Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 177960 January 29, 2009JEFFREY RESO DAYAP,Petitioner,vs.PRETZY-LOU SENDIONG, GENESA SENDIONG, ELVIE SY and DEXIE DURAN,Respondents.D E C I S I O NTinga,J.:Before us is a petition for review1on certiorari of the Decision2dated 17 August 2006 and Resolution3dated 25 April 2007 by the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01179 entitled,Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa R. Sendiong, Elvie H. Sy and Dexie Duran v. Hon. Judge Cresencio Tan and Jeffrey Reso Dayap.The case had its origins in the filing of an Information4on 29 December 2004 by the Provincial Prosecutors Office, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, charging herein petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap with the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to Homicide, Less Serious Physical Injuries, and Damage to Property. The pertinent portion of the information reads:That at about 11:55 oclock in the evening of 28 December 2004 at Brgy. Maslog, Sibulan, Negros Oriental, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously drive in a reckless and imprudent manner a 10-wheeler cargo truck with plate number ULP-955, color blue, fully loaded with sacks of coconut shell, registered in the name of Ruben Villabeto of Sta. Agueda Pamplona, Negros Oriental, thereby hitting an automobile, a Colt Galant with plate number NLD-379 driven by Lou Gene R. Sendiong who was with two female passengers, namely: Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, thus causing the instantaneous death of said Lou Gene R. Sendiong, less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy and extensive damage to the above-mentioned Colt Galant which is registered in the name of Cristina P. Weyer of 115 Dr. V. Locsin St., Dumaguete City, to the damage of the heirs of the same Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the other two offended parties above-mentioned.An act defined and penalized by Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code.On 10 January 2005, before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sibulan, Negros Oriental, petitioner was arraigned and he pleaded not guilty to the charge.5On 17 January 2005, respondents Pretzy-Lou P. Sendiong, Genesa Sendiong and Dexie Duran filed a motion for leave of court to file an amended information.6They sought to add the allegation of abandonment of the victims by petitioner, thus: "The driver of the 10-wheeler cargo truck abandoned the victims, at a time when said [Lou-Gene] R. Sendiong was still alive inside the car; he was only extracted from the car by the by-standers."7On 21 January 2005, however, the Provincial Prosecutor filed an Omnibus Motion praying that the motion to amend the information be considered withdrawn.8On 21 January 2003, the MTC granted the withdrawal and the motion to amend was considered withdrawn.9Pre-trial and trial of the case proceeded. Respondents testified for the prosecution. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner sought leave to file a demurrer to evidence which was granted. Petitioner filed his Demurrer to Evidence10dated 15 April 2005 grounded on the prosecutions failure to prove beyond reasonable doubt that he is criminally liable for reckless imprudence, to which respondents filed a Comment11dated 25 April 2005.In the Order12dated 16 May 2005, the MTC granted the demurrer and acquitted petitioner of the crime of reckless imprudence. The MTC found that the evidence presented by respondents failed to establish the allegations in the Information. Pertinent portions of the order state:An examination of the allegations in the information and comparing the same with the evidence presented by the prosecution would reveal that the evidence presented has not established said allegations. The facts and circumstances constituting the allegations charged have not been proven. It is elementary in the rules of evidence that a party must prove his own affirmative allegations.x x x xNowhere in the evidence of the prosecution can this Court find that it was the accused who committed the crime as charged. Its witnesses have never identified the accused as the one who has committed the crime. The prosecution never bothered to establish if indeed it was the accused who committed the crime or asked questions which would have proved the elements of the crime. The prosecution did not even establish if indeed it was the accused who was driving the truck at the time of the incident. The Court simply cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime has been committed and that the accused is the person responsible for it. There was no evidence on the allegation of the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong as there was no death certificate that was offered in evidence. The alleged less serious physical injuries on the bodies of Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy were not also proven as no medical certificate was presented to state the same nor was a doctor presented to establish such injuries. The alleged damage to the [C]olt [G]alant was also not established in any manner as no witness ever testified on this aspect and no documentary evidence was also presented to state the damage. The prosecution therefore failed to establish if indeed it was the accused who was responsible for the death of Lou Gene R. Sendiong and the injuries to Dexie Duran and Elvie Sy, including the damage to the Colt Galant. The mother of the victim testified only on the expenses she incurred and the shock she and her family have suffered as a result of the incident. But sad to say, she could not also pinpoint if it was the accused who committed the crime and be held responsible for it. This Court could only say that the prosecution has practically bungled this case from its inception.x x x xThe defense furthermore argued that on the contrary, the prosecutions [evidence] conclusively show that the swerving of vehicle 1 [the Colt Galant] to the lane of vehicle 2 [the cargo truck] is the proximate cause of the accident. The court again is inclined to agree with this argument of the defense. It has looked carefully into the sketch of the accident as indicated in the police blotter and can only conclude that the logical explanation of the accident is that vehicle 1 swerved into the lane of vehicle 2, thus hitting the latters inner fender and tires. Exhibit "7" which is a picture of vehicle 2 shows the extent of its damage which was the effect of vehicle 1s ramming into the rear left portion of vehicle 2 causing the differential guide of vehicle 2 to be cut, its tires busted and pulled out together with their axle. The cutting of the differential guide cause[d] the entire housing connecting the tires to the truck body to collapse, thus causing vehicle 2 to tilt to its left side and swerve towards the lane of vehicle 1. It was this accident that caused the swerving, not of [sic] any negligent act of the accused.x x x xEvery criminal conviction requires of the prosecution to prove two thingsthe fact of the crime,i.e., the presence of all the elements of the crime for which the accused stands charged, and the fact that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime. Sad to say, the prosecution has miserably failed to prove these two things. When the prosecution fails to discharge its burden of establishing the guilt of the accused, an accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf.x x x xWHEREFORE, premises considered, the demurrer is granted and the accused JEFFREY RESO DAYAP is hereby acquitted for insufficiency of evidence. The bail bond posted for his temporary liberty is also hereby cancelled and ordered released to the accused or his duly authorized representative.SO ORDERED.13Respondents thereafter filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65,14alleging that the MTCs dismissal of the case was done without considering the evidence adduced by the prosecution. Respondents added that the MTC failed to observe the manner the trial of the case should proceed as provided in Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court as well as failed to rule on the civil liability of the accused in spite of the evidence presented. The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Negros Oriental, Br. 32.In the order15dated 23 August 2005, the RTC affirmed the acquittal of petitioner but ordered the remand of the case to the MTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. The RTC ruled that the MTCs recital of every fact in arriving at its conclusions disproved the allegation that it failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also demonstrated that the MTC conducted the trial of the case in the manner dictated by Sec. 11, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, except that the defense no longer presented its evidence after the MTC gave due course to the accuseds demurrer to evidence, the filing of which is allowed under Sec. 23, Rule 119. The RTC however agreed that the MTC failed to rule on the accuseds civil liability, especially since the judgment of acquittal did not include a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did not exist. Thus, the RTC declared that the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and resolved to remand the issue to the MTC. The dispositive portion of the decision states:WHEREFORE, the questioned order of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan on accuseds acquittal is AFFIRMED. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin or its successor for further proceedings on the civil aspect of the case. No costs.SO ORDERED.16Both parties filed their motions for reconsideration of the RTC order, but these were denied for lack of merit in the order17dated 12 September 2005.Respondents then filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals under Rule 42, docketed as CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179. The appellate court subsequently rendered the assailed decision and resolution. The Court of Appeals ruled that there being no proof of the total value of the properties damaged, the criminal case falls under the jurisdiction of the RTC and the proceedings before the MTC arenull and void. In so ruling, the appellate court citedTulor v. Garcia(correct title of the case isCuyos v. Garcia)18which ruled that in complex crimes involving reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical injuries and damage to property, the jurisdiction of the court to take cognizance of the case is determined by the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting from the reckless imprudence, not by the corresponding penalty for the physical injuries charged. It also found support in Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 and the 1991 Rule 8 on Summary Procedure, which govern the summary procedure in first-level courts in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence where the imposable fine does not exceedP10,000.00. As there was no proof of the total value of the property damaged and respondents were claiming the amount ofP1,500,000.00 as civil damages, the case falls within the RTCs jurisdiction. The dispositive portion of the Decision dated 17 August 2006 reads:WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered by Us REMANDING the case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region, Branch 32, Negros Oriental for proper disposition of the merits of the case.SO ORDERED.19Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the Court of Appeals decision,20arguing that jurisdiction over the case is determined by the allegations in the information, and that neither the 1991 Rule on Summary Procedure nor Sec. 36 of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 can be the basis of the RTCs jurisdiction over the case. However, the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit in the Resolution dated 25 April 2007.21It reiterated that it is the RTC that has proper jurisdiction considering that the information alleged a willful, unlawful, felonious killing as well as abandonment of the victims.In the present petition for review, petitioner argues that the MTC had jurisdiction to hear the criminal case for reckless imprudence, owing to the enactment of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7691,22which confers jurisdiction to first-level courts on offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence. He asserts that the RTC could not have acquired jurisdiction on the basis of a legally unfiled and officially withdrawn amended information alleging abandonment. Respondents are also faulted for challenging the MTCs order acquitting petitioner through a special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 in lieu of an ordinary appeal under Rule 42.The petition has merit. It should be granted.The first issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that jurisdiction over the offense charged pertained to the RTC.Both the MTC and the RTC proceeded with the case on the basis of the Information dated 29 December 2004 charging petitioner only with the complex crime of reckless imprudence resulting to homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to property. The Court of Appeals however declared in its decision that petitioner should have been charged with the same offense but aggravated by the circumstance of abandonment of the victims. It appears from the records however that respondents attempt to amend the information by charging the aggravated offense was unsuccessful as the MTC had approved the Provincial Prosecutors motion to withdraw their motion to amend the information. The information filed before the trial court had remained unamended.23Thus, petitioner is deemed to have been charged only with the offense alleged in the original Information without any aggravating circumstance.Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code punishes any person who, by reckless imprudence, commits any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, with the penalty ofarresto mayorin its maximum period toprision correccionalin its medium period. When such reckless imprudence the use of a motor vehicle, resulting in the death of a person attended the same article imposes upon the defendant the penalty ofprision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods.The offense with which petitioner was charged is reckless imprudence resulting in homicide, less serious physical injuries and damage to property, a complex crime. Where a reckless, imprudent, or negligent act results in two or more grave or less grave felonies, a complex crime is committed.24Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code provides that when the single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. Since Article 48 speaks of felonies, it is applicable to crimes through negligence in view of the definition of felonies in Article 3 as "acts or omissions punishable by law" committed either by means of deceit (dolo) or fault (culpa).25Thus, the penalty imposable upon petitioner, were he to be found guilty, isprision correccionalin its medium period (2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years) and maximum period (4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years).Applicable as well is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless such statute provides for a retroactive application thereof.26When this case was filed on 29 December 2004, Section 32(2) of Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 had already been amended by R.A. No. 7691. R.A. No. 7691 extended the jurisdiction of the first-level courts over criminal cases to include all offenses punishable with imprisonment not exceeding six (6) years irrespective of the amount of fine, and regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties including those for civil liability. It explicitly states "that in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence, they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction thereof." It follows that criminal cases for recklessimprudence punishable withprision correccionalin its medium and maximum periods should fall within the jurisdiction of the MTC and not the RTC. Clearly, therefore, jurisdiction to hear and try the same pertained to the MTC and the RTC did not have original jurisdiction over the criminal case.27Consequently, the MTC of Sibulan, Negros Oriental had properly taken cognizance of the case and the proceedings before it were valid and legal.As the records show, the MTC granted petitioners demurrer to evidence and acquitted him of the offense on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. The demurrer to evidence in criminal cases, such as the one at bar, is "filed after the prosecution had rested its case," and when the same is granted, it calls "for an appreciation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and its sufficiency to warrant conviction beyond reasonable doubt, resulting in a dismissal of the case on the merits, tantamount to an acquittal of the accused."28Such dismissal of a criminal case by the grant of demurrer to evidence may not be appealed, for to do so would be to place the accused in double jeopardy.29But while the dismissal order consequent to a demurrer to evidence is not subject to appeal, the same is still reviewable but only by certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Thus, in such case, the factual findings of the trial court are conclusive upon the reviewing court, and the only legal basis to reverse and set aside the order of dismissal upon demurrer to evidence is by a clear showing that the trial court, in acquitting the accused, committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed judgment void.30Accordingly, respondents filed before the RTC the petition for certiorari alleging that the MTC gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the case and failing to consider the evidence of the prosecution in resolving the same, and in allegedly failing to follow the proper procedure as mandated by the Rules of Court. The RTC correctly ruled that the MTC did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the criminal complaint. The MTCs conclusions were based on facts diligently recited in the order thereby disproving that the MTC failed to consider the evidence presented by the prosecution. The records also show that the MTC correctly followed the procedure set forth in the Rules of Court.The second issue is whether the Court of Appeals erred in ordering the remand of the case of the matter of civil liability for the reception of evidence.We disagree with the Court of Appeals on directing the remand of the case to the RTC for further proceedings on the civil aspect, as well as with the RTC in directing a similar remand to the MTC.The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted.31However, the civil action based on delict may be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist32or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him.33Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.34This is because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is issue an order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the private complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case.35A scrutiny of the MTCs decision supports the conclusion that the acquittal was based on the findings that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist and that petitioner did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him; hence, petitioners civil liability has been extinguished by his acquittal. It should be noted that the MTC categorically stated that it cannot find any evidence which would prove that a crime had been committed and that accused was the person responsible for it. It added that the prosecution failed to establish that it was petitioner who committed the crime as charged since its witnesses never identified petitioner as the one who was driving the cargo truck at the time of the incident. Furthermore, the MTC found that the proximate cause of the accident is the damage to the rear portion of the truck caused by the swerving of the Colt Galant into the rear left portion of the cargo truck and not the reckless driving of the truck by petitioner, clearly establishing that petitioner is not guilty of reckless imprudence. Consequently, there is no more need to remand the case to the trial court for proceedings on the civil aspect of the case, since petitioners acquittal has extinguished his civil liability.WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 17 August 2006 and Resolution dated 25 April 2007 in CA-G.R. SP. No. 01179 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated 16 May 2005 of the Municipal Trial Court of Sibulan, Negros Oriental in Criminal Case No. 3016-04 granting the Demurrer to Evidence and acquitting petitioner Jeffrey Reso Dayap of the offense charged therein is REINSTATED and AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaSECOND DIVISIONG.R. No. 174497 October 12, 2009HEIRS OF GENEROSO SEBE AURELIA CENSERO SEBE and LYDIA SEBE,Petitioners,vs.HEIRS OF VERONICO SEVILLA and TECHNOLOGY AND LIVELIHOOD RESOURCE CENTER,Respondents.D E C I S I O NABAD,J.:This case concerns the jurisdiction of Municipal Trial Courts over actions involving real properties with assessed values of less thanP20,000.00.The Facts and the CaseIn this petition for review on certiorari1petitioners seek to reverse the Order2dated August 8, 2006, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog City, Branch 9, in Civil Case 5435, for annulment of documents, reconveyance and recovery of possession with damages. The trial court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction over an action where the assessed value of the properties is less thanP20,000.00. Petitioners asked for reconsideration3but the court denied it.4On August 10, 1999 plaintiff spouses Generoso and Aurelia Sebe and their daughter, Lydia Sebe, (the Sebes) filed with the RTC of Dipolog City5a complaint against defendants Veronico Sevilla and Technology and Livelihood Resources Center for Annulment of Document, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of two lots, which had a total assessed value ofP9,910.00, plus damages.6On November 25, 1999 they amended their complaint7to address a deed of confirmation of sale that surfaced in defendant Sevillas Answer8to the complaint. The Sebes claimed that they owned the subject lots but, through fraud, defendant Sevilla got them to sign documents conveying the lots to him. In his Answer9Sevilla insisted that he bought the lots from the Sebes in a regular manner.While the case was pending before the RTC, plaintiff Generoso Sebe died so his wife and children substituted him.10Parenthetically, with defendant Veronico Sevillas death in 2006, his heirs substituted him as respondents in this case.11On August 8, 2006 the RTC dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter considering that the ultimate relief that the Sebes sought was the reconveyance of title and possession over two lots that had a total assessed value of less thanP20,000.00. Under the law,12said the RTC, it has jurisdiction over such actions when the assessed value of the property exceedsP20,000.00,13otherwise, jurisdiction shall be with the first level courts.14The RTC concluded that the Sebes should have filed their action with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Dipolog City.On August 22, 2006 the Sebes filed a motion for reconsideration.15They pointed out that the RTC mistakenly classified their action as one involving title to or possession of real property when, in fact, it was a case for the annulment of the documents and titles that defendant Sevilla got. Since such an action for annulment was incapable of pecuniary estimation, it squarely fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC as provided in Section 19 of Batas Pambansa 129, as amended.To illustrate their point, the Sebes drew parallelisms between their case and the cases of De Rivera v. Halili16and Copioso v. Copioso.17The De Rivera involved the possession of a fishpond. The Supreme Court there said that, since it also had to resolve the issue of the validity of the contracts of lease on which the opposing parties based their rights of possession, the case had been transformed from a mere detainer suit to one that was incapable of pecuniary estimation. Under Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, civil actions, which were incapable of pecuniary estimation, came under the original jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance (now the RTC).18The Sebes pointed out that, like De Rivera, the subject of their case was "incapable of pecuniary estimation" since they asked the court, not only to resolve the dispute over possession of the lots, but also to rule on the validity of the affidavits of quitclaim, the deeds of confirmation of sale, and the titles over the properties.19Thus, the RTC should try the case.The Copioso, on the other hand, involves the reconveyance of land the assessed value of which was allegedlyP3,770.00. The Supreme Court ruled that the case comprehended more than just the title to, possession of, or any interest in the real property. It sought the annulment of contracts, reconveyance or specific performance, and a claim for damages. In other words, there had been a joinder of causes of action, some of which were incapable of pecuniary estimation. Consequently, the case properly fell within the jurisdiction of the RTC. Here, petitioners argued that their case had the same causes of actions and reliefs as those involved in Copioso. Thus, the RTC had jurisdiction over their case.On August 31, 2006 the RTC denied the Sebess motion for reconsideration, pointing out that the Copioso ruling had already been overturned by Spouses Huguete v. Spouses Embudo.20Before the Huguete, cancellation of titles, declaration of deeds of sale as null and void and partition were actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. Now, however, the jurisdiction over actions of this nature, said the RTC, depended on the valuation of the properties. In this case, the MTC had jurisdiction because the assessed value of the lots did not exceedP20,000.00.The IssueThe issue in this case is whether or not the Sebess action involving the two lots valued at less thanP20,000.00 falls within the jurisdiction of the RTC.The Courts RulingWhether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a particular action is determined by the plaintiffs allegations in the complaint and the principal relief he seeks in the light of the law that apportions the jurisdiction of courts.21The gist of the Sebess complaint is that they had been the owner for over 40 years of two unregistered lots22in Dampalan, San Jose, Dipolog City, covered by Tax Declaration 012-239, with a total assessed value ofP9,910.00.23On June 3, 1991 defendant Sevilla caused the Sebes to sign documents entitled affidavits of quitclaim.24Being illiterate, they relied on Sevillas explanation that what they signed were "deeds of real estate mortgage" covering a loan that they got from him.25And, although the documents which turned out to be deeds conveying ownership over the two lots to Sevilla forP10,000.0026were notarized, the Sebes did not appear before any notary public.27Using the affidavits of quitclaim, defendant Sevilla applied for28and obtained free patent titles covering the two lots on September 23, 1991.29Subsequently, he mortgaged the lots to defendant Technology and Livelihood Resource Center forP869,555.00.30On December 24, 1991 the Sebes signed deeds of confirmation of sale covering the two lots.31Upon closer examination, however, their signatures had apparently been forged.32The Sebes were perplexed with the reason for making them sign such documents to confirm the sale of the lots when defendant Sevilla already got titles to them as early as September.33At any rate, in 1992, defendant Sevilla declared the lots for tax purposes under his name.34Then, using force and intimidation, he seized possession of the lots from their tenants35and harvested that planting seasons yield36of coconut and palay worthP20,000.00.37Despite demands by the Sebes, defendant Sevilla refused to return the lots, forcing them to hire a lawyer38and incur expenses of litigation.39Further the Sebes suffered loss of earnings over the years.40They were also entitled to moral41and exemplary damages.42They thus asked the RTC a) to declare void the affidavits of quitclaim and the deeds of confirmation of sale in the case; b) to declare the Sebes as lawful owners of the two lots; c) to restore possession to them; and d) to order defendant Sevilla to pay themP140,000.00 in lost produce from June 3, 1991 to the date of the filing of the complaint,P30,000.00 in moral damages,P100,000.00 in attorneys fee,P30,000.00 in litigation expenses, and such amount of exemplary damages as the RTC might fix.43Based on the above allegations and prayers of the Sebess complaint, the law that applies to the action is Batas Pambansa 129, as amended. If this case were decided under the original text of Batas Pambansa 129 or even under its predecessor, Republic Act 296, determination of the nature of the case as a real action would have ended the controversy. Both real actions and actions incapable of pecuniary estimation fell within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.But, with the amendment of Batas Pambansa 129 by Republic Act 7601, the distinction between these two kinds of actions has become pivotal. The amendment expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include real actions involving property with an assessed value of less thanP20,000.00.44The power of the RTC under Section 19 of Batas Pambansa 129,45as amended,46to hear actions involving title to, or possession of, real property or any interest in it now covers only real properties with assessed value in excess ofP20,000.00. But the RTC retained the exclusive power to hear actions the subject matter of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. ThusSEC. 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:(1) In all civil actions in which the subject of the litigations is incapable of pecuniary estimation.(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; x x x.Section 33, on the other hand provides that, if the assessed value of the real property outside Metro Manila involved in the suit isP20,000.00 and below, as in this case, jurisdiction over the action lies in the first level courts. ThusSEC. 33. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in Civil Cases -- Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall exercise:x x x x(3) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein where the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) x x x.But was the Sebess action one involving title to, or possession of, real property or any interest in it or one the subject of which is incapable of pecuniary estimation?The Sebes claim that their action is, first, for the declaration of nullity of the documents of conveyance that defendant Sevilla tricked them into signing and, second, for the reconveyance of the certificate of title for the two lots that Sevilla succeeded in getting. The subject of their action is, they conclude, incapable of pecuniary estimation.1avvphi1An action "involving title to real property" means that the plaintiffs cause of action is based on a claim that he owns such property or that he has the legal rights to have exclusive control, possession, enjoyment, or disposition of the same.47Title is the "legal link between (1) a person who owns property and (2) the property itself."48"Title" is different from a "certificate of title" which is the document of ownership under the Torrens system of registration issued by the government through the Register of Deeds.49While title is the claim, right or interest in real property, a certificate of title is the evidence of such claim.Another way of looking at it is that, while "title" gives the owner the right to demand or be issued a "certificate of title," the holder of a certificate of title does not necessarily possess valid title to the real property. The issuance of a certificate of title does not give the owner any better title than what he actually has in law.50Thus, a plaintiffs action for cancellation or nullification of a certificate of title may only be a necessary consequence of the defendants lack of title to real property. Further, although the certificate of title may have been lost, burned, or destroyed and later on reconstituted, title subsists and remains unaffected unless it is transferred or conveyed to another or subjected to a lien or encumbrance.51Nestled between what distinguishes a "title" from a "certificate of title" is the present controversy between the Sebes and defendant Sevilla. Which of them has valid title to the two lots and would thus be legally entitled to the certificates of title covering them?The Sebes claim ownership because according to them, they never transferred ownership of the same to anyone. Such title, they insist, has remained with them untouched throughout the years, excepting only that in 1991 they constituted a real estate mortgage over it in defendant Sevillas favor. The Sebes alleged that defendant Sevilla violated their right of ownership by tricking them into signing documents of absolute sale, rather than just a real estate mortgage to secure the loan that they got from him.Assuming that the Sebes can prove that they have title to or a rightful claim of ownership over the two lots, they would then be entitled, first, to secure evidence of ownership or certificates of title covering the same and, second, to possess and enjoy them. The court, in this situation, may in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction and without ordering the cancellation of the Torrens titles issued to defendant Sevilla, direct the latter to reconvey the two lots and their corresponding Torrens titles to them as true owners.52The present action is, therefore, not about the declaration of the nullity of the documents or the reconveyance to the Sebes of the certificates of title covering the two lots. These would merely follow after the trial court shall have first resolved the issue of which between the contending parties is the lawful owner of such lots, the one also entitled to their possession. Based on the pleadings, the ultimate issue is whether or not defendant Sevilla defrauded the Sebes of their property by making them sign documents of conveyance rather than just a deed of real mortgage to secure their debt to him. The action is, therefore, about ascertaining which of these parties is the lawful owner of the subject lots, jurisdiction over which is determined by the assessed value of such lots.Here, the total assessed value of the two lots subject of the suit isP9,910.00. Clearly, this amount does not exceed the jurisdictional threshold value ofP20,000.00 fixed by law. The other damages that the Sebes claim are merely incidental to their main action and, therefore, are excluded in the computation of the jurisdictional amount.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Order dated August 8, 2006, of the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City, Branch 9, in Civil Case 5435, is AFFIRMED.SO ORDERED.Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 137686 February 8, 2000RURAL BANK OF MILAOR (CAMARINES SUR),petitioner,vs.FRANCISCA OCFEMIA, ROWENA BARROGO, MARIFE O. NIO, FELICISIMO OCFEMIA, RENATO OCFEMIA JR, and WINSTON OCFEMIA,respondents.PANGANIBAN,J.:When a bank, by its acts and failure to act, has clearly clothed its manager with apparent authority to sell an acquired asset in the normal course of business, it is legally obliged to confirm the transaction by issuing a board resolution to enable the buyers to register the property in their names. It has a duty to perform necessary and lawful acts to enable the other parties to enjoy all benefits of the contract which it had authorized.The CaseBefore this Court is a Petition for Review onCertiorarichallenging the December 18, 1998 Decision of the Court of Appeals1(CA) in CA-GR SP No. 46246, which affirmed the May 20, 1997 Decision2of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Naga City (Branch 28). The CA disposed as follows:Wherefore, premises considered, the Judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the respondent-appellant.3The dispositive portion of the judgment affirmed by the CA ruled in this wise:WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing findings, decision is hereby rendered whereby the [petitioner] Rural Bank of Milaor (Camarines Sur), Inc. through its Board of Directors is hereby ordered to immediately issue a Board Resolution confirming the Deed of Sale it executed in favor of Renato Ocfemia marked Exhibits C, C-1 and C-2); to pay [respondents] the sum of FIVE HUNDRED (P500.00) PESOS as actual damages; TEN THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS as attorney's fees; THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS as moral damages; THIRTY THOUSAND (P30,000.00) PESOS as exemplary damages; and to pay the costs.4Also assailed is the February 26, 1999 CA Resolution5which denied petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration.The FactsThe trial court's summary of the undisputed facts was reproduced in the CA Decision as follows:This is an action formandamuswith damages. On April 10, 1996, [herein petitioner] was declared in default on motion of the [respondents] for failure to file an answer within the reglementary-period after it was duly served with summons. On April 26, 1996, [herein petitioner] filed a motion to set aside the order of default with objection thereto filed by [herein respondents].On June 17, 1996, an order was issued denying [petitioner's] motion to set aside the order of default. On July 10, 1996, the defendant filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of June 17, 1996 with objection thereto by [respondents]. On July 12, 1996, an order was issued denying [petitioner's] motion for reconsideration. On July 31, 1996, [respondents] filed a motion to set case for hearing. A copy thereof was duly furnished the [petitioner] but the latter did not file any opposition and so [respondents] were allowed to present their evidenceex-parte. Acertioraricase was filed by the [petitioner] with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA GR No. 41497-SP but the petition was denied in a decision rendered on March 31, 1997 and the same is now final.The evidence presented by the [respondents] through the testimony of Marife O. Nio, one of the [respondents] in this case, show[s] that she is the daughter of Francisca Ocfemia, a co-[respondent] in this case, and the late Renato Ocfemia who died on July 23, 1994. The parents of her father, Renato Ocfemia, were Juanita Arellano Ocfemia and Felicisimo Ocfemia. Her other co-[respondents] Rowena O. Barrogo, Felicisimo Ocfemia, Renato Ocfemia, Jr. and Winston Ocfemia are her brothers and sisters.1wphi1.ntMarife O. Nio knows the five (5) parcels of land described in paragraph 6 of the petition which are located in Bombon, Camarines Sur and that they are the ones possessing them which [were] originally owned by her grandparents, Juanita Arellano Ocfemia and Felicisimo Ocfemia. During the lifetime of her grandparents, [respondents] mortgaged the said five (5) parcels of land and two (2) others to the [petitioner] Rural Bank of Milaor as shown by the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage (Exhs. A and A-1) and the Promissory Note (Exh. B).The spouses Felicisimo Ocfemia and Juanita Arellano Ocfemia were not able to redeem the mortgaged properties consisting of seven (7) parcels of land and so the mortgage was foreclosed and thereafter ownership thereof was transferred to the [petitioner] bank. Out of the seven (7) parcels that were foreclosed, five (5) of them are in the possession of the [respondents] because these five (5) parcels of land described in paragraph 6 of the petition were sold by the [petitioner] bank to the parents of Marife O. Nio as evidenced by a Deed of Sale executed in January 1988 (Exhs. C, C-1 and C-2).The aforementioned five (5) parcels of land subject of the deed of sale (Exh. C), have not been, however transferred in the name of the parents of Merife O. Nio after they were sold to her parents by the [petitioner] bank because according to the Assessor's Office the five (5) parcels of land, subject of the sale, cannot be transferred in the name of the buyers as there is a need to have the document of sale registered with the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur.In view of the foregoing, Marife O. Nio went to the Register of Deeds of Camarines Sur with the Deed of Sale (Exh. C) in order to have the same registered. The Register of Deeds, however, informed her that the document of sale cannot be registered without a board resolution of the [petitioner] Bank. Marife Nio then went to the bank, showed to if the Deed of Sale (Exh. C), the tax declaration and receipt of tax payments and requested the [petitioner] for a board resolution so that the property can be transferred to the name of Renato Ocfemia the husband of petitioner Francisca Ocfemia and the father of the other [respondents] having died already.The [petitioner] bank refused her request for a board resolution and made many alibi[s]. She was told that the [petitioner] bank ha[d] a new manager and it had no record of the sale. She was asked and she complied with the request of the [petitioner] for a copy of the deed of sale and receipt of payment. The president of the [petitioner] bank told her to get an authority from her parents and other [respondents] and receipts evidencing payment of the consideration appearing in the deed of sale. She complied with said requirements and after she gave all these documents, Marife O. Nio was again told to wait for two (2) weeks because the [petitioner] bank would still study the matter.After two (2) weeks, Marife O. Nio returned to the [petitioner] bank and she was told that the resolution of the board would not be released because the [petitioner] bank ha[d] no records from the old manager. Because of this, Marife O. Nio brought the matter to her lawyer and the latter wrote a letter on December 22, 1995 to the [petitioner] bank inquiring why no action was taken by the board of the request for the issuance of the resolution considering that the bank was already fully paid [for] the consideration of the sale since January 1988 as shown by the deed of sale itself (Exh. D and D-1 ).On January 15, 1996 the [petitioner] bank answered [respondents'] lawyer's letter (Exh. D and D-1) informing the latter that the request for board resolution ha[d] already been referred to the board of directors of the [petitioner] bank with another request that the latter should be furnished with a certified machine copy of the receipt of payment covering the sale between the [respondents] and the [petitioner] (Exh. E). This request of the [petitioner] bank was already complied [with] by Marife O. Nio even before she brought the matter to her lawyer.On January 23, 1996 [respondents'] lawyer wrote back the branch manager of the [petitioner] bank informing the latter that they were already furnished the receipts the bank was asking [for] and that the [respondents] want[ed] already to know the stand of the bank whether the board [would] issue the required board resolution as the deed of sale itself already show[ed] that the [respondents were] clearly entitled to the land subject of the sale (Exh. F). The manager of the [petitioner] bank received the letter which was served personally to him and the latter told Marife O. Nio that since he was the one himself who received the letter he would not sign anymore a copy showing him as having already received said letter (Exh. F).After several days from receipt of the letter (Exh. F) when Marife O. Nio went to the [petitioner] again and reiterated her request, the manager of the [petitioner] bank told her that they could not issue the required board resolution as the [petitioner] bank ha[d] no records of the sale. Because of this Merife O. Nio already went to their lawyer and ha[d] this petition filed.The [respondents] are interested in having the property described in paragraph 6 of the petition transferred to their names because their mother and co-petitioner, Francisca Ocfemia, is very sickly and they want to mortgage the property for the medical expenses of Francisca Ocfemia. The illness of Francisca Ocfemia beg[a]n after her husband died and her suffering from arthritis and pulmonary disease already became serious before December 1995.Marife O. Nio declared that her mother is now in serious condition and they could not have her hospitalized for treatment as they do not have any money and this is causing the family sleepless nights and mental anguish, thinking that their mother may die because they could not submit her for medication as they do not have money.6The trial court granted the Petition. As noted earlier, the CA affirmed the RTC Decision.Hence, this recourse.7In a Resolution dated June 23, 1999, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order directing the trial court "to refrain and desist from executing [pending appeal] the decision dated May 20, 1997 in Civil Case No. RTC-96-3513, effective immediately until further orders from this Court."8Ruling of the Court of AppealsThe CA held that herein respondents were "able to prove their present cause of action" against petitioner. It ruled that the RTC had jurisdiction over the case, because (1) the Petition involved a matter incapable of pecuniary estimation; (2)mandamusfell within the jurisdiction of RTC; and (3) assuming that the action was for specific performance as argued by the petitioner, it was still cognizable by the said court.IssuesIn its Memorandum,9the bank posed the following questions:1.Question of Jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. Has a Regional Trial Court original jurisdiction over an action involving title to real property with a total assessed value of less than P20,000.00?2.Question of Law. May the board of directors of a rural banking corporation be compelled to confirm a deed of absolute sale of real property owned by the corporation which deed of sale was executed by the bank manager without prior authority of the board of directors of the rural banking corporation?10This Court's RulingThe present Petition has no merit.First Issue:Jurisdiction of the Regional Trial CourtPetitioner submits that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. Disputing the ruling of the appellate court that the present action was incapable of pecuniary estimation, petitioner argues that the matter in fact involved title to real property worth less than P20,000. Thus, under RA 7691, the case should have been filed before a metropolitan trial court, a municipal trial court or a municipal circuit trial court.We disagree. The well-settled rule is that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint.11In the present case, the Petition for Mandamus filed by respondents before the trial court prayed that petitioner-bank be compelled to issue a board resolution confirming the Deed of Sale covering five parcels of unregistered land, which the bank manager had executed in their favor. The RTC has jurisdiction over such action pursuant to Section 21 of BP 129, which provides:Sec. 21.Original jurisdiction in other cases. Regional Trial Courts shall exercise original jurisdiction;(1) in the issuance of writ ofcertiorari, prohibition, mandamus,quo warranto,habeas corpusand injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions; and(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls.A perusal of the Petition shows that the respondents did not raise any question involving the title to the property, but merely asked that petitioner's board of directors be directed to issue the subject resolution. Moreover, the bank did not controvert the allegations in the said Petition. To repeat, the issue therein was not the title to the property; it was respondents' right to compel the bank to issue a board resolution confirming the Deed of Sale.Second Issue:Authority of the Bank ManagerRespondents initiated the present proceedings, so that they could transfer to their names the subject five parcels of land; and subsequently, to mortgage said lots and to use the loan proceeds for the medical expenses of their ailing mother. For the property to be transferred in their names, however, the register of deeds required the submission of a board resolution from the bank confirming both the Deed of Sale and the authority of the bank manager, Fe S. Tena, to enter into such transaction. Petitioner refused. After being given the runaround by the bank, respondents sued in exasperation.Allegations in the Petition for Mandamus Deemed AdmittedRespondents based their action before the trial court on the Deed of Sale, the substance of which was alleged in and a copy thereof was attached to the Petition forMandamus. The Deed named Fe S. Tena as the representative of the bank. Petitioner, however, failed to specifically deny under oath the allegations in that contract. In fact, it filed no answer at all, for which reason it was declared in default. Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court read:Sec. 7.Action or defense based on document. Whenever an action or defense is based upon a written instrument or document, the substance of such instrument or document shall be set forth in the pleading, and the original or a copy thereof shall be attached to the pleading as an exhibit, which shall be deemed to be a part of the pleading, or said copy may with like effect be set forth in the pleading.Sec. 8.How to contest genuineness of such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon a written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he claims to be the facts; but this provision does not apply when the adverse party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for an inspection of the original instrument is refused.12In failing to file its answer specifically denying under oath the Deed of Sale, the bank admitted the due execution of the said contract. Such admission means that it acknowledged that Tena was authorized to sign the Deed of Sale on its behalf.13Thus, defenses that are inconsistent with the due execution and the genuineness of the written instrument are cut off by an admission implied from a failure to make a verified specific denial.Other Acts of the BankIn any event, the bank acknowledged, by its own acts or failure to act, the authority of Fe S. Tena to enter into binding contracts. After the execution of the Deed of Sale, respondents occupied the properties in dispute and paid the real estate taxes due thereon. If the bank management believed that it had title to the property, it should have taken some measures to prevent the infringement or invasion of its title thereto and possession thereof.Likewise, Tena had previously transacted business on behalf of the bank, and the latter had acknowledged her authority. A bank is liable to innocent third persons where representation is made in the course of its normal business by an agent like Manager Tena, even though such agent is abusing her authority.14Clearly, persons dealing with her could not be blamed for believing that she was authorized to transact business for and on behalf of the bank. Thus, this Court has ruled inBoard of Liquidators v.Kalaw:15Settled jurisprudence has it that where similar acts have been approved by the directors as a matter of general practice, custom, and policy, the general manager may bind the company without formal authorization of the board of directors. In varying language, existence of such authority is established, by proof of the course of business, the usages and practices of the company and by the knowledge which the board of directors has, or must be presumed to have, of acts and doings of its subordinates in and about the affairs of the corporation. So also,. . . authority to act for and bind a corporation may be presumed from acts of recognition in other instances where the power was in fact exercised.. . . Thus, when, in the usual course of business of a corporation, an officer has been allowed in his official capacity to manage its affairs, his authority to represent the corporation may be implied from the manner in which he has been permitted by the directors to manage its business.Notwithstanding the putative authority of the manager to bind the bank in the Deed of Sale, petitioner has failed to file an answer to the Petition below within the reglementary period, let alone present evidence controverting such authority. Indeed, when one of herein respondents, Marife S. Nino, went to the bank to ask for the board resolution, she was merely told to bring the receipts. The bank failed to categorically declare that Tena had no authority. This Court stresses the following:. . . Corporate transactions would speedily come to a standstill were every person dealing with a corporation held duty-bound to disbelieve every act of its responsible officers, no matter how regular they should appear on their face. This Court has observed inRamirez vs.Orientalist Co., 38 Phil. 634, 654-655, that In passing upon the liability of a corporation in cases of this kind it is always well to keep in mind the situation as it presents itself to the third party with whom the contract is made. Naturally he can have little or no information as to what occurs in corporate meetings; and he must necessarily rely upon the external manifestation of corporate consent. The integrity of commercial transactions can only be maintained by holding the corporation strictly to the liability fixed upon it by its agents in accordance with law; and we would be sorry to announce a doctrine which would permit the property of man in the city of Paris to be whisked out of his hands and carried into a remote quarter of the earth without recourse against the corporation whose name and authority had been used in the manner disclosed in this case. As already observed, it is familiar doctrine that if a corporation knowingly permits one of its officers, or any other agent, to do acts within the scope of an apparent authority, and thus holds him out to the public as possessing power to do those acts, the corporation will, as against any one who has in good faith dealt with the corporation through such agent, be estopped from denying his authority; and where it is said "if the corporation permits this means the same as "if the thing is permitted by the directing power of the corporation."16In this light, the bank is estopped from questioning the authority of the bank manager to enter into the contract of sale. If a corporation knowingly permits one of its officers or any other agent to act within the scope of an apparent authority, it holds the agent out to the public as possessing the power to do those acts; thus, the corporation will, as against anyone who has in good faith dealt with it through such agent, be estopped from denying the agent's authority.17Unquestionably, petitioner has authorized Tena to enter into the Deed of Sale. Accordingly, it has a clear legal duty to issue the board resolution sought by respondent's. Having authorized her to sell the property, it behooves the bank to confirm the Deed of Sale so that the buyers may enjoy its full use.The board resolution is, in fact, mere paper work. Nonetheless, it is paper work necessary in the orderly operations of the register of deeds and the full enjoyment of respondents' rights. Petitioner-bank persistently and unjustifiably refused to perform its legal duty. Worse, it was less than candid in dealing with respondents regarding this matter. In this light, the Court finds it proper to assess the bank treble costs, in addition to the award of damages.WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. The Temporary Restraining Order issued by this Court is hereby LIFTED. Treble costs against petitioner.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTTHIRD DIVISIONG.R. No. 138248 September 7, 2005BARANGAY PIAPI, herein represented by its chairman ANDRES L. LUGNASIN and LIBERATO LARGO, RITA LARGO, SABAS MONTECALBO, SR., CARLOS ZAMORA, DONATA SESICAN, DIZAR CASTILLO, ALEJANDOR GICALE, SALVACION SALE, PABLO MORASTIL, JOSE JAVELOSA, ISIDRA BERNAL, FELIX EGHOT, CORAZON EGHOT, ROSALINA REMONDE, ROA EGHOT, CEFERINA LAGROSA, MARIO ARANEZ, ALBERTO CAMARILLO, BOBBY DULAOTO, NOEL ZAMORA, MARTINO MORALLAS, DANILO FAILAGA, MARITA BRAGAT, NATIVIDAD LAGRAMON, RAQUEL GEROZAGA, SHIRLY CESAR, PIO ZAMORA, ANDRES LUGNASIN, ELPIDIO SESICAN, CRESENTA BORJA, CARLITO TANEZA, JR., MARCIAL RELLON, JEANILITO SUMALINOG, ALBERTO ZAMORA, and LUISITO LAGROSA,Petitioners,vs.IGNACIO TALIP representing the HEIRS OF JUAN JAYAG,Respondent.D E C I S I O NSANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,J.:Before us is a petition for review oncertiorari1assailing the Orders dated January 12, 19992and April 20, 19993of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 18, Digos, Davao del Sur in Civil Case No. 3715 filed by the above-named petitioners against respondent Ignacio Talip representing the heirs of Juan Jayag.The factual antecedents as borne by the records are:On August 28, 1998, petitioners filed with the said RTC a complaint for reconveyance and damages with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against respondent, docketed as Civil Case No. 3715.The complaint alleges that petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual, peaceful, continuous and open possession for more than 30 years of a parcel of land consisting of 3.2 hectares situated in Piapi, Padada, Davao del Sur. It is covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-(3331)-4244 of the Registry of Deeds, same province, issued in the name of Juan Jayag and has amarket value ofP15,000.00. The same land was subdivided into lots consisting of 100 square meters each, where the individual petitioners built their houses. On the remaining portion were constructed their barangay center, multi-purpose gym and health center. Respondent fraudulently obtained from the said Registry of Deeds a Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) in his name. In 1998, he paid real estate taxes and subsequently, he threatened to build a barb-wire fence around the land.Instead of filing an answer, respondent moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case considering that theassessed value of the land is onlyP6,030.00. Respondent, citing Section 33 (3) of BP Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,4maintains that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Padada-Kiblawan, Davao del Sur.In their opposition to the motion to dismiss, petitioners alleged that jurisdiction is vested in the RTC considering that thetotal assessed value of the property isP41,890.00, as shown by a Real Property Field Appraisal and Assessment Sheet dated August 20, 1996 issued by Atty. Marcos D. Risonar, Jr., Provincial Assessor of Davao del Sur.5On January 12, 1999, the trial court issued an Orderdismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.Petitioners then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in an Order dated April 20, 1999.Hence, petitioners directly filed with this Court the instantpetition for review oncertiorariassailing the trial courts Order dismissing the complaint for lack of jurisdiction.Petitioners contend that under Section 19 (1) of BP Blg. 129, as amended, the RTC has jurisdiction over the complaint for reconveyance since it is incapable of pecuniary estimation.The contention is bereft of merit. This case is analogous toHuguete vs. Embudo.6There, petitioners argued that a complaint for annulment of a deed of sale and partition is incapable of pecuniary estimation, and thus falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC. However, we ruled that "the nature of an action is not determined by what is stated in the caption of the complaint but by the allegations of the complaint and the reliefs prayed for.Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiffs, like petitioners herein, is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof."Indeed, basic as a hornbook principle is that the nature of an action, as well as which court or body has jurisdiction over it, is determined based on the allegations contained in the complaint of the plaintiff, irrespective of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover upon all or some of the claims asserted therein.7Let us examine the pertinent allegations in petitioners complaint below:"x x x x x x2. Plaintiffs by themselves and/or thru their predecessors-in-interest have been in actual possession, in the concept of an owner, in good faith and in a manner that is open, peaceful, uninterrupted, public, adverse and continuous, for more than 30 years, the following described parcel of land, viz:A parcel of land containing an area of 3.2 hectares, more of less, covered by OCT No. P-(3331)-4244, in the name of Juan Jayag and situated in Piapi, Padada, Davao del Sur.2a.The market value of the above-described land is Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).3. The respective areas that private plaintiffs occupy consisted of an average of 100 square meters on which their homes and houses are built while a large chunk of the above-described property has been used or set aside for the barangay site of and other infrastructures for Piapi, Padada, Davao del Sur.x x x x x x5. Defendant or his predecessor-in-interest has never been in possession, of the land in suit and except for the year 1998, has not paid taxes thereon nor declared the same for taxation purposes a clear index that defendants title over the same is not genuine.6. Defendant, in procuring title to the land in suit did so by fraud, mistake and/or misrepresentation, hence, he holds the title for the benefit and in trust of the landowner that is, herein plaintiffs.7. Defendant is by law under obligation to reconvey the land in suit in favor of herein plaintiffs, x x x."It can easily be discerned that petitioners complaint involves title to, or possession of, real property. However, they failed to allege therein theassessed valueof the subject property. Instead, what they stated is themarket value of the land atP15,000.00.Section 19 (2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended provides:"SEC. 19.Jurisdiction in civil cases.Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:x x x x x x(2)In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest thereon, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00)or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts."The Rule requires that "theassessed valueof the property, or if there is none, the estimated value thereof, shall be alleged by the claimant."8It bears reiterating that what determines jurisdiction is the allegations in the complaint and the reliefs prayed for. Petitioners complaint is for reconveyance of a parcel of land. Considering that their action involves the title to or interest in real property, they should have alleged therein its assessed value. However, theyonly specified the market value or estimated value, which isP15,000.00.Pursuant to the provision of Section 33 (3) quoted earlier, it is the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Padada-Kiblawan, Davao del Sur, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.WHEREFORE, the petition isDENIED.The assailed Orders dated January 12, 1999 and April 20, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Digos, Davao del Sur in Civil Case No. 3715 are herebyAFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURTManilaFIRST DIVISIONG.R. No. 158121 December 12, 2007HEIRS OF VALERIANO S. CONCHA, SR. NAMELY: TERESITA CONCHA-PARAN, VALERIANO P. CONCHA, JR., RAMON P. CONCHA, EDUARDO P. CONCHA, REPRESENTED BY HIS LEGAL GUARDIAN, REYNALDO P. CONCHA, ALBERTO P. CONCHA, BERNARDO P. CONCHA and GLORIA,petitioners,vs.SPOUSES GREGORIO J. LUMOCSO1and BIENVENIDA GUYA, CRISTITA J. LUMOCSO VDA. DE DAAN, AND SPOUSES JACINTO J. LUMOCSO and BALBINA T. LUMOCSO,2respondents.D E C I S I O NPUNO, C.J.:On appeal bycertiorariunder Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the decision3and resolution4of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 59499, annulling the resolutions5and order6of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dipolog City, Branch 9, in Civil Case Nos. 5188, 5433 and 5434 which denied the separate motions to dismiss and Joint Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents.The relevant facts are undisputed.Petitioners, heirs of spouses Dorotea and Valeriano Concha, Sr., claim to be the rightful owners of Lot No. 6195 (Civil Case No. 5188), a one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A (Civil Case No. 5433), and a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A (Civil Case No. 5434), all situated in Cogon, Dipolog City, under Section 48(b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141 (C.A. No. 141), otherwise known as the Public Land Act. Respondent siblings Gregorio Lumocso (Civil Case No. 5188), Cristita Lumocso Vda. de Daan (Civil Case No. 5433) and Jacinto Lumocso (Civil Case No. 5434), are the patent holders and registered owners of the subject lots.The records show that on August 6, 1997, Valeriano Sr.7and his children, petitioners Valeriano Jr., Ramon, Eduardo, Alberto, Bernardo, Teresita, Reynaldo, and Gloria, all surnamed Concha, filed a complaint for Reconveyance and/or Annulment of Title with Damages against "Spouses Gregorio Lomocso and Bienvenida Guya." They sought to annul Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and the corresponding Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-22556 issued in the name of "Gregorio Lumocso" covering Lot No. 6195. The case was raffled to the RTC of Dipolog City, Branch 9, and docketed as Civil Case No. 5188. In their Amended Complaint, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered:1. Declaring Free Patent No. (IX-8)985 and Original Certificate of Title No. 22556 issued to defendants as null and void ab initio;2. Declaring Lot No. 6195 or 1.19122-hectare as private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b) of CA No. 141 otherwise known as the Public Land Act as amended by RA 1942;3. Ordering the defendant Lomocsos to reconvey the properties (sic) in question Lot No. 6195 or the 1.19122 hectares in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in this case and if they refuse, ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of reconveyance with like force and effect as if executed by the defendant[s] themselves;4. Ordering defendant Lomocsos to payP60,000.00 for the 21 forest trees illegally cut;P50,000.00 for moral damages;P20,000.00 for Attorneys fees;P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the proceedings;5. Declaring the confiscated three (sic) flitches kept in the area of the plaintiffs at Dampalan San Jose, Dipolog with a total volume of 2000 board feet a[s] property of the plaintiff [they] being cut, collected and taken from the land possessed, preserved, and owned by the plaintiffs;6. The plaintiffs further pray for such other reliefs and remedies which this Honorable Court may deem just and equitable in the premises.8On September 3, 1999, two separate complaints for Reconveyance with Damages were filed by petitioners,9this time against "Cristita Lomocso Vda. de Daan" for a one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A and "Spouses Jacinto Lomocso and Balbina T. Lomocso" for a one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A. The two complaints were also raffled to Branch 9 of the RTC of Dipolog City and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434, respectively. In Civil Case No. 5433, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered:1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 6196-A titled under OCT (P23527) 4888 equivalent to one hectare located at the western portion of Lot 4888 as private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(B) CA 141 otherwise known as Public Land OCT (sic) as amended by RA No. 1942;2. Ordering the defendant to reconvey the equivalent of one (1) hectare forested portion of her property in question in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in this case segregating one hectare from OCT (P23527) 4888, located at its Western portion and if she refuse (sic), ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of reconveyance with like force and effect, as if executed by the defenda[n]t herself;3. Ordering defendant to payP30,000.00 for the 22 forest trees illegally cut;P20,000.00 for moral damages;P20,000.00 for Attorney's fees;P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the proceedings.10In Civil Case No. 5434, petitioners prayed that judgment be rendered:1. Declaring [a] portion of Lot 7529-A under OCT (P-23207) 12870 and Lot 6196-B OCT (P-20845) 4889 equivalent to one hectare located as (sic) the western portion of said lots as private property of the plaintiffs under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A. No.] 141 otherwise know[n] as the [P]ublic [L]and [A]ct as amended by RA 1942;2. Ordering the defendants to reconvey the equivalent of one (1) hectare forested portion of their properties in question in favor of the plaintiffs within 30 days from the finality of the decision in this case segregating one hectare from OCT (P-23207) 12870 and OCT (T-20845)-4889 all of defendants, located at its Western portion and if they refuse, ordering the Clerk of Court of this Honorable Court to execute the deed of reconveyance with like force and effect as if executed by the defendants themselves[;]3. Ordering defendants to payP20,000.00 for the six (6) forest trees illegally cut;P20,000.00 for moral damages;P20,000.00 for Attorney's fees;P20,000.00 for litigation expenses; and to pay the cost of the proceedings.11The three complaints12commonly alleged: a) that on May 21, 1958, petitioners' parents (spouses Valeriano Sr. and Dorotea Concha) acquired by homestead a 24-hectare parcel of land situated in Cogon, Dipolog City; b) that since 1931, spouses Concha "painstakingly preserved" the forest in the 24-hectare land, including the excess four (4) hectares "untitled forest land" located at its eastern portion; c) that they possessed this excess 4 hectares of land (which consisted of Lot No. 6195, one-hectare portion of Lot No. 6196-A and one-hectare portion of Lot Nos. 6196-B and 7529-A) "continuously, publicly, notoriously, adversely, peacefully, in good faith and in concept of the (sic) owner since 1931;" d) that they continued possession and occupation of the 4-hectare land after the death of Dorotea Concha on December 23, 1992 and Valeriano Sr. on May 12, 1999; e) that the Concha spouses "have preserved the forest trees standing in [the subject lots] to the exclusion of the defendants (respondents) or other persons from 1931" up to November 12, 1996 (for Civil Case No. 5188) or January 1997 (for Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434) when respondents, "by force, intimidation, [and] stealth forcibly entered the premises, illegally cut, collected, [and] disposed" of 21 trees (for Civil Case No. 5188), 22 trees (for Civil Case No. 5433) or 6 trees (for Civil Case No. 5434); f) that "the land is private land or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, plaintiffs had already acquired imperfect title thereto" under Sec. 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1942; g) that respondents allegedly cut into flitches the trees felled in Lot No. 6195 (Civil Case No. 5188) while the logs taken from the subject lots in Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434 were sold to a timber dealer in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte; h) that respondents "surreptitiously" filed free patent applications over the lots despite their full knowledge that petitioners owned the lots; i) that the geodetic engineers who conducted the original survey over the lots never informed them of the survey to give them an opportunity to oppose respondents' applications; j) that respondents' free patents and the corresponding OCTs were issued "on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation"; and k) that the lots in question have not been transferred to an innocent purchaser.On separate occasions, respondents moved for the dismissal of the respective cases against them on the same grounds of: (a) lack of jurisdiction of the RTC over the subject matters of the complaints; (b) failure to state causes of action for reconveyance; (c) prescription; and (d) waiver, abandonment, laches and estoppel.13On the issue of jurisdiction, respondents contended that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the complaints pursuant to Section 19(2) of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P.) 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, as in each case, the assessed values of the subject lots are less thanP20,000.00.Petitioners opposed,14contending that the instant cases involve actions the subject matters of which are incapable of pecuniary estimation which, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. 7691, fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTCs. They also contended that they have two main causes of action: for reconveyance and for recovery of the value of the trees felled by respondents. Hence, the totality of the claims must be considered which, if computed, allegedly falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC.The trial court denied the respective motions to dismiss of respondents.15The respondents filed a Joint Motion for Reconsideration,16to no avail.17Dissatisfied, respondents jointly filed a Petition forCertiorari, Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Restraining OrderEx Parte18with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 59499. In its Decision,19the CA reversed the resolutions and order of the trial court. It held that even assuming that the complaints state a cause of action, the same have been barred by the statute of limitations. The CA ruled that an action for reconveyance based on fraud prescribes in ten (10) years, hence, the instant complaints must be dismissed as they involve titles issued for at least twenty-two (22) years prior to the filing of the complaints. The CA found it unnecessary to resolve the other issues.Hence, this appeal in which petitioners raise the following issues, viz:FIRST - WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN REVERSING THE ORDER OF THE COURT A QUO DENYING THE MOTION FOR DISMISSAL, CONSIDERING THE DISMISSAL OF A PARTY COMPLAINT IS PREMATURE AND TRIAL ON THE MERITS SHOULD BE CONDUCTED TO THRESH OUT EVIDENTIARY MATTERS.SECOND - WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITIONERS' COMPLAINTS ON [THE] GROUND OF PRESCRIPTION.THIRD - WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THERE IS NO DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO SHOW THAT PETITIONERS OWN THE SUBJECT FOREST PORTION OF THE PROPERTIES ERRONEOUSLY INCLUDED IN THE TITLES OF PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.FOURTH - WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITION OF HEREIN PRIVATE RESPONDENTS FILED WITH THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS (FORMER FIRST DIVISION) SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED OUTRIGHTLY FOR PRIVATE RESPONDENTS' THEREIN FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATORY REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 1 RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT TO SUBMIT CERTIFIED TRUE COPIES OF THE ASSAILED ORDERS OF THE TRIAL COURT WHICH RENDERED THEIR PETITION (CA G.R. 59499) DEFICIENT IN FORM AND SUBSTANCE CITING THE CASE OF CATUIRA VS. COURT OF APPEALS (172 SCRA 136).20In their memorandum,21respondents reiterated their arguments in the courts below that: a) the complaints of the petitioners in the trial court do not state causes of action for reconveyance; b) assuming the complaints state causes of action for reconveyance, the same have already been barred by prescription; c) the RTC does not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the instant cases; d) the claims for reconveyance in the complaints are barred by waiver, abandonment, or otherwise extinguished by laches and estoppel; and e) there is no special reason warranting a review by this Court.Since the issue of jurisdiction is determinative of the resolution of the instant case yet the CA skirted the question, we resolved to require the parties to submit their respective Supplemental Memoranda on the issue of jurisdiction.22In their Supplemental Memorandum,23petitioners contend that the nature of their complaints, as denominated therein and as borne by their allegations, are suits for reconveyance, or annulment or cancellation of OCTs and damages. The cases allegedly involve more than just the issue of title and possession since the nullity of the OCTs issued to respondents and the reconveyance of the subject properties were also raised as issues. Thus, the RTC has jurisdiction under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129, which provides that the RTC has jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation." Petitioners cited: a)Raymundo v. CA24which set the criteria for determining whether an action is one not capable of pecuniary estimation; b)Swan v. CA25where it was held that an action for annulment of title is under the jurisdiction of the RTC; c)Santos v. CA26where it was similarly held that an action for annulment of title, reversion and damages was within the jurisdiction of the RTC; and d)Commodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation v. CA27where it was held that "[w]here the action affects title to the property, it should be filed in the RTC where the property is located." Petitioners also contend that while it may be argued that the assessed values of the subject properties are within the original jurisdiction of the municipal trial court (MTC), they have included in their prayers "any interest included therein" consisting of 49 felled natural grown trees illegally cut by respondents. Combining the assessed values of the properties as shown by their respective tax declarations and the estimated value of the trees cut, the total amount prayed by petitioners exceeds twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00). Hence, they contend that the RTC has jurisdiction under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129.Jurisdiction over the subject matter is the power to hear and determine cases of the general class to which the proceedings in question belong.28It is conferred by law and an objection based on this ground cannot be waived by the parties.29To determine whether a court has jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case, it is important to determine the nature of the cause of action and of the relief sought.30The trial court correctly held that the instant cases involve actions for reconveyance.31An action for reconveyance respects the decree of registration as incontrovertible but seeks the transfer of property, which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in other persons' names, to its rightful and legal owners, or to those who claim to have a better right.32There is no special ground for an action for reconveyance. It is enough that the aggrieved party has a legal claim on the property superior to that of the registered owner33and that the property has not yet passed to the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.34The reliefs sought by the petitioners in the instant cases typify an action for reconveyance. The following are also the common allegations in the three complaints that are sufficient to constitute causes of action for reconveyance, viz:(a) That plaintiff Valeriano S. Concha, Sr. together with his spouse Dorotea Concha have painstakingly preserve[d] the forest standing in the area [of their 24-hectare homestead] including the four hectares untitled forest land located at the eastern portion of the forest from 1931 when they were newly married, the date they acquired this property by occupation or possession;35(b) That spouses Valeriano S. Concha Sr. and Dorotea P. Concha have preserved the forest trees standing in [these parcels] of land to the exclusion of the defendants Lomocsos or other persons from 1931 up to November 12, 1996 [for Civil Case No. 5188] and January 1997 [for Civil Case Nos. 5433 and 5434] when defendants[,] by force, intimidation, [and] stealth[,] forcibly entered the premises, illegal[ly] cut, collected, disposed a total of [twenty-one (21) trees for Civil Case No. 5188, twenty-two (22) trees for Civil Case No. 5433 and six (6) trees for Civil Case No. 5434] of various sizes;36(c) That this claim is an assertion that the land is private land or that even assuming it was part of the public domain, plaintiff had already acquired imperfect title thereto under Sec. 48(b) of [C.A.] No. 141[,] otherwise known as the Public Land Act[,] as amended by [R.A.] No. [7691];37(d) That [respondents and their predecessors-in-interest knew when they] surreptitiously filed38[their respective patent applications and were issued their respective] free patents and original certificates of title [that the subject lots belonged to the petitioners];39(e) [That respondents' free patents and the corresponding original certificates of titles were issued] on account of fraud, deceit, bad faith and misrepresentation;40and(f) The land in question has not been transferred to an innocent purchaser.41These cases may also be considered as actions to remove cloud on one's title as they are intended to procure the cancellation of an instrument constituting a claim on petitioners' alleged title which was used to injure or vex them in the enjoyment of their alleged title.42Being in the nature of actions for reconveyance or actions to remove cloud on one's title, the applicable law to determine which court has jurisdiction is Section 19(2) of B.P. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691,viz:Section 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases.-- Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction: x x x(2) In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed value of the property involved exceeds Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila, where such value exceeds Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts;x x x.In the cases at bar, it is undisputed that the subject lots are situated in Cogon, Dipolog City and their assessed values are less thanP20,000.00, to wit:Civil CaseNo. Lot No.Assessed Value

51886195P1,030.00

54336196-A4,500.00

54346196-B4,340.00

7529-A1,880.00.43

Hence, the MTC clearly has jurisdiction over the instant cases.Petitioners' contention that this case is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC pursuant to Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 is erroneous.In a number of cases, we have held that actions for reconveyance44of or for cancellation of title45to or to quiet title46over real property are actions that fall under the classification of cases that involve "title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein."The original text of Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 as well as its forerunner, Section 44(b) of R.A. 296,47as amended, gave the RTCs (formerly courts of first instance)exclusive original jurisdiction "[i]n all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, except actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction over which is conferred upon Metropolitan Trial Courts, [MTCs], and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts (conferred upon the city and municipal courts under R.A. 296, as amended)." Thus, under the old law, there was no substantial effect on jurisdiction whether a case is one, the subject matter of which was incapable of pecuniary estimation, under Section 19(1) of B.P. 129 or one involving title to property under Section 19(2). The distinction between the two classes became crucial with the amendment introduced by R.A. No. 769148in 1994 which expanded the exclusive original jurisdiction of the first level courts to include "all civil actions which involve title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest thereinwhere the assessed value of the property or interest therein does not exceed Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000.00) or, in civil actions in Metro Manila, where such assessed value does not exceed Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) exclusive of interest, damages of whatever kind, attorney's fees, litigation expenses and costs."Thus, under the present law, original jurisdiction over cases the subject matter of which involves "title to, possession of, real property or any interest therein" under Section 19(2) of B.P. 129 is divided between the first and second level courts, with the assessed value of the real property involved as the benchmark. This amendment was introduced to "unclog the overloaded dockets of the RTCs which would result in the speedier administration of justice."49The cases ofRaymundo v. CA50andCommodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporation v. CA,51relied upon by the petitioners, are inapplicable to the cases at bar.Raymundoinvolved a complaint for mandatory injunction, not one for reconveyance or annulment of title. The bone of contention was whether the case was incapable of pecuniary estimation considering petitioner's contention that the pecuniary claim of the complaint was only attorney's fees ofP10,000, hence, the MTC had jurisdiction. The Court defined the criterion for determining whether an action is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation and held that the issue of whether petitioner violated the provisions of the Master Deed and Declaration of Restriction of the Corporation is one that is incapable of pecuniary estimation. The claim for attorney's fees was merely incidental to the principal action, hence, said amount was not determinative of the court's jurisdiction. Nor canCommodities Storage and ICE Plant Corporationprovide any comfort to petitioners for the issue resolved by the Court in said case was venue and not jurisdiction. The action therein was for damages, accounting and fixing of redemption period which was filed on October 28, 1994, before the passage of R.A. No. 7691. In resolving the issue of venue, the Court held that "[w]here the action affects title to property, it should be instituted in the [RTC] where the property is situated. The Sta. Maria Ice Plant & Cold Storage is located in Sta. Maria, Bulacan. The venue in Civil Case No. 94-727076 was therefore improperly laid."Worse, the cases ofSwan v. CA52andSantos v. CA53cited by the petitioners, contradict their own position t