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Religion, Media Credibility, and Supportfor Democracy in the Arab WorldGuy J. Golan a & Spiro K. Kiousis ba Seton Hall Universityb University of FloridaPublished online: 17 May 2010.

To cite this article: Guy J. Golan & Spiro K. Kiousis (2010) Religion, Media Credibility, andSupport for Democracy in the Arab World, Journal of Media and Religion, 9:2, 84-98, DOI:10.1080/15348421003738793

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Journal of Media and Religion, 9:84–98, 2010

Copyright © Taylor & Francis Group, LLC

ISSN: 1534-8423 print/1534-7701 online

DOI: 10.1080/15348421003738793

Religion, Media Credibility, and Support forDemocracy in the Arab World

Guy J. GolanSeton Hall University

Spiro K. KiousisUniversity of Florida

Ever since the events of September 11, 2001 and the subsequent war in Iraq, the U.S. State

Department has invested much effort into winning the hearts and minds of individuals around

the Muslim world. Using secondary data from a large-scale public opinion survey of Arab youth

in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the current study presents a model that identifies the complex and

multidimensional relationships among religion-based variables, media credibility and individual

assessments of democracy. The results of our path analysis point to a significant relationship

between personal religiosity and media credibility for both domestic and foreign media, as well as

mixed findings regarding the relationship between perceptions of media credibility and perceptions

of democracy.

Following the tragic events of September 11, 2001 and of the second Iraq war, the Bush

administration publicized its commitment to improving perceptions of the United States within

the Muslim world. The government launched a multimillion dollar public relations campaign

headed by Under-Secretary Karen Hughes with the declared purpose of winning the intellectual

war of values against radical Islam and promoting pro-American attitudes in the Muslim world

(Applebaum, 2005). In their attempt to identify some of the variables that may account for

the multidimensional anti-American sentiments, some scholars have pointed to the role of the

media as a mitigating variable (Nisbet, Nisbet, Scheufele, & Shanahan, 2004).

Ever since the end of the Cold War, the globalization movement changed the very nature

of the transnational news media with the mass diffusion of Satellite and Internet technologies

to media markets around the world. This proliferation of Western media and media content

into the Third World often challenged many of the core values of highly traditional societies

(Barzilai-Nahon & Barzilai, 2005; Wheeler, 1998).

The current study examines the assessments of Arab youth in regard to media credibility

of both domestic and satellite networks in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. It analyzes the role that

Correspondence should be sent to Guy J. Golan, PO Box 287082, New York, NY 10128. E-mail: golanresearch@

yahoo.com

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MEDIA CREDIBILITY IN THE ARAB WORLD 85

personal and collective religion-based variables play in their assessment and later analyzes the

relationship between media credibility and assessments and attitudes toward the West. Finally,

research findings are synthesized into the broader spectrum of media credibility research and

global strategic communications.

LITERATURE REVIEW

Mass Media in the Muslim World

Dissimilar from most Western nations, mass media channels in Muslim nations traditionally

have been state owned (Ayish, 2002) and provided a limited degree of press freedom (Connolly-

Ahern & Golan, 2007). The diffusion of the World Wide Web and the introduction of satellite

news channels into the Muslim world have somewhat altered the very nature of mass media in

the Muslim world with the Al-Jazeera network at the forefront of these changes, described by

many scholars as an Arabic-language channel that provides a pluralist and diverse perspective

of worldviews to audiences in the Arab world (Lynch, 2006; Miles, 2005). The so-called

Al-Jazeera effect has been credited with modernizing the very nature of mass media in the

Middle East (El-Nawawy & Gher, 2003). However, some have argued that the channel pushes

a pan-Islamic perspective in an attempt to shape world public opinion (Cherribi, 2006).

Some scholars posit that the mass media in general and the Internet and satellite technology

in particular represent the core values of a secular Western global society (Zassoursky, 2002)

and therefore may represent a threat to those who identify themselves to be highly religious

(Gross, 1990). One may assume that nowhere will this rejection of new media become more

prevalent than among highly religious individuals in the Muslim world, but research has

provided some mixed evidence. As shown by those who argued for the concept of cultured

technology (Barzilai-Nahon & Barzilai, 2005), members of fundamentalist groups often reshape

a technology and make it a part of their culture. Thus, a cultural context and perspective is

necessary for an understanding of how some adapt the tools of Western globalization while

sustaining their own cultural traditions (Wheeler, 1998).

While many Muslim fundamentalists reject the values of globalization and Westernization

that are often associated with the World Wide Web and satellite media, they nevertheless adopt

these same technologies for the promotion of their own ideology and political purposes. Since

the events of September 11, the world has witnessed the manner through which pan-Islamic

terror organizations such as Hezbollah and al-Qaeda have adopted Western technology in the

promotion of their own anti-Western campaigns (Weimann, 2006).

However, the adaptation of new Western media by people of high religiosity in the Islamic

world should not be reduced to political movements or terror groups. As argued by Khatib

(2003), the Internet is used by many who view themselves as highly religious or fundamentalists

as an identity tool through which they share their values and world perspectives with other

Muslims around the world.

The current study focused on the complex relationship between personal and political Islam

and perceptions of media credibility of users in regards to both domestic media and global

satellite media. The following sections will provide some background regarding research on

media credibility and its relationship to research on media and religious audiences.

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86 GOLAN AND KIOUSIS

Media Credibility

As noted by Kiousis (2001), media credibility research traditionally has focused on either source

or medium credibility. While research of the former primarily focuses on the characteristics of

the message source such as communicator and message variables (Sundar, 1998; Greer, 2003;

Fico, Richardson, & Edwards, 2004; Cheong-Yi, 2006), the latter focuses on the very nature

of the medium through which the message is transmitted such as differences between online

and traditional media (Johnson & Kay, 1998; Flanagin & Metzger, 2000; Johnson & Kaye,

2002). Although both perspectives have contributed much to scholarship on media credibility,

no one variable can alone predict or account for this multidimensional concept (Berlo, Lemert,

& Mertz, 1970). Media credibility does not always depend on the source of the message, nor

does it always depend on the nature of the medium through which the message is delivered.

There is some evidence suggesting that the extent of perceived media credibility may depend

in part on audience-based variables.

Audience-Based Approach

An audience-based approach to the study of media credibility traditionally has focused on

demographics. However, some scholars have argued for the need to move beyond mere demo-

graphics to include individual factors (Eveland & Shaw, 2003) in predicting media credibility

(Gunther, 1992). While the demographics approach often focuses on such variables as gender,

age, and education as predictors of media credibility, the individual factors research approach

examines how partisanship, issue involvement, and media reliance may influence individual

perceptions of media credibility.

Demographics

Age has been identified as a key predictor of media credibility. Bucy (2003) compared evalu-

ations of media credibility across five dimensions and found that younger audiences evaluated

media as more credible than did older audiences. These findings are consistent with previous

studies indicating that younger audiences were more positive in their evaluations of media

credibility than were older audiences (Reagan & Zenaty, 1979; Robinson & Kohut, 1988).

Mulder (1981) found that education, coupled with age, influenced perceptions of media

credibility. He also found that older, more educated individuals tended to judge the media as

less credible than did younger, less educated audiences.

Ibelema and Powell (2001) found a significant relationship between income and evaluations

of radio credibility as lower income individuals perceived radio news to be more credible than

did those with higher incomes.

Robinson and Kohut (1988) found that gender was highly associated with media credibility

as men tended to evaluate the media as less credible than did women. Johnson and Kay (1998)

found that women trusted online news more than men did. The results of Eveland and Shah’s

(2003) study suggested that men were more likely to perceive the media as biased than women.

Beaudoin and Thorson (2005) identified race as a significant predictor of media credibility.

Their analysis of survey data indicated that evaluations of news coverage of racial in and out

groups largely depended on one’s racial identification.

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MEDIA CREDIBILITY IN THE ARAB WORLD 87

Individual Factors

Moving beyond mere demographics, mass communication scholars have identified a series of

individual factors such as media reliance (Johnson & Kaye, 2004; Wanta & Hu, 1994) and

media consumption (Bucy, 2003; Tsfati & Cappella, 2003) in predicting assessments of media

credibility.

The involvement of an individual with an issue or with a group has been identified by schol-

ars as a key predictor of media credibility (Johnson & Fahmy, 2008). So strong is this variable

in predicting perceptions of media credibility that it has produced an offshoot line of research

referred to as the hostile media effect. According to this perspective, individuals who have a high

degree of involvement with an issue or a group typically will view media coverage of their issue

or group as biased against their position (Christen, Kannaovakun, & Gunther, 2002; Gunther,

Christen, Liebhart, & Chia, 2001; Schmitt, Gunther, & Liebhart, 2004; Vallone, Ross, & Lepper,

1985). Research on the hostile media effect consistently points to a significant relationship

between issue or group involvement and lower individual assessments of media credibility.

Involvement has been tested and identified as a predictor of media credibility outside of

hostile media effect research. Eveland and Shaw (2003) tested political involvement as a

predictor of perceived media bias against one’s own opinion. The results of their analysis

pointed to a statistically significant relationship between the two variables. In their assessment of

Weblog credibility, Johnson and Kaye (2004) identified a moderate but significant relationship

between users’ political involvement and their overall evaluations credibility. Choi, Watt, and

Lynch (2006) tested perceptions of online media credibility among those who either supported

or opposed the war in Iraq. The results of their analysis indicated a significant relationship

between issue involvement (support or opposition to the war) and overall assessments of Internet

credibility.

Gunther’s (1992) analysis of survey data tested how demographic variables, media attributes,

skepticism, and involvement may predict overall assessments of media credibility. He found

group membership to be the strongest and most significant predictor of any other variable

included in the study. The author related these findings to research on the hostile media effect

and argued for the theoretical implications of partisanship as a core antecedent of media

credibility.

This study aims to advance research on media credibility by providing one of the first

measurements of the impact of religious-based variables on credibility at both the demographic

and individual-factors level using an audience-based approach. At the demographic level, we

will measure the impact of personal religiosity on assessments of media credibility. As for the

individual factors, we will test how involvement in a religious political ideology may impact

individual assessments of media credibility.

RELIGIOSITY AND MEDIA CREDIBILITY

As highlighted by Buddenbaum and Stout (1996), research of religion and the media is largely

underinvestigated. The limited scholarship published in this discipline points toward a complex

and often problematic relationship between people of faith and what they often perceive as a

secular media that often contradicts their values (Kerr, 2003; Swatos & Christiano, 2001).

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88 GOLAN AND KIOUSIS

Media scholars have identified significant relationships between the different levels of

religiosity and various media consumption habits. Such relationships are often contradictory

in direction and may entirely depend on the religious affiliation of study participants or the

medium that is examined. However, research does suggest that those of higher religiosity prefer

traditional media outlets over new media.

While some studies point to a positive relationship between religiosity and newspaper

(Finnegan & Viswanath, 1988; Sobel & Jackson-Beeck, 1981; Stamm & Weis, 1986) and

magazine readership magazine use (Al-Olayan & Karande, 2000; Swatos, 1988), other studies

point to a significant negative correlation between religiosity and media consumption of both

television (Hamilton & Rubin, 1992; Tankard & Harris, 1980) and the Internet (Armfield &

Holbert, 2003; Day, 2005).

The secularization hypothesis has been widely used as an explanation for media consumption

differences among people of faith (Buddenbaum, 1986; Buddenbaum & Stout, 1996). When

applied to the mass media, secularization argues that the mainstream media serve agents of

secularization that may undermine religious values, faith, and commitment over time (Maguire

& Weatherby, 1998).

Thus, the mass media are viewed by some people of higher religiosity as a competing and

sometimes antagonistic platform for the advocacy of core values and belief systems. Although

some have argued that secularization may cause religious audiences to shun the secular media

(Brock and Balloun, 1967), others have argued that secularization may lead to the emergence

of interpretive communities (Stout, 2004). Understanding the media consumption habits of

religious audiences is of great importance to research of religiosity and media credibility

because consumption has been identified by previous studies as a principal influence on

perceived media credibility (Greer, 2003; Rimmer & Weaver, 1987; Shaw, 1973).

Indeed two recent studies directly tested and identified a negative relationship between

religious identity and perceived media credibility. Ariyanto, Hornsey, and Gallois (2007) tested

how religious group membership may influence perceptions of media bias regarding in and

out groups. Their study of Christians and Muslims in Indonesia identified an interaction

between strong identification with one’s religious group and perceptions of media bias in terms

of coverage of that religious group. Golan and Day (2007) directly tested the relationship

between religiosity and perceived media bias. They found significant linkages among an array

of religiosity-based variables, including how much guidance one gets from religion, the role

of religion in one’s life and prayer, and different dimensions of media credibility.

Based on the previous research that indicates a negative relationship between religiosity and

media consumption and the research that identified media consumption as a positive predictor

of media credibility, we predict the following:

H1: The higher an individual’s level of religiosity, the lower will be their assessment of

credibility of domestic media.

H2: The higher an individual’s level of religiosity, the lower will be their assessment of

credibility of satellite and the Internet.

The political Islam dimension serves as an extension of personal religiosity into the political

realm. While personal religiosity focuses on the role of religion in one’s personal life, the

political Islam dimension focuses on one’s view of the role of religion in public life. At its

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MEDIA CREDIBILITY IN THE ARAB WORLD 89

most basic level, political Islam refers to Islam as a political rather than a theological construct

that applies the rules of Islam to the political, economic and social aspects of public life

(Fuller, 2003). Much like religious fundamentalists of other faiths (Gross, 1990), attitudes of

Muslim fundamentalists toward traditional mass media often carry a certain degree of suspicion.

Furthermore, Muslim adherents are likely to be suspicious of online and satellite media as

agents of the non-Islamic world (the Arab concept of Dar al-Harb) who are trying to import

their values into the Muslim world (the Arab concept of Dar al-Islam).

Based on the previously discussed research regarding religiosity and media credibility, as

well as the perceived threat of Western influence on the values of the Muslim, we predict the

following:

H3: The higher an individual’s level of political Islam, the lower will be their assessment

of credibility of domestic media.

H4: The higher an individual’s level of political Islam, the lower will be their assessment

of credibility of satellite and the Internet.

MEDIA CREDIBILITY AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THE WEST

In the wake of September 11 and the war in Iraq, Western diplomats have been struggling to

identify the factors that may lead to negative evaluations of Western cultures within Muslim

societies. It appears that media-based variables may be among the many factors that may help

explain this complex foreign policy issue.

Gentzkow and Shapiro (2004) measured the influence of media exposure and education on

anti-American sentiments in the Arab world. They found that exposure to satellite news sources

was directly linked to viewers’ attitudes toward the United States. The results of their analysis

suggested the Al-Jazeera viewers were more likely to hold negative views of the United States

than nonviewers while audiences of CNN were more likely hold positive attitudes toward the

United States.

Nisbet et al. (2004) also provide evidence of a significant relationship between media

consumption in the Muslim world and anti-American attitudes. The results of their analysis of

public opinion polls from nine Muslim nations indicate that overall attention to television news

was strongly associated with negative perceptions of the United States. Like Gentzkow and

Shapiro (2004), the authors found that attention to Arab-based media is positively related to

anti-American attitudes, while attention to Western media is negatively related to anti-American

attitudes. The authors point to overall attention to television news coverage of the United States

as the strongest predictor of anti-American attitudes.

The relationship between media credibility, reliance and the agenda setting process was

highlighted by Wanta and Hu (1994). Using a path analysis, the authors found that higher

levels of credibility often lead to higher levels of reliance on the media, which ultimately

increases their susceptibility to the agenda setting process. If applied to the credibility of news

in the Muslim world, one may predict that higher levels of credibility may lead to higher levels

of reliance and consequently assessments of pro- or anti-American attitudes. Indeed research

suggests that exposure to media coverage of world nations may lead to individual evaluations

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90 GOLAN AND KIOUSIS

of those nations at both the cognitive (Salwen & Matera, 1989; Semetko et al., 1992) and

affective levels (Wanta, Golan, & Lee, 2004).

It is important to note that media variables alone cannot predict anti-American perceptions,

nor can they predict negative attitudes toward democracy in the Muslim world. Yet it appears

from the research that there is some connection between what people watch and how they

perceive the world. Based on Wanta and Hu’s (1994) assertion that media credibility and

reliance may impact media effects and on the research that indicates that source of world news

may help predict pro and anti-American attitudes, we predicted the following:

H5: Higher perceptions of media credibility (domestic) will predict more negative assess-

ments of democracy.

H6: Higher perceptions of media credibility (international) will predict more positive as-

sessments of democracy.

METHOD

Using secondary data from a cross-national study conducted by Moaddel, Karabenick, and

Thornton (2005), the present study examined the interrelationships among perceptions of

religiosity, media credibility, and attitudes toward democracy with a sample of 1,882 Arab

youths from Egypt and Saudi Arabia. The data were collected via face-to-face interviews in

three major cities of each country. For Egypt, the cities were Alexandria, El-Minya, and Cairo;

for Saudi Arabia, they were Jeddah, Riyadh, and Dammam/Khobar.

Sample participants were between the ages of 18 and 25. Nearly 57% of respondents were

male, and 43% were female. The majority of participants obtained some level of secondary

schooling while nearly 30% attended or completed a university.

KEY VARIABLES

Media Credibility

Our measurements of respondents’ perceived media credibility were aggregated within two

separate media credibility indices, one for domestic TV and newspapers within Egypt and

Saudi Arabia and one for satellite TV and the Internet. Each index was composed of the

following question in regards to a specific medium. Respondents answered to the statement:

“To what extent do you rely on, that is, do you believe and trust, what the following people

tell you about the following subjects”:

� on the role of women in society and politics

� politics and forms of government

� your education and career choice

� evolution as an explanation of how plants and animals have evolved

� Western societies and foreign culture.

Cronbach’s alpha reliability measures produced reliable coefficients for the domestic credibility

index (˛ D .71) and the satellite and Internet index (˛ D .81).

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MEDIA CREDIBILITY IN THE ARAB WORLD 91

Religion-Based Variables

Our study offers two distinct measures of religion-based variables. The first, religiosity, mea-

sures the everyday role of religion in the life of an individual. The second set of measures,

political Islam, identifies participants’ views of the role of religion within public life (the

collective role). In order to measure the individual and collective religion-based variables, we

constructed two indices.

� The two-item religiosity index (r D .33, p < .001) was based on how often participants

prayed and on the degree in which they view themselves as religious people.

� The political Islam index was initially measured by a series of 15 questions regarding the

role of Islam in public life.

An exploratory factor analysis of the original political Islam index was completed due to low

reliability scores. Specifically, a principal components factor analysis (factors had to exceed

eigenvalues greater than 1) with varimax rotation was executed to examine the index. The

results of the factor analysis showed one major factor of fundamentalism that accounted for

22% of the total variance. Four other minor factors were found but not included due to lack of

conceptual fit with our theoretical model. Consequently, the fundamentalism index was used

for the remainder of the statistical analyses.

The fundamentalism factor is consistent with Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s (1992) definition

as

the belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, basic,

intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally

opposed by forces of evil which must be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today

according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and

follow these teachings have a special relationship with the deity. (p. 118)

Consequently, a fundamentalism index was created using seven items (Cronbach’s alpha D

.79). Specifically, participants were asked for their overall level of agreement with the following

statements using various Likert scales:

� God has given humanity a complete, unfailing guide to happiness and salvation, which

must be totally followed.

� There is a particular set of religious teachings in this world that are so true, you cannot go

any “deeper” because they are the basic, bedrock message that God has given humanity.

� To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true

religion.

� Whenever science and religion conflict, religion is always right.

� The fundamentals of God’s religion should never be tampered with or compromised with

others’ beliefs.

� The only acceptable religion to God is Islam.

� Islam is the only religion on this earth that teaches, without error, God’s truth.

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92 GOLAN AND KIOUSIS

Attitudes Toward Democracy

The attitudes toward democracy index was composed of three items measuring participants’

views of democracies as indecisive and having too much quibbling; in democracy, the economy

runs badly; and toward having an Islamic government, where religious authorities have absolute

power. The three-item index produced a Cronbach’s alpha of .71.

STATISTICAL PROCEDURES

Pearson’s correlations were initially conducted to get a primary understanding of the complex

relationships among religiosity, fundamentalism, attitudes toward democracy, and the two

media credibility measures. Subsequently, path analysis was chosen to examine the proposed

relationships. Specifically, regression path modeling is utilized in the present analysis (Cohen &

Cohen, 1983). As an extension of multiple regression, path analysis cannot establish causality,

but it can demonstrate the pattern of relationships among multiple variables given an assumption

of direct and indirect effects. The path model controlled for the influence of the following basic

demographics: age, gender, and education level.

RESULTS

The results reported in Table 1 point to significant correlations between the religiosity index

and overall assessments of media credibility for both domestic (r D .111, p D .000) and

satellite media (r D .084, p D .000). While attitudes toward democracy were significantly

correlated with assessments of credibility for satellite media (r D �.065, p D .007), they were

not significant for domestic media (r D �.003, p D .907).

Positive correlations were found between the fundamentalism index and domestic media

credibility (r D .11, p D .000) as well as satellite media (r D .08, p D .001). While we did not

predict this relationship, the results in Table 1 indicates a significant linkage between overall

assessments of media credibility for domestic television and newspapers with assessments of

media credibility for satellite television and the Internet. This finding indicates that individuals’

assessments of domestic media credibility may relate to their overall assessment of satellite

television and Internet credibility, but it does not indicate that the two variables measure the

same phenomenon.

As explained in the methods section, this study utilized path analysis to examine the highly

complex relationship between the different variables. The results of the path analysis are

displayed in Figure 1.

H1 predicted that higher levels of religiosity would be negatively related with the perceived

credibility of domestic media, while H2 expected a similar relationship with the perceived

credibility of Internet/satellite media. As shown in Figure 1, the data did not support either

hypothesis. In fact, significant relationships were observed in the opposite direction predicted,

as religiosity was positively connected with domestic media credibility (ˇ D .10, p < .001;

r D .111, p D .000) as well as Internet/satellite media credibility (ˇ D .07, p < .01; r D .084,

p D .000).

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MEDIA CREDIBILITY IN THE ARAB WORLD 93

TABLE 1

Correlates of Media Credibility

DOM SAT ATD REL FUND

DOM Pearson Correlations 1.000 .657** �.003 .111* .113**

Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .907 .000 .000

N 1855 1854 1768 1850 1849

SAT Pearson Correlations .657** 1.000 �.065** .084** .075**

Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .007 .000 .001

N 1854 1854 1767 1849 1847

ATD Pearson Correlations �.003 �.065** 1.000 �.031 .202**

Sig. (2-tailed) .907 .007 .189 .000

N 1768 1767 1771 1765 1844

REL Pearson Correlations .111* .084** �.031 1.000 .059*

Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .000 .189 .011

N 1850 1849 1765 1852 1844

FUND Pearson Correlations .113** .075** .075** .202** .059*

Sig. (2-tailed) .000 .001 .001 .000 .011

N 1849 1847 1847 1844 1844

Note. **Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

DOM D domestic TV and newspaper credibility.

SAT D satellite TV and Internet credibility.

ATD D attitudes toward democracy index.

REL D religiosity index.

FUND D fundamentalism index.

Similar to the first two hypotheses, H3 and H4 anticipated negative relationships between

support for fundamentalism and perceptions of credibility for domestic media and Inter-

net/satellite media. Again, the data did not support either hypothesis, and linkages were found

in the opposite direction than predicted. Specifically, support for fundamentalism was positively

associated with domestic (ˇ D .10, p < .001; r D .113, p D .001) and international media

credibility (ˇ D .07, p < .01; r D .075, p D .001).

H5 and H6 predicted that higher levels of perceived credibility for domestic and Inter-

net/satellite media would be negatively related to positive assessments concerning democracy.

The data did not support H5. However, the data did support H6 as higher levels of credibility

FIGURE 1 Predictors of attitudes toward democracy.

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94 GOLAN AND KIOUSIS

for international media were negatively related toward opinions supporting democracy (ˇ D

�.11, p < .001; r D �.065, p D .007). Though not predicted, a positive association was found

between support for political Islam and attitudes toward democracy (ˇ D .21, p < .001; r D

.075, p D .001).

DISCUSSION

Five major findings are identified from the current study. As parts, they provide some insight

into their respective areas of research; as a sum, they provide limited insight into the multidi-

mensional and largely unknown role that religion-based variables may play in perceptions of

media credibility and their possible implications on public opinion.

The first set of findings from our research indicates there is a significant relationship between

levels of religiosity and overall assessments of media credibility for both domestic and satellite

media. The direction of the relationship is contrary from the hypothesized direction. As noted,

research on the complex relationship between religiosity and media credibility is extremely

limited. A recent study by Golan and Day (2007) identifies a significant negative relationship

between personal religiosity and assessments of media credibility among primarily female

Christian college students. The results of the current study identify a dissimilar relationship.

One explanation for why our findings identify a positive rather than negative relationship

between religiosity and media credibility may have to do with our sample. The survey partici-

pants in our study were derived from two highly traditional Islamic societies (Egypt and Saudi

Arabia) where people largely depend upon centralized institutions such as government and

religion in their everyday lives. Because media content is largely regulated by the governments

and religious institutions in both Egypt and Saudi Arabia (Ayish, 2002), one could argue that

trust in the media may reflect a broader perspective of trust in the institutions of the government.

Indeed, there is evidence that trust in religious institutions in Muslim societies is positively

associated with trust in key institutions of the state (Hassan, 2000). In other words, we argue

that those whose personal religiosity is higher are more likely to have faith in centralized

institutions not only religious but also such public institutions as the state owned and regulated

media. A second potential explanation for the somewhat counterintuitive findings regarding the

relationship between religiosity and satellite/Internet credibility may have to do with the age

of the survey participants. As evident by the aftermath of the 2009 Iranian elections, young

Muslims across the Middle East are widely familiar and somewhat dependent on Internet-based

media as well as social media as important sources of news information. We argue that future

studies should control for age as a key variable that may influence the complex relationship

between media credibility and religion.

The second major finding of our research points to a significant positive relationship between

fundamentalism and overall assessments of media credibility for both domestic and satellite

media. Once again, the direction of the relationship found by the current study was opposite

than the one hypothesized. We present the age of the sample as well as the trust in institutions

as potential explanations for these findings.

The next set of findings from our research points to conflicting relationships between media

credibility and support for democracy: There was a positive relationship between domestic

credibility and support for democracy and a negative relationship between satellite/Internet

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MEDIA CREDIBILITY IN THE ARAB WORLD 95

credibility and support for democracy. These findings are important because they extend beyond

merely identifying the determinants of media credibility and into the real life consequences of

credibility research. Because the U.S. State Department spends much time and effort promoting

democracy in the Middle East, the United States must understand the complex relationship

between credibility and assessments of democracy.

Our limited model cannot fully explain why there is a reversed relationship between domestic

credibility and “foreign media” credibility (satellite/Internet). One possible explanation may be

found in the nature of the content shown on the two types of media. While the Saudi and

Egyptian governments and their respective religious institutions may regulate their domestic

content, they have a more limited capability in the regulation of media content outside of the

channels they control, such as satellite networks. Thus, while they can limit access to certain

Web sites and satellite networks, they cannot fully monitor content after access to a Web site

or a channel is granted.

Those Saudi and Egyptian youths who are exposed to highly regulated media content may

very well assess Western cultures and their democratic institutions in a much different manner

than those who are exposed to somewhat unregulated media content that may be available to

them on satellite networks and the Internet. Individuals exposed to more controversial foreign

media content, such as American style soap operas and reality programming, may view the

West as decadent and immoral and therefore view Western democracies in a more negative

light. Those who will view the highly regulated domestic content will have less exposure to

controversial content and therefore have less of a reason to identify faults within Western

cultures and their democratic systems.

Our last finding points toward a positive relationship between support for fundamentalism

and attitudes toward democracy. Such a finding may not only seem counterintuitive but also

almost impossible to some people living in the United States. However, previous research does

indeed indicate that there is no evidence of a significant relationship between fundamentalism

and support for democracy (Tessler, 2002, 2003). We suspect that our finding is a false negative,

but one possible explanation may be that Arab youth do not find a contradiction between a

deep respect for their religion and their interpretation of democracy. While traditional views

of democracy in Western societies intrinsically value a separation of church and state and

somewhat view the role of clergy in politics as undemocratic, there are many around the world

who do not see the two as mutually exclusive. Recent elections in the Arab world have yielded

examples that illustrate the combination of religious fundamentalism and a democratic process.

Examples are the recent victory of Hamas in the 2006 Palestinian presidential elections, the

participation of the Hezbollah-backed political parties in the 2005 Lebanese elections, and the

2009 Iranian elections in which voters had to chose among four different candidates selected

and approved by the Iranian Supreme Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.

LIMITATIONS

The findings of our study may not reflect the nature of the complex relationships among

religion-based variables, media credibility, and attitudes toward democracy in the entire Muslim

world. Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia are close economic and military allies of the United States.

Thus, the nature of their regulated media content may differ from other Arab and Muslim

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96 GOLAN AND KIOUSIS

nations, such as Syria, Iran, Somalia, and Indonesia whose governments may push a different

agenda.

In addition, it is important to note that both Egypt and Saudi Arabia are predominantly

Sunni nations whose religious cultures and traditions are very different from those of other

Muslims such as Shias or Sufis.

As argued, age may be a key variable to control for when examining the relationship between

media credibility (especially new media) and religion. One may suspect that our study would

have produced different results if the sample was composed of survey participants older than

40 years of age.

Future research should further investigate the complex relationship between religion-based

variables and media credibility across religious traditions and media vehicles. As globalization,

new media technologies and Western culture are exported to the different cultures of the

world; media scholars ought to investigate how culture- and religion-based variables may

influence individual assessments of media credibility and their consequences on evaluations of

the West.

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