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INTERPRETATION OF THE PROVISIONS OF THE RULES OF COURT

PCI LEASING and FINANCE, INC. vs. ANTONIO C. MILAN, Doing Business Under the Name andStyle of "A. MILAN TRADING," and LAURA M. MILAN

G.R. No. 151215, April 5, 2010, J. Leonardo–De Castro

A final and executory judgment, under the doctrine of immutability and inalterability, may no

longer be modified in any respect either by the court which rendered it or even by the Supreme Court.

However, as rules of procedure are mere tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, their

strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than

promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed. Thus, in the absence of a pattern or scheme to

delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules

on the part of the plaintiff, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority to

dismiss.

Facts:

PCI Leasing and Finance, Inc. (PCI Leasing) extended loans against herein respondentsAntonio C. Milan (Antonio) and Laura M. Milan. As such, the latter executed Deeds of Assignment inwhich they assigned and transferred to the former their rights to various checks for and inconsideration of the various amounts obtained. Subsequently, when presented for payment, thosechecks were dishonored for different reasons. Despite repeated demands, respondents failed tosettle their obligation, which amounted to P2,327,833.33 as of January 15, 2000. PCI Leasing wasthen compelled to litigate to enforce payment.

On March 2, 2000, the RTC issued summons to respondents addressed to their place ofresidence as stated in the complaint which were, however, returned unserved. As such, PCI Leasingfiled a Motion to Archive Civil Case No. Q-00-40010 subject to its reinstatement after thewhereabouts of the respondents was determined. It was denied by the RTC and on July 13, 2000, itissued an Order, directing PCI Leasing "to take the necessary steps to actively prosecute the instantcase within ten days from receipt" under pain of dismissal of the case "for lack of interest." Thus,PCI Leasing filed a Motion for Issuance of Alias Summons, which was, however, also denied on theground of a defective notice of hearing. Another similar motion was thereafter filed by PCI Leasingand the same was scheduled for hearing on October 13, 2000. However, on said date, there was noappearance from both counsels of the parties. Accordingly, the RTC issued an Order dismissing CivilCase No. Q-00-40010. PCI Leasing sought a reconsideration of the said Order, explaining that itscounsel was already in the courtroom when Judge Leah S. Domingo-Regala of the RTC was dictatingthe order of dismissal. However, the same was also denied. On January 26, 2001, PCI Leasing filedan Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration which was also denied by the RTC.

PCI Leasing eventually filed a Notice of Appeal which was also dismissed by the RTC by wayof a Resolution, given that it was filed beyond the reglementary period. Thus, it resorted into filing aPetition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals, which washowever, dismissed outright for having been taken out of time. As its Motion for Reconsideration

GENERAL PRINCIPLES


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with the CA was also denied, it elevated this case to the Supreme Court by way of the instantPetition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.

With the SC, despite numerous attempts of PCI Leasing of determining the respondents'

address, the latter has been consistent in refusing to accept the summons and to file a comment tothe petition despite the Resolutions ordered by the Court and notwithstanding the penalty of fineimposed for non-compliance of those. As such, on June 27, 2005, the Court resolved that: 1) thecopies of the said resolutions be deemed served; and b) an alias warrant of arrest againstrespondent Milan be issued, directing the NBI to cause his immediate arrest and to detain him untilhe complies with the said resolutions.

Eventually, Antonio Milan was arrested and detained by the NBI on March 24, 2006. Also, hepaid the fine earlier imposed upon him and filed an Explanation on Failure to File Comment withUrgent Motion for Immediate Release from Detention with Prayer for Time to File Comment,maintaining that he had not received any of the Resolutions of the Court, hence, the failure to abideby the same. At the onset, the Court denied the said motion but it was eventually granted.

PCI Leasing, for its part, averred that both the lower courts defeated its right to recover thesums of money it had loaned to the respondents simply because it allegedly committed "someprocedural lapses" in the prosecution of its case. It argued that if those rulings would be allowed tostand, the respondents would allegedly be enriched at their expense. Thus, invoking for a liberalapplication of the pertinent rules of procedure and invoking the inherent equity jurisdiction ofcourts, it ultimately prays for the reinstatement of Civil Case No. Q-00-40010.

Issue:

Whether Civil Case No. Q-00-40010 should be reinstated.

Ruling:

We grant the petition.

The Court of Appeals indeed committed a mistake in issuing the Resolutions whichdismissed outright the Petition for Certiorari filed by PCI Leasing and denied the latter’s Motion forReconsideration. To recall, it based the dismissal of the Petition for Certiorari on the fact that (1)the appeal of PCI Leasing was filed out of time and (2) the Notice of Appeal supposedly involvedpure questions of law.

As to the second ground, the CA was mistaken in concluding that the Notice of Appealinvolved pure questions of law on the basis of the statement therein that the Order and Resolutions

of the RTC would be appealed to it on the ground that the same were "contrary to the applicablelaws and jurisprudence on the matter." It was unreasonably hasty in inferring its lack of jurisdictionover the intended appeal of PCI Leasing. It is only after the specific issues and arguments of PCILeasing are laid out in detail before the CA in the appropriate substantive pleading can it make aconclusion as to whether or not the issues raised therein involved pure questions of law.

The first ground which was in concurrence with the findings of the RTC that the Notice ofAppeal was filed one day late was correct, but the premise therefor was evidently mistaken. In


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accordance with the ruling rendered in the case of Neypes v. Court of Appeals, a party litigant mayeither file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the RTC’s decision or file it within 15days from receipt of the order (the "final order") denying his motion for new trial or motion forreconsideration. Obviously, the new 15-day period may be availed of only if either motion is filed;

otherwise, the decision becomes final and executory after the lapse of the original appeal periodprovided in Rule 41, Section 3. In the case at bar, PCI Leasing filed a Motion for Reconsideration ofthe RTC Order which dismissed Civil Case No. Q-00-40010. On January 4, 2001, the RTC rendered aResolution, denying the same. As said Resolution was received by PCI Leasing on January 17, 2001,the latter therefore should have filed its Notice of Appeal within 15 days from such date or untilFebruary 1, 2001. However, it actually filed its Notice of Appeal on May 11, 2001 or 114 days afterreceipt of the said Resolution. Contrary to the findings of the RTC, the period within which to filethe Notice of Appeal should not be reckoned from May 3, 2001, the date of receipt of the RTCResolution dated April 6, 2001, which denied the Ex Parte Motion for Reconsideration of PCILeasing, the latter being a prohibited pleading as it was in the nature of a second motion forreconsideration.

Therefore, the RTC Order dated October 13, 2000, dismissing Civil Case No. Q-00-40010,should be deemed final and executory. As such, under the doctrine of immutability andinalterability of a final judgment, it may no longer be modified in any respect either by the courtwhich rendered it or even by this Court. The two-fold purpose of the said doctrine are: (1) to avoiddelay in the administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge ofjudicial business and (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors,which is precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag on indefinitely. The rights andobligations of every litigant must not hang in suspense for an indefinite period of time. However,notwithstanding the said doctrine, the Court finds, after a thorough review of the records, thatcompelling circumstances are extant in this case, which clearly warrant the exercise of our equityjurisdiction. It has been settled that rules of procedure should be viewed as mere tools designed tofacilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would result in

technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, must always beeschewed. To our mind, it will not serve the ends of substantial justice if the RTC’s dismissal of thecase with prejudice on pure technicalities would be perfunctorily upheld by appellate courtslikewise on solely procedural grounds, unless the procedural lapses committed were so gross,negligent, tainted with bad faith or tantamount to abuse or misuse of court processes. In thisinstance, PCI Leasing would be left without any judicial recourse to collect the amount ofP2,327,833.33 it loaned to the respondents. Corollarily, if PCI Leasing would be forever barred fromcollecting the aforesaid amount, respondent Milan stands to be unjustly enriched at the expense ofPCI Leasing.

Also, it is important to note that the hearing in which the counsel of PCI Leasing came latewas merely for the issuance of Alias Summons. It was not even for the presentation of the evidence

in chief of PCI Leasing, where the latter’s presence would be indispensable. Incidentally, the Motionfor Issuance of Alias Summons filed by PCI Leasing is non-litigious in nature, which does not requirea hearing under the Rules, as the same could have been acted upon by the RTC without prejudicingthe rights of the respondents. Thus, it was serious error on the part of the trial court to have deniedthe first motion for issuance of alias summons for want of notice of hearing. It was also notmandatory for the trial court to set the second motion for hearing. However, despite all of these, theRTC still dismissed the case and eventually denied the Motion for Reconsideration thereof. Whiletrial courts have the discretion to impose sanctions on counsels or litigants for tardiness or absence


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at hearings, such sanctions should be proportionate to the offense and should still conform to thedictates of justice and fair play. Moreover, It does not escape this Court’s notice that PCI Leasingfailed to successfully prosecute the case for several months due to the difficulties it encountered inlocating respondents, who appeared to have a propensity for changing addresses and refusing to

accept court processes. Clearly, the delay in the trial court proceedings was not entirely the fault ofPCI Leasing.

The circumstances of this case do not constitute sufficient bases to warrant the conclusionthat PCI Leasing had lost interest in prosecuting Civil Case No. Q-00-40010. As such, in the absenceof a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to observe themandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the case at bar, courts shoulddecide to dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss.

CITY OF DUMAGUETE, HEREIN REPRESENTED BY CITY MAYOR, AGUSTIN R. PERDICESvs. PHILIPPINE PORTS AUTHORITY

G.R. No. 168973, August 24, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application of

the rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yield to

the latter.

Facts:

Petitioner City of Dumaguete, through Mayor Felipe Antonio B. Remollo (Remollo), filedbefore the RTC an Application for Original Registration of Title over a parcel of land withimprovements, located at Barangay Looc, City of Dumaguete under the Property RegistrationDecree.

The RTC set the initial hearing of LRC Case No. N-201 and sent notices to the parties.

The Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, and Philippine PortsAuthority(PPA), represented by the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel, filed separateOppositions to the application for registration of City of Dumaguete. Both the Republic and PPAaverred that City of Dumaguete may not register the property in its name since the latter had neverbeen in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the said property for at least 30years immediately preceding the filing of the application; and the subject property remains to be aportion of the public domain which belongs to the Republic.

However, before the next hearing, PPA filed a Motion to Dismiss, seeking the dismissal ofLRC Case No. N-201 on the ground that the RTC lacked jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. PPA

argued that Section 14(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1529, Property Registration Decree, refersonly to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of ownership.

The subject property in LRC Case No. N-201 is not alienable and disposable, since it is aforeshore land, as testified to by City of Dumaguete's own witness, Engr. Dorado. A foreshore land isnot registerable. This was the reason why the property was included in Presidential ProclamationNo. 1232 (delineating the territorial boundaries of the Dumaguete Port Zone), so that the samewould be administered and managed by the State, through PPA, for the benefit of the people.


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In its Opposition to Oppositor’s Motion to Dismiss, City of Dumaguete claimed that theproperty was a swamp reclaimed about 40 years ago, which it occupied openly, continuously,exclusively, and notoriously under a bona fide claim of ownership. The technical description of the

property showed that the it was not bounded by any part of the sea. It invoked Republic Act No.1899, which authorizes chartered cities and municipalities to undertake and carry out, at their ownexpense, the reclamation of foreshore lands bordering them; and grants said chartered cities andmunicipalities ownership over the reclaimed lands. Presidential Proclamation No. 1232 isimmaterial to the present application for registration because it merely authorizes PPA toadminister and manage the Dumaguete Port Zone and does not confer upon PPA ownership of theproperty.

PPA filed a Reply/Rejoinder (To Applicant ’s Opposition to Oppositor’s Motion to Dismiss),asserting that there are no factual or legal basis for the claim of petitioner that the subject propertyis reclaimed land. The present claim of City of Dumaguete that the property is reclaimed landshould not be allowed for it would improperly change the earlier theory in support of the

application for registration. PPA reiterated that the property is foreshore land which cannot beregistered; and that Presidential Proclamation No. 1232 is very material to LRC Case No. N-201because it confirms that areas within the Dumaguete Port Zone, including the subject property, arenot alienable and disposable lands of the public domain.

On September 7, 2000, the RTC issued an Order granting the Motion to Dismiss of PPA. Ithaving been shown by City of Dumaguete's own evidence that the lot subject of the application fororiginal registration is a foreshore land, and therefore not registerable, the application must bedenied. The admission by Engr. Dorado that there is no formal declaration from the executivebranch of government or law passed by Congress that the land in question is no longer needed forpublic use or special industries x x x further militates against the application. The RTC decreed inthe end that "the instant application for original registration is dismissed for lack of merit."

In its Motion for Reconsideration, City of Dumaguete contended that the dismissal of itsapplication was premature and tantamount to a denial of its right to due process. It has yet topresent evidence to prove factual matters in support of its application, such as the subject propertyalready being alienable and disposable at the time it was occupied and possessed. City ofDumaguete also pointed out that its witness, Engr. Dorado, "testified only as to the physical statusof the land at the time when the cadastral survey of Dumaguete was made sometime in 1916." Thephysical state of the subject property had already changed since 1916. It is now within the"alienable and disposable area" as certified by the Bureau of Lands, as verified and certified by theLand Management Sector, DENR Regional Office in Cebu City, who has yet to take the witness standbefore the RTC.

City of Dumaguete insisted that the RTC should continue with the hearing of LRC Case No.N-201 and allow to present evidence to prove it is reclaimed land. It sufficiently alleged in itsapplication for registration that it has been in "open, continuous, exclusive, and notoriouspossession of the [subject property] for more than thirty (30) years under a bona fide claim ofownership."

PPA based its Opposition (To Applicant ’s Motion for Reconsideration) on technical andsubstantive grounds.


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In its Order dated November 16, 2000, the RTC initially agreed with PPA that the Motion forReconsideration of City of Dumaguete violated Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 and Section 11, Rule 13of the Rules of Court. Resultantly, the Motion for Reconsideration of petitioner was considered as

not filed and did not toll the running of the period to file an appeal, rendering final and executorythe order of dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201.

However, after taking into consideration the Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration ofCity of Dumaguete, the RTC issued another Order dated December 7, 2000, setting aside its Orderdated September 7, 2000 in the interest of justice and resolving to have a full-blown proceeding todetermine factual issues in LRC Case No. N-201.

It was then the turn of PPA to file with the RTC a Motion for Reconsideration of the Orderdated December 7, 2000. In an Order dated February 20, 2001, the RTC denied the motion of PPA.

The Court wants to correct this error in its findings on the September 7, 2000 Order, that

Lot No. 1 is situated on the shoreline of Dumaguete City. The Court simply committed an oversighton the City of Dumaguete's evidence that the lot is a foreshore land x x x when in fact it is not. Andit is for this reason that the court reconsidered and set aside said September 7, 2000 Order, tocorrect the same while it is true that said September 7, 2000 Order had attained its finality, yet thisCourt cannot in conscience allow injustice to perpetuate in this case and that hearing on the meritsmust proceed to determine the legality and truthfulness of its application for registration of title.

The Court of Appeals found merit in the Petition of PPA and set aside the RTC Orders datedDecember 7, 2000 and February 20, 2001.

Issue:

Can the court a quo allow the liberal application of the rules in order to avoid miscarriage ofjustice?

Ruling:

Yes, the court may allow the liberal application of the rules.

The grant of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court requires graveabuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion existswhere an act is performed with a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment equivalent to lack ofjurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positiveduty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of

law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion orpersonal hostility.

The Court of Appeals erred in granting the writ of certiorari in favor of PPA. The RTC did notcommit grave abuse of discretion when, in its Orders dated December 7, 2000 and February 20,2001, it set aside the order of dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201 and resolved to have a full-blownproceeding to determine factual issues in said case.


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Procedural rules were conceived to aid the attainment of justice. If a stringent application ofthe rules would hinder rather than serve the demands of substantial justice, the former must yieldto the latter. In Basco v. Court of Appeals, we allowed a liberal application of technical rules ofprocedure, pertaining to the requisites of a proper notice of hearing, upon consideration of the

importance of the subject matter of the controversy.

Likewise, in Samoso v. CA, the Court ruled:

But time and again, the Court has stressed that the rules of procedure are not to be appliedin a very strict and technical sense. The rules of procedure are used only to help secure not overridesubstantial justice. The right to appeal should not be lightly disregarded by a stringent applicationof rules of procedure especially where the appeal is on its face meritorious and the interests ofsubstantial justice would be served by permitting the appeal.

In the case at bar, the Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion forReconsideration of City of Dumaguete , which sought the reversal of RTC Order dated September 7,

2000 dismissing LRC Case No. N-201, cite meritorious grounds that justify a liberal application ofprocedural rules.

The dismissal by the RTC of LRC Case No. N-201 for lack of jurisdiction is patentlyerroneous.

PPA sought the dismissal of LRC Case No. N-201 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, notbecause of the insufficiency of the allegations and prayer therein, but because the evidencepresented by petitioner itself during the trial supposedly showed that the subject property is aforeshore land, which is not alienable and disposable. The RTC granted the Motion to Dismiss ofPPA in its Order dated September 7, 2000. The RTC went beyond the allegations and prayer forrelief in the Application for Original Registration of City of Dumaguete and already scrutinized and

weighed the testimony of Engr. Dorado, the only witness petitioner was able to present.

As to whether or not the subject property is indeed foreshore land is a factual issue whichthe RTC should resolve in the exercise of its jurisdiction, after giving both parties the opportunity topresent their respective evidence at a full-blown trial.

It is true that City of Dumaguete, as the applicant, has the burden of proving that the subjectproperty is alienable and disposable and its title to the same is capable of registration. However, westress that the RTC, when it issued its Order dated September 7, 2000, had so far heard only thetestimony of Engr. Dorado, the first witness. City of Dumaguete was no longer afforded theopportunity to present other witnesses and pieces of evidence in support of its Application. The

RTC Order dated September 7, 2000 – already declaring the subject property as inalienable publicland, over which the RTC has no jurisdiction to order registration – was evidently premature.

The RTC Order dated September 7, 2000 has not yet become final and executory as City ofDumaguete was able to duly file a Motion for Reconsideration and Supplemental Motion forReconsideration of the same, which the RTC eventually granted in its Order dated December 7,2000. Admittedly, said motions filed by City of Dumaguete did not comply with certain rules ofprocedure. Ordinarily, such non-compliance would have rendered said motions as mere scraps of


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paper, considered as not having been filed at all, and unable to toll the reglementary period for anappeal. However, we find that the exceptional circumstances extant in the present case warrant theliberal application of the rules.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the RTC judiciously, rather than abusively orarbitrarily, exercised its discretion when it subsequently issued the Order dated December 7, 2000,setting aside its Order dated September 7, 2000 and proceeding with the trial in LRC Case No. N-201.

EDDIE T. PANLILIO vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and LILIA G. PINEDAG.R. No. 181478, July 15, 2009, J. Leonardo- De Castro

In cases where a COMELEC Division issues an interlocutory order, the same COMELEC Division

should resolve the motion for reconsideration of the order.

Facts:

The parties of the case were two of the contending gubernatorial candidates in the provinceof Pampanga. On May 18, 2007, the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pampanga proclaimedPanlilio as the duly elected governor of Pampanga having garnered the highest number of votes. OnMay 25, 2007, private respondent Pineda filed an election protest based on a number of grounds.On July 23, 2007, the COMELEC, Second Division, issued the first assailed order giving due course toprivate Pineda’s election protest and directed among others, the revision of ballots pertaining to theprotested precincts of the Province of Pampanga. Panlilio filed a motion for reconsideration of theaforesaid order but the same was denied. Aggrieved, petitioner filed the instant petition for

certiorari. Petitioner insists that the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion when it deniedhis omnibus motion to certify his earlier motion for reconsideration and to stay the order directingthe collection of ballot boxes of the contested precincts in the province of Pampanga.

Issue:

Whether the COMELEC En Banc gravely abused its discretion when it denied Panlilio’somnibus motion to certify his motion for reconsideration.

Ruling:

No, it did not.

Since the COMELEC’s Division issued the interlocutory Order, the same COMELEC Divisionshould resolve the motion for reconsideration of the Order. The remedy of the aggrieved party isneither to file a motion for reconsideration for certification to the COMELEC En Banc nor to elevatethe issue to the Court via a petition for certiorari. Under the Rules, the acts of a Division that aresubject of a motion for reconsideration must have a character of finality before the same can beelevated to the COMELEC en banc. The elementary rule is that an order is final in nature if itcompletely disposes of the entire case. But if there is something more to be done in the case after its

JURISDICTION


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issuance, that order is interlocutory. Only final orders of the COMELEC in Division may be raisedbefore the COMELEC en banc. Furthermore, the present controversy does not fall under any of theinstances of which the COMELEC En Banc can take cognizance. Neither is it one where a Division isnot authorized to act nor one where the members of the Second Division have unanimously voted

to refer the issue to the COMELEC En Banc. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc is not the proper forumwhere petitioner may bring the assailed interlocutory Orders for resolution.

CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs. FATIMA A. MACUD G.R. No. 177531, September 10, 2009, J. Leonardo-De Castro

As a general rule, the defense of lack of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the

proceeding. However, it admits an exception where the party fully participated in the proceedings. A

teacher cannot raise want of jurisdiction when she has availed of the remedies in the proceedings.

Facts:

As a requirement for her appointment as Teacher I of the Department of Education, FatimaA. Macud submitted her Personal Data Sheet (PDS) to the CSC Regional Office and declared that shesuccessfully passed the Professional Board Examination for Teachers (PBET). Upon investigation,petitioner was formally charged with Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct and Conduct Prejudicial to theBest Interest of the Service due to several irregularities in her Application Form (AF) and PDS suchas, first, disparity in Macud’s date of birth as December 15, 1958 appeared as her date of birth in theAF while it was December 15, 1965 that appeared in her PDS; second, the facial features of Macudin the picture attached to her PDS vis--vis her features as shown in the picture attached to the AFshowed an obvious dissemblance; and lastly, the signature of Macud as appearing in her PDS islikewise different from that affixed in her AF.

Macud asserted that she personally took the PBET and vehemently denied the findings

about the photograph alleging that the dissemblance of her picture attached to her AF and PSP fromher picture pasted on her PDS was because the two pictures were taken roughly nine (9) yearsapart from each other. Anent the disparity in her signatures, petitioner reasoned out that it was theresult of the change of her status, i.e., she eventually got married and had to use the surname of herhusband. With respect to her date of birth, she alleged that her known and recognized date of birthprior and up to 1994 was 15 December 1958. Thereafter, she was informed that her correct date ofbirth was 15 December 1965.

CSC Regional Office found Macud guilty of dishonesty. She appealed to CSC Central Officebut the same was denied. Macud elevated the matter to the CA which reversed the decision ofCSCRO and CSCCO on the ground of lack jurisdiction. The CA held that CSC had no jurisdiction overthe case because it is the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers which should apply thus

Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS) shall have jurisdiction. Hence, the presentpetition.

Issue:

Whether or not CSC has jurisdiction over the case of Macud

Ruling:


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Yes. We grant the petition.

As the Solicitor General correctly argues, petitioner CSC is the constitutional body charged

with the establishment and administration of a career civil service which embraces all branchesand agencies of the government.

Article IX-B, Section 2(1) of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned orcontrolled corporations with original charters. x x x (emphasis ours)

Section 3 of the same Article further states:

Section 3. The Civil Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the

Government, shall establish a career service and adopt measures to promote morale,efficiency, integrity, responsiveness, progressiveness, and courtesy in the civil service. Itshall strengthen the merit and rewards system, integrate all human resources developmentprograms for all levels and ranks, and institutionalize a management climate conducive topublic accountability. It shall submit to the President and the Congress an annual report onits personnel programs. (emphasis ours)

In the recent case of Civil Service Commission v. Alfonso, the Court held that special laws suchas R.A. 4670 did not divest the CSC of its inherent power to supervise and discipline all members ofthe civil service, including public school teachers. To quote from that decision:

As the central personnel agency of the government, the CSC has jurisdiction to

supervise the performance of and discipline, if need be, all government employees,including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations with originalcharters such as PUP. Accordingly, all PUP officers and employees, whether they beclassified as teachers or professors pursuant to certain provisions of law, are deemed, firstand foremost, civil servants accountable to the people and answerable to the CSC in cases ofcomplaints lodged by a citizen against them as public servants. xxx

xxx xxx xxx

We are not unmindful of certain special laws that allow the creation of disciplinarycommittees and governing bodies in different branches, subdivisions, agencies andinstrumentalities of the government to hear and decide administrative complaints against

their respective officers and employees. Be that as it may, we cannot interpret the creationof such bodies nor the passage of laws such as R.A. Nos. 8292 and 4670 allowing for thecreation of such disciplinary bodies as having divested the CSC of its inherent power tosupervise and discipline government employees, including those in the academe. To holdotherwise would not only negate the very purpose for which the CSC was established, i.e. toinstill professionalism, integrity, and accountability in our civil service, but would alsoimpliedly amend the Constitution itself. (emphasis supplied)


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This Court has also previously held in Civil Service Commission v. Albao that the CSC has theauthority to directly institute proceedings to discipline a government employee in order to protectthe integrity of the civil service.

Indeed, where an administrative case involves the alleged fraudulent procurement of aneligibility or qualification for employment in the civil service, it is but proper that the CSC wouldhave jurisdiction over the case for it is in the best position to determine if there has been a violationof civil service rules and regulations.

Moreover, it is now too late for respondent to challenge the jurisdiction of the CSC. Afterparticipating in the proceedings before the CSC, respondent is effectively barred by estoppel fromchallenging the CSCs jurisdiction. While it is a rule that a jurisdictional question may be raisedanytime, this, however, admits of an exception where, as in this case, estoppel has supervened.

DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS and BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS vs. HON. FRANCOT. FALCON, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 71 OF THE REGIONAL

TRIAL COURT IN PASIG CITY and BCA INTERNATIONAL CORPORATIONG.R. No. 176657, September 1, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction of special civil

actions for certiorari and mandamus filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or if

warranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition. The Court may

suspend or even disregard rules when the demands of justice so require.

No court, aside from the Supreme Court, may enjoin a “national government project” unlessthe matter is one of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issue such that unless the act

complained of is enjoined, grave injustice or irreparable injury would arise.

Facts:

In line with the DFAs mandate to improve the passport and visa issuance system, as well asthe storage and retrieval of its related application records, and pursuant to our governments ICAOcommitments, the DFA secured the approval of the President of the Philippines, as Chairman of theBoard of the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA), for the implementation of theMachine Readable Passport and Visa Project (the MRP/V Project) under the Build-Operate-and-Transfer (BOT) scheme, provided for by Republic Act No. 6957, as amended by Republic Act No.7718 (the BOT Law), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR). There were severalbidders responded and BCA was among those that pre-qualified and submitted its technical andfinancial proposals. PBAC found BCAs bid to be the sole complying bid; hence, it permitted the DFAto engage in direct negotiations with BCA. On even date, the PBAC recommended to the DFA

Secretary the award of the MRP/V Project to BCA on a BOT arrangement. BCA incorporated aproject company, the Philippine Passport Corporation (PPC) to undertake and implement theMRP/V Project.

A Build-Operate-Transfer Agreement (BOT Agreement) between the DFA and PPC wassigned by DFA Acting Secretary Lauro L. Baja, Jr. and PPC President Bonifacio Sumbilla. FormerDFA Secretary Teofisto Guingona and Bonifacio Sumbilla, this time as BCA President, signed anAmended BOT Agreement in order to reflect the change in the designation of the parties and to


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harmonize Section 11.3 with Section 11.8 of the IRR of the BOT Law. The Amended BOT Agreementwas entered into by the DFA and BCA with the conformity of PPC.

An Assignment Agreement was executed by BCA and PPC, whereby BCA assigned and ceded

its rights, title, interest and benefits arising from the Amended BOT Agreement to PPC. As set out inArticle 8 of the original and the Amended BOT Agreement, the MRP/V Project was divided into sixphases. Both the DFA and BCA impute breach of the Amended BOT Agreement against each other.

According to the DFA, delays in the completion of the phases permeated the MRP/V Projectdue to the submission of deficient documents as well as intervening issues regarding BCA/PPCssupposed financial incapacity to fully implement the project. On the other hand, BCA contends thatthe DFA failed to perform its reciprocal obligation to issue to BCA a Certificate of Acceptance ofPhase 1 within 14 working days of operation purportedly required by Section 14.04 of theAmended BOT Agreement.

Later, the DFA sought the opinion of the Department of Finance (DOF) and the Department

of Justice (DOJ) regarding the appropriate legal actions in connection with BCAs alleged delays inthe completion of the MRP/V Project. BCA, in turn, submitted various letters and documents toprove its financial capability to complete the MRP/V Project. However, the DFA claimed thesedocuments were unsatisfactory or of dubious authenticity. DFA sent a Notice of Termination to BCAand PPC due to their alleged failure to submit proof of financial capability to complete the entireMRP/V Project in accordance with the financial warranty under Section 5.02(A) of the AmendedBOT Agreement.

PDRCI invited the DFA to submit its Answer to the Request for Arbitration within 30 daysfrom receipt of said letter and also requested both the DFA and BCA to nominate their chosenarbitrator within the same period of time. Initially, the DFA requested for an extension of time tofile its answer, without prejudice to jurisdictional and other defenses and objections available to it

under the law. However, DFA declined the request for arbitration before the PDRCI. While itexpressed its willingness to resort to arbitration, the DFA pointed out that under Section 19.02 ofthe Amended BOT Agreement, there is no mention of a specific body or institution that waspreviously authorized by the parties to settle their dispute. DOJ concurred with the steps taken bythe DFA, stating that there was basis in law and in fact for the termination of the MRP/V Project.

Thereafter, the DFA and the BSP entered into a Memorandum of Agreement for the latter toprovide the former passports compliant with international standards. The BSP then solicited bidsfor the supply, delivery, installation and commissioning of a system for the production of ElectronicPassport Booklets or e-Passports. For BCA, the BSPs invitation to bid for the supply and purchase ofe-Passports (the e-Passport Project) would only further delay the arbitration it requested from theDFA. Moreover, this new e-Passport Project by the BSP and the DFA would render BCAs remedies

moot inasmuch as the e-Passport Project would then be replacing the MRP/V Project which BCAwas carrying out for the DFA.

Thereafter, BCA filed an application for preliminary injunction. The trial court issued anOrder granting BCAs application for preliminary injunction. Thereafter, DFA and the BSP filed theinstant Petition for Certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a prayer forthe issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary injunction, imputinggrave abuse of discretion on the trial court when it granted interim relief to BCA .


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Issue:

1. Whether or not petitioners did not follow the hierarchy of courts by filing their petition

directly with this Court, without filing a motion for reconsideration with the RTC andwithout filing a petition first with the Court of Appeals.2. Whether or not the trial court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction

in the present case

Ruling:

1. Although the direct filing of petitions for certiorari with the Supreme Court is discouraged whenlitigants may still resort to remedies with the lower courts, we have in the past overlooked thefailure of a party to strictly adhere to the hierarchy of courts on highly meritoriousgrounds. Most recently, the Court relaxed the rule on court hierarchy in the case of Roque, Jr. v.Commission on Elections wherein it ruled that the policy on the hierarchy of courts , which

petitioners indeed failed to observe, is not an iron-clad rule. For indeed the Court has fulldiscretionary power to take cognizance and assume jurisdiction of special civil actionsfor certiorari and mandamus filed directly with it for exceptionally compelling reasons or ifwarranted by the nature of the issues clearly and specifically raised in the petition.

The Court deems it proper to adopt a similarly liberal attitude in the present case inconsideration of the transcendental importance of an issue raised herein. This is the first time thatthe Court is confronted with the question of whether an information and communicationtechnology project, which does not conform to our traditional notion of the term infrastructure, iscovered by the prohibition on the issuance of court injunctions found in Republic Act No. 8975,which is entitled An Act to Ensure the Expeditious Implementation and Completion of GovernmentInfrastructure Projects by Prohibiting Lower Courts from Issuing Temporary Restraining Orders,

Preliminary Injunctions or Preliminary Mandatory Injunctions, Providing Penalties for ViolationsThereof, and for Other Purposes. Taking into account the current trend of computerization andmodernization of administrative and service systems of government offices, departments andagencies, the resolution of this issue for the guidance of the bench and bar, as well as the generalpublic, is both timely and imperative.

2. Yes. The trial court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunction against the e-Passport Project.

It is indubitable that no court, aside from the Supreme Court, may enjoin a nationalgovernment project unless the matter is one of extreme urgency involving a constitutional issuesuch that unless the act complained of is enjoined, grave injustice or irreparable injury would arise.

Under Section 2(a) of Republic Act No. 8975, there are three types of national government projectsenumerated in Section 2(a), to wit:

(a) current and future national government infrastructure projects, engineeringworks and service contracts, including projects undertaken by government-owned and controlled corporations;

(b) all projects covered by R.A. No. 6975, as amended by R.A. No. 7718, or theBuild-Operate-and-Transfer ( BOT) Law; and

(c) other related and necessary activities, such as site acquisition, supply and/orinstallation of equipment and materials, implementation, construction,


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completion, operation, maintenance, improvement repair and rehabilitation,regardless of the source of funding.

Although the Court finds that the trial court had jurisdiction to issue the writ of preliminary

injunction, we cannot uphold the theory of BCA and the trial court that the definition of the terminfrastructure project in Republic Act No. 9184 should be applied to the BOT Law.

Republic Act No. 9285 is a general law applicable to all matters and controversies to beresolved through alternative dispute resolution methods. This law allows a Regional Trial Court togrant interim or provisional relief, including preliminary injunction, to parties in an arbitration caseprior to the constitution of the arbitral tribunal. This general statute, however, must give way to aspecial law governing national government projects, Republic Act No. 8975 which prohibits courts,except the Supreme Court, from issuing TROs and writs of preliminary injunction in cases involvingnational government projects.

However, as discussed above, the prohibition in Republic Act No. 8975 is inoperative in this

case, since petitioners failed to prove that the e-Passport Project is national government project asdefined therein. Thus, the trial court had jurisdiction to issue a writ of preliminary injunctionagainst the e-Passport Project.

BF HOMES, INC. and THE PHILIPPINE WATERWORKS AND CONSTRUCTION CORP.vs. MANILA ELECTRIC COMPANY

G.R. No. 171624, December 6, 2010, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Administrative agencies, like the Energy Regulatory Commission, are tribunals of limited

jurisdiction and, as such, could wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling

statutes. In relation thereto is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction involving matters that demand the

special competence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial in nature.

Facts:

MERALCO is a corporation duly organized and existing under Philippine laws engaged inthe distribution and sale of electric power in Metro Manila. On the other hand, BF Homes and PWCCare owners and operators of waterworks systems delivering water to over 12,000 households andcommercial buildings in BF Homes subdivisions in Paranaque City, Las Pinas City, Caloocan City,and Quezon City. The water distributed in the waterworks systems owned and operated by BFHomes and PWCC is drawn from deep wells using pumps run by electricity supplied by MERALCO.

BF Homes and PWCC filed a Petition [With Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of PreliminaryInjunction and for the Immediate Issuance of Restraining Order] against MERALCO docketed as

Civil Case No. 03-0151, which the RTC granted. The Motion for Reconsideration of MERALCO wasdenied by the RTC.

Aggrieved, MERALCO filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65of the Rules of Court. MERALCO sought the reversal of the RTC Orders granting a writ ofpreliminary injunction in favor of BF Homes and PWCC. MERALCO asserted that the RTC had nojurisdiction over the application of BF Homes and PWCC for issuance of such a writ. In its Decision,the Court of Appeals agreed with MERALCO that the RTC had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of


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preliminary injunction in Civil Case No. 03-0151, as said trial court had no jurisdiction over thesubject matter of the case to begin with. In a Resolution, the Court of Appeals denied the Motion forReconsideration of BF Homes and PWCC.

Now, BF Homes and PWCC come before this Court via the instant Petition. BF Homes andPWCC argued that due to the threat of MERALCO to disconnect electric services, BF Homes andPWCC had no other recourse but to seek an injunctive remedy from the RTC under its generaljurisdiction. The merits of Civil Case No. 03-0151 was not yet in issue, only the propriety of issuinga writ of preliminary injunction to prevent an irreparable injury. Even granting that the RTC has nojurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 03-0151, the ERC by enabling law has noinjunctive power to prevent the disconnection by MERALCO of electric services to BF Homes andPWCC.

Issue:

Whether the jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 03-0151 lies with the RTC

or the Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC).

Ruling:

A careful review of the material allegations of BF Homes and PWCC in their Petition beforethe RTC reveals that the very subject matter thereof is the off-setting of the amount of refund theyare supposed to receive from MERALCO against the electric bills they are to pay to the samecompany. This is squarely within the primary jurisdiction of the ERC.

The right of BF Homes and PWCC to refund, on which their claim for off-setting depends,originated from the MERALCO Refund cases. In said cases, the Court (1) authorized MERALCO toadopt a rate adjustment in the amount of P0.017 per kilowatthour, effective with respect to its

billing cycles beginning February 1994; and (2) ordered MERALCO to refund to its customers orcredit in said customers favor for future consumption P0.167 per kilowatthour, starting with thecustomers billing cycles that begin February 1998, in accordance with the ERB Decision datedFebruary 16, 1998.

It bears to stress that in the MERALCO Refund cases, this Court only affirmed the February16, 1998 Decision of the ERB (predecessor of the ERC) fixing the just and reasonable rate for theelectric services of MERALCO and granting refund to MERALCO consumers of the amount theyoverpaid. Said Decision was rendered by the ERB in the exercise of its jurisdiction to determine andfix the just and reasonable rate of power utilities such as MERALCO.

Presently, the ERC has original and exclusive jurisdiction under Rule 43(u) of the EPIRA

over all cases contesting rates, fees, fines, and penalties imposed by the ERC in the exercise of itspowers, functions and responsibilities, and over all cases involving disputes between and amongparticipants or players in the energy sector. Section 4(o) of the EPIRA Implementing Rules andRegulation provides that the ERC shall also be empowered to issue such other rules that areessential in the discharge of its functions as in independent quasi-judicial body.

Indubitably, the ERC is the regulatory agency of the government having the authority andsupervision over MERALCO.Thus, the task to approve the guidelines, schedules, and details of the


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refund by MERALCO to its consumers, to implement the judgment of this Court in the MERALCORefund cases, also falls upon the ERC. By filing their Petition before the RTC, BF Homes and PWCCintend to collect their refund without submitting to the approved schedule of the ERC, and in effect,enjoy preferential right over the other equally situated MERALCO consumers.

Administrative agencies, like the ERC, are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and, as such,could wield only such as are specifically granted to them by the enabling statutes. In relationthereto is the doctrine of primary jurisdiction involving matters that demand the specialcompetence of administrative agencies even if the question involved is also judicial innature. Courts cannot and will not resolve a controversy involving a question within the jurisdictionof an administrative tribunal, especially when the question demands the sound exercise ofadministrative discretion requiring special knowledge, experience and services of theadministrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact. The court cannotarrogate into itself the authority to resolve a controversy, the jurisdiction of which is initiallylodged with the administrative body of special competence.

Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the Petition of BF Homes and PWCC in Civil Case No.03-0151, then it was also devoid of any authority to act on the application of BF Homes and PWCCfor the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction contained in the same Petition. The ancillary andprovisional remedy of preliminary injunction cannot exist except only as an incident of anindependent action or proceeding

Lastly, the Court herein already declared that the RTC not only lacked the jurisdiction toissue the writ of preliminary injunction against MERALCO, but that the RTC actually had nojurisdiction at all over the subject matter of the Petition of BF Homes and PWCC in Civil Case No. 03-0151. Therefore, in addition to the dissolution of the writ of preliminary injunction issued by theRTC, the Court also deems it appropriate to already order the dismissal of the Petition of BF Homesand PWCC in Civil Case No. 03-0151 for lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matter of the

same.

BERNABE L. NAVIDA et al. vs. HON. TEODORO A. DIZON, JR.G.R. No. 125078, May 30, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law and is

determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of

whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. Once vested by law, on

a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the action cannot be

dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law.

Facts:

Before the Court are consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of theRules of Court, which arose out of two civil cases that were filed in different courts but whosefactual background and issues are closely intertwined.

Beginning 1993, a number of personal injury suits were filed in different Texas state courtsby citizens of twelve foreign countries, including the Philippines. The thousands of plaintiffs soughtdamages for injuries they allegedly sustained from their exposure to dibromochloropropane


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(DBCP), a chemical used to kill nematodes (worms), while working on farms in 23 foreigncountries. The cases were eventually transferred to, and consolidated in, the Federal District Courtfor the Southern District of Texas, Houston Division. The defendants in the consolidated casesprayed for the dismissal of all the actions under the doctrine of forum non conveniens.

In a Memorandum and Order dated July 11, 1995, the Federal District Court conditionallygranted the defendants’ motion to dismiss. Notwithstanding the dismissal of the consolidated cases,the Court noted that in the event that the highest court of any foreign country finally affirms thedismissal for lack of jurisdiction of an action commenced by a plaintiff in these actions in his homecountry or the country in which he was injured, that plaintiff may return to this court and, uponproper motion, the court will resume jurisdiction over the action as if the case had never beendismissed for [forum non conveniens].

In accordance with the above Memorandum and Order, a total of 336 plaintiffs from GeneralSantos City (the petitioners in G.R. No. 125078, hereinafter referred to as NAVIDA, et al.) filed aJoint Complaint in the RTC of General Santos City. Navida, et al., prayed for the payment of damages

in view of the illnesses and injuries to the reproductive systems which they allegedly sufferedbecause of their exposure to DBCP. They claimed, among others, that they were exposed to thischemical when they used the same in the banana plantations where they worked at; and/or whenthey resided within the agricultural area where such chemical was used. Navida, et al., claimed thattheir illnesses and injuries were due to the fault or negligence of each of the defendant companiesin that they produced, sold and/or otherwise put into the stream of commerce DBCP-containingproducts. According to NAVIDA, et al., they were allowed to be exposed to the said products, whichthe defendant companies knew, or ought to have known, were highly injurious to the former’shealth and well-being.

Instead of answering the complaint, most of the defendant companies respectively filedtheir Motions for Bill of Particulars.

Without resolving the motions filed by the parties, the RTC of General Santos City issued anOrder dismissing the complaint. First, the trial court determined that it did not have jurisdiction tohear the case. It held that the subject matter stated in the complaint consisted of activity engaged inby foreign defendants outside Philippine territory, hence, outside and beyond the jurisdiction ofPhilippine Courts. It further held that Navida, et al. did not freely choose to file the complaint, butwere coerced to do so, merely to comply with the U.S. District Court’s Order dated July 11, 1995,and in order for them to have the opportunity to return to the U.S. District Court.

Thereafter, another joint complaint for damages against the same defendants was filedbefore the RTC of Davao City by 155 plaintiffs from Davao City. These plaintiffs (the petitioners inG.R. No. 126654, hereinafter referred to as ABELLA, et al.) in their complaint, pray for the same

reliefs as those mentioned in the complaint filed by Navida, et al. They likewise based their claimson almost the same facts as those alleged by Navida, et al.

Finding that it has no jurisdiction over the case the RTC of Davao City dismissed thecomplaint of Abella, et al.

Issue/s:


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1. Whether or not the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City erred indismissing the Complaints of herein petitioners for lack of jurisdiction.

2. Whether or not the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly acquiredjurisdiction over the persons of all the defendant companies

Ruling:

1. Yes, General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City erred in dismissing the Complaints of hereinpetitioners for lack of jurisdiction.

The rule is settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by law andis determined by the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespectiveof whether the plaintiffs are entitled to all or some of the claims asserted therein. Once vested bylaw, on a particular court or body, the jurisdiction over the subject matter or nature of the actioncannot be dislodged by anybody other than by the legislature through the enactment of a law.

At the time of the filing of the complaints, the jurisdiction of the RTC in civil cases underBatas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, was:SEC. 19. Jurisdiction in civil cases. – Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive originaljurisdiction:

x x x x(8) In all other cases in which the demand, exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind,attorney’s fees, litigation expenses, and costs or the value of the property in controversyexceeds One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) or, in such other cases in MetroManila, where the demand, exclusive of the abovementioned items exceeds Two hundredthousand pesos (P200,000.00).

As specifically enumerated in the amended complaints, NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,

point to the acts and/or omissions of the defendant companies in manufacturing, producing, selling,using, and/or otherwise putting into the stream of commerce, nematocides which contain DBCP,"without informing the users of its hazardous effects on health and/or without instructions on itsproper use and application."

Verily, in Citibank, N.A. v. Court of Appeals, this Court has always reminded that jurisdictionof the court over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint,irrespective of whether or not the plaintiffs are entitled to recover upon all or some of the claimsasserted therein. The jurisdiction of the court cannot be made to depend upon the defenses set upin the answer or upon the motion to dismiss, for otherwise, the question of jurisdiction wouldalmost entirely depend upon the defendants. What determines the jurisdiction of the court is thenature of the action pleaded as appearing from the allegations in the complaint. The averments

therein and the character of the relief sought are the ones to be consulted.

Clearly then, the acts and/or omissions attributed to the defendant companies constitute aquasi-delict which is the basis for the claim for damages filed by NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al.,with individual claims of approximately P2.7 million for each plaintiff claimant, which obviouslyfalls within the purview of the civil action jurisdiction of the RTCs.


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Moreover, the injuries and illnesses, which NAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., allegedlysuffered resulted from their exposure to DBCP while they were employed in the banana plantationslocated in the Philippines or while they were residing within the agricultural areas also located inthe Philippines. The factual allegations in the Amended Joint-Complaints all point to their cause of

action, which undeniably occurred in the Philippines. The RTC of General Santos City and the RTC ofDavao City obviously have reasonable basis to assume jurisdiction over the cases.

It is, therefore, error on the part of the courts a quo when they dismissed the cases on theground of lack of jurisdiction on the mistaken assumption that the cause of action narrated byNAVIDA, et al., and ABELLA, et al., took place abroad and had occurred outside and beyond theterritorial boundaries of the Philippines, i.e., "the manufacture of the pesticides, their packaging incontainers, their distribution through sale or other disposition, resulting in their becoming part ofthe stream of commerce," and, hence, outside the jurisdiction of the RTCs.

Certainly, the cases below are not criminal cases where territoriality, or the situs of the actcomplained of, would be determinative of jurisdiction and venue for trial of cases. In personal civil

actions, such as claims for payment of damages, the Rules of Court allow the action to becommenced and tried in the appropriate court, where any of the plaintiffs or defendants resides, orin the case of a non-resident defendant, where he may be found, at the election of the plaintiff.2. Yes, the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City validly acquired jurisdiction overthe persons of all the defendant companies.

Rule 14, Section 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that "[t]he defendant’svoluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons." In this connection,all the defendant companies designated and authorized representatives to receive summons and torepresent them in the proceedings before the courts a quo. All the defendant companies submittedthemselves to the jurisdiction of the courts a quo by making several voluntary appearances, bypraying for various affirmative reliefs, and by actively participating during the course of the

proceedings below.

In line herewith, this Court, in Meat Packing Corporation of the Philippines v.Sandiganbayan, held that jurisdiction over the person of the defendant in civil cases is acquiredeither by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service ofsummons. Furthermore, the active participation of a party in the proceedings is tantamount to aninvocation of the court’s jurisdiction and a willingness to abide by the resolution of the case, andwill bar said party from later on impugning the court or body’s jurisdiction.

Thus, the RTC of General Santos City and the RTC of Davao City have validly acquiredjurisdiction over the persons of the defendant companies, as well as over the subject matter of theinstant case. What is more, this jurisdiction, which has been acquired and has been vested on the

courts a quo, continues until the termination of the proceedings.

It may also be pertinently stressed that "jurisdiction" is different from the "exercise ofjurisdiction." Jurisdiction refers to the authority to decide a case, not the orders or the decisionrendered therein. Accordingly, where a court has jurisdiction over the persons of the defendantsand the subject matter, as in the case of the courts a quo, the decision on all questions arisingtherefrom is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. Any error that the court may commit in the


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exercise of its jurisdiction is merely an error of judgment, which does not affect its authority todecide the case, much less divest the court of the jurisdiction over the case.

NM ROTHSCHILD & SONS (AUSTRALIA) LIMITED vs. LEPANTO CONSOLIDATED MINING

COMPANYG.R. No. 175799, November 28, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

A party cannot invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his

opponent and after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same

jurisdiction.

Facts:

Lepanto Consolidated Mining Company (Lepanto) filed with the RTC of Makati City aComplaint against NM Rothschild & Sons (Australia) Limited praying for a judgment declaring theloan and hedging contracts between the parties void for being contrary to Article 2018 of the Civil

Code of the Philippines and for damages.

Upon Lepanto’s motion, the trial court authorized Lepanto’s counsel to personally bring thesummons and Complaint to the Philippine Consulate General in Sydney, Australia for the latteroffice to effect service of summons on NM Rothschild & Sons. NM Rothschild & Sons filed a SpecialAppearance With Motion to Dismiss praying for the dismissal of the Complaint on the ground thatthe court has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of NM Rothschild & Sons due to thedefective and improper service of summons.

Later, NM Rothschild & Sons filed two Motions: (1) a Motion for Leave to take thedeposition of Mr. Paul Murray (Director, Risk Management of NM Rothschild & Sons) before thePhilippine Consul General; and (2) a Motion for Leave to Serve Interrogatories on Lepanto.

The RTC denied the Motion to Dismiss. According to the trial court, there was a proper service ofsummons through the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA). The CA affirmed the decision of theRTC. Meanwhile, the RTC issued an Order directing Lepanto to answer some of the questions in NMRothschild & Sons’s Interrogatories to Lepanto.

Lepanto vigorously argues that NM Rothschild & Sons should be held to have voluntarilyappeared before the trial court when it prayed for, and was actually afforded, specific reliefs fromthe trial court. Lepanto points out that while NM Rothschild & Sons’s Motion to Dismiss was stillpending, it prayed for and was able to avail of modes of discovery against Lepanto, such as writteninterrogatories, requests for admission, deposition, and motions for production of documents.

NM Rothschild & Sons counters that in the leading case of La Naval Drug Corporation v.

Court of Appeals, a party may file a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over itsperson, and at the same time raise affirmative defenses and pray for affirmative relief, withoutwaiving its objection to the acquisition of jurisdiction over its person.

Issue:

Is NM Rothschild & Sons deemed to have voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of thecourt by seeking affirmative reliefs?


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effect until November 28, 2003, provided that a written notice of termination is given by one partyto the other not later than November 28, 2001. In the absence of such written notice, the Agreementshall continue in effect beyond November 28, 2003 but may be terminated thereafter by eitherparty by giving to the other a prior two year written notice of termination, and that in the event of

breach, the parties may obtain judicial relief, including a writ of execution.

Thereafter, ETPI filed a Motion for Enforcement/Execution and an Urgent Motion in RTC,alleging, among others, that PLDT violated the terms of the above Compromise Agreement. PLDTand ETPI arrived at a Letter-Agreement which contains, among others, that they shall continue tonegotiate within the shortest possible time for a mutually acceptable agreement which will amendour existing Compromise Agreement which was approved by the Court; that without prejudice toother claims of PLDT and ETPI against each other, they will settle amicably or through arbitration;they likewise agree that to facilitate the resolution of our respective claims and the execution of anew agreement which shall supersede the Compromise Agreement, both PLDT and ETPI shall nottake any action that will in any way violate the Compromise Agreement.

Subsequently, PLDT advised ETPI that it would be implementing a complete blocking oftelephone service traffic from REACH Hong Kong carried on the ETPI-REACH circuits if thesettlement rate arrangements for telephone service between Hong Kong and the Philippines werenot resolved on or before a certain date.

RTC favored ETPI defendant, PLDT was ordered to restore the free flow oftelecommunication calls and data from the Philippines to Hongkong passing through the REACH-ETPI circuits since the same was in violation of the Compromise Agreement.

Thus, PLDT filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari , which was granted.

However, later on it amended its own decision, reversing it on the ground that after the approval of the

Compromise Agreement by the RTC, the decision based on the judicial compromise between the

parties became immediately final and executory. NTC although having original and exclusivejurisdiction over resolving disputes between telecommunications companies regarding settlementof access charge and/or revenue sharing, it did not divest the trial court of its jurisdiction to enforceits judgment through the issuance of the necessary writs.

With respect to the execution of the Letter-Agreement, the Court of Appeals held that thesame did not revise, modify or novate the Compromise Agreement.

Issue:

1) Whether or not RTC retained jurisdiction over the subject matter sought to be enjoined

by ETPI.2) Whether or not the Letter-Agreement novated the Compromise Agreement when the

former expressly provided that the parties’ respective claims against each other shouldbe settled amicably or through arbitration.

Ruling:


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No. After a thorough review of the facts and issues of the instant petition, the Court findsthat, the same is already moot.

The Compromise Agreement, by its own terms, was effective only until 28 November 2003.

It stated that agreement shall take effect and shall continue in effect until November 28, 2003,provided that a written notice of termination is given by one party to the other not later thanNovember 28, 2001. In the absence of such written notice, this Agreement shall continue in effectbeyond November 28, 2003 but may [be] terminated thereafter by either party by giving to theother a prior two year notice of termination. x x x

The conditions for the termination of the Compromise Agreement were complied with inthat: (a) both PLDT and ETPI are now coursing traffic through their respective networks; (b)foreign telecommunications companies such as Hong Kong REACH, Singtel and Chung Hua TelCom,were advised about the expiration of the Compromise Agreement; and (c) the parties arenegotiating and/or have already concluded their respective agreements.

It is a fact that there is now nothing to unblock because circuits have already beendeactivated and migrated pursuant to the existing interconnection agreements between PLDT andETPI. As a result of the expiration of the Compromise Agreement, there is nothing for the RTC-Makati to enforce and/or act upon. x x x.

Far from controverting the above submissions of PLDT, ETPI sustained the same andinsisted on the mootness of PLDT’s petition. It is a rule of universal application, almost, that courtsof justice constituted to pass upon substantial rights will not consider questions in which no actualinterests are involved; they decline jurisdiction of moot cases. And where the issue has becomemoot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, so that a declaration thereon would be of nopractical use or value. There is no actual substantial relief to which petitioners would be entitledand which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition

Applying the above pronouncement, there was no justiciable controversy anymore in theinstant petition in view of the expiration of the Compromise Agreement sought to be enforced.There was no longer any purpose in determining whether the Court of Appeals erred in affirmingthe RTC Orders since any declaration thereon would be of no practical use or value. By the veryadmission of PLDT, it can no longer be compelled to undo its act of blocking the telecommunicationcalls and data from the Philippines to Hong Kong passing through the REACH-ETPI circuits since,effectively, there were no more circuits to speak of.

Clearly, any decision of this Court on the present petition, whether it be an affirmance or areversal of the Amended Decision of the Court of Appeals, would be equivalent in effect to anaffirmance or an invalidation of the challenged Orders of the RTC. But as can be gleaned from the

above discussion, and as succinctly put by PLDT in its Memorandum, there is nothing more for theRTC to enforce and/or act upon. As such, any discussion on the matter would be a mere surplusage.Although the moot and academic principle admits of certain exceptions, none of them areapplicable in the instant case.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. GIOVANNI OCFEMIA y CHAVEZG.R. No. 185383, September 25, 2013, J. Leonardo-De Castro


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A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC, entitled “Resolution Providing Guidelines in the Inventory and

Adjudication of Cases Assigned to Judges who are Promoted or Transferred to Other Branches in the

Same Court Level of the Jud icial Hierarchy,” actually recognizes that both the transferred judge and

the new judge can decide the case but gives consideration to the preference of the parties, but the

lapses in the observance of the rule by the judge which was not chosen by the accused does notinvalidate the decision due to violation of due process when the accused was sufficiently given the

opportunity to be heard, to defend himself and to confront his accusers on the offense hurled against

him.

Facts:

Accused-appellant Giovanni Ocfemia was charged before the RTC with illegal sale ofdangerous drugs, penalized under Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165, or the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.The prosecution averred that a team of PDEA and PNP agents and officers conducted a buy-bustoperation against Ocfemia. After Ocfemia the poseur-buyer PO2 Aldea a sachet of shabu, he wasarrested. The substance later tested positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Ocfemia denied the charge and asserted that he was framed-up by the police. As a policeasset, he joined some of the members of the PDEA/PNP team in a buy-bust operation, whereOcfemia would be the poseur-buyer. After the supposed suspect was arrested, PO2 Aldea disclosedthat Ocfemia would be charged with illegal sale of shabu.

After the prosecution presented their rebuttal witness, the RTC, then presided by ActingPresiding Judge William B. Volante (Volante), considered the case submitted for decision. In themeantime, the Supreme Court en banc approved A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC, entitled “ResolutionProviding Guidelines in the Inventory and Adjudication of Cases Assigned to Judges who arePromoted or Transferred to Other Branches in the Same Court Level of the Judicial Hierarchy.” Itprovided in part that “Should any case be left undecided by the transferred/detailed/assigned

judge, the judge conducting the inventory shall cause the issuance to the parties of a noticeof transfer/detail/assignment of the judge to which the case had been assigned, with adirective for the plaintiff/s to manifest, within five (5) days from receipt of such notice,whether or not he/she desires that the transferred judge should decide the case. The desireof the plaintiff, who may opt to have the case decided by the new judge, shall be respected.However, should the defendant oppose the manifestation of the plaintiff, the new judge shallresolve the matter in accordance with these Guidelines. Should the plaintiff fail to submitsuch manifestation within the said 5-day period, the presumption is that he/she desires thatthe case be decided by the transferred judge.”

In an Order dated June 6, 2006, the RTC notified the parties that Acting Presiding JudgeVolante had already been replaced by Presiding Judge Angeles S. Vasquez (Vasquez) and directed

the parties to manifest within five days from notice whether they want the case to still be decidedby Judge Volante, otherwise, it would already be decided by Judge Vasquez. While the prosecutiondid not submit such a manifestation, Ocfemia filed his Manifestation on July 13, 2006 informing theRTC that he wished for Judge Volante to decide the case.

The RTC promulgated its Decision, penned by Judge Vasquez, convicting and sentencingOcfemia of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the conviction.


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Issue:

Was the ruling of Judge Vasquez invalid due to his lack of authority to rule on the case inview of Ocfemia’s manifestation of his preference that Judge Volante be the one to decide the case?

Ruling:

The appeal is denied.

The reason behind A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC is primarily administrative, i.e., to establish anorderly system for the management and disposition of cases of a trial court in the event of transfer,reassignment, or promotion of its presiding judge. It intends to prevent conflict between thetransferred judge and the new judge, and confusion as to when, where, and how case records shallbe transferred and decisions shall be promulgated in such cases. It does not touch upon anyjurisdictional issue and, in general, does not have any effect on the validity of the decision orresolution of either the transferred judge or the new judge.

A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC actually recognizes that both the transferred judge and the new judgecan decide the case but gives consideration to the preference of the parties. Indeed, Judge Volantewas the presumed choice of the Republic of the Philippines and the expressed option of Ocfemia todecide Criminal Case No. 4594. Under A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC, Judge Vasquez should have endorsedthe case to the OCA, which, in turn, would have authorized Judge Volante to decide the case.Nonetheless, while Judge Vasquez may face administrative liability (after appropriateadministrative proceedings) for his failure to comply with A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC, his Decision datedAugust 31, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 4594 is completely valid absent any showing that it had beenrendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or in violation of accused-appellant’s constitutionalright to due process.

Contrary to Ocfemia’s averment, he was not denied due process of law just because of JudgeVasquez’s lapses in the observance of A.M. No. 04-5-19-SC. [As ruled by the CA,] Ocfemia was not atall deprived of due process xxx he was sufficiently given the opportunity to be heard, to defendhimself and to confront his accusers on the offense hurled against him. Hence, due process was notdenied to Ocfemia by the mere issuance of a judge of a decision based on the records despite thefact that said judge was not the one who conducted the trial [and] receive the evidence of theparties. The circumstance that the Judge who rendered the judgment was not the one whoheard the witnesses, does not detract from the validity of the verdict of conviction.

DOCTRINE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

NEW SUN VALLEY HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., vs. SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY,

BARANGAY SUN VALLEY, PARAÑAQUE CITY, ROBERTO GUEVARRA IN HIS CAPACITY ASPUNONG BARANGAY AND MEMBERS OF THE SANGGUNIANG BARANGAY

G.R. No. 156686, July 27, 2011, J. Leonardo-De Castro

Petitioner wants this Court to recognize the rights and interests of the residents of Sun Valley

Subdivision but it miserably failed to establish the legal basis, such as its ownership of the subject

roads, which entitles petitioner to the remedy prayed for. As petitioner has failed to establish that it

has any right entitled to the protection of the law, and it also failed to exhaust administrative remedies


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by applying for injunctive relief instead of going to the Mayor as provided by the Local Government

Code, the petition must be denied.

Facts:

Pursuant to its power under the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act No. 7160), theSangguniang Barangay of Barangay Sun Valley (the "BSV Sangguniang Barangay") issued BSVResolution entitled "Directing the New Sun Valley Homeowners Association to Open Rosemallowand Aster Streets to Vehicular and Pedestrian Traffic," at all hours daily except from 11 p.m. to 5a.m. at which time the said streets may be closed for the sake of the security of the residentstherein.

The New Sun Valley Homeowners Association, Inc. (NSVHAI), represented by its President,Marita Cortez, filed a Petition for a "Writ of Preliminary Injunction/Permanent Injunction withprayer for issuance of TRO" with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque City.

NSVHAI claimed that the implementation of BSV Resolution would "cause grave injusticeand irreparable injury" as "the affected homeowners acquired their properties for strictlyresidential purposes"; that it would provide them privacy and "a peaceful neighborhood, free fromthe hassles of public places". According to NSVHAI, the opening of the route to all kinds of vehicleswould result to the traffic build-up in an already congested choke point. NSVHAI state that themaintenance of peace and order in the residential area was one of the reasons why entry and exit tothe subdivision was regulated by the Association and why the passing through of vehicles wascontrolled and limited; and that criminal elements would take advantage of the opening to publicuse of the roads in question.

Executive Judge Helen Bautista-Ricafort of the RTC issued a Temporary Restraining Order(TRO) directing the Sangguniang Barangay to cease and desist from the implementation of the said

Resolution or maintain the status quo.

NSVHAI submitted an Amended Petition wherein it claimed that the BSV Sangguniang Barangayhad no jurisdiction over the opening of Rosemallow and Aster Streets (the "subject roads"); that aBarangay Resolution cannot validly cause the opening of the subject roads because under the law,an ordinance is required to effect such an act.

The RTC dismissed the case on the grounds that the streets have long been part of thepublic domain and beyond the commerce of man. The authority to close or open the said streets isvested in the local government units and not on homeowner’s associations, pursuant to Section 21of the local Government Code (RA 7160) quoted as follows: "Section 21. Closure and Opening ofRoads. (a) A local government unit may, pursuant to an ordinance, permanently or temporarily

close or open any local road, alley, park, or square falling within its jurisdiction x x x." Hence thereis no right on the part of Plaintiff NSVHA entitled to the protection of the law. Further, defendantcontends that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies as ordained in Sections 32 and57 of the Local Government Code giving the city mayor the supervisory power, and the power ofreview by the Sangguniang Panlungsod, respectively.

The Court of Appeals issued a Decision denying the appeal and affirming the Orders of the RTC.


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Issue:

Can the court issued injunctive relief against the implementation of BSV Resolution No. 98-

096 to give petitioner the protection of the law even if it failed to exhaust administrative remedies?

Ruling:

No, petitioner has failed to establish that it has any right entitled to the protection of thelaw, and it also failed to exhaust administrative remedies by applying for injunctive relief instead ofgoing to the Mayor as provided by the Local Government Code.

We see no reason to depart from these findings by the Court of Appeals. Petitioner’srecourse in questioning BSV Resolution No. 98-096 should have been with the Mayor of ParañaqueCity, as clearly stated in Section 32 of the Local Government Code, which provides:

Section 32. City and Municipal Supervision over Their Respective Barangays. - The city ormunicipality, through the city or municipal mayor concerned, shall exercise generalsupervision over component barangays to ensure that said barangays act within the scopeof their prescribed powers and functions.

We do not see how petitioner’s act could qualify as an exception to the doctrine ofexhaustion of administrative remedies. We have emphasized the importance of applying thisdoctrine in a recent case, wherein we held:

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is a cornerstone of our judicialsystem. The thrust of the rule is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out theirfunctions and discharge their responsibilities within the specializ

rem compiled final

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