such as

beatings and extended periods of solitary-confinement. Some detainees released under the

programme have also stated off record that they and their families have been threatened

with severe punishment should they decide to re-engage in militant activity following their

release (Abuza, 2009:208). There is little doubt that Malaysia’s de-radicalisation programme

attempts to disengage extremists, at least in part, through the utilisation of coercive power

as a deterrent. Whilst the fear for themselves and their family that this method can instil in

individuals doubtless contributes to the programme’s reportedly low recidivism rates, it is

not conducive to de-radicalisation as such. It will not convince offenders of the error of their

ways or to renounce their ideology and might even serve to strengthen their misguided

beliefs, nor is it applicable to states that ensure they enforce human rights legislation;

however, despite this it can be seen be conducive to the process of disengagement.

Malaysia uses religious clerics as a means to re-educate extremists and explain the

true teachings of the Quran. Whilst the process of dialogue forms the basis of successful

programmes, the fact that the clerics used within Malaysia’s programme work for the state

can be considered a drawback. Independent religious scholars, like those used in Saudi

Arabia often have more credibility with radicals, some of whom will never accept the

authority of state officials in matters of religion.

Conclusion

Malaysian officials report a high level of success with its de-radicalisation programme with

very few released detainees returning to terrorism. The programme utilises a number of

methods that can that are known to facilitate disengagement such as religious re-education,

financial assistance to both detainees and their families, post-release surveillance and

support and controversially the threat of physical punishment. The reported success of the

programme, however, is largely based on internal evaluations, decreasing the scope for any

negative aspects to become public. Similarly, the reluctance of officials to allow outside

access to report on the mechanics of the programme means that assessments of the exact

level of after-care and assistance provided to former prisoners is limited. There is little

doubt that coercion plays a central role in its de-radicalisation efforts which, moral

arguments aside, can prove conducive to disengagement. Given this coercive nature,

Malaysia’s programme appears less concerned with de-radicalisation than with

disengagement; however, when the success of de-radicalisation programmes is based

ultimately on how effectively they prevent former offenders reengaging in terrorism it can

be seen to operate a number of effective methods, albeit the more coercive of which are

only able to be applied given the context of its legal structure.

De-radicalisation in Yemen

The Programme in Context

Yemen has had a long standing problem with terrorism; it stems from the end of the 1979

Afghan war and the significant number of radicalised and highly-trained mujahideen who

returned to the country (Balachandran, 2012). In the 1994 civil war, the Yemeni government

successfully recruited these fighters to assist with the quelling of southern secessionists; the

mujahideen agreed to the undertaking, believing that their efforts would result in the

establishment of an Islamic state. The cessation of the fighting, however, did not yield such

an outcome and their relationship with the government disintegrated. Rotberg (2005:15)

remarks that their experiences in Afghanistan combined with this frustration made them

particularly susceptible to terrorist propaganda and resulted in eight nine terrorist incidents

perpetrated by Islamists in the country between 1980 and 2000. The attack on the USS Cole

in 2000 was the most well-known of a number of attacks that targeted U.S interests and

increased in intensity until 2002. Yemen’s President Saleh was widely criticized for failing to

prevent this string of atrocities and it soon became clear that new methods were required in

order to suppress al-Qaeda and other violent Islamist groups within the borders of Yemen.

To this end, and presumably encouraged by the general consensus that the U.S would take

matters into its own hands if Saleh failed to act, a new initiative titled the Religious Dialogue

Committee (RDC) was born.

Analysis of the Programme

Organisation and Process

The committee was established in August 2002, with Hamoud al-Hitar, a widely-respected

judge, appointed as its head. Al-Hitar, together with a handful of religious scholars

constituted the nucleus of what, at the time, was considered a pioneering enterprise and a

unique approach to counter-terrorism. Much like Saudi Arabia’s, the programme was

grounded in a religious dialogue that attempted to change the ideological beliefs of

prisoners and release them into society following their renunciation of violence (Porges,

2010c:28).

Al-Hitar’s policy of engaging incarcerated militants in discussion designed to expose

their misinterpretations of Islamic doctrine was based on the concept of “mutual respect”

(Johnson, 2009:15). Rather than seeking to force the correct version of Islam upon

radicalised individuals in one-sided communication, the scholars afforded participants the

opportunity to attempt to convince them of their own beliefs; these in turn were refuted

through the presentation of supporting evidence. In an interview with National Public Radio,

Judge al-Hitar (2005) effectively encapsulates the premise of his endeavour, stating; “We

tell them, if you are right we will follow you, but if what we are saying is right, you have to

admit it and follow us”. Al-Hitar himself opted to lead the first round of dialogue with some

of the most extremist prisoners, encouraged by the view that if he could make tangible

progress with them then the less extreme would constitute a far easier undertaking.

Boucek, Beg and Horgan (2009:185-187) comment that al-Hitar provided the detainees with

the opportunity to amend or add to the proposed agenda and structure of the dialogue

process before any substantive matters were discussed. It was then mutually decided in the

first meeting with detainees that the Sunnah and Qur’an would form the basis of the

dialogue, and the Hadith would likewise provide an essential foundation, given that the

Prophet himself favoured dialogue (even with his enemies) wherever possible. This sense of

inclusivity that the approach engendered served to enhance the programme’s credibility

both in the eyes of outside observers and in those of its participants.

The meetings between prisoners and officials were small and intimate - around five

per session and concluded with prisoners documenting and signing off on what they had

discussed and learned; a process which was repeated each time the scholars broached a

new topic (Horgan & Braddock, 2010:275). The first issue discussed during the pilot dialogue

session was the nature of the Yemeni state; the prisoners argued that it was not Islamic

which, coupled with their perception of the government as pro-Western led them to believe

that it was fundamentally inimical to the Muslim population’s interests. In response al-Hitar

produced copies of the constitution for the inmates to examine and explained that the laws

contradict neither the Sunnah nor Qur’an but that if they were able to effectively

demonstrate they were at odds with sharia then the government would be prepared to

amend its laws (Boucek, Beg & Horgan, 2009:187). After detailed examination of the

documents the detainees were unable to find anything that contradicted Sharia.

Other issues discussed included the legitimacy of the regime and President Saleh’s

rule, and the rules governing the killing of ‘non-believers’. Emphasis was placed upon the

illegitimacy of violence due to the many verses of the Koran advocating that non-Muslims

be treated with respect. The detainees argued that such actions were allowed since they

were kufr (infidels); al-Hitar rebuked this misconception explaining that the Qu’ran states

such killing can only be justified with rightful reasons, related to circumstances of

oppression or war. This explanation was buttressed with the observation that historically,

Muslim armies refrained from killing Christian priests, women and children and by drawing

attention to the Quranic quote: “Whoever kills a soul, unless for a soul or for corruption

done in the land - it is as if he had slain all mankind entirely. And, whoever saves one; it is as

if he had saved mankind entirely” (Johnson, 2009). During the dialogue process, it was

found that many of the detainees had memorised certain chapters of the Qu’ran, which

when taken alone appear to advocate the violent acts which they viewed as permissible.

Quoting verses from the Qu’ran isolated from the context of passages, a misguided

endeavour at which Muslim extremists appear to have become particularly adept, was one

which from which detainees were increasingly convinced to abstain as religious scholars

provided the contextual background for which those versus came to be.

The conditions for release of the inmates were, in some respects, similar to those

adopted by Saudi officials; before release, participants were required to sign a document

testifying to the renunciation of former beliefs and family and tribal members had to vouch

for them, such that they were, responsible for their future behaviour (Boucek, Beg &

Horgan, 2009:189). A process of monitoring was also implemented upon detainees’ release

from custody, typically for a one year probationary period and enforced by the security

agencies; al-Hitar (2005) remarked that some were given jobs within the military so that

their movements could be more closely monitored.

Methods Conducive to Success?

A number of parallels can be drawn between Yemen’s RDC and Saudi Arabia’s programme,

not only in the goals they set out to achieve but in the methods they adopted in their efforts

to do so.

One of the most basic but pivotal methods required to disengage extremists, seen in

the Yemeni programme, was the religious debate which convinced a number of participants

that their ideologies were unjust.

Tribal and family affiliations are utilised in the disengagement effort under the same

premise as the Saudi Programme; that participants are less likely to revert to their terrorist

ways if this kind of obligation and responsibility to loved ones is invoked. El-Said (2012:42)

observes that the Yemeni government sought to involve the families of detained individuals

throughout the process; as part of selective inducements they were encouraged to visit

their incarcerated relatives as often as possible. In addition to demonstrating that the

authorities were treating the detainees well, this afforded family members the opportunity

to exert social and tribal pressures on the inmates to moderate their views and repent.

Whilst Yemen’s resources do not enable it to employ post-release incentives on the

scale of Saudi Arabia’s programme, some effort was made to prevent recidivism through

such methods. Released participants received up to YR 20000 in order to assist with the re-

building of their lives after imprisonment; some also received cheap government loans to

establish private businesses, which many used to purchase vehicles and become taxi drivers

(El-Said, 2012:42-43). The state also facilitated the cost of marriages, in part and provided

assistance in-kind by donating essential day-to-day items.

Central to the Yemeni approach was re-education; al-Hitar recognised the necessity

of exposing offenders’ misinterpretations of Islamic doctrine to disengagement efforts.

Whilst the Yemeni state may not wield the same level of religious authority as its Saudi

counterpart, undoubtedly the most effective way to disengage an individual from extremist

activity is to achieve de-radicalisation, by convincing him that his beliefs and methods are

unjust and run contrary to Islam, through a process of dialogue with imminent clerics who

have the experience and education to debate Islamic issues (McGregor, 2007).

Successes & Problems

Successes

Yemen’s RDC was principally designed to get offenders to refrain from committing violent

acts within Yemen, and achieving their recognition of the Islamic legitimacy and sovereignty

of the Yemeni government (Boucek, Beg & Horgan, 2009:189). On these issues it achieved

relative success; Yemen, a state once synonymous with violent Islamic extremism witnessed

no terrorist attacks within its borders between the end of the first dialogues in 2002 and

2005.

Initial reports of the RDC appeared promising. Taarnby (2005) implies that the ability

of the clerics to engage extremists in debate over interpretation of the Qu’ran constituted a

success in its own right. The fact that detainees were “unable to present a convincing

concept of jihad based on the authoritative sources” meant that over time it was proven

and accepted that the legitimacy of jihad as outlined by terrorist groups was based on false

reasoning, a significant accomplishment given the once uncompromising view of most of

the detainees. By late 2005 al-Hitar claimed that around 360 suspected militants had been

released through the programme and in an interview with Abdul-Aziz Oudah, claimed that

“those influenced by al-Qaeda were persuaded at a 98 percent rate” (Horgan & Braddock,

2010:276).

Yemen was one of the first Muslim states to consider and actively participate in

dialogue with militants as a central component to a wider counter-terrorism strategy. This

innovative counter-ideological approach to Islamist extremism cannot be underestimated;

the influence of the Yemeni initiative set a new precedent in soft approaches to terrorism

and its efforts can be felt in numerous other countries where attempts to critically engage

detained extremists in ideological debate are becoming standard practice. However, the

programme’s early perceived successes were overshadowed by the recapture of numerous

participants engaging in terrorism within Iraq; the tidal wave of criticism that washed over

al-Hitar and his methods, coupled with further emerging evidence of recidivism from

outside intelligence services subsequently led to the termination of the program by 2006.

Problems

Rabasa, et al. (2010:52) note that there is an absence of reliable data on the Yemeni RDC

which serves to complicate assessments and evaluations; this difficulty is exacerbated by

the government’s unwillingness to facilitate research into or publish statistics on the

programme. Most claims to success were the biased assertions of al-Hitar himself; Yemen’s

president Saleh, however, acknowledged that the programme was only effective in changing

participants’ behaviour or ideology about sixty percent of the time (Peraino, 2009:22); on

this basis the programme was relatively unsuccessful.

It has been charged that the regime was more concerned with political expediency

than actual ideological engagement due to the pressure it was under to prove to the U.S

that it was a reliable ally in its fight against terrorism (Boucek, Beg & Horgan, 2009:189).

Whewell (2005) believes that as a result the dialogue sessions were short and aimed at

securing the offenders’ acquiescence, rather than the robust and engaging meetings

described by officials involved in the process. Reflecting this opinion, Porges (2010:28)

noted that one detainee and former member of al-Qaeda portrayed the scheme as simply

“consisting of short meetings during which prisoners were encouraged to sign a form

pledging obedience to President Saleh as a precondition for release”. Nasser al-Bahri (2005,

cited in Whewell, 2005), a graduate of the programme, provided his assessment, stating

that: “The Yemeni Mujahideen in prison know Hitar is the way for them to get released, so

they ingratiate themselves with him”, and admitting that the programme did not change his

basic views or diminish his support for al-Qaeda. These accounts appear to indicate a

disconnection between how al-Hitar portrayed the committee publically and what it

consisted of in reality. It appears that many militants merely told al-Hitar what he wanted to

hear in order to be released from prison. Furthermore, the aforementioned pledge did not

prohibit acts of terrorism outside of the Yemeni state, thus resembling more of a bargain

that implied terrorists would be left alone if they exempted Yemen from their violent jihad.

It seems that al-Hitar’s primary concern was with preventing attacks within Yemen and as a

result many of the graduates simply left the state upon release and returned to terrorist

activity in Iraq and other jihadi hotspots (Speckhard, 2012:7).

Whilst the Yemeni government provided post-release care in part, it was at a level

insufficient to effectively induce the disengagement of participants from acts of terrorism.

Porges (2010:28), observes that the programme only guaranteed post-release support to a

minority of detainees and most of those who received financial aid had spent it within a

short period of time. This was the result of governmental failure, opting to hand out

relatively small lump sums rather than ensuring consistent monthly stipends and providing

adequate job provision. When detainees failed to secure employment many re-joined al-

Qaeda since it pays its cadre (El-Said, 2012:44). The fact that many detainees were able to

successfully return to terrorist groups also highlights the inadequacy of the surveillance

efforts, which due to lacking resources were only implemented for up to one year; a

comparison with the level of surveillance employed by Saudi Arabia’s programme

demonstrates the importance deterrence plays as a factor in disengaging extremists. The

contrast between the results observed in the Saudi program and those observed in Yemen

indicate the importance of sufficient funding to the success of de-radicalisation

programmes; the limited funds available to the Yemeni government, stretched further by

renewed rebellions and secessionist movements, resulted in an ill-financed de-radicalisation

program that was unable to fully utilise financial and employment incentives, marriage

facilitation and post-release monitoring as methods which can facilitate permanent

disengagement.

Conclusion

El-Said (2012:43) perfectly encapsulated the impact of Yemen’s RDC on de-radicalising

extremists when he remarked that it is “difficult to speak of a professional, comprehensive,

and financially-sustainable counselling and rehabilitation program in Yemen”. Its

ineffectiveness lay in the government’s inability to implement a robust programme with a

structure to effectively address the different reasons why individuals commit to extremism;

rather, it allowed participants to go through the motions of ‘de-radicalisation’ by signing a

sheet of paper and being granted their release with little required from them afterwards to

prove their disengagement (Seifert, 2010:23). The RDC focused solely on refuting ideology

but was unable to provide sufficient post-release care or support to detainees in order to

effectively reintegrate them into society; a necessity if recidivism is to be kept to a

minimum. Yemen was, however, a pioneer in using the process of dialogue to counter-

extremism; this has allowed a number of other states to build on their approach and

implement similar elements within their own de-radicalisation programmes. Largely the RDC

was the work of one man and was never institutionalised; successful de-radicalisation

programmes require the full support of a wider government apparatus to ensure sufficient

development and the dedication of adequate resources and personnel. Essentially, Yemen’s

initiative had a number of the key methods required for success, including re-education,

(basic) financial aid and post-release monitoring techniques, however, it utilised them

neither fully nor effectively.

Final Analysis

Findings

Through an analysis of de-radicalisation programmes in Saudi Arabia, Malaysia and Yemen,

this dissertation sought to discern methods which have been most successfully able to

disengage Islamist extremists from terrorist behaviour. In the process it has compared and

contrasted the techniques employed within each of the programmes and accounted for

their reported successes and failures, as well as commented on the general applicability of

their methods to other states. Although an analysis of programmes in three states is by no

means an exhaustive study it does enable one to observe practices that appear to be having

success and thus to draw conclusions about the methods which are most likely to facilitate

disengagement, and the most effective ways to implement them. The ICSR (2010:47) believe

that the success and results of de-radicalisation programmes cannot be compared across

the board; each is dependent on local context and political and economic conditions. Whilst

this is true, key elements that appear to underlie the success of programmes can, however,

be identified which, when applied to fit country specific contexts, can be seen to effectively

disengage Islamist extremists, irrespective of the state in which they are employed. This

dissertation sought to answer the question: what are the most effective methods de-

radicalisation programmes can employ to disengage Islamists from terrorist behaviour?

These were ultimately determined by the reported successes of the programmes; it is thus

proposed that the most effective methods and hence those which are likely to contribute to

the success of prison-centred de-radicalisation programmes generally are:

1. Employing independent clerics

- Religious re-education constitutes the foundation of de-radicalisation programmes. All

three programmes employ clerics that have the knowledge and experience to counter

the misguided ideology of detainees and engage them in dialogue designed to address

their Qu’ranic misinterpretations. Saudi Arabia has shown that the independence of

clerics from the state is important since extremists are more likely to recognise their

authority, a shrewd observation from which the Malaysian state could benefit in the

further development of its programme. Re-education as a method is pivotal to the de-

radicalisation of Islamists; the most effective way to guarantee that militants will not re-

engage in violent activity is to convince them to renounce their violent ideology, since

without it and enlightened by the true teachings of Islam they come to understand that

their previously advocated action runs contrary to this faith. However, some committed

ideologues may never give up their beliefs but, as Porges (2010) points out, “might

change their behaviour”. Acknowledging this, more successful programmes, like that in

Saudi Arabia, have recognised the need to combine religious dialogue with behaviour-

focused components that attempt to facilitate reintegration, such as provision for

education and employment.

2. Extensive post-release care and financial incentives

- When an individual joins an extremist group, he can also become reliant upon them to

provide for basic needs (Rabasa et al, 2010). Thus to ensure that a relapse back into a

terrorist network does not occur, steps to ensure reformed extremists are able to

provide for themselves are needed. These will necessarily take the form of state

assistance with finding employment and financial help whilst the process is on-going. A

comparison between Saudi Arabia and Yemen indicates that the most effective method

by which to approach this is through monthly stipends so as to prevent, as in the case of

the latter, funds being spent quickly and participants returning to terrorist groups for

financial reasons.

- Saudi Arabia has recognised that release from prison can be a difficult process; some

detainees may not have homes to go back to. Its rehabilitation centre thus affords them

a transitional step on the way to full reintegration. Housing provision, likewise affords

those released the opportunity to build a new life away from terrorist affiliation.

Although many countries would be unable to develop a system as costly and advanced

as the Saudi case, basic half-way houses that operate on the same premise and some

form of housing provision could achieve the same desired effect.

3. Post-release surveillance and deterrence measures

- A comparison of the surveillance measures adopted by the programmes in Saudi Arabia,

Malaysia and Yemen highlights its effectiveness as a deterrent to participant

reengagement. The failure of Yemeni authorities to adequately monitor its

programme’s graduates led to high recidivism rates, whereas Saudi Arabia and Malaysia

both implement round-the-clock surveillance and stringent post-release conditions,

requiring ex-detainees to check in with local authorities. With the knowledge that they

are being watched, the vast majority have been reported to avoid former affiliations in

fear of state-reprisal by means of punitive measures and revoked assistance.

- Coercive methods, including the threat of violent state reprisal are unlikely to assist

with effective de-radicalisation nor are such methods ever likely to be utilised in states

that enforce adequate human rights legislation. Malaysia has shown, however, that the

threat of harsh, physical punishment can have a powerful deterrence effect.

4. Efforts to foster family commitments and Family inclusion

- Fink and Hearne (2008:10) note that familial obligations can be “the driving force

behind disengagement from violent activism”. The moderating influence of spouses and

children are integral elements of disengagement; obligations to a family have been

primary reasons for extremists to pursue a non-violent lifestyle. Saudi Arabia has drawn

effectively on the influence family commitments can have, through its methods that

facilitate and fund marriages and encourage family building. This is doubtless a costly

procedure but one which appears to be a considerably effective method by which to

disengage extremists.

- Similarly both the Malaysian and Saudi programmes aim to keep the spouses of

detainees involved in their work. This can mitigate their concerns with regards the

detention of their partner and encourage them to assist in the de-radicalisation process.

5. Tailored approach

- The previous methods are at their most effective when they are tailored to the specific

situation. This involves, at the very least, individual attention for detainees so that any

unique concerns or questions can be addressed (Porges, 2011). Malaysia’s programme

draws on this element when officials seek to ameliorate the concerns of JI members

over state Sharia law. In a similar vein, Saudi Arabia’s programme targets the specific

needs of extremists returning from Guantanamo Bay so that they can more easily

reintegrate and are thus less likely to reoffend.

- States throughout the world are able to adopt this principle and design their de-

radicalisation programmes to suit their own cultural context and to address detainees

on an individual basis.

Conclusion

Despite their misleading name, de-radicalisation programmes (although they do seek to

truly ‘de-radicalise’), appear to be focused more on disengaging Islamist extremists from

terrorist behaviour. Whilst religious re-education is the foundation for all three

programmes; an approach based upon the presumption that extremist behaviour emanates

from misguided ideology and misinterpretation of key Islamic texts, they combine this with

a number of behaviour-focused methods. This undoubtedly constitutes recognition that

despite the fact that most hardened ideologues will never recant their violent outlook, they

can be incentivised and convinced to desist from violent action and withdraw from terrorist

organisations through numerous other methods. This is a necessary and practical approach

that needs to be considered in the development of the future programmes of other states,

for, one designed solely to refute militant ideology without other incentive and deterrence

based initiatives will only achieve disengagement in the relatively few who become

genuinely de-radicalised through the process of re-education through religious teachings.

Saudi Arabia’s programme represents the most robust and comprehensive effort to

rehabilitate extremists to date; it employs a number of well implemented methods that

have been seen to effectively disengage terrorists and incorporates them within a structure

tailored to the specific needs of individual participants. Although specific conditions unique

to the Kingdom, such as its vast resources and cultural hierarchies are conducive to its

success, the methods it employs (and those identified by this dissertation as ‘most

effective’) can be easily assimilated into the cultural and political and legal structures of

other states. However, as Yemen has shown, such methods will only be effective if the state

implements them correctly, within an institutionalised and robust programme framework.

More coercive elements, like those employed in the Malaysian programme have attracted

much criticism; however, whilst they are unlikely to facilitate de-radicalisation, they have

proven effective in disengaging extremists. Despite their apparent effectiveness in this

respect though, they could only realistically be employed in states that are relatively

unconcerned with enforcing sufficient human rights legislation and thus are relatively

inapplicable as effective general methods for de-radicalisation programmes.

De-radicalisation programmes do not represent an alternative to traditional counter-

terrorism efforts, but they are a necessary accompaniment. States that fully recognise the

ubiquitous threat of Islamic extremism in modern society should take heed of the reported

successes that countries like Saudi Arabia have achieved in successfully repudiating

extremist ideology and disengaging militants from terrorist behaviour. The methods

identified in this dissertation are those which appear to most effectively assist with this

process and accordingly should be considered as crucial components in the future

development of prison-centred de-radicalisation programmes.

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