REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

~anoiganha~anQuezon City

FIRST DIVISION

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Plaintiff,

CRIM. CASE NO. S8-16-CRM-0801For: Violation of Sec. 121 of the RRACCS

in relation to Sec. 67, Book V, E0292

- versus-Present:

Accused.

DE LA CRUZ, J., Chairperson

MUSNGI*, J.CRUZ**, J.

VICENTE Y. EMANO,

Promulgated on:

JAN 052011 ~

RESOLUTION

DE LA CRUZ, J.

This resolves accused's Motion to Quash (Lack ofJurisdiction), dated November 4, 2016; the prosecution'sComment/Opposition (To the Motion to Quash filed by accusedVicente Y. Emano), dated November 28, 2016; and the accused'sRejoinder to Comment, dated December 12, 2016.

The accused seeks the quashal of the Information on theqround that this Court does not have jurisdiction over the case. Heargues that the jurisdiction of this Court under Section 4(a) of PO1606, as amended by RA 10660, covers violations of RA 3019, RA1379 and the Revised Penal Code such that when the offensedoes not pertain to a violation of any of them, then jurisdiction isvested with the Regional Trial Court, following Section 21 of RA10660.

1 Section 2. Section 4 of the same decree, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:xxxProvided, That the Regional Trial Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the information:(a) does not allege any damage to the government or any bribery; or (b) alleges damage to thegovernment or bribery arising from the same or closely related transactions or acts in an amount notexceeding One million pesos (P1 ,000,000.00).xxx

'Sitting as Special Member of the First Division as per Administrative Order No. 204-2016, dated June 29. 2016."Sitting as Special Member ofthe First Division as per Administrative Order No. 327·20115,dated NovemlJer 25, 20115.

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The accused maintains that since the Information against him.neither alleges damage to the government in any monetary amountnor any bribery, it is the Regional Trial Court which has exclusiveoriginal jurisdiction over his case.

He also asserts that while he was a former city mayor, suchfact is irrelevant considering that the Sandiganbayan can only havejurisdiction over city mayors if the crimes are those mentioned inSection 4(a).

By way of comment/opposition, the prosecution claims thatthe provision of RA 10660 is not applicable to the present case asthe offense was committed by the accused before the effectivity ofsaid law, pursuant to Section 52 thereof. Citing Section 23 of thesaid law, the prosecution also argues that RA 10660 is not a self-executing law, and thus would need the promulgation ofimplementing rules before it can be applied.

In his rejoinder, the accused insists that RA 10660 applies.The Information against him states that the crime was committed"in March 2013, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto." Heargues that the words "subsequent thereto" could encompass aperiod extending beyond March 2013, and even up to the effectivityof RA 10660 in 2015. Moreover, jurisdiction is determined uponthe filing of the Information, which in this case, was done during theeffectivity of RA 10660. The accused also claims that said lawapplies because the trial has not begun, citing Section 5 thereof.

The accused likewise belies the argument that RA 10660 isnot self-executing. According to him, the jurisdiction of theSandiganbayan cannot be made dependent upon rules ofprocedure. Finally, the accused asserts that in case of doubt,interpretation of penal statutes should be construed in favor of theaccused.

The motion is bereft of merit.

2 Section 5. Transitory Provision. - This Act shall apply to all cases pending in the Sandiganbayan overwhich trial has not begun: Provided, That: (a) Section 2, amending Section 4 of Presidential Decree No.1606, as amended, on "Jurisdiction"; and (b) Section 3, amending Section 5 of Presidential Decree No.1606, as amended, on "Proceedings, How Conducted; Decision by Majority Vote" shall apply to casesarising from offenses committed after the effectivity of this Act.3 Section 2. Section 4 of the same decree, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:xxx"Subject to the rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, the cases falling under the jurisdiction of theRegional Trial Court under this section shall be tried in a judicial region other than where the officialholds office.

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Section 4 of PO 1606, as amended, enumerates the casesover which this Court shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction,to wit:

Section 4. Jurisdiction - The Sandiganbayan shallexercise original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter 11, Section 2, Title VII, Book11 of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more of the accusedare officials occupying the following positions in the government,whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time ofthe commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupyingthe positions of regional director and higher,otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, ofthe Compensation and Position Classification Actof 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specificallyincluding:

xxx

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, membersof the sangguniang panlungsod, citytreasurers, assessors, engineers, and othercity department heads;

xxx

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple orcomplexed with other crimes committed by the public officialsand employees mentioned in subsection a. of this section inrelation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and inconnection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issuedin 1986.

xxx

Contrary to the position of the accused, this Court'sjurisdiction is not limited to violations of RA 3019, RA 1379, andChapter 11, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code.As expressly provided under PO 1606 and the amendatory laws,this Court also exercises exclusive original jurisdiction over otheroffenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes

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committed by the public officials and employees mentioned inSection 4(a) in relation to their office. As clarified in People v.Sandiganbayan and Pieze:"

A simple analysis after a plain reading of the aboveprovision shows that those public officials enumerated in Sec. 4(a) of PD. No. 1606, as amended, may not only be charged inthe Sandiganbayan with violations of R.A. No. 3019, R.A. No.1379 or Chapter 11, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised PenalCode, but also with other offenses or felonies in relation to theiroffice. The said other offenses and felonies are broad in scopebut are limited only to those that are committed in relation to thepublic official or employee's office. This Court had ruled that aslong as the offense charged in the information is intimatelyconnected with the office and is alleged to have beenperpetrated while the accused was in the performance, thoughimproper or irregular, of his official functions, there being nopersonal motive to commit the crime and had the accused nothave committed it had he not held the aforesaid office, theaccused is held to have been indicted for "an offense committedin relation" to his office. Thus, in the case of Lacson v. ExecutiveSecretary, et al., where the crime involved was murder, thisCourt held that:

The phrase "other offenses or felonies" istoo broad as to include the crime of murder,provided it was committed in relation to theaccused's official functions. Thus, under saidparagraph b, what determines theSandiganbayan's jurisdiction is the official positionor rank of the offender - that is, whether he is oneof those public officers or employees enumeratedin paragraph a of Section 4. xxx

The determination as to whether or not an offense may beconsidered as committed in relation to the accused's office wasalso explained in People v. Sandiganbayan and Amante,5 thus:

In Sanchez v. Demetriou [227 SCRA 627 (1993)], theCourt elaborated on the scope and reach of the term "offensecommitted in relation to [an accused's] office" by referring to theprinciple laid down in Montilla v. Hi/ario [90 Phil 49 (1951 )], andto an exception to that principle which was recognized in Peoplev. Montejo [108 Phil 613 (1960)]. The principle set out in Montillav. Hi/ario is that an offense may be considered as committed inrelation to the accused's office if "the offense cannot exist

4630 SCRA 489,501 (September 15, 2010)5 August 25, 2009, 596 SCRA 49, 64-65

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without the office" such that "the office [is] a constituent elementof the crime x x x." In People v. Montejo, the Court, throughChief Justice Concepcion, said that "although public office is notan element of the crime of murder in [the] abstract," the facts in aparticular case may show that x x x the offense therein chargedis intimately connected with [the accused's] respective officesand was perpetrated while they were in the performance, thoughimproper or irregular, of their official functions. Indeed, [theaccused] had no personal motive to commit the crime and theywould not have committed it had they not held their aforesaidoffices. x x x

In the present case, there is no question that the offensecharged against the accused, which is willful refusal or failure toimplement the Decision of the CSC to reinstate Leonor Esparcia,was in relation to his office as then Mayor of Cagayan de Oro City.

While jurisdiction of a court is determined at the time of theinstitution of the action, specifically, the filing of the Information,Section 2 of RA 10660 would still not apply in the present case.Section 5 thereof specifically states that Section 2 which amendedSection 4 of PO 1606, as amended, shall apply to cases arisingfrom offenses committed after the effectivity of RA 10660 in 2015.Considering that the offense charged against the accused wasallegedly committed sometime in March 2013, this Court is notdivested of jurisdiction simply because the Information does notallege any damage to the government or any bribery, or allegesdamage to the government or bribery not exceeding 1 Millionpesos.

The accused also argues that the words "subsequent thereto"in the information would mean that the offense could extend fromMarch 2013 up to the effectivity of RA 10660 in 2015. Suchargument must indubitably fail. As culled from the records, theInformation stated that the offense was committed sometime inMarch 2013, the period when the CSC Decision became final dueto the accused's failure to file an appeal before the Court ofAppeals. It was also in March 2013 that Esparcia, through herlawyer, wrote to the accused to request the implementation of theCSC Decision, which the accused refused to do. Clearly, it isbeyond cavil to construe the words "subsequent thereto" as tomean until 2015.

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With respect to the accused's contention that there is nomore need for the implementing rules of RA 10660 before it couldbe applied, the Court is not convinced, considering that Section 2of the said law, which amended Section 4 of PO 1606, explicitlyprovides that "[§}ubject to the rules promulgated by the SupremeCourt, the cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Regional TrialCourt under this section shall be tried in a judicial region other thanwhere the official holds office." In other words, assuming that thejurisdiction to try the case falls on the Regional Trial Court, theSupreme Court still has to promulgate rules to determine in whichjudicial region should the case be filed.

Finally, the accused's assertion that "in case of doubt,interpretation of penal statutes should be construed in favor of theaccused" is misplaced. Such principle cannot be appliedconsidering that PO 1606, as amended, is not a "penal statute."Besides, assuming that it is, the provision of the law is so clear thatthere is no need to resort to statutory construction. Indeed, theCourt is puzzled how a case to be tried by the Sandiganbayan orthe Regional Trial Court can be favorable or prejudicial to theaccused.

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the accused'sMotion to Quash (Lack of Jurisdiction), dated November 4, 2016, ishereby DENIED for lack of merit.

50 ORDERED.

EFREN :Jlot: LA CRUZchairpers~~ ;-;tociate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MICHAEL FAssociate Justic

"'''' .••• w'"' L. MU5NGI