relations between the muslim league and the panjab national unionist party 1935–47

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Relations between the Muslim league and the Panjab

national unionist party 193547Imran Ali

a

aPh.D. student in the institute of Advanced Studies , Australian National University

Published online: 24 Feb 2011.

To cite this article:Imran Ali (1976) Relations between the Muslim league and the Panjab national unionist party 193547,

South Asia: Journal of South Asian Studies: Series 1, 6:1, 51-65

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RELATIONS BETWEEN THE MUSLIM LEAGUE ANDTHE PANJAB NATIONA L UNIONISTPARTY 1935-47

IMR AN ALI

It is difficult to conceive of the establishment of a separate Muslim nation in SouthAsia in 1947 without taking into account the profound contribution of the All-IndiaMuslim League (AIML) to the Pakistan demand. The story of the League in i tsnegotiations with the British and the Indian National Congress is better known thanits fortunes in the various Ind ian provinces. It was .a regional im petus that of thethre aten ed M uslim minority of the Un ited P rovinces that helped to form a n all-Ind ia Muslim political struc ture , bu t such an- imp etus was not forthcoming from theMuslim majority provinces, at least not those of north-west India. Yet, until theLeague attained power in these provinces it could not effectively promote its demandfor Pakistan. This process was determined by the methods it adopted in its relationswith existing regional parties. This study deals with this process in one such province,the Panjab, where the League's methods were largely designed to enlist the supportand cooperat ion of the Panjab National Unionist Party (PNUP), composed of therepresentatives of the landed interest that dominated the Panjab Legislative Assembly.

The IssuesThe results of the 1937 elections, for which it had made widespread preparations,

showed that the Congress had emerged as a nation-wide organization. It captured 716out of 1,585 seats and qualified to form ministries in at least six provinces. 1 But theCongress secured only 5.4 pe r cent of seats reserved for Ind ian Muslims, proving th at ithad been repudiated by them as their representat ive. 2 Neither, however, could theMuslim Le agu e claim to represe nt Muslim interests , having won only 109 seats in theprovincial legislatures. For the M uslims, therefore, there was an evident lack of an all-India organization comparable to the Congress. Apprehensive of losing all initiative tothe Hind us, with their greater numb ers and m ore advanced p oli tical organization, theMuslim lite tried to build an all-India structure in the next decade. The emergence ofthe AIM L und er the leadership of M uh am m ad Ali Jinn ah as the third party in In diaafter the British and the Congress, was the cu lmin ation of this process. The 1937 elec-tions had revealed dram atically th at the Leag ue's position was weakest in the Muslim1 Returns Showing the Results of Elections inIndia 1937 , Parliamentary Papers [hereafter PP ]1937-38 XXI, Cmd 5589.2A. H. Batalwi, Hamari Qaumi Jadd-o-Jihd

(Lahore, Albiyan, 1966), p. 14; Congress secured26 of the 482 seats reserved for Muslims, and ofthese 15 were from the North-west Frontier Pro-vince (NWFP) and only 11 from the rest of India.


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5 2 SOUTH ASIAmajority provinces.3 But within a decade the League had become a formidable powerin these provinces, and its political demands had assumed the inexorable stature thatled to the formation of Pakistan.For the Leag ue th e significance of its involvement in provincial politics was equal to,if not greater than, the negotiations at the central, all-India level with the British andthe Congress. In the wider sense, the League's popularity was related to the growth ofcommunalism. However, social and political conditions in the Muslim majority pro-vinces not only influenced, but virtually dictated, the process by which the Leag ueestablished its power. At the regional level, the manipulation of non-communalfactors, such as class, the existing power structure and its relationship to British rule,and internecine rivalries, can by no means be discounted; and in the Panjab theLeague had to contend with these before it made the Pakistan demand into a massmovement. The League's own contribution lay in bringing about a communal con-frontation, but in the process entrenched interests had learnt to manipulate the powerof communal symbols.

These interests were represented by the Unionist Party, which from the 1920s hadbeen carefully nurtured by the British administration to uphold the power of thelanded lite. The Unionist Party comprised a group within the Panjab legislaturerather th an a polit ical organization. Tho ugh predom inantly Muslim in composit ion, i tendeavoured to retain a non-communal stance, justified chiefly by the inclusion ofHindu Jat members from eastern Panjab. As such, i t remained the only non-com-munal rural based party in the Panjab, all other parties, with the exception of thecommunalistic Sikh Akalis, being urban based. The Unionists also readily entered intointer-c om mu nal coalitions, as with mo dera te Sikh and Hi ndu MLAs after the 1937elections. The Unionists had emerged as the strongest party in the Panjab legislaturein 1937, securing ab out 100 out of 186 seats.4 It was to them that Jinnah's appeal foran all-India Muslim consensus was directed. Jinnah visualized the League as a partyled by lite and influential M uslims, and thus he placed grea t imp ortan ce on someagreement with the Unionists. League-Unionist relations were, therefore, an integralelement in the growth of Muslim political nationalism in the Panjab.The transition in Muslim politics in the Panjab between 1935 and 1947 falls intocertain iden tifiable stages. Th e Unionists at first refused to cooperate with the Leag ue,resulting in the latter's poor showing in the 1937 elections. This was followed by aperiod of formal linkage between the two parties inaugurated by the Sikander-JinnahPact of 1937. Though this Pact helped to give the League an all-India stature, itsrepercussions in the Panjab were to place the L eague in a situation of adversity an d theUnionists in a position of contro l. It was not until 1944 that the L eague challenged theUnionist hold over the Panjab Ministry. This abortive bid, and Unionist resistance toit, resulted in a complete break that prevented any further reconciliation. The 1946elections saw a complete reversal of roles, with the Leagu e em erging as the und ispute drepresentative of Panjab Muslims. However, it contin ued to be deprived of office whenHindus and Sikhs formed a coalition with the Unionist rump. Bristling with strength,the League resorted to a non-cooperation movement in early 1947 and succeeded inbringing down the Coalition Ministry. But at this point Panjab politics were super-

3Z. H. Zaidi, Aspects of the Development ofMuslim League Policy 1937-47 , Th e Partition ofIndia ed. C. H. Phillipsand M . D.Wainwright(London, Allen & Unwin, 1970), p. 253; in theNWFP an d Sind no League candidates were putup, in thePanjab only2 of the 7League candidates

were successful, and inBengal th eLeaguewon 39of the 117Muslimseats.4T he number of Unionist (PNUP) MLAs wasgivenas 99 inKeesings Contemporary Archives 21March 1937; and 101 in Indian Annual Register(Calcutta) [hereafter IA R] 938, I, 223.


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MUSLIM LEAGUE AND PANJAB 5seded by the wider momentum of Partition. These developments will now be examinedmore closely.The 1937 Elections: the League Excluded

In May 1936 Jin nah tried an d failed to obtain the supp ort of FazI-i-Husain, theUnionist leader, for League participation in the forthcoming elections. 5 Earlier over-tures had not been prom isingin Janu ary 1936 Husain had refused Jinnah's invitationto preside over the ensuing A IML session.6J inn ah wished to get Muslims all over In diato contest the elections on a common League platform. But Husain refused to agree toMuslim Unionists standing on League tickets, although Jinnah was willing to allowthem to cooperate with non-Muslim parties in the Assembly. 7 There were severalreasons for Husain's attitude and they were to bedevil the League's efforts to gain afoothold in the Panjab over the next decade. Husain believed that strong provincialparties could best tackle the peculiar conditions and problems in each province, andthus did not want League participation in provincial elections. 8 He was himself re-organizing the Unionist Party for the elections, and wanted similar parties to emergein Sind, the North-West Frontier Province and the United Provinces.9 Husain wasloyal to the desire of the Britishwh o had a special military and econo mic stake in th erural Panjab to keep the province free from communal dissensions.10 The distr ibu-tion of constituencies was heavily weighted in favour of the rural areas, and thefranchise d om inated by the land-owning cas tes. n In the Assembly the landed interestswere broug ht toge ther in the Unionist Party, which in the 1930s was still unfettered bythe communalist and nationalist notions that h ad beset the Indian u rban bourgeoisie.

Husain's decision not to support a communal party was also guided by the realitiesof the Communal Award in the Panjab. Muslims did not have an overall majority inthe Assembly, though they constituted 55 per cent of the population. Even with lossesof 5 to 10 per cent a Muslim party would find itself in a minority. This would make acoalition necessary, but for a com mu nal pa rty this would be difficult to atta in. Hu saincontended that the ensuing political instability would give the Governor unwarrantedpowers of interference .12 Moreover, Hindu s and Sikhs would also adopt the com mu nalissue in electioneering, which could undermine support for the non-Muslim Unionists,such as the Chho tu Ram Gro up . 1 3A coalition with such elements had been evolvedsince the early 1920s, and this Husain wished to retain for the 1937 elections. Therationale of this doctrine of inter-communal linkages was to confront the Leaguethrou gho ut the next deca de, and its negation resu lted in the partitio n of the Pan jab.

An other reason for Husain's refusal to cooperate with Jin na h was the internal dis-sension and factionalism within M uslim U nionists. Th ere w ere two influential Muslim5A. H. Batalwi, Iqbal ke akhiri do sal(Karachi,Ferozesons, 1961), p. 305.6 A. Husain, Fazl-i-Husain (Bombay, LongmansGreen, 1946), pp. 306-7.7 M, Rafique Afzal, Malik Barkat Ali His Lifeand Writings (Lahore, Research Society of Paki-stan, 1969), p. 35.8 A. Husain, op. cit. p. 310.9Ibid. p. 304.10 K. B. Sayeed, Th e Personality of Jin na h an dhis Political Strategy , in Phillips and Wainwright(eds), op. cit. p. 284.11 Of 149 territorial seats in the Panjab Legis-lative Assembly, 130 were rural and 19 urba n. Thisrural-urban disparity was greater than in the oldPanjab Legislative Council, where of 64 territorial

seats 13 were urban an d 51 rural; Rep ort of theCommittee appointed in Connection with the De-limitation of Constituencies , PP 1933-36 IX, 55.1 2 Ghazanfar Ali Khan,Martial Law sae M artialLaw tak (Lahore, Syed Nur Ahmed, 1966), pp.174-5.13 Sir Chho tu Ra m (1881-1945), with Fazl-i-Husain, founded the PNUP in 1923, was leader ofthe Party from 1926-36, and Panjab Minister ofRevenue 1937-45. He headed the powerful groupof Hin du Jats from eastern Pan jab whose inclusionin the PNUP was its chief justification for callingitself a non-communal party: S. P. Sen (ed.), Dic-tionary of National Biography (Calcutta, Insti tuteof Historical Studies, 1972), I, 309-11; Pioneer(Lucknow ), 10 Jan . 1945.


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54 SOUTH ASIAgroups in the old Panjab Council: the Noon-Tiwana and the Dau ltana factions.14Their rivalry centredon the possessionof Ministerial positions. Intrigues were inces-sant andperiodically an open confrontation wasthreatened.1 5 It was usually left toHusaintofindacompromiseandthus retainthe twogroups unde rhisleadership.1 6By1936 Husain's position itselfwas threatenedby theefforts of the Daul tana group toreplacehim bySikander Hyat K han. Sikanderwasonly conc iliated after b eing assuredof succession to Unionist leadership at Husain's impending death, and by the con-venient removalof his rival, Feroze Khan Noon, to Britain asHigh Comm issioner.17Understandably, because the League would inevitably involve itself in Muslim fac-tionalism, and institutionalize it along communal and non-communal l ines, theUnionist leadership wished to keepit out of Panjab politics. In fact, even within theUnionist Party there was a threatened combination of Muslim factionalism andcomrnunalism in the advocacy, by Noon amongst others, of a purely Muslim ratherthan anon-communal par ty .18 It willbe seen thatit was a cleavage along these verylinesin the 1940s that vitally determined thefortunes of the Leaguein the Panjab.Frustrated in his efforts to gain influence over the Muslim landed li te, Jinnahsought electoral alliances withthe Majlis-i-Ahrar19 and the Majlis-i-Ittehad-i-Millat,80representingthe urban middle classes.Had such links been consolidated, the Leaguewould perhaps have been committedto an urban orientation, but developments wereto prove otherwise.For one, theAhrarsandMillat decidedtocontesttheelectionsontheir own.21 This left Jin na hnochoicebut toconfer L eague ticketson thesmall grou pof urbanits whichhad constituted itself intothe Panjab Muslim League (PML), withthe poet Muhammed Iqbalas President, Malik BarkatAM and Khalifa Shuja-ud-D inas Vice-Presidents, and Ghulam Rasul Khan as Secretary. The PML had littlepolitical statureandvirtuallynofollowing,nor anyopportunitytobuildan organiza-tion before the elections. As a result only seven candidates contested and two were

1 4The Noon and Tiwana Maliks were largelandholders in the north-west Panjab and werebased inShahp ur District: for thehistory of theirprincipal families see L. H. Griffin and C. F.Massy, ChiefsandFam iliesofNote in the Punjab(Lahore Govt. Printing Press, 1940), II 191-20,223-35.TheDaul tana groupwas led byChaudhryShahab-ud-Din, Mian AhmedYarKhan Daul tana(thesetwowere relatedandbelongto theJoiyatribeof Multan District), Nawab Muzaffar Khan andSikand er Hyat K han (1892 -1942)(thelasttwowererelatedandbelongedto theKhattar tr ibeofAttockDistrict) for their family history see ibid., pp.332-6).15G. A. Khan, op. cit. pp. 60-71, 161; A.Husain, op. cit. pp. 269-71,324.16 Fazl-i-Husain (1887-1936)was alawyerand aself-mademan.Startingas anurban polit ician,hecame to champion the cause of the rural litethroughthePNUP.Forassessmentsof hispoliticalcareerseeAfzal, op. cit. pp. 34-5;Batalwi, Iqbalke . .., pp. 270-1;S. A.Vahid , Studies in Iqbal(Lahore , Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf, 1967), p.275.Hisonly biograp hy iswrittenby his son: A.Husain, op. cit.17G. A.Khan, op. cit. pp. 158-60;A. Husain,op . cit. pp. 322-37; Batalwi, Iqbal ke . . ., pp.288-93.ForFeroze Khan Noon's family h istoryseeGriffin andMassy,op. cit. II,232-5. Noon israreamongst Panjabi politiciansfor having attemptedan autobiography, but its informality, lack ofdetailandunmethodical treatmentofissuesmar its

value: see F. K. Noon, From Memory (Lahore ,Ferozesons, 1969). The Noon family was leasedextensive areasof land by theBritish in ShahpurDistrictin thenineteenth century, and these werelater purchased at concessionary terms. They alsoowned an inundation canal and obtained astud-farm and other grants in the Panjab CanalColonies.18 A. Husain, op. cit. p. 306.1 9TheM ajlis-i-Ahrar was formed in 1930 andcooperated closely with the Congress in the CivilDisobedience Movements. It was intitially not acommunal party, but tended increasingly towardscommunalisrn in the1930s.By theearly 1940stheAhrars werein astateofdecay, withthemor econ-servative elements joinin gtheMuslim L eague:seeW . C. Smith, Modern Islam in India (Lahore ,Minerva Books, 1943),pp.260-4.2 0The Majlis-i-Ittehad-i-Millat was formed inFebruary 1936under the leadership of MaulanaZafarAliKhan.Itgrewout of theShahidganjagi-tation,adispute between MuslimsandSikhs overareligious site:seeBatalwi, Iqhalke . .., pp.317-18.21Ibid. pp.320-1,335-7;theMillat withdrewinJune1936 on thegrounds that theLeaguewas notdemanding complete independence, and decidedto contest theelections on the Shahidganj issue;an d the Ahrars withdrew by Sept. 1936 as theirhopes that the League had been promised vastsumsofmoneyfor theelectionsbyBombay tradersa nd Oudh talukdars turned out to be withoutfoundation.


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MUSLIM LEAGUE AND PANJAB 55elected, Malik Barkat Ali and Raja Ghazanfar Ali Khan, of whom, the latter immedi-ately joined the Unionist Party and obtained a Parliam enta ry Secretarys hip.82 Suchwas the consequence of the Unionist refusal to cooperate with the League. However,the urban group, enthusiastic about this opportunity of championing the Leaguecause, had decided to embark on a programme of opening League branches andspreading its organization over the province.23 Had such activity continued, it is con-ceivable that the PML would have politicized the Muslim masses along communallines. It might thereby have created a political front not dependent on party strengthin the legislature, which was controlled by the landed interests. But it was not destinedthat the role of the League in the Panjab should proceed on this basis.The Sikander-Jinnah Pact 1937In 1937 Jin na h m ade fresh overtures to the entren ched Unionists in a n effort toawaken them to the cause of Indian Muslims. As a consequence, Sikander Hyat Khan,the Panjab Premier, attended the AIML session at Lucknow in October 1937, andconcluded an agreement with Jinnah commonly called the S ikander-Jinnah Pact,which promised to bring Muslim Unionists into the League. By most interpreters,Sikander's presence at Lucknow together with that of Fazlul Haq of Bengal is regardedas a great ad vance for th e L eague , giving it the sup port of the two largest Muslimprovinces and hence an all-India stature.24 Certainly, th ere a ppe ared to have been, asignificant transfo rma tion in the AIML 's position since early 1937, when Jin nah wasvirtually in the political wilderness. But in emphasizing these gains, prope r recognitionhas not been given to the effects on the League at the provincial level, for in thePanjab regional politics imposed their own weight in curtailing the spread of Leagueinfluence. This contradiction can be explained by examining Sikander's motives inreaching this agreement with the AIML.

It has commonly been asserted that the fervour of the Lucknow session was mainlystimula ted by the M uslim reaction to Congress politics. However, it is doubtful thatfear of Congress power motivated Muslim Unionists to seek political links with theAIML. The organizational and financial resources of the Congress could be a threat tothe inter-communal Unionist coalition. But there was no real prospect of the loss ofminority support for the Ministry in the Assembly.25 Sikander in 1937 was publicallycritical of Congress, especially of its policy towards the minorities. 26 However, the realreason for this criticism was not concern for Muslims, but an effort to support theBritish position against Congress on the office ac cep tanc e issue. Also the prospect ofurban Muslims forming a common front with Congress did not materialize. They werein fact becoming more comrnunalistic, as indicated bv the Shahideani agitation. 2 8

2 2Afzal, op. cit. pp. 36-7; G. A. Khan, op. cit.p. 189.23 Afzal, op. cit. p p . 29-43; Vahid, op. cit. p .29 ;Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah (Lah ore, S. M. Ash-raf, 1956), pp. 29-30; Chief Secretary's Repor t[hereafter CSR] for second half of Novemb er 1937,incorporated in Panjab Governor's Reports (here-after PGR), India Office Library and Records L/P& J / 5 .Since holdings at th e India Office of dep art-mental proceedings of the Panjab Government donot continue after 1936, the PGR s are the most im-portant source of official information on Panjabpolitics reaching the India Office for the 1935-47period. It is largely from th e PGRs tha t m aterial onpolitical conditions in the Panjab is obtained in N.Mansergh (ed.) , Constitutional Relations betweenBritain and India: The T ransfer of Power 1942-7(London, HMSO, 1970- ), I- . Their value is

further enhanced by the restriction on research onpost-1940 material in Pakistan.2 4 See Chaud hry Khaliquzzaman, Pathway toPakistan (Lahore, L ongm ans Green, 1961), p. 171;Zaidi, op. cit. p. 259; P. Moon, Divide and Quit(London, Chatto & Windus, 1964), p. 17.25IAR 1938 II, 224; in 1937-38 about 120MLAs were consistently voting with the Ministry,including two-fifths of the Hindus and about halfthe Sikh MLAs.26 See Sikander's speech to a dep utatio n of theAll-India Kshatri Conference: PGR, 22 May 1937.2 7 See Sikander's speech in the Panja b Assemblyon the office acceptance issue: PGR, 8 May 1937.28 IAR 1937 I, 288-9; for the participation ofthe Ahrars and Millat in the Shahidganj agitation,see PGR, Jan.-Dec. 1937; Jan.-June 1938.


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56 SOUTH ASIASikander, in keeping with the Unionist tradition, was a non-communal politician,and in associating with Muslim nationalism he risked the weakening of his coalitionwith non-Muslims and his campaign against communalism. In attending the AIMLsession it seems that, rather than providing leadership to Muslim communal con-sciousness, Sikander wished to immobilize it at its origin. He rightly perceived theLeague as potentially the most virulent exploiter of the communal issue, and thePanjab Muslim League from its urban base was already thus orientated. 29 He shared

Fazl-i-Husain's fear of the Le ague as a Muslim party which mig ht erode Unionist ranksor attract a rival faction. Sikander cleverly pre-empted such a development and main-tained the status quo by cooperating with the League himself,30 holding that therewere no differences of policy with it on all-India issues, providing Jinna h respected thenon-communal composit ion of the Unionist Party.31 Muslim Unionists, therefore,attended the Lucknow session to try and reduce the spread of communalism in thePanjab, and as such their intentions were negative in nature and hostile to the role ofthe League.This became clear from statements by Unionist leaders on their return from Luck-now. The Panjab was astir with rumours that Sikander had'made a complete obeis-ance to Jin na h a nd would allow the Unionists to be absorbed by the L eague , or tha t hewould bring the PM L und er his control .32 Especially critical were the Congress and theAkali Sikhs who wished to discredit the Unionist Party's non-communal stance. The

Unionists, however, emphatically stated that the Pact would have no effect on theexisting composition of parties in the Assembly, though Muslim Unionists would beadvised to obtain League membership. But in future elections League candidateswould have to join th e Unionists in the Assembly.33 This could be regarded as contraryto the wording and spirit of the Sikander-Jinnah Pact as it did not encompass theestablishment of a League Party in the Assembly. 34 Thus the Unionists were quick todispel any notions of an accommodation with Muslim communalism.These views were not shared by the urban PML group. The Unionists had opposedthe PML tooth and nail in the 1937 elections and the antagonism had continued, withthe Ministry being frequently attacked at League meetings. The PML President,Iqba l, ha d twice asked Jin nah to remove the 28 Unionists from the A IML Councilbecause of their anti-L eagu e stand; bu t on bo th occasions Jin na h had refused.35Therefore, the initiative for the Sikander-Jinnah Pact certainly did not come from thePML; rather the Pact added a new source of friction to the Panjab League's alreadystrained relations with the Unionist Party. The PML office-bearers interpreted thePact as virtually merging the Muslim Unionists into the League, which would now betheir party in the Assembly.36These ambitious claims by the PML were perhaps ma debecause it was afraid of being side-tracked by the new PNUP-AIML linkage. They

29Batalwi, Iqbal he . . . , pp. 478-9.30Sikander ha d m ade clear to the PanjabGovernor that no change in the polit ical balancewa sintende d; His Hi nd u and Sikh colleagues are,Ithink, a l i tt le uneasy but not seriously perturb ed .. . . On the othe r hand , his action is undo ubted lythoroughly approved by his Muslim supporters,andthe da nger of any split in the M uslim ranks hasbeenrem oved for some t ime :PGR , 21 Oct. 1937.31 Batalwi, Iqbal ke . . . p p . 476-7.32PGR , 21 O ct. 19S7; Afzal, op. cit. p . 43 .33 Statem ent by Sikander Hya t in Batalwi,Iq balke . . . , p. 492.34Th e text of the Sikan der-Jinnah Pact isrepro-duced in Afzal, op. cit. p. 40 n.

35Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah pp . 26-7; Batalwi,Iqbal ke . . . , pp. 483-4.36See statements of PML Office Bearers;Batalwi, Iq bal ke. . . , pp.504-9.Batalwi was JointSecretaryof the PM L, a nd his book on Iqba l pro-vides an in t imate though par t i san account ofpoliticsin theseyears. It also has a useful collectionofstatem ents of polit ical leaders and parties, a ndcorrespondencebetw een various leaders. Th e valu-ableMuslim League and Q uaid-i-Azam papers arelyinglargely unsifted in Islam abad , and access toall bu t a highly selective portio n is still not possible.Adefinit ive history of mo dern Muslim polit ics mustawait th e openin g of these papers for research.


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MUSLIM LEAGUE AND PANJAB 57could rely neither on Jinnah's support nor on any factional splits within the Unionists.Iqbal an d other PM L leaders warned Jinn ah that Sikander wished to minimize theLeague's influence in the Panjab, and it was they rather than the Unionists who weregenuine League workers and were busy establishing its branches. 3 7 But Jin na h refusedto embroil himself in the controversy, displaying cold indifference towards the menwhose help he had solicited for the 1937 elections. 38 Jinnah's att i tud e demonstratedtha t the price of obtainin g Unionist coopera tion at the all-India level was to concede tothem all initiative in Panjab politics.The League Beleaguered: 1937-42

As it transpired the PML had good cause for anxiety. Under the Sikander-JinnahPact, Muslim Unionists were to join the Lea gue, b ut even by mid-1938 there was not asingle instanc e of this. 39 Perhaps this was due to the alarm caused by the PML's claimof the virtual negation of the PNUP, but it nevertheless indicated the real motives ofthe Unionists. Sikander wished first to gain control of the PML, and he now endeav-oured to remove its office-bearers. He com plained to Iqbal tha t he found it difficult towork with the PML Secretary, Ghulam Rasul, and suggested his replacement by hisown nominee, Nawabzada Khurshid Ali Khan, but Iqbal refused.40 However, byMarch 1938 Sikander achieved a bigger coup. Iqbal, who was fatally ill, was himselfreplaced as President of the PML by Nawab Shahnaw az K han of Mam dot, a pillar ofthe Unionist Party and the largest landowner in the Panjab. The PML was by this timein a state of financial collapse through lack of patronage, and Mamdot succeeded inconvincing some of its leaders that his appointment would assure financial viability.41Thus Iqbal, the man who is reputed to be the greatest philosopher-poet amongstmod ern In dian M uslims, was in the end ignored an d discarded by Jinna h, spurned bythe Unionists, and even betrayed by his own close associates.With a Unionist as the PML President, Sikander acquired a vital source of manipu-lation. He could now start turning the key that he hoped would lock the League out ofthe P anja b. A first step was the cancellation of Laho re as the venue for the 1938 AIM Lsession. Iqbal had been very eager for this as a means of spreading League popularity,and Jinnah had been sympathetic to i t .42 However, Mamdot strongly protested that itwould increase communal friction, and Jinnah had no choice but to shift the venue toCalcut ta .4 3 League policy on Shahidganj shows that in 1938 Sikander had also begun

to influence AIML decisions. At Lucknow the AIML had strongly condemned thePanjab Government 's policy on Shahidganj, 44 indicating a readiness to use the issuefor an incursion into communal politics in the Panjab. However, at Calcutta theAIML decided against a non-cooperation movement, assured the Panjab Governmentof its assistance in bring ing ab out a settlement, and expressed confidence in Sikander's37Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah pp. 41-2; Batalwi,Iqbal ke . . . pp. 511-28.38Jin nah to Bark at A li, 20 Nov. 1987, in G.Allana (ed.) , Pakistan Movement: Historic Docu-ments (Karachi, Paradise Agency, 1968), pp.167-8.39 Batalwi, Iqbal ke . . . p. 623; PGR, 12 Feb.1938: many Unionists had signed League forms,but these were not accepted since they all attac hedthe proviso that membership was subject to the

Sikander-Jinnah Pact.40 Batalwi, Iqbal ke . . ., pp. 523-4. ForKhurs hid Ali Khan's family history see Griffin andMassy, op. cit. II, 529-36.41 Batalwi, Iqbal ke . . . , pp . 604-5, 613. For the

family history of Mamdot (1883-1942) see Griffinand Massy,op. cit. I, 229-33. Mam dot's estate andjagirextended to over 300 villages and the owner-ship of six inundation canals in Firozpur District;and Canal Colony land purchased at auctions inLyallpur and Montgomery Districts.42 Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah pp. 26-7; Vahid,op. cit. p. 298; Batalwi, Iqbal ke . . ., p. 593.43 Batalwi, Iqbal ke . . . pp. 613-7.4 4S. S. Pirzada (ed.), Foundations of PakistanAll-India Muslim League Documents: 1906-1947(Karachi, National Publ. House, 1970), p. 278;PGR, 21 Oct. 1937: the AIML resolution onShahidganj was passed after Sikander had leftLucknow.


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58 SOUTH ASIApolicy.45 With the gifted hand of a master, Sikander now applied the finishing touchesto the PML.His first major move was to obtain the disaffiliation of the Panjab League from itsparent body.45 By 15 March 1938 provincial Leagues had to submit a full account oftheir branches and office-bearers for affiliation to the AIML. At this time also, theyhad to submit names of members to the AIML Council, for which the PML sent a listof 90 nam es. No Unionists were included as non e had accepted Lea gue me mb ership .Thus Sikander was suddenly threatened with a complete loss of representation in theLeag ue Cou ncil. Th e AIM L ha d no legal right to refuse election of these 90 nominees.Th e only way out was to reject the ap plications for affiliation by the PM L, a nd this wasresorted to on grounds of discrepancies between the PML and the AIML constitutions.It was alleged that Liaquat Ali Khan was throughout sympathetic to Sikander, andwas instru me ntal in obta ining disaffiliation. Lia qua t perhaps cou ld not afford toantagonize the Sikander Ministry, as he held much land in eastern Panjab and hisbrother was a Unionist MLA. The final denouement for the old PML came at theCalc utta session in April 1938. Jinn ah resolved that the Pa njab Leag ue should be con-stituted anew, and a 35-member organizing committee was established representingboth factions. But Sikander's group got a strong majority with 25 supporters on thecommittee, with the old PML getting only 10. 47

The Unionists had now gained full control over the PML in what was yet anotherexpression in Panjab politics of the dominance of the landed over the bourgeoiselement. Sikander could now brand the old PML as traitors in the League camp, andmade it clear that he would not tolerate constant interference in Panjab affairs, onpain of withdrawing his support for the League. 4 8 Jinna h was not prepared for abreach with the Unionists, and gave Sikander complete freedom of action in thePanjab. This situation did not change substantially till Sikander's death in late 1942.Efforts by the old PML leaders to discuss in the AIML Council the vitiated state of theLeague in the Panjab made l i t t le headway.49 Nor were their efforts to open newLeague branches successful, for Sikander would not countenance their recognition bythe AIML, and had them rejected.50 Significantly, Sikander was using AIML bodies,such as the Cou ncil and special committees to suppress such initiatives. M eanwhile,the new PM L leadership under M amdot continued to impress upon Jinnah their soli-darity with Sikander.51

Jinnah had certainly allowed himself to be outmanoeuvred by Sikander, a conse-quence perh aps of his desperate ne ed for influential supp ort in 1937. Jin nah himselflacked an intimate knowledge of Panjab politics, and it is unlikely that any of his closeassociates counselled him against Sikander. Also, in a province where the rural liteshad overwhelming power, it was not unnatural that the League should play a sub-ordinate role to the Unionists in the initial years. The League's communal messageappealed to urban Muslims, as shown by their enthusiasm and large attendance at itsLahore session in March 1940. But the Unionists prevented the spread of this con-sciousness into the countryside by suppressing League organization up to 1942 n oteven an annual session of the PML was held. Men like Barkat Ali, excluded from thePM L, helped to organize the Panjab Muslim Stud ents 'Fed eratio n, and in 1941 theLvallour Pakistan Conference.52 H owever, without the P ML 's aid these could not serve45 Pirzada, op. cit. pp. 296-8; PGR, 10 May1938.46 Inform ation on this subject is from Batalwi,Iqbal ke . . ., pp. 606-7, 618, 623-9.47 Batalwi, H amari Qaumi Jadd-o-Jihd p p .16-18.

48IAR 1938 II, 346-7.49 Ibid. 1939 I, 374-5; II, 348.50 Khaliquzzaman, op. cit. pp. 228-9, 235.51 IAR 1941 II , 12-13.52Ibid. pp. 112-35.


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MUSLIM LEAGUE AND PANJAB 59as an organizational base for Muslim communalism. In this context Sikander's resig-nation from the National Defence Council cannot be regarded as a concession toJinnah, but rather as a defensive measure calculated to preserve the situation andavoid an open break. His response differed from Fazlul Haq's, who had far lessinfluence over the Ben gal Leagu e and therefore h ad less to lose.53 However, Sikander'scredibility was being increasingly questioned. His whole-hearted support for the wareffort appeared quite incongruent with the values of nationalism. Sikander's FederalScheme of 1939, based firmly on the principle of provincial autonomy, was in directconflict with the League's demand for a separate Muslim nation. Jinnah publicallycriticized the Scheme in 1942, whilst Sikander openly opposed the Pakis tand e m a n d .5 4 Jinnah had finally realized his mistake in entrusting the PML to Sikander,and in July 1942 he was removed from the AIM L W orking C om mitte e. But non e ofthese developments caused a radical departure from the established League-Unionist

The Leagu e-Unionist Clash of 1944However, two new factors emerged after 1940 which were to contribute to a funda-mental change in the balance of Panjab politics: the new life breathed into the Leagueby the Pakis tan dem and , and mo rtality among st political leaders of the 1930s. The

right of self-determination for the Muslim natio n was directed particularly at theMuslim-majority provinces, which could now be made to hope for complete separationfrom Hindu India. The League's demand armed it after 1940 with a positive doctrinethat was effectively to regenerate and exploit the religious fervour of Indian Muslims.This implied that provincial politics were to be radically affected by the Pakistanmovement, and this could not fail to alter the pattern of relations between the Leagueand Unionists, and tip the balance in favour of the former. After Sikander's death itwas on the strength of this resurgent Muslim nationalism that the League came intoconflict with the Unionist Ministry. But this clash was to be only outwardly one ofideologies. That the League was composed of the most reactionary elements was clearin the Pa njab , for Jin na h had pre ferred linkages with the lan ded gentry to links withthe rural and u rban masses or even the urban bourgeoisie. By ma nipulating nationaland communal symbols, this landed lite began to legitimize its control over the Paki-stan movement. With the growth of the League's influence in the Panjab in the 1940s,the class basis of its leadership d id not ch ange . In fact, dur ing these years the UnionistParty ceasedand the League beganto be the caucus of the M uslim lite, for a largesection broke its Unionist links and assumed leadership of the PML.

This development was facilitated by the second vital change in Panjab politics after1940: the passing of the old generatio n. Between 1940 and 1943 virtually all the m oreprominent Unionist leaders diedAhm ed Daultan a, S under Singh Majithia, Shahna-waz Khan Mamdot and Sikander Hyat. Only Chhotu Ram was alive during theLeague-Unionist clash in 1944, and he died in early 1945. These deaths were seriousblows to the inter-communal linkage and to unity amongst Muslim Unionists. Theformer proved to be the lesser evil. After Majithia's death, Akali criticism of theUnionists grew very severe,55 but an agreemen t was reached and Baldev Singh entered53 Fazlul Haq resigned from the Nat iona l

Defence Council, and also from the AIML Counciland Working Committee as a protest against Jin-nah's arbitrary use of power: ibid. p. 18.54 PGR, 28 Nov. 1942; Keesings ContemporaryArchives 22 Feb.-1 M ar. 1941 , 4480A; A. H. Ispa-

hani , Q uaid-i-Azam as I Knew H m (Karachi,Rota Printing Agency, 1968), pp. 56-8; G. A.Khan, op. cit. p p . 202-3.55 PGR , 21 Oct. 1941; 22 Nov. 1941; for thefamily history of Majithia (1872-1941) see Griffinand Massy, op. cit. I, 413-20.


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6 SOUTH ASIAthe Cabinet .5 6 After Chhotu Ram 's death there was a threatened spli t amongst H induJats, b ut this was resolved by their unanim ous choice of Tika R am for the Ca bine t.57Dissensions within the Muslim Unionists proved more serious and irreparable than theinter-c om mu nal tensions; and bore striking similarities to the factionalism before1937. Sikander had conciliated the Noon-Tiwana group in 1937 by taking Khizr HyatKhan Tiwana into the Cabinet.5 8 When Khizr himself became Premier in 1943 thenew generation of Unionists had no experience of the years of cooperation that,despite all the intrigues, had kept their predecessors together. Shaukat Hyat Khan,Mumtaz Daultana and If t ikhar Husain Khan of Mamdot, 5 9 who had assumed leader-ship of the Panjab Muslim League, were unable to reach a compromise with Khizr.One reason for this was the growing confidence in the League, which had recentlyformed Ministr ies in Bengal, Sind and N W FP. 6 0 A Unionist faction could now affordto opt for the League and break with the Unionist Party. However, one ubiquitoustendency remainedthe thirst for office am ong st Pa njab politician sand this causedthe League, after seven years of passivity, to challenge Khizr's Ministry.

After Sikander Hyat 's death, Jinnah, at the PML's urging, attempted to assumegreater control over Panjab affairs. He expressed anger at not being consulted on theappointment of a League member, Khizr Hyat, as Premier.61 Expressing dissatisfac-tion with the existing situation, th e AIML C ouncil told Khizr to resuscitate th e Lea guein the Panjab Assembly and bring the Unionists under its control. 6 2 Khizr attemptedto preserve the status quo by upholding the Sikander-Jinnah Pact, which he inter-preted as excluding the League from interference in Panjab's internal politics. 63 H ewished to maintain his inter-communal Ministry, and the British wanted a stablegovernment in the Panjab for the war effort, on which the League's policy wasregarded as indeterm inate and unreliable. 64 But there were various indications of theLeague's bid for greater intervention. During 1943 there was a noticeable increase inLeague organization and political activity,65 accompanied by rumours of a split inUnionist ranks.6 6 There was renewed friction between Khizr and the PML leadership,which constantly protested to Jin na h ab out the lack of vitality in the L eagu e AssemblyParty, and asked for his intercession. 67

5 6This was a conseq uence of the Sikande rBaldev Agreement: PGR, 26 May 1942; IAR 1940I, 93. For a discussion of Sikh politics in this periodsee Stephen Oren , Th e Sikhs, Congress, and theUnionists in British Punjab, 1937-1945 , ModernAsian Studies VIII no . 3 (July 1974), 397-419; andB. R. Nayar, Minority Politics in the Punjab(Princeton, PUP, 1966), pp. 75-97.57Pioneer 1945: 15, 28 Jan.58 From am ongst his own sup porters, Sikanderhad made Ahmed Daultana Chief ParliamentarySecretary, and Chaudhry Shahab-ud-Din Speakerof the Assembly. The Daultana family obtainedland from the British, first as leasehold and thenunder proprietary rights at concessionary terms, inthe Multan District in the nineteenth century.They also owned an inundation canal, andobtained compensation in Colony land and cashwhen it was incorporated into the Sutlej ValleyProject after 1925.For Khizr Tiwan a's family history see Griffin andMassy, op. cit. II, 191-210. The Tiwana familyalso obtained leasehold and then proprietary rightsin land granted by the Brit ish in S hahpur District ,where they also owned several inundation canals.They penetrated extensively into the Canal

Colonies through auction purchases, and landedgentry and stud-farm grants.Significantly, Noon, Mamdot, Daultana andTiwana were all not merely landlords but alsowater-lords, and this no doubt enhanced theirpolitical influence and economic power. Thelargest water-lords in the Panjan, by far, were itsBritish rulers, and the political control they thusobtain ed is indicate d by the absence of any seriousnationalist challenge virtually till 1947.5 9These three me n w ere the sons respectively ofSikander Hyat, Ahmed Daultana and ShahnawazMamdot .60 IAR 1944 1, 223; PG R, 12 May1943;22 Aug.1943.61 PGR, 15 March 1943.62 Ibid.; IAR 1943, I, 277-8.63 G. A. Khan, op. at. p. 221.64IAR 1944 I, 218-21, 225-6.65 PGR: C SR for 2nd 1/2 of M arch 1943;CSR for2nd 1/2 July 1943.66 PGR: CSR for 1st 1/2 May 19 43; CSR for 2nd1/2 Ju ne 1943; CSR for 1st 1/2 Aug . 1943; CSR for1st 1/2 Sept. 1943; PG R, 6 July 1943 .67 G. A. Kha n, op. cit. p p . 222-3.


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MUSLIM LEAGUE AND PANJAB 61Jinnah's response to these developments was to assess the political situation in thePanjab. He sent three committees to Lahore in late 1943 and early 1944 to probe thechances of forming a League Ministry, but they failed to elicit Khizr's cooperation.68Finally, in Marc h 1944, Jinnafa himself arrived in Laho re to co nduc t neg otiations withKhizr. On the grounds that Unionist MLAs had previously signed League membershipforms, Jfinnah held that the League rather than the Unionist Party formed thecoalition Ministry with non-M uslims, and that even its nam e be changed to Muslim

League Coalition Party .69 Khizr rejected these demands, stressing the non-communalnature of the Unionist Party whose relations with the League were strictly subject tothe Sikander-Jinnah Pact.70 Jin na h publically ridiculed Khizr's interpreta tion of thePac t, and declared th at he wan ted to kill the very nam e Unio nist .71 With this theKhizr-Jinnah negotiations broke down completely. During May Khizr refused to relentto further League pressure, and with no other option left he was finally expelled fromits membership. Thus the League's efforts to gain control of the Ministry were unsuc-cessful, and resulted in a complete breach with the Unionists. There was now nolonger the pretence of dual membership of the League and the Unionist Party; and adistinct League Party, which sat in opposition to the Ministry, was constituted in theAssembly.In its efforts to browbeat the Ministry, the League had claimed that Unionistsceased to belong to the PNUP when they obtained formal membership of the

League.7 2 In reality, under Sikander Muslim MLAs had throughout remained loyal tothe Ministry, and und er K hizr it is doubtful if the majority would have risked opposingthe Ministry.73 Even throughout 1944 the League could count on the support of nomore than a third of the Muslim members. 7 4 Mamdot and his followers undoubtedlygave Jin nah a misleading impression of the extent of their suppo rt, and by using theLeague as their vehicle in what was essentially a factional struggle within th e U nionistParty, involved Jinn ah in an unsuccessful and e mba rrassing en coun ter with K hizr.The PML in 1944 did not have the organizational capacity to challenge the Ministrywith a non-cooperation movement. It was further weakened by internal dissensionscaused by resistance from older PML groups to the yet fledgling leadership of con-verted Unionists l ike Mamdot and Daultana.7 5 Also, the British, the non-MuslimMinisters a nd the non-M uslim press stood solidly by Khizr.76 The breach between theUnionist Party and the League was permanent, and was to have adverse consequencesfor the latter's all-India image. At the Simla Conference in 1945, Unionist insistenceon a non-League member from the Panjab for the Viceroy's Executive Council was thechief failing in the League's claim to be the sole representative of Indian Muslims. 77Th e events of 1944 crystallized past trends a nd showed the way to future ones. W ellbefore it made a serious challenge for Ministerial power, PML leadership had already

68 PGR , 8 D ec. 1943: CSR for 1st 1/2 Feb. 1944;the three committees were the League ElectionEnquiry Committee, the Co mmittee of Action an da Committee to examine the PML Constitution.69IAR 1944 I, 217-21) Jam il-ud-D in Ahm ed(ed.), Historic Documents of the Muslim FreedomMovement (Lahore, Publishers United, 1970), pp.479-82.70 IAR 1944 I, 220-1.71 Ibid. p. 222.72 Ibid. p. 231.7 3PGR , CSR for 1st 1/2 Sept. 1943.74 PGR, 24 Jun e 1944; Pioneer 5 Dec. 1944;both sources gives the strength of the MuslimLeague Assembly Party at 26 MLA's. Ex-Unionist

politicians in Pakistan are normally not forth-coming with their private papers, pe rhaps owing totheir fear of being marked as collaborato rs . Thishas restricted insight into aspects of Panjabpolitics, such as intra-party factionalism and indi-vidual considerations in th e conversion of Unioniststo Muslim nationalists.7 5 E.g., M amd ot had m uch difficulty in con-trolling the Lahore City Muslim League: see Afzal,op. cit. p. 60; PGR , CSR for 2nd 1/2 Ju ne 1943;CSR for 1st 1/2 Au g. 1943.76 IAR 1944 I 225-8.7 7See Khizr Hyat's Statem ent on th e Simla Con-ference: Pioneer 17 July 1945.


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62 SOUTH ASIApassed to the landed lite. Shahnawaz Marndot's personal allegiance to Sikander hadensured th at this would not split the Unionists. In fact, the Le ague in the PanjabAssembly had no separate decision- and policy-making structure, but subscribed tothat of the Unionist coalition, arrived at in common with non-Muslim MLAs. Thismea nt tha t the League Assembly Party had a paper rathe r than a real existence. From1937 to 1940 this did not create tension, as League policy was too indeterminate torequire a separate parliamentary identity. But after the Pakistan resolution thisposition was fundamentally changed. The League's role was now no longer to placateMinisterial power but to attain Pakistan; and for this, determined support fromLeague parties in provincial legislatures was essential. But Khizr, the new Premier,refused to allow Muslim ML As to be controlled by the League Parlia me ntary Boa rd,thus frustrating League efforts to formulate policies in the Assembly independent ofthe inter-communal linkage. This was one reason for the 1944 clash: the other was thechoice of Khizr as Premier. Owing to factionalism and rivalry amongst the largestlandlords, the British had from the earliest found it convenient to bestow Unionistleadership on men whose personal power did not come from land Fazl-i-Husain andSikander Hyat (who came from an eminent landed family but was not himself a largeproprietor). In choosing Khizr they made a strategic mistake by departing from thistradit ion and upsett ing the factional balance, thus inducing men like If t ikhar Mam-dot and Mumtaz Daultana to seek power through the League and the Pakistandemand. This breakaway could have proved abortive, for in the Assembly up tomid-1945 the League had only abo ut twenty-five adhe rents, a nd even suffered somedesertions to the Ministry. However, the announcement of elections for 1946 caused adramatic reversal, for it brought into further prominence the prospect of nationalindependence and with i t the vital need to resolve the communal problem. TheLeague alone appeared to Muslims to be able to tackle these issues, and Muslimpoliticians realized that the future lay with it rather than the Unionist Party. Thedesertion of Muslim Unionists to the League became a common feature in the latterhalf of 1945, and for the elections there was com plete identification of the L eague withthe landed li te. Thus the si tuation before independence was the produc t of a complexinteraction of communalization, factionalism and nationalism, leading to the consoli-dation of power by the dominant classes.

The Complete Break: 1945-47In the long run the clash of 1944 proved a blessing in disguise for the PML. It wasnow independent of the Unionist Party's control, and could concentrate on populariz-ing the Pakistan demand and expanding i ts organization, to which the prospect ofelections in the winter of 1945-6 added a further stimulus. 78 The Muslim LeagueNationa l G uard, the Muslim Students' Federation and the Jamiat-ul-Ulema-i-Islamalso served as platforms for th e L eagu e, whilst as a counterpoise th e Unionists revivedthe Zamindara League. During 1945 efforts were made at League-Unionist reconcili-ation, but none of these came to anything, for the League demanded a completesurrender and the Unionists wanted a reversal to the pre-1943 situation. 79 T h eLeagu e's failure to reconcile the Unionists was only one aspect of its isolation in 1 945.

78 JAR 1944 I,232-3;P GR : CSR for 2nd 1/2 May1944; CSR for 1st 1/2 Nov. 1945; CSR for 1st 1/2Dec. 1945;Pioneer 20 Oct. 1944; 29 Dec. 1944; 30Jan. 1945.79Pioneer 1945: 16 Ja n.; 2 July; 19, 2 4, 2 8, 30

Sept.; 1 Oc t.; Panjab politicians like Abd ul Haye,the Minister of Edu cation , and F. K. Noon, tried toinitiate a rapprochement and further efforts weremade at the Simla Conference.


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MUSLIM LEAGUE AND PANjAB 6Equally unsuccessful wereitsefforts to reach a settlement with the Congressand theAkali Sikhs.80TheLeaguehad fundamental differences withtheother parties,due toits campaign for Pakistan. On the other hand, the traditional Unionist suspicion ofCongresswasd isappear ing,81 whilstthe Sikander-Baldev Pact already providedfor co-operation with the Akalis. These trends not only strengthened the non-communalspiritof the Panjab Ministry, but also anticipated political allegiances after the 1946elections.

The League and Unionists contested virtuallyall the Muslim constituencies in theelections.Therivalryof the 1937electionswasrevivedon amuc h larger scale,and theconcordof theinterven ing years firmlysetaside. Becausethevital issueof the Pakistandemandwas at stake, therewas a profusion of religious symbolism, in the League'selection cam paign.Thepowerofmosquesandulemaand theinfluenceof the Muslimbureaucracy were employed to the full.82 The Unionists harnessed administrativeresources, land grantsand War-Front Fundsfor their campaign. The election resultsshowed which of the twofactors, the religious or the governmental , was the morepotent . The League emerged with seventy-five Muslim seats and the Unionists withonly thir teen.8 3 This transition, overtly caused by the Pakistan issue, had a strongunderlying continuity:theMuslim land ed litehad not been displacedbut hadjoinedthe League.8 4Though it was the largest party in the new legislature, the League's ambition to

form a Ministrywas to bedefeatedby theexigenciesof the Communal Award. It didnot havean absolute majority, and a coalition wasnecessary, for which negotiationstook place at a hectic pace between 25 February and 6March 1946. Having aban-doned thepoliticsof compromise priorto the elections, the League now found itselfthe victim of its own extremism. There does not appear to have been a seriousinitiativefor a League-Unionist settlement,sowidewas thebreach between them.TheLeague tr ied for a coalition with the Akalisand the Congress, but these efforts wereunsuccessful. The Akalis, already being enticed awaybyCongress,85 were unable toobtain from the PML thepromise of autonomy or independence as a condition foraccepting Pakistan.86 A League-Congress compromise came unstuck because theLeague insisted that no Congressite Muslim be nominated to the Cabinet .87 Bycontrast , the small Unionist group suffered from no such impediments, and on 6MarchSir Bertrand Glancy, the Panjab Governor, invited Khizr to head a Congress-Akali-Unionist Coalition. League leaders censured Glancyfor preventing the forma-tion of a League Ministry.38 Mamdot even claimed to have an absolute majority,whichthe Governorhad notcredited.89 Certainly, the Party that could nowclaim to

80Ibid. 25 Aug.; 5, 7Sept.; 1 Oct.: at this timemany Muslims left Congress and joined theLeague,themost promine nt being Mian Ift ikhar-ud-Din, President of the Panjab ProvincialCon-gress Committee.81SeespeechofTikaRam,MinisterofRevenue,identifying UnionistsandCongress interests: ibid.25 , 29July.82 Ibid. 1946: 7April ; 10 Oct.; PGR, 1 Dec.1945; K. B. Sayeed, Pakistan The FormativePhase (London, OUP, 1968),p. 20S.83TheUnionist Partywon 20seats,ofwhich13were Muslim. However, Khizr was elected fromthree seatsand had to resign from two. Theotherresults were: Congress51,Panthic Akali Sikhs22,Independents 7: Pioneer 24 Jan. 1946.84 Over40% of Muslim MLAs were re-elected.The newly elected Muslim MLAs can readily be

identified as belonging to major land-owningfamilies,or hadnam e prefixes suchas Chaudhrywhich indicate land-holding status.Anillustrationoftheabsenceofchangein theclass compositionofMuslim leadershipwas theelectionofMalik FerozeKhan Noon and Shaukat Hyat Khan from urbanconstituencies.Seelistof members, Panjab Legis-lative Assembly Debates 1937 and1946.8 5Anagreement was reached about the distri-bution of offices between Akalis and CongressSikhs; Pioneer 3-5March1946.86Ibid. 26 Feb., 1, 2, 9, 10 March.87 Ibid. 7 March.88 Ibid. 7, 9, 13 March.89Mamdot claimed thathe wassupportedby 88MLAs,butGlancyhadonly credited himwith78and insisted tha t theothers were neutral: ibid. 6,10 March.


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64 SOUTH ASIArepresent Panjab Muslims was kept out of the Ministry against its will. Th e decision toextend the life of the Unionist Party was an unfortunate one, for it only impeded theLeague's entry into the Ministry. It could no longer play an independent role, andpower was placed in the hands of the Hindu and Sikh parties. This could not havebeen done without the partisanship of the British, who perhaps decided to retain somesemblance of an inter-communal government in the Panjab, rather than committhemselves to a Muslim communal Ministry.

Finding itself in opposition at the height of its power, the Panjab Muslim Leagueduring 1946 abstained from active non-cooperation for two main reasons. Firstly, itexpected the Coalition itself to break up, for the Akali-Congress compact was uneasyat best. But the Sikhs in fact remained in the Coalition mainly to prevent the Leaguefrom joining it. Secondly, the League regarded the constitutional process as the meansof testing its strength againt the Coalition. However, this too was closed to it when theGovernment prematurely ended the 1946 Assembly Session by a motion adjourning itsine die.90 It was clear that the M uslims could only be kept out of power by suspen dingthe democratic process. Also, by passing the Panjab Public Safety Ordinance theGovernment obtained special powers for the enforcement of law and order, and twofurther orders prohibited the holding of demonstrations and public meetings. 91This tense si tuation erupted when the Government banned the Muslim LeagueNa tiona l Guard an d the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh on 24 Jan uary 1947 an d

raided their offices, arresting seven top PM L lead ers.92 This gave the PML, till now infrustrated opposition, the opportunity to challenge the Ministry openly. The Leagueundertook a virulent non-cooperation movement lasting till 26 February 1947, for theremoval of the repressive measures. 93 The movement found mass support with Mus-lims, the Safety Ordinance was openly defied in every large town, and it culminatedtriumphantly by bringing down the Khizr Ministry. With events moving swiftlytowards Partition the Unionist Party, even as a rump, now ceased to have any role inPan jab p olitics. As a political force it had bee n effaced by the 1946 elections . T heLeague, on the other hand, ruled the hearts of Panjabi Muslims, and tore to theground the inter-communal bonds that the Unionists held so dear and that had so farkept the Panjab as one Province.Conclusion

This article has attempted to show the elements of continuity in provincial politicsduring the period that witnessed South Asia's transition to national independence. Inthe Panjab League-Unionist relations demonstrated the method and tactics by whichan entrenched power lite adapted itself to changing political circumstances. Theexpediency that had led the landed interest to identify with the British and with non-communal politics also enabled it to join and control a communal party workingtowards independence. Power within the oligarchy was regulated through factional-ism, and it was factionalism that came to mould League-Unionist relations. Withinthe broader ideological struggle for a separate Muslim nation was the tussle by thelanded interest to retain its dominance in this transitional period. For this the Leagueserved as an ideal vehicle, allowing itself first to be subordinated to the existing powergroup, and then facilitating its assumption of the leadership of mass politics. This hasha d various consequences. T he Leagu e in the Panjab was never in office nor d id it everhave the opportunity to build a grass-roots organization in any way comparable to the90Ibid. 20 July9 1 b i d . 2 1 25 Nov

92 b i d . 25Jan 19479 3bid. 7 Feb 1947


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MUSLIM LEAGUE AND PANJAB 65Congress. This explains the differing fortunes of the League and the Congress afterinde pen den ce, the one una ble to sustain any cohesion in the face of factionalism andself-interest,94 and the other remaining in office unchallenged and retaining itsorganizational structure to this day. Because the political domination of big landlordshad not been superseded before 1947 as it was in the Hindu-majority provinces, Paki-stan did not in the 1950s, and still does not, have an effective land reform. 95 T hepolitical confusion of the 1950s did, however, reveal the ineptitude of the landedinterest either to provide satisfactory national leadership or operate a sound politicalsystem. This would indica te that its function is mo re that of an interm ediary promis-ing control and pacification of the countryside to the ruling authority. Such anauthority was the British up to 1947, and such another the military in the 1960s whilst in the 1970s the large landed element has successfully infiltrated a ruling partythat was initially elected on a progressive programme.

94 For a review of th e Muslim Leag ue inPakistani politics see K. Callard, Pakistan: aPolitical Study (Lon don, Allen & Unwin, 1957),pp . 34-76.

9 5Thi s issue is surveyed in N. San dara tne, Landowners and Land Reform in Pakistan ,South Asian Review VII no.2, 123-36.