relations between neighbouring states in north-east africa

Relations between Neighbouring States in North-East AfricaAuthor(s): Peter WoodwardSource: The Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Jun., 1984), pp. 273-285Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/160552 .

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The Journal of Modern African Studies, 22, 2 (I984), pp. 273-285

Relations Between Neighbouring States in North-East Africa

by PETER WOODWARD*

I N recent years there has been a resurgence of interest in international

politics in Africa. After the initial post-independence discussion of

pan-Africanism the international dimension seemed overshadowed by the concern to account for domestic developments in many new states, and it is this imbalance which is now being redressed. Indeed, it has

recently been argued by Robert Jackson and Carl Rosberg that, contrary to the situation elsewhere, Africa's international politics have assumed an order which is sadly lacking in the domestic affairs of many states: 'At the level of international society, a framework of rules and conventions governing the relations of the states in the region has been bounded and sustained for almost two decades.'1 If the contrast between internal anarchy and international order seems somewhat exaggerated, the distinction between domestic and foreign politics appears both conventional and appropriate.

Yet there are problems in making such an analysis, because as

Christopher Clapham has commented with respect to developing countries in general, 'for many purposes systemic boundaries between internal and external environments simply do not exist'.2 A second

difficulty is that the recent literature on foreign policy-making in the continent has focused more on relations with external governments, especially the former colonial nations and the super-powers, rather than between the African states themselves. Much of this recent discussion relates to such concepts as 'dependency' and 'core-periphery relations', often placed within the context of the world political economy.3 At the

* Lecturer in Politics, University of Reading. The author wishes to thank the British Council for the travel grant that enabled him to present the original version of this article to the Conference on the Nile Valley in 1982, designed to mark the 25th Anniversary of the University of Khartoum.

1 Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, 'Why Africa's Weak States Persist: the empirical and the juridical in statehood', in World Politics (Princeton), xxxv, I, October 1982, pp. 23-4.

2 Christopher Clapham, 'Comparative Foreign Policy and Developing States', in Clapham (ed.), Foreign Policy Making in Developing States: a comparative approach (Farnborough, 1977), p. I70.

3 Early discussion of African foreign policy-making did refer to international relations in Africa, but generally in regard to pan-Africanism and neutralism rather than between neighbouring states: for example, Ali A. Mazrui, Towards a Pax Africana: a study of ideology and ambition (London, 1967); Vernon McKay (ed.), African Diplomacy: studies in the determinants offoreign policy (New York, 1966); Doudou Thiam, Foreign Policy of African States (New York, 1965); and Dennis Austin, Inter-State Relations in Africa (Freiburg, 1965).

However, by the late I970s the emphasis was heavily on external relations: for example,



PETER WOODWARD

same time, in the analysis ofinternational strategies, military involvement in Africa takes on increasing importance as the extent of the bi-polar world appears to spread. Relations between neighbouring states have tended to be discussed only in terms of particular regions - in North-East Africa these have most frequently been the Horn of Africa, East Africa, and the Nile Valley.1 This is understandable, not only because of the different character of the countries involved in these three regions, but because of the specific character of their relationships within each.

However, there are two reasons for looking more generally at the situation between neighbouring states in North-East Africa. The first is the realisation that they have developed an expanding relationship - in other words, that affairs in the three regions mentioned are impinging on each other to a greater extent, reflecting not only broader horizons, such as Libyan involvement in far-away Uganda, but the strategic significance of North-East Africa in relation to the oil-producing Gulf

states, and the growth of direct super-power interventions. The second reason is more general in character. It is possible to point empirically to a number of broad themes or dimensions, and the attempt to identify and discuss these may contribute to a wider understanding of the

significance and character of neighbouring relationships in Africa as a whole.

BORDERS

It is commonplace both to refer to the borders of states in Africa as

artificial, and to account for their post-independence survival as

preferable to the endless problems which would be opened up once they were to be questioned.2 Hence the Organisation of African Unity's support for the principle of the maintenance of frontiers and its reluctance to back secessionist movements, however real their sense of

Ali A. Mazrui, Africa's International Relations: the diplomacy of dependency and change (London, I977);

Olajide Aluko, 'The Determinants of the Foreign Policies of African States', in Aluko (ed.), The Foreign Policies of African States (London, I977); and Christopher Clapham, 'Sub-Saharan Africa', in Clapham (ed.), op. cit.

1 Colin Legum and Bill Lee, Conflict in the Horn of Africa (New York, I977), and The Horn of Africa in Continuing Crisis (New York and London, I979); TomJ. Farer, War Clouds on the Horn

of Africa: the widening storm (New York, 1979); Colin Leys and Peter Robson (eds.), Federation in East Africa (London, I965); Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Pan-Africanism and East African Integration (Cambridge, Mass., I966); Ali A. Mazrui, 'The Valley of Violence', in Soldiers and Kinsmen in Uganda: the making of a military ethnocracy (Beverly Hills and London, 1975); and John Obert Voll,

'Unity of the Nile Valley: identity and regional integration', in Journal of African Studies (Berkeley), 3, 2, Summer i976, pp. 205-28.

2 For a fuller discussion of borders, see Carl-Gosta Widstrand (ed.), African Boundary Problems (Uppsala, I969), and Antony Allott, 'The Changing Legal Status of Boundaries in Africa: a diachronic view', in Kenneth Ingham (ed.), Foreign Relations of African States (London, 1974).

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RELATIONS BETWEEN NEIGHBOURING STATES

grievance. But this does not mean that sympathy is always lacking for those who would seek to question borders, especially if sentiment arouses

support for irredentists in neighbouring states. In the dispute over Eritrea, the indigenous factions have for a variety of reasons won some

sympathy in Northern Sudan, both with the regime and people; while in Uganda there has been similar encouragement for the Southern Sudanese. Sentiment may go as far as covert assistance, but rarely further, although this alone can be a source of friction between close

neighbours and may be developed into more serious commitment. However, by far the most grave border disputes in North-East Africa

have lain at the centre of conflict in the Horn where, it was alleged, could be found the ultimate irony in boundary-drawing in Africa. The one area in the continent under colonial rule in which there was thought to be sufficient ethnic and cultural homogeneity to constitute a nation, Somaliland, found that with de-colonisation large areas ofSomali-grazed territory were recognised as parts of Ethiopia and Kenya. The reaction of both governments was to resist the irredentist activities of Somali clansmen within their territories, as well as the claims, advanced with

varying degrees of intensity, by the regime in Mogadishu. Jomo Kenyatta argued simply that those who did not wish to be Kenyans could leave; while Haile Selassie's rejection was based initially on the multi-ethnic character of his empire, and after the revolution on a Marxist-Leninist (or perhaps Stalinist) response to the 'nationalities question'. The importance of the animosity was fully revealed by the scale and fury of the 1977-8 Ethiopia-Somali war, the most mobile and

technologically sophisticated of the numerous conflicts to have taken

place in Africa since World War II. At the same time, Ethiopia and

Kenya, often alleged to be virtual clients of the rival super-powers, once more revealed their capacity for co-operation in the face of a common enemy.

The Somali claim is often seen as standing alone amongst conflicts in Africa, yet borders elsewhere in the North East have also played a

part in generating tensions between neighbouring states, and sometimes war. President Hissene Habre of Chad continues to claim the Aouzou strip, which Libya had effectively annexed long before the present division of that unhappy country. President Idi Amin of Uganda had several times reiterated extravagant claims to territory held by his neighbours which had not endeared them to him, and in 1978, for somewhat obscure reasons, a section of his ramshackle army had occupied a piece of land in the extreme north-west of Tanzania. Possibly this action was not only provocative in itself, but also the last straw for

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PETER WOODWARD

his neighbour, President Julius Nyerere, whose contempt for Amin had never been in doubt. Certainly, the border issue was the casus belli for an invasion by regular Tanzanian units, together with Ugandan exiles, which did not rest at the recovery of territory but advanced to complete the overthrow of Amin's regime.

Further north as well, a border dispute had played a part in the circumstances of the first military coup d'etat in the Sudan in 1958. The

disputed Halayab region claimed by Egypt, east of the Nile, was not the only source of friction between those two countries, but reports of

Egyptian troops and officials entering the area contributed to worsening relations and political crisis in the Sudan. Though settled without resort to violence (the Egyptian presence was withdrawn), the issue of relations with Cairo on the one hand and Washington on the other was central to the circumstances in which the Prime Minister, Abdalla

Khalil, invited General Ibrahim Abboud's intervention. The net result of these border disputes in Africa has been the

preservation of the status quo. But this is not, therefore, an issue which has entirely gone away. Somali-Ethiopian relations have remained tense, and the problem of the Aouzou strip remains unresolved between Chad and Libya.

ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION

The above reference to integration leads into the theme of economic

co-operation, which has been considered already in two of the three

regions mentioned already, the Nile Valley and East Africa. Historically, the discussion of economies in Africa has closely paralleled, perhaps to some extent pioneered, that of international relations. The 'modern' sectors have been largely concerned with the export of agricultural crops and raw minerals to industrial countries in return for imports of

processed or semi-processed goods, while the indigenous 'traditional' or ' parallel' economic activities have developed or regressed according to their own logic. Yet the importance of economic co-operation in Africa has long been pointed out, and in academic circles, at least, the

advantages of economic regionalism have been increasingly recognised. In the Nile Valley a degree of co-operation, certainly as far as

resource-sharing is concerned, has long been inevitable and, because of its importance, often a source of contention. Egypt has always been

totally dependent on the waters of the Nile for its survival, while the Sudan's major agricultural development both in the past, and that

projected for the future, centres on the river as well. The primary problems arise because both countries would like to remove more water

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from the river; and, indeed, the recent challenging study by John Waterbury estimates that at some stage in the foreseeable future it is unavoidable that Egypt and the Sudan between them will seek to use more water from the Nile than the river contains.1

To judge from earlier negotiations between Egypt and the Sudan, especially immediately before and after the latter's independence in

1956, it will be very difficult for them to reach any agreement. It took five years, from 1954 to I959, to achieve success once self-government had been obtained, and some Sudanese felt that they had fared badly in both 1929 and 1959. Indeed, the difficulties encountered were a major factor in the deteriorating relations between the two countries, which in 1953 had appeared destined for some form ofunion, and disagreements in the future on this same issue could play a major part in the outcome of current plans for integration.

The waters of the Nile are, of course, not infinite, but nor are they at present finite, for hydrological management can improve both their volume and seasonal availability. This has been a major feature of the construction of dams in the past, and at present theJonglei canal is being built to reduce loss by evaporation from the sudd in the Southern Sudan. At the time of writing, work is suspended as a result of political problems, the outcome of which may involve some redistribution of the increased volume of water resulting from the canal.

However, the issue of the Nile waters has also been extended. Ever sinceJonglei was first proposed early this century, Egyptian hydrologists have suggested that a further dam was needed in Uganda, at the outlet of Lake Albert, in order to raise the water level and improve the river's flow. Egypt's influence in Uganda, both before and after independence, has always been limited, but unfulfilled hopes still exist and might be raised once again. More disturbingly for the Cairo regime is the fact that Ethiopia, where agricultural development is as great a necessity as it is in Egypt, has recently been reconsidering the advantages of

greater control and systematic water extraction from the Blue Nile. Such a move would add a further dimension to the always complex issue of relations between Ethiopia and her neighbours. Overall the Nile valley is one of the most developed in Africa, yet there is clearly more that could be done, and river-basin planning - or the lack of it - will both reflect and contribute to relations between the neighbouring states.

Economic co-operation in East Africa arose in spite of the lack of shared resources, and owed its origins to the mutual experience of

1 John Waterbury, Hydropolitics of the Nile Valley (Syracuse, N.Y., 1979).

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PETER WOODWARD

British colonial rule which established the framework of common services. At independence there was even talk of political federation, and

though that failed to materialise, the East African Community was created. Its failure was due to a number of factors, including geography and ideology, but its demise went beyond the break-up of the common services themselves, being the product of deteriorating relations between the three member-states concerned, and this in turn contributed fresh areas of acrimony. The mutual bitterness shown by Kenya and Tanzania had economic effects that were felt by both as a result of the closure of their land frontier, whilst politically this contributed to

suspicion by Kenyans of Dar es Salaam's motives at the time of the Tanzanian-backed overthrow of Amin's regime in Uganda. Although the tensions have since eased and discussion of the legacy of problems left by the collapse of the Community has resumed, the imperative for

co-operation is obviously less acute than in the Nile valley, even though the potential economic advantage may be scarcely less real.

At present a further extension of economic co-operation in North-East Africa appears remote, but this is due less to the lack of possible advantages which co-operation might bring than to the very obvious

political problems which stand in its way.1

SHARED POLITICAL INSTABILITY

Though African states may subscribe sincerely to the O.A.U.'s oft-

quoted principle of 'non-interference in the affairs of other countries', situations can arise in which some involvement in the political instability of neighbouring states is virtually unavoidable. Perhaps the most dramatic source of involvement has been due to the escalation in the number of political refugees, a problem which has affected North-East Africa in particular in recent years. The largest numbers have been in

Somalia, where the consequences of the Somali-Ethiopian conflict have

produced I -5 million refugees. Second in scale has been the Sudan with over 6oo,000, mainly from Eritrea and Northern Ethiopia, but also at various times from Zaire, Uganda and Chad. The Sudan has in turn been a source of refugees from conflicts in the South, especially. Many have fled to Tanzania from Burundi and Uganda, while some opponents of the regime in Kampala have escaped to Kenya.

There are two difficulties in summarising the position of political refugees: first of all, there may be some circumstances in which it is

1 Early cases for economic integration were made by Kwame Nkrumah, Africa Must Unite

(London, I963), and by Reginald H. Green and Ann Seidman, Unity or Poverty? The Economics of Pan-Africanism (Harmondsworth, I968), and subsequent experience has made many of their arguments more cogent.

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impossible to discover the extent to which they have been generated by drought and political instability; secondly, it is alleged that on some occasions the various host governments have exaggerated their numbers in order to attract additional aid. Nevertheless, it is clear that a major problem since independence has been the influx of refugees as a result of various domestic conflicts.

The causes of these great movements are indicative of political instability in the regions of origin, but they also create social, economic and political difficulties in the host countries. Clearly Somalia has

experienced the greatest strain in terms of pressures on local services, for here a small, poor population has had to accommodate a vast and

mainly destitute band of refugees. In the Sudan, too, hardships have

arisen, especially in the eastern areas. In recent years there has been a growing body of literature describing these difficulties, and discussing lines of policy for international agencies and host governments, including the possibility of repatriation.1

However, the concern here is with the possible impact of displaced persons on relations between neighbouring states. Few political refugees in Africa will readily accept their new status as a permanent condition, and many will become involved in supporting resistance movements which are likely in turn to perpetuate the original conflict that forced them to leave their homes. Thus, Somalis from Eastern Ethiopia have continued their struggle even from camps in Somalia, for their claim was still to their former lands; Eritreans in exile in the Sudan have sought to continue their fight against the regime in Addis Ababa; Sudanese have been active from bases in Uganda and Ethiopia; while Ugandans in Kenya and Tanzania have plotted and then participated in the liberation of their country from Amin's rule. The potential effect of such activities on relations between neighbouring states is obvious, especially as those generating refugees accuse those offering asylum of failing to control, and perhaps even of abetting them. In fact, the conflict may spill onto the territory of host governments, as when Amin's agents sought his enemies in Kenya and elsewhere. The problem may even be mutual - for example, the Sudan and Ethiopia have supported refugees from each other's conflicts apparently on a tit-for-tat basis, and are once more doing so at the time of writing.

It is going to be hard to achieve any quick and lasting answer to this growing problem because of the domestic and inter-state difficulties mentioned above. The simplest 'solution' may appear to be the resettlement of those who have fled to neighbouring countries, but this

1 Sam A. Aiboni, Protection of Refugees in Africa (Uppsala, 1978), and G6ran Melander and Peter Nobel (eds.), African Refugees and the Law (Uppsala, I978).

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PETER WOODWARD

overlooks the resentment of the refugees themselves, and the economic, social, and political problems which frequently confront their hosts. The alternative is for the country generating the fugitives to allow them to return voluntarily, and this requires not only a political resolution of the initial conflict, but also the co-operation of neighbouring governments. Such an ideal solution is difficult; but an important example was

provided by the Sudan when, following the Addis Ababa agreement of I972 ending the civil war in the Sudan, thousands of Southerners were

repatriated with the assistance of Ethiopia and Uganda in particular. It is therefore all the more tragic that recent fighting, in the Upper Nile

especially, is once more resulting in the creation of many more refugees. Clearly, apart from the personal tragedies faced by such vast numbers

of displaced persons, the growth in the problem may lead to a deterioration of relations between neighbouring states; while a resolution of the initial conflict that generated the exodus could lead to a reduction in inter-state tensions which might have wider implications for the future than the question of refugees alone.

DOMESTIC POLITICS AND INVOLVEMENT OF

NEIGHBOURING STATES

Though the members of the O.A.U. subscribe in theory to the

principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of other African

states, there are numerous examples of events which put the reality of this in doubt. The extent to which the axiom is transgressed, if at all, is of course often open to question. It is, for instance, not uncommon to blame the activities of the agents of neighbouring states for political disturbances or potentially unstable conditions. Some of these charges may be inventions designed to cover the fragility of the regime making them, or to deflect attention from genuine internal opposition. There is also the question of degree, for there is clearly a difference between failure to effectively contain the activities of refugees who continue to conduct operations in their country of origin, and a military invasion

by a neighbouring state. Similarly, circumstances might be thought to

justify some acts of intervention: a gross and sustained abuse of human

rights, for instance, may provide the vindication for the overthrow of a regime - Africa, too, can have its just wars as well as just revolts. Intervention is often depicted as being aggressive, but on occasions it

may be to defend a friendly regime against internal opposition, even

though there might be an additional justification in terms of hostile external support for those opponents.

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The most overt forms of aggressive intervention in North-East Africa have occurred in Chad and Ethiopia where both Libya and Somalia, respectively, had already given years of covert support to regionally based resistance movements when both tried to use their own armies

decisively. In the case of Somalia, it led to defeat at the hands of

Ethiopia; while Libya, after her rapid entrance and exit from Chad, now finds herself defending the northern section of that divided country. Both these interventions brought condemnation from many members of the O.A.U., but more consternation and principle-searching was caused by Tanzania's no less overt action to overthrow Amin's tyranny.

Such open military assistance as these remain, however, the exception rather than the rule - much more common is some form of secret help, generally in conjunction with an indigenous opposition group. In North-East Africa, as in recent years also in West Africa, the charge of covert action is most commonly made against President Muammar Qaddafi. Certainly his activities have ranged far and wide, including the provision of training and logistic support for the dramatic attempt to overthrow Gaafar Muhammad Numeiri's regime in Khartoum. But he has not been alone in his involvement. As already mentioned, the Sudan and even Saudi Arabia have given support to the Eritreans, while

Ethiopia, and once more Libya, have assisted the current opposition movement in the Southern Sudan. Egypt and the Sudan actively helped Habre in his attack on Oueddi during his Libyan-backed interlude in

power in Chad, while the Sudan continues to host and encourage the enemies of Qaddafi. In the Horn, Ethiopia and Somalia have continued to bolster opposition movements even after the decisive conclusion of their major conflict; while in East Africa, Tanzania had given encouragement to Amin's opponents long before the victorious invasion of I979.

Intervention in neighbouring states is not confined to aggressive intent, but may be of an essentially defensive character. The action taken to protect a friendly regime may be harder to evaluate unless in some clearly visible manner it actually turns the tide of an assault; but even without being activated in that way, knowledge of possible intervention may be significant. An outstanding example in the Nile

valley has been Egypt's readiness to play a military and political role in defence of Numeiri. In I970, 197 , and I976 Egypt provided military assistance when the Sudanese regime was under direct attack, and in I984 has appeared to display a willingness to do so once more. Such clear-cut intervention in the defence of neighbouring states may be

relatively unusual, but Egypt's actions are not unique: Libya

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endeavoured unsuccessfully to assist Amin during the Tanzanian-led invasion of Uganda.

There are, however, powerful political constraints on such external

involvements, quite apart from the strictures of the O.A.U. already mentioned. Aggressive intervention, even if by covert means, can be

internationally humiliating, and may incite political criticism and, perhaps, opposition at home. Certainly many commentators remarked on the dire straits of Siad Barre's regime in Somalia following the unsuccessful attack on Ethiopia. Even if there is a military victory, it

may have been gained at considerable cost. While many sympathised with Nyerere's hostility to Amin's regime, the subsequent maintenance of Tanzanian troops in Uganda gave rise to considerable criticism; political developments there brought little credit to Tanzania, while leaders in Dar es Salaam loudly regretted the high cost of the whole

operation. Even intervention by a neighbouring state to protect a

friendly regime may have its price. Few will happily acknowledge that their leaders appear to rely for their survival on the support of a

neighbour, and the knowledge of such an eventuality even, if the

promised assistance is not forthcoming, is likely to reduce rather than enhance the popularity of the regime involved.

There is, however, another possible form of neighbourly involvement - conciliation. There may be few examples in North-East Africa, but they have not been entirely absent. Ethiopia played a role in the peace settlement in the Southern Sudan in 1972; and it is not beyond the realms of feasibility that both Ethiopia and the Sudan might in the future help to resolve the conflicts under way at the time of writing in Eritrea and Northern Ethiopia, and in the Southern Sudan. However, conciliation depends not only on the attitudes of neighbouring states, but more importantly on the views of the protagonists, as the O.A.U. has found out to its cost, first in the Somali-Ethiopia dispute, and more

recently in Chad.

RELATIONS BETWEEN NEIGHBOURING STATES AND

THE SUPER-POWERS

The growth of super-power involvement in North-East Africa has risen once more since the mid-Ig70s, and certain countries, especially Egypt and Ethiopia, have become major recipients of military and other

supplies from either the United States or the Soviet Union.1 In part,

1 Gerard Chaliand, The Struggle for Africa: conflict of the great powers (London, I980).

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this development arises from the strategic position of this region in relation to an area of even greater international concern, the oil-

producing Middle East. Indeed, in a variety of ways, North-East Africa has been drawn more closely into contact with Arabia, resurrecting a centuries-old historical tradition which had lost much of its thrust

during the period of European colonialism. Clearly, it is these strategic considerations which have led to such a build-up of military activity on the part of the United States in Egypt, the Sudan, and Kenya, including operations such as 'Bright Star', while the Soviet Union

dramatically switched its main location from Somalia to Ethiopia. However, while external involvement in the region may be primarily

for strategic reasons in relation to the Middle East, the super-powers have also found themselves increasingly drawn into the problems of domestic instability. Troubled client-states may expect help from their external patrons to deal with political and economic difficulties: indeed, these may be presented in such a light as to actively encourage the involvement of the super-powers. Allegations that subversive activities in the domestic arena are being organised by 'communists and revolutionaries' on the one hand, or by 'feudalists and capitalist lackeys' on the other, quickly become the language of describing opposition threats, however far they may be removed from the real

complexities of the political and economic problems faced by most states in the region.

There is a danger that over-reliance on super-power patronage may pervert attempts at constructive rather than destructive solutions to the real problems of domestic politics which exist in North-East Africa - of which Ethiopia and the Sudan are major examples - and that such reliance on the presence of cold-war rivals may serve to worsen relations between neighbouring states. In such cases, clients may endeavour to draw in their patrons by invoking charges and counter-accusations of involvement. Thus, Egypt and the Sudan have expressed concern at the Soviet Union's military connections with Libya and Ethiopia by alleging their involvement in Chad and the Southern Sudan. These

charges have met with some success - certainly, high-technology AWAC planes have been coming and going with increased regularity, but although America would like to interpret this surveillance as a means of protecting friendly states, it is just as likely to be seen as a method of bolstering up a disliked regime, since substantial domestic

instability is often associated with external friction. However, as shown

by the experience of Kenya and Ethiopia, relations between neighbours can be co-operative, in spite of being allied to rival super-powers, if there

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is a greater common threat - in this case, Somalia. But in an area where few governments face an external challenge such as that posed by Somalia, this example is likely to prove the exception rather than the rule - for the most part the involvement of, and perhaps growing dependence on, external nations will hinder rather than assist co-

operative relations between neighbours.

CONCLUSION

Much of the discussion of African foreign policy-making is in terms of dependence on former colonial and super-powers, a condition seen

largely as deriving from Africa's economic underdevelopment on the one hand, and strategic rivalry on the other. A concern with relations between neighbouring states can offer, therefore, a shift in emphasis away not only from the strategic interests of the rival great powers, but also from economic to political factors. This may be dismissed as

ideologically unsound, but can be defended historically. The rudi-

mentary state structure of North-East Africa was established before the full impact of the world economy on the region occurred. Thus, international borders may be of limited economic significance and yet retain a political importance of the kind mentioned earlier.

The most frequent form of economic analysis, featuring structural

underdevelopment, may divert analysts from the issue of neighbour-state co-operation, and yet its implications may lead directly towards this. It has been fashionable to consider the advantages of at least a degree of disengagement from the world economy, but this may realistically also require further exploration of regional economic co-operation of the kind already undertaken in West and Southern Africa. If there is, then, a case for such collaboration, the two major obstacles are the differences in the political and economic policies of the states involved which create problems of co-ordination, and - as discussed above - the

general character of the relations between neighbouring countries. These will not in practice be confined to economic issues alone, but will involve a whole range of wider problems. Egypt and the Sudan's

political relationship has underwritten the moves towards economic

co-operation which they have been pursuing for the past decade. And, as the Southern Sudanese involvement with theJonglei canal illustrates, if political arrangements start to go wrong, economic developments may suffer a severe blow. Similarly, the improved political climate between

Kenya and the Sudan, following the Addis Ababa agreement of 1972,

encouraged a growth in trade between the two countries. In contrast,

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the late I970S witnessed a major deterioration in relations between

Kenya and Tanzania, but their developing rapprochement may pave the way for some measure of renewed economic co-operation in the future. The exchange of prisoners accused of acts of political subversion in 1984 may be regarded as a cynical rejection of refugee status, but

may also herald a mutual recognition of the desirability of improving confidence between the two governments and of good neighbourly behaviour.

It is not intended to suggest that past analysis of Africa's international relations has been misguided, only that a dimension of considerable

importance has hitherto tended to be neglected unless a specific issue, such as the Somali-Ethiopian war, has come to the fore. Nor is it intended to exaggerate the degree of regionalism in North-East Africa, although the growing super-power involvement has added a new sense of regional awareness which cannot be overlooked. But above all the aim has been to point out that relations between neighbouring states are not necessarily single-issue problems - as suggested by the division of territory between Ethiopia and Somalia, or of water between Egypt and the Sudan - but may have more than one dimension, perhaps even all five which this article has sought to identify, in which case the

complexity as well as the importance of paying more attention to relations between neighbouring states is clearly illustrated.

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relations between neighbouring states in north-east africa

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