report on the threat of terrorism (collaborative)
DESCRIPTION
This report questions whether the US reaction to the 9/11 terror attacks were in fact an overreaction, by considering political rhetoric, psychological studies and statistics showing the actual size of the threat. Written by Maria Floyd and Emma Cassidy.TRANSCRIPT
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International Security and Terrorism: Group Report
International Security and Terrorism:
Group Report
Terrorism as a subjective threat: did the United States overreact to 9/11?
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Contents
Part One: Framing the Question……………………………………………………………………………………………..….pp.2-4
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………..p.2
What is Terrorism……………………………………………………………………………………………………….pp.2-3
Measuring Risk……………………………………………………………………………………………………..…….pp.3-4
Part Two: An Objective Threat……………………………………………………………………………………………..…….pp.4-6
Risk and Reaction……………………………………………………………………………………………………….pp.4-5
The Precautionary Principle……………………………………………………………………………………….pp.5-6
Part Three: A Subjective Threat…………………………………………………………………………………………….…….pp.6-8
Psychological Terrorism……………………………………………………………………………………………..pp.6-7
Encouraging Fear………………………………………………………………………………………………………….….p.8
Part Four: Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………….p.9
List of Figures and Illustrations
Fig. 0,Cover Photo, (New York City Police Aviation Unit, 2001).
Fig. 1, Lifetime chance of death by cause, US 2008 (National Safety Council, 2012)………………………p.4
Fig. 2, Dread risk and unknown risk (Marshall et al. 2007:308)………………………………………………………p.7
Fig. 3, George W. Bush is told about 9/11 (Agence France-Presse, 2001)…………………………….………....p.8
Fig. 4, Cover of the New York Times on 12/09/2001 (NYT, 2001:1)………………………..……………………….p.9
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Part One: Framing the Question
Introduction
The 9/11 terrorist attacks induced change within the United States, terrorism became the priority of policymakers and
the homeland security department was formed, leading to the ‘war on terror’ and the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan.
The date marks the beginning of an ‘age of terror’.1 In this report we argue that the United States has overreacted to
9/11 due to the extent of the subjective threat of terrorism; this is the concept that terrorism, by creating fear and
uncertainty, leads to excessive and disproportionate reactions. After considering complications in measuring risk, we
conceptualize the terrorist threat posed by 9/11 and compare this to the US reaction. We then consider why the US
may have overreacted to 9/11 by evaluating how the subjective threat of terrorism has affected the public through the
creation of psychological terror, which is encouraged by politicians and the media. We acknowledge alternative
motives for the US overreaction, such as to achieve other political motives or to maintain a strong international image
in the wake of their arguably declining hegemony, however these reasons are not the focus of this report which
concentrates on classifying the terrorist threat. Evaluating the US response to terrorism is important because it
influences power, money and even threatens lives in the case of a military response (Jackson et at., 2011:125) and the
fear created by the response to terrorism may also have a psychological effect on populations (Friedland & Merari,
1986:234).
What is Terrorism?
A broad and encompassing definition is that terrorism is the use or threat of violence with political aims and motives,
with a target which is bigger than the immediate victims of violence (Lutz & Lutz, 2008:9). There is a terminological
difficulty in creating a more concise definition of terrorism due to wide variation in the use of the term (Schmid,
2011:39). Therefore, instead of deliberating the possibilities for a universal definition, we will create a more specific
and relevant concept of terrorism by considering the key features of our case study. In literal terms, the 9/11 attack
was perpetrated by the Islamic extremist group al-Qaeda and suffered by the United States. It caused the deaths of
1 Some interpret this rhetoric as an extreme exaggeration (Mueller, 2005:478).
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Security, ‘in the subjective objective sense,
measures the absence of threats to previously
acquired values, in a subjective sense, the
absence of fear that such values will be attacked’
(Wolfers, 1952:485)
2,977 people and the collapse of the World Trade Centre (CNN, 2013). Based on these facts, 9/11 was an act of
violence by a sub-state group, the perpetrator had a wider aim, the target was a national landmark and the act caused
many fatalities. An important counterpart of these features in relation to this report is the dramatic nature of the attack;
the magnitude and high profile of the attack created shock and therefore became the focus of mass media attention.
This is a common feature of terrorist acts; even before 9/11, Diana Taylor argued that terrorist attacks were purposely
theatrical because they have symbolic aims (1990:165). The wider aim or ‘symbolic’ aim of a terrorist group means
that attacks have the object of gaining as much attention as possible,
A further clarification of our interpretation of terrorism is
the distinction we make between objective and subjective
terrorism. This idea is grounded in Arnold Wolfers’ original
definition of national security, which distinguishes between
real ‘objective’ threats and imagined ‘subjective’ threats. In
the objective sense, terrorism may be a threat because of the actual use of violence, and in the subjective sense,
terrorism may be perceived as a threat because it creates fear that violence will be used.
Measuring Risk
A key barrier in knowing whether the US has overreacted to the threat posed by 9/11 is the difficulty in identifying the
level of threat. The global policy think tank RAND suggests that a difficulty for security policy in general is that
threats are often located in the future and are therefore inherently hypothetical (Jackson & Frelinger, 2009:ix). The
post-9/11 threat to the US has been defined as anything from unlimited to non-existent; columnists such as Charles
Krauthammer suggest that terrorism threatens ‘civilization itself’ (2004:A19) whilst academics such as John Mueller
suggest that the terrorist threat has been exaggerated and that now almost no threat exists in the US (2006:2). Jackson
et al. identify three methods used to measure the terrorist threat: statistically, statistically with psychological analysis
and by using the precautionary principle (Jackson et al., 2011:128). This report uses a combination of these three
methods; it draws upon statistical research but also considers how this numerical information has been analysed and
interpreted in order to understand both the level of threat posed by 9/11 and whether the reaction from the US was
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appropriate. The precautionary principle is suggested within our analysis when we consider whether the terrorist threat
may be bigger than statistics imply.
Part Two: An Objective Threat
In this section, we classify the extent of the ‘actual’ or objective terrorist threat and compare this to the US’s reaction.
Firstly we measure both the threat and the reaction statistically, using the number of fatalities and financial cost as
indicators. Then, using the precautionary principle, we consider any reasons for which the US may believe that the
objective threat is bigger than these numbers suggest.
Risk and Reaction
The magnitude of the 9/11 attacks created an
unprecedented level of fear; US President Barack
Obama described 9/11 as the ‘worst attack on the
American people in history’ (2011). Given that 2,977
people died as a direct result of the attacks (CNN,
2013), we may contextualize the extent of the threat by
considering comparative death tolls. Fig. 1 shows that
there are many more threatening risks than terrorism in
the US, where you are more likely to die from being
stung by a bee, or because of a fireworks discharge.
Other studies show that even in 2001 the risk of death
from causes such as homicide and even by accidental
choking were higher than those of dying in a terrorist
attack (Marshall et al., 2007:310). With the exception of 2001, the risk of death from a terrorist attack in the US has
been virtually non-existent, in almost all years fewer than ten Americans die worldwide at the hands of terrorists (US
State Department, 1997). On the other hand, Jackson et al. argue that terrorist attacks usually target property as
opposed to people and may therefore have a higher financial harm cost (2011:130). The New York Times used
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research from a range of national and international institutions to find the cost of 9/11, and claims that the economic
impact of 9/11 was $123 billion (Carter & Cox, 2011).
The US responded to 9/11 with the invasions of Iraq and Afghanistan and the creation of the Homeland Security
department. Paul Rogers classified the response as ‘vigorous and extended’ with an ‘overwhelming use of firepower’
(Rogers, 2013:221). The ‘war on terror’ has so far killed 5,281 American soldiers (Griffis, 2014) and 186,000 Iraqis
(Iraq Body count, 2014). In terms of financing the war on terror, a recent study from Harvard suggests that the war has
cost somewhere between $4 and $6 trillion (Blimes, 2013:1). This suggests even more loss of life when considering
that this money could have been spent, for example, on health care or on tackling gun crime. Even if we disregard
these possibilities as well as the detrimental impact the war on terror has had on Iraq and Afghanistan, America’s
response to 9/11 has cost 2,304 more American lives and around $4 trillion more American dollars than 9/11 did.
These statistics alone suggest that the US has overreacted at an extortionate level.
The Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle suggests that states should
actively try to prevent a threat even before there is any
evidence of that threat (Jackson et al., 2011:128). The
unpredictability associated with terrorism means that future
threat is unknown and therefore states have to make a decision between taking precautionary action or running the risk
of being attacked; this is the security dilemma (Herz, 1962:232). John Mueller argues that al-Qaeda is unlikely to
disappear (2005:491), the persistence and uncertainly surrounding terrorist groups creates the possibility that a
terrorist attack could happen at any time, which may explain why a states response to terrorism is often more extreme
than the act itself.2 This sentiment is echoed by the US; homeland security released statements shortly after 9/11
claiming that another terrorist attack could happen at any moment. Additionally, as the events which would have
occurred if the US had ‘done nothing’ are unknown, there is a possibility that terrorist attacks would have occurred,
and therefore supporters of the regime argue that the terrorist threat has been significantly reduced because of the
2 Mueller references other times in history in which states have ‘overreacted’ to a terrorist threat, such as the Russian reaction to
Chechen terrorism in 1999 and the US attack on Sudan after terrorist attacks towards American embassies in Africa in 1998
(Mueller, 2005:491).
‘Today’s terrorists can strike at any place, at any
time, and with virtually any weapon’
(Homeland Security, 2002:8).
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government reaction (Jackson et al., 2011:131). Other argue that the Iraq conflict has actually increased the spread of
the ‘al-Qaeda ideological virus’. One study, drawing upon data from an MIPT-RAND terrorism database, found that
the rate of terrorist attacks around the world by jihadist groups and the rate of fatalities in those attacks more than
doubled after the invasion of Iraq (Bergen & Cruickshank, 2007:1). Therefore, evidence suggests that the US has not
slowed down the rate of terrorist attacks, although it would be impossible to tell whether there would have been even
more attacks if the US had ‘done nothing’ in response to 9/11. Considering the number of fatalities and the financial
cost does suggest that the US did overreact to 9/11. However, 9/11 represents the threat of terrorism which is now a
possibility for the future, and therefore some argue that the impulsive reaction of the US was necessary in order to
prevent further terrorism.
Part Three: A Subjective Threat
In this section we argue that terrorism is a subjective threat due to the psychological effects it produces. Terrorism is a
form of psychological warfare; it aims to paralyze the population with fear and anxiety, to intimidate and to induce
worry and concern that is disproportional to and far exceeds the actual damage it causes (Friedland & Merari, 1986;
234). Although terrorist acts injure and hurt their immediate victims, their ultimate goal is to cause a sense of fear and
anxiety, helplessness and vulnerability among the general population. As a result these acts evoke feelings of potential
victimization (Krupnick, 1980: 347, Freedman, 1983; 389-401) unrelated to the actual probability of becoming a
victim of terrorism (Friedland & Merari, 1986; 250). This could explain why the United States overreacted to the
terrorist threat after 9/11.
Psychological Terrorism
The fact that terrorist attacks are unpredictable creates a perception of uncontrollability, which affects one’s capability
of coping with the threat (Klar, Medding & Sarel,1996; 229-245). Studies conducted in the United States have
examined the psychological reaction to the events of September the 11th (Galea, Ahern & Resnick, 2002; 346). The
findings indicate post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms, symptoms with consistent depression, anxiety and
a reduced sense of safety. Although the prevalence of probable PTSD symptoms was significantly higher in the New
York City metropolitan area, it was shown that psychological effects were not limited to those who experienced it
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directly (Stephenson, 2001; 286). Research shows that the effects of the events on September the 11th spread
throughout the country and that individuals continue to have substantial anxiety about future terrorist attacks. Fig. 2
represents how terrorism is seen by the American public as a ‘high signal potential event’ that could happen. This
articulates the widespread fear that the public had to the idea of terrorism which may explain the political policy focus
on counterterrorism (as opposed to a concentration on other equally dangerous threats) .
Fig. 2
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Encouraging Fear
If political leaders focus their policies on terrorism, they can
cause psychological anxiety about the threat within their
country. An example of this is the Bush Doctrine, a political
agenda which created a culture of fear (Furedi, 2005; 124).
The phrase initially justified the 2001 invasion of
Afghanistan with the argument that the United States had the
right to secure its own safety against countries that harbour
or give aid to terrorist groups. Naomi Klein, author of The Shock
Doctrine (2008), claims that the Bush administration exploited a
‘window of opportunity that opens up in a state of shock’ (Klein,
2007). George Bush’s speeches explicitly implied that the US was
under immediate threat of another attack, this caused psychological
terror and anxiety for the citizens of the United States, as they
believed that there was an immediate threat of a terrorist attack
(Glassner, 2010:234).
In a similar vein to political rhetoric, media rhetoric promotes the
fear of future terrorist attacks. The initial reaction of the media
suggests that 9/11 was a colossal threat. In the days following the attacks, newspapers were filled with images of
destruction and fear-inducing headlines; the New York Times cover, shown in Fig. 4, named 9/11 the ‘day of terror’
and ‘a creeping horror’ (New York Times, 2001:1). After the terrorist attacks of September the 11th, Schuster et al.
(2001) conducted a national survey in the United States and found a substantial increase in indicators of stress
throughout the country, suggesting that media coverage communicated the emotional impact of terrorism to distant
audiences. Similar effects have been found in other states in which media coverage of terrorist attacks induce wide-
spread fear.3 The media has the same psychological effect as political figures and institutions in adding to the
3 For example, a survey of Israelis conducted shortly after a series of deadly terrorist attacks found that exposure to coverage
including horrifying details of the attacks, was associated with the development of symptoms similar to post-traumatic stress
disorder (Keinan, Sadeh & Rosen, 2003).
‘If we were not fighting and destroying the
enemy in Iraq, they would not be idle. They
would be plotting and killing Americans across
the world and within our own borders. By
fighting these terrorists in Iraq, Americans in
uniform are defeating a direct threat to the
American people’
(President George W. Bush, 2005)
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subjective threat of terrorism by increasing the level of public fear.
Part Four: Conclusion
Throughout this report, we have made two key arguments:
that the US did overreact to 9/11, and that the US did so in
response to the fear, evident in the level of psychological
anxiety, which was created by the subjective threat of
terrorism. We agree with academics such as John Mueller,
who argue that the costs of terrorism can come from fear
and reaction as opposed to the direct effects of terrorism
(2005:478). This was communicated to the public by
political rhetoric and mass media attention. These
arguments to not ignore the objective threat and harm
caused by 9/11, but simply suggest that the subjective
threat spread further and caused an over exaggeration of
the likelihood of future threat. This is an important
message for critics of policy and academics, who may
benefit from the awareness that policymakers are likely to
respond to terrorist threats disproportionately, and also to
the general public, who may benefit from the knowledge
that terrorism is unlikely to directly threaten them.
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