reordering regional security

REORDERING REGIONAL SECURITY IN LATINAMERICA

Harold Trinkunas

In the wake of the Cold War, regional democratization and economic liberalization weresupposed to usher in an opportunity to build a common hemispheric security agenda,designed to unite the United States and Latin America in collaboration against the "new"security threats posed by organized crime and violent nonstate actors. Two decades later,the threats remain much the same, yet the hemispheric security agenda has fragmented,replaced in part by projects designed to build specifically South American regional insti-tutions. As some scholars predieted, heterogeneous threat perceptions across the region,differences over democratization, and tensions over the effects of free trade and marketliberalization have confounded the effort to build a hemispheric security agenda. Yet theefforts by former President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela to radically transform the regionalsecurity order by building a Bolivarian alliance of states as an explicit counterweight toU. S. power have also fallen short. Jnstead, Brazil's ascent as a global economic power andthe growing prosperity of the region as a whole has created an opportunity for Brazil toorganize new mid-range political institutions, embodied in the Union of South AmericanStates (UNASUR), that exclude the United States yet pursue a consensual securityagenda. This emerging regional order is designed by Brazil to secure its leadership inSouth America and allow it to choose when and where to involve the United States inmanaging regional crises. Yet, Brazil is finding that the very obstacles that confoundedhemispheric security collaboration afier the Cold War still endure in South America,limiting the effectiveness of the emerging regional security order

Contemporary accounts of insecurity in Latin America focus with good reasonon the rising tide of violence and threats to public safety in cities such as

Caracas, Ciudad Juárez, and Kingston; along borders—particularly the U.S.-Mexico and Mexico-Guatemala border; and along smuggling routes in Central

Harold Trinkunas is an associate professor in the Department of National Security Affairs at theNaval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and a visiting professor at the Center for Iberianand Latin American Studies at the University of California, San Diego.

The views expressed in this article are those of the author, and they do not represent those of the U.S.Navy or the U.S. government.

Journal of International Affairs, Spring/Summer 2013, Vol. 66, No. 2. SPRING/SUMMER 2013 | 83© The Trustees of Columbia University in the City of New York

Harold Trinkunas

America and the Caribbean. Organized crime, narcotics, smuggling, gangs, and

other violent nonstate actors are the main threat to security, and in some cases,

give rise to the talk about failed states in the Western Hemisphere.'

These threats are similar, although perhaps played out in different settings and

with other actorS; to those Latin America faced during the 1990s in the wake of

the Cold War. At that time, the wave of democratization and liberalization that

swept through Latin America gave rise to the hope that the region would move

away from traditional geopolitical tensions and towards a cooperative regional

security agenda that countered the new security threats posed by organized crime

and supported the prevailing agenda for free elections and free trade. In turn,

free trade would support deepening economic interdependence, a convergence of

security interests between the United States and Latin America, and a regional

democratic peace. So what went wrong?

In his seminal 1998 article, "Security in Latin America," Andrew Hurrell

observed that the enduring heterogeneity of interests and threat perceptions

between states in the Southern Cone of South America, the Andes, Central

America, and the United States were obstacles to regional collaboration. He argued

that democratization and regional integration were as likely to accentuate disagree-

ments as to resolve them, and he predicted that variation in perceptions of threat

among states would hinder cooperation against transnational crime.^

Today, Hurrell's warnings have by and large been borne out: threat perceptions

remain heterogeneous across the region; disagreements over what is a democracy

have produced new ideological tensions between states; integration projects have

advanced modestly amidst great argument; and the perennial calls to regionalize

responses to growing criminal violence have foundered on national interests.

However, the centrality of the United States for the regional security order has

decreased during the past decade, at least for states in South America. Steady

economic improvement in states across the region and the limited impact of the

global financial crisis on regional economies since, has provided governments,

particularly in Brazil and Venezuela, with new latitude to pursue regional security

arrangements and agendas that do not include the United States as a participant.

Key Latin American states—such as Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela—have

historically had the ambition to establish a more autonomous foreign and security

policy. Argentina thought itself the economic rival of the United States, nearly

equal in GDP per capita at the end of the nineteenth century. Brazil sought the

diplomatic prerogatives associated with great power status by becoming a co-bel-

ligerent during the First World War and a member of the Allies during the Second

World War. During the 1960s and 1970s, Venezuela played a leading role in

forming the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the

84 I JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

Reordering Regional Security in Latin America

Contadora Group. Historically, these ambitions were eventually checked by crisesof development and growth.^ More recently, steady gains and increasingly favor-able terms of trade for exports have provided some Latin American states witha period of stability from the late 1990s to 2008—a contrast with the economicdownturns of the 1980s and 1990s. This upturn has been particularly significantin the case of Brazil, which has become one of the ten

largest economies in the world, and Venezuela, which At thc Cnd ofbenefited from unprecedented windfall oil rents due fVip (^olH Wpirto the steady climb in the world price for oil for the ,past decade." some observers

Economic gains during the past decade provided WCrC OptlITllStlC

both Brazil and Venezuela with the wherewithal to âbout ürOSDCCtSrenew their ambitions for regional leadership and a £^^ re?ÍOnalrevised security order Venezuela under the leader- ^revised security order. Venezuela, under the leader-ship of former President Hugo Chavez, attempted touse its booming oil revenues to consolidate a regional in thccoalition, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples ofOur America (ALBA), with an explicitly revisionistagenda towards the international order and towardsthe U.S. role in this order.' Brazil has pursued an alternative diplomatic approachto building new regional institutions, focused on the Union of South AmericanNations (UNASUR) and its associated defense wing, the South American DefenseCouncil (CDS).^ Significant Brazilian elites aspire to a global role, including apermanent seat on the UN Security Council and UNASUR is part of a strategy ofconsolidating regional leadership.

Revisionism aimed at the security order in South America is unlikely toproduce a radical shift in the focus of the regional security agenda. The regionalsecurity threats remain the same, at least in nature if not in the specific identityand location of violent nonstate actors and organized crime groups.^ Brazil, theonly power in the region that has the potential to achieve major power status basedon traditional indicators used in the literature on power transition—populationsize, economic growth, and stage of development—seeks marginal adjustmentsto the international order that accommodates its ambitions to be a great power.However, the same obstacles that plagued the development of a consensualregional security agenda during the 1990s—questions about democratization, ten-sions over economic integration, and differences in threat perceptions—are now onthe agenda of the new regional security institutions, regardless of their exclusion ofthe United States as a participant.

SPRING/SUMMER 2013 I 85

Harold Trinkunas

OBSTACLES TO A REGIONAL APPROACH TO SECURITY IN LATIN AMERICA AFTER

THE COLD WAR

At the end of the Cold War, some observers were optimistic about prospects

for regional peace and security in the Western Hemisphere, believing that eco-

nomic interdependence, regional integration, and democratization would produce

a hemispheric "Kantian" peace.^ The end of military dictatorships across the region

during the 1980s provided an opportunity to test the reach of this democratic

peace theory.'^ Free trade and market liberalization, the so-called Washington

Consensus, were the prevailing economic doctrine, and following the successful

ratification of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the

Southern Common Market (MERCOSUR), negotiations for a region-wide Free

Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) were foremost on the regional trade agenda.

At least theoretically, deepening economic interdependence in the region suggested

that interstate tensions should diminish. Finally, the prevalence of nonstate threats

to regional security such as organized crime, smuggling, and other forms of illicit

trafficking gave rise to the hope that a collaborative region-wide security agenda

was possible. After all, surely states could agree to cooperate to combat violent

nonstate actors that were a threat to all of their citizens."

As David Mares argues, the international status quo in Latin America is

deceptive, in that war is infrequent but the alternative is a "violent peace," a situ-

ation in which there are few interstate wars but enduring border disputes.'^ Latin

America is geographically distant from conflicts between great powers in Eurasia;

many of its state borders lie along remote, difficult to access terrain; and regional

military capabilities are relatively modest. This has translated into a small and

declining number of major interstate wars within the region since the nineteenth

century. There is also a regional predilection for addressing territorial disputes via

arbitration and international law on the basis of uti possidetis juris, a legal doctrine

that enshrines the legitimacy of inherited colonial boundaries.'-* However, many

border disputes go unresolved for decades, such as those between Peru and Chile

over maritime borders, Bolivia and Chile over access to the sea, and Colombia and

Nicaragua over the San Andrés islands.''' The perpetual diplomacy over border

disputes and the diminishing number of interstate wars provides a regional appear-

ance of peace that masks the enduring possibility for violence and militarization,

thereby reducing the possibility that a so-called Kantian peace will take root. The

recent near-war in 2008 between Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela is an illus-

tration of how persistent border tensions and the political calculations of elected

leaders can still lead to conflict. The dispute caused by the Colombian bombing of

an insurgent camp across the border in Ecuador generated military mobilization in

Venezuela and Ecuador yet, in the end, was settled at a meeting of Latin American



leaders in Santo Domingo.'^

Initially, democratization offered the possibility of a "warmer" peace in Latin

America during the 1990s. The most prominent conflict in Latin America during

the previous decade—involving Sandinista Nicaragua, its neighbors in Central

America, and the United States—ended in a peaceful negotiation following the end

of the Cold War and transitions to democracy across most of the subregion.'^ In the

Southern Cone, elected leaders sought to restrain the power of their own militaries

by resolving territorial disputes and limiting defense spending.'^ More recently,

Argentina and Chile have also pursued an agenda of resolving territorial disputes

and engaging in confidence-building measures such as exchange of information

about troop deployments, shared methodologies for calculating defense spending,

and joint training between their armed forces.'^ The possibility of a Kantian peace

was explicitly pursued by democratizers across the region, culminating in the

Inter-American Democratic Charter signed by Organization of American States

(OAS) members in September 2001. This document, which called for the common

defense of democratic regimes in the Americas against unconstitutional overthrow,

reflected a shared belief that the consolidation of democracy in the Americas

would shift the region towards peace and a cooperative security agenda.

Yet, the very states that moved towards more peaceful relations during the

1990s have begun to increase defense spending, and the regional consensus on the

defense of democracy has worn increasingly thin. Democratic consolidation in a

number of states has produced elected leaders that have grown less fearful of a coup

d'état and less interested in restraining defense spending as a way to control their

armed forces. In some cases, perceptions of increased domestic and international

threats have spurred higher levels of defense spending, particularly in the cases of

Colombia and Venezuela. Economic stability in Brazil has been accompanied by

a steady rise in military spending, and Brazil now accounts for half of all defense

spending in Latin America.'^ Border disputes continue to produce regional crises,

not only in the aforementioned Colombia-Venezuela-Ecuador dispute in 2008, but

also between Nicaragua and Costa Rica in 2012 and ongoing disputes between

Chile and Bolivia over border issues.^"

It is also apparent that there are more differences among Latin American

leaders over the definition of democracy. States across the region reacted quite dif-

ferently to the 2002 coup attempt in Venezuela, the 2009 coup in Honduras, and

the impeachment of President Lugo in Paraguay in 2012. These events highlight

the enduring interests that states have in particular governments rather than par-

ticular regime types.2' The rise of populist leaders in Venezuela, Ecuador, Bolivia,

Argentina, and Nicaragua have highlighted the gap between traditional democra-

tizers in the region, who advocate procedural democracy and those on the political


Harold Trinkunas

left, who prefer participatory democracy. ^ These disagreements revitalized the roleof ideology in dividing states in the region and undermined the possibility of aWestern Hemisphere cooperative security agenda.

Economic interdependence has also proven to be a mixed blessing for security

and peace in the Western Hemisphere. On the one hand, trade has grown quicklyin North America with the NAFTA in the Southern

The stress that Cone, Venezuela with MERCOSUR, and on thei l l ic i t aCt iv i tV Colombian-Venezuelan border due to bilateral market

1 . and trade liberalization initiatives undertaken in theorganized cr ime, .„„^ , , .1 .u r . i A • c

o ' 1990s. More recently, the Central American Freed v i o l e n c e Trade Agreement (CAFTA) has deepened already-

on states existing trade linkages in that region to the UnitedIPQQ rc\n'>c\f\T States. ^ However, despite these agreements and ini-

-u J tiatives, the hemispheric FTAA has stalled, mainlyC O n t r i D U t e a t o because there is no natural confluence of interests

p a r t i c u l a r r e g i o n a l between the united States and Brazil to support thentS arrangement. '* Economic interdependence brought

new sources of cross-border conflict. In both NAFTAand MERCOSUR, efforts by the largest economy in each bloc, the United Statesand Brazil respectively, to get their way on trade issues provoked tensions withtheir partners. Timber between the United States and Canada; cross-border trucktraffic between the United States and Mexico; and auto manufacturing betweenBrazil and Argentina are all examples of the ways in which interdependencecreated new sources of dispute and leverage among regional trading partners.^^

Liberalization of economies during the 1990s provided greatly increasedopportunities for economic exchange, but this also provided greater opportuni-ties to disguise illicit traffic in narcotics, cash, and people within the much largervolume of legal trade. ' The distribution of production sites and markets for illicitgoods and the differences between states in terms of capacity and policy created ageography of illegal activities that spilled over into violence along certain borders(e.g., between the United States and Mexico or Colombia and Venezuela) or alongcertain transit routes (e.g.. Central America through Mexico into North America).The stress that illicit activity, organized crime, and violence placed on stateswith less capacity has contributed to particular regional flashpoints, such as theEcuador-Colombia border, where disagreements over how to respond to a mix oforganized crime and insurgency have led neighbors into open conflict. ^

Efforts to securitize and internationalize the threats posed by organized crime,violence, and illicit trafficking in the Western Hemisphere have continued over thepast two decades, yet the threat persists and some states in the region have begun

I JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS


to question a confrontational approach to organized crime. As a central actor in

the regional security order during the 1990s, the United States made considerable

efforts to develop a collaborative regional security agenda to combat organized

crime and drug trafficking. This agenda was supported by U.S. security coop-

eration programs designed to enhance regional, military, and police capabilities,

including very extensive assistance as part of the Merida Initiative with Mexico

and as part of Plan Colombia to combat domestic insurgents and drug traffickers.^^

The counternarcotics agenda was largely accepted by states in Central America,

the Caribbean, and the Andes during the 1990s, since the production and trans-

portation of illicit goods and cash across borders were particularly high in those

regions. In the Southern Cone, it was met with skepticism since these threats had

a lower profile, and there were concerns among local politicians that militarizing

responses to crime would increase civil-military friction.^^ Today, the counternar-

cotics agenda is being questioned by a broader range of regional leaders, such as the

presidents of Uruguay and Guatemala, as it is increasingly viewed as being ineffec-

tive in containing the growth in gang violence and organized crime.-*''

In the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the U.S. gov-

ernment made a similar effort to boost security and extend the counterterrorism

agenda in the Western Hemisphere, again with mixed success. States that saw

an opportunity to advance their interests collaborated with the new U.S. agenda.

Governments facing domestic insurgencies—particularly in Colombia and to a

lesser extent Peru—were quick to reclassify their domestic enemies as terrorists

and as a way to seek new assistance from the United States as a part of the global

war on terror. However, their neighbors were very reluctant to go along with this

reclassification of local conflicts. The U.S. post-9/11 counterterrorism agenda faced

skepticism in the Southern Cone because of the association of counterterrorism

with a military-led "dirty war" in the subregion in the 1970s, but also because of

the perceived hypocrisy of pursuing militarized counterterrorism measures while

at the same time advocating improved human rights performance by regional

security forces.^'

TRADITIONAL AND REVISIONIST SECURITY AGENDAS IN THE WESTERN

HEMISPHERE

Despite enduring obstacles to hemispheric cooperation, efforts to create a

regional security agenda that integrates North and South America date back over

a century, and the United States played the central role in organizing the hemi-

spheric security order for much of that time. Western Hemisphere security insti-

tutions, such as the OAS, have historically been rooted in Pan-American ideals.

Pan-Americanism, as a philosophy, held that the New World and its republics were

SPRING/SUMMER 2013 89

Harold Trinkunas

truly different from Europe and should manage their international relations ona new basis of equality and diplomacy rather than pure power relations. Yet thegrowing power asymmetry between the United States and other republics in thehemisphere since their independence in the early nineteenth century enabled theUnited States to assume a central role in ordering the regional security system and

setting the agenda. This agenda focused on internal

politics stability during the Cold War and then on elections,

T íítin ^ ^ trade, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism in. , , its wake. The latter made the most progress during the

America nave I ^^Q^^ ^ J ^^^ I ^ prevailing political agenda in Latin

t o t r i e l e r t , America favored market liberalization, and regional

a number leaders sought international and U.S. assistance to

of States have support economic reforms.32The OAS has found it difficult to forge a regional

clcCieQ leaQerS agenda during the past decade in the face of the growing

. , . that are far ideological divide among members and the loss of con-

mOrP critical of sensus around the defense of democracy.^^ Within theU T T * AC Western hemisphere, there have always been critiques

of the Pan-American ideal and the preponderantpower of the United States in the OAS. To deal with

the underlying "problem" of power asymmetries in Pan-Americanism, autonomy-minded Latin American leaders have historically sought to build up their domesticcapabilities, develop regional institutions that are specifically Latin American, andpursue extra-regional alliances.-*'* Today, politics across Latin America have shiftedto the left, and a number of states have elected leaders—such as Evo Morales inBolivia, Cristina Kirchner in Argentina, Daniel Ortega in Nicaragua, and RafaelCorrea in Ecuador—that are far more critical of the United States.^^ This hasproduced efforts to develop a regional agenda that is explicitly opposed to U.S.interests, most strongly embodied in the Bolivarian agenda proposed by formerVenezuelan President Hugo Chavez. Yet, this new agenda faced opposition fromthe United States and the obstacle of moderate Brazilian preferences regardinginter-American relations. Instead, we are witnessing the emergence of new regionalpolitical and security institutions led by Brazil that does not include the UnitedStates, yet seek moderate approaches to address perennial security issues of howto manage border crises, reduce diplomatic tensions, and counter the threats posedby violent nonstate actors.

More recent critiques of Pan-Americanism had been taken up most promi-nently by the modern proponent of Bolivarianism, former President Hugo Chavez.Bolivarianism, named after one of the liberators of South America from Spain

90 I JOURNAL OF INTERNATÍONAL AFFAIRS


and espoused by Ghávez, advocates for a foreign policy designed to produce a

multipolar world in which U.S. hegemony is contained and balanced, including by

a Latin American alliance that President Ghávez had sought to lead. To advance

this agenda, Ghávez pursued a number of international initiatives to build

partnerships in the region. Overtly, he led the creation of ALBA, which linked

Nicaragua, Ecuador, Venezuela, Bolivia, and a number of Garibbean states. Less

publicly, he built a network of contacts with state and local governments, political

parties, NGOs, and key activists that embedded Venezuela in a broader coali-

tion of entities that opposed globalization, free trade, and free markets. He also

sought to develop strong links to other states in the international system that are

critical of the prevailing international order: Russia, Ghina, Iran, and Guba. ' The

increasingly anti-U.S. focus of Venezuelan efforts and persistent U.S. critiques of

Venezuela's agenda introduced sufficient friction into inter-American fora as to

obviate a collaborative hemispheric agenda.

The Bolivarian international effort to develop an alternative regional security

order had limited success, while Venezuela benefited from boom oil export rev-

enues during the 2000s. Now that Venezuela is under greater economic pressure,

the Bolivarian agenda has increasingly been overtaken by broader Brazilian pro-

posals for regional security institutions.^^ Venezuela has historically been a middle

ranked power in the region in terms of its population, economy, and military

capabilities. As a major oil exporter, it has been able to exert greater influence at

times of high international oil prices, and this has been the case during the 2000s.

Hugo Ghávez used oil revenue to some advantage to advance his international

agenda, funding allies in Nicaragua, Ecuador, Bolivia, Argentina, and across the

Garibbean. However, this strategy has reached its limits.

Venezuelan economic influence is declining in the face of deteriorating rates of

production in its oil industry and rising domestic demand for funding to sustain

nationalized industries and poverty-alleviation programs. This places constraints

on the ability to continue supplying its network of friends and allies.^^ In addi-

tion, Brazil has never acquiesced to Venezuelan regional leadership, has traditional

leadership ambitions of its own, and in any event, has capabilities that dwarf

those of Venezuela. While the United States maintained a persistent critique of

Venezuelan policies during both the Bush and Obama administrations, Brazil has

instead worked to bring Venezuela into new regional economic, political, and secu-

rity institutions where Brazil would be the dominant power setting the agenda.^'

Bolivarianism had an aspirational appeal to some sectors of Latin American

politics, particularly the populist left, but persistent domestic policy failures and

the uncertain follow through on promises of international assistance dimmed the

appeal of Ghávez's message.''"


Harold Trinkunas

On the other hand, the recent rise of Brazil as a leading global economy hascreated new opportunities for this state to reorganize the regional security order.Brazil and a number of other key Latin American economies were less affectedby the 2008 global financial crisis than many developed countries."" This relativeeconomic stability is important, because it means that states in the region have not

felt the need to resort to international financial institu-

. . . has tions to surmount the recent crisis. This broadens the

ar i l l lp lpr i range of options that Brazil's and its partners in SouthAmerica can pursue in terms of their foreign and secu-

rr y rity policies, since cooperation with the United Statesr e g i o n a l or access to international financial assistance is not as

that ^'^^' *-*-* ensuring economic stability. Meanwhile, China1 J has expanded its role in the region, both as a consumer

c X C l U Q c 3.11 T T A - 1 1 1 1 • J

of Latm American products and as a diplomatic andOLRci Wloc economic presence.'' This provides Latin Americanpreoccupied states with alternatives to traditional trading and invest-

S t i î tPS ment partners in Europe and the United States.'' At thesame time, the global financial crisis hit Europe and theUnited States particularly hard, diminishing the avail-

ability of economic and technical assistance and the relevance of these markets forLatin America's products. Finally, the focus of the United States during the pastdecade on the Global War on Terror, the Middle East, Central and South Asia, andnow a pivot towards the Asia Pacific has meant that Brazil, as the leading regionaleconomy, has an unparalleled opportunity to forge regional agendas that excludean otherwise preoccupied United States.

Brazil's recent economic boom raises the possibility that it will finally emergeas a major global power. As one of the top ten economies in the world, it certainlymeets some of the criteria posited in the literature on power transitions for greatpower status.'''' It has long been a dominant subregional power, and with the col-lapse of Argentine power, it has no regional rivals in South America. Brazil hascritiqued the existing international order as unfair, but it has generally sought toaccess the rank of great powers on the basis of the existing order, not a new one.For example, it seeks a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, not to replacethe council all together. It critiques the Nonproliferation Treaty as inequitable inits treatment of signatories, but it supports the general principle of nuclear nonpro-liferation.'' Basically, Brazil is a territorially satisfied power, unchallenged in theregion, and it would prefer the existing global order to accommodate its ambitionsto great power status over any major change.''

The centerpiece of Brazil's regional political and security strategy in South

92 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS


America is UNASUR, created in 2008 as a regional political institution, followed

by its corresponding defense wing, CDS, formed in 2009. UNASUR is designed

to promote peace in South America, confidence-building measures among member

states, and to give the continent a more unified voice on the world stage. Neither

of these institutions includes the United States nor other North American states.

Similarly, the CDS is a Brazilian initiative to provide a regular institutional venue

for South American defense ministers to meet. The CDS has a small secretariat,

and its working agendas over the last several years call mostly for workshops

designed to exchange views on a host of issues ranging from the "new" security

threats, such as violent organized crime, the participation of women in defense,

industrial policy, confidence-building mechanisms, and collaborative military

education and training.""^ The limited institutionalization of UNASUR and CDS

reflects their recent creation, but also signals the difficulty of building a truly

regional approach to security when there are still considerable differences amongst

states in their interests and their perceptions of threats.

UNASUR and the CDS provide a venue for Brazilian diplomacy to secure its

predominant power in South America. With the exclusion of the United States

from these institutional arrangements, Brazil has the principal role in setting the

agenda and determining responses to regional crises. Although Venezuela has

ambitions for its own Bolivarian agenda to become embedded within this new

institution, UNASUR offers Brazil the opportunity to channel Venezuelan préten-

tions to less confrontational ends. This is important because Brazil would prefer

to maintain cordial relations with the United States. For Brazil, UNASUR is not

designed to replace the traditional regional, political, and security institutions

embodied in the OAS. The existence of UNASUR and the OAS side-by-side in

the region enables Brazil and other member states to select the most advantageous

institutional forum for resolving a crisis."*^ This was apparent in the 2008 sepa-

ratism crisis in Bolivia, where UNASUR quickly became the dominant forum for

addressing Bolivia's internal political crisis for Brazil and other regional leaders,

despite the efforts by separatist actors to go to the OAS as a preferred setting.''^

Similarly, the 2009 crisis over the expanded use of Colombian military facilities by

U.S. forces was resolved with UNASUR as a venue, precisely because it excluded

the United States, but included Colombia.

Yet, while the member states of UNASUR have relatively greater capabilities

now than in the 1990s and are less beholden to the United States economically,

Brazil and its partners are finding that, at the subregional level, they experience

some of the same impediments to collaborative regional security that Hurrell first

identified. UNASUR has shown itself to have similar issues as the OAS with pro-

moting a regional agenda opposing unconstitutional transfers of power. During


Harold Trinkunas

the 2009 overthrow of Honduran President Zelaya, UNASUR did not reach anagreement on how to react, because some member states were suspicious of thepopulist left agenda of Bolivarian governments—including that of ousted PresidentZelaya. * Moreover, the Honduran regime that ousted Zelaya was able to rely ona United States that was also reluctant to take coercive measures to oppose theouster of the Honduran president. Brazil and Venezuela attempted to lead an adhoc group of states—a coalition of the willing—to support President Zelaya, butno attempt to isolate the new Honduran regime could succeed without the supportof the United States, which was not forthcoming.^'

Similarly, economic interdependence has not forestalled conflict in theUNASUR region. In the clearest case, MERCOSUR has become increasinglypoliticized by the conflict over Venezuelan accession that began in 2005. On theface of it, Venezuela's increasingly statist and protectionist economy doubtfullymet the requirements for MERCOSUR membership, yet the dominant partners,Argentina and Brazil, wished it to join for political reasons. However, the Senateof Paraguay—another MERCOSUR member state—refused to ratify Venezuelanaccession because of critiques by opposition legislators of Paraguayan PresidentLugo's affinity for Hugo Chavez's Bolivarian project and their belief that Venezuelawas no longer a democracy and therefore did not qualify for MERCOSUR mem-bership.^^ The impeachment of Paraguayan President Lugo in 2012, an erstwhileVenezuelan ally, provided an opportunity for other MERCOSUR members topunish Paraguay by suspending its membership. This conveniently allowedVenezuela's application to proceed. In this case, economic interdependence and itsinstitutions hardly forestalled conflict, but rather they created new mechanismsfor the exercise of power.

Finally, UNASUR and the CDS have created a cooperative agenda to combatthe security threats posed by organized crime, gangs, smugglers, and violentextremists, but they face similar problems to those of the OAS in translatingagendas into concrete operational goals and plans. It is true that working groupshave been formed and meetings convened, yet a review of the work plans of theCDS for 2010 to 2013 shovvs a focus on workshops and seminars, ln fact, theUNASUR agenda towards regional threats would not look out of place as part ofan OAS regional security agenda.^^ The problem UNASUR faces is that the percep-tions of threat related to security in the region remain very different between theAndean states—where narcotics trafficking originates—and the Southern Conestates that are transit or increasingly consumer states. Moreover, the legal struc-tures, roles, and missions of security forces and jurisdictional arrangements forcombating organized crime vary widely across UNASUR member states, impedingcooperation. It is reasonable to think that, like the United States and the OAS,



Brazil and UNASUR will also find it difficult to lead a regional agenda to combat

new security threats. It is also not clear that Brazil has the willingness at this time

to deploy the same side payments and sanctions as the United States to forge a

collective regional security agenda.

CONCLUSION: A N E W REGIONAL ORDER FACES THE OLD REGIONAL SECURITY

AGENDA

Since the end of the Cold War, the optimistic predictions for regional peace

and prosperity based on democratization and free trade have not been borne out.

In certain countries, such as Mexico and Venezuela, organized crime and violence

have grown much worse. Ideological divisions between Bolivarian, traditional

center-left, and conservative governments in Latin America have re-emerged. There

is only superficial agreement on a democratization agenda and free trade boost-

erism has faded in favor of a new developmental agenda. On the other hand, certain

aspects of Latin America's security have improved since the 1990s. Violent political

extremist organizations in Peru and Colombia have been defeated or brought to the

negotiating table. Highly conflictive situations, such as the Colombia-Venezuela

relationship or Bolivian separatism have been managed short of war. The cold

peace between states in Latin America endures. Despite rhetoric of the emergence

of failed states in some quarters, there is no real threat to the state's grip on power

anywhere in the region.''* When viewed from a historical perspective, endemic ban-

ditry, insurgency, organized crime, and gang activity are not new internal security

threats, which explains why the emerging regional institutions such as UNASUR

and CDS find themselves with agendas that address many of the same threats that

the OAS discussed during the 1990s.

In the long term. South America's effort to consolidate a regional security

order that is autonomous from the United States is significant and reflective of

the relative macroeconomic stability of the region during the past decade and the

greater resources available to some states, particularly Brazil and Venezuela, to

pursue their regional ambitions. Venezuela's Bolivarian alternative has not suc-

ceeded, and it faces the significant challenge posed by greater Brazilian material

and diplomatic capabilities. The ALBA alliance has not become a realistic alterna-

tive order for the region because, in the end, ALBA is an alliance of the relatively

weaker states in the region, welded together in part by political sympathy, but in

greater part by Venezuelan oil resources.'^ Venezuela's resources are now increas-

ingly needed to meet domestic political and economic demands.^^ Brazil, on the

other hand, is reaching the necessary status, at least economically, to possibly

emerge as a major power. It is also fortunate in that it lacks regional adversaries

since the collapse of Argentine power, first due to its defeat in the Malvinas war


Harold Trinkunas

in 1982 and later due to its economic tribulations in the 1980s and from 1999 to2002.^^ Brazil therefore has great flexibility in how to structure its relations withother Western Hemisphere states, including the United States, through its lead-ership of UNASUR and its continuing membership in long-established regionalinstitutions such as the OAS and MERCOSUR.

The creation of UNASUR and the CDS should be understood as Brazil's effortto provide itself with a choice of how to exercise regional leadership and manageits relationship with the United States. In instances where regional instability canbest be managed by including the United States, Brazil will seek cooperation withthe United States through the OAS and legacy regional institutions. On the otherhand, where Brazil prefers to manage a crisis itself, it will resort to UNASUR orthe CDS, as occurred in the 2008 Bolivia separatism crisis or the 2009 Colombiacrisis over U.S. military basing rights. UNASUR also has the advantage of chan-neling Venezuelan ambitions into venues that minimize the possibility of directconfrontation with the United States and allow Brazil to moderate the Bolivarianagenda. Nevertheless, although it is too soon to confirm this, it seems likely thatthe same obstacles to cooperation that plagued post-Cold War hemispheric secu-rity agendas will affect UNASUR on a smaller scale. Even within South America,there are continuing differences in threat perceptions, ongoing economic disputes,and ideological disagreements over the preferred form of democracy.

For the United States, the shift from a pan-American regional order to some-thing new should not be a major concern as long as Brazil succeeds in developingand leading moderate regional, political, and security institutions. The UnitedStates has priorities in Asia and the Middle East, and it faces considerable domesticchallenges on the economic and financial fronts. The regional security agenda willremain much the same, whether it is debated in the OAS or UNASUR, becausethe threats remain the same. In North and Central America, geopolitical and eco-nomic factors will continue to give the United States a significant leading role indetermining the security agenda. In South America, Brazil's rise as a major powerand its reordering of South America's political and security institutions are not athreat to the United States, because Brazil's agenda is not truly revisionist in theinternational order but rather seeks accommodation of its interests as an emergingpower. ^

96 1 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS


NOTES

' For a cross-section of research on security in Latin America during the past two decades, see RobertL. Ayres, Crime and Violence as Development Issues in Latin America and the Caribbean (Washington, DC:The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, 1998); Kees Koonings and Dirk Krujit,eds.. Armed Actors: Organised Violence and State Failure in Latin America (London: Zed Books, 2004);Magaly Sanchez, "Insecurity and Violence as the New Power Relation in Latin America," in Annalsof the American Academy of Political and Social Science 606, no. 1 (2006), 178-195; George W. Grayson,Mexico: Narco-violenee or Failed States (Rutgers: Transaction Press, 2010); Thomas C. Bruneau, LuciaDämmert and Elizabeth Skinner, eds., Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America (Austin:University of Texas Press, 2012). These share a common concern with the "new" nontraditional secu-rity threats posed by violent nonstate actors; for an example of the discussion about "failed states" inthe region, see Gary J. Hale, "A 'Failed State' in Mexico: Tamaulipas Declares itself Ungovernable,"(working paper, James Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University: 2011).

^ Andrew Hurrell, "Security in Latin America," International Affairs 74, no. 3 (1998), 529-546.

^ Deborah Norden and Roberto Guillermo Russell, Tlie United States and Argentina: Changing Relationsin a Changing World (New York: Routledge, 2002), 9-27; Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira, "Brazil as aregional power and its relations with the United States," in Latin American Perspeetives 33.3 (2006),12-27; Harold Trinkunas, "The Logic of Venezuelan Foreign Policy during the Chavez Period," inVenezuela's Petro-diplomacy: Hugo Chavez's Foreign Policy, ed. Clem, Ralph S. Clem and Anthony P.Maingot (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011), 16-31.

'' Maria Regina Soares de Lima and Monica Hirst, "Brazil as an Intermediate State and RegionalPower: action, power, and responsibilities," International Affairs 82, no. 1 (2006), 21-40; Eduardo Levy-Yeyati with Luciano Cohan, "Latin America Economic Perspectives - Innocent Bystanders in BraveNew World" (report, Brookings Institution, Washington, DC: 2011), 1-2.

' Harold Trinkunas, "Defining Venezuela's 'Bolivarian Revolution," Military Review (2005).

^ Andrés Serbin, "América del Sur en un mundo multipolar: es la Unasur la alternativa?" NuevaSociedad 219 (2009), 145-156.

^ Trinkunas 2005; Carlos A. Romero and Javier Corrales, "Relations between the United States andVenezuela, 2001-2009. A Bridge in Need of Repairs," in Contemporary US. -Latin American Relations:Cooperation or Conflict in the 21st Century, ed. Jorge Dominguez and Rafael Fernández de Castro (NewYork: Routledge, 2011), 218-246.

^ See Douglas Lemke, Regions of War and Peace (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002)for a discussion of the literature on power transitions as applied to the developing world.

' Randall Parish and Mark Peceny, "Kantian Liberalism and the Collective Defense of Democracyin Latin America," Journal of Peace Research 39, no. 2 (2002), 229-250.

'" For a fully developed version of this argument, see Randall Parish and Mark Peceny, "KantianLiberalism and the Collective Defense of Democracy in Latin America," Journal of Peace Research 39,no. 2 (2002), 229-250.

" Hurrell (1998), 541-545.

'^ David Mares, Violent Peace: militarized interstate bargaining in Latin America (New York: ColumbiaUniversity Press, 2001), 28-54.

'^ Jorge I. Dominguez, Boundary Disputes in Latin America (Washington, DC: Peaceworks No. 50,United States Institute of Peace, 2003).

''' David R. Mares, "Chapter Three: Latin American hot spots," Adelphi Series, 52.429 (2012),93-128.

'5 Ibid., 94-107.

" See Thomas M. Leonard, "Central America, US Policy, and the Crisis of the 1980s: RecentInterpretations," Latin American Research Review (1996), 194-211, for a review of literature producedimmediately following the Central American conflicts of the 1980s.

''' Hurrell, 536.

' David Pion-Berlin, "Will Soldiers Follow? Economic Integration and Regional Security in theSouthern Cone," Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs, 42 (2000), 43-69.


Harold Trinkunas

'^ Rafael Duarte Villa and Juliana Viggiano, "Trends in South American weapons purchases at thebeginning of the new millennium," Revista Bmsileim de Política ¡níeniacional 55, no. 2 (2012), 28-47.

20 Mares (2012), 107-125.

2' Jennifer L. McCoy, "Challenges for the Collective Defenseof Democracy on the Tenth Anniversaryof the Inter-American Democratic Charter," Latin American Policy 3, no. 1 (June 2012), 33-57.

^ Steven Levitsy and Kenneth M. Roberts, eds., Ti\e Resurgence of the Latin American Left {Baltimore:John Hopkins University Press, 2011), 24-26.

^ John F. Hornbeck, "U.S.-Latin American Trade; Recent Trends," Congressional Research Service,Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 2008.

^^ Clauco Oliveira: "What went wrong: Brazil, the United States, and the FTAA," in Requiem orRevival: T¡te Promise of North American Integration {Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,2007).

^ Andrés Malamud, "Mercosur Turns 15; Between Rising Rhetoric and Declining Achievement,"Cambridge Revietv of International Affairs 18, no. 3 {2005), 421-436; Jorge Dominguez and RafaelFernández de Castro, The United States and Mexico: Between Partnership and Coi^ict (New York:Routledge, 2009), 71-74.

^ Peter Andreas, "Transnational Crime and Economic Clobalization," in Transnational Crime andInternational Security: Business as Usual?, ed. Mats Berdal and Monica Serrano, (Boulder, CO; LynneRienner, 2002), 37-52.

2 Harold Trinkunas, Maiah Jaskoski, and Arturo Sotomayor, "Borders and Borderlands in theAmericas" (PASCC Report 2012 009, Center on Contemporary Conflict, Monterey, CA: August2012), 7.

^ Clare Ribando Seelke, Liana Sun Wyler, and June S. Beittel, "Latin America and the Caribbean:Illicit Drug Trafficking and U.S. Counterdrugs Programs" (CRS Report for Congress, CongressionalResearch Service, Washington, DC; 30 April 2010).

2 David Pion-Berlin, "Neither Military Nor Police: Facing Heterodox Security Challengers andFilling the Security Cap in Democratic Latin America," Democracy and Security 6, no. 2 {2010), 109-127.

0 Damien Cave, "South America Sees Drug Path to Legalization," Neiv York Times, 30 July 2012,AI.

^' Rut Diamint, "Security Challenges in Latin America," Bulletin of Latin America Research 23, no. 1(January 2004), 43-62; R. Cuy Emerson, "Radical Neglect? The 'War on Terror' and Latin America,"Latin American Politics and Society 52, no. 1 {Spring 2010), 33-62.

2 Sebastian Edwards, "Forty Years of Latin America's Economic Development: From the Alliancefor Progress to the Washington Consensus," National Bureau of Economic Research (working paper 15190,Washington, DC: July 2009).

^ Brigitte Weiffen, "Persistence and Change in Regional Security Institutions; Does the OAS stillhave a Project?" Contemporary Security Policy 33, no. 2 {2012), 360-383.

^^ David Sheinin, ed. Beyond the Ideal: Pan Americanism in Inter-American Affairs, (Westport, CT;Praeger, 2000), 1-9.

^ See Steven Levitsky and Kenneth M. Roberts, eds. Tlie Resurgence of the Latin American Left(Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University Press, 2011) for a thorough study of the issue; Maxwell A.Cameron, "Latin America's Left Turns: beyond good and bad." Tliird World Quarterly 30, no. 2 (2009),331-348.

^^ Alfredo foro, "El ALBA como instrumento de 'soft balancing,"' Pensamiento Propio 33 {2011), 159-185.

^ Sean W. Burges, "Building a Clobal Southern Coalition: The Competing Approaches of Brazil'sLula and Venezuela's Chavez," Viird World Quarterly 28, no. 7 (2007), 1343-1358.

3^ Corrales and Romero (2012).

^ To be clear, the fundamental ideological differences between United States and Venezuela leadersand the political affinities between Brazilian presidents Lula da Silva and Dilma Rouseff, and former

98 JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS


Venezuelan President Hugo Chavez, gave Brazil an advantage in managing relations with Venezuela.

'" Javier Corrales and Michael Penfold, Dragon in the Tropics (Washington, DC: Brookings Institutions,2011), 98-136.

'" Levy-Yeyati and Cohan (2011), I.

'^^ Rhys Jenkins, "Latin America and China - a new dependency?" Third World Quarterly 33, no. 7(2012), 1337-1358.

'' R. Evan Ellis, China in Latin America: The Whats and Wherefores (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner,2009).

'*'' See Douglas Lemke for one discussion of power transition theory in the contemporary period,"The continuation of history: Power transition theory and the end of the Cold War," Journal of PeaceResearch 34.1 (1997), 23-36; Lael Brainard and Leonardo Martinez-Diaz, eds., Brazil as an EconomicSuperpower? Understanding Brazil's Role in a Changing Global Economy (Washington, DC: BrookingsInstitution, 2009).

'' Diego Santos Vieira de Jesus, "The Brazilian way: negotiation and symmetry in Brazil's nuclearpolicy," Nonproliferation Review 17, no. 3 (2010), 551-567.

''^ Andrew Hurrell, "Brazil and the New Global Order," Current History 109, no. 724, (February2010), 60-67.

'' José Antonio Sanahuja, "Multilateralismo y regionalismo en clave suramericana: El caso deUNASUR," POT5fl«iíe«to Proprá 33 (2011), 115-155.

'^^ Sanahuja, 127.

'' Eric Mosinger, "Crafted by Crises: Regional Integration and Democracy in Latin America," inRegions and Crises: New Challenges for Contemporary Regionalisms, ed. Lorenzo Fioramonti (New York:Palgrave MacMillan, 2012), 172-175.

^ Carlos A. Romero, "Las secuelas regionales de la crisis de Honduras" Nueva Sociedad 226 (2010),85-99; Peter Andreas, "-Illicit Globalization: Myths, Misconceptions, and Historical Lessons," PoliticalScience Quarterly 126, no. 3 (2011), 403-425.

^' Thomas Legier, "The Democratic Charter in Action: Reflections on the Honduran Crisis," LatinAmerican Policy 3, no. 1 (May 2012), 74-87; Maxwell A. Cameron and Jason Tockman, "A DiplomaticTheatre of the Absurd: Canada, the OAS and the Coup in Honduras," NACLA: Report on the Americas43, no. 3 (2010), 18-22.

^ José A. Moreno Ruffinelli, "La viabilidad del MERCOSUR para los países chicos puesta a prueba:el caso del fallido ingreso de Venezuela como socio pleno," Cuadernos Manuel Giménez Abad 3 (2012),105-109.

^ 2010 to 2013 Action Plans for the South American Defense Council (CDS) can be found at http://www.unasurcds.org/

5" Andreas, 403-425.

55 Corrales and Romero (2012), 168.

5 Phil Gunson, "Venezuela's New Era," Foreign Policy, 19 February 2013.

5 Javier Corrales, "The politics of Argentina's meltdown." World Policy Journal 19, no. 3 (2002),29-42; Vicky Baker, "Ten years after economic collapse, Argentina is still in recovery," Guardian, 14December 2011, http://gu.eom/p/3447p.


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