, ,

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t

. UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

liJ-J/( 00) THmD FLEET

Serial W

DECLASSIFIED Frans The Commander TH:mD'Fleet (formerly' Commander

South Pacifio Force and Area). To a The CCIIIIIDllnder in Chief,United States Fleet. Via a The Ccmmander in Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet

and Pacific Ocean Areas.

Subjects South Pacifio Campaign - Narrative account.

Enclosures (A) Subject Narrative .

1. With my detachment on 15 June 1944 as CODJIlander South P....cific Force and Area, and the simultaneous assumgtion bY' General llacJ.rthur of t ho c d of all forces West or Lone;itude 159 East, the South Pacific Call1paien against Japanese forces virtua.lly ended.

2. The details of the various actions that comprised the S ut h Pacific campaign Jll8.1 be studied in appropriate Action Reports but t he hieb-lights of the campaign can beot be presented i n the more-easily' ro~d narrative form; therefore the enclosure is submitted in oreer that t here may be available, in one document, an authentic presentation of such broad matters as command relations , strategic motives and impl1cat i c ~ t e.cd the mutual sr..d relative relationshl.p or the various ground, amphibious, surface, and air operations.

3. J.1:q study or the individual records of the various Services and components engaged in the South Pacific campaign should inolude a review of the aspects presented in the enclosure in order that the canponent contributions to the campaign results ms:r appea. in . their proper perspective. ..

93556

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,"

'rlll~ DOUTII PACInc AkEA

20 APRIL 1942 to 15 JUNE 1944

'I'he Secretary of t he Navy, on 20 April, 1942, est abl i shed the South Pacific Area, defined as that area bo~,ded on t he north by the equetor, on the west by the one hundred s ixti eth meridinn, e8.':it longitude, and cn the aa by t he om~ hundred t enth meridian, west. l ongitude. Shortly before the commencement of the Guadalcanal operation, the western boundary vras changed to read "one hundred fifty-ninth meridian, east longitude".

Vice Admiral Robort Ghormley, U.S .N., was designated "Com-ander South Paci.fic Area and South Pacific Force ll and under the pr incipla of unity of command on 19 Juno 1942 assumed control of all Army). Navy" Marine Corps , and lUlied Nations t forces then ass igned or to be assigned t o the S01.4th Pacific Area. Het!lCiquarters were established i nitially at Auckland, _~ c.... Zealand. O~ 1 August 1942, a fo rward echolon was set U? on the U,S,S. ,\RGONNE ~t t\oumea, New Caledonia.

The organization of the South Pacific Force at this time included Army units , undor Major General Hillard F. Harmon, Amphibious forces , under Rear AWJl.i.ral Tkrner, and :..farine units under Major Goneral Vandegrift.

f~l Army unit3 in the South Pacific Ar ea were engaged in garriscning 3trQtegically important islands on the lines of communication to t he South and Southvmst Pacific. Major 'Army units at this timG were the Arnl3rical. Division on New Caledonia, the 37th Infant~~r Division in Fiji, the l 47th I nfantry on Tongatabu j supporting gro'.lnd units, nnd certain air units . {ajor General Millard F. Harmon commanded, reporting to Vice Admiral Ghorml ey at Noumea, 1 August 1942. He waG charced with the administration and training of all Army troops , und aosi~ted t he Commander South Pacific Area in the preparation and execution of plans for the employment of ~ forces.

Commander Service Squadron,Captu1n Bowman, moved his headquarters on 29 Sept ember 1942, i'rom Auckland ~ New ZealC'.nd, to Moumea, New Caledord.a. I nitially t he Commander Service Squadron controlled l ittle shipping, due to t he nc d for all Qvailable shipping under the Amphi bious Force Conmar.dor to support the impending Guad~lcanal operations. Ships that normally w~uld,

. have been controlled by Commander Service Squadron were placed in the Transport Group under captain Reifsnidcr.

Nt:ed f or a unified but decentralized air cor;mand nppoarcd early, in vicw of the wide dispersion of air units, t heir dissimil.:l.r compos ition, the variation in available f acilitics , the i nherent difficulties in communication, and the necessity fo r frequent shifting of the 3Ccnty air means available to meet J apanese offensive moves. Rear Admiral rcCain vm.s designated Commn.nder Aircraft, South Pacific Force, on 19 MllY 1942 and charged with the 'welding of an efficient air te::un oomposed. o all ~, N~, and .!a.rine air, and eventually Ncm Zealnnd air component , units ::;horc or tender based. On 21 September 19421 Rear Admiral Fitch succeeded Admirll licCain as Cornnk~der Aircraft, South Pacific.

Operational air control was decentralized to the defense force and t ask force con~nders, und units were frequently redeployed to meet the changi ng situation.. Under the air commondcr in each defense or Task For~ Command there msted an Air Patrol Command, B. Bomber Command, an InterJceptbr COr.lllland, and a Base Corrmand. Navy, Mnrine , Arr:I:!, and New Zenland

- 1 ENCLOSURE (~) ,. .

http:ZealC'.nd

THE SOUTH PACIFIC AREA 20 APRIL 1942 to 15 JUNE 1944

air units were wel ded into one force -- olt~ai~ed were not t he result of the . Ihe ove~'me~Jnine air successes pr~n 1plcs of air force emplo ent br~g d ap l~cat1~n Ol the ideas and r.J.ther were the r osult of the~er . y any 0 e ~ndiv~duaJ. or Service , but onc(; of all ch co/""'''', ... b g1 , of tho knowl edge and combat eYneri1u 1 ' '~,,,,,111cr onofiting from and deli ......

now edge gained by his predeces . ~ ng to the canb

THK SOUTH PACIFIC AREA ." 20 APRIL 1942 to 15 JtmE 1944

It became necessary to vdthdraw the carrier forces 8 August, rule to ::;horta.ge of f uel and plane loss es i ncurred in covering the landings . This vlithdr,'lwa.l loft the Amphibious Force vessels dangerounly exposed to enertY air and surface attack, a danger brcught to r ealization by the night battle of Savo I sland 8-9 August, resulting in the l oss of four cruisers and one destroyer. It .became necessary to withdraw the tran~po!"ts and careo ships rithout complotion of unloading , leaving tho forces llShore in a precarious logistical situation, r emodied only \rlth great difficulty in th- erwui ng da.ys .

During t ho period August 9 to 23, tho troops ashore on Guudalcanal were subjected to numerous counter attackG, daily bombing nttack from tho air , and to almost niehtly bombardments by onany surface forces which operated at will in the area. This conditi.on endod 2.3-25 August I when i n the battle of tho EaGt

THg SOtJ'ru F ACllo'IC ARZA , . 20 APRIL 1942 to 15 JUNE 1944

Air operat i ons at Guadalcanal during this early period were carr ' ed on tmder the moot primitive oper ational conditions and de3pite nn acute shortar:e of personnel. mum the f orward echel on 'Jf l.!AG 23 arri ved , it found a s~rvicing detachment of approximat ely 140 man of Cub One available for f eling , r earming and servicing of aircraft. All fueling was done by Iilec.ns of ha.nd pumps from drums. Reanni ng was done without t he aid of bornb- hc..ndling true aJ , bomb carts or bomb hoi s t s. On numerous occas i ons , pl anes which hadr et'urnud f rom one mi:Jsion would be unable to t ake off on a s econd s t rikL"1g

"mis.:nun due to t he ~fficulty of rei'ueling and r earming the pl anes befor e ,~' C!.l nl.lmy air stri ke uas over the f i eld. It was not until 29 hUQ"'Ust that .

;. ..,1 this init iul r ound s erv:icing force ?lao augm.jnted by tho arrival of llAG 2)IS .. ~ 'iiv'" grcu-'1d personnel and material in the U.S.S. i3tJ1iR.QUJ}B: \'Urt~ oW.s ..,..

~~ Dur ing t he month of August , numer ous llTIIfY B-17s working out of Espiritu Santo on bombi ng missi ons wquld drop in at Guadalcanal for sorvicin6 bef ere r et ur :in; to their home bas e, due , i n .:l. majority of cas es, to l ack of suf

. f ici)nt fuel. In addition, U,\G 23 had inaugurated air evacuation s orvica ~~th DC-3s. These additional planes r equiring servi ces placed an additional 1 ad on th.J alroady sorely-taxed ground cra~ t hen on duty at t hat field, operating under f requunt encll\Y air str ikes .

ring late S ptember and earl y October, General Vandegrift ' s force on Gm~da::..canal \vas reinforced by the 7th Mar i nes f rom the Sa."JOan area. and the 164th I nfantry Resiment, Americal Dhrision, from Noumen. The latte:- r egi(j,ent, arriving on 13 October, Iilet i mmediate employment , f or the J apunes e \'lore mnki ng r epeated attempts by l and , 2.ir, and sea to Imock out Henderson Fiold , in ordor to bring in 'supplies and men without baing subj_ct e.:: to crippling ai attacks. :m attempt t o bombnrd Henderson Fi~ld on the nit;ht of 11- 12 October was thrown ba ck t emporarily i n t he battl e of Cape Esperance , ut t wo nights l ater a J apanese t ask f orce succeeded i n shelling th'3 f ield

for ;m hour and t wenty minutes., Tho f ollowing morning we had only one bomber and t en fighters in condi tion to t ak(; t o the air; they were unable to prevcnt n. r:onvoy of s ix J apr..nes6 t r C'.nsports fror.:. coming in, l:mdil'.g a force cstim;ltcd by General Vl!.l1degrif t to numb~lr 16, 000. Hov:,c:V(.;r, des t ructi on or damaging of t he transports by air str" cs , of t h e:m cor.ri.ng frun Espir itu S"nt o, prevented adoquate supplies and matorial bei:'lg put ashore fO::thG troops l anded.

,01B Octo or 1942, I r elieved ,~dmiral Ghonnley ~ Cor.lOander Sout h 1 -:.c.ific i'Ll'e:;\'

THE SOUTH PACIFI C AREA

20 APRIL 1942 to .15 JUNE 1944

, I The l ast of October saw renewed Ja~unese eff orts to ret~e Henderson

Field. Fi.ve he vy land attacks were turned hack by the defenders 23-25 October. , Ir. or er to capitali ze on t he expected re-capture of Hen0.erson Fielcl a lu.~g ~ Japanese task force drove dovm from the Buln-F&bi .:trea. of South B~uW .in-.,rille, encountering our forces under Admiral KincaJ.cl. in the costly battle of Santa Cruz. Our losses were the HORNEI' .-:.cd the PORTm (DD), besidu J G'lllW. . ~ U to tho lil'TTERPRISE, SOUTH DAKOTA, one CL(Arf: , ...nd onu DD. Two J api,M3, ...' c. :'r:lors were damagod , besides t.wo CA , onl. GL, cna D!:; , a.nd oj ght AKs.. 'r~"t.i.caJ~y, the results of tho bc.ttle may be cor.s:i.dcred unfavarable. but st.:-:\tcg:i.cally we br::lncfited bccl'!.uJe the aircraft ::.C3S C.3 end carrier d~,n.n-B(I ''':lfL:cted on t he enemy kept him f r om providinc nore effective Flir tiUp '>or" f or Lis invasion fleet in the decisive ba.tt l e of Guadalcautt.l , t hroe WUCk3 lilt er- ., . '

T'1c c.U mw. of the Guadalcannl campai Gn ca:ne in the period 11-15 November, ... 1t.h t }:c shflttrn'ing of the cnerrvr's supr ;1\C -;:ffort to overwbc:J . .m our f crc l"!':' < ual' .:'..ir a.cJ'omos on the island had greatly improved , c.nd a r() cent~~rll.1'rived ta.1k forco of 24 suhm' rincs had mo.de tho ::lkc:shift supply mdhod of the "Ta!':J-o Express" even less' satisfactory. Imposi ng Jav.:;.n~se forces were .'l3SeIllb1cd in tho Buin-Fnisi-Tonolci rulcborc..ges , .'lnd an all-ou.t Japanl.lo ....-cd 14-15 ::0 ''::::''0 .r. Our. carri er pIanos frcm. the ENTEHPRISE, shore-based r.t G'I'ld~ca.noJ., pl.:.yed 11 1 iMpVl't :l.11t p"l.rt in c..ir n.tt

TH ~ JOllTIl p:.Cn'IC J~t:.;;.. 20 APIln. 1942 t o 15 JUN31944

lith ttl(; m O'ttiOl, by C,,,. il.v..".nder ;jouth P.:lcific of l\ Jc.int LoGi::;tico llor..rd , co.:..poocd of CVf1J.11:.ndor 80rvicc Squadron, Co.: Uldin.r; General , !:ierviccs uf ";upply ( Arr..y), Cor n ....mdillG Gonerill., SUP:'I1y Sorvice, Fir!3t ~:'''.I'inc Anpi Iiuious Corps J C'.nd C:>rJ:.::nder Fleet Air J IJo\lr.le;: fo:C'cc under Rer.r Admiral Turner, COLlI10s ed of elements of tho I~Jrd Infantry DiVision, the 3rd J..rinc :1.llcer Eat

\ tD.1ion nnd Construction personnel, occupied tho ;;Us3ell I slil.nds 21 Fei'lruary 1943 -1'Iithout resistanco. DoveloIllJcnt of air and minor naval facilitios vr~ ~I~ecilhtely pro6~cd.

The nextstol'> in the adv.'nce up the Solo.wons invol\ped the s eizura ~ establishme-ilt of r.ir buseD on New Gooreia. The moons at han did not appear ,sufficient to justify a diroct assault on tho Vlla-; 'unda area, It T"~ t here.f ore docided to first captuTe :;encovn I s l and and poi nts in Southern Htm GeorGi.::., incluclinr; lickham. Anchorc:.zo, ieni , and Viru. Re.ll' .dmiral Turner cornrr.v.nc.ed the Am.,r.Jhibious Force and ..ajar General Hester the L'lndirl0 Force, eonsinti n:; of " reinforced infD.ntry ciivi::Jion (General Hester 's 4Jrd), ar..d a :iarine rDidor battalion.

The in.i..ti

THE 30UTH P/,CIFI C :JlZA

20 APRIL 1942 to 15 JU:~!: 1944

tho ,'~:round rorce~, retw'nin~ hlrn to cO/:lT,umd of his elivision ( tho 4Jrd) end de~l':IlLlted Uljor enernl G' io';;old, ConY.W.ndin,3 Canoral, XIV Corps , as CQ:l/;'lander 01' .all forces in No~'! Geo ,;a on 15 July 1943.

On 15 Jul y 1943, baGed on 0 ci.cra issued by CinCPac, Rcar I.dniral. Turne \1M r elieved of COf.lf.1D.nd, by eur Admiral .Jilkinson, and \"las directed t.o proceed to Pc 1 f or f urthel' llSsigruncnt to coinmand of the Amphibious Force in the (;ent.ral Pacifi c Aroa. '

,lefore t ho cWllPairm ended ..':ith the seizure of :iunda c.irficld on 5 All..:.'1l 191+3, r nd the moppinG up of t ho oth.:lr areas on deu Geor :ia on 25 Jiu...,"ilBt 194J., three /,rf'''''Y cu.vini:ms (I~:kd, 37th, and 25th) at reduced strel1o~h , a :~ine def n~ b,',tt. lion. a : :ari ne raider b~tta1.ion, and additionul i.rr"f'j ~illery ann t ank Loti ons \'Iere co.' . t tcd.

:Jav1.l opet'ut.i ons cill'ectly iru'luonced tho DUCCe33 of the He'd Geor . a operation. Prior to t he o~eration, cruiser-destroyer t ask forces under Rear Aduir.ll.D J~errill d liii.1~"I0~, :1 OP(3l:'o.tcd D.~ri8in~ tho Guadalcanal aroa, :':heroin t clBk forcos could b~ trained \Uld mount ed. ConnMdiJ'lti General, Services of Supply, \1a3 .c:.ade r08ponsible tor coor~tion" asscnbly end 10Ming

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.TIl~ GOU7U r JICI FIC AH.JJ'J~ 20 j\1':t1L 1942 to 15 J UHJ 1944

of all su!,>pli()s t.o the forrmrd area llhilo CO;:;J.c.nticr .::Jervice Squc.dron lms

r ooponsiLlc f01' cunvoying and rout.ing measures thereto. lUl r..ovcmcnts from

the for'.lurcl ureu to the combat zone \"lore still of necessity controlled by

the :un? libious Force COnl/;1a.naor. ,

'rho no;::t, stO.D in tho prescribed overall l'acific strategy involved the

seizure or 1'lL'Utrnlizution of Bou:;v.inville IGlond, d,th its nwncrous air

ba~cs. Folloi'Jin~ the p2.tt Jrn of tho previous short hops measured in t en:-lS

of' f i Ghtor I'D,diua, i t h~d criginnlly been planned t.o att.acl: Buin-Shortland

ChoiSQul nre['.. Iionever, tho ru'1azin,1 success 0; t.he Vella Lavella opcrd ion

ul1ich byp~s3cd r:olomban~ara and in a fa,! 1'mek:1 forced the evacuat ion or

Kolojllban':-~D l'a ;'Iithout a fit3ht, led to a re-examination of the Solomons' c~

pnign. l'oconnnissrulce showed t.h:;l.t direct assault. on the Ghortlands ,','Ould

be extroJ:\cly costlYjnor could our fichters, oparat.in:; from Shortlnnd fields,

lnt.er cover bomber strikes a;:;u.inst t.he Je:.pancse bastion at nabaul. Con

sideration of (f lesoer ulternut.c o!.)or;:tion involvin'J t ho occupation of t.ho

Trea..ur"'J Island-ChoiGuul Bay r.roa as a r.Jeans 0; noutr

'l'H, : 30t."TH Pi,ClFIO :,:t "..:,

20 iU';W. 191~ to 15 .TUN:: 1944

objective; ho r ei n orced the crcm and I(,oved in artillery and he .. \7 cqui!ll':lent - t.o t he satis '\..ction of HII.

:'~cw /.c.:.lr ncJ and United 3tatc~ troor's \TCl'O a:wi~n!Jd to a prclisri.-k!ry 1r-ndin;.; in t he Tr~! IDIands , nnd J,700 Here cnbarkcd in the first echelon. The t r.:.ns:.lort unite depart.ed frc ra Gu:ldclcanc.l bc;tt'Jeen 23 ~ 26 Octo er and r.rrivoo" o.l; Jlanchc Irarbor, \1hi ch 3 oparatOS ::ono fron ~tirl.in.:; IolL'.nd , ?,t d!'.i';n of 27 Octob~r . Taok Group Y).3, consi sti.n.::; of 2 CL ~ 1

c 10n, undcl.' CPrepc.ratione lor the nouecdnville I nndin..,;o \'lere ac",eleratcd to tho r.lC.Xir.lU ' and the nctual landi~ '. :as r:!.D.do by t he T1IOO ~:ilrino Division on ;; vcr.: er l~t under bench ~ tcrrcl.n conditions t hat ~/erc dOrse then UJYthine ever encQUl.t.ercd bofore in the .south P

The expectod cneny r eacti on to our l andin:; IIl.1.teri2.lized pl'Or.lptly; L!.lthol\,~h the Bou:;lunes un er t'o

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: \ ' TH .~ 'JOUlll r ',cn'IC .ul1A

20 IIl'w.IL 1942 to 15 JU,o; 191.4

-.-- :ll3Gcra lin.::: 1'01'.,11nd of the Co~dcr

South Pa.cific. ~!o other heavy forcos ',tore avail abls or located nGoint it appo;u-ed as t houch not li~

bu.t a SUCCG3si'ul cnl'Ti l3r strike could pl:'cvenL thooncr~r f rom. Clrlp10~ his

. SUl'r~ce force offen~ivcly and d1s~3trously to cur couse. 1\ plun -:mo prep81~qG for p1acine tho S/ul:.TOGi in strikine ?Osition and

f or tho l o:unchil\"; of u. aneoI( t't-(j",clc on tho enemy f l oet M3cnbled in :to.bt

:1llb ~-'ul on !;ovcr.:bcr 11th J..:(,O. ' l tne .j!~_ .TOG;~ ue

t. unl'ort.untl.t e ileath r cO:1ctitions tho strike nllB not coordinr:.ted as rla.mOO

~nd \.as not. ovorly Gucces!.;.i.'ul. HO:'lcvc:r J durin;r. the retirement of the forcC::i I

'fucccsQful~y eli.r.'.inated all the shore-bc:.scci air thl:: tUlCI:iW

could put aC(Qnst them, about 60 pl~nes l ~dthout d~~~a to uny ships in tho

task .:;rou:). 'i'he .s':l:UTCG;\ and PJ~nlc : ..'l.' iJ mede t heir r etirement tnthout a:l,Y

onor.v o!,~sition \l~L',tsoever ..

On c..nothcr occasion "Thirty-One Knot Durke" rdth his "Uttle :Je."lVer8"

~!a.:J t inpcd. off to illl enenw dent roycr J,lovement t OHarcl ~luka I and ~kc sys

t Cl'!k"l.ticull y sank four out of f ive or the dostroyers and cho.scd tho .rU th

virtual~~ into Ji.:!,baul .

~A.trl.l\: tho Christr'lUS holicAYS ~ tr~:? \~ Idd ror Co cruiscr-dostzvJer'

force in Truk l.t-.ic.:.l flas cnde:l.Vorin~ to reinforce or evncuo.to pcrSOIU1.el fI'OlJ.

th~ J snL:l'C {.3. :. baobardnont on 3ulta r.2.::> carried out in such a r.annc:r as to

i ndicutc ir pending land1~I7S . This 'r1M ealculnted to drm'l an ~ttack rom

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tHi~ ':;CUTH PACIFIC ,\RU 20 AP]lL 1942 to 15 JWr..:; 1941f

e=v

Jt.?aricSeno.v2.1 air groups then at IIn tho mcantir.,o the Japs ~;ore not idle,; the :;iD''l'H J Clp..-mese J.\l'.-:-~ Division au.:;:wntcd by ....u.sce;Uc.neous units, ~!1d under the over

TH~~: ;")UUTH PACIFIC 1'1..1&\

20 AP~IL 1942 to 15 JUiB 1944

::.-...;-.---

,..tupid. 'fhey were notTed dO\'ffi \sithout r.larcy and the attack \"Tas actuilly broken up by the killinc of a Bufficient nur.lber of Jcp.:mese to r ender them ineffective. At this \'rriting, over 10,000 J aps have been buried by our forces on Bouea:'.nville. The r on.:Under can probc.b1y mana:~e to ){eep alive but their potentinl effectiveness and heavy weapons h~ve been destroyed. The DouGainvillo cru:1pmr,n was intended t o accomplish the destruction of. en~ air str neth int-he L3ismarcks; not only nas this acconp1ished, but the bypro ,uctD of the carnpni!~n \'Tere so e;ct,cnsive that the subsequent oper::tions at Groen Islo.nd and ::birau \!Cro aC(lomplished vi:.."tually without encr.ty opposition, nd t he entire enol:'(Y of:':emlivo pot entinl in tho 3isr..a.rcks area uas destroyed. In tho snattor of ultim:t objcctive uith t entative tarcet

of 1 I .~ch 1944. Thio operation \'Tas schedulod dr..ultaneously '.lith the

seizure of llo.nus by the 30uthvlest Pacific Forces in order to cor.rplcte the

isolution of Ra.bau1 nnd tho Disr.Ul.rc.k Archipoln:;o . However, rollowin;~ a

. cunference uith CinCP~c in Deceobcr 1943, \":0 were i nformed that t he ostiI:lute

..:It th t time indicated t hct tho Knvfene operations could not start before

1 Hay 1944 due to iJlbility of Cinerac to get tho nocessary Fleet support to

the South Pacific.

In viSi l of the proh~b10 delay in the Kavien-3 tareot date, lie explored \':ays and .r.1cans of continuinG offensive o!,orntions \':it h t he &'cans t hen available'to tho South and Southwest Pacific Areas. In this connection, Fe discussed llit.hConSoiicsPnc the f easibility of his procccctin!:; \"lith the execution of t ho ;.!lln1ls oporll.tion on 1 I.~nrch 1944 \'thile tho South Pacific Force chculd f irst occupy Groan I~J.c.nd (Nisst. ;'-':l.!.thiA.s Groll;l, thus bjpnosin~ t ho stroncly held Kavienc area and yet ~ccompli6hing the ndos10n 01' isolntin~ aabaul and tho Disr.1U'ck !~rchipcl:lr;o

CinC30 :031'ac stated t hut Con:.ioPac was D.t libsrty to seize and occupy Green Island but the situution d.th .i.cenrd to seizure of a St. ::c.thias position in lieu of Kavicll(: Has not clarified until 1,.te J aIlunry 1944) IIhen at Il conference at Pearl CinCGo, ;esr'ac, th~"ou~h his Chief of Stuff , Lieutcrw.nt Oenaro.! 3uthcrland, otntcd that he "onsidorod it cssential th~t SQ1Jth Pacific Forces sei~c and occupy Kt:.vio~ in lieu of one;) or more of the islands in the St. i,:athino Group.

:~canHhile, plans had been prepared for tho sciZ'J.rc of Gro0n lsl3Jld

on 15 Fobrunry 1944, in order to ostD.blish nn tir ase from \'rhich f ichter .

covl..!r could bo o:)oratod ll.gn.iI1.'3t Knvionc as ',roll as :1n.b.'lul .

The soizure and oocupation of Green :tsl.:md was dolegated to Rear Ii l~dr~ral T. S .:ilkinson (CTF 31). Boccuse of tho charnctt!r' of the lc.gQon '. entr~mccs, his f orce did not includo any cupitnl ships but consisted of C hi:,h-speed transports , 12 LCI, 7 W'I', 6 LeT, 17 no, 2 aircraft rescue boats , .2 tu~s, 1 LeL:, 1 PC, 1 :3C , 2 APC, 3 r.'S, 2 LeI GWlboats .:llld other minor unit s. A 1i~ht cruisor t ll.Sl~ force, numbor 39, undor rear Adrn.iral A. S. =':errill, and Mother task force , nULWel" 38" under Rear Admiral ilr L. A1n:nrorth, operated in t he vioinity as covorinf. orc05. Tho attaok and Garr i son forces oonoisted or units o:r t he 3rd NEI\'I Zoalnnd Division undor llAjor General. Iloarrom:louch.

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TIJ.~ Jctri't:. :->:',CITIC A.tU 20 'iJ"l UL 1942. to 15 JthU 1944

In c.ddition, t.here '.rore nav;.:! per.oonnel for a l.lOtor torpedo boc.t ::!nd sa:cl.l cr aft buse .

Th~ t .:!ok '"rouns dcoW'ted frw:: thclr respect-ivc ':-Ol"\:ard bc..scs on 12 and 13 rCbruiJI',/ c.n~i the hi.:;.-spcccl ,ri n::;por ts re~\.chcr'. t heir cl5si71c: arec:a: the lo.~':o~n cntriJ1Ce ,-tt 0620 of 15 FcbruIl1"J" 1944. Troops \;cre put. c:;hore ~t 0655 .L'allm.cd i!1I:.U.:Cll by 3ucccs~ian ,'laves of l\!3!:ltl.ult bo..e .

CinCJ o" :os~r.cdiroct\;!d l;;.e on 14 1 :nrcll 1944 to cMccl the '(e.virlJ o?Crdion and substitute therci'or t~10 zeizurc r:.nd occuortion of ~.ir~u lsl :mc. ac sooa as po;;sible. It i :2.S only nocessa.ry to nclc~ \:'.inol' revi-sion:: in tho pl",n ilroviously ~rcpc.rcd for tllis o)err.tion , end ns u r ~ult the 4tr. ::ar in>3 r.c, ;! :l:~nt J reinforced, \"lac ;:.bh: to execut e u I f.n~r of ~l.mes v.nd air cro', iS to ranl ncG his continuclus stO(~'" 10s.'; 06. This conclition continu~d to erlst 113 ion.1 ~s thore l1 ~)pc;lI'erl to- hir.. to be a possihilit.r of elli:.in . t in,:; our ] ou3c.invillo boac!lo~e:.d , but '. Iit h the dist'.strous ':"jJ:ure ot t hC3 land c.os ...ult on t he perimeter defonse i n ~.:crch 1944. end ldth tho ~,pt\Ssi~ of both ~~abaul nnel I{,wieng by t he sci zuruof cl:lirau on 20 ::.u-ch. it bcccr.:.e ap~a.rent that the cost of the JllP: ne~e ope.rf'.t ions had become too ~:roC'.t to be fUrther sustained. The ;~"1;b.:t.ul airdror.!OD werc continuolly ha.ocLe~~ed, c.nd bJ' I S June 1944, tho da.to l'men oSJorotionnl control of the OQDbat

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':'l r~ JOUTH PltCIl'IC AR.j~

20 lu11UL 1942 to 15 J UNE 1944

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area. rlcs t of thE:: 159th l'lcrioian, r;est lonf~itudc I p~st:ed to Cor.ilTIander in Chief, ~outhilest Pllcii'ic trcn, the H...1.baul airclroraes uere selcor.l o!,crational and supported fo\: if any servicoable planes.

Tho successes of tho South Pc.cific FOl'~e ~'lOro not the achievements 0:1 separate s ervi oes or indivi duals but tho reoult of wholchcmcd subordinntion of acli'-interest by all in order that ono DUCCG:5Sful 1Ii'~hti.ne t e2r.l." could be cre~tcd.:.rtl.lly indivi dunls contributed brilliantly, - VandQ:~rift, HurrJon, Fitch, Ba.rroVTclou~~h, Turner, Geiger, : ~itochor, i:ilJdnson, j:itchall, T\7ininG, ..; to ment ion only D. fOIl. I 'lias parti cul e.rly tortun.'ltc in hl:.v~ Harrr,,'n as co .:m..1.nd:i.rir; General 0; the i \l'TI r:J forc es ; his s oUJ'lll advico and \.nolohc:rted cooperation in nttclnin.:; tho OOl'lMOn ti0al Tlor~ outota.nd1.n:; contributio~ to th6 joint effort.

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.12 UNITED STATES PACIFIC F~ - AND PACIFIC OCEAN AREAS l\ __

BEADQUAB1'SRS OJ' THE COMU.UlDD IN CBID'

erial ( .: . 10 I"

15 SEP 1944

l stEndorsement on ComTHInJ Fl eet Coni. l tr. A16-)/(00), ser. 021, dtd. 3 September 1944 .

From: Commander in Chi 1', u. S. Pacific FIe t and Pacific cean Areas. ..,/'

To Commander. in Chief, U.s. Fleet . ~....~~ 'I. I\I~ ) .~IL

ub j ect: South Paci fic Campaisn - Jarrati ve account.

1. Sub ' ect narrative of t e can.aign in he Sou+h fa:~ic .~o::-. :J ,..-... il , 1942, .- en .,e Ct:. -