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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 Report of the Committee on

Fire Pumps

John D. Jensen, ChairFire Protection Consultants, ID [SE]

Frank L. Moore, SecretaryMoore Pump and Equipment, Inc., MS [IM]

(Alt. to Alan A. Dorini)

John R. Bell, US Department of Energy, WA [U] Rep. US Department of Energy Thomas R. Boccetti, The DuPont Company, DE [U] Rep. NFPA Industrial Fire Protection Section Pat D. Brock, Oklahoma State University, OK [SE] Hugh D. Castles, Entergy Services, Inc., LA [U] Rep. Edison Electric Institute Phillip A. Davis, Allianz Global Risks, IL [I] Manuel J. DeLerno, S-P-D Incorporated, IL [M] Rep. Illinois Fire Prevention Association Alan A. Dorini, Gulfstream Pump & Equipment, Inc., FL [IM] George W. Flach, George W. Flach Consultant, Inc., LA [SE] Dana R. Haagensen, Massachusetts Office of the Fire Marshal, MA [E] Bill M. Harvey, Harvey & Associates, Inc., SC [IM] Rep. American Fire Sprinkler Association Hatem Ezzat Kheir, Kheir Group, Egypt [IM] Timothy S. Killion, Peerless Pump Company, IN [M] John R. Kovacik, Underwriters Laboratories Inc., IL [RT] R. T. Leicht, State of Delaware, DE [E] Rep. International Fire Marshals Association Stephen A. Mezsick, Eli Lilly and Company, IN [U] Rep. American Chemistry Council David S. Mowrer, HSB Professional Loss Control, TN [I] T. Gayle Pennel, Schirmer Engineering Corporation, IL [I] Jeffrey R. Roberts, GE Global Asset Protection Services, MS [I] Rep. GE Global Asset Protection Services Matthew Roy, Armstrong Darling, Inc., Canada [M] Richard “Dick” Schneider, Joslyn Clark Controls, SC [M] Rep. National Electrical Manufacturers Association Darrell A. Snyder, Patterson Pump Company, GA [M] Rep. Hydraulic Institute Hansford Stewart, ITT A-C Fire Pump Systems, IL [M] Terry L. Victor, Tyco/SimplexGrinnell, MD [IM] Rep. National Fire Sprinkler Association Lawrence J. Wenzel, Hughes Associates, Inc., CT [SE] John Whitney, Clarke Fire Protection Products, Inc., OH [M] Rep. Engine Manufacturers Association

Alternates

Kerry M. Bell, Underwriters Laboratories Inc., IL [RT] (Alt. to John R. Kovacik)Tim Fernholtz, Sterling Fluid Systems-Peerless Pump, CA [M] (Alt. to Timothy S. Killion)

Brandon W. Frakes, GE Global Asset Protection Services, NC [I] (Alt. to Jeffrey R. Roberts)David B. Fuller, FM Approvals, RI [I] (Voting Alt. to FM Rep.) Kenneth E. Isman, National Fire Sprinkler Association, NY [IM] (Alt. to Terry L. Victor)James J. Koral, General Motors, NY [U] (Alt. to Thomas R. Boccetti)Gary Lauer, ITT A-C Fire Pump Systems, IL [M] (Alt. to Hansford Stewart)J. Scott Mitchell, American Fire Sprinkler Association, TX [IM] (Alt. to Bill M. Harvey)Michael R. Moran, State of Delaware, DE [E] (Alt. to R. T. Leicht)Jeffrey L. Robinson, Westinghouse Savannah River Company, SC [U] (Alt. to John R. Bell)Arnold R. Sdano, Fairbanks Morse Pump, KS [M] (Alt. to Darrell A. Snyder)William F. Stelter, Master Control Systems, Inc., IL [M] (Alt. to Richard “Dick” Schneider)Shay Pei Wu, Schirmer Engineering Corporation, MD [I] (Alt. to T. Gayle Pennel)

Nonvoting

Edward D. Leedy, Naperville, IL (Member Emeritus) James W. Nolan, James W. Nolan Company, IL (Member Emeritus)

Staff Liaison: David R. Hague

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents on the selection and installation of stationary pumps supplying water or special additives including but not limited to foam concentrates for private fire protection, including suction piping, valves and auxiliary equipment, electric drive and control equipment, and internal combustion engine drive and control equipment.

This list represents the membership at the time the Committee was balloted on the text of this edition. Since that time, changes in the membership may have occurred. A key to classifications is found at the front of this book.

The Report of the Technical Committee on Fire Pumps is presented for adoption.

This Report was prepared by the Technical Committee on Fire Pumps and proposes for adoption, amendments to NFPA 20, Standard for the Installation of Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection, 2003 edition. NFPA 20-2003 is published in Volume 2 of the 2004/2005 National Fire Codes and in separate pamphlet form.

This Report has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Committee on Fire Pumps, which consists of 27 voting members. The results of the balloting, after circulation of any negative votes, can be found in the report.

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 _______________________________________________________________20-1 Log #118 Final Action: Accept in Principle(1.1.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add new text to clause 1.1.2: 1.1.2 Items considered include liquid supplies; suction, discharge, and auxiliary equipment; power supplies , including power supply arrangements ; electric drive and control; diesel engine drive and control; steam turbine drive and control; and acceptance tests and operation. SUBSTANTIATION: Power supply arrangements are definitely part of the critical operating path of an electric drive fire pump controller and many power supply problems and confusion continue to exist in the field. Numerous installations have inadequate power or have to had very expensive upgrades to meet the power supply requirements.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Add new text to clause 1.1.2: 1.1.2 Items considered The scope of this document shall include liquid supplies; suction, discharge, and auxiliary equipment; power supplies , including power supply arrangements ; electric drive and control; diesel engine drive and control; steam turbine drive and control; and acceptance tests and operation. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Corrects unenforceable text.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-2 Log #55 Final Action: Reject(2.3.5) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James Conrad, Rockbestos-Surprenant Cable Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Add the following NEMA Publication to 2.3.5: NEMA Standards Publication ICS 14-2001. Application Guide for Electric Fire Pump Controllers. SUBSTANTIATION: Over the past couple of years there have been numerous high profile fires in the US which has prompted several jurisdictions to adopt a more stringent building code. These new building codes will require existing build to be retrofitted with a sprinkler system. This NEMA publication has valuable design information for sizing and installing the electrical system of the fire pump controller.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The proposed document is not referenced in the standard but is referenced in Annex C.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-3 Log #CP2 Final Action: Reject(Chapter 3 Definitions (GOT)) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Adopt the preferred definitions from the NFPA Glossary of Terms for the following terms: Signal (preferred) NFPA 72, 2002, ed. A status indication communicated by electrical or other means. Signal . (secondary) NFPA 20, 2003 ed. An indicator of status. Relief Valve (preferred) NFPA 1914, 2002, ed. A device that allows the bypass of fluids to limit the pressure in a system. Relief Valve . (secondary) NFPA 20, 2003 ed. A device that allows the diversion of liquid to limit excess pressure in a system.SUBSTANTIATION: Adoption of preferred definitions will assist the user by providing consistent meaning of defined terms throughout the National Fire Codes. Terminology for signals has not been finalized by the committee. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: “Diversion” is a better description than “bypass”, Secondary definition is more accurate.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-4 Log #157 Final Action: Accept in Principle(3.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Bill M. Harvey, Harvey and Associates Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add a new Section No. 3.3.31.1 Qualified Personnel. The term “Qualified Personnel” shall apply to an individual that is fully trained and has proven through competency testing to be qualified to perform a specific task or service on fire pump equipment.SUBSTANTIATION: The term “qualified personnel” is used in several locations without specific definition.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle

Add preferred definition of Qualified Person from the Glossary of Terms as follows: 3.3.31.1 Qualified Person. A person who, by possession of a recognized degree, certificate, professional standing, or skill, and who, by knowledge, training, and experience, has demonstrated the ability to deal with problems relating to a particular subject matter, work, or project. [NFPA 1451] COMMITTEE STATEMENT: This definition has been coordinated with other documents and is consistent with the NFPA glossary of terms. It provides a more comprehensive description of the term.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-5 Log #86 Final Action: Accept(3.3.x Set Pressure (New) ) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John R. Kovacik, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add a new general definition as follows: 3.3.x Set Pressure. As applied to variable speed pressure limiting control systems, the pressure that the variable speed pressure limiting control system is set to maintain. SUBSTANTIATION: This proposal is a recommendation resulting from the work of the NFPA 20 Task Group on Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control. The Task Group consists of: John Kovacik, UL (Chair); Russ Anderson, Metron; Tim Killion, Peerless Pump Company; Steve Mezsick, Eli Lilly; Gayle Pennel, Schirmer Engineering; Matt Roy, Armstrong Darling; John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel - Allison. The term “set pressure” is referred to throughout the proposed requirements for variable speed pressure limiting control.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-6 Log #16 Final Action: Accept(3.3.10 Fault Tolerant External Control Circuit) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Vince Baclawski, National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 3.3.10 Fault Tolerant External Control Circuit. Those control circuits entering and/or leaving the fire pump controller enclosure, which, if broken, disconnected, ground-faulted or shorted will not prevent the controller from starting the fire pump and may cause the controller to start the pump under these conditions. SUBSTANTIATION: The ungrounding of the CPT secondary has, historically, been the controller manufacturer’s predominant practice to comply with NFPA 20 - 10.5.2.6 and NFPA 20 - 3.3.10.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-7 Log #140 Final Action: Reject(3.3.21) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Tom Reser, Caps Fire Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows: 3.3.21 Liquid. For the purposes of this standard liquid refers to water, foam-water solution, foam concentrates, water additives or other liquids such as clean agents, used for fire protection purposes. SUBSTANTIATION: The definition should be expanded for additional clarity for users and approval agencies. Add example of “other liquids” for better understanding.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The term “clean agent” refers to gaseous suppression systems.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKCOMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE HAAGENSEN: The scope of NFPA 20 includes pumps supplying any liquid for fire protection. If clean agent systems are requiring pumps, then the TC on Fire Pumps should address requirements for these pumps.

_______________________________________________________________20-8 Log #139 Final Action: Reject(3.3.30.15) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Tom Reser, Caps Fire Inc.RECOMMENDATION: A vertical shaft centrifugal pump with rotating impeller or impellers ( multistage) and with...the pumping element(s) is suspended...

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 SUBSTANTIATION: The word multistage is very common in the pump world. This will add a commonly used descriptor for multi impeller pumps. Adds clarity see 5.1.1COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Unnecessary verbiage.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-9 Log #18 Final Action: Accept in Principle(3.3.30.16 Dual Drive (Dual-drive or Dual-drive pump units) (New) ) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Vince Baclawski, National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)RECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows: 3.3.30.16 Dual Drive (Dual-drive or Dual-drive pump units) - Pumps equipped with two drivers, usually an electric motor and an engine driver. First prohibited in the 1994 edition of NFPA 20. SUBSTANTIATION: A standard should define what is being prohibited in that same standard.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Modify sections 5.7, 5.7.3 to provide clarity. Add Appendix A.5.7.3 as follows: 5.7. Pumps and Drivers and Controllers. 5.7.1* Fire pumps shall be dedicated to and listed for fire protection service. 5.7.2 Acceptable drivers for pumps at a single installation are electric motors, diesel engines, steam turbines, or a combination thereof. 5.7.3* Except for installations made prior to adoption of the 1974 edition of this standard, dual-drive pump units shall not be used. A pump shall not be equipped with more than one driver. 5.7.4 Each driver shall have its own dedicated controller. A.5.7.3 This is not intended to require replacement of dual driver installations made prior to the adoption of the 1974 edition of this standard. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposals 20-65 (Log #50) and 20-164 (Log #124).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-10 Log #138 Final Action: Accept(3.3.31) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Tom Reser, Caps Fire Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: Pumping water liquid level. The level, with respect to the pump, of the body of water liquid from which it takes suction when the pump is in operation. Measurements are made...with the static water liquid level. SUBSTANTIATION: Not all fire protection liquids in this standard are water.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-11 Log #137 Final Action: Accept in Principle(3.3.37) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Tom Reser, Caps Fire Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows; Static water liquid level. The level, with...body of water liquid from which... for vertical shaft turbine-type ( multistage) pumps, the distance to the water liquid level.... SUBSTANTIATION: Static liquid level is better suited for applications of all pump types should not be restricted to water.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: 3.3.37 Static Water Liquid Level. The level, with respect to the pump of the body of water liquid from which it takes suction when the pump is not in operation. For vertical shaft turbine-type pumps, the distance to the water liquid level is measured vertically from the horizontal centerline of the discharge head or tee COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The definition was revised to reference liquid to recognize foam concentrate pump applications.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-12 Log #136 Final Action: Accept(3.3.40) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Tom Reser, Caps Fire Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: The distance from the pumping water liquid level to the center of the discharge gauge plus the total discharge head. SUBSTANTIATION: Adds clarity and broader definition for pump uses other than water.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-13 Log #119 Final Action: Accept in Principle(3.3.44.7 Circulation Relief Valve (New) ) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add a new definition to 3.3.44.7 to read: 3.3.44.7 Circulation Relief Valve. A valve used to cool a pump running at shutoff (churn). This valve is separate from and independent of a main relief (pressure) valve, if present. This valve is needed with electric motor driven fire pumps and with radiator cooled engine drive fire pumps.SUBSTANTIATION: This definition is missing. There remains confusion between this valve and a main (pressure) relief valve.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: 3.3.44.1 Circulation Relief Valve. A valve used to cool a pump by discharging a small quantity of water, this valve is separate from and independent of the main relief valve.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Clarifies the intended application of circulation relief valves.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-14 Log #135 Final Action: Reject(5.1.2.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Tom Reser, Caps Fire Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: These pumps shall be limited to maximum capacities of less than 1892 L/min (500 gpm). 2839 L/min (750 gpm) or less with no minimum capacity requirement. SUBSTANTIATION: Expands the range of “other pumps” and brings definition to the low flow range to allow for very small pump capacities such as those found in non water applications. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The need for increasing the limitation not indicated.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-15 Log #102 Final Action: Accept in Principle(5.2.9 and 10.5.2.1.6) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Renumber Section 5.29 to Section 5.30. Move clauses 10.5.2.1.6(A) through (D) to a new Section 5.29.SUBSTANTIATION: The pressure sensing plumbing relates to general pump room requirements rather than requirements of the fire pump controller.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Delete sections 10.5.2.1.6(A) through (D), renumber (E) through (H). Delete sections 12.5.2.1.6(A), (B)(1), and B(2), renumber B(3), B(4) and B(5). Renumber section 5.29 to 5.30 and move and reformat section 10.5.1.1.6(A) through (d) to new section 5.29 as follows 10.5.2.1.6 Water pressure control shall be in accordance with 10.5.2.1.6(A) through 10.5.2.1.6( H E ): (A) For all pump installations, including jockey pumps, each controller shall have its own individual pressure-sensing line. (B) The pressure-sensing line connection for each pump, including jockey pumps, shall be made between that pump’s discharge check valve and discharge control valve, as follows: (1) This line shall be brass, copper, or series 300 stainless steel pipe or tube, and the fittings shall be of 15 mm (0.50 in.) nominal size. (2) Check valves or ground-face unions shall be installed as follows: (a) There shall be two check valves installed in the pressure-sensing line at least 1.52 m (5 ft) apart with a nominal 2.4 mm (0.09375 in.) hole drilled in the clapper to serve as dampening. [See Figure A.10.5.2.1(a) and Figure A.10.5.2.1(b).] (b) Where the water is clean, ground-face unions with noncorrosive diaphragms drilled with a nominal 2.4 mm (0.09375 in.) orifice shall be permitted in place of the check valves. (C) There shall be no shutoff valve in the pressure-sensing line. ( D A ) Pressure switch actuation at the low adjustment setting shall initiate pump starting sequence (if pump is not already in operation). ( E B ) * A listed pressure recording device shall be installed to sense and record the pressure in each fire pump controller pressure-sensing line at the input to the controller. ( F C ) The recorder shall be capable of operating for at least 7 days without being reset or rewound.

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 ( G D ) The pressure-sensing element of the recorder shall be capable of withstanding a momentary surge pressure of at least 27.6 bar (400 psi) or 133 percent of fire pump controller rated operating pressure, whichever is greater, without losing its accuracy. ( H E ) For variable speed pressure limiting control, a 12.7 mm (0.50 in.) nominal size inside diameter pressure line, including appropriate strainer, shall be connected between the pump discharge flange and the discharge check valve. 12.5.2.1.6 Water pressure control shall be as follows: (A) For all pump installations, including jockey pumps, each controller shall have its own individual pressure-sensing line. (B) The pressure-sensing line connection for each pump, including jockey pumps, shall be made between that pump’s discharge check valve and discharge control valve. (1) This line shall be brass, copper, or series 300 stainless steel pipe or tube, and fittings of 15 mm (0.50 in.) nominal size. (2) Check valves or ground-face unions shall be in accordance with the following: (a) There shall be two check valves installed in the pressure sensing line at least 1.52 m (5 ft) apart with a nominal 2.4 mm (0.09375 in.) hole drilled in the clapper to serve as a damper. [See Figure A.10.5.2.1(a) and Figure A.10.5.2.1(b).] (b) Where the water is clean, ground-face unions with noncorrosive diaphragms drilled with a nominal 2.4 mm (0.09375 in.) orifices shall be permitted in place of the check valves. ( 3 1 ) There shall be no shutoff valve in the pressure-sensing line. ( 4 2 ) Pressure switch actuation at the low adjustment setting shall initiate the pump starting sequence if the pump is not already in operation. ( 5 3 ) For variable speed pressure limiting control, a 12.7 mm (0.50 in.) nominal size inside diameter pressure line, including appropriate strainer, shall be connected between the pump discharge flange and the discharge check valve. 5.29 Pressure Sensing Lines 5.29.1 For all pump installations, including jockey pumps, each controller shall have its own individual pressure-sensing line. 5.29.2 The pressure-sensing line connection for each pump, including jockey pumps, shall be made between that pump’s discharge check valve and discharge control valve. 5.29.3 This The pressure-sensing line shall be brass, copper, or series 300 stainless steel pipe or tube, and the fittings shall be of 15 mm (0.50 in.) nominal size. 5.29.4 Check Valves or Ground-Face Unions. 5.29.4.1 Where the requirements of 5.29.4.2 are not met , there shall be two check valves installed in the pressure-sensing line at least 1.52 m (5 ft) apart with a nominal 2.4 mm (0.09375 in.) hole drilled in the clapper to serve as dampening. [See Figure A.10.5.2.1(a) and Figure A.10.5.2.1(b).] 5.29.4.2 Where the water is clean, ground-face unions with noncorrosive diaphragms drilled with a nominal 2.4 mm (0.09375 in.) orifice shall be permitted in place of the check valves. 5.29.5 There shall be no shutoff valve in the pressure-sensing line. 5.29.6 Pressure switch actuation at the low adjustment setting shall initiate pump starting sequence (if pump is not already in operation). COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Pressure sensing line requirements are better placed in the fire pump chapter.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-16 Log #105 Final Action: Accept in Principle(5.2.9 and 12.5.2.1.6) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Renumber Section 5.29 to Section 5.30. Move clauses 12.5.2.1.6(A) and (B) to a new Section 5.29.SUBSTANTIATION: The pressure sensing plumbing relates to general pump room requirements rather than requirements of the fire pump controller.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-15 (Log #102).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-17 Log #5 Final Action: Reject(5.3) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Jon Nisja, Northcentral Regional Fire Code Development CommitteeRECOMMENDATION: Replace “qualified personnel” with “a person, with knowledge on the operation and use of the fire pump,”SUBSTANTIATION: The current provision requires that a qualified person respond to the pump. No where does it explain what “qualified” is. The proposed wording better clarifies that the person responding to the pump must be familiar with its operation.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The proposed change does not provide clarification, and the term qualified personnel is used elsewhere in the standard. NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: HAAGENSEN: The submitter should be referred to the Committee Action and Statement in Proposal 20-4, where a definition of ‘Qualified Person’ was added to NFPA 20 (extract from NFPA 1451).

_______________________________________________________________20-18 Log #134 Final Action: Accept in Principle(5.6.2.4) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Tom Reser, Caps Fire Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows: 5.6.2.4 for liquids other than water the liquid source for the pump shall be determined based on discharge time requirements of the hazard and whether a single discharge or multiple discharges are required. SUBSTANTIATION: Address a critical source/supply consideration for fire protection pump systems using liquids other than water.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Add text to read as follows: 5.6.4.2 For liquids other than water, the liquid source for the pump shall be adequate to supply the maximum required flow rate for any simultaneous demands for the required duration, and the required number of discharges. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Better addresses the requirements for foam concentrate pumps.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-19 Log #133 Final Action: Accept in Principle(5.6.4.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Tom Reser, Caps Fire Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows: A stored supply...the expected design duration or the total volume of the discharges required. SUBSTANTIATION: Addresses the need for design duration when stored supply is limited or multiple discharges are required.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: 5.6.4.1 A stored supply shall be sufficient to meet the demand placed upon it for the expected design duration. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Eliminates unenforceable text and meets the intent of the submitter.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-20 Log #121 Final Action: Accept in Principle(5.7.3) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add a new 5.7.3 (and renumber extant 5.7.3 and etc.) to read: 5.7.3 Pumps, Drivers, and Controllers. 5.7.3.1* Each fire pump shall have its own dedicated driver.5.7.3.2 Fire pump units covered by 8.5.3 need not comply with 5.7.4.1. 5.4.3.3 Each fire pump driver shall have its own dedicated controller. A.5.7.3.1 See also 3.3.13.SUBSTANTIATION: Common, but unstated practice and intent. Also repeats the requirements of 7.5.3.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-9 (Log #18).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-21 Log #CP11 Final Action: Accept(5.7.4.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 5.7.4.2 Pressure relief valves and pressure regulating devices in the fire pump installation shall not be used as a means to meet the requirements of 5.7.4.1. SUBSTANTIATION: Guidance on the application of pressure relief valves and pressure regulating devices is needed.

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-22 Log #CP8 Final Action: Accept(5.7.4.3.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Revise Section 5.7.4.3.1 to read as follows: 5.7.4.3.1 Variable speed pressure limiting control drivers, as defined in this standard, are acceptable to limit system pressure . meet the requirements of 5.7.4.1 . SUBSTANTIATION: It is not the intent of the committee to limit the application of VSD to specific systems.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-23 Log #87 Final Action: Accept in Principle(5.7.4.3.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John R. Kovacik, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.RECOMMENDATION: (1) Replace 5.7.4.3.2 with: 5.7.4.3.2 * One hundred ten (110) percent of the rated pressure of the variable speed pressure limiting control, adjusted for elevation, shall not exceed the pressure for which the system components are rated. The total discharge head of the pump for variable speed pressure limiting controlled systems, during variable speed operation and adjusted for elevation shall not exceed the pressure rating of any system component at any pump suction pressure or flow condition. (2) Insert a new A.5.7.4.3.2 to read: A.5.7.4.3.2 This requirement is intended to take into consideration the set pressure tolerance performance of the variable speed pressure limiting control as stated by the manufacturer. SUBSTANTIATION: This proposal is a recommendation resulting from the work of the NFPA 20 Task Group on Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control. The Task Group consists of: John Kovacik, UL (Chair); Russ Anderson, Metron; Tim Killion, Peerless Pump Company; Steve Mezsick, Eli Lilly; Gayle Pennel, Schirmer Engineering; Matt Roy, Armstrong Darling; John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel - Allison. The changed requirement is intended to use a performance basis for the pressure tolerance rather than the standard requiring a specific tolerance. The proposed wording also provides guidance to the fire protection system designer on how to account for the effects of the variable speed pressure tolerance.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: 5.7.4.3.2 * One hundred ten (110) percent of the rated pressure of the variable speed pressure limiting control, adjusted for elevation, shall not exceed the pressure for which the system components are rated. The set pressure plus the maximum pressure variance of the variable speed pressure limiting controlled systems, during variable speed operation and adjusted for elevation shall not exceed the pressure rating of any system component. (2) Insert a new A.5.7.4.3.2 to read: A.5.7.4.3.2 This requirement is intended to take into consideration the set pressure tolerance performance of the variable speed pressure limiting control as stated by the manufacturer. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The term set pressure better describes the intent of this section.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-24 Log #101 Final Action: Reject(5.7.4.3.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add a new clause to read: 5.7.4.3.2* Other Pressure Limitations. Where sprinkler heads require a maximum operating pressure, the pressure limiting control set point pressure shall be set so as to satisfy said maximum operating pressure requirements. A.5.7.4.3.2 Operating pressure rating of some sprinkler heads is limited to values below the maximum component pressure ratings, such as with particular sprinkler heads such as large drop heads. See, for example, NFPA 13 clause 12.2.2.2.2.2 – “For large drop sprinkler design purposes, 95 psi (6.6 bar) shall be the maximum discharge pressure at the hydraulically most remote sprinkler.”SUBSTANTIATION: Pressure limitations below the system components pressure ratings will occur in a number of installations and applications.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-22 (Log #CP8).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-25 Log #123 Final Action: Accept in Principle(5.7.4.3.3 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add exception (new clause) to read: 5.7.4.3.3 Where the variable speed controller can control the pressure to within 1 percent or better, the 102 percent of the rated set point pressure of the pressure limiting control, adjusted for elevation, shall not exceed the pressure for which the system components are rated.SUBSTANTIATION: Where more accurate and precise control is available, the performance of a system is needlessly limited. Also, the required main relief valve, when used, protects the system from damage due to overpressure.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-23 (Log #87).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-26 Log #22 Final Action: Reject(5.10) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Jim Everitt, Western Regional Fire Code Development CommitteeRECOMMENDATION: Revise to read: 5.10.1.1 A liquid-filled pressure gauge having a dial not less than 89 mm (3.5 in.) in diameter shall be connected near the discharge casting with a nominal 6 mm (0.25 in.) gauge valve. 5.10.2.1 Unless the requirements of 5.10.2.4 are met, a liquid-filled compound pressure and vacuum gauge having a dial not less than 89 mm (3.5 in.) in diameter shall be connected to the suction pipe near the pump with a nominal 6mm(0.25 in.) gauge valve.SUBSTANTIATION: Fire pumps generate vibration during operation. Liquid filled gauges help dampen the vibration, allowing for better pressure readings. Cost increase will be minimal.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Not necessary for normal usage, calibrated gauges should be used for performance testing.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-27 Log #128 Final Action: Accept in Principle(5.11.1.6) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: David Flettrich, David C. Flettrich, Professional Engineering Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows: The automatic relief valve size shall only be as large as is required to prevent the pump from overheating with no discharge. Oversizing of the automatic relief valve is prohibited. In the event of a fire, an oversized automatic relief valve that opens prematurely, fails opens, or fails to close at pressures below its setting is capable of depriving a fire protection system of the required fire flow and pressure. Minimum size of the automatic relief valve shall have a nominal size of 19 mm (0.75 in.) for pumps with a rated capacity not exceeding 9462 L/min (2500 gpm) and have a nominal size of 25 mm (1 in.) for pumps with a rated capacity of 11,355 to 18.925 L/min (3000 to 5000 gpm). SUBSTANTIATION: In the event of a fire, an oversized automatic relief valve that opens prematurely, fails open, or fails to close at pressures below its setting is capable of depriving a fire protection system of the required fire flow and pressure. This problem can best be explained by a generic example. If we assume (1) that an oversized circulation relief valve has been installed and (2) that the pump operates at the specified operating point (the operating point at 100 percent of rated capacity and 100 percent of total rated head) when the pump is operating at no discharge to the fire protection system and the oversized circulation relief valve is fully open, then, in the event a fire occurs and the oversized circulation relief valve fails fully open, even the slightest fire protection system demand will cause a shift in the actual pump operating point to the right of the specified operating point. Operation at this new operating point will result in a reduction in total head below the rated total head and, consequently, rated pressure will no longer be available to the fire protection system. Increased system demand will only exacerbate the problem, i.e., increased system demand will cause a further shift to the right of the specified operating point and an even greater reduction in total head and available pressure.

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 Although the aforementioned example was for an oversized circulation relief valve with a nominal flow rated capacity equal to the pump rated capacity, any size circulation relief valve that fails open (even partially open) can deprive the fire protection system of required fire flow and pressure if the pump has not been selected to account for the demand (flow) through a circulation relief valve that has failed open. Limiting the size of the circulation relief valve to a size only as large as is required to prevent the pump from overheating with no discharge will essentially eliminate, or at the very least minimize, the potential for depriving the fire protection system of the required fire flow and pressure in the event the circulation relief valve fails open during a fire event. To totally eliminate the potential for depriving the fire protection system of the required fire flow and pressure in the event the circulation relief valve fails open during a fire event, the pump should be of sufficient capacity to meet the combined demands (1) of the fire protection system and (2) the flow that will occur through the pump when the circulation relief valve fails open and the pump is operating with no discharge.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: 5.11.1.6 Minimum size of the The automatic relief valve shall have a nominal size of 19 mm (0.75 in.) for pumps with a rated capacity not exceeding 9462 L/min (2500 gpm) and have a nominal size of 25 mm (1 in.) for pumps with a rated capacity of 11,355 to 18,925 L/min (3000 to 5000 gpm). COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The section should establish the specific size of the relief valve, not a minimum size.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-28 Log #CP13 Final Action: Accept(5.11.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Modify section 5.11.2 as follows: 5.11.2 Combination with Pressure Relief Valve. Where a pressure relief valve has been piped back to suction, a circulation relief valve shall be provided and the size shall be in accordance with Section 6.6 5.11.1.6 . SUBSTANTIATION: Correction of reference. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-29 Log #122 Final Action: Accept in Principle(5.12.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read: 5.12.1.1 Indoor fire pump units in high rise buildings shall have 2 hour protection. 5.12.1.2 5.12.1.1 Indoor Fire Pump Units. Indoor fire pump units shall be physically separated or protected by fire-rated construction in accordance with Table 5.12.1.1 5.12.1.2 . Renumber Table 5.12.1.1 as 5.12.1.2. SUBSTANTIATION: Past and recent history shows that high rise fires can and do take many hours to control. There are two reasons for a fire pump to be attended during a fire: 1) it is common practice for the fire service to continuously monitor the fire pump or pumps, or 2) personnel are attempting to bring a non-operating fire pump into operation. In case #2, t he sprinklers have to be assumed as not working. One hour is too little time to locate experts, determine cause and remedy a non working fire pump, driver, and/or controller, valves, or etc. Examples include One Meridian Plaza (Philadelphia), 135 S. La Salle (Chicago) and Cook County Building (Chicago).COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Renumber Table 5.12.1.1 to Table 5.12.1.1.2 and modify section 5.12.1.1 as follows: 5.12.1.1 Indoor Fire Pump Units 5.12.1.1.1 Indoor fire pumps in high rise buildings shall be physically separated or protected by 2-hour fire-rated construction. 5.12.1.1.2 Indoor fire pumps in non high rise buildings shall be physically separated or protected by fire-rated construction in accordance with Table 5.12.1.1.2 Add definition for highrise building from NFPA 5000 to read as follows: Highrise Building. A building greater than 23 m (75 ft) in height where the building height is measured from the lowest level of fire department vehicle access to the floor of the highest occupiable story. [NFPA: 5000] COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Better defines the intended protection of fire pumps.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-30 Log #43 Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part(5.12.1.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Matthew Roy, S.A. Armstrong LTDRECOMMENDATION: Add Section 5.12.1.1.2 to read: Indoor fire pump rooms shall be located such that the pump room is easily accessible from the outside of the building. Add Section 5.12.1.1.3 to read: The entrance closest to the fire pump room shall be marked “Fire Pump Room Access”. Change Section 5.12.1.1 as follows: 5.12.1.1 Indoor Fire Pump Units. 5.12.1.1.1 Indoor fire pump units shall be physically separated or protected by fire-rated construction in accordance with Table 5.12.1.1.SUBSTANTIATION: Most fire departments have procedures requiring operation of a fire pump unit during an incident. Designers should be made aware that the fire pump room must be accessible to the fire department during an incident and not located such that they cannot access the pump room. Further, the pump room should be marked such that the fire department can easily identify the location of the fire pump room.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle in Part Revise text to read as follows: 5.12.1.1 Indoor Fire Pump Units 5.12.1.1.1 Indoor fire pumps in highrise buildings shall be physically separated or protected by 2-hour fire-rated construction. 5.12.1.1.2 Indoor fire pumps in non highrise buildings shall be physically separated or protected by fire-rated construction in accordance with Table 5.12.1.1.2 5.12.1.1.3 Location and access to the fire pump room shall be pre-planned with the fire department. A.5.12.1.1 Most fire departments have procedures requiring operation of a fire pump unit during an incident. Building designers should locate the fire pump room to be easily accessible during an incident.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action on Proposal 20-29 (Log #122). While identification of the fire pump room location is desirable, for security purposes, the pump room location should be part of the fire department pre-plan.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-31 Log #23 Final Action: Reject(Table 5.12.1.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Jim Everitt, Western Regional Fire Code Development CommitteeRECOMMENDATION: Revise table as follows:

Table 5.12.1.1 Equipment ProtectionPumpRoom/House

Building(s)Exposing PumpRoom/House

RequiredSeparation

Not sprinkleredNot sprinkleredFully sprinklered

Not sprinkleredFully sprinklered

2 hour fire-ratedor15.3 m (50 ft)

Fully sprinklered Fully sprinklered 1 hour fire-ratedor15.3 m (50 ft)

SUBSTANTIATION: Section 5.12.1.2.1 indicates that a minimum distance for outdoor installation should be 15.3 m (50 ft), regardless of the building being fully sprinklered or not. There should be one set standard for interior separation of the fire pump from the remainder of the structure. The 2-hour fire rated separation will ensure the survivability of the fire pump. The 2-hour requirement will also specify the any opening protection be higher than with the 1-hour construction.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The requirement is not substantiated.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 _______________________________________________________________20-32 Log #6 Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part(5.12.1.1.1 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James Everitt, Western Regional Fire Code Development CommitteeRECOMMENDATION: Add Section 5.12.1.1.1 to read: “5.12.1.1.1 Rooms containing fire pumps shall be maintained free from storage, uses and penetrations not essential to the operation of the pump and related components.”SUBSTANTIATION: The accumulation of storage in and around pumps, drivers, control equipment, and power supplies can interfere with pump operation, deter maintenance, and limit access.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle in Part Add 5.12.1.1.4 to logs 122 and 43 5.12.1.1.4 Rooms containing fire pumps shall be free from storage, and penetrations not essential to the operation of the pump and related components. A.5.12.1.1.1 Equipment that increases the fire hazard (such as boilers) and is not related to fire protection systems should not be in a fire pump room. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Clarifies the requirements for a dedicated fire pump room.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKCOMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE HAAGENSEN: The Committee Meeting Action for this Proposal adds a requirement concerning storage and penetrations, and a recommendation in the Annex to not have boilers or other hazards in the pump room (have a dedicated pump room). The condition that the pump room be dedicated should be a requirement not a recommendation.

_______________________________________________________________20-33 Log #44 Final Action: Accept(5.12.4) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Matthew Roy, S.A. Armstrong LTDRECOMMENDATION: Change Section 5.12.4 to read: 5.12.4 Emergency lighting shall be provided by fixed or portable battery operated lights, including flashlights in accordance with NFPA 101, Life Safety Code. SUBSTANTIATION: The current section is inadequate for safe operation of a fire pump during a power failure. For example, the manual start handle on a fire pump controller required two hands to operate. A hand-held flashlight cannot be held while manually starting the fire pump. Further, any lighting requirements should be extracted text from NFPA 101.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-34 Log #7 Final Action: Accept in Principle(5.12.4.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James Everitt, Western Regional Fire Code Development CommitteeRECOMMENDATION: Replace 5.12.4.1 with: “5.12.4.1 Emergency lighting shall be installed in accordance with Section 7.9 of NFPA 101.”SUBSTANTIATION: Permanent emergency lighting is reliable. Portable lighting may not operate properly or be present when needed.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Section 7.9 of NPFA 101, Life Safety Code, covers emergency lighting in means of egress.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-35 Log #82 Final Action: Reject(5.13.1.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows: “5.13.1.1 Where pipe is to be installed above ground, the pipe shall be one of the following: 1) Steel 2) Listed for fire protection service and protected from mechanical damage 3) Connections to underground suction and underground discharge pipe shall be permitted as long as they are an acceptable material for such piping.”SUBSTANTIATION: As currently written requires steel pipe to be used. Other types of pipe should be permitted as long as they are protected against mechanical damage and are listed for fire protection use.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Not sufficiently restrictive. As an example the wording submitted would allow CPVC pipe because it is listed for fire protection use, however it has limitations on the listing that make it unsuitable

for this application.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-36 Log #CP12 Final Action: Accept(5.14.3.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Modify section 5.14.3.2 as follows: 5.14.3.2 The requirements of 5.14.3.1 shall not apply where the supply is a suction tank with its base at or above the same elevation as the pump, where the gauge pressure at the pump suction flange shall be permitted to drop to -0.2 bar (-3 psi) with the lowest water level after the maximum system demand and duration have been supplied .SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification of intent. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-37 Log #61 Final Action: Reject(5.14.9(3)) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: In the third line of the section, change “activate an alarm” to “activate a signal”.SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”. See the enclosed article on the subject. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-38 Log #88 Final Action: Accept(5.15.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John R. Kovacik, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise 5.15.2 as follows: The pressure rating of the discharge components shall be adequate for the maximum working pressure total discharge head with the pump operating at shutoff and rated speed, but not less than the rating of the fire protection system. SUBSTANTIATION: This proposal is a recommendation resulting from the work of the NFPA 20 Task Group on Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control. The Task Group consists of: John Kovacik, UL (Chair); Russ Anderson, Metron; Tim Killion, Peerless Pump Company; Steve Mezsick, Eli Lilly; Gayle Pennel, Schirmer Engineering; Matt Roy, Armstrong Darling; John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel - Allison. (1) The term “working pressure” was revised to “total discharge head” because the latter is defined in Chapter 3. (2) The additional revisions are intended to require the discharge components to be rated for the maximum pressures that will occur with the variable speed pressure limiting control turned off and the pump running at rated speed (testing).COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-39 Log #58 Final Action: Reject(5.15.10) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Revise 5.15.10 by adding new subsections as follows: 5.15.10.1 Pressure regulating valves shall be permitted to meet the requirements of 5.7.4. 5.15.10.2 Where pressure regulating valves are installed in the discharge piping, control valves shall be installed on the upstream and downstream sides so that the valve can be isolated for maintenance. 5.15.10.3 Where pressure regulating valves are installed in the discharge piping, a means of testing the valve at the largest flow demand of the fire protection systems served by the valve shall be provided. 5.15.10.4 Where pressure regulating valves are installed in the discharge piping, a second pressure regulating valve sized to handle the flow from the

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 smallest fire protection device on the systems served by the pressure regulating valves shall be installed on a bypass around the main pressure regulating valve and its isolating control valves. 5.15.10.5 Control valves shall be installed upstream and downstream of the small pressure regulating valve required by 5.15.10.4 so that it can be isolated for maintenance. 5.15.10.6 Means of flow testing the small pressure regulating valve shall be installed. A.5.15.10.1 See Figure A.5.15.10.1.”

SUBSTANTIATION: During the last cycle, the committee decided that a pressure reducing valve could be used to deal with the periodic high pressure created by a fire pump. However, section 5.15.10 confuses this issue and needs to be clarified. In addition, the committee needs to deal with some of the side issues involved with the use of such pressure relief valves. There needs to be some method of testing the valve downstream of the device. NFPA 13 and NFPA 14 provide for such a test at full flow of the device, but if the valve is placed in the suction piping it is not subjected to the jurisdiction of those standards. There is a need to deal with small flows. The main pressure reducing valve will end up being a 6 or 8 in. device, which will not open under low flow conditions such as those created by a single sprinkler opening. The small pressure relief valve is a reasonable alternative for dealing with small flows.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: NFPA 20 does not allow pressure reducing valves in the suction or discharge piping, and discourages their use for trimming pump discharge pressure. Where they are used is outside the scope of NFPA 20.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: ISMAN: No justification has ever been given by the committee that substantiates any prohibition against pressure reducing valves. Other fire protection committees are convinced of the reliability and safety of these valves. For the committee to know that they are being used in other positions and then prohibit them in the discharge piping does not make sense. If they are going to be installed, the best location is in the discharge piping so that they will be exercised each time the pump is flow-tested and so that the pump test header can be used to also test the pressure reducing valve. If the valve is installed downstream of the discharge piping, it will need some additional test header to be tested and maintained correctly. This just adds needless cost to the system. During committee discussion, the concern seemed to be over single pressure reducing valves. Our proposal would not have allowed a single pressure reducing valve. It would only have allowed two pressure reducing valves in parallel, which would have increased reliability over the single valve installation.

COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE HAAGENSEN: It should be noted that Paragraph 5.15.9 permits the installation of a pressure regulating device in the discharge of the pump when required by the AHJ to sustain minimum suction pressures. Therefore, the Committee Statement is not entirely correct.

_______________________________________________________________20-40 Log #12 Final Action: Reject(5.16) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: David Stringfield, University of MinnesotaRECOMMENDATION: Delete the entire Section 5.16 (including 5.16.1 and 5.16.2).SUBSTANTIATION: The scope of the standard is how to install fire pumps, not valve supervision. NFPA 1 , NFPA 101, and NFPA 5000 determine valve supervision requirements.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Valve supervision is an integral part of fire pump operation and NFPA 20 is applied at times without NFPA 1, Uniform Fire Code, NFPA 101, Life Safety Code, and NFPA 5000, Building Construction and Safety Code. NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-41 Log #158 Final Action: Reject(5.18) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Bill M. Harvey, Harvey and Associates Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add new Section No. 5.18.1.1.1. Add new text: Where an electric motor driven fire pump is installed and where a total of 121 percent of the net shutoff (churn) pressure plus the maximum static suction pressure, adjusted for elevation, exceeds the pressure for which the system components are rated a pressure relief valve shall be installed.SUBSTANTIATION: There are many instances where a safety relief valve is needed, where an electric driven fire pump is installed. This new text is needed to clarify the need and use of a safety relief valve.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The 121 percent is based on 10% over speed on a diesel engine and is not applicable to an electric pump. It is not the committee’s intention to allow utilization of pressure relief valves to relieve pressure for normal design conditions.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-42 Log #110 Final Action: Accept in Principle(5.18.1.4 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add a new exception clause to read: 5.18.1.4 Where the pump shutoff pressure at the maximum expected static suction pressure does not exceed 90 percent of the pressure for which the system components are rated the relief valve of 5.18.1.3 is not required.SUBSTANTIATION: Where the pump churn pressure at maximum static suction pressure and at full rated speed is well below the system component rated pressure a main relief valve is both unnecessary and an impediment to reliability since it can fail open and thus reduce the system capacity. As an example, if the pump running in the bypass mode (full rated speed) at shutoff gives no more than 155 psi, the system components are safe from overpressure.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: 5.18.1.3 Where a an electric variable speed pressure limiting control driver is installed, and the maximum total discharge head adjusted for elevation, with the pump operating at shutoff and rated speed exceeds the pressure rating of the system components, a pressure relief valve shall be installed. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Establishes the application for a pressure relief valve.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-43 Log #CP14 Final Action: Accept(5.18.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Modify section 5.18.2 as follows: 5.18.2 Size. The relief valve size shall be determined by one of the following methods. 5.18.2.1 The relief valve may be sized hydraulically to discharge sufficient water to prevent the pump discharge pressure, adjusted for elevation, from exceeding the pressure rating of the system components.

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 5.18.2.2 If the relief valve is not sized hydraulically, the relief valve size shall not be less than that given in Section 5.25. (See also 5.18.7 and A.5.18.7 for conditions that affect size.). SUBSTANTIATION: Sizing the relief valve hydraulically could minimize the loss of water to the fire protection system when the pressure relief valve fails open. Changes the requirement to performance based.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-44 Log #CP15 Final Action: Accept(5.19.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Modify section 5.19.2 as follows: 5.19.2.2 All of the meter system piping shall be permitted to be sized hydraulically but shall not be smaller than as specified by the meter manufacturer but not less than the meter device sizes shown in Section 5.25 . 5.19.2.3 If the meter system piping is not sized hydraulically, then all All of the meter system piping shall be sized as specified by the meter manufacturer but not less than the meter device sizes shown in Section 5.25. 5.19.2.4 3 For non hydraulically sized piping, the The minimum size meter for a given pump capacity shall be permitted to be used where the meter system piping does not exceed 30.5 m (100 ft) equivalent length. 5.19.2.4 3 .1 For non hydraulically sized piping, w W here meter system piping exceeds 30.5 m (100 ft), including length of straight pipe plus equivalent length in fittings, elevation, and loss through meter, the next larger size of piping shall be used to minimize friction loss. 5.19.2.4 3 .2 The primary element shall be suitable for that pipe size and pump rating. 5.19.2.4 3 .3 The readout instrument shall be sized for the pump-rated capacity. (See Section 5.25.) SUBSTANTIATION: Sizing meter piping hydraulically can reduce installation cost without sacrificing performance. Changes the requirement to performance based. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-45 Log #125 Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part(5.20.1.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Renumber extant 5.20.1.2 to 5.20.1.3 and add a new 5.20.1.2 to read: 5.20.1.3 As a minimum, the power supply shall meet the requirements of Sections 9.2 through 9.4.SUBSTANTIATION: Reference to details on power supply choices, selection, reliability, and performance.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle in Part Delete entire section 5.20.1, 5.20.1.1 and 5.20.1.2, modify section 5.12.1 as follows: 5.12.1* General Requirements. The fire pump, driver, and controller, water supply, and power supply shall be protected against possible interruption of service through damage caused by explosion, fire, flood, earthquake, rodents, insects, windstorm, freezing, vandalism, and other adverse conditions. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Refines the requirements for system reliability.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-46 Log #62 Final Action: Reject(5.23 and A.5.23) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows: Change “alarms” to “signals” in several places and just delete the word alarms in others so that the section and its annex note reads as follows: 5.23* Alarms Signals . When required by other sections of this standard, alarms signals shall call attention to improper conditions in the fire pump equipment. A.5.23 In addition to those conditions that require alarm signals for pump controllers and engines, there are other conditions for which such alarms signals might be recommended, depending upon local conditions. Some of these supervisory alarm signal conditions are as follows: (1) Low pump room temperature (2) Relief valve discharge (3) Flowmeter left on, bypassing the pump (4) Water level in suction supply below normal (5) Water level in suction supply near depletion

(6) Diesel fuel supply below normal (7) Steam pressure below normal Such additional alarms signals can be incorporated into the trouble alarms signals already provided on the controller, or they can be independent. SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-47 Log #159 Final Action: Accept in Principle(5.24) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Bill M. Harvey, Harvey and Associates Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add new text to section No. 5.24.5.1: Add after the phrase “rating of the fire protection equipment.” Add “or where a total of the net shutoff pressure plus the maximum static suction pressure create excessive system pressure.” The remainder of the section remains the same.SUBSTANTIATION: This additional text is needed to provide guidance to installers of the pressure maintenance or jockey pumps with regards to excessive pressure. The JP experiences the same change in suction pressure as the fire pump and this change must be addressed in the safety concerns of the systems.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: 5.24.5.1 Where a centrifugal-type pressure maintenance pump has a total discharge pressure with the pump operating at shutoff pressure exceeding the working pressure rating of the fire protection equipment, or where a turbine vane (peripheral) type of pump is used, a relief valve sized to prevent overpressuring of the system shall be installed on the pump discharge to prevent damage to the fire protection system. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The total pressure must be considered when determining the need for a pressure relief valve.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-48 Log #160 Final Action: Accept in Principle(5.28) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Bill M. Harvey, Harvey and Associates Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Refer to section 15.28.1 and change to new section 5.28.7 the text remains as is. Refer to section No. 5.28.2 and change the section No. to read 5.28.8 the text remains the same. Refer to section 5.28.3 and change the Section No. to read 5.28.9, the text remains the same. Reuse section No. 5.28.1. And add new text to read: A packaged pump house and/or skid units shall include detailed design information suitable for review by the Authority Having Jurisdiction. Reuse section No. 5.28.2 and add new text: All electrical components and wiring shall meet the minimum requirements of the applicable NEC-70 articles. Reuse section No. 5.28.3 and add new text: Packaged and prefabricated skid unit shall meet all the requirements set forth in paragraphs 5.12, 5,13, 5,14 and 5,15 as minimum requirements. Add the following new sections and text: 5.28.4 Careful consideration shall be given to the possible effects of system component damage during shipment to the project site. The structural integrity shall be maintained with minimal flexing and movement. The necessary supports and restraints shall be installed to prevent damage and breakage during transit. New section 5.28.5. The packaged fire pump shall have the correct lifting points marked to insure safe rigging of the unit. New section 5.28.6. All packaged pump house and/or pump skids shall meet the requirements of Paragraph 5.27 Earthquake Protection and all related sections 5.27.1, 527.2, 5.27.3 and 5.27.4 SUBSTANTIATION: Many packaged units are assembled by companies and individuals without any fire protection experience. Guidance is needed that the packaged unit meets the NFPA 20 requirements.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: 5.28 Packaged Fire Pump Systems. 5.28.1 A packaged pump house and/or skid unit[s] shall include detailed design information acceptable to the Authority Having Jurisdiction. 5.28.2 All electrical components and wiring shall meet the minimum requirements of the applicable NEC-70 articles 5.28.3 Packaged and prefabricated skid unit[s] shall meet all the requirements set forth in paragraphs 5.12, 5.13, 5.14, 5.15 as minimum requirements.

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 5.28.4 Careful consideration shall be given to the possible effects of system component damage during shipment to the project site. The structural integrity shall be maintained with minimal flexing and movement. The necessary supports and restraints shall be installed to prevent damage and breakage during transit. 5.28.5 The packaged fire pump shall have the correct lifting points marked to insure safe rigging of the unit. 5.28.6 All packaged pump house and/or pump skids shall meet the requirements of Paragraph 5.27 Earthquake Protection and all related sections 5.27.1, 5.27.2, 5.27.3 and 527.4 5.28.7 Suction and discharge piping shall be thoroughly inspected, including checking all flanged and mechanical connections per manufacturers’ recommendations, after the pump house or skid unit is set in place on the permanent foundation. 5.28.8 The units shall be properly anchored and grouted in accordance with Section 6.4COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Guidance is needed to ensure that packaged units meet the requirements of NFPA 20 .NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: DELERNO: There is need for clarification and for additional requirements for packaged pump systems which is not met by this proposal. Consider the following: 1. What is a packaged pump system? Can it be packaged by anyone? Must it be a “stand alone” system, not requiring field additions? 2. Why are matters such as 5.28.4 and 5.28.5 standards requirements? 3. In 5.28.2, what is conveyed by the words “minimum” and “applicable”. The text is redundant. The committee statement is ambiguous. NFPA 20 is a standard, not a guide or a recommended practice

_______________________________________________________________20-49 Log #57 Final Action: Accept in Principle(5.29 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Create a new Section 5.29 and renumber the existing 5.29 as 5.30: 5.29 Break Tanks. 5.29.1 Where a tank is installed between the water supply and the fire pump with an air gap to atmospheric pressure between the water supply and the tank, the piping between the water supply and the tank, the tank itself, the fill mechanism for the tank, and the piping from the tank to the pump shall comply with this section. 5.29.2 The piping between the water supply and the tank shall be considered suction pipe and shall be designed and installed in accordance with Section 5.14 and Table 5.25(a) or Table 5.25(b). 5.29.3 If the tank is not sized to meet the entire demand of the fire protection system, the refill mechanism shall be approved and shall be capable of filling the tank at a rate of 150 percent of the rated capacity of the fire pump. 5.29.4 The tank shall be installed in accordance with NFPA 22. 5.29.5 The tank shall be sized for a minimum duration of 30 minutes for the most demanding fire protection system served by the pump. 5.29.6 The piping from the tank to the fire pump shall be considered suction pipe and shall be designed and installed in accordance with Section 5.14 and Table 5.25(a) or 5.25(b). SUBSTANTIATION: The committee clearly expressed an interest in using break tanks during the previous cycle of NFPA 20, but there is no guidance in any NFPA standard regarding the performance of such tanks. Guidance is needed to make sure the tank refills at an acceptable rate and that the tank has some minimum size in case the refill mechanism does not work. Our preference would be to require listed refill mechanisms, however, such devices do not yet exist. It might be in the best interest of fire protection for the committee to require refill mechanisms to be listed by a specific date so that manufacturers can work towards a listing.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Revise section 5.6.4.1 to read as follows: 5.6.4* Stored Supply. 5.6.4.1 A stored supply plus reliable automatic refill shall be sufficient to meet the demand placed upon it for the expected duration. Renumber sections 3.3.6 to 3.3.47 and Add the following definition to section 3.3.6 of NFPA 20 3.3.6 Break Tank. A tank providing suction to a fire pump whose capacity is less than the fire protection demand (flow rate times flow duration). Add a new section 5.29 and renumber section existing section 5.29 to 5.30 5.29 Break Tanks. Where a break tank is used to provide the pump suction water supply, the installation shall comply with this section. 5.29.1 Application. Break tanks are used for one or more of the following reasons: (1) As a backflow prevention device between the city water supply and the fire pump suction (2) To eliminate pressure fluxations in the city water supply and provide a

steady suction pressure to the fire pump. (3) To augment the city water supply when volume of water available from the city is inadequate for the fire protection demand. 5.29.2 Break Tank Size. The tank shall be sized for a minimum duration of 15 minutes with the fire pump operating at 150% of rated capacity. 5.29.3 Refill Mechanism. The refill mechanism shall be listed and arranged for automatic operation. 5.29.3.1 If the break tank capacity is less than the maximum system demand for 30 minutes, the refill mechanism shall meet the following requirements. 5.29.3.1.1 Install dual automatic refill lines, each capable of refilling the tank at a minimum rate of 150% of the fire pump(s) capacity 5.29.3.1.2 A manual tank fill bypass designed for and capable of refilling the tank at a minimum rate of 150% of the fire pump(s) capacity shall be provided. 5.29.3.1.3 A local visible and audible low liquid level signal shall be provided in the vicinity of the tank fill mechanism. 5.29.3.2 If the break tank is sized to provide a minimum duration of 30 minutes of the maximum system demand, the refill mechanism shall meet the following requirements. 5.29.3.2.1 The refill mechanism shall be designed for and capable of refilling the tank at 110% of the rate required to provide the total fire protection system demand [110% * (Total Demand - Tank Capacity) / Duration] 5.29.3.2.2 A manual tank fill bypass designed for and capable of refilling the tank at at 110% of the rate required to provide the total fire protection system demand [110% * (Total Demand - Tank Capacity) / Duration] 5.29.2.3 The pipe between the city connection and the automatic fill valve shall be installed in accordance with NFPA 24. 5.29.2.4 The automatic filling mechanism shall be maintained at a minimum temperature of 40°F. 5.29.2.5 The automatic filling mechanism shall activate a maximum of 6 inches below the overflow level. 5.29.3 The break tank shall be installed in accordance with NFPA 22. Add paragraph 14.2.7.2.4 as follows: 14.2.7.2.4 Where the suction to the fire pump is from a break tank, the tank refill rate shall be tested and recorded. The refill device shall be operated a minimum of 5 timesCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: Guidance is needed on the allowable use, design, and testing of water tanks that do not have sufficient capacity to provide the full system demand, but are provided with automatic refilling to provide the full system demand. Some municipalities do not allow fire pumps to be connected directly to a public water main, and break tanks are used to fill this gap. Break tanks can also be used to augment public water when public water does not have sufficient capacity to meet the full system demand, but is sufficiently reliable that the cost of a tank sized for full demand may not be justified.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: HAAGENSEN: NFPA 20 should definitely contain requirements/guidance on the use of break tanks. However, the Committee Meeting Action for this Proposal will establish a “double standard” for suction tanks. The provisions in proposed Section 5.29.3.2.1 (30 minutes + 110% flow) essentially permits two inadequate water supplies to be considered as one adequate supply.COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE PENNEL: The tank refill rate in new sections: 5.29.3.1.1 Install dual automatic refill lines, each capable of refilling the tank at a minimum rate of 150% of the fire pump(s) capacity shall be provided. 5.29.3.1.2 A manual tank fill bypass designed for and capable of refilling the tank at a minimum rate of 150% of the fire pump(s) capacity shall be provided. Should be reworded to provide consistency with revised section 14.2.7.2.2 14.2.7.2.2 If available suction supplies do not permit the flowing of 150 percent of rated pump capacity, the fire pump shall be operated at maximum allowable discharge to determine its acceptance. This reduced capacity shall not constitute an un acceptable test, provided that the pump discharge exceeds the fire protection system design flow and pressure requirements. We also need to address the same inconsistency between sections 14.2.7.2.2 and 5.26.4.2. 5.26.4.2 Where a backflow prevention device is installed, the final arrangement shall provide effective pump performance with a minimum suction pressure of 0 bar (0 psi) at the gauge at 150 percent of rated capacity.

_______________________________________________________________20-50 Log #164 Final Action: Accept(6.3.4, 6.3.4.3) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Darrell W. Underwood, Underwood Fire Equipment, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Delete the entire section.SUBSTANTIATION: Per NFPA 70, Section 350.30, a flexible metal conduit up to 4 in. diameter times 3 ft long can be installed at the motor junction box. Therefore, the motor does not have to be disconnected to inspect the inside of the pump impeller. Actually, it is easier to inspect an inline fire pump rather than a horizontal split case type because the impeller is completely visible. The motor and impeller are easier to pull than most upper half casings because there are fewer bolts, less weight and the mass is easier to handle.

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 The suction strainer adds an additional problem of maintenance, pressure drop, and restrictions to the fire protection. The worst-case scenario with an inline type pump would be lifting the motor and impeller in “one complete piece”. However, it would only have to be lifted 6 1/2 in. upwards and at the most 16 bolts would have to be unfastened. A horizontal split case could require as many as 36 bolts be removed and there could be problem with sealing the surface. In addition to this, a horizontal split case may need to be repacked after the inspection before replacing the upper casing half. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-51 Log #53 Final Action: Reject(6.3.4.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Matthew Roy, S.A. Armstrong LTDRECOMMENDATION: Delete text in Section 6.3.4.1 as follows: 6.3.4.1 Pumps that require removal of the driver to remove rocks or debris from the pump impeller shall have a pipeline strainer installed in the suction line a minimum of 10 pipe diameters from the suction flange. SUBSTANTIATION: There are a number of reasons why all fire pumps should be equipped with a pipeline strainer: 1. The fire water demand for buildings is usually the largest water load a city main or supply tank experiences. During a pump test or emergency condition, the high water volume disturbs any rocks or debris in the supply piping resulting in a clogged pump. 2. A clogged pump is more difficult to clean than a strainer. 3. Rocks and debris in the piping have the potential to damage the pump. If the pump becomes clogged during a test or emergency, the pump must be taken off line and repaired. Depending on the extent of the damage and availability of parts, the pump may be off line for an extended period of time resulting in a compromised fire protection system. 4. Requirements for strainer maintenance exist in NFPA 25, Section 8.3.3.7 to ensure regular cleaning of the fire pump strainer. A slight modification to Table 8.5.3 would ensure completeness and consistency between NFPA 20 and NFPA 25.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Pump committee feels this would decrease overall reliabilityNUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-52 Log #54 Final Action: Reject(6.3.4.4) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Matthew Roy, S.A. Armstrong LTDRECOMMENDATION: Add Section 6.3.4.4 to read: The strainer shall be installed in an accessible location to allow for regular maintenance in accordance with NFPA 25.SUBSTANTIATION: If the proposal to put strainers on all fire pumps is accepted by the committee, this text would be required to ensure maintenance of the pipeline strainer.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-51 (Log #53).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-53 Log #40 Final Action: Reject(6.4.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Matthew Roy, S.A. Armstrong LTDRECOMMENDATION: Change Section 6.4.2 to read: 6.4.2* Pumps of the overhung impeller close-coupled in-line [see Figure A.6.1.1(c)] shall be permitted to be mounted on a base attached to the pump mounting base plate mounted without a base and supported by the piping if recommended by the manufacturer. SUBSTANTIATION: There is no need for “close coupled” to appear in this section. This section should apply for separately coupled vertical in-line pumps which are mounted in the same manner as close coupled vertical in-line pumps. Many vertical in-line pumps are designed to be mounted in the piping without a base. Base mounting can reduce the life and increase noise and vibration produced by the pump. Further, the pump manufacturer should be consulted for proper installation of the fire pump. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Committee feels the pump should be mounted to a base.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1

BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: ROY: The committee rejection of this proposal has no technical substantiation. Specific (proscriptive) installation requirements for equipment should be the responsibility of the manufacturer of the equipment. The committee should consider performance-based equivalence of installation. Some manufacturers’ in-line pumps are designed to be suspended in the piping like a valve rather than be base mounted.

_______________________________________________________________20-54 Log #35 Final Action: Reject(6.4.3) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Matthew Roy, S.A. Armstrong LTDRECOMMENDATION: Add text in Section 6.4.3 as follows: 6.4.3 The base plate for separately coupled pumps shall be securely attached to a solid foundation or inertia base in such a way that proper pump and driver shaft alignment is ensured. SUBSTANTIATION: The piping system and the building itself are independent dynamical systems. Anywhere two dynamical systems are rigidly connected, the interface between the two systems becomes the transmission point for stresses and harmonics between the two systems. For a base mounted pump, the pump becomes the connection point of the piping to the building. If stress is not relieved at the pump, then the pump, coupling, driver, and piping are subject to potential damage, failure, or rupture. There are two ways of isolating the two systems (building and piping) at this connection point: 1) Spring supported inertia base to absorb and damp mechanical vibration between the two systems. 2) Flexible piping connections between the pump and the piping system. These flexible connections do not necessarily need to be mounted directly on the pump flanges, but need to be within a reasonable distance from the pump.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Committee feels inertia bases should not be used for a fire pump.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: ROY: The current text of section 6.4.3 does not allow a fire pump to be installed to meet seismic requirements in the model building codes. Rigid base mounting of pumps with rigid piping, and no means of vibration isolation is likely to result in equipment failure during a seismic event. Other NFPA codes make allowances for seismic design. One cannot comply with NFPA 20 and building code requirements. My recommendation is to accept the proposal.

_______________________________________________________________20-55 Log #36 Final Action: Reject(6.4.4) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Matthew Roy, S.A. Armstrong LTDRECOMMENDATION: Delete text in Section 6.4.4 as follows: 6.4.4* The foundation shall be sufficiently substantial to form a permanent and rigid support for the base plate. SUBSTANTIATION: The piping system and the building itself are independent dynamical systems. Anywhere two dynamical systems are rigidly connected, the interface between the two systems becomes the transmission point for stresses and harmonics between the two systems.For a base mounted pump, the pump becomes the connection point of the piping to the building. If stress is not relieved at the pump, then the pump, coupling, driver, and piping are subject to potential damage, failure, or rupture. There are two ways of isolating the two systems (building and piping) at this connection point: 1) Spring supported inertia base to absorb and damp mechanical vibration between the two systems. 2) Flexible piping connections between the pump and the piping system. These flexible connections do not necessarily need to be mounted directly on the pump flanges, but need to be within a reasonable distance from the pump.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Committee feels rigid support is needed.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: ROY: See comment on Proposal 20-54 (Log #35). My recommendation is to accept the proposal._______________________________________________________________20-56 Log #37 Final Action: Reject(6.4.6) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Matthew Roy, S.A. Armstrong LTDRECOMMENDATION: Add Section 6.4.6 to read: Pumps and drivers mounted on a rigid foundation shall have flexible piping connections to prevent damage to the piping and equipment from vibration.

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 SUBSTANTIATION: The piping system and the building itself are independent dynamical systems. Anywhere two dynamical systems are rigidly connected, the interface between the two systems becomes the transmission point for stresses and harmonics between the two systems.For a base mounted pump, the pump becomes the connection point of the piping to the building. If stress is not relieved at the pump, then the pump, coupling, driver, and piping are subject to potential damage, failure, or rupture. There are two ways of isolating the two systems (building and piping) at this connection point: 1) Spring supported inertia base to absorb and damp mechanical vibration between the two systems. 2) Flexible piping connections between the pump and the piping system. These flexible connections do not necessarily need to be mounted directly on the pump flanges, but need to be within a reasonable distance from the pump.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Committee feels the use of flexible piping connections would decrease reliability.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: ROY: See comment on Proposal 20-54 (Log #35). My recommendation is to accept the proposal.COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE HAAGENSEN: Existing Paragraph 5.14.6.5 requires the installation of flexible couplings for this purpose under certain conditions, as shown in Figure A.6.3.1 (Item 5).

_______________________________________________________________20-57 Log #38 Final Action: Reject(6.4.7) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Matthew Roy, S.A. Armstrong LTDRECOMMENDATION: Add Section 6.4.7 to read: Flexible piping connections shall be listed.SUBSTANTIATION: The piping system and the building itself are independent dynamical systems. Anywhere two dynamical systems are rigidly connected, the interface between the two systems becomes the transmission point for stresses and harmonics between the two systems.For a base mounted pump, the pump becomes the connection point of the piping to the building. If stress is not relieved at the pump, then the pump, coupling, driver, and piping are subject to potential damage, failure, or rupture. There are two ways of isolating the two systems (building and piping) at this connection point: 1) Spring supported inertia base to absorb and damp mechanical vibration between the two systems. 2) Flexible piping connections between the pump and the piping system. These flexible connections do not necessarily need to be mounted directly on the pump flanges, but need to be within a reasonable distance from the pump.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-56 (Log #37).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: ROY: My recommendation is to accept the proposal subject to acceptance of Proposal 20-37 (Log #61).COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE HAAGENSEN: See my Affirmative with Comment on Proposal 20-56 (Log #37).

_______________________________________________________________20-58 Log #39 Final Action: Reject(6.4.8) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Matthew Roy, S.A. Armstrong LTDRECOMMENDATION: Add Section 6.4.8 to read: Flexible piping connections shall be metallic in construction. Elastomer flexible connectors shall be unacceptable.SUBSTANTIATION: The piping system and the building itself are independent dynamical systems. Anywhere two dynamical systems are rigidly connected, the interface between the two systems becomes the transmission point for stresses and harmonics between the two systems.For a base mounted pump, the pump becomes the connection point of the piping to the building. If stress is not relieved at the pump, then the pump, coupling, driver, and piping are subject to potential damage, failure, or rupture. There are two ways of isolating the two systems (building and piping) at this connection point: 1) Spring supported inertia base to absorb and damp mechanical vibration between the two systems.

2) Flexible piping connections between the pump and the piping system. These flexible connections do not necessarily need to be mounted directly on the pump flanges, but need to be within a reasonable distance from the pump.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-56 (Log #37).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: ROY: My recommendation is to accept the proposal subject to acceptance of Proposal 20-37 (Log #61).COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE HAAGENSEN: See my Affirmative with Comment on Proposal 20-56 (Log #37).

_______________________________________________________________20-59 Log #33 Final Action: Accept(6.5.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Matthew Roy, S.A. Armstrong LTDRECOMMENDATION: Revise Section 6.5.1.1 as follows: 6.5.1.1 The Separately coupled-type pumps and with electric motor driver s on separately coupled type pumps shall be connected by a rigid coupling, flexible coupling , or flexible connecting shaft. SUBSTANTIATION: Rigid couplings are less tolerant of vibration common on pumps operating at churn and are more likely to fail under a locked rotor start. They should be unacceptable for fire pump service.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-60 Log #34 Final Action: Reject(6.5.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Matthew Roy, S.A. Armstrong LTDRECOMMENDATION: Renumber Section 6.5.1.2 to Section 6.5.1.3 and add a new Section 6.5.1.2 as follows: 6.5.1.2 Pumps with diesel engine drivers shall be connected to the driver by a flexible connecting shaft with universal joint.SUBSTANTIATION: Directly coupling a pump to an engine makes alignment and service of the fire pump unit expensive and difficult to perform. A drive shaft with universal joint makes field alignment and service much easier and adds an insignificant first cost to the equipment.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Some existing diesel drivers do not use this type of connection and have shown reliable performance.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: ROY: Directly coupling a diesel engine to a fire pump increases the likelihood of coupling failures. Further, a drive shaft and universal joint coupling allow service of pump bearings without having to move the driver. Though drive shaft installation can increase the equipment first cost, it reduces installation cost and significantly improves the reliability of the pump system.

_______________________________________________________________20-61 Log #41 Final Action: Accept in Principle(6.5.3) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Matthew Roy, S.A. Armstrong LTDRECOMMENDATION: Add Section 6.5.3 to read: 6.5.3 Couplings shall be installed with a coupling guard in accordance with ANSI B15.1, Section 8. Add ANSI B15.1 as a referenced publication in Chapter 2.SUBSTANTIATION: There is currently no requirement in NFPA 20 to protect operators from coming into contact with the rotating elements of a fire pump. Couplings for all mechanical equipment are required by law to have coupling guards which meet OSHA 1910.219. NFPA 20 should be updated to reflect this.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: 5.12.7 Guards. Guards shall be provided for flexible c Couplings and flexible connecting shafts to prevent rotating elements from causing injury to personnel . shall be installed with a coupling guard in accordance with ANSI B15.1, Section 8. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Provides mandatory language for the installation of coupling guards.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 _______________________________________________________________20-62 Log #83 Final Action: Reject(7.2.2.1.3) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows: “7.2.2.1.3 The distance between the bottom of the strainer and the bottom of the wet pit shall be at least one-half of the pump bowl diameter but not less than 12 inches (305mm).SUBSTANTIATION: This statement has been in the annex, but needs to be moved to the body of the standard because people are missing it and it is important to pump performance.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The design should be engineered.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-63 Log #84 Final Action: Accept(7.2.2.2.4) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows: “7.2.2.2.4 The distance between the bottom of the strainer and the bottom of the wet pit shall be at least one-half of the pump bowl diameter but not less than 12 inches (305 mm).”SUBSTANTIATION: This statement has been in the annex to 7.2.2.1 for well installations, but needs to be moved to the body of the standard and applied to wet pits because people are missing it and it is important to pump performance.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-64 Log #CP20 Final Action: Accept(7.5.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: 7.5.1 Method of Drive. Add new text to read as follows; 7.5.1.6 Mass Elastic System. 7.5.1.6.1 Unless the requirements of 7.5.1.4 are met, the pump manufacturer shall provide a complete mass elastic system torsional analysis to insure there are no damaging stresses and or critical speeds within 25 percent above and below the operating speed of the pump and drive. 7.5.1.6.1.1 The torsional analysis shall include the mass elastic characteristics for a wetted pump with the specific impeller trim, coupling, right-angle gear, flexible connecting shaft, and engine, plus the excitation characteristics of the engine.SUBSTANTIATION: The inclusion of right-angle gears used with horizontal shaft drivers result in a much more complex torsional system. These systems need to receive engineering review prior to installation to assure torsional compatibility and reliability of the complete system. This need has been demonstrated by failures of these systems in the field.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Negative: 2 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: KHEIR: I vote against the action, there are thousands of vertical turbine pumps driven by diesel engines through right angle gears, and have no problems, in many applications including fire pumps. Our action will increase the cost of live safety equipment, w/o benefit to the user, and without any support documents. We don’t have any data, or numbers to apply such extra requirement, resulting of high extra cost. KILLION: While I do not believe the intention of this change is to require the additional exercise and expense to perform a torsional analysis on each and every vertical turbine engine driven fire pump, it is not clear when interpreted along with current 7.5.1.3 and 7.5.1.4. I believe the wording needs to be clarified to provide a more clear meaning and avoid any misinterpretation. _______________________________________________________________20-65 Log #50 Final Action: Accept in Principle(7.5.3.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Vince Baclawski, National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 7.5.3 Driver . 5.7.3 Each vertical shaft turbine-type fire pump shall have its own dedicated driver unless otherwise permitted in 8.5.3.1. and 5.7.4. E ach driver shall have its own dedicated controller. Revise 5.7 to read: Pumps , Drivers , and Controllers. Renumber remaining sections.

SUBSTANTIATION: This should apply to all controllers, pumps, and drivers, not just vertical-shaft turbine type fire pumps.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-9 (Log #18).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-66 Log #131 Final Action: Accept in Principle(8.1.3.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Tom Reser, Caps Fire Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows: Positive displacement pumps are used for pumping water, foam concentrates, or additives , or other fire protection liquids. SUBSTANTIATION: Adds the necessary option to include any liquid used for fire protection - will not limit uses of specialty positive displacement pumps.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: 8.1.3 Application. 8.1.3.1 Positive displacement pumps are used for pumping water, foam concentrates, or additives . shall be permitted to pump liquids for fire protection applications. 8.1.3.2 The liquid viscosity will affect pump selection. The selected pump shall be appropriate for the viscosity of the liquid.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Better clarifies the application for positive displacement pumps.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-67 Log #132 Final Action: Accept in Principle(8.3) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Tom Reser, Caps Fire Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add 8.3.6 Water mist pumps do not have to run dry for 10 minutes without damage. SUBSTANTIATION: A great many questions have been raised about the need for a water mist pump to run dry. The TC on Positive Displacement Pumps did not intend for water mist pumps to run dry without damage.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Add new appendix paragraph A.8.2.4 8.2.4 * Dry Run. Foam concentrate pumps shall be capable of dry running for 10 minutes. A.8.2.4 This requirement does not apply to water mist pumps.

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Guidance on the application of positive displacement pumps is needed.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: FULLER: The run dry requirement is necessary and appropriate for positive displacement (PD) pumps intended for water mist systems, just as it is for foam pumps. Many water mist system applications are for special hazard protection utilizing a water tank of finite capacity, typically 10 to 30 minutes of duration. When this is the case, the possibility of running a pump dry for a short period of time is probable. Testing this condition assures that the pump is able to function after such an event and increases the reliability of the system. This is a requirement of FM Approvals Standard Class 5560 “Water Mist Systems”. It has been FM Approvals experience that many PD pump manufacturers are reluctant to run this test, however, it has been run successfully on all types of PD pumps. _______________________________________________________________20-68 Log #89 Final Action: Accept in Principle(9.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John R. Kovacik, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise Section 9.1 as follows: 9.1 General. 9.1.1 Scope. 9.1.1 .1 This chapter covers the minimum performance and testing requirements of the sources and transmission of electrical power to motors driving fire pumps. 9.1 .1 .2 Also covered are the minimum performance requirements of all intermediate equipment between the source(s) and the pump, including the motor(s) but excepting the electric fire pump controller, transfer switch, and accessories (see Chapter 10). 9.1 .3 .2 Installation. All electrical equipment and installation methods shall comply with NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, Article 695, and other applicable articles.

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 SUBSTANTIATION: This proposal is a recommendation resulting from the work of the NFPA 20 Task Group on Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control. The Task Group consists of: John Kovacik, UL (Chair); Russ Anderson, Metron; Tim Killion, Peerless Pump Company; Steve Mezsick, Eli Lilly; Gayle Pennel, Schirmer Engineering; Matt Roy, Armstrong Darling; John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel - Allison. The recommendation is editorial.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-69 (Log #97).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-69 Log #97 Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part(9.1, 9.2, and 9.3) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Dana R. Haagensen Tewksbury, MARECOMMENDATION: Replace Sections 9.1, 9.2, and 9.3 with the text below and appropriately renumber existing Section 9.4 through 9.6: 9.1 General. 9.1.1 This chapter covers the minimum performance and testing requirements of the sources and transmission of electrical power to motors driving fire pumps. 9.1.2 Also covered are the minimum performance requirements of all intermediate equipment between the source(s) and the pump, including the motor(s) but excepting the electric fire pump controller, transfer switch, and accessories (see Chapter 10). 9.1.3 All electrical equipment and installation methods shall comply with NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, Article 695, and other applicable articles. 9.1.4* All power supplies shall be located and arranged to protect against damage by fire from within the premises and exposing hazards. A.9.1.4 Where the power supply involves an on-site power production facility, the protection is required for the facility in addition to the wiring and equipment. 9.2 Normal Power. 9.2.1 An electric motor driven fire pump shall be provided with at least one normal source of power. 9.2.1.1 The normal source of power required in 9.2.1 shall be from a source that is both: (1) Intended as a continually available source (2) Not subject to intentional disconnection 9.2.1.2 The normal source of power required in 9.2.1 shall be arranged in accordance with one of the following: (1) As a service connection dedicated to the fire pump installation powered by a utility. (2) Supplied from a connection dedicated to the fire pump installation powered by an on-site power production facility. (3) As a feeder connection dedicated to the fire pump installation powered by a utility where the service is provided at greater than 600 volts. (4) As a feeder connection dedicated to the fire pump installation powered by a utility where all of the following conditions are met: a. The protected facility is part of a multi-building campus style arrangement. b. A back-up source of power is provided from a source independent of the normal source of power. c. It is impractical to supply the normal source of power through arrangement 9.2.1.2(1), 9.2.1.2(2) or 9.2.1.2(3). d. The arrangement is acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction. 9.2.2 For fire pump installations using the arrangement of 9.2.1.2(1) for the normal source of power, and having no back-up source of power, no more than one disconnecting means and associated overcurrent protection device shall be installed in the power supply to the fire pump controller. 9.2.2.1 Where the disconnecting means permitted by 9.2.2 is installed, the disconnecting means shall meet all of the following: (1) Identified as being suitable for use as service equipment. (2) Lockable in the closed position. (3)* Located remote from other building disconnecting means. (4)* Located remote from other fire pump source disconnecting means. (5) Marked “Fire Pump Disconnecting Means” in letters that are no less than one inch (25 mm) in height and that can be seen without opening enclosure doors or covers. A.9.2.2.1(3) The two disconnecting means should be located such that inadvertent simultaneous operation is not likely. A.9.2.2.1(4) The two disconnecting means should be located such that inadvertent simultaneous operation is not likely. 9.2.2.2 Where the disconnecting means permitted by 9.2.2 is installed, a placard shall be placed adjacent to the fire pump controller stating the location of this disconnection means and the location of any key needed to unlock the disconnect. 9.2.2.3 Where the disconnecting means permitted by 9.2.2 is installed, the disconnect shall be supervised in the closed position by one of the following methods: (1) Central station, proprietary, or remote station signal device

(2) Local signaling service that will cause the sounding of an audible signal at a constantly attended location (3) Locking the disconnecting means in the closed position (4) Sealing of disconnecting means and approved weekly recorded inspections where the disconnecting means are located within fenced enclosures or in buildings under the control of the owner 9.2.4 Where the overcurrent protection permitted by 9.2.2 is installed the overcurrent protection device shall be selected or set to carry indefinitely the sum of the locked-rotor current of the fire pump motor(s) and the pressure maintenance pump motor(s) and the full-load current of the associated fire pump accessory equipment when connected to this power supply. 9.3 Back-up Power. 9.3.1 Except for an arrangement described in 9.3.3 or 9.3.4, at least one back-up source of power shall be provided when the height of the structure is beyond the pumping capacity of the fire department apparatus. 9.3.2* Except for an arrangement described in 9.3.3 or 9.3.4, at least one back-up source of power shall be provided when one of the following conditions of the normal source of power exists: (1)* The source power plant has experienced any shut downs of longer than 4 continuous hours in the year prior to plan submittal. (2)* Power outages have been experienced in the area of the protected facility caused by failures in the power grid that were not due to natural disasters or electric grid management failure. (3)* The normal source of power is supplied on-site by overhead conductors outside the protected facility. (4)* Disconnect switches or overcurrent protection devices are installed in the normal source of power that do not comply with 9.2.2. A.9.3.2 The conditions identified are conditions that would make the normal source of power be considered not reliable. A.9.3.2(1) NFPA 25 begins to require special undertakings (i.e., fire watches) when a water-based fire protection system is taken out of service for longer than 4 hours. If the normal source power plant has been intentionally shut down for longer than 4 hours in the past, it is reasonable to require a back-up source of power. A.9.3.2(2) The standard does not require that the normal source of power is infallible. NFPA 20 does not intend to require a back-up source of power for every installation using an electric motor driven fire pump. Should the normal source of power fail due to a natural disaster (hurricane) or due to a problem with electric grid management (regional blackout), the fire protection system could be supplied through the fire department connection. However, if the power grid is known to have had problems in the past (i.e., switch failures or animals shorting a substation), it is reasonable to require a back-up source of power. A.9.3.2.(3) Fire departments responding to an incident at the protected facility will not operate aerial apparatus near live overhead power lines, without exception. A back-up source of power is required in case this scenario occurs and the normal source of power must be shut off. Additionally, many utility providers will remove power to the protected facility by physically cutting the overhead conductors. If the normal source of power is provided by overhead conductors, which will not be identified, the utility provider could mistakenly cut the overhead conductor supplying the fire pump. A.9.3.2(4) Power disconnection and activated overcurrent protection should only occur in the fire pump controller. The provisions of 9.2.2 for the disconnect switch and overcurrent protection essentially require disconnection and overcurrent protection to occur in the fire pump controller. If unanticipated disconnect switches or overcurrent protection devices are installed in the normal source of power that do not meet the requirements of 9.2.2, the normal source of power must be considered not reliable and a back-up source of power is necessary. 9.3.3 A back-up source of power shall not be required where a back-up engine driven or back-up steam turbine driven fire pump is installed in accordance with NFPA 20. 9.3.4* A back-up source of power shall not be required when acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction. A.9.3.4 The standard recognizes that prescriptive standards cannot address every possible situation. This provision would permit the authority having jurisdiction to accept a normal source of power as reliable based on a project specific situation even though the normal source of power does not comply the regular requirements of Section 9.2. 9.3.5 When provided, the back-up source of power shall come from one of the following sources: (1) A generator installed in accordance with Section 9.8 (2) One of the sources identified in 9.2.1.2(1), 9.2.1.2(2) or 9.2.1.2(3) when the power is provided independent of the normal source of power.9.3.6 When provided, the back-up source of power shall not be supplied through overhead conductors outside the protected facility. 9.4 For fire pump installations using the power supply arrangement of 9.2.1.2(4), and having more than one disconnecting means supplied by a single feeder, the overcurrent protection device(s) in each disconnecting means shall be selectively coordinated with any other supply side overcurrent protective device(s). 9.5 Where the supply voltage is different from the utilization voltage of the fire pump motor, a transformer meeting the requirements Article 695 of NFPA 70 shall be installed.

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 SUBSTANTIATION: Jurisdictions have a difficult time enforcing the power supply requirements because it is difficult to point to particular provision(s) within the existing Chapter 9 that clearly specifies the intent. For example, there is no link from existing 9.2.1.1 to 9.2.2, 9.2.3, or 9.2.4. There are designers out there that interpret Chapter 9 to permit the use of a reliable stand-by generator as the normal power source. The rewrite being proposed makes it much clearer what are acceptable power supply arrangements. Secondly, Article 695 of NFPA 70 extracts the effected power supply provisions of NFPA 20. This extract has become less direct over the years as the provisions of NFPA 20 are modified during the various revision cycles. The existing text of NFPA 20 for power supply requirements needs to be made clearer so that no editorial changes are needed by the NEC to extract the material. In addition to the example concern above, the proposed rewrite clears up some of the following concerns with the existing provisions: 1. Definition of a “reliable” power supply. 2. Which portion of the power supply must be dedicated to the fire pump installation. 3. Confusion on whether the normal supply arrangement is allowed to change based on provisions for back-up power. 4. Confusion with the requirements for using the “campus style” arrangement. 5. Whether more than one back-up source of power is permitted. 6. Lack of direct guidance for over 600 volt services (privately owned transformers), which was the subject of the NFPA Standards Council decision the last revision cycle of NFPA 70.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle in Part Revise text to read as follows: 9.1 General. 9.1.1 This chapter covers the minimum performance and testing requirements of the sources and transmission of electrical power to motors driving fire pumps. 9.1.2 Also covered are the minimum performance requirements of all intermediate equipment between the source(s) and the pump, including the motor(s) but excepting the electric fire pump controller, transfer switch, and accessories (see Chapter 10). 9.1.3 All electrical equipment and installation methods shall comply with NFPA 70, National Electrical Code, Article 695, and other applicable articles. 9.1.4* All power supplies shall be located and arranged to protect against damage by fire from within the premises and exposing hazards. A.9.1.4 Where the power supply involves an on-site power production facility, the protection is required for the facility in addition to the wiring and equipment. 9.2 Normal Power. 9.2.1 An electric motor driven fire pump shall be provided with a normal source of power as a continually available source. 9.2.2 The normal source of power required in 9.2.1 and its routing shall be arranged in accordance with one of the following: (1) Service connection dedicated to the fire pump installation. (2) On-site power production facility connection dedicated to the fire pump installation. (3) A dedicated feeder connection derived directly from the service to the fire pump installation. (4) As a feeder connection where all of the following conditions are met: a. The protected facility is part of a multi-building campus style arrangement. b. A back-up source of power is provided from a source independent of the normal source of power. c. It is impractical to supply the normal source of power through arrangement 9.2.2(1), 9.2.2(2) or 9.2.2(3). d. The arrangement is acceptable to the authority having jurisdiction. (5) A dedicated transformer connection directly from the service meeting the requirements of Article 695 of NFPA 70. 9.2.3 For fire pump installations using the arrangement of 9.2.2(1), 9.2.2(2),9.2.2(3), 9.2.2(5) for the normal source of power, no more than one disconnecting means and associated overcurrent protection device shall be installed in the power supply to the fire pump controller. 9.2.3.1 Where the disconnecting means permitted by 9.2.3 is installed, the disconnecting means shall meet all of the following: (1) Identified as being suitable for use as service equipment. (2) Lockable in the closed position. (3) * Located remote from other building disconnecting means. (4) * Located remote from other fire pump source disconnecting means. (5) Marked “Fire Pump Disconnecting Means” in letters that are no less than one inch (25 mm) in height and that can be seen without opening enclosure doors or covers. A.9.2.3.1(3) The disconnecting means should be located such that inadvertent simultaneous operation is not likely. A.9.2.3.1(4) The disconnecting means should be located such that inadvertent simultaneous operation is not likely. 9.2.3.2 Where the disconnecting means permitted by 9.2.3 is installed, a placard shall be placed adjacent to the fire pump controller stating the location of this disconnection means and the location of any key needed to unlock the disconnect.

9.2.3.3 Where the disconnecting means permitted by 9.2.3 is installed, the disconnect shall be supervised in the closed position by one of the following methods: (1) Central station, proprietary, or remote station signal device (2) Local signaling service that will cause the sounding of an audible signal at a constantly attended location (3) Locking the disconnecting means in the closed position (4) Sealing of disconnecting means and approved weekly recorded inspections where the disconnecting means are located within fenced enclosures or in buildings under the control of the owner 9.2.3.4 Where the overcurrent protection permitted by 9.2.3 is installed, the overcurrent protection device shall be selected or set to carry indefinitely the sum of the locked-rotor current of the fire pump motor(s) and the pressure maintenance pump motor(s) and the full-load current of the associated fire pump accessory equipment. 9.3 Alternate power. 9.3.1 Except for an arrangement described in 9.3.3, at least one alternate source of power shall be provided when the height of the structure is beyond the pumping capacity of the fire department apparatus. 9.3.2* Other Sources. For pump(s) driven by electric motor(s) where reliable power cannot be obtained from one of the power sources of 9.2.2(1) or 9.2.2(2), one of the following arrangements shall be provided: (1) An approved combination of two or more of the power sources in Section 9.2.2.(1) or 9.2.2(2) (2) One of the approved power sources and an on-site standby generator in accordance with Section 9.1.4 and Section 9.6 (3) An approved combination of feeders constituting two or more power sources, but only as permitted in 9.2.2(4) (4) An approved combination of one or more feeders in combination with an on-site standby generator, but only as permitted in 9.2.2(4) (5) One of the approved power sources and a redundant fire pump driven by a diesel engine complying with Chapter 11 (6) One of the approved power sources and a redundant fire pump driven by a steam turbine complying with Chapter 13COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The committee agrees with the reorganization and accepts these changes in principle. The committee has reviewed the issue of reliable power in the past and finds that the reliability of power supplies is directly related to each and every location. Each location should be reviewed by the authority having jurisdiction. NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Negative: 2 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: HAAGENSEN: Every AHJ that I have ever talked to about fire pump power supply reliability is concerned by the vague provisions of NFPA 20, and the lack of guidance from the NFPA TC on Fire Pumps, in determining reliability of the primary power supply. The Committee Meeting Action does not accept this important piece of the original Proposal. The fire protection industry is looking to the NFPA TC on Fire Pumps for definition. The lack of criteria in NFPA 20 causes frustration and economic surprises in the field due to multiple AHJ’s interpreting the requirements differently. Remember that, due to the NFPA 20 material appearing in NFPA 70, electric motor driven fire pumps can have as many as three different municipal AHJ’s - the building inspector, the fire code official, and the electrical inspector. We have seen projects where plans were issued a permit by the building official under the premise that the primary power is reliable, and then the electrical inspector deems the primary power unreliable when doing the wiring inspection of the already started/complete project. The installation of a back-up generator to power the fire pump load is not typically a cheap solution. These problems would not occur if clear direction is provided in the requirements of NFPA 20/NFPA 70. ISMAN: We agree with the submitter that some definition of reliable power is necessary for the document. The committee can no longer afford to duck this issue and must develop a minimum definition or at least provide guidance on what AHJ’s should look for.

_______________________________________________________________20-70 Log #130 Final Action: Reject(9.1.3) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Tom Reser, Caps Fire Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows: 9.1.3 * *9.1.3 In some cases for low flow pumps DC drive motors and electrical equipment is permitted providing it is approved by the authority having jurisdiction. SUBSTANTIATION: This language is recommended to provide an appendix item very small foam additive or other liquid fire protection pumps.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: There is no equipment available at this time and the AHJ can always approve items not covered in this standard.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 _______________________________________________________________20-71 Log #59 Final Action: Reject(9.2.1.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: State whether or not phase converters are allowed where a 3-phase motor is being used for the fire pump, but three-phase electricity isn’t available.SUBSTANTIATION: The users of NFPA 20 need guidance on whether or not the use of phase converters constitutes “a reliable source” of power. The situation occurs frequently where three-phase power is not available. How is this problem intended to be addressed? Is there a need to list phase converters for fire pump service? Is there a need to regulate how phase reversal will be monitored and annunciated? Users of the standard need answers to these questions.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Performance of this equipment is not suitable for this service.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: HAAGENSEN: If the Committee strongly considers that phase converters are not suitable for this purpose, then the provisions of NFPA 20 should clearly state that sentiment.

_______________________________________________________________20-72 Log #10 Final Action: Reject(9.2.1.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: David Stringfield, University of MinnesotaRECOMMENDATION: Delete 9.2.1.2.SUBSTANTIATION: It is not within the scope of NFPA 20 to decide when back-up power is required due to building height. This is NFPA 1, NFPA 101, and NFPA 5000 material.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The committee feels that the requirement for backup power is within the scope of the document.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-73 Log #CP1 Final Action: Reject(9.2.3, 9.2.4) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: 1. Insert new Paragraph 9.2.3 (renumbering remaining sections) to read: “Feeders with Services Over 600 Volts. Where a building has a service operating above 600 volts, a fire pump shall be permitted to be connected at the secondary terminals of a transformer, ahead of any secondary disconnects for the building, provided the over 600 volt service disconnect, transformer disconnect, and transformer, are located outside the building.” 2. In existing Section 9.2.4, replace “9.2.2 or 9.2.3” with “9.2.2, 9.2.3, or 9.2.4”.SUBSTANTIATION: The NFPA Standards Council, in Decision #04-36, has directed the Technical Committee on Fire Pumps to consider this recommendation. Decision #04-36 references Comment 13-49, Comment 13-50, and Proposal 13-83 in the NEC Report on Comments and NEC Report on Proposals for the 2005 edition.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The committee is opposed to the idea as expressed in Annex Section A.9.3.2.2.2. See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-74 Log #9 Final Action: Reject(9.2.5.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: David Stringfield, University of MinnesotaRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read: ”...operational accident that occurs away from the fire pump equipment that interrupts...” SUBSTANTIATION: The revision is to clarify that, near the transfer switch, it is extremely expensive to totally separate the power sources.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The committee feels that the text is clear as written.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-75 Log #56 Final Action: Reject(9.3.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James Conrad, Rockbestos-Surprenant Cable Corp.RECOMMENDATION: Add the following to the end of 9.3.1: Circuit conductors should be sized per NFPA 70, 310-15 and Table 310-16, Use 75 C column as appropriate. See NFPA 110.14(C)(1).SUBSTANTIATION: There is a lot of confusion as to which table should be used for sizing the circuit conductors of the fire pump circuit. This would give a starting point for the proper sizing of these circuits.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The proposal is outside of the scope of NFPA 20.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-76 Log #111 Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part(9.3.2.2.6 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add new clauses to read: 9.3.2.2.6 Junction Boxes. Where fire pump wiring to or from a fire pump controller is routed through a junction box, the following requirements shall be met. 9.3.2.2.6.1 The junction box shall be securely mounted. 9.3.2.2.6.2* Mounting and installing of a junction box shall not violate the enclosure Type (NEMA) rating of the fire pump controller(s). A.9.3.2.2.6.2 See also clause 10.3.3 (Enclosures for Electric-Drive Controllers). 9.3.2.2.6.3* Mounting and installing of a junction box shall not violate the integrity of the fire pump controller(s) and shall not affect the Short Circuit Rating of the controller(s). A.9.3.2.2.6.3 See 10.1.2.1, controller short circuit (withstand) rating. 9.3.2.2.6.4 As a minimum, a National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) Type 2, dripproof enclosure (junction box) shall be used. The enclosure shall be listed for the subject enclosure Type rating. 9.3.2.2.6.5 Terminals, junction blocks, splices, and the like, when used, shall be listed.SUBSTANTIATION: A number of fire pump controllers have had very large rectangular cut outs made to them and fitted with flimsy unrated junction boxes for the purposes of terminating cables. This violates both the enclosure Type (NEMA) rating and the controller’s withstand (short circuit) rating. This makes the reliability of the controller an unknown factor and also leads to dangerous installations.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle in Part Revise text to read as follows: 9.3.2.2.6 Junction Boxes. Where fire pump wiring to or from a fire pump controller is routed through a junction box, the following requirements shall be met. 9.3.2.2.6.1 The junction box shall be securely mounted. 9.3.2.2.6.2* Mounting and installing of a junction box shall not violate the enclosure Type ( NEMA) rating of the fire pump controller(s). A.9.3.2.2.6.2 See also clause 10.3.3 (Enclosures for Electric-Drive Controllers). 9.3.2.2.6.3* Mounting and installing of a junction box shall not violate the integrity of the fire pump controller(s) and shall not affect the Short Circuit Rating of the controller(s). A.9.3.2.2.6.3 See 10.1.2.1, controller short circuit (withstand) rating. 9.3.2.2.6.4 As a minimum, a National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) Type 2, dripproof enclosure (junction box) shall be used. The enclosure shall be listed f or the subject to match the fire pump controller enclosure Type rating. 9.3.2.2.6.5 Terminals, junction blocks, splices, and the like, when used, shall be listed. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The junction box mounting requirement is out of scope and repeating the title of NEMA is not needed.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-77 Log #99 Final Action: Accept in Principle(9.3.2.2.7 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add new clauses to read: 9.3.2.2.7* Listed Electrical Circuit Protective System to Controller Wiring. 9.3.2.2.7.1* When used Type MI (Mineral Insulated) cable shall be terminated in a separate junction box and in accordance with NFPA 70. A.9.3.2.2.7.1 Cutting slots or rectangular cutouts in a fire pump controller will violate the NEMA Enclosure Type rating, and the controller’s Short Circuit (Withstand) rating and will void the manufacturer’s warrantee. See also NFPA 70 Articles 300.20 and 322, for example, for further information.

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 9.3.2.2.7.2* Where required by the manufacturer of a Listed Electrical Circuit Protective System or by NFPA 70 or by the Listing agency, the raceway between a junction box and the fire pump controller shall be sealed at the junction box end as required and per the instructions of the manufacturer or listing agency. A.9.3.2.2.7.2 When so required, this seal is to prevent flammable gases from entering into the fire pump controller.SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification of field confusion and questions. Except for conductors smaller than #8 AWG, most or all electric drive fire pump controllers inlet terminals are rated and Listed for use with stranded wire and not solid wire. Some Listed Electrical Circuit Protective Systems make use of solid wire and require splicing to regular stranded cables for proper termination in the controller. Note that clause numbering is based on another submitted proposal. Also, if adopted, this text should also become extract text material for NFPA 70 Article 695.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Add new clauses to read: 9.3.2.2.7* Listed Electrical Circuit Protective System to Controller Wiring. 9.3.2.2.7.1* When used, Type MI (Mineral Insulated) cable shall be terminated in a separate junction box and in accordance with NFPA 70. A.9.3.2.2.7.1 Cutting slots or rectangular cutouts in a fire pump controller will violate the NEMA Enclosure Type rating, and the controller’s Short Circuit (Withstand) rating and will void the manufacturer’s warrantee. See also NFPA 70 Articles 300.20 and 322, for example, for further information. 9.3.2.2.7.2* Where required by the manufacturer of a L l isted Electrical Circuit Protective System or by NFPA 70 or by the Listing agency , the raceway between a junction box and the fire pump controller shall be sealed at the junction box end as required and per the instructions of the manufacturer or listing agency. A.9.3.2.2.7.2 When so required, this seal is to prevent flammable gases from entering into the fire pump controller.9.3.2.2.7.3 Standard wiring between junction box and controller is acceptable. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Clarification for standard wiring to junction boxes is needed. Editorial corrections were also made.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-78 Log #100 Final Action: Accept in Principle(9.3.2.2.8 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add new clauses to read: 9.3.2.2.8* Raceway Terminations. 9.3.2.2.8.1 Listed conduit hubs shall be used to terminate raceway (conduit) to the fire pump controller. 9.3.2.2.8.2 The NEMA Type rating of the conduit hub(s) shall be at least equal to that of the fire pump controller. 9.3.2.2.8.3 The installation instructions of the manufacturer of the fire pump controller shall be followed. 9.3.2.2.8.4 No alterations to the fire pump controller without the express specific approval of the manufacturer of the controller. A.9.3.2.2.8 All fire pump controllers are required to be rated as NEMA (U.L.) Type 2 as a minimum. Conduit hubs must also. Controllers rated at higher levels, such as Type 12, Type 4, Type 4X and etc., require correspondingly rated hubs in order for the controller Type rating to be valid. Failing to do so will void the controller’s warranty and may cause controller damage or destruction by entry of water into the controller.SUBSTANTIATION: Field problems, damage and confusion. Many controllers have been ruined by not following the above either at time of installation or after water damage due to not following the above requirements. The resulting loss of fire protection is often lengthy due to having to replace the entire controller or having rebuild same in the field. The water damage situation is compounded by the fact that more and more pump rooms are sprinklered. Note that clause numbering is based on another submitted proposal. Also, if adopted, this text should also become extract text material for NFPA 70 Article 695.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Add new clauses to read: 9.3.2.2.8* Raceway Terminations. 9.3.2.2.8.1 Listed conduit hubs shall be used to terminate raceway (conduit) to the fire pump controller. 9.3.2.2.8.2 The NEMA Type rating of the conduit hub(s) shall be at least equal to that of the fire pump controller. 9.3.2.2.8.3 The installation instructions of the manufacturer of the fire pump controller shall be followed. 9.3.2.2.8.4 No A lterations to the fire pump controller shall be approved by the authority having jurisdiction. without the express specific approval of the manufacturer of the controller. A.9.3.2.2.8 All fire pump controllers are required to be rated as NEMA (U.L.) Type 2 as a minimum. Conduit hubs must also. Controllers rated at higher levels, such as Type 12, Type 4, Type 4X and etc., require correspondingly rated hubs in order for the controller Type rating to be valid. Failing to do so will void the controller’s warranty and may cause controller

damage or destruction by entry of water into the controller. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Reference to NEMA is not needed. The other changes were editorial. The annex information is not needed.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-79 Log #129 Final Action: Reject(9.5.1.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Tom Reser, Caps Fire Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows: 9.5.1.1* Appendix “In some cases such as fractional HP or DC type motors, NEMA standards do not apply or may have different compliance regulations. SUBSTANTIATION: Allows for small foam, additive or other fire protection fluid drive motors.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-70 (Log #130).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-80 Log #51 Final Action: Accept in Principle(9.5.1.1.3) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Vince Baclawski, National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)RECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows: 9.5.1.1.3 Motors used with variable speed controllers shall additionally meet the requirements of NEMA MG1, Part 31 and shall be marked for inverter duty. Note: This is a companion proposal to proposal 10.10 (new). SUBSTANTIATION: To ensure motors specifically designed for inverter duty are used with variable speed controllers.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Add new text as follows: 9.5.1.1.3 Motors used with variable speed controllers shall additionally meet the applicable requirements of NEMA MG1, Part 31 and shall be marked for inverter duty. Note: This is a companion proposal to Proposal 20-113 (Log #46). COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The word applicable was inserted.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: ROY: The reference to NEMA MG-1, Part 31 is sufficient to specify a motor used on pumping equipment used in inverter applications. Motors marked specifically for inverter duty are rated for turndown ratios and torques not experienced by centrifugal turbo-machinery applications (pumps, compressors, and fans). Inverter duty labeling unnecessarily increases cost and creates availability problems for motors used on variable speed pressure limiting control devices.

_______________________________________________________________20-81 Log #112 Final Action: Accept(9.6.1.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise 9.6.1.1 to read: 9.6.1.1 Where on-site generator systems are used to supply power to fire pump motors to meet the requirements of 9.2.4, they shall be of sufficient capacity to allow normal starting and running of the motor(s) driving the fire pump(s) while supplying all other simultaneously operated load(s) while meeting the requirements of Section 9.4 . SUBSTANTIATION: There are frequent and serious field problems with under sized gen-sets. Ditto when there are long cable runs from the gen-set. Most gen-set sizing software application programs do NOT take this requirement into account. In other words, most of these programs are not designed for fire pump applications.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-82 Log #63 Final Action: Reject(10.1.1.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Delete the fourth word, “alarm” from the sentence.SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-83 Log #32 Final Action: Accept(10.1.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Matthew Roy, S.A. Armstrong LTDRECOMMENDATION: Separate the two requirements in Section 10.1.2.2 and renumber sections 10.1.2.3 and 10.1.2.4.SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial: The Manual of Style does not allow two requirements to be placed in one section of an NFPA Standard.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept 10.1.2.2* The controller and transfer switch shall be suitable for the available short-circuit current at the line terminals of the controller and transfer switch. 10.1.2.3 The controller and transfer switch shall be marked “Suitable for use on a circuit capable of delivering not more than ____ amperes RMS symmetrical at ____ volts ac,” or “____ amperes RMS symmetrical at ___ volts ac short-circuit current rating,” or equivalent, where the blank spaces shown shall have appropriate values filled in for each installation. 10.1.2.4 Preshipment. All controllers shall be completely assembled, wired, and tested by the manufacturer before shipment from the factory. 10.1.2.5 Service Equipment Listing. All controllers and transfer switches shall be listed as “suitable for use as service equipment” where so used. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Consistent with the Manual of Style.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-84 Log #126 Final Action: Reject(10.1.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Dana R. Haagensen Tewksbury, MARECOMMENDATION: Add new clause and Annex item to read: 10.1.2.8* Program code. Where program code (software) is used in the starting path or where program code can affect the starting path the reliability of the program code shall be suitable to the listing agency. A.10.1.2.8 Microprocessors, microcontrollers and programmable logic controllers all make use of program code (software) to function. Where the software is used in the critical starting or running path of the fire pump controller, the reliability of the program code may be examined by the listing agency against whatever standard it deems appropriate. Examples of standards for the quality and/or reliability of program code include (among others): UL-1998, RTCA DO078B, Mil-Std-882C, IEEE 1228-1994, FDA DS-9, CSA Q396.1.1. These are used to assess the reliability of software used in avionics, medical equipment and other critical applications.SUBSTANTIATION: Where program code is in the critical starting path it’s quality and reliability directly affect the reliability of the fire pump installation. Where program code may negatively affect the starting of the fire pump, even though not intended to be in the critical starting path, the quality and reliability of such code also affects the reliability of the fire pump installation.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The proposed text is under the purview of the listing organization.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-85 Log #161 Final Action: Reject(10.1.2.5) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Bill M. Harvey, Harvey and Associates Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Refer to section 10.1.2.5.1. Refer to the portion of the paragraph that reads, “rated operating pressure” and correct to read “rated operating voltage.”SUBSTANTIATION: Editorial.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The current wording in the standard is correct.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-86 Log #CP4 Final Action: Accept(10.1.2.5.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Change rated to maximum as follows: 10.1.2.5.1 All controllers shall be marked “Electric Fire Pump Controller” and shall show plainly the name of the manufacturer, identifying designation, rated maximum operating pressure, enclosure type designation, and complete electrical rating. SUBSTANTIATION: Reference to maximum operating pressure is more appropriate.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-87 Log #1 Final Action: Accept(10.3.4.4) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Manuel J. DeLerno, S-P-D Industries Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise as follows: “...voltages with an accuracy within ±5 percent of full scale motor nameplate rated voltage and current .” SUBSTANTIATION: Full scale of what? Clarification needed.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Accuracy should be at the range of use. For example high scale and reading the low end of the scale.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-88 Log #CP5 Final Action: Accept(10.3.5) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Revise the title of the section to: 10.3.5 Protection of Control Circuits.SUBSTANTIATION: Clarifies the information in the section.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-89 Log #14 Final Action: Accept(10.3.5.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Vince Baclawski, National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)RECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows: 10.3.5.1 The secondary of the transformer and control circuitry shall be permitted to be ungrounded. SUBSTANTIATION: The ungrounding of the CPT secondary has, historically, been the controller manufacturer’s predominant practice to comply with NFPA 20 - 10.5.2.6 and NFPA 20 - 3.3.10.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-90 Log #114 Final Action: Reject(10.4.3.3.1(7) (New) ) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add a new 10.4.3.3.1(7) to read: (7) Low or missing voltage on any conductor (any phase) shall not interfere with the operation and tripping of the circuit breaker.SUBSTANTIATION: Controllers should operate as intended regardless of low or missing line voltage. This includes starting a pump or pumps when operating via the Emergency Mechanical Operator, or when the Motor Contactor(s) are already sealed in before a low voltage condition or single phase condition occurs.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The proposed text is unnecessary and restrictive.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 _______________________________________________________________20-91 Log #115 Final Action: Reject(10.4.4.1(6) (New) ) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add a new 10.4.4.1(6) to read: (6) Low or missing voltage on any conductor (any phase) shall not prevent or interfere with meeting the requirements of (1) through (5).SUBSTANTIATION: Controller locked rotor protection should operate as intended regardless of low or missing line voltage. This is especially important when the Emergency Mechanical Operator is used. Needless damage to the motor and possible personal injury may result. The same is true when the motor attempts to start under single phase conditions when the controller is not equipped with single phase start protection. Needless damage to the fire pump motor can and does result.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-90 (Log #114).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-92 Log #90 Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part(10.4.5) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John R. Kovacik, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.RECOMMENDATION: (1) Revise beginning of 10.4.5 as follows: 10.4.5 Motor Contactor Starting Circuitry . 10.4.5.1 General Motor Contactor . The motor contactor shall be horsepower rated and shall be of the magnetic type with a contact in each ungrounded conductor. (2) Insert a new 10.4.5.2 as follows (renumbering remaining sections of 10.4.5): 10.4.5.2 Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control. The variable speed pressure limiting control shall have a horsepower rating at least equal to the motor horsepower or, where rated in amperes, shall have an ampere rating not less than the motor full-load current. (3) Revise existing 10.4.5.5 (incorporating section renumbering) to read as follows: 10.4.5 .5 .6 Operating Coil s . For controllers of 600 V or less, the operating coil (s) for the main any motor contactor (s), and any by bypass contactor(s) if provided, shall be supplied directly from the main power voltage and not through a transformer. (4) Revise existing 10.4.5.6.1 (incorporating section renumbering) to read as follows: 10.4.5 .6 .7 .1 General. No undervoltage, phase loss, frequency sensitive, or other sensor(s) shall be installed that automatically or manually prohibit electrical actuation of the motor contactor or variable speed pressure limiting control . (5) Insert a new 10.4.5.8 as follows: 10.4.5.8 Bypass Starting. Where a variable speed pressure limiting control is the automatic starting means, contactors shall be provided to isolate the variable speed pressure limiting control on the line and load side, and provide bypass starting. 10.4.5.8.1 The bypass contactors shall be operable using the emergency-run handle or lever defined in 10.5.3.2. 10.4.5.8.2 Means shall be provided to prevent higher than normal starting currents when automatically switching from variable speed pressure limiting control to the bypass contactor. SUBSTANTIATION: This proposal is a recommendation resulting from the work of the NFPA 20 Task Group on Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control. The Task Group consists of: John Kovacik, UL (Chair); Russ Anderson, Metron; Tim Killion, Peerless Pump Company; Steve Mezsick, Eli Lilly; Gayle Pennel, Schirmer Engineering; Matt Roy, Armstrong Darling; John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel - Allison. (1) Editorial. (2) The rating of the variable speed control unit is similar to motors in that they are based on a service factor of 1.0. (3) The variable speed control unit may introduce additional motor contactors. (4) This arrangement must be required for both the bypass and the variable speed pressure limiting control. (5) Permits the bypass of the variable speed control unit by manual means if necessary.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle in Part (1) Accept proposed change. (2) Move 10.4.5.2 to new 10.10.1.3. (3) Accept (4) Delete changes to 10.4.5.6.1 - VFDs have various shutdowns in them but they are automatically bypassed if a shutdown occurs so this paragraph does not apply.

(5) Delete 10.4.5.8 already covered by 10.10.3. (6) Move 10.4.5.8.1 to new 10.10.3.3. (7) Delete 10.4.5.8.2 already covered by 10.10.3.1.5. 9.5.2.2.1 Where the motor is used with a variable speed pressure limiting controller, the service factor shall not be used.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Meets the intent of the submitter.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-93 Log #116 Final Action: Accept in Principle(10.4.5.5 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add a new 10.4.5.5 to read: 10.4.5.5 Soft Starters. 10.4.5.5.1 Soft start units shall be horsepower rated or specifically approved for the service. 10.4.5.5.2 The bypass contactor shall comply with 10.4.5.1. 10.4.5.5.3 Starting reactors and autotransformers shall comply with the requirements of ANSI/UL 508, Standard for Industrial Control Equipment, Table 92.1.SUBSTANTIATION: Current practice and intent, but not stated. No guidance for approval labs or for new vendors.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Add a new 10.4.5.5 to read: 10.4.5.5 Soft Start ers Units . 10.4.5.5.1 Soft start units shall be horsepower rated or specifically approved designed for the service. 10.4.5.5.2 The bypass contractor shall comply with 10.4.5.1. 10.4.5.5.3 Soft start units shall comply with the duty cycle requirements per 10.4.5.4.1 and 10.4.5.4.2. Starting reactors and autotransformers shall comply with the requirements of ANSI/UL 508, Standard for Industrial Control Equipment, Table 92.1. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The proposed changes are intended to clarify the present practice.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-94 Log #117 Final Action: Accept in Part(10.4.5.6.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Move 10.4.5.6.1 to revised 10.3.4.6 to read: 10.3.4.6 Field Connections. 10.3.4.6.1 A fire pump controller shall not be used as a junction box to supply other equipment. 10.3.4.6.2 No undervoltage, phase loss, frequency sensitive, or other sensor(s) shall be installed that automatically or manually prohibit electrical actuation of the motor contactor. 10.3.4.6.3 No alterations to the fire pump controller shall be performed without the express permission of the controller manufacturer. SUBSTANTIATION: Field problems with modifications to controllers. Clearer direction.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Part Add a new 10.3.4.6 to read as follows: 10.3.4.6 Field Connections. 10.3.4.6.1 A fire pump controller shall not be used as a junction box to supply other equipment. 10.3.4.6.2 No undervoltage, phase loss, frequency sensitive, or other sensor(s) shall be installed that automatically or manually prohibit electrical actuation of the motor contractor.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Alterations are not permitted for this specific component or other listed components.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-95 Log #64 Final Action: Reject(10.4.5.6.2.3) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: In the second line of the section, change “local visible alarm” to “local visible signal”.SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”.

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-96 Log #91 Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part(10.4.6) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John R. Kovacik, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.RECOMMENDATION: (1) Revise 10.4.6.1.1 as follows: 10.4.6.1.1 A visible indicator shall monitor the availability of power in all phases at the line terminals of the motor contactor or bypass contactor if provided . (2) Add a new 10.4.6.3 as follows: 10.4.6.3* Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control Fault. Visible indication shall be provided for when the variable speed pressure limiting control is in the fault condition or the bypass contactor(s) are energized. (3) Add a new A.10.4.6.3 as follows: A.10.4.6.3 The bypass contactor should be energized only when there is a pump demand to run and the variable speed pressure limiting control is in the fault condition. (4) Add a new 10.4.6.4 as follows: Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control Overpressure. Visible indication shall be provided on all controller equipped with variable speed pressure limiting control to actuate at 115 percent of set pressure. SUBSTANTIATION: This proposal is a recommendation resulting from the work of the NFPA 20 Task Group on Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control. The Task Group consists of: John Kovacik, UL (Chair); Russ Anderson, Metron; Tim Killion, Peerless Pump Company; Steve Mezsick, Eli Lilly; Gayle Pennel, Schirmer Engineering; Matt Roy, Armstrong Darling; John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel - Allison. The two alarms are necessary when variable speed pressure limiting control is provided.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle in Part (1) Accept (2) Delete 10.4.6.3 already covered by 10.10.8.1 and 10.10.8.2. (3) Move A.10.4.6.3 to A.10.10.3.1. (4) Move to 10.4.6.4 to 10.10.8.3.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Meets the intent of the submitter.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-97 Log #65 Final Action: Reject(10.4.6 and A.10.4.6) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: In the title of 10.4.6, delete “Alarm and” so that the title reads “Signal Devices on Controller”. In the sentence of A.10.4.6, delete “alarm and” so that the sentence begins, “The pilot lamp for alarm and signal service....”. SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-98 Log #66 Final Action: Reject(10.4.7 and A.10.4.7) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Change “alarm” to “signal” and delete the word “alarm” in several places so that the section and its annex reads as follows: 10.4.7* Alarm and Signal Devices Remote from Controller. 10.4.7.1 Where the pump room is not constantly attended, audible or visible alarms signals powered by a source not exceeding 125V shall be provided at a point of constant attendance. 10.4.7.2 These alarms signals shall indicate the information in 10.4.7.2(A) through 10.4.7.2(D). (A) Pump or Motor Running. The alarm signal shall actuate whenever the controller has operated into a motor-running condition. This alarm signal circuit shall be energized by a separate reliable supervised power source or from the pump motor power, reduced to not more than 125V. (B) Loss of Phase.

(1) The loss of any phase at the line terminals of the motor contractor shall be monitored. (2) All phases shall be monitored. Such monitoring shall detect loss of phase whether the motor is running or at rest. (3) When power is supplied from multiple power sources, monitoring of each power source for phase loss shall be permitted at any point electrically upstream of the line terminals of the contactor, provided all sucrose are monitored. (C) Phase Reversal. (See 10.4.6.2) This alarm signal circuit shall be energized by a separate reliable supervised power source or from the pump motor power, reduced to not more than 125V. (D) Controller Connected to Alternate Source. Where two sources of power are supplied to meet the requirements of 9.2.4, this alarm signal circuit shall indicate whenever the alternate source is the source supplying power to the controller. This alarm signal circuit shall be energized by a separate reliable, supervised power source, reduced to not more than 125V. A.10.4.7 Where unusual conditions exist whereby pump operation is not certain, a “failed-to-operate” alarm signal is recommended. In order to supervise the power source for the alarm signal circuit, the controller can be arranged to start upon failure of the supervised alarm signal circuit power. SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-99 Log #92 Final Action: Accept in Principle in Part(10.4.7.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John R. Kovacik, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.RECOMMENDATION: (1) Revise 10.4.7.2(B)(1) to read: (1) The loss of any phase at the line terminals of the motor contactor , or bypass contactor if provided, shall be monitored. (2) Insert a new 10.4.7.2(E) to read: (E) Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control Fault. An alarm contact shall activate whenever the variable speed pressure limiting control, if provided, is indicating a fault condition. This alarm circuit shall be energized by a separate reliable supervised power source or from the pump motor power, reduced, to not more than 125 V. (3) Insert a new 10.4.7.2(F) to read: (F) Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control Overpressure. For controllers equipped with variable speed pressure limiting control, an alarm shall actuate at 115 percent of the set pressure. This alarm circuit shall be energized by a separate reliable supervised power source or from the pump motor power, reduced to not more than 125 V. SUBSTANTIATION: This proposal is a recommendation resulting from the work of the NFPA 20 Task Group on Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control. The Task Group consists of: John Kovacik, UL (Chair); Russ Anderson, Metron; Tim Killion, Peerless Pump Company; Steve Mezsick, Eli Lilly; Gayle Pennel, Schirmer Engineering; Matt Roy, Armstrong Darling; John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel - Allison. These remote alarm contacts are necessary when variable speed pressure limiting control is provided.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle in Part (1) Accept (2) Delete 10.4.7.2(E) already covered by 10.10.9. (3) Delete 10.4.7.2(F) covered by new 10.10.8.3 and 10.10.9.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Meets the intent of the submitter.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-100 Log #CP6 Final Action: Accept(10.5.2.1.1.1, 12.5.2.1.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Revise 10.5.2.1.1.1 to read as follows: 10.5.2.1.1.1 Unless the requirements of 10.5.2.1.1.2 are met, there shall be provided a pressure-actuated switch having independent adjustable high- and low calibrated adjustments set-points as part of the controller. Revise 12.5.2.1.1.1 to read as follows: 12.5.2.1.1. Unless the requirements of 12.5.2.1.1.2 are met, there shall be provided a pressure-actuated switch having independent adjustable high- and low calibrated adjustments set-points as part of the controller.

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 SUBSTANTIATION: Presently, the only switches that meet the existing literal requirement for “independent high- and low-” calibration contain mercury. Many states have adopted, or are in the process of adopting, legislation that will prohibit the use of mercury in many products - including pressure switches. This change will permit the use of switches that are mercury-free, offer equivalent reliability and are currently available. These switches are of the adjustable dead-band type, which permit the selection of a low set-point and an adjustable dead-band. The dead-band setting determines the high set-point. This type of switch is used in other fire protection applications. The requirement for “adjustable high- and low-calibrated set-points” ensures that the requirement for separate and adjustable pump start and stop pressures is not removed from the standard. States that have enacted “mercury ban” legislation include Connecticut, which became effective in June 2004, and Rhode Island and Maine shortly thereafter.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-101 Log #11 Final Action: Reject(10.5.2.1.6(C)) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: David Stringfield, University of MinnesotaRECOMMENDATION: Revise 10.5.2.1.6(C) to read: “10.5.2.1.6(C) There shall be no shutoff valve in the pressure-sensing line between the controller and the connection to the water supply .” SUBSTANTIATION: Figure A.10.5.2.1(A) shows four shutoff valves, which is OK because they are not between the water supply and the controller. Why is the format for the electric and diesel controller sections different? The same Proposal is submitted for 12.5.2.1.6(B)(3)COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The text is clear as written.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: HAAGENSEN: The submitter’s proposed change has merit because this issue is often confused.

_______________________________________________________________20-102 Log #48 Final Action: Accept in Principle(10.5.2.1.6(H)) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Vince Baclawski, National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)RECOMMENDATION: Revise existing 10.5.2.1.6(H) as follows: 10.5.2.1.6(H) For variable speed pressure limiting control, a 12.7 mm (1.2 in.) nominal size inside diameter pressure line, including appropriate strainer, shall be connected between the pump discharge flange and the discharge check control valve, as appropriate. Note: This is a companion proposal to proposal 10.10.7.2 (new). SUBSTANTIATION: Reading the pressure on the system side of the check valve allows the controller to determine when to shut down on the minimum run timer.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Revise existing 10.5.2.1.6(H) as follows: 10.5.2.1.6(H) For variable speed pressure limiting control, a 12.7 mm (1/2 in.) nominal size inside diameter pressure line, including appropriate strainer , shall be connected between the pump discharge flange and the discharge check control valve, as appropriate. Note: This is a companion proposal to Proposal 20-113 (Log #46). COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Reference to the strainer is not needed since there is no flow.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-103 Log #17 Final Action: Accept(10.5.2.6.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Vince Baclawski, National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 10.5.2.6.1 External control circuits that extend outside the fire pump room shall be arranged so that failure of any external circuit (open, ground fault or short circuit) shall not prevent operation of pump(s) from all other internal or external means.

SUBSTANTIATION: The ungrounding of the CPT secondary has, historically, been the controller manufacturer’s predominant practice to comply with NFPA 20 - 10.5.2.6 and NFPA 20 - 3.3.10.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-6 (Log #16).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-104 Log #15 Final Action: Accept(10.5.2.6.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Vince Baclawski, National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 10.5.2.6.2 Breakage, disconnecting, shorting of the wires, ground fault or loss of power to these circuits shall be permitted to cause continuous running of the fire pump, but shall not prevent the controller(s) from starting the fire pump(s) due to causes other than these external circuits. SUBSTANTIATION: The ungrounding of the CPT secondary has, historically, been the controller manufacturer’s predominant practice to comply with NFPA 20 - 10.5.2.6 and NFPA 20 - 3.3.10.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-105 Log #93 Final Action: Accept in Principle(10.5.3.2.4 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John R. Kovacik, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add a new 10.5.3.2.4 to read: 10.5.3.2.4 The handle or lever shall be arranged to isolate power from the variable speed pressure limiting control, if provided, prior to engaging the bypass contactor. SUBSTANTIATION: This proposal is a recommendation resulting from the work of the NFPA 20 Task Group on Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control. The Task Group consists of: John Kovacik, UL (Chair); Russ Anderson, Metron; Tim Killion, Peerless Pump Company; Steve Mezsick, Eli Lilly; Gayle Pennel, Schirmer Engineering; Matt Roy, Armstrong Darling; John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel - Allison. The proposed requirement is to ensure use of the bypass contactor when engaging the emergency-run handle/lever.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Delete 10.5.3.2.4 already covered by 10.10.4.1.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-113 (Log #46).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-106 Log #19 Final Action: Reject(10.5.5) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Manuel J. DeLerno, S-P-D Industries Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text of 10.5.5 to read: Where pump suction pressure variations exceed 40 percent of rated pump discharge pressure, variable speed fire pump controllers shall be permitted. ..” (remainder unchanged). SUBSTANTIATION: Maintenance, reliability, and life of VFD units do not approach the level of similarly installed constant speed units. Limiting their use to need is appropriate. The 40 percent figure is selected because the standard allows pump shutoff pressure up to 140 percent of rated pressure (6.2.2).COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-113 (Log #46) which meets th eintent of the submitter. NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-107 Log #CP7 Final Action: Accept(10.5.5) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Delete Section 10.5.5.SUBSTANTIATION: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-113 (Log #46).COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 _______________________________________________________________20-108 Log #68 Final Action: Reject(10.6.6) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows: In the title of 10.6.6, delete “Alarm and” so that the title reads “Signal Devices on Controller”.SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-109 Log #31 Final Action: Accept(10.7.2.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Daniel Gendebien, Torna Tech Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: In lieu of 10.1.2.5.1, each controller shall be marked “limited service controller”...” (See 10.4.2.1) SUBSTANTIATION: Paragraph 10.4.2.1 has nothing to do with this statement - to clearly replace 10.1.2.5.1 by 10.7.2.2.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-110 Log #21 Final Action: Accept in Principle(10.8.2.1.2.2 & 10.8.3.12) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Daniel Gendebien, Torna Tech Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 10.8.2.1.2.2 The requirements of the isolating switch shall be in accordance with 10.8.2.1.2.2(A) through 10.8.2.1.2.2(C). (A) The isolating switch shall be supervised to indicate when it is open. (B) Supervision shall operate an audible and visible signal on the fire pump controller/automatic transfer switch combination and permit monitoring at a remote point where required. (C) The isolating switch shall be suitable for the available short-circuit of the alternate source. 10.8.3.12 (1) A device... (2) A circuit loop... (3) A means to prevent sending of the signal for starting of the alternate source generator when commanded by the power transfer switch, if the isolation switch on the alternate source side of the transfer switch is open. if the alternate isolating switch or the alternate circuit breaker (if installed) is in open or tripped position (4) The alternate isolating switch and the alternate circuit breaker (if installed) shall be supervised to indicate when one of them is in open or tripped position (5) Supervision shall operate an audible and visible signal on the fire pump controller/automatic transfer switch combination and permit monitoring at a remote point where required. SUBSTANTIATION: The automatic transfer switch includes an alternate isolating switch and may include an alternate circuit breaker in series when the generator capacity exceeds 225 percent of FLA or when the second source is a utility. If the alternate circuit breaker is open or tripped and the alternate isolating switch is closed, the alternate power is disconnected. So, the alarm (audible and visual signal) must be also given and the generator should not start to prevent burning gas needlessly. Then, the supervision of the alternate isolating switch only is not adequate and must be extended also to the alternate circuit breaker. The original text located under 10.8.2.1.2 “isolating switch” must be adapted and relocated somewhere else, proposition to relocate under 10.8.3.12, “additional requirements”.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Accept proposed changes and add item 4(a): 10.8.2.1.2.2 The requirements of the isolating switch shall be in accordance with 10.8.2.1.2.2(A) through 10.8.2.1.2.2(C). (A) The isolating switch shall be supervised to indicate when it is open. (B) Supervision shall operate an audible and visible signal on the fire pump controller/automatic transfer switch combination and permit monitoring at a remote point where required. (C) The isolating switch shall be suitable for the available short-circuit of the alternate source. 10.8.3.12 (1) A device... (2) A circuit loop... (3) A means to prevent sending of the signal for starting of the alternate source generator when commanded by the power transfer switch, if the isolation switch on the alternate source side of the transfer switch is open. if the alternate isolating switch or the alternate circuit breaker (if installed) is in open or tripped position (4) The alternate isolating switch and the alternate circuit breaker (if installed) shall be monitored to indicate when one of them is in open or tripped position(A) When interlocked, it is not necessary to monitor both switches in item 4. (5) Supervision shall operate an audible and visible signal on the fire pump controller/automatic transfer switch combination and permit monitoring at a remote point where required. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Clarifies the monitoring requirments.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-111 Log #103 Final Action: Accept(10.8.3.6) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise clause 10.8.3.6 to read: 10.8.3.6 Undervoltage-Sensing Devices. Unless the requirements of 10.8.3.6.5 are met, the requirements of 10.8.3.6.1 through 10.8.3.6.4 shall apply. Turning off the normal source isolating switch or the normal source circuit breaker shall not inhibit the transfer switch from operating as required by clauses 10.8.3.6.1 through 10.8.3.6.4. Or, add new clause 10.8.3.6.5 and renumber the balance.SUBSTANTIATION: Clarification. Field confusion and questions occur on locking out transfer switch transfer operation. Only the Emergency Isolating Switch should lock-out or inhibit gen-set starting and subsequent transfer switch transfer operation.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-112 Log #20 Final Action: Accept(10.8.3.14) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Daniel Gendebien, Torna Tech Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 10.8.3.14 Remote Indication. Auxiliary open or closed contacts mechanically operated by the fire pump power transfer switch mechanism shall be provided for remote indication that the fire pump controller has been transferred to the alternate source. in accordance with 10.4.8. SUBSTANTIATION: This paragraph is more comprehensive if it is read with 10.4.8. The contacts described in this paragraph are also described in 10.4.8.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-113 Log #46 Final Action: Accept in Principle(10.10) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Vince Baclawski, National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)RECOMMENDATION: Add new 10.10 through 10.10.11, A.10.10.3, and A.10.10.5. Note: This is a companion proposal to proposals 9.5.1.1.3, 10.5.2.1.6(H), and A.10.5.2.1.6(H).

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 SUBSTANTIATION: 10.10 Controllers with Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control.

10.10.1 Control Equipment. 10.10.1.1 Controllers equipped with variable speed pressure limiting control shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 10, except as provided in 10.10.1 through 10.10.11. Substantiation: A new section is required, similar to transfer switch fire pump controllers and high voltage fire pump controllers, to locate all the requirements in one place. 10.10.1.2 Controllers with variable speed pressure limiting control shall be listed for fire service. Substantiation: This text was moved from NFPA 20, 2003, paragraph 10.5.5(2) and editorially changed. 10.10.1.3 Variable speed pressure limiting controllers for use with positive displacement pumps shall use constant torque rated drives. Substantiation: Positive displacement pumps require the rated torque at any speed as opposed to centrifugal pumps which reduces the torque required by the square of the speed. This higher torque requirement for positive displacement pumps at reduced speeds requires drives rated for the more severe conditions.

10.10.2 Additional Marking. In addition to the markings required in 10.1.2.5.1, the controller shall be marked with the maximum ambient temperature rating. Substantiation: Since cooling is critical to the proper operation of the VFD drive, additional marking is required to avoid misapplications in the field. 10.10.3 Bypass Operation. A. 10.10.3 The bypass path constitutes all of the characteristics of a non-variable speed fire pump controller. Substantiation: Provides clarification that the bypass path is a fully rated full service fire pump controller. 10.10.3.1 Upon failure of the variable speed pressure limiting control to keep the system pressure above the start pressure setting of the pressure actuated switch in 10.5.2.1.1 the controller shall bypass and isolate the variable speed pressure limiting control and operate the pump at rated speed. Substantiation: This text was moved from NFPA 20, 2003, paragraph 10.5.5(1) and editorially changed. 10.10.3.1.1* Low Pressure Bypass. If the fire pump controller pressure switch remains tripped for over 15 seconds, the bypass operation shall be initiated.

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 A.10.10.3.1.1 Low Pressure Bypass. This constitutes a so called “fail-over” timer, as does the Drive Not Ready Bypass of 10.10.3.1.3. No signals from the VSD are used for this circuitry since it is assumed that the VSD may have failed in an unknown manner. This circuitry monitors the pressure switch at all times. It includes the time after initiating the start as well as the time during running. If the pressure switch re-trips and stays tripped while the pump is running, it is assumed that an unknown failure in the variable speed mode has occurred and bypass mode is required in an attempt to satisfy the demand. The setting of the Low Pressure Bypass time should be as short as possible consistent with the system hydraulic time constants, the variable speed PID process controller time parameter settings and the pump and controller accelerating time constant. If this time is exceeded, the controller will shut down the pump momentarily and latch into the bypass mode of operation which will run the pump at full speed. 10.10.3.1.2 The requirements of 10.10.3.1.1 shall not apply in a non-pressure-actuated controller, where the pressure-actuated switch shall not be required. 10.10.3.1.3* Drive Not Ready Bypass. If the variable speed drive does not provide a drive ready signal in 5 seconds, the bypass operation shall be initiated. A.10.10.3.1.3 Drive Not Ready Bypass. Variable Speed Drive units (VSDs) must have a positive means of indicating that the drive is ready and initialized within a few seconds after power application. If the VSD fails, there is no need to wait for the low pressure bypass time of 10.10.3.1.1. 10.10.3.1.4* Absence of power to the variable speed drive unit (VSD) shall not cause a drive ready signal or inhibit the operation of the bypass circuitry. A.10.10.3.1.4 The Drive Ready Signal, if from relay contacts, should be a pick-up relay so that it remains de-energized in the event of loss or lack of power to the VSD unit. 10.10.3.1.5 Means shall be provided to prevent higher than normal in-rush currents when transferring the fire pump motor from the variable speed mode to the bypass mode. 10.10.3.2 Once the variable speed pressure limiting control is bypassed, the unit shall remain at rated speed until manually shut down. Substantiation: Prevents cycling back and forth between variable speed and bypass modes. 10.10.3.3 The variable speed drive output contactor and the bypass contactor shall be mechanically and electrically interlocked to prevent simultaneous closure. Substantiation: A motor running at a reduced frequency can not be connected immediately to a source at line frequency without creating high transient currents which may cause tripping of the fire pump circuit breaker. It is also important to take extra care not to connect (back feed) line frequency power to the VSD since this will damage the VSD; but, more importantly can cause the fire pump circuit breaker to trip which takes the pump out of service. 10.10.4 Isolation. The variable speed drive shall be line and load isolated when not in operation. Substantiation: Line isolation of the variable speed drive significantly increases its’ life as well as increasing its’ transient immunity. 10.10.5 Short-Circuit Protection. A.10.10.5 The intent is to prevent tripping of the fire pump controller circuit-breaker due to a drive failure and thus maintain the integrity of the by-pass circuit. Substantiation: Clarifies the intent of 10.10.5. 10.10.5.2 The short-circuit protection required in 10.10.5.1 shall be coordinated such that the circuit-breaker in Section 10.4.3 does not trip due to a fault condition in the variable speed circuitry. Substantiation: Prevents a fault in the drive circuitry from tripping the fire pump controller circuit breaker. 10.10.6 Power Quality. 10.10.6.1 Power quality correction equipment shall be located in the variable speed circuit. As a minimum, 5 percent line reactance shall be provided. Substantiation: The 5 percent reactance reduces the RMS line currents to that of a motor running without the VSD. Also, it virtually eliminates nuisance overvoltage trips in the VSD. Additionally, line current harmonics are substantially reduces which helps to avoid power quality problems in other equipment in the building. 10.10.6.2 When additional power quality corrective equipment is required, it shall be provided as part of a Listed fire pump controller in the variable speed circuit. Substantiation: Ensures that any additional power corrective equipment is evaluated for fire protection by the listing agency(s).

10.10.6.3 The manufacturer’s recommendations for motor cable lengths shall be followed. Substantiation: As the motor cable length between the controller motor increase, the VSD high frequency switching voltage transients at the motor increase. To prevent the transients from exceeding the motor insulation ratings, the manufacture’s recommended cable lengths must be followed. 10.10.7 Local Control. 10.10.7.1 All control devices required to keep the controller in automatic operation shall be within lockable cabinets. 10.10.7.2 Substantiation: Ensures local control over settings or programs that could otherwise prevent the variable speed drive from operating properly. This also avoids tampering with factory set adjustments and programming. 10.10.7.3 An additional variable speed pressure sensing element connected in accordance with Section 10.5.2.1.6(H) shall only be used to control the variable speed drive. Substantiation: Ensures proper connection of the variable speed drive pressure sensing element. This also avoids a defective VSD from damaging the controller main pressure switch of clause 10.5.2.1 (Water Pressure Control). This also eliminates one single point failure which could render both the variable speed and the by-pass (full-speed) fire pump controller from operating to provide fire water. 10.10.7.3 10.10.7.4 Means shall be provided to manually select between variable speed and bypass mode. Substantiation: Allows the operator to manually control the mode of operation. Also allows automatic full speed fire pump operation when a VSD is being serviced or is inoperative. Also aids in pump testing and commissioning. 10.10.7.4 Common pressure control shall not be used for multiple pump installations. Each controller pressure sensing feedback control circuit shall operate independently. Substantiation: Maintains independent operation of each fire pump controller in multiple pump installations. Avoids a single point failure from affecting more than one fire pump. 10.10.8 Alarm and Signal Devices on Controller. 10.10.8.1 Drive Failure. A visible indicator shall be provided to indicate when the variable speed drive has failed. Substantiation: Provides diagnostic information on the VSD. 10.10.8.2 Bypass Mode. A visible indicator shall be provided to indicate when the controller is in bypass mode. Substantiation: Provides operational information. 10.10.9 Controller Alarm Contacts for Remote Indication. Controllers shall be equipped with contacts (open or closed) to operate circuits for the conditions in 10.10.8. Substantiation: Provides remote contacts for remote monitoring comparable with those of clause 10.4.8 (Controller Alarm Contacts for Remote Indication). 10.10.10 System Performance. 10.10.10.1 The system shall be stable to avoid hunting, excessive over-shoot, or oscillating. Substantiation: Provides general information to the field on system performance. 10.10.10.2 Operation at reduced speed shall not result in motor overheating. Substantiation: Ensures that the motor does not overheat due to reduced speed operation. This is particularly important for constant torque applications like positive displacement pumps. 10.10.10.3 The maximum frequency setting of the drive shall not exceed line frequency. Substantiation: Prevents variable speed drives from operating the fire pump motor at speeds greater than they’re listed and approved rated speed. 10.10.11 Critical Settings. A table of critical settings shall be provided and permanently attached to the inside of the controller enclosure. Minimum critical settings are: a) Variable speed pressure limiting set point setting b) Pump start pressure c) Pump stop pressure d) Instructions to return to default settings for programmable devices. Substantiation: Provides the operator or inspector with information on the proper settings for his specific job.

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: 10.10 *Controllers with Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control.

10.10.1 Control Equipment. 10.10.1.1 Controllers equipped with variable speed pressure limiting control shall comply with the requirements of Chapter 10, except as provided in 10.10.1 through 10.10.11. 10.10.1.2 Controllers with variable speed pressure limiting control shall be listed for fire service. 10.10.1.3 Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control. The variable speed pressure limiting control shall have a horsepower rating at least equal to the motor horsepower or, where rated in amperes, shall have an ampere rating not less than the motor full-load current. (log 90, item (2)) 10.10.2 Additional Marking. In addition to the markings required in 10.1.2.5.1, the controller shall be marked with the maximum ambient temperature rating. 10.10.3 Bypass Operation. (log 90, item (5)) A.10.10.3 The bypass path constitutes all of the characteristics of a non-variable speed fire pump controller. 10.10.3.1 * Upon failure of the variable speed pressure limiting control to keep the system pressure at or above the set pressure of the variable speed pressure limiting control system, the controller shall bypass and isolate the variable speed pressure limiting control system and operate the pump at rated speed. A.10.10.3.1 The bypass contactor should be energized only when there is a pump demand to run and the variable speed pressure limiting control is in the fault condition. (log 91, item (3)) 10.10.3.1.1* Low Pressure. If the system pressure remains below the set pressure for more than 15 seconds, the bypass operation shall occur. 10.10.3.1.3* Drive Not Operational. If the variable speed drive indicates that it is not operational within 5 seconds, the bypass operation shall occur. A.10.10.3.1.3 Variable Speed Drive units (VSDs) should have a positive means of indicating that the drive is operational within a few seconds after power application. If the VSD fails, there is no need to wait for the low pressure bypass time of 10.10.3.1.1. 10.10.3.1.5* Means shall be provided to prevent higher than normal in-rush currents when transferring the fire pump motor from the variable speed mode to the bypass mode. (log 90, item (5))

A.10.10.3.1.5 A motor running at a reduced frequency cannot be connected immediately to a source at line frequency without creating high transient currents which may cause tripping of the fire pump circuit breaker. It is also important to take extra care not to connect (back feed) line frequency power to the VSD since this will damage the VSD; but, more importantly can cause the fire pump circuit breaker to trip which takes the pump out of service. 10.10.3.2 Once the variable speed pressure limiting control is bypassed, the unit shall remain bypassed until shut down. 10.10.3.3 The bypass contactors shall be operable using the emergency-run handle or lever defined in 10.5.3.2. (log 90, item (5)) 10.10.4 Isolation. The variable speed drive shall be line and load isolated when not in operation. 10.10.4.1 The variable speed drive load isolation contactor and the bypass contactor shall be mechanically and electrically interlocked to prevent simultaneous closure. (log 93) 10.10.5 *Circuit Protection. A.10.10.5 The intent is to prevent tripping of the fire pump controller circuit-breaker due to a variable speed drive failure and thus maintain the integrity of the by-pass circuit. 10.10.5.1 Separate variable speed drive circuit protection shall be provided between the line-side of the variable speed drive and the load-side of the circuit-breaker required in Section 10.4.3. 10.10.5.2 The circuit protection required in 10.10.5.1 shall be coordinated such that the circuit-breaker in Section 10.4.3 does not trip due to a fault condition in the variable speed circuitry10.10.6 Power Quality. 10.10.6.1 Power quality correction equipment shall be located in the variable speed circuit. As a minimum, 5 percent line reactance shall be provided. 10.10.6.2 Coordination shall not be required where the system voltage does not exceed 480V and cable lengths between the motor and controller do not exceed 100 ft (see 10.10.6.3). 10.10.6.3* Where higher system voltages or longer cable lengths exist, the cable length and motor requirements shall be coordinated. A.10.10.6.3 As the motor cable length between the controller and motor increases, the VSD high frequency switching voltage transients at the motor will increase. To prevent the transients from exceeding the motor insulation ratings, the motor manufacturer’s recommended cable lengths must be followed.10.10.7 Local Control. 10.10.7.1 All control devices required to keep the controller in automatic operation shall be within lockable cabinets. 10.10.7.2 The variable speed pressure sensing element connected in accordance with Section 10.5.2.1.6(H) shall only be used to control the variable speed drive. 10.10.7.3 Means shall be provided to manually select between variable speed and bypass mode. 10.10.7.4 Common pressure control shall not be used for multiple pump installations. Each controller pressure sensing control circuit shall operate independently.10.10.8 Alarm and Signal Devices on Controller.10.10.8.1 Drive Failure. A visible indicator shall be provided to indicate when the variable speed drive has failed. (log 91, item (2)) 10.10.8.2 Bypass Mode. A visible indicator shall be provided to indicate when the controller is in bypass mode. (log 91, item (2)) 10.10.8.3 Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control Overpressure. Visible indication shall be provided on all controller equipped with variable speed pressure limiting control to actuate at 115 percent of set pressure. (log 91, item (4) and log 92, item (3)) 10.10.9 Controller Alarm Contacts for Remote Indication. Controllers shall be equipped with contacts (open or closed) to operate circuits for the conditions in 10.10.8. (Log 92, items (2) and (3))10.10.10 System Performance. 10.10.10.1 The controller shall be provided with suitable adjusting means to account for various field conditions. A.10.10.10.1 This allows for field adjustments to reduce hunting, excessive overshooting, or oscillating. 10.10.10.2 Operation at reduced speed shall not result in motor overheating.10.10.10.3 The maximum operating frequency shall not exceed line frequency.10.10.11 Critical Settings. Means shall be provided and permanently attached to the inside of the controller enclosure to record the following settings: a) Variable speed pressure limiting set point setting b) Pump start pressure c) Pump stop pressureCOMMITTEE STATEMENT: The action taken was to restructure the section based on Task Group recommendations.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

Figure A.10.10

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE DELERNO: Editorial: In Figure A.10.10 change “M” in circle to the committee selected label (BP). “M” stands for motor which is not on the figure.

_______________________________________________________________20-114 Log #142 Final Action: Accept in Principle(11.1.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel-Allison, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Delete paragraph.SUBSTANTIATION: This is an unnecessary statement. Actually diesel engine driven fire pumps must be in compliance with the entire document, not limited to one paragraph.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Revise 11.1.1 an add new section 11.1.2 to read as follows: 11.1.1 This chapter provides requirements for minimum performance of diesel engine drivers. 11.1.2 Accessory devices, such as monitoring and signaling means, are included where necessary to ensure minimum performance of the aforementioned equipment.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Consistant with the language of Chapter 12.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-115 Log #143 Final Action: Accept in Principle(11.2.2.3) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel-Allison, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Delete paragraph.SUBSTANTIATION: The requirements contained in this paragraph are redundant to paragraphs 11.2.1 and 11.2.2.2.

COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Change: 11.2.2.1 Engines shall have a nameplate indicating the listed horsepower power rating available to drive the pump.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Meets the intent of the submitter and clarifies the remaining referenced paragraph.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-116 Log #25 Final Action: Reject(11.2.3.1.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Theodore Syrros, National Diesel CorporationRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: The flexible coupling shall be directly connected to the engine flywheel adapter or , stub shaft or inline gear box output shaft . SUBSTANTIATION: The adoption of an integral inline gear drive as part of a listed diesel engine will enable engines to meet current and future emission requirements, reduce initial costs to the end user and lower engine noise and vibration for high speed pumps. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Committee met with the submitter and his representative. No information, additional to that provided with the proposal, was provided by the submitter. Considering the actions taken by the technical committee in the 1996 cycle on this same subject which included ROP logs #39, 76, 14, 77; & ROC logs #45, 46, & 58 the Committee is very

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 concerned about the introduction of additional components and complexity into the engine-pump drive system. These concerns were explained to the submitter and that the information he had provided did not provide sufficient information to insure the reliability and torsional concerns expressed in the 1996 technical committee actions had been resolved when introducing additional components in the drive between the engine and pump.

Proposals/Comments from the 1996 cycle. ROP Logs #39, 76, 14, 77 & ROC Logs #45, 46, 58 are shown below:

(Log#CP39) 20-131 - (8-2.3): AcceptSUBMITTED Technical Committee on Fire Pumps RECOMMENDATION: Revise and separate 8-2.3 into two paragraphs as follows:8-2.3 Engine Connection to Pump.8-2.3.l Horizontal Shaft Pumps. Engines shall be connected to horizontal shaft pumps by means of a flexible coupling or flexible connecting shaft listed for this service. The flexible coupling shall be directly attached to the engine flywheel adapter or stub shaft. (see 3-5)8-2.3.2 Vertical Shaft Turbine-Type Pumps. Engines shall be connected to vertical shaft pumps by means of a right-angle gear drive with a. listed flexible connecting shaft that will prevent undue strain on either the engine or gear drive. (See 4-5).Exception: Diesel engines and steam turbines designed and listed for vertical installation with vertical shaft turbine-type pumps shall be permitted to employ shafts and do not require a right-angle drive but do require a nonreverse ratchetSUBSTANTIATION: Reorganization and text revision! to this section clarity die requirements related to connecting a pump to a diesel engine driver. COMMITTEEACTION: AcceptNUMBER OP COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 24 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:AFFIRMATIVE: 23NOT RETURNED: 1 Flach

(Log #76)20-130-J8-2.2.6): AcceptSUBMTTTER; John Whitney, Detroit Diesel-Allison. Inc. RECOMMENDATION; Delete the existing last sentence completely.SUBSTANTIATION: This is in concert with proposed change to 3-2.3.1 prohibiting integral gears, COMMITTEE ACTION: AcceptNUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 24 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:AFFIRMATIVE: 23NOT RETURNED: 1 Flach

Log#14)20-132 - (8-2.3.1: RejectSUBM1TTER: Robert J. Wilson, BLM Automatic Clutch Limited RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:8.2.3 Engine Connection to Pump8.2.3.I Engines shall be connected to horizontal shaft pumps by means of a flexible coupling or s centrifugal clutch coupling of a design that has been successfully proved in such service. They shall be connected to vertical shaft pumps by means of a right-angle gear drive with suitable universal joints. The service factor used shall be conservatively selected for the maximum horsepower rating of the pumping unit being equal to or greater than die coupling or centrifugal clutch manufacturer’s recommended factor for the intended service. The angle of deflection for the flexible connecting shaft shall not exceed the maximum recommended by the manufacturer for the speed and horsepower transmitted.Exception: Diesel engines and steam turbines designed and listed for vertical installation with vertical shaft turbine-type pumps may employ solid shafts and do not require a right-angle drive but do require a non-reverse ratchet,SUBSTANTIATION: Re: Centrifugal Fire Pumps Chapter 8 Diesel Engine Drive 8-2. 3.1The problem is that the fire pump application excludes the use of a centrifugal clutch coupling.It is proposed that this standard be amended to permit the us of centrifugal clutch couplings.This is justifiable as a centrifugal clutch has been in service at the former radar base, Sydney, M.S. at least 15 years in a centrifugal fire pump application. No problems were experienced and the clutch was only recently removed in good working order solely to comply with the standard set out in 8-2.3.1. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Insufficient supporting documentation has provided to permit the use of centrifugal clutch couplings in the fire pump installation. The Committee has concerns regarding the reliability and performance of these devices. Some of the concerns include the fact there is no lock-up feature if the centrifugal coupling fails to perform as intended. Furthermore, there is no method to verify the status or wear condition of the

clutch mechanisms. In the event of a clutch coupling failure, it appears that power transmission may not be available to the pump. Many large centrifugal clutches have a limited ability to accommodate for torsional forces which necessitates the installation of flexible couplings in addition to the clutch. The addition of a clutch in this application would introduce unnecessary components which are subject to potential failure.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 24 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:AFFIRMATIVE: 23NOT RETURNED: 1 Flach

(Log #77)2Q-135-(8-2.3.1 (New)): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: John Whitney, Detroit Diesel-Allison, Inc.RECOMMENDATION; Additional sentence placed second in the paragraph:-The flexible coupling shall be directly attached to the engine flywheel adaptor or stub shaft.”SUBSTANTIATION: It is the Intent of this proposal to prohibit engines with integral gear drives, from being listed. These engine packages are not the most reliable type as required in 8-1.1. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See the Committee Action on Proposal 20-131 (Log#CP39).NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE:24 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 23 NOT RETURNED: 1 Flach

(Log #45)20-58-(8-2.3.6): Reject SUBMITTER: James L. Boyer, Firetrol Inc. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 20-130 RECOMMENDATION: Underline indicates inserted text and strikethrough indicates deleted text.Change reference from 8-2.3.1 to 8-2.3.2 [see ROP 20-131 (Log #CPS9) and relocate; add new sentence/section to modified 8-2.2.6 so that section reads:8-2-2.6 Where right-angle gear drives (see 8-2.3.1) arc used between the vertical turbine pump and its driver (see 8-2.2.6). the horsepower requirement of the pump shall he increased to allow for power loss in the gear drive.Where integral gear drives are part of it listed engine:a) the gear box housing shall be mounted directly to the engine:b) the gearbox input shaft shall be coupled to the engine flywheel with a flexible coupling (torsional vibration isolator).c) the package consisting of the engine, flexible coupling. and gearbox shall be listed as diesel engine unit at the horsepower and speed delivered at the gearbox output shaft.Note: It may more appropriate to put these statements in 3-5 or 8-2.2 (New); however, Proposal 20-130 (Log #76) addresses 8-2.2.6, and the commentor does not want to enter an issue of “new business.”SUBSTANTIATION; The proposal lacks technical substantiation for “prohibiting integral gears”. The issues of torsional vibration associated with (gearboxes can be easily eliminated by employing a torsional vibration isolator (flexible coupling) between the engine crank shaft and the gearbox driven shaft; there is no need to prohibit a product when it is entirely suitable for .the application.Also, see Comment op 8-2.3.1, ROP 20-131 (Log#CP39). COMMITTEE ACTION; Reject.COMMITTEE STATEMENT! The use of gear box drives between pumps adds an element of complexity and risk that can negatively effect system reliability. The Committee finds this unacceptable. NUMBER Of COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 24 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:AFFIRMATIVE: 20NOT RETURNED; 4 Kahenbsck, Marvi, McNamee, Stewart

(Log#46)20-59 - (8-2.3.1): Reject SUBMITTER: James L. Boyer, Firetrol Inc-COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 20-131RECOMMENDATION: Underline indicates inserted text and strikethrough indicates deleted text.Delete the added new sentence, but retain other changes, so that section reads:8-2.3.1 Horizontal Shaft Pumps. Engines shall be connected to horizontal shaft pumps by means of a flexible coupling or flexible connecting shaft listed for this service. The flexible coupling shall be directly attached to the engine flywheel adaptor or stub shaft (see 3-5).SUBSTANTIATION: The proposal lacks technical substantiation for “prohibiting integral gear” Reorganization and text revisions to ... clarify the requirements related to connecting a pump to a diesel engine driver” is not technical substantiation to prohibit integral gears which are entirely suitable to the application..Also, see Comment on 8-2.2.6, ROP 20-130 (Log #76).

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 COMMITTEE ACTION: RejectCOMMITTEE STATEMENT; See the Committee Action and Statement on Comment 20-58 (Log#45).NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 24 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:AFFIRMATIVE: 20 NOT RETURNED: 4 Kahenbeck, Marvi, McNamee, Stewart

(Log #58)20 - (8-2.3.1): RejectSUBMITTER) Robert Wilson, BLM Automatic Clutch Limited COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 20-132 RECOMMENDATION: None.SUBSTANTIATION: In response TO Committee Statement NFPA 20 -A96 ROP 30-132 (8-2.3.1) Reject pg. 556:1. Reliability and performance -used as backup in pump stations for as long is 60 years.2. No lock up feature-this is the whole reason for a centrifugal clutch. Any problem with the driven load causes slippage thus preventing destruction of die load i.e., pump or engine. 3. Status of wear condition- this is easily established in routing maintenance by a single visual check with no disassembly necessary in most cases.4. Power transmission may not be available to the pump - this is an advantage not a disadvantage, If the clutch failed and thus power was not transmitted to the pump this would prevent the pump or engine from destruction. Without a clutch power transmission would also be interrupted upon the destruction of the pump or engine.5. Limited ability to accommodate torsional forces -this makes no sense. Clutch designs do accommodate torsional alignment and add to the ease of this alignment.6. Unnecessary components which are subject to potential failure- failures typically occur from using an incorrect load factor contrary to professional advice or due to improper maintenance of this mechanical device.Additionally, the clutch permits no load start ups of the driven engine or motor which is an important factor in emergency situations.Should the committee be convinced that centrifugal clutches are Not able to meet the criteria that we claim they do, the standardcould be written to encompass these criteria. Then, in fairness, if a centrifugal clutch can do the job (as one has at Former Radar Base Sydney, Nova Scotia, for 15 years) then it could be installed. COMMITTEE ACTION: RejectCOMMHTEE STATEMENT: The Committee believes the technical concerns raised in the ROP are still valid. It is believed that the centrifugal clutch coupling device would significantly increase the potential for power transmission not being available to die pump during a fire condition.NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 24 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:AFFIRMATIVE: 20NOT RETURNED: 4 Kahenbeck, Marvi, McNamee, Stewart

NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKCOMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE HAAGENSEN: The Committee took action relevant to this proposal in Proposal 20-64 (Log #CP20).

_______________________________________________________________20-117 Log #144 Final Action: Accept(11.2.4.2.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel-Allison, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 11.2.4.2.1 Variable speed pressure Pressure limiting control systems used on diesel engines for fire pump drive shall be listed for fire pump service and be capable of limiting the pump output pressure to 110 percent of total rated head (pressure) by reducing pump speed. SUBSTANTIATION: To be consistent with the work done by the variable speed task group is paragraph 5.7.4.3.2.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-118 Log #145 Final Action: Accept in Principle(11.2.4.7) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel-Allison, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows: 11.2.4.7 Instrument Panel. 11.2.4.7.1 All engine instruments shall be placed on a suitable panel secured

to the engine at suitable point. 11.2.4.7.2 The engine instrument panel shall not be used as a junction box or conduit for the AC supply to the engine jacket water heater. SUBSTANTIATION: Contractors often use the engine instrument panel as a junction box for the engine heater.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Add text to read as follows: 11.2.4.7 Instrument Panel. 11.2.4.7.1 All engine instruments shall be placed on a suitable panel secured to the engine or inside an engine baseplate mounted controller at a suitable point . 11.2.4.7.2 The engine instrument panel shall not be used as a junction box or conduit for any AC supply. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Meets the intent of the submitter.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-119 Log #146 Final Action: Accept in Principle(11.2.4.9) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel-Allison, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows: 11.2.4.9* Automatic Control Wiring in the Field. 11.2.4.9.1 Interconnections between the automatic controller and engine junction box shall be made using stranded wire sized on a continuous duty basis. 11.2.4.9.2 The DC interconnections between the automatic controller and engine junction box and AC power supply to the engine jacket water heater shall be routed in separate conduits. SUBSTANTIATION: Contractors often pull these AC and DC conductors in the same conduit.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Add text to read as follows: 11.2.4.9* Automatic Control Wiring in the Field. 11.2.4.9.1 Interconnections between the automatic controller and engine junction box shall be made using stranded wire sized on a continuous duty basis. 11.2.4.9.2 The DC interconnections between the automatic controller and engine junction box, and any AC power supply to the engine shall be routed in separate conduits. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Meets the intent of the submitter.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-120 Log #147 Final Action: Accept(11.2.4.10) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel-Allison, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Move 11.2.4.10* to 11.2.5.2.1. Renumber subsequent paragraphs.SUBSTANTIATION: This requirement would be better located in the Starting Methods section under Electric Starting for clarity for the reader.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-121 Log #148 Final Action: Accept(11.2.4.13.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel-Allison, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 11.2.4.13.2 ECM Voltage Protection. SUBSTANTIATION: Provide clarity to paragraph header.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-122 Log #149 Final Action: Accept(11.2.4.13.3) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel-Allison, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as possible: 11.2.4.13.3 ECM Selector Switch. 11.2.4.13.3.1 Operation. The transition from the primary ECM to the alternate ECM shall be accomplished manually with a single switch that has no off position. 11.2.4.13.3.2 Supervision. A visual indicator shall be provided on the engine instrument panel and supervisory signal shall be provided to the controller when the ECM selector switch is positioned to the alternate ECM. Renumber subsequent paragraphs.

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 SUBSTANTIATION: Both 11.2.4.13.3 and 11.2.4.13.4 address the same component. This style only, no change to requirements.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-123 Log #150 Final Action: Accept in Principle(11.2.4.13.7) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel-Allison, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add: (3) Any Primary Sensor Failure. SUBSTANTIATION: Paragraph 11.2.4.13.6 requires the engine ECM to automatically transition from a failed primary sensor to a redundant sensor. Without this supervisory signal the failed primary sensor would go un-repaired leaving the reliability of the engine to the redundant sensor only.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Change Section title and add item (3) as proposed. Section now reads as follows: 11.2.4.13.7 ECM Supervision.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Clarification of the section contents is needed.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-124 Log #151 Final Action: Accept in Principle(11.2.5.2.2.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel-Allison, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Move 11.2.5.2.2.2 to 14.2.7.3.7.1 and revise as follows: 11.2.5.2.2.2 When dry charge batteries have been supplied, electrolyte shall be added 24 hours prior to at the time the engine is to be started put in service and the battery is given a conditioning charge. Renumber subsequent paragraphs. SUBSTANTIATION: 1) This is a startup problem resulting in damage at the time of startup. 2) Starting motors have been damaged, during the initial engine startup, by high currents caused by low battery voltages. Startups have been done with electrolyte in the batteries for as little as a couple hours.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Move 11.2.5.2.2.2 to 14.2.7.3.7.1 and revise as follows: 14.2.7.3.7.1 When dry charge batteries have been supplied, electrolyte shall be added to the batteries a minimum of 24 hours prior to at the time the engine is to be started put in service and the batteries battery is given a conditioning charge.Renumber subsequent paragraphs.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Meets the intent of the submitter.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-125 Log #152 Final Action: Accept(11.2.5.2.2.3) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel-Allison, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 11.2.5.2.2.3 Nickel-cadmium or other kinds of batteries shall be permitted to be installed in lieu of lead-acid batteries provided they meet the engine manufacturer’s requirements. 11.2.5.2.2.4 Other kinds of batteries shall be permitted to be installed in accordance with the manufacturer’s. SUBSTANTIATION: Requirements for alternative batteries are more clearly stated in one paragraph. This is style only, no change to the requirements.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-126 Log #153 Final Action: Accept(11.2.5.2.5.3) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel-Allison, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows: Storage batteries shall not be located in front of the engine mounted instruments and controls.SUBSTANTIATION: Batteries located in front of engine instruments and controls create a hazard to the engine operates.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-127 Log #154 Final Action: Accept in Principle(11.2.5.3.2(5)) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel-Allison, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: (5) The capacity of the hydraulic cranking system shall provide not fewer than six cranking cycles of 15 seconds each. Each... SUBSTANTIATION: There has been confusion that a cranking cycle for a hydraulic starting system is different than as defined in par. 11.2.5.2.1.2.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: (5) The capacity of the hydraulic cranking system shall provide not fewer than six cranking cycles of not less than 15 seconds each . Each cranking cycle - the first three to be automatic from the signaling source - shall provide the necessary number of revolutions at the required rpm to permit the diesel engine to meet the requirements of carrying its full rated load within 20 seconds after cranking is initiated with intake air, room ambient temperature, and hydraulic cranking system at 0°C (32°F).COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Meets the intent of the submitter.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-128 Log #155 Final Action: Accept in Principle(11.2.5.3.2(7)) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel-Allison, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Delete the following text: (7) All controls for engine shutdown in the event of low engine lube, overspeed, and high water jacket temperature shall be 12V or 24Vde source to accommodate controls supplied on engine. In the event of such failure, the hydraulic cranking system shall provide an interlock to prevent the engine from recranking. The interlock shall be manually reset for automatic starting when engine failure is corrected. SUBSTANTIATION: This Standard does not allow the engine to shut-down for self preservation. Automatic cranking signals addressed in Chapter 12.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Revise text to read as follows: (7) All controls for engine shutdown in the event of low engine lube , overspeed, and high water jacket temperature shall be 12V dc or 24Vdc source to accommodate controls supplied on engine. In the event of such failure, the hydraulic cranking system shall provide an interlock to prevent the engine from recranking. The interlock shall be manually reset for automatic starting when engine failure is corrected.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Meets the intent of the submitter.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-129 Log #24 Final Action: Reject(11.2.6.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Theodore Syrros, National Diesel CorporationRECOMMENDATION: Add new text as follows: (3) Air cooled type that includes engines driven cooling fan and engine baffle cooling fins. SUBSTANTIATION: Current approved engine technology is limited to the types provided by existing suppliers. More reliable engine designs are available to lower the cost and improve the long term reliability of diesel driven fire pumps. Currently air-cooled engines are not accepted in the NFPA 20. Note: Supporting material is available for review at NFPA Headquarters.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Insufficient information was provided in the proposal to appropriately address the application of air-cooled engines for fire pump service. The submitter was asked and encouraged to carefully review each requirement in Chapter 11 and 14 of NFPA 20 and develop comprehensive proposed revisions addressing air cooled engines that maintains the level of performance currently established for fire pump diesel engine drivers. The proposed revisions will need to cover all relevant performance issues including critical items such as engine construction features, engine cooling and room ventilation, and maintaining acceptable temperatures in the combustion chamber. NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: KHEIR: I vote against the action, as I see requirement for air cooled engines, and belongs to the same requirement made the committee agreed before on radiator cooled engines. The submitter is not required to write the complete section, or chapter for what we expect from air cooled engines, or need, this is just his recommendation, and we shall evaluate the needs in the industry for such recommendaion, and I feel it can be new business, because there are many places where it need air cooled engines. In many parts of the world, the fire fighters use air cooled engines to fight fire.

_______________________________________________________________20-130 Log #CP23 Final Action: Accept(11.2.6.3.1.4) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Add section 11.2.6.3.1.4 and renumber the current 11.2.6.3.1.4 to 11.2.6.3.1.5., new Section 11.2.6.3.1.4 will read as follows “ 11.2.6.3.1.4 Where two levels of separation for possible contaminates to the ground or potable water source are required by the authority having jurisdiction, dual spring-loaded check valves or backflow preventors shall be installed. (A) The spring-loaded check valve(s) shall replace the second indicating manual shutoff valve(s) in the cooling loop assembly as stated in 11.2.6.3.1.3. (B) If backflow preventors are used, the devices shall be listed for fire protection service and installed in parallel in the heating water supply and heating water supply bypass assembly. (C) Where the authority having jurisdiction requires the installation of backflow prevention devices in connection with the engine, special consideration shall be given to the increased pressure loss, that will require that the cooling loop pipe size be evaluated and documented by engineering calculations to demonstrate compliance with the engine manufacturers recommendation.” Add Figure 11.2.6.3.1.4(A) Spring Loaded Check valve Arrangement. Add Figure 11.2.6.3.1.4(B) Backflow Preventer Arrangement.SUBSTANTIATION: Public Health and Safety requires two layers of separation for possible contaminates to ground or potable water sources. The ethylene glycol in the heat exchanger is considered a contaminate. Some installations are being supplied with a backflow preventor(s) on the cooling loop. NFPA #20 11.2.6.3.1.3 allows “ a second indicating manual shutoff valve or a spring-loaded check valve in the cooling loop assembly”. If we recommend a backflow preventor or a check valve, the resultant pressure drop will require a review of the cooling loop size to guarantee adequate flow to cool the engine.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-131 Log #156 Final Action: Accept(11.3.2.4.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel-Allison, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add text to read as follows; The air discharge ventilator shall be considered to include anything in the air discharge path from the engine to the outdoors room. SUBSTANTIATION: To provide clarity as to the origin of the air discharge ventilator.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept COMMITTEE STATEMENT: NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-132 Log #CP18 Final Action: Accept(11.4.2, A.11.4.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Change text to read as follows; 11.4.2* Fuel Line Protection. A guard, pipe protection, or approved double walled pipe shall be provided for all exposed fuel lines. Add: A.11.4.2. A means, such as covered floor trough, angle, channel steel or other adequate protection cover(s), ( Mechanical or non-mechanical) should be used on all fuel line piping ‘exposed to traffic’ to prevent damage to the fuel supply and return lines between the fuel tank and diesel driver. SUBSTANTIATION: The TG proposes this language as an alternate to double contained fuel lines. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-133 Log #CP10 Final Action: Accept(11.4.7.1.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Add new text to read as follows; 11.4.7.1.1* In areas where local air quality management regulations only allow the use of DF #1 fuel, and no diesel fire pump driver is available listed for use with DF #1 fuel, an engine listed for use with DF #2 shall be permitted to be used but shall have the nameplate rated horsepower derated 10%, provided the engine manufacturer approves the use of DF #1 fuel.SUBSTANTIATION: At least one state is now allowing only the use of DF #1 fuel for fire pump engines as a means of reducing engine exhaust emissions. At present time all listed fire pump engines are listed for use with DF #2 fuel. Because engine fuel injection systems are of the positive displacement type, engine performance can be reasonably predicted based on the differences in the BTU content between DF #1 and DF #2, which is typically 7-8%. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-134 Log #CP9 Final Action: Accept(11.5.3.11) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Add new text to read as follows: 11.5.3.11* Exhaust emission after treatment devices that have the potential to adversely impact the performance and reliability of the engine shall not be permitted. 11.5.3.11.1 Where required by the authority having jurisdiction, the installation of an exhaust emission after treatment device shall be of the active regeneration type with a pressure limiting device that shall permit the engine exhaust to by-pass the after treatment device when the engine manufacturer’s maximum allowed exhaust back pressure is exceeded. A11.5.3.11 Exhaust emission after treatment devices are typically dependent upon high exhaust temperature to burn away collected materials to prevent clogging. Due to the lower exhaust temperatures produced by the engine when operating at pump shutoff during weekly operation, there is high possibility the after treatment device will accumulate collected material and will not be capable of flowing the volume of exhaust in the event the engine is required to produce full rated power for an emergency.SUBSTANTIATION: California is now requiring reduced engine emission levels. The California regulatory body believes exhaust emission after treatment devices are an acceptable technology for achieving their goal. The technical committee needs to address the subject and provide guidance.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-135 Log #162 Final Action: Accept in Principle(11.6.4) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Bill M. Harvey, Harvey and Associates Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Refer to section 11.6.4.1. Refer to the portion of the paragraph that reads, “tanks shall be kept as full as possible at all times” and change the next phrase to read “but never below 66 percent (2/3) of tank capacity”. Add new text: A fuel level switch shall be provided to activate at the 2/3 tank level. A supervisory signal circuit shall be provided per NFPA 72.SUBSTANTIATION: The fuel storage tank sizing requirements set forth in this standard do not provide standby fuel capacity to allow for half of the fuel to be missing before an alarm is sent. The low fuel level would not provide the necessary water supply for the duration requirements for the fire system demands. NFPA 25 also requires a 2/3 fuel level as minimum storage levelCOMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Delete last sentence. Refer to section 11.6.4.1. Refer to the portion of the paragraph that reads, “tanks shall be kept as full as possible at all times” and change the next phrase to read “but never below 66 percent (2/3) of tank capacity”. Add new text: A fuel level switch shall be provided to activate at the 2/3 tank level. A supervisory signal circuit shall be provided per NFPA 72. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: A reference to NFPA 72 is not needed.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE PENNEL: The words “tanks shall be kept as full as possible at all times” is impractical, may be unenforceable and I don’t believe represents our intention. It is “possible” to keep the tanks full at all times by filling the tanks even while the engine is running. We need to clean this language up during the ROC stage.

_______________________________________________________________20-136 Log #8 Final Action: Accept in Principle(11.6.4.2 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Jon Nisja, Northcentral Regional Fire Code Development CommitteeRECOMMENDATION: Add a new Section 11.6.4.2 to read: “11.6.4.2 When the capacity drops below 50 percent of tank capacity, a supervisory signal shall be initiated in accordance with NFPA 72.” Renumber existing 11.6.4.2 as 11.6.4.3.SUBSTANTIATION: In the correct application of NFPA 20, the fuel shall never drop below 50 percent. The standard also requires that fire pumps bei operated weekly. This weekly testing is creating an insufficient check on the amount of fuel available in the case the pump should be needed. Fire pumps that are running appropriately each week will test OK until they are empty. Once their fuel level drops below 50%, the intent of the standard is no longer being met. A supervisory signal will bring the attention to the business that the fuel is insufficient and can begin processes to have the fuel replenished. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-135 (Log #162).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-137 Log #69 Final Action: Reject(12.1.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows: In the first line, delete the word “alarm.”SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-138 Log #106 Final Action: Accept in Principle(12.3.5.3) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise 12.3.5.3 to read: 12.3.5.3 Field Connections. 12.3.5.3.1 A diesel engine fire pump controller shall not be used as a junction box to supply other equipment. 12.3.5.3.2 No undervoltage, phase loss, frequency sensitive, or other sensor(s) shall be installed that automatically or manually prohibit electrical actuation of the motor contactor. 12.3.5.3.3 No alterations to the fire pump controller shall be performed without the express permission of the controller manufacturer. SUBSTANTIATION: Field problems with modifications to controllers. Clearer direction.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Revise 12.3.5.3 to read: 12.3.5.3 Field Connections. 12.3.5.3.1 A diesel engine fire pump controller shall not be used as a junction box to supply other equipment. 12.3.5.3.2 No undervoltage, phase loss, frequency sensitive, or other sensor(s) shall be installed that automatically or manually prohibit electrical actuation of the engine starting contractor.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-103 (Log #17).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-139 Log #70 Final Action: Reject(12.4.1 and A.12.4.1.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows: Throughout 12.4.1 and in A.12.4.1.2, delete the term “alarm” and substitute with the term “signal as follows: 12.4.1 Alarm and Signal Devices on Controller. 12.4.1.1 All visible indicator alarms signals shall be plainly visible. 12.4.1.2* Visible indication shall be provided to indicate that the controller is in the automatic position. If the visible indicator is a pilot lamp, it shall be accessible for replacement. 12.4.1.3 Separate visible indicators and a common audible alarm signal capable of being heard while the engine is running and operable in all positions of the main switch except the off position shall be provided to immediately indicate trouble caused by the following conditions: (1) Critically low oil pressure in the lubrication system. The controller shall provide means for testing the position of the pressure switch contacts without causing trouble alarms signals . (2) High engine jacket coolant temperature. (3) Failure of engine to start automatically. (4) Shutdown from overspeed. (5) Battery failure or missing battery. Each controller shall be provided with a separate visible indicator for each battery. (6) Battery charger failure. Each controller shall be provided with a separate visible indicator for battery charger failure and shall not require the audible alarm signal for battery charger failure. (7) Low air or hydraulic pressure. Where air or hydraulic starting is provided (see 11.2.5 and 11.2.5.4), each pressure tank shall provide to the controller separate visible indicators to indicate low pressure. (8) System overpressure, for engines equipped with pressure limiting controls, to actuate at 115 percent of total rated head (pressure). (9) ECM selector switch in alternate ECM position (for engines with ECM controls only.) (10) Fuel injection malfunction (for engines with ECM only). (11) Low fuel level, Alarm Signal at two-thirds tank capacity. 12.4.1.4 No audible alarm signal silencing switch, other than the controller main switch, shall be permitted for the alarms signals required in 12.4.1.3. A.12.4.1.2 It is recommended that the pilot lamp for alarm and signal service have operating voltage less than the rated voltage of the lamp to ensure long operating life. When necessary, a suitable resistor should be used to reduce the voltage for operating the lamp. SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-140 Log #94 Final Action: Accept(12.4.1.3(8)) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John R. Kovacik, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise item (8) to read: (8) System overpressure, for engines equipped with variable speed pressure limiting controls, to actuate at 115 percent of total rated head ( set pressure ) . SUBSTANTIATION: This proposal is a recommendation resulting from the work of the NFPA 20 Task Group on Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control. The Task Group consists of: John Kovacik, UL (Chair); Russ Anderson, Metron; Tim Killion, Peerless Pump Company; Steve Mezsick, Eli Lilly; Gayle Pennel, Schirmer Engineering; Matt Roy, Armstrong Darling; John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel - Allison. This alarm is necessary when variable speed pressure limiting control is provided.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 _______________________________________________________________20-141 Log #26 Final Action: Accept in Principle(12.4.1.4 & 12.6.7.4) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: William E. Wilcox, FM GlobalRECOMMENDATION: 1. Revise Section 12.4.1.4 as follows: 12.4.1.4 No audible alarm silencing switch, other than the controller main switch and low fuel level alarm, shall be permitted for the alarms required in 12.4.1.3. Any alarm silencing switch for low fuel level must be located immediately adjacent to the visual indicator, and be clearly marked as such. 2. Revise Section 12.6.7.4 as follows: 12.6.7.4 No audible alarm silencing switch, other than the controller main switch or valve, and low fuel level alarm, shall be permitted for the alarms required in 12.6.7.3. Any alarm silencing switch for low fuel level must be located immediately adjacent to the visual indicator, and be clearly marked as such.SUBSTANTIATION: The present text in Chapter 12 of NFPA 20 does not allow for the silencing of the newly required low diesel fuel audible alarm. It is anticipated that the diesel tank replenishment process may require a few days to accomplish. During that time, the building owner/occupants may be tempted to turn off the fire pump controller in an attempt to silence the alarm, thereby putting the building and occupants at risk. This situation was not fully contemplated when the original text for the low fuel alarm was proposed and poses a significant and urgent problem.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle 1. Revise Section 12.4.1.4 as follows: 12.4.1.4 No audible alarm silencing switch, other than the controller main switch and low fuel level alarm, shall be permitted for the alarms required in 12.4.1.3 (items 1-8) . Any alarm silencing switch for low fuel level must be located immediately adjacent to the visual indicator, and be clearly marked as such. 2. Revise Section 12.6.7.4 as follows: 12.6.7.4 No audible alarm silencing switch, other than the controller main switch or valve, and low fuel level alarm, shall be permitted for the alarms required in 12.6.7.3 (items 1-5) . Any alarm silencing switch for low fuel level must be located immediately adjacent to the visual indicator, and be clearly marked as such.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Clarification of submitters intent. See Commitee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-167 (Log #4).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-142 Log #71 Final Action: Reject(12.4.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows: Throughout 12.4.2 delete the term “alarm” and substitute with the term “signal” as follows: 12.4.2 Alarm and Signal Devices Remote from Controller. 12.4.2.1 Where the pump room is not constantly attended, audible or visible alarms signals powered by a source other than the engine starting batteries and not exceeding 125V shall be provided at a point of constant attendance. 12.4.2.2 These alarms signals shall indicate the following: (1) The engine is running (separate signal). (2) The controller main switch has been turned to the off or manual position (separate signal). (3)* Trouble on the controller or engine (separate or common signals). (See 12.4.1.3.) SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-143 Log #72 Final Action: Reject(12.4.3) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows: In the title, change “Alarm” to “Signal”.SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire

department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-144 Log #67 Final Action: Reject(12.4.8) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows; In the title of 10.4.8, delete “Alarm”.SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-145 Log #13 Final Action: Accept in Principle(12.5.2.1.6(B)(3)) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: David Stringfield, University of MinnesotaRECOMMENDATION: Revise 12.5.2.1.6(B)(3) to read: “12.5.2.1.6(B)(3) There shall be no shutoff valve in the pressure-sensing line between the controller and the connection to the water supply .” SUBSTANTIATION: Figure A.10.5.2.1(A) shows four shutoff valves, which is OK because they are not between the water supply and the controller. Why is the format for the electric and diesel controller sections different? The same Proposal is submitted for 10.5.2.1.6(C)COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-101 (Log #11).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: PENNEL: My notes indicate the decision was to reject this proposal. The committee statement: “See committee action on Proposal 20-101 (Log #11)” references a proposal that was rejected.COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE HAAGENSEN: The Committee Statement does not agree with the Committee Meeting Action, Proposal 20-101 was Rejected.

_______________________________________________________________20-146 Log #141 Final Action: Accept(12.5.2.1.6(B), (5)) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel-Allison, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: 12.5.2.1.6 (B)(5) For variable speed pressure limiting control, a 12.7 mm (1⁄2 in.) nominal size inside diameter pressure line, including appropriate strainer, shall be connected between the pump discharge flange and the discharge check valve. 11.2.4.2.4 A pressure sensing line shall be provided to the engine with a 12.7 mm (1⁄2 in.) nominal size inside diameter line, from a connection between the pump discharge flange and the discharge check valve.SUBSTANTIATION: For diesel engine driven pumps the pressure sensing line must go to the engine, not the controller. For diesel VSPLC systems the controlling device is a part of the engine.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-147 Log #30 Final Action: Accept(12.5.3.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Daniel Gendebien, Torna Tech Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add new sub clause 12.5.3.2.1 as follows: In a non pressure actuated controller, the manual test shall be permitted to be initiated by means other than a solenoid valve.SUBSTANTIATION: There is no solenoid valve in non pressure actuated controller, manual test must be done by other means.

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-148 Log #73 Final Action: Reject(12.5.4(4)) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows: In the last line (fourth word from the end), change the word “alarm” to “signal”.SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-149 Log #74 Final Action: Reject(12.5.5.2(2)) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: In the last line, change the word “alarm” to “signal”.SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-150 Log #75 Final Action: Reject(12.6.7) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Revise text to read as follows: Throughout 12.6.7 delete the term “alarm” and substitute with the term “signal” as follows: 12.6.7 Alarm and Signal Devices on Controller. 12.6.7.1 A visible indicator(s) shall be provided to indicate that the controller is in the automatic position. 12.6.7.2 The visible indicator shall be accessible for replacement. 12.6.7.3 Separate visible indicators and a common audible alarm signal shall be provided to indicate trouble caused by the following conditions: (1) Critically low oil pressure in the lubrication system. The controller shall provide means for testing the position of the pressure switch contacts without causing trouble alarms signals . (2) High engine jacket coolant temperature. (3) Failure of engine to start automatically. (4) Shutdown from overspeed. (5) Low air pressure. The air supply container shall be provided with a separate visible indicator to indicate low air pressure. (6) Low fuel level. Alarm Signal at two-thirds tank capacity. 12.6.7.4 No audible alarm signal silencing silencing switch or valve, other than the controller main switch or valve, shall be permitted for the alarms signals in 12.6.7.3. 12.6.7.5 Additional Alarms Signals 12.6.7.5.1 Where audible alarms signals for the conditions listed in A.5.23 are incorporated with the engine alarms signals specified in 12.6.7.3, a silencing switch or valve for the A.5.23 audible alarms signals shall be provided at the controller. 12.6.7.5.2 The circuit shall be arranged so that the audible alarm signals will be activated if the silencing switch or valve is in the silent position when the supervised conditions are normal. SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-151 Log #76 Final Action: Reject(12.6.8) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows: In the title, change the word “Alarms” to “Signals”.SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-152 Log #77 Final Action: Reject(12.6.15(2)) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Revise text at follows: Change the word from “alarms” to “signals”.SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-153 Log #163 Final Action: Accept in Part(14.2.7) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Bill M. Harvey, Harvey and Associates Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Refer to section 14.2.7.1* Text Equipment: Revise the beginning of the sentence/paragraph to read: “Listed and Certified field test equipment”. The remainder of the sentence remains as is. Add new section No. 14 2.7.1.1 Calibrated and certified test equipment shall bear the latest date of calibration. The listed test equipment shall bear the stamp of the listing and/or approval agency. Calibration of test gauges shall be maintained at an accuracy level of plus or minus .01 percent.SUBSTANTIATION: There are many shop fabricated test devices being used without having any certification. Also test gauges used in most applications are not recalibrated as they should be.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Part Add new section to read as follows: 14.2.7.1.1. Calibrated test gauges shall be used and bear a label with the latest date of calibration. Gauges must be calibrated a minimum of annually. Calibration of test gauges must be maintained at an accuracy level of plus or minus of 1 percent.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Listed or approved test appliances shall be used to determine the performance of the fire pump system. Shop fabricated and untested equipment shall not be used.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-154 Log #2 Final Action: Accept in Principle(14.2.7.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Manuel J. DeLerno, S-P-D Industries Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add the word “Separate” at the start of the first sentence.SUBSTANTIATION: The use of untried test equipment (i.e. supplied as part of the permanent installation) to verify performance is substandard.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Add the word “Calibrated” at the beginning of the first sentence: 14.2.7* Field Acceptance Test Procedures. 14.2.7.1* Test Equipment. Calibrated Test equipment shall be provided to

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 determine net pump pressures, rate of flow through the pump, volts and amperes for electric motor–driven pumps, and speed. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Meets the intent of the submitter.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-155 Log #95 Final Action: Accept(14.2.7.2.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John R. Kovacik, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise 14.2.7.2.2 to read: 14.2.7.2.2 If available suction supplies do not permit the flowing of 150 percent of rated pump capacity, the fire pump shall be operated at maximum allowable discharge to determine its acceptance. This reduced capacity shall not constitute an un acceptable test provided that the pump discharge exceeds the fire protection system design flow and pressure requirements . SUBSTANTIATION: This proposal is a recommendation resulting from the work of the NFPA 20 Task Group on Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control. The Task Group consists of: John Kovacik, UL (Chair); Russ Anderson, Metron; Tim Killion, Peerless Pump Company; Steve Mezsick, Eli Lilly; Gayle Pennel, Schirmer Engineering; Matt Roy, Armstrong Darling; John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel - Allison. In determining the necessary requirements to address testing of variable speed pressure limiting control, this proposal was developed to clarify the intent of the “exception”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: HAAGENSEN: The accepted wording is still not correct. As an example, the paragraph could be interpreted to mean that an electric motor driven pump with improper voltage could pass the acceptance test requirements solely because of an unrelated flow test.

_______________________________________________________________20-156 Log #96 Final Action: Accept(14.2.7.2.4 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: John R. Kovacik, Underwriters Laboratories Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Insert a new 14.2.7.2.4 to read: 14.2.7.2.4 Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control. 14.2.7.2.4.1 Pumps with variable speed pressure limiting control must be tested at minimum, rated and peak loads with both the variable speed pressure limiting control operational, and with the fire pump operating at rated speed. 14.2.7.2.4.2 The fire protection system shall be isolated and the pressure relief valve closed for the tests required in 12.2.7.2.4.1. SUBSTANTIATION: This proposal is a recommendation resulting from the work of the NFPA 20 Task Group on Variable Speed Pressure Limiting Control. The Task Group consists of: John Kovacik, UL (Chair); Russ Anderson, Metron; Tim Killion, Peerless Pump Company; Steve Mezsick, Eli Lilly; Gayle Pennel, Schirmer Engineering; Matt Roy, Armstrong Darling; John Whitney, Clarke Detroit Diesel - Allison. The dual set of testing ensures that the performance of both the pump and variable speed pressure limiting control are verified. Since testing the performance of the pump without the variable speed pressure limiting control and relief valve operable could overpressurize the fire protection system components, the discharge valve must be closed for these tests.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-157 Log #78 Final Action: Reject(14.2.11) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows: In the first line, change the word “alarm” to “signal”.SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-158 Log #79 Final Action: Reject(14.3.2(5)) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows: Change the word “alarm” to “signal”.SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-159 Log #CP21 Final Action: Accept(Table 14.5.2.3) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Add new Table 14.5.2.3 Summary of Component Replacement Testing Requirements to read as shown on the following pages.SUBSTANTIATION: Proposal to create new sections in NFPA-25 No. 8.6.1, 8.6..2 and Table 8.6.1 , is presented to align the new NFPA-25 and the current edition of NFPA-20 as related to Component Replacement. The NFPA-20 Technical Committee for Stationary Pumps for Fire Protection presents these proposed new sections to be created in the NFPA-25 Standard, to provide supplemental guidance to the various entities performing repairs or replacement of critical path components of the fire pump systemsCOMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: DELERNO: Table 14.5.2.3 is titled “Component Replacement Testing Requirements” Certainly “Component Replacement Acceptance Testing Requirements” is within the scope of NFPA 20. However, the addition of the “Adjust” column goes beyond this. In its entirety, it confuses scope responsibility of NFPA 20 and NFPA 25.COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE MOORE: This proposal was to be forwarded to the NFPA 25 committee for their acceptance. _______________________________________________________________20-160 Log #52 Final Action: Accept in Principle(19.5.2.1.6(H)) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Richard “Dick” Schneider, Joslyn Clark Controls, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: It was the NFPA 20 VS TF that added subparagraph (H) to 10.5.2.1.6 and 12.5.2.1.6 for the 2003 edition of NFPA 20. NEMA has now tendered a CCP to NFPA 20 (2003) because it felt that the point of connection was restrictive and possibly wrong and thus drafted the below CCP. It has since been pointed out that strainers are not used in pressure sensing lines and that an inconsistency exists in the presentation in the mm size between 10.5.2.1.6 (& 12.5.2.1.6) and their subparagraphs (H) thereto. Lastly, the NEMA proposal indicates that it is a companion proposal to 10.10.7.2(new) which should be 10.10.7.3(new). The below “personal” CCP thus further modifies that NEMA Proposal. This proposal is intended to supplement the CCP tendered by Mr. Vince A. Baclawski of NEMA pertaining to 10.5.2.1.6(H) which proposed a revision of present 10.5.2.1.6(H) to the following: 10.5.2.1.6(H) For variable speed pressure limiting control, a 12.7 mm (.50 in) nominal size inside diameter pressure line, including appropriate strainer, shall be connected between the pump discharge flange and the discharge control valve, as appropriate. Please consider a change to: 10.5.2.1.6(H) For variable speed pressure limiting control the pressure sensing line shall be connected between the pump discharge flange and the discharge control valve, as appropriate.SUBSTANTIATION: 10.5.2.1.6 mandates compliance of all subparagraphs thereto, (A) through (H). Pipe size and type of metal are already covered in subparagraph (B) and thus need not be restated again. The permission of addition of a strainer, is contrary to the philosophy of 10.5.2.1.2 pertaining to the pressure switch. The Committee should also consider the same changes to 12.5.2.1.2(H).COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-102 (Log #48).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

20-35

Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20

Tabl

e 14

.5.2

.3 (

NE

W)

Sum

mar

y of

Com

pone

nt R

epla

cem

ent

Test

ing

Req

uire

men

ts.

Com

pone

ntA

djus

tR

epai

rR

ebui

ldR

epla

ceTe

st C

rite

ria

A.

Fire

Pum

p Sy

stem

1 E

ntir

e pu

mp

asse

mbl

yX

Perf

orm

Acc

epta

nce

Test

in a

ccor

danc

e w

ith N

FPA

-20

14.5

.2.6

.2

2 Im

pelle

r/ro

tatin

g as

sem

bly

XX

Perf

orm

Acc

epta

nce

Test

in a

ccor

danc

e w

ith N

FPA

-20

14.5

.2.6

.2

3 C

asin

gX

XPe

rfor

m A

ccep

tanc

e Te

st in

acc

orda

nce

with

NFP

A-2

0 14

.5.2

.6.2

4 B

eari

ngs

XPe

rfor

m a

nnua

l tes

t in

acco

rdan

ce w

ith N

FPA

25

8.3.

3

5 Sl

eeve

sX

Perf

orm

ann

ual t

est i

n ac

cord

ance

with

NFP

A 2

5 8.

3.3

6 W

ear

Rin

gsX

Perf

orm

ann

ual t

est i

n ac

cord

ance

with

NFP

A 2

58.3

.3

7 M

ain

shaf

tX

XPe

rfor

m a

nnua

l tes

t in

acco

rdan

ce w

ith N

FPA

258

.3.3

8 Pa

ckin

gX

XPe

rfor

m w

eekl

y te

st in

acc

orda

nce

with

NFP

A 2

5 8.

3.2

B. M

echa

nica

l Tra

nsm

issi

on

1 G

ear

Rig

ht A

ngle

dri

ves

XX

XPe

rfor

m A

ccep

tanc

e Te

st in

acc

orda

nce

with

NFP

A-2

0 14

.5.2

.6.2

2 D

rive

cou

plin

gX

XX

XPe

rfor

m w

eekl

y te

st in

acc

orda

nce

with

NFP

A 2

5 8.

3.2

C. E

lect

rica

l Sys

tem

/Con

trol

ler

1 E

ntir

e co

ntro

ller

X

XX

Perf

orm

Acc

epta

nce

Test

in a

ccor

danc

e w

ith N

FPA

-20

14.2

.8

2 Is

olat

ing

switc

hX

Perf

orm

wee

kly

test

in a

ccor

danc

e w

ith N

FPA

258

.3.2

and

exe

rcis

e 6

times

3 C

ircu

it br

eake

rX

Perf

orm

six

mom

enta

ry s

tart

s In

acc

orda

nce

with

NFP

A-2

0 14

.2.8

.9

Cir

cuit

brea

ker

XPe

rfor

m a

one

hou

r fu

ll lo

ad c

urre

nt te

st

4 E

lect

rica

l con

nect

ions

XPe

rfor

m w

eekl

y te

st in

acc

orda

nce

with

NFP

A 2

5 8.

3.2

5 M

ain

cont

acto

rX

Perf

orm

wee

kly

test

in a

ccor

danc

e w

ith N

FPA

25

8.3.

2

Mai

n co

ntac

tor

XPe

rfor

m A

ccep

tanc

e Te

st in

acc

orda

nce

with

NFP

A-2

0 14

.2.8

6 Po

wer

mon

itor

XPe

rfor

m w

eekl

y te

st in

acc

orda

nce

with

NFP

A 2

58.3

.2

7 St

art r

elay

XPe

rfor

m w

eekl

y te

st in

acc

orda

nce

with

NFP

A 2

5 8.

3.2

8 Pr

essu

re s

witc

hX

XPe

rfor

m A

ccep

tanc

e Te

st in

acc

orda

nce

with

NFP

A-2

0 14

.2.8

.9

10 P

ress

ure

Tra

nsdu

cer

XX

Perf

orm

Acc

epta

nce

test

in a

ccor

danc

e w

ith N

FPA

-20

14.2

.8.9

11 M

anua

l sta

rt o

r st

op s

witc

hX

Perf

orm

six

ope

ratio

ns u

nder

load

12 T

rans

fer

switc

h -

load

car

ryin

g pa

rts

XX

XPe

rfor

m a

one

hou

r fu

ll lo

ad c

urre

nt te

st, a

nd tr

ansf

er f

rom

nor

mal

pow

er to

emer

genc

y po

wer

and

bac

k on

e tim

e

Tra

nsfe

r sw

itch

- no

n lo

ad p

arts

XX

XPe

rfor

m s

ix n

o lo

ad o

pera

tions

of

tran

sfer

of

pow

er

D. E

lect

ric

Mot

or D

rive

r

1 E

lect

ric

mot

orX

XX

Perf

orm

Acc

epta

nce

Test

in a

ccor

danc

e w

ith N

FPA

-20

14.5

.2.6

.2

2 M

otor

bea

ring

sX

Perf

orm

ann

ual t

est i

n ac

cord

ance

with

NFP

A 2

5 8.

3.3

3 In

com

ing

pow

er c

ondu

ctor

sX

Perf

orm

a o

ne h

our

full

load

cur

rent

test

20-36

Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20

Tabl

e 14

.5.2

.3 (

NE

W)

Sum

mar

y of

Com

pone

nt R

epla

cem

ent

Test

ing

Req

uire

men

ts (

cont

inue

d)

E.

Die

sel E

ngin

e D

rive

r

1 E

ntir

e en

gine

XX

Perf

orm

ann

ual t

est i

n ac

cord

ance

with

NFP

A 2

5 8.

3.3

2 Fu

el tr

ansf

er p

ump

XX

XPe

rfor

m w

eekl

y te

st in

acc

orda

nce

with

NFP

A 2

5 8.

3.2

3 Fu

el in

ject

or p

ump

XX

Perf

orm

wee

kly

test

in a

ccor

danc

e w

ith N

FPA

25

8.3.

2

4 Fu

el s

yste

m f

ilter

XX

Perf

orm

wee

kly

test

In

acco

rdan

ce w

ith N

FPA

25

8.3.

2

5 C

ombu

stio

n ai

r in

take

sys

tem

XX

Perf

orm

wee

kly

test

in a

ccor

danc

e w

ith N

FPA

25

8.3.

2

6 Fu

el ta

nkX

XPe

rfor

m w

eekl

y te

st I

n ac

cord

ance

with

NFP

A 2

5 8.

3.2

7 C

oolin

g sy

stem

XX

XPe

rfor

m w

eekl

y te

st in

acc

orda

nce

with

NFP

A 2

5 8.

3.2

8 B

atte

ries

XX

Perf

orm

wee

kly

test

in a

ccor

danc

e w

ith N

FPA

-20

8.3.

2

9 B

atte

ry c

harg

erX

XPe

rfor

m a

sta

rt/s

top

sequ

ence

NFP

A-2

5 8.

3.2

10 E

lect

rica

l sys

tem

XX

Perf

orm

wee

kly

test

in a

ccor

danc

e w

ith N

FPA

25

8.3.

2

11 L

ubri

catio

n Fi

lter/

Oil

Serv

ice

XX

Perf

orm

wee

kly

test

in a

ccor

danc

e w

ith N

FPA

-20

8.3.

2

F.St

eam

Tur

bine

s1

Stea

m tu

rbin

eX

Perf

orm

ann

ual t

est i

n ac

cord

ance

with

NFP

A-2

0 14

.5.2

.6.2

2 St

eam

reg

ulat

or o

r so

urce

upg

rade

XX

Perf

orm

ann

ual t

est i

n ac

cord

ance

with

NFP

A-2

0 14

.5.2

.6.2

G,

Posi

tive

Dis

plac

emen

t Pum

ps1

Ent

ire

pum

pX

Perf

orm

ann

ual t

est I

n ac

cord

ance

with

NFP

A 2

58.3

.3

2 R

otor

sX

Perf

orm

ann

ual t

est I

n ac

cord

ance

with

NFP

A 2

5 8.

3.3

3 Pl

unge

rsX

Perf

orm

ann

ual t

est I

n ac

cord

ance

with

NFP

A 2

5 8.

3.3

4 Sh

aft

XPe

rfor

m a

nnua

l tes

t In

acco

rdan

ce w

ith N

FPA

25

8.3.

3

5 D

rive

rX

XX

Perf

orm

ann

ual t

est I

n ac

cord

ance

with

NFP

A 2

5 8.

3.3

6 B

eari

ngs

XPe

rfor

m w

eekl

y te

st I

n ac

cord

ance

with

NFP

A 2

5 8.

3.2

7 Se

als

XPe

rfor

m w

eekl

y te

st in

acc

orda

nce

with

NFP

A-2

0 8.

3.2

G,

Pum

p H

ouse

and

Mis

c C

ompo

nent

s1

Bas

e pl

ate

XX

Perf

orm

wee

kly

test

In

acco

rdan

ce w

ith N

FPA

25

8.3.

2 w

ith a

llign

men

t che

ck

2 Fo

unda

tion

XX

XPe

rfor

m w

eekl

y te

st I

n ac

cord

ance

with

NFP

A 2

5 8.

3.2

with

alli

gnm

ent c

heck

3 Su

ctio

n/di

scha

rge

pipe

4

XX

Vis

ual i

nspe

ctio

n in

acc

orda

nce

with

NFP

A 2

5 5~

2.2

Suct

ion/

disc

harg

e fi

tting

s 5

XX

Vis

ual i

nspe

ctio

n in

acc

orda

nce

with

NFP

A 2

5 5~

2.2

Suct

ion/

disc

harg

e va

lves

XX

XO

pera

tiona

l tes

t in

acco

rdan

ce w

ith N

FPA

25

12.3

.3

20-37

Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 _______________________________________________________________20-161 Log #127 Final Action: Accept in Principle(A.5.7.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: J. Scott Mitchell, American Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Revise the last sentence of the existing paragraph as follows: Such pumps are permitted for fire protection if they are considered reliable by a reliability analysis by the analysis mandated in 5.7.1. The analysis should evaluate at least the level of supervision and rapid response to problems as is typical in municipal water systems. SUBSTANTIATION: First - it should be noted that 5.7.1 does not mandate an analysis. It simply requires that fire pumps be dedicated to and listed for fire protection service. In those scenarios where non-listed pumps and components are intended to be allowed, an analysis should be made to show that an acceptable level of reliability is achieved.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle The reference in A.5.7.1 should corrected as follows: A.5.7.1 This section does not preclude the use of pumps in public and private water supplies that provide water for domestic, process, and fire protection purposes. Such pumps are not fire pumps and are not expected to meet all of the requirements of NFPA 20. Such pumps are permitted for fire protection if they are considered reliable by the analysis mandated in 5.6. 1 Evaluating the reliability should include reviewing at least the level of supervision and rapid response to problems as is typical in municipal water systems. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Unclear what makes an adequate Reliability Analysis.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: HAAGENSEN: If anything is done with the recommendations in A.5.7.1, the provision should be deleted from NFPA 20. This recommendation conflicts with the scope of the document expressed in Paragraph 1.1.1.

_______________________________________________________________20-162 Log #120 Final Action: Accept(A.5.7.4) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise text of A.5.7.4 to read: A.5.7.4 It is poor design practice to overdesign the fire pump and driver and then count on the pressure relief valve to open and relive the excess pressure. A pressure relief valve is not an acceptable method of reducing system pressure under normal operating conditions. and should not be used as such. SUBSTANTIATION: Clause 5.7.4 now specifically prohibits the use of a pressure relief valve for the purpose of controlling system pressure.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-163 Log #60 Final Action: Accept in Principle(A.5.14.6(q)) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Without deleting the existing figure, add back the portions of the figure from the 1999 edition as follows:

SUBSTANTIATION: When this portion of the figure was added for the 2003 edition, it was not our intention to delete what was in the 1999 edition. We thought that we had made our ROP and ROC submittals clear that we wanted to add to the figure, not replace the existing worthwhile information.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Restore referenced drawings from the 1999 Edition. Add “correct” drawing with two back to back vertical elbows having a centerline plane perpendicular to a horizontal split-case pump shaft.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Direction on the correct installation of suction pipes is needed.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

Figure A.5.14.6

20-38

Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 _______________________________________________________________20-164 Log #124 Final Action: Accept in Principle(A.5.18.1.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise A.5.18.1.2 to read: A.5.18.1.2 In situations where the required system pressure is close to the pressure rating of the system components and the water supply pressure varies significantly over time, it might be necessary to use a tank between the water supply and the pump suction control valve, in lieu of a direct connection to the water supply piping, or a variable speed fire pump to eliminate system over-pressurization. SUBSTANTIATION: Add missing other means to control pressure.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Revise A.5.18.1.2 to read: A.5.18.1.2 In situations where the required system pressure is close to the pressure rating of the system components and the water supply pressure varies significantly over time, to eliminate system over-pressurization it might be necessary to: (a) use a tank between the water supply and the pump suction in lieu of directly connecting to the water supply piping, or(b) use a variable speed pressure limiting control device. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: To add other means to control pressure and to avoid misinterpretation.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-165 Log #CP17 Final Action: Accept(Figure A.5.18.2.1) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Add Figure A.5.18.2.1 as shown on the following pages.SUBSTANTIATION: Guidance is needed on how to calculate the pipe size for pressure relief valve piping.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-166 Log #CP16 Final Action: Accept(A.5.19.3.4(2)) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Add Figure A5.19.3.4(2) as shown on the following pages.SUBSTANTIATION: Guidance is needed on how to calculate the pipe size for pump test header piping.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-167 Log #4 Final Action: Accept(A.5.23) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: R. Schneider, Joslyn Clark Controls, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Delete A.5.23(6).SUBSTANTIATION: Low fuel level alarm is now mandatory in 12.6.7.3(6) and is not silenceable per 12.6.7.4. Reference to A.5.23 in 12.6.7.5.1 (which mandates ability to silence) is incompatible.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-168 Log #CP22 Final Action: Accept(A.9.3.2.2.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Remove first sentence of Section A.9.3.2.2 A.9.3.2.2.2 Where the alternate power is from an on-site generator, the alternate service equipment need not be located in the fire pump room. SUBSTANTIATION: The committee has considered many times, the potential arrangement of providing fire pump power from the secondary side of the transformer, which supplies other electrical loads of the facility. The committee recognizes that it is possible to supply the fire pump power ahead of other plant loads and to protect the fire pump power circuit by proper electrical coordination. However, the committee is concerned that, while responding to

an emergency, fire fighters might seek to disconnect electrical power to the facility by opening the transformer primary disconnect, which in this case would isolate power to the fire pump as well. In addition, the committee is concerned that the designed electrical coordination can be compromised by ongoing additional electrical loads to the facility power distribution system. Therefore, if electrical service is supplied to the facility at voltage higher than utilization voltage, the committee feels that a separate transformer to provide power to the fire pump is appropriate. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-169 Log #113 Final Action: Accept(A.9.6.5 (New) ) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add new Annex item: A.9.6.5 Generator Protective Devices. The subject protective device(s), where used, need to be sized to allow the generator to allow instantaneous pickup of the full pump room load. This includes starting any and all connected fire pumps in the across-the-line (direct on line) full voltage starting mode. This is always the case when the fire pump(s) is running by use of the Emergency Mechanical Operator of 10.5.3.2* (Emergency-Run Mechanical Control at Controller).SUBSTANTIATION: Field confusion and field breaker tripping problems.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-170 Log #80 Final Action: Reject(A.10.4.5.6.2) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows: Change the word “alarm” to “signal” three times in the sentence to read as follows: A.10.4.5.6.2 The alarm signal should incorporate local visible indication and contacts for remote indication. The alarm signal can be incorporated as part of the power available indication and loss of phase alarm signal [see 10.4.6.1 and 10.4.7.2(B)]. SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-171 Log #27 Final Action: Accept in Principle(A.10.7) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Vince Baclawski, National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)RECOMMENDATION: Delete existing text and replace as shown. A.10.7 The authority having jurisdiction can permit the use of a limited service controller for special situations where such use is acceptable to said authority. A.10.7 The use of limited-service controllers for fire service is not recommended but permitted for special situations when acceptable to the Authority Having Jurisdiction. SUBSTANTIATION: NFPA 20 permits Limited Service Controllers (LSC’s) to have no isolating switch, use thermally responsive overcurrent protective devices, limit its application in various ways and means and getting the AHJ to sign off for each installation. These compromises have introduced the following: a) The controller circuit breaker can trip if the fire is near (can’t reset because breaker is hot - even when using the manual/emergency handle). b) Substantially longer reset time if breaker trips due to distressed pump, etc. Tripping consistency and reset times are compromised on “hot-starts”. c) Substantially longer “Down time” (no fire protection) if breaker needs service/replacement due to no isolating switch. Most LSCs are SUSE (Suitable for Use as Service Equipment) rated and are so used. d) Sizing of breaker is difficult - some Hp/volt. exceed permissible 8-20 seconds LRC trip times depending on hot or cold starts.

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20

Figure A.5.18.2.1

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20

Figure A.5.19.3.4(2)

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 UL and FM have set the first quarter 2005 as the “compliance date” for newly required external current and voltage reading capability, which, of course, drastically reduces the cost advantage of the LSC. In CMP language, the “cost/benefit ratio” has changed to where the risks of the product exceed the benefits and thus it should be eliminated, especially since electric fire pump controllers (EFPCs) exist for all Hp/voltage served by the LSC.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Delete existing text and replace as shown. A.10.7 The authority having jurisdiction can permit the use of a limited service controller for special situations where such use is acceptable to said authority. A.10.7 The use of limited-service controllers for fire service is permitted for special situations when acceptable to the Authority Having Jurisdiction. NFPA 20 permits Limited Service Controllers (LSC’s) to have no isolating switch and use thermally responsive overcurrent protective devices which limit their application. These compromises have introduced the following: a) The controller circuit breaker can trip if the fire is near (can’t reset because breaker is hot - even when using the manual/emergency handle). b) Substantially longer reset time if breaker trips due to distressed pump, etc. Tripping consistency and reset times are compromised on “hot-starts”. c) Substantially longer “Down time” (no fire protection) if breaker needs service/replacement due to no isolating switch. Most LSCs are SUSE (Suitable for Use as Service Equipment) rated and are so used. d) Sizing of breaker is different and can significantly exceed the 8-20 seconds locked rotor current (LRC) trip time of a full service fire pump controller depending on hot or cold starts.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Clarifies the intended application for limited service controllers.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: DELERNO: The introduction of the a) through d) sentences is to explain why there are few “special situations” which justify the AHJ accepting their use. It is reasonable to do this in a handbook or standard explanation treatise; it does not belong in the standard. NEMA already has such a publication. _______________________________________________________________20-172 Log #45 Final Action: Accept(A.10.7) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Vince Baclawski, National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA)RECOMMENDATION: Revise existing text as shown: 7.5.3 Driver. Each vertical shaft turbine-type fire pump shall have its own dedicated driver, and each driver shall have its own dedicated controller. Proposed text: a) 7 5 . 5 7 .3 Driver. Each vertical shaft turbine-type fire pump shall have its own dedicated driver unless otherwise permitted in 8.5.3.1. b) and 5.7.4 E ach driver shall have its own dedicated controller c) Revise 5.7 to read Pumps, Drivers , and Controllers d) Renumber remaining sections. SUBSTANTIATION: This should apply to all controllers, pumps, and drivers, not just vertical-shaft turbine type fire pumps.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Abstain: 1BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION: DELERNO: I am unable to understand why a multi-stage horizontal pump cannot be two single stage pumps connected to a double ended shaft motor. I do not see that it is less reliable. It may be less economical, but that is not a standards matter.

_______________________________________________________________20-173 Log #104 Final Action: Accept(A.10.8) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise the Arrangement II figure of A.10.8 as follows: A.10.8 The reference designation for “Arrangement II” Normal source circuit breaker now reads: “See 9.3.2”. It should read: “See 9.3.2.2.3” Clause 9.3.2.2.3 is “Supervised Connection” which covers the subject circuit breaker, when used.SUBSTANTIATION: Confusion in the field. Section 9.3.2 is “Power Supply Arrangement” which includes “Continuity of Power” which includes both “Direct Connection” (9.3.2.2.2) as well as “Supervised Connection” (9.3.2.2.3). However, the circuit breaker illustrated is used only as part of the latter Supervised Connection.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-174 Log #CP19 Final Action: Accept(A.11.4.5) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Add text to the end of Annex Section A.11.4.5 to read as follows: A.11.4.5. Research has identified nothing in NFPA 30 or 37 that prohibits the outlet connection to the engine from the diesel tank from being in the location required by NFPA 20. The applicable code is NFPA 37 - 2002, Standard for the Installation and Use of Stationary Combustion Engines and Gas Turbines, not NFPA 30, Flammable and Combustible Liquids. The scope of NFPA 30 clearly states that if the installation meets the criteria in NFPA 37, then it satisfies the requirements of NFPA 30. Therefore, NFPA 37 applies for the fuel tank for the fire pump, as it is considered to be part of the installation of the internal combustion engine. Section 6.3.2 deals with fuel tanks inside structures for fuels other than class I liquids. Sections 6.6, 6.7 and 6.8 deal with filling, venting and connections between the engine and the fuel tank; and these sections send the reader back to NFPA 30 for the requirements. In reviewing the tank chapter - chapter 4 for fixed tanks with capacity of 119 gallons or more - no requirement could be found that states the connection to the engine has to be from the top of the tank, if the tank is on the floor on legs, or otherwise above ground. SUBSTANTIATION: Guidance on the fuel tank outlet location is needed.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: HAAGENSEN: Paragraph 6.9.1 of NFPA 37-2002 reads “Liquid fuel shall feed to engines by pumps.” This conflicts with the requirements of NFPA 20 that the fuel be fed by gravitational forces. With regard to NFPA 30, I have heard many comments that the trend in flammable/liquid storage tanks is to position any outlet/fill connections on the top of the tank. The Committee needs to further research this claim.

_______________________________________________________________20-175 Log #107 Final Action: Accept in Principle(A.12.4.2.2(3)(2) ) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Revise A.12.4.2.2(3)(2) as follows: (2) Use of a fire pump to supervise loss of power or loss of current output of the battery charger: Unless there is adequate fuel and fire water to run the fire pump for a 72 hour time (over a three day weekend) the fire pump shall not be used as an A.C. Failure alarm. Only where specifically approved by the authority having jurisdiction and where a minimum of a 72 hour supply of fuel and water exist should the controller be so used. In this case, If there is no other way to supervise loss of power, the controller can should be equipped with a power failure circuit, which should be time delayed to start the engine upon loss of current output of the battery charger. SUBSTANTIATION: All too often engines run out of fuel after a power failure event, especially if the controller is set up for manual stop rather than automatic stop. In other cases, engines are destroyed (burned up) due to loss of cooling water during a prolonged running period even though there is no fire or actual water demand.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle (1) In “11.4.3 Fuel Tank Capacity”, create a new paragraph to read: A.11.4.3.4 Where the authority having jurisdiction approves the start of the fire pump on loss of AC power supply, provisions should be made to accommodate the additional fuel needed for this purpose. (2) In “A.5.6.4 Stored Supply”, create a new paragraph to read: 5.6.4.3 Where the authority having jurisdiction approves the start of an engine driven fire pump on loss of AC power supply, the liquid supply should be sufficient to meet the additional cooling water demand. (3) In A.12.4.2.2(3)(2), add a second sentence to read: “This arrangement is only permitted where approved by the authority having jurisdiction in accordance with Section 1.5” (4) In A.12.4.2.2(3)(2), add a third sentence to read: “This arrangement allows, upon loss of the AC power supply, the batteries to maintain their charge, activates ventilation in case conditions require cooling the engine, and/or maintains engine temperature in case conditions require heating the engine.” (5) In A.12.4.2.2(3)(2), add a fourth sentence to read, “(See also 5.6.4.3 and 11.4.3.4.)”COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Meets the intent of the submitter.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: HAAGENSEN: If batteries will be charged, or fire pump room air conditioned, upon AC power loss, by running the fire pump, then requirements need to be added to the document relative to water and fuel supply.

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 _______________________________________________________________20-176 Log #108 Final Action: Accept in Principle(A.12.4.2.2(3)(3) (New) ) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add a new clause A.12.4.2.2(3)(3) as follows: A.12.4.2.2(3)(3) Where high temperature process occur such as with ovens, furnaces, or the like, the local authority may require that the controller be equipped with power failure start in order to bring the pump on line when plant power is lost and when such loss causes the loss of high temperature cooling fans, blowers, or pumps. When equipped, the controller should incorporate a time delay to avoid nuisance and needless starts.SUBSTANTIATION: Too few field personnel are familiar with this concept. This is especially important when old controllers are replaced and when no information is available to determine how the old controller is or was equipped. There remain many controllers in service which are over 40 years old. Some of these have become orphans as far as documentation of options are concerned.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-175 (Log #107) (A.12.4.2.2(3)(2)).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: HAAGENSEN: See my Explanation of Negative Vote on Proposal 20-175 (Log #107).

_______________________________________________________________20-177 Log #109 Final Action: Accept in Principle(A.12.4.2.2(3)(3) (New) ) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add a new clause A.12.4.2.2(3)(3) as follows: A.12.4.2.2(3)(3) In very cold climates (Polar Regions) where loss of A.C. power would result in freezing of pump room components in a short time, it may be desirable for the controller be equipped with power failure start in order to provide engine heat. When equipped, the controller should incorporate a time delay to avoid nuisance and needless starts.SUBSTANTIATION: Few field personnel are familiar with this concept or hazard.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-175 (Log #107) (A.12.4.2.2(3)(2)).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: HAAGENSEN: See my Explanation of Negative Vote on Proposal 20-175 (Log #107).

_______________________________________________________________20-178 Log #81 Final Action: Reject(A.14.2.13) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Kevin J. Kelly, National Fire Sprinkler AssociationRECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows: In the second sentence, change “an alarm” to “signal”.SUBSTANTIATION: Utilizing consistent terminology throughout all NFPA standards is important. An “alarm” is a type of signal that indicates a fire emergency necessitating the need to call the fire department immediately. The signal described in this section is not an emergency needing the fire department’s response. While it is an important supervisory signal, it is not a fire emergency and should therefore not be called an “alarm”.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-183 (Log #CP3).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-179 Log #98 Final Action: Accept in Principle(Annex D (New)) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: James S. Nasby, Master Control Systems, Inc.RECOMMENDATION: Add a new Annex D Cross Reference between NFPA 20 and NFPA 70-695 as shown on the following page.SUBSTANTIATION: Clarify which clauses in NFPA 70-695 are extract text from NFPA 20. Present format of NFPA 70 makes it difficult to know which sections and sentences are extract text. Some proposals and comments have been misdirected. This would also help the NFPA 20 Technical Committee to

know which clauses have been extracted into NFPA 70.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept in Principle Change title to read as follows: NFPA 20 Material Extracted by 70 Article 695.COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Clarifies that the information in NFPA 70 is extracted from NFPA 20.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK _______________________________________________________________20-180 Log #85 Final Action: Reject(Chapter X (New)) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Denyse DuBrucq, AirWars DefenseRECOMMENDATION: Add a new Chapter titled: Liquid Nitrogen Stationary Pumping System SUBSTANTIATION: Liquid nitrogen applied appropriately generates inert gas, nitrogen, displacing oxygen-containing air, and cools air, liquids and solids, both stopping fires. A pumping mechanism is essential to carry liquid nitrogen into a reservoir dewar for liquid nitrogen and selected routing for the liquid be made to feed distribution means in the structure or surrounding the flammable material storage tanks. Liquid nitrogen is recommended for tall buildings, storage of flammables, silos, manufacturing or servicing with fire hazards, banks, convenience stores, and buildings where destruction of equipment, papers, art and furnishings is unacceptable. Primary water states as Colorado, Utah, Nevada, New Mexico, Arizona, and California preserve water if they substitute liquid nitrogen for water in fire fighting. A chapter in NFPA Code Section 20 should be added defining acceptable means to transfer this cryogenic liquid to the reservoir for liquid nitrogen fixed fire control systems. Gravity flow of liquid nitrogen would best feed the installed distributing units on a selective basis. For filling the reservoir, the preferred method would be a dewar bucket brigade means drawing the buckets up a vertical passage exclusive to this task accessing the delivery vehicle at the bottom and the reservoir at the top.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Inadequate substantiation of need and technology. Appears to be outside the scope of NFPA 20. The submitter should pursue this technology through NFPA 2001, Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems, 12, Standard on Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems, 12A, Standard on Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing Systems.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

_______________________________________________________________20-181 Log #29 Final Action: Reject(Entire Document) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Denyse Dubrucq, AirWars DefenseRECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows: Covers minimum requirements for the selection and installation of pumps supplying water or Liquid Nitrogen for private fire protection. SUBSTANTIATION: For buildings equipped with Liquid Nitrogen fixed fire control systems, the delivery of the cryogen must be swift and safe. The pipes must be purged of air to prevent icing and water condensation. Pipes must be thermally insulated and have anti-backflow valves to prevent moisture from invading the pipelines. Gaseous Nitrogen from evaporation of the stored Liquid Nitrogen bleeds through the pipes outgassing at the dispensing unit at a slow rate on a continuous basis. The reservoir of Liquid Nitrogen must be above the pipes and have downhill flow to the dispensing unit. The only pumps needed are for Liquid Nitrogen delivery to the high mounted reservoir. This reservoir should hold enough liquid Nitrogen to fill the space stopping the fire. The fire department may bring Liquid Nitrogen to the scene and can augment the fixed supply as needed to complete the fire fighting operation. An opening in the system allows adding the Fire Department’s Liquid Nitrogen supply to the fire control process. This can provide precautionary Nitrogen to adjacent locations after clearing out residents if the fire is threatening to spread or control a larger fire than the fixed reservoir can handle.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: See Committee Action and Statement on Proposal 20-180 (Log #85).NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK

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NFPA-20 NFPA-70 Section 695

1999 Edition 2003 Edition 2002 Edition 2005 Edition* Section 695 (2002 Edition) Titles -or- Text

(Reference Only) 695.2 - same- Definitions.

(None) 3.3.10 (ditto) - same- Fault Tolerant External Control Circuits.

(None) 3.3.27 (ditto) - same- On-Site Power Production Facility.

(None) 3.3.28 (ditto) - same- On-Site Standby Generator.

6-2 9.2.1.1 695.3 - same- Power Source(s) for Electric Motor-Driven Fire Pumps.

6-2, 6-2.3 9.2 695.3(A) - same- Individual Sources.

6-2.1 9.2.2 695.3(A)(1) - same- Electric Utility Service Connection. (2nd sentence)

6-2.2 9.2.3 695.3(A)(2) - same- On-Site Power Production Facility.

6-2.3 9.2.4 695.3(B) - same- Multiple Sources.

6-6.1 9.6.1 695.3(B)(1) - same- Generator Capacity.

6-2.4.3 9.2.5.3 695.3(B)(2) - same- Feeder Sources.

6-2.4.1 9.2.5.1 695.3(B)(3) - same- Arrangement.

6-3.2.1, 9.3.2.1.1, 695.4 - same- Continuity of Power.

6-3.2.2 9.3.2.2.1 (ditto) - same- (ditto)

6-3.2.2.1 9.3.2.2.2 695.4(A) - same- Direct Connection.

6-3.2.2.2 9.3.2.2.3.1 695.4(B) - same- Supervised Connection.

6-3.2.2.2(1) 9.3.2.2.3.1(1) 695.4(B)-(1) - same- (listed fire pump controller)

6-3.2.2.2(2) 9.3.2.2.3.1(2) 695.4(B)-(2) - same- (listed fire pump power transfer switch)

6-3.2.2.2(3) 9.3.2.2.3.1(3) 695.4(B)-(3) - same- (listed combo. fire pump controller / transfer switch)

6-3.2.2.3 9.3.2.2.3.3 695.4(B) - cont’d - same- For systems installed under the provisions of 695.3(B)(2) only . . .

6-3.2.2.2 9.3.2.2.3.2 695.4(B) - cont’d - same- All disconnecting devices and over-current protective devices . . .

6-3.2.2.3 9.3.2.2.3.2(A) 695.4(B)(1) - same- Overcurrent Device Selection. & etc.

6-3.2.2.3(b) 9.3.2.2.3.2(B) 695.4(B)(2) - same- Disconnecting Means.

6-3.2.2.3(b)(1) 9.3.2.2.3.2(B)(1) 695.4(B)(2)-(1) - same- Be identified as suitable for use as service equipment . . .

6-3.2.2.3(b)(2) 9.3.2.2.3.2(B)(2) 695.4(B)(2)-(2) - same- Be lockable in the closed position . . .

(Reference Only) (New in 2005) 695.4(B)(2)-(3) Not be located within equipment that feeds loads other than . . .

6-3.2.2.3(b)(3) 9.3.2.2.3.2(B)(3) 695.4(B)(2)-(3) 695.4(B)(2)-(4) Be located sufficiently remote from . . .

6-3.2.2.3(c) 9.3.2.2.3.2(C) 695.4(B)(3) - same- Disconnect Marking.

6-3.2.2.3(d) 9.3.2.2.3.2(D) 695.4(B)(4) - same- Controller Marking.

6-3.2.2.3(e) 9.3.2.2.3.2(E) 695.4(B)(5) - same- Supervision.

6-3.2.2.3(e)(1) 9.3.2.2.3.2(E)(1) 695.4(B)(5)-(1) - same- Central station, proprietary, or remote station . . .

6-3.2.2.3(e)(2) 9.3.2.2.3.2(E)(2) 695.4(B)(5)-(2) - same- Local signaling service . . .

6-3.2.2.3(e)(3) 9.3.2.2.3.2(E)(3) 695.4(B)(5)-(3) - same- Locking the disconnecting means . . .

6-3.2.2.3(e)(4) 9.3.2.2.3.2(E)(4) 695.4(B)(5)-(4) - same- Sealing of disconnecting means . . .

6-3.2.2.5 9.3.2.2.5 695.5 - same- Transformers.

6-3.2.2.5 9.3.2.2.5 695.5(B) - same- Overcurrent Protection.

(Reference Only) 695.5(C) - same- Feeder Source.

(Reference Only) 695.5(C)(1) - same- Size.

6-2.4.3 9.2.5.3.3 695.5(C)(2) - same- Overcurrent Protection.

(Reference Only) 695.6 - same- Power Wiring.

7-3.4.4 10.3.4.6, 695.6(F) - same- Junction Points.

10.3.4.7 (ditto) - same- (ditto)

6-4 9.4 695.7 - same- Voltage Drop.

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NFPA-20 NFPA-70 Section 695

1999 Edition 2003 Edition 2002 Edition 2005 Edition* Section 695 (2002 Edition) Titles -or- Text

- same-

6-5.1.1, 9.5.1.1, 695.10 - same- Listed Equipment.

7-1.2.1, 10.1.2.1, (ditto) - same- (ditto)

7-8.3.1, 10.8.3.1, (ditto) - same- (ditto)

9-1.1.1 12.1.3.1 (ditto) - same- (ditto)

(Reference Only) 695.12 - same- Equipment Location.

7-2.1, 10.2.1, 695.12(A) - same- Controllers and Transfer Switches.

9-2.1 12.2.1 695.12(B) - same- Engine-Drive Controllers.

8-2.5.2.5 11.2.5.2.5 695.12(C) - same- Storage Batteries.

8-2.5.2.6 11.2.5.2.6 695.12(D) - same- Energized Equipment.

7-2.2, 10.2.2, 695.12(E) - same- Protection Against Pump Water.

9-2.2 12.2.2 (ditto) - same- (ditto)

7-3.2, 10.3.2, 695.12(F) - same- Mounting.

9-3.2 12.3.2 (ditto) - same- (ditto)

7-5.2.5, 10.5.2.6, 695.14(A) - same- Control Circuit Failures.

9-5.2.5, 12.5.2.5, (ditto) - same- (ditto)

9-6.12 12.6.12 (ditto) - same- (ditto)

7-4.5.6 10.4.5.6 695.14(B) - same- Sensor Functioning.

7-8.1.3 10.8.1.3 695.14(C) - same- Remote Device(s).

9-3.5.1, 12.3.5.1, 695.14(D) - same- Engine-Drive Control Wiring.

9-6.4.1 12.6.4.1 (ditto) - same- (ditto)

(Reference Only) 695.14(E) - same- Electric Fire Pump Control Wiring Methods.

Additional References - Informational Only

A-6.2.3 A.9.2.4(3) 695.6(A) - same- Service Conductors.

6-6.4 9.6.4 695.12(A) - same- Controllers and Transfer Switches.

A-6.2.3 A.9.2.4(3) 695.14(F) - same- Generator Control Wiring Methods.

Note: *NFPA-70 2005 Edition Paragraph Numbering Shown are Tentative and for Reference Only.

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 _______________________________________________________________20-182 Log #CP24 Final Action: Accept(Entire Document) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Units of measure shall illustrate in./lb units first with metric units in parentheses.SUBSTANTIATION: It is the committee’s intent is to illustrate in./lb units first.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Accept NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 23 Negative: 2 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: DELERNO: Some years back, all committees were directed to state all units of measurement in both English and Metric terms. It is my recollection that the preferred orientation was Metric first with English in parenthesis. I admit ignorance as to whether this directive was rescinded or modified. If it has, then this is a protest vote. If it hasn’t, then we shouldn’t be unique. MOORE: Proposal to go back to English standard with inches and pounds would move us backward and lose respect in the International community where the NFPA 20 standard has been well respected.

_______________________________________________________________20-183 Log #CP3 Final Action: Reject(Entire Document) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Fire PumpsRECOMMENDATION: Create a definition of alarm below: Alarms. A signal indicating an abnormal condition requiring immediate attention. And reference 3.3.35 Signals. An indicator of status.5.14.9(3) Suitable devices shall be permitted to be installed in the suction supply piping or stored water supply and arranged to activate an alarm a signal if the pump suction pressure or water level falls below a predetermined minimum. 10.1.1.2 Accessory devices, including alarm monitoring and signaling means, are included where necessary to ensure the minimum performance of the aforementioned equipment. 10.4.6.1 All visible indicators alarms shall be plainly visible. 10.4.6.3 Controllers shall be equipped with separate visible indicators that operate under the following conditions:(A) Power Available. (1) A visible indicator shall monitor the availability of power in all phases at the line terminals of the motor contactor. (2) When power is supplied from multiple power sources, monitoring of each power source for phase loss shall be permitted at any point electrically upstream of the line terminals of the contactor provided all sources are monitored. (B) Phase Reversal. (1) A visible alarm indicator shall indicate phase reversal of the power source to which the line terminals of the motor contactor are connected shall be indicated by a visible indicator. (2) When power is supplied from multiple power sources, monitoring of each power source for phase reversal shall be permitted at any point electrically upstream of the line terminals of the contactor, provided all sources are monitored. 10.4.7 Remote Alarm and Signal Contacts on Controller. 10.4.7.1 Controllers shall be equipped with contacts (open or closed) to operate remote alarm and signal circuits for the following conditions: (A) Pump or Motor Running. The alarm signal shall actuate whenever the controller has operated into a motor-running condition. (B) Loss of Phase. (1) The alarm shall actuate whenever any phase at the line terminals of the motor contactor is lost. (2) All phases shall be monitored. (3) Such monitoring shall detect loss of phase whether the motor is running or at rest. (4) When power is supplied from multiple power sources, monitoring of each power source for phase loss shall be permitted at any point electrically upstream of the line terminals of the contactor, provided all sources are monitored. (C) Phase Reversal. (See 10.4.6.2.) The alarm shall actuate whenever the 3-phase power at the line terminals of the motor contactor is reversed. (D) Controller Connected to Alternate Source. Where two sources of power are supplied to meet the requirements of 9.2.4, this signal alarm circuit shall indicate whenever the alternate source is the source supplying power to the controller. 10.4.8 Alarm and Signals Remote from Controller. 10.4.8.1 Where the pump room is not constantly attended, audible or visible alarms and signals powered by a source not exceeding 125 V shall be provided at a point of constant attendance. 10.4.8.2 These alarm monitoring circuits required in 10.4.7.1(A), (C), and (D) shall be energized by a separate reliable supervised power source or from the pump motor power, reduced to not more than 125 V. 10.4.8.3 These alarms and signals shall indicate the information conditions in 10.4.7.1(A) through (D).

10.6.6 Alarm and Signal Devices Visible Alarm and Signal Indicators on Controller. 12.1.2 Accessory devices, such as alarm monitoring and signaling means, are included where necessary to ensure minimum performance of the aforementioned equipment.

12.4.1 Alarm and Signal Devices Visible Alarm and Signal Indicators on Controller.12.4.1.1 All visible indicators alarms shall be plainly visible.12.4.1.2 Visible indication shall be provided to indicate that the controller is in the automatic position.12.4.1.3 Visual indicators shall be operable in all positions of the main switch, except for off position.12.4.1.4 If the visible indicator is a pilot lamp, it shall be accessible for replacement.12.4.1.5 Controllers shall be equipped with separate visible alarm and signal indicators that operate under the following conditions:(A) Critically low oil pressure in the lubrication system. The controller shall provide means for testing the position of the pressure switch contacts without causing trouble alarms.(B) High engine jacket coolant temperature.(C) Failure of engine to start automatically.(D) Shutdown from overspeed.(E) Battery failure or missing battery. Each controller shall be provided with a separate visible indicator for each battery.(F) Battery charger failure. Each controller shall be provided with a separate visible indicator for battery charger failure and shall not require the audible alarm for battery charger failure.(G) Low air or hydraulic pressure. Where air or hydraulic starting is provided (see 11.2.5 and 11.2.5.4), each pressure tank shall provide to the controller separate visible indicators to indicate low pressure.(H) System overpressure, for engines equipped with pressure limiting controls, to actuate at 115 percent of total ratedhead (pressure).(I) ECM selector switch in alternate ECM position (for engines with ECM controls only).(J) Fuel injection malfunction (for engines with ECM only).(K) Low fuel level. Alarm at two-thirds tank capacity.12.4.2 Audible Indication on Controller.12.4.2.1 Audible indication shall be provided for items (A) through (K) of 12.4.1.5.12.4.2.2 The audible alarm shall not be required for item (F) of 12.4.1.5.12.4.2.3 The audible indicator shall be capable of being heard while the engine is running.12.4.2.4 No audible alarm silencing switch, other than the controller main switch, shall be permitted for the alarms required in 12.4.1.5(A) through 12.4.1.5(J).12.4.2.5 A separate alarm silence switch shall be used for the low fuel level indication in 12.4.1.5(K).12.4.2.6 Where audible alarms for the conditions listed in A.5.23 are incorporated with the engine alarms pecified in 12.4.1.5, a silencing switch or valve for the A.5.23 audible alarms shall be provided at the controller.12.4.2.6.1 The circuit shall be arranged so that the audible alarm will be activated if the silencing switch or valve is in the silent position when the supervised conditions are normal. 12.4.3 Remote Alarm and Signal Contacts on Controller.12.4.3.1 Controllers shall be equipped with contacts (open or closed) to operate remote alarm and signal circuits for the conditions below:(A) Engine Running. The signal shall actuate when the engine is running (separate signal).(B) Controller Switch Off. The alarm shall actuate when the controller main switch has been turned to the off or manual position (separate signal).(C) Trouble on Controller. Engine Failure. The alarms shall actuate when any of the conditions in 12.4.1.5(A) through 12.4.1.5(J) occur. (separate or common (signals).(D) Pumproom Trouble. The signals shall actuate when the conditions in 12.4.1.5(K) or others in the pumproom occur. (see A.5.23).12.4.4 Alarm and Signals Remote from Controller.12.4.4.1 Where the pump room is not constantly attended, audible or visible alarms and signals powered by a source other than the engine starting batteries and not exceeding 125 V shall be provided at a point of constant attendance.12.4.4.2 These alarms and signals shall indicate the information in 12.4.3.1(A) through (D). 12.6.7 Alarm and Signal Devices on Controller . Visual Alarm and Signal Indicators on Controller. 12.6.7.1 All visible indicators alarms shall be plainly visible.12.6.7.2 Visible indication shall be provided to indicate that the controller is in the automatic position.12.6.7.3 Visual indicators shall be operable in all positions of the main switch, except for off position.12.6.7.4 If the visible indicator is a pilot lamp, it shall be accessible for replacement.12.6.7.5 Controllers shall be equipped with separate visible alarm indicators that operate under the following conditions:(A) Critically low oil pressure in the lubrication system. The controller shall provide means for testing the position of the pressure switch contacts without

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Report on Proposals A2006 — Copyright, NFPA NFPA 20 causing trouble alarms.(B) High engine jacket coolant temperature.(C) Failure of engine to start automatically.(D) Shutdown from overspeed.(E) Low air pressure. The air supply container shall be provided with a separate visible indicator to indicate low air pressure.(F) Low fuel level. Alarm at two-thirds tank capacity. 12.6.8 Audible Indication on Controller. 12.6.8.1 Audible indication shall be provided for items (A) through (F) of 12.6.7.5 12.6.8.2 The audible indicator shall be capable of being heard while the engine is running. 12.6.8.3 No audible alarm silencing switch, other than the controller main switch or valve, shall be permitted for the alarms required in 12.6.7.5(A) through 12.6.7.5(E). 12.6.8.4 A separate alarm silence switch or valve shall be used for the low fuel level indication in 12.6.7.5(F). 12.6.8.5 Where audible alarms for the conditions listed in A.5.23 are incorporated with the engine alarms pecified in 12.6.7.5, a silencing switch or valve for the A.5.23 audible alarms shall be provided at the controller. 12.6.8.5.1 The circuit shall be arranged so that the audible alarm will be activated if the silencing switch or valve is in the silent position when the supervised conditions are normal. 12.6.9 Remote Alarm and Signal Circuits on Controller. 12.6.9.1 Controllers shall be equipped to operate circuits for remote indications of conditions the covered in 12.4.3.1(A) through (D). 12.6.7.5 12.6.10 Additional Alarms. (moved to 12.6.8.5 and 12.6.8.5.1)12.6.7.5.1 12.6.10.1 Where audible alarms for the conditions listed in A.5.23 are incorporated with the engine alarms pecified in 12.6.7.3, a silencing switch or valve for the A.5.23 audible alarms shall be provided at the controller.12.6.7.5.2 12.6.10.2 The circuit shall be arranged so that the audible alarm will be activated if the silencing switch or valve is in the silent position when the supervised conditions are normal. 14.2.11 Simulated Conditions. Both local and remote alarm and signal conditions shall be simulated to demonstrate satisfactory operation. A.5.23 In addition to those conditions that require alarm and signals for pump controllers and engines, there are other conditions for which such alarms signals might be recommended, depending upon local conditions. Some of these supervisory alarm signal conditions are as follows: (1) Low pump room temperature (2) Relief valve discharge (3) Flowmeter left on, bypassing the pump (4) Water level in suction supply below normal (5) Water level in suction supply near depletion (6) Diesel fuel supply below normal (7) Steam pressure below normalSuch additional alarms signals can be incorporated into the trouble alarms signals already provided on the controller, or they can be independeSUBSTANTIATION: A re-write of alarm and signal requirements is needed.COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The terminology for alarms and signals has not yet been determined by the Committee.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 24 Negative: 1 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICKEXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: DELERNO: This was a task force’s attempt to clarify any confusion concerning “alarm” and “signal” definitions without capitulating to the NFP 72 definitions. I believe that it does that and that it should be accepted.

_______________________________________________________________20-184 Log #28 Final Action: Reject(Entire Document) _______________________________________________________________SUBMITTER: Denyse Dubrucq, AirWars DefenseRECOMMENDATION: Add new text to read as follows: For buildings equipped with Liquid Nitrogen fixed fire control systems, the delivery of the cryogen must be swift and safe. The pipes must be purged of air to prevent icing and water condensation. Pipes must be thermally insulated and have anti-backflow valves to prevent moisture from invading the pipelines. Gaseous Nitrogen from evaporation of the stored Liquid Nitrogen bleeds through the pipes outgassing at the dispensing unit at a slow rate on a continuous basis. The reservoir of Liquid Nitrogen must be above the pipes and have downhill flow to the dispensing unit. The only pumps needed are for Liquid Nitrogen delivery to the high mounted reservoir. This reservoir should hold enough Liquid Nitrogen to fill the space stopping the fire. The fire department may bring Liquid Nitrogen to the scene and can augment the fixed supply as needed to complete the fire fighting operation. An opening in the system allows adding the Fire Department’s Liquid Nitrogen supply to the fire control process. This can provide precautionary Nitrogen to adjacent locations after clearing out residents if the fire is threatening to spread or control a larger fire than the fixed reservoir can handle.SUBSTANTIATION: To address the outgassing proposed, Murray Brian Calvert, partner of AirWars Defense, mathematician, defined here how to estimate oxygen levels in a room: 1. Assuming that an extinguisher leaks N cubic yards of nitrogen gas per day into a vacant room, and that the ventilation system pumps A cubic yards of

fresh air into the room per day, and that these gases mix well before leaving the room: The concentration of oxygen in the room will gradually decrease to 21%* A/(A+N). Note that A+N will be the rate at which air leaves the room. For example, if the extinguisher leaks N=1, and the incoming ventilation rate is A=20, then the oxygen level will go down from 21% to 21%* 20/(20+1) = 20% 2. If there are humans or other living things respiring in the room, using up R cubic yards of oxygen per minute, and plants photosynthesizing P cubic yards of oxygen per minute, then the oxygen concentration could go down to (0.21A-R +P)/(A+N), again depending on mixing. This equation implies that, when there is more respiration than photosynthesis, the ventilation rate can always be increased to offset the effect of nitrogen leakage, meeting the same air quality standards. If there is more photosynthesis than respiration, then the oxygen level will go up and carbon dioxide will drop, no problem for living things. Nitrogen leakage should not make it harder to get rid of exhaled carbon dioxide. 3. If air exhausts from the room near the nitrogen leak, there will be less mixing, so oxygen levels will be closer to normal than as described above. 4. The size of the room does not affect the ultimate oxygen levels in these equations! However, building codes require a higher ventilation rate for a larger room, since there would potentially be more people breathing in it. All other quantities being equal, changes are slower in a large room than in a small room. That is why room volume becomes important when extinguishing a fire. Addressing the proposal in general, included with the drawing of a Liquid Nitrogen dispensing unit is justification of including Liquid Nitrogen with water fire control. The reasons this, rather than halon-type chemical fire control categories, is where Liquid Nitrogen methods should be included in the NFPA Codes and Standards.

This drawing of a unit system where 10 indicates a reservoir, 10a the transfer tubing, 11 the dispenser, and 14 the means to affix the dispenser to the window inset or wall. When the Liquid Nitrogen is dispersed it is liquid 2 and as it evaporates it is gaseous 4. In the case of a Liquid Nitrogen (LN) fixed fire control system, the reservoir can hold one or more quantities to flood one or more living units with Nitrogen. Fire department LN supplies can add to the volume for multiple unit fires. Liquid Nitrogen systems should be included with Water Systems for the following reasons: 1. Both Nitrogen and water are major ingredients in the natural earth’s atmosphere. 2. Both Liquid Nitrogen and liquid water are brought to the fire scene. 3. Both are fire retardants in their gaseous form. 4. Both provide cooling of the vicinity of the fire through evaporation. 5. Both in great volume do not pollute the atmosphere. 6. Both in great volume do not pollute the watershed. COMMITTEE MEETING ACTION: Reject COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Inadequate substantiation of need and technology. Appears to be outside the scope of NFPA 20. The submitter should persue this technology through NFPA 2001, Standard on Clean Agent Fire Extinguishing Systems, 12, Standard on Carbon Dioxide Extinguishing Systems, 12A, Standard on Halon 1301 Fire Extinguishing Systems.NUMBER ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 27BALLOT RESULTS: Affirmative: 25 BALLOT NOT RETURNED: 2 LEICHT, MEZSICK