report on the investigation of the grounding of ¨msc ... de... · page 1 of 24 report on the...

Grounding of MSC MAGALI Captain Manuel ManeroAccidents Investigator

Panama Maritime Authority General Directorate of Merchant Marine

Marine Casualty Investigation Branch Panama, Republic of Panama

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REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION OF THE GROUNDING OF

¨MSC MAGALI

PORT OF SALVADOR DE BAHIA BRAZIL

DECEMBER 9TH, 2007

R-032-08/DISAM




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INTRODUCTION The Marine Casualty Investigation Branch of the Panama Maritime Authority received the “Report of vessel casualty or accident”, dated 12.14.07, describing that the M/V MSC MAGALI with IMO No. 7819357, grounded on soft mud when making a turn around the breakwater, without human injuries (See appendix No 1). On December 19th, 2007 the undersigned investigator was nominated to conduct the investigation by means of letter No. 104-01-109-DGMM/DISAM (See appendix No 2), following the correspondence received by the Marine Casualty Investigation Branch from Messrs. MSC Ship Management. Immediately upon the receipt of the appointment, the website “Equasis” (www.equasis.org) was consulted relative to named ship as to her full identification, classification, and inspections by the various PSC MoU, showing that the ship was found with 5 minor deficiencies in the last 2 PSC inspections during the year 2007. The ship is classed with American Bureau of Shipping and, without any overdue Conditions of Class. Statutory Certificates issued by American Bureau of Shipping, and Bureau Veritas. (See section 10, appendix No 3 and 13). This report was made in accordance with Panamanian National regulations, the Code for the Investigation of Marine Casualties and Incidents, (Resolution A.849 (20) adopted on November 27th, 1997, as amended by IMO Resolution A.884 (21), adopted on November 25th, 1999, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the International Conventions to which Panama is a Party.




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OBJECTIVE The objective of the investigation of the grounding of MSC MAGALI is to determine its cause(s), in order to prevent future accidents of the same nature, to identify errors, whether technical or human, in order to correct them, and to avoid recurrence of accidents of this nature. This investigation is not for the purpose of determining liability, or to apportion blame; however, the investigating authorities have not refrained from fully reporting the cause(s) because fault or liability may be inferred from the findings.




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SYNOPSIS At 0738 local time on December 9th, 2007 the Panama registered container vessel MSC MAGALI was reported to run ground in a bank of sand 3 cables off the North end of the breakwater in the port of Salvador, Brazil, in position 12º 57.088” S and 38º 30.553” W. She was on passage from Rio de Janeiro to Barcelona via Las Palmas. Six hours later, with the high tide, the Master managed to successfully refloat the ship without any damage using the ship´s own propulsion.




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INDEX

1. GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS

2. PARTICULARS OF THE SHIP

3. HULL

4. MACHINERY

5. BACKGROUND TO THE INCIDENT

6. MANAGEMENT COMPANY

7. NARRATIVE

8. WEATHER CONDITIONS

9. PARTICULARS OF THE CREW

10. VESSEL’S CERTIFICATION

11. NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT

12. PASSAGE PLANNING

13. ANALYSIS

14. CONCLUSIONS

15. RECOMMENDATIONS

16. APPENDIXES




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1. GLOSSARY AND ABBREVIATIONS Marine incident: means an occurrence or event being caused by, or in connection with, the operations of a ship by which the ship or any person is imperiled, or as a result of which serious damage to the ship or structure or the environment might be caused. DPA: Designated person ashore LBP: Length between Perpendiculars MCR: Maximum Continuous Rating KW: Kilowatts PSC: Port State Control ENE: East-North-East




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2. PARTICULARS OF MSC MAGALI

Previous Names: AMBER I, APL AMBER, NOL AMBER

Former name: NEPTUNE AMBER

Previous Flags: Republic of Singapore (January 23rd, 2002 - May 19th, 2002)

Oficial Number: 28705-02-A IMO Number: 7819357

Registered owner: COMPAÑIA NAVIERA MAGALI S.A. C/O Eskildsen & Eskildsen, 50th Street No.102, Edificio Universal, Panama, Republic of Panama

Manager Operator: MSC Ship Management (Hong Kong) Limited 45th Floor, the Centre 99, Queen's Road Central Hong Kong

DPA: Mr. Arvind Sharma

Flag: Panama

P&I Club: The West of England Shipowners (20-Feb-07)

Type: Containership

Delivery Date: Mar 1st , 1980

Keel Laying Date: June 20th, 1979

Builder: IHI MARINE UNITED INC.

Date of conversion Not applicable

Classification society: American Bureau of Shipping

Class notation: A1, , AMS Length overall: 234 m

LBP: 216.23 m

Molded Breadth: 32.2m

Molded Depth: 19m

Gross tonnage: 33113

Engine power: 8400 kW




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3. HULL Hull No. 2688

Material: Ordinary Strength Steel

Construction Double bottom

Decks: 1

Stiffener Systems: On Side Shell : Longitudinal

Bulkheads: 9 watertight

Ballast tanks: 16

Fuel oil tanks: 15

Fresh water tanks: 5

Lubricating oil tanks: 5

Waste Water tanks: 2

Diesel Oil tanks: 2

Potable Water tanks: 1

Slop tanks: 1

Cargo holds: 6

Freshwater Capacity: 485 CuM/475.3 tons

Fuel Oil Capacity: 7261 CuM/6825.34 tons

Ballast Capacity: 10191 CuM/10191 tons




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4. MACHINERY

Manufacturer’s Name: ISHIKAWAJIMA-HARIMA HEAVY INDUSTRIES CO.,LTD.

Cylinder Bore: 899.922 mm

Number of Cylinders: 12

MCR: 29989.2 Kw

Piston Stroke: 1549.908 mm

Propeller Material: Bronze

Main Power Distribution: 3 Generators, rated power 1600 Kw, 1600 Kw and 1200 Kw

Bow thruster provided




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5. MANAGEMENT COMPANY

The Management Company of MSC MAGALI is MSC SHIP MANAGEMENT HK LTD with IMO No 1932716, is located at 99, Queen's Road Central, Hong Kong HONG KONG, CHINA, and operates around 90 vessels between General Cargo and containerships, but mainly Containerships.




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6. NARRATIVE All times are ship’s times (GMT –3). December 9th, 2007 started with MSC MAGALI being anchored in the inner anchorage of Porto de Salvador, waiting for berthing. The Second Officer on duty had prepared the vessel as per the Safety and Quality Management System (SQMS) procedure “Preparation for Arrival Port” (See appendix No 4). The Pilot, boarded at 0618 hrs. while the vessel still anchored. The pilot was given the ship’s pilot information card in “Pilot Card” (SQMS) (See appendix No 5). He then described the intended route to the “TECON” container terminal and other pilotage details required in the “Master Pilot Exchange Checklist” (SQMS) (See appendix No 6). Shortly after weighing anchor, the vessel was heading for the North entrance at a speed of 4.5 knots, as per Pilot’s advice. Master asked the pilot to be assisted by two harbour tugs. The tugs assigned were the “Lagoa Carioca” and the “Arcturus” (See appendix No 7). Both said to be of 28 tonnes of bollard pull. The bridge was also manned by the Chief Officer, as duty officer, and an Able Seaman at the wheel. The current was setting SSW at 2 knots. The Pilot estimated the ship’s position and movement by eye. Master was reliant on the Pilot in controlling the harbour passage and the tugs rendezvous to make fast to the ship before the breakwater. At 0705 hrs., the breakwater was abeam on starboard side, as per the Bridge Log Book. At 0709 hrs., both the “Lagoa Carioca” and the “Arcturus” were made fast, respectively, at starboard quarter and starboard bow main deck, using their own lines. Immediately thereafter the Pilot ordered the tugs to pull.




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Shortly thereafter the vessel gently ran aground at a speed of about 4.5 knots on her port bow, although it was not entirely assumed until 0738, with a final position of 12º 57.088’ S and 038º 30,453’ W, and a heading of 166.3º (See appendix No 7). At 0738 hrs., a third tug, the “Brigantia,” joined the other two in a vain attempt to refloat the vessel (See appendix No 7). At 0747 hrs., the tugs “Lagoa Carioca” and “Brigantia” let go. Master began implementing the company emergency procedures, which included sounding the tanks and inspecting the vessel for ingress of water and bunker leakage as appropriate. At 1040 hrs., Master then attempted to maneuver her clear of the sand bank by means of the bow thruster; as she did not move, Master decided to wait for instructions from the MSC Office. At 1318 hrs., Master asked to try out the main engine. It was found in order. At 1320 hrs., two (2) pilots boarded the ship. The master then ordered to start engine to refloat the vessel. At 1340 hrs., the vessel was refloated and sent back to the inner anchorage for investigation as per Brazilian rules. At 1400 hrs., the vessel passed the breakwater at port side. At 1425 hrs., one of the pilots disembarked. At 1450 hrs., let go starboard anchor. Then at 1512 hrs., the vessel was brought up with 6 shackles of cable in the water with Northeasterly winds of force 3 / 4. Sea watches kept. Anchor bearings frequently checked. The vessel maintained her position. All tanks and hold bilges checked as per company instructions. As verbally declared by Master to the undersigned investigator, after an assessment of the Class surveyor based on a full underwater survey (divers), which reported no damage in the vessel plating, she was able to continue unconditionally in service. It also satisfied the local harbour authority, who cleared the ship.




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7. WEATHER CONDITIONS Weather conditions at the time of the grounding were declared as of “light airs” and “rippled sea”, as per Bridge Log Book. Additionally, the Distance of Visibility was declared as “Overcast”, with a wind ENE, Directions of the sea “RIPPLED TOWARD SHORE,” and no swell. Low water was predicted to occur at 0926 hrs..




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8. PARTICULARS OF THE CREW The vessel is operated with 29 crewmembers (See appendix No 8). All the crewmembers were found with valid Panamanian endorsements (See appendix No 9). MSC MAGALI is operated in a three-watch system covered by three deck officers. This left the Master free to conduct non-watch keeping bridge duties. The remainder of the deck crew watch consisted of three AB seamen and two Ordinary seamen. As a matter of fact, the deck cadets also kept bridge watches (See appendix No 10). The Master The Master, aged 38, is an Indian citizen. He started his sea career in 1991, serving as Master since 2004, the last two years being with MSC (See appendix No 11). Chief Officer The Chief Officer, aged 30, is an Indian citizen. He was holding an Indian Master Mariner License since October, 2007. He joined MSC in 2005 (See appendix No 12). Chief Engineer Chief Engineer, aged 54, is a Philippino citizen. He signed off on December 14th, 2007 before starting of this investigation.




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9. VESSEL’S CERTIFICATION A “Patente Reglamentaria de Navegación”, No. 20705-02-B was issued on November 14th, 2007 with expiration date November 14th, 2011; same was found onboard. The ship is classed with the American Bureau of Shipping, and is without any overdue Conditions of Class. Class Certificate Date of Issue Expire date

Full term Apr-24 -2006 Mar - 31 -2009 Class Survey status as follows: Survey Type Due Date

Annual Hull Survey 4 Mar 31 2008

Annual Machinery Survey 4 Mar 31 2008

Boiler Survey - Auxiliary Boiler Mar 31 2009

Boiler Survey - Waste Heat Boiler Mar 31 2009

Drydocking Survey Mar 31 2009

Special Continuous Survey Machinery 6 Mar 31 2009

Special Periodical Survey - Hull 6 Mar 31 2009

Tailshaft Survey - Tail Shaft - Oil Mar 05 2008




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Statutory Certificates were also issued by the American Bureau of Shipping. However, the Document of Compliance was issued by Bureau Veritas, as follows: Certificate Authority body Expiration

Date Document of Compliance BV 2011-01-19

Safety Management Certificate ABS 2009-01-13

Oil Pollution Prevention ABS 2009-03-31

Cargo Ship Safety Radio ABS 2007-10-30

Cargo Ship Safety Construction ABS 2009-03-31

Cargo Ship safety equipment ABS 2007-11-07

DOC for dangerous goods ABS 2009-03-31

Load Line certificate ABS 2009-03-31 Copies of the statutory certificates can be found within this report (See appendix No 13).




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10. NAVIGATIONAL EQUIPMENT MSC MAGALI´s bridge was spacious (See appendix No 10), had open bridge wings, and a navigational area with a forward facing chart table extended aft on starboard side. All the bridge navigational devices, inter alia, two Sperry Marine X Band Radars fitted with ARPA, were fitted on starboard side, two GPSs mounted over the chart table, one FURUNO FE-700 digital echo sounder, one TOKIO KEIKI course recorder and engine movements recoded, Rudder angle indicator, RPM, and one TOKIO KEIKI giro compass with three repeaters on the bridge, were reported to be in good working conditions. Steering gear hard-over to hard-over, main engine and bow thruster, checked.




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11. PASSAGE PLANNING The nautical chart used was the British Admiralty number 545, Ports in Bahia de Todos os Santos, to a scale 1: 20,000, published by the United Kingdom Hydrographic Office. This chart is a three-in-one document, representing three different areas of the whole bay, in which the portion for the Salvador port area is a mere 1/34 of the chart surface. (See appendix No 14 and 15). Nevertheless, that chart was duly corrected to be in compliance with the latest applicable Notice to Mariners, No. 5016 (2006). The ship´s voyage passage plan to Salvador did not include the harbour passage plan, (or part of it) as the Company’s Safety Management System does not establish procedures to include harbour passage plans within its voyage planning procedures. In fact, SOLAS Regulation V/34 does not require a berth to berth planning, although it is recommended by the IMO Resolution A.893 (21).




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12. ANALYSIS This was an event of concurrence of responsibilities where Master, in exercising his overriding authority and the responsibility to make decisions with respect to safety and pollution prevention (ISM Code 5.2), had to accept by law a port pilotage that could not be monitored by the ship due to the inadequate mapping of the zone, as well as to, in fact, conceded his overriding authority to the Pilot for any ship/tug boat communications due to language barriers, as Master did no speak Portuguese. Though the British Admiralty Chart No. 545 could be considered a good coastal chart, it was not appropriate for monitoring vessels in waters of Porto de Salvador. Actually, this chart was produced by the United Kingdom Hydrographic Office as “derived data,” from the Brazilian body “Centro de Hidrografía da Marinha,” Ministry of Defense. A larger scale chart would enable more information and space on which to plot regular positions and monitor the Pilot’s advises, in order to respond meaningfully to the company’s safety management “Master Pilot Exchange Checklist” procedure, and to comply with Resolution A.893(21), ANNEX: “Guidelines For Voyage Planning”, Objective 1.3), which states that:

“Voyage and passage planning includes appraisal, i.e. gathering all information relevant to the contemplated voyage or passage; detailed planning of the whole voyage or passage from berth to berth, including those areas necessitating the presence of a pilot; execution of the plan; and the monitoring of the progress of the vessel in the implementation of the plan.”

Every compulsory harbour pilot service, as it was, should be rendered according to a guidance approved by harbour authorities meeting the IMO Resolution A.960 (23), regarding pilot training, who inter alia states that:




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“Every pilot should be trained in bridge resource management with an emphasis on the exchange of information that is essential to a safe transit. This training should include a requirement for the pilot to assess particular situations and to conduct an exchange of information with the master and/or officer in charge of the navigation watch. Maintaining an effective working relationship between the pilot and the bridge team in both routine and emergency conditions should be covered in training. Emergency conditions should include loss of steering, loss of propulsion, and failures of radar, vital systems and automation, in a narrow channel or fairway”

On the other hand, and as a contributing factor the ship´s bow thrusters was underpowered in 700 BHP of its 1500 BHP.




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13. CONCLUSIONS There was no reason why an earlier notice to the tugs to be in rendezvous position could not have been planned and executed by the Pilot, taking into account that the bow thrusters was working at 800 BHP of its 1500. The cause of the incident was a failure to prevent the vessel drifting over the sand bank. The lack of any sort of formal plan of the pilotage area may be considered a contributory cause. The chart used was insufficient for an effective monitoring of the vessel within the waters of Porto de Salvador. The photos ((See appendix No 16) Barcelona 12/26/07) of the existing chart shows no signs of fix plotting, with the exception of a circle marking the position of the grounding (See appendix No 14 and 15).




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14. RECOMMENDATIONS It would be desirable to recommend to the MSC Ship Management (Hong Kong) to monitor the standard of passage plans as per IMO Resolution A.893 (21) “Guidance for Voyage Planning”, with an emphasis to harbour pilotage waters. It would also be advisable to suggest to the Brazilian Authorities, as to the adequate chart of Porto de Salvador to the needs of the international merchant fleet, as well as, on the other hand, to revise the safety management of this port.

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