Research Note 82-8

PREDICTION OF INFANTRY SQUAD ERRORS DURINGTRAINING; PILOT INVESTIGATION

Jean L. Dyer

IAR FIELD UNIT AT FORT BENNINCO GEORGIA

ELECTE

APR 15 1983 "U

C.> U. S. Army

~J Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences

January 1982

Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.

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REPORT DOCUMENTAINON PAGE READ INSTRUCTIONSBEFORE COMPLETING FORM

1. REPORT NUMBER 2 OVT ACCESSION NO. 3. RECiPIENT'S CATALOG NUMBER

4. TITE (an Subitle)5. TYPE OF REPORT 0 PEkIO-, (',-:VERZD

P lredict ion of In fanitry Squaid Errors Durini, Final. Report - 193i.

6. PERFORMING ORG. REPORT NUMBER

7. AUITHOR(do) S.CNTRACT Oti GRANT NUMBER(s)

Jean L. Dyer

9. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME AND ADURESS 10. PROGRAM ELEMENT. PROJECT, TASKAREA & WORK UNIT NUMBERS

US Army Research Field UnitP.O. Box 2086 2Q263743A794Fort Benning, Georgia 31905

11I. CONTROLLING OFFICE NAME AND ADDRESS 12. REPORT DATE

US Army Res;earch Institute for the Behavioral January 1932and Social Sciences 13. NUMLRER OF PAdES

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19 KEY WORDS (C.- iouue on reverse aide If necessary mind identit~y by block number)

*111 f;nT ry Sqiiad Armyv Tra in inin* TasiTra ining Prediction oi ]terformJnce

Mi lit:-ry OpeUl.t 10115 Iin [!rhblti zed rua in ing ProblemsTerrain (NVIAT) Personnel rurnowver

*Small groups Team Performance

ýGOABS r~RACT CCcrtiue a r~0 stil ei~t n.eceeary ad Identify by block nuarbor)

* ~ Indidviduals with previous ~ompanyv commnand experience were a-sked to. pred jetthle errors made by rifle squads during a OT(~~ tr pr'tions' i I

urbanilzed terrainl) exercise basied onl a writte-n de-cr ipt ion of the training,setting. The agreement between these predlictions and the, urrors that ac*tuil ly

7 occured was determined. Although experienced individuals could p)redict error"made by squads, the overlap am~ong the predicti-mis was; not hiyh. Acetual andpredicted erroLrs reflect~ed bothi Individual and squad mistakes. Thi-e ,ýi~e ofexperienced individual,, Lo predict specif ic teami and indiv i~dluL errors

D AM "..1473 EDITION OF I NOV 65 IS ODSOLEI 11. lIn a-S i fiLed

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"" klikely to be made by trainees in performing particular missions appears tobe an approach worth further exploration. Documentation of these predictionscould provide very useful training requirement information to incoming

% commandi. s and trainers. Such documentation would provide continuityand maintain quality in training despite the constant turnover in training

N personnel. Further modifications of the procedure used in the present"study arid investigation of additional iL ;ues such as identifying errorsthat arc difficult to correct are needed, however, before such guidelinescan be_ i.icorporated in training materials.

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Research Note 82-8

I!PREDICTION OF INFANTRY SQUAD ERRORS DURIW:-

TRAINING: PILOT INVESTIGATION

SJean L. Dyer

Submitted by:Seward Smith, Chief

ARI FIELD UNIT AT FORT BENNING, GEORGIA

Approved by:Hilton S. Katz, Acting DirectorTRAINING RESEARCH LABORATORY

U.S. ARMY RESEARCH INSTITUTE FOR THE BEHAVIORAL AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

5001 Eisenhower Avenue, Alexandria, Virginia 22333

Office, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel

Department of the Army

January 1982

Army Project Number Skill Training Strategies2Q263743A794 for Infantry Teams

Approwd for public release; distribution unlimited.

S~iii

PREDICTION OF INFANTRY SQUAD ERRORS DURING TRAINING: PILOT INVESTIGATION

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

INTRODUCTION .................. .............................. . . .. 1

METHOD .................. ......... ................................. 2MOUT Training ...................... ........................... 2Prediction of Squad Performance Errors .... ................... 2

RESULTS................... ............... 3

MOUT Training ........................ .......................... 3Prediction and Observation of MOUT Errors ... ...............

DISCUSSION .................. ............................... .... 13

REFERENCES .................... .............................. . 14

FIGURES

1. MOUT Setting Presented to Infantry Company Commanders ... ..... 4

2. Location of Rifle Squads during MOUT fxercise ... ......... .

TABLES

1. Summary of Error Predictions ............. .................. 6

2. Errors Predicted to be Made by the Attacking Squad whenAssaulting the Bjilding ................ .................... 7

3. Errors Actually Made by Squad in the Assault ...... .......... 8

4. Errors Predicted to be Made by the Attacking Squad whenClearing the Building .......... ...................... 9

5. Errors Actually Made by Squad when Clearing Building .... ...... 10

6. Errors Predicted to be Made by the Squad Providing SupportiveFire ................... .............................. .... 11

7. Errors Actually Made by Squad Providing Supportive Fire .... 12

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INTRODUCTION

Personnel turbulence and the lack of experienced personnel in militaryunits have often been cited as factors that creato training probltms (Dyer,Tremble & Finley, 1980; Funk, Johnson, Batzer, Gambell, Vandeoaveys, & Hiller,1980). Turnover disrupts training efforts and provides little continuity intraining personnel, so that new trainirg personnel at the squad, platoon, orcompany level cannot profit from the experience of their predeoesors. The useof inexperienced training personnel has a direct negetive impact upon trainingquality. Most Army training documents (e.g., FM 21-6, TC 21-5-7, TRADOC Cir-oular 351-8) fail to provide the type of Oetailed information needed •'n suchtraining situations. Only general guidanog is given regarding the manigementof personnel, resources and time during training periods, procedures ft,rpreparing, conducting and evaluating training, and forms of individual aindcollective training. Such documents do not address the more specificquestions of what objectives should be trained and what methods are best fortraining those specific objectives.

Some specific guidance regarding how to train within Infantry units isprovided, however, in ST 21-6-188-2. Training tips/aids and points to bechecked during company, platoon, and squad level ARTEP (Army Training andEvaluation Program) training missions are cited. Examples of training tips atthe squad level were "leader TEWT is useful to practice leader tasks," "varycombat power of thn force ony-cirn th'e souad from one man to one sound," and"use barrels, sandbags, old tires, and other rubble to simulate a bombed outcity." Yet none of these documents indicates what specific trainingproblems/needs are likely to occur, e.g., the mistakes that individuals arelikely to make in particular missions. The present study examined one way ofsystematically identifying such training problems/needs by capitalizing uponthe expertize of experienced training personnel.

An exploratory investigation was conducted to determine if individualswith Infantry company command experience could predict errors likely to bemade by Infantry squads in training situations. The particular situationexamined was an Infantry platoon in a MOUT (Military Operations in UrbanizedTerrain) training exercise. Although the results are limited in generality,they do provide some indication of the extent to which hoth individual andteam performance errors can be predicted, and of areas chat could beemphasized during squad training.

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!1

Previous analytic efforts In this area are meager. Military documents onMOUT (FM 90-10, ARTEP 7-15) provide little information on how to train forMOUT exercises and what to stress during those exercises. In an effort toimprove the training given by air crew commanders, Caviness and Titas (1977)recommended specific training procedures based on their experience as membersof alrorevs and as airorew instructors. Miraballa (1978) had noncommissionedofficers (NCOs) act at squad leaders and provide estimates regarding thespecific behavior of Infantry squads in ARTEP missions (e.g., maximum andminimum distances between fire teams, whether or not the enemy's observationpost would be detected prior to crossing a critical phase line, the likelihoodof the squad taking the observation post, time estimates for various missionphases, casualty 6stimates). The NCOs also made these predictions for fourhypothetical levels of squad training. Results indicated that the NCOs'estimates did distinguish among the training levels, but that the level ofagreement among the NCOs within each training level was low. The presentstudy did not require quantitative predictions like those obtained in theMirabella study, but was similar in that the estimates/predictions were basedupcn military experience.

METHOD

MOUT Training

An Infantry platoon consisting of two rifle sauads was observed duringMOUT training. The mission was to assault Pnd 3lear a two-story building.One squad assaulted the building, while the other squad provided supportingfire. During training the assault was rehearsed several times. A militaryexpert, a retired Infantry Lieutenant Colonel with particular expertise intraining, observed the assault and recorded errors made by the squad membcei-.These observations served as the criterion measures in the study.

Prediction of Squad Performance Errors

Five Infantrymen, two captains and three majors, each with previousInfantry company command experience, were asked to indicate the errors thatthe squad members were likely to make during MOUT training. These individualswere either in the Directorate of Combat Developments or the Directorate ofDoctrine and Literature within the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning.

The description of the MOUT mission given to each respcndent was asfollows:

To assault and clear a two-story building where the enemy may be located.The attack is to be conducted during daylight. The attacking forceconsists of two rifle squads--one to provide supporting fires while theother assaults the building.

2

Additional information regarding the MOOT setting was as folloas:

"The northeast corner of the building to be assaulted islocated approximately 100-200 meters from a woodline. Thebuilding is a wooden structure with windows and a highfoundation. A door is located at each end of the building.The woodline gradually curves away from the building on itseast side. About 20 meters to the west is another buildingwhich parallels the building to be assaulted. Other buildingsare located approximately 300-500 meters southeast and southwestof the building. In reality there is no enemy in the building.(See Figure 1 foi" a diagram of the MOUT setting).

The attacking force has no grapling hooks or rope. The squads arerelatively inexperienced with W3UT operations, obtaining moot of theirinformation via classroom lecture. They have had no previous fieldexperience with MOUT operations.

The respondents were asked to address three questions: (1) What errorsare likely to be made by the attacking squad when assaulting the building, (Z)what errors are likely to be made by the attacking squad when clearing thebuilding, and (3) what errors are likely to be made by the element providingsupporttve fire. The responses to these questions were then coded accordingto their agreement with the errors actually observed during training by themilitary expert. The codes were determined by the military expert and theauthor.

RESULTS

MOUT Training

One of the difficulties encountered by the squads was the absence of anopposing force. This made it difficult to evaluate the role of the supportingfire element, and for the assaulting squad to perform as it would if an enemywere actually present. To complicate this problem, little effort was made topresent a hypothetical enemy situation to the squads. The squads were notequipped with appropriate MOUT equipment, and they also had limited numbc•rs ofsimulators (smoke, grenades, etc.), Blank ammunition was provided to only themachine gunner, not the riflemen.

The squad attacked from the northeast, assaulted the northeast corner ofthe building, and entered the door on the north side (see Figure 2), Th..sapproach gave the squad the shortest route to the building, but it also meantttat they faced the higheet entry point into the building. The difficultentry slowed the entry process, and made the squad vulnerable to possibleenemy fire. The fire support element was in the woeds, at the looationindicated on the map (see Figure 2). This element did have good cover, as theground started to decline at the edge of the woodline. Only one machine gut.was available for the exercise.

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FIGURE 1. MOUT SETTING PRESENTED TO INFANi RY COMPANY COMMANDERS

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FIGURE 2. LOCATION OF RIFLE SQUADS DURING MOUT FXERCISE

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* Prediction and Obsttrvation of MUT Errors

A summary of the responses made to the three questions is presented inTable 1. Of the 21 errors explicitly cited by the military expert, six ofthem were not predicted by any of the respondents, and only one error waspredicted by all five respondents (lack of coordination between the assaultand support elements (Table 7)). Most of the other errors were predicted byonly one or two of the respondents. Six other errors were predicted but wereMAX committed by the squads. A total of ten other errors were correctlypredicted, but were not explicitly cited by the subject matter expert. Ingeneral, most of the respondents' predictions were appropriate for the MOUTexercise, and most (71%) of the errors observed were predicted by at least oneof the respondents. However, there was relatively little overlap among therespondents' predictions.

Predictions regarding the assault phase of the MOUT exercise appeared tobe the most difficult to make. Responses to the assault question resulted inthe lowest degree of overlap among the respondents' predictions, the highestnumber of errors that were incorrectly predicted, and the highest number oferrors that were correctly predicted but were not explicitly cited by themilitary expert.

Tables 2, 4, and 6 present the predictions made by each of therespondents to each of the three questions. The errors observed by thl;military expert are presented in Tables 3, 9, and 7. The relationship betweenthe expert's observations and the respondents' predictions is also shown inthese tables.

The predictions made and the actual errors observed reflected bothin dtV-ual errors (,, 1-,A, rifl-e a-i,,g, exposure of body to open windows.and team errors. Team errors refer to squad behavior that lacked teamwnrk,that is, lack of coordination and planning among the individuals within thesquads, as wall as lacl" of coordination between the assault and supportelements. Examples of such errors were no communi1cation between downstairsand upstairs elements when clearing the building, lack of proper cover forindividuals clearing rooms by the remainder of the squad, and slow squadmovement from the woodline to the building.

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Table 1

SUMMARY OF ERROR PREDICTIONS

Assault Clear SuppoitBuilding Building Squad Total

Ierrors cited by military expert 9 9 3 21

#I errors not predicted by respondents 3 3 0 6

#1 errors predicted by only 1 respondent 5 3 1 9

#f errors predicted by 2 respondents 1 1 1 3

#/ errors predicted by 3 respondents 0 1 0 1

#t errors predicted by 4 respondents 0 1. 0 1

.7. errors predicted by 5 respondents 0 0 1 1

#I errors predicted, but were not made 5 0 1 6

#I errors predicted and did occur, butwere not explicitly cited by militaryexpert 5 2 3 10

#I other types of errors predicted, butcoded as not applicable, cannot beevaluated, or observer disagreementregarding appropriateness of citeddoe trine/tact ics 3 3 4 10

Table 2

ERRORS PREDICTED TO BE MADE BY THE ATTACKING SQUAD WHEN ASSAULTING THE BUILDING

CODE Respondent #1

E la. Will not plan Tor friendly casualtiesE lb. Probably will try normal entry points into building first instead

of breaching a wallNE 1c. Will probably m'jve broadside to the building, increasing their

exposure to wiJer range of enemy observer/firesDD id. Probably will move in short rushes until they receive fire; should

begin by crawling

ResA-ondent #2

E la. Failure to conduct exte-sive recon!E lb. Failure to use smoke properly (screening their movement). Should

use explosives at base of building to enter. Doors and windowsprobably booby trapped

E 1c. Use of supporting mortar fires are not planned on southern buildingsafter assault executed

E Id. (Failure to) cover the doors at each end of building with fire!NE le. Failure to attack from north where fewer windows

Respondent #3

E li. Lack of good coordination between squad leader and team leadersE lb. Lack of coordination with squad providing supporting fireE* 1c. Improper movement through open areaNA Id. Improper equipment to break into building withNE I,. Weapons jamming because of improper cleanliness

Respond-ent #4

E la. Failure to use snmoke to cover advanceE lb. Fail to secure the building to the west of objective buildingDD Ic. Failure to cover each other using fire and movement techniquesNE Id. Failure to make full use of woodline to minimize "distance in

open" to be traversed.

Respondent 15

E la. Too :Inuch exposure while entering the buildingNE ]b. Failure to use available cover

Code Def init ionF Error that wa3 observed during exercise.E* Error made - "improper" movement refers, however, to too slow movanent.DD Observer disagreement regarding appropriateness of cited tactics/doctrine.

Appropriate procedure depends upon the enemy situation, and vo entsny wasJ played.

NE This error was not made.NA Not applicnrle. Scenario description stated squad did not lhave proper

equipment. Squad should not be held responsible for this prob]hcn.

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Table 4

ERRORS PREDICTED TO BE MADE BY THE ATTACKING SQUAD WHEN CLEARING THE BUILDING

CODE Respondent #1

E 2a. Probably will 'trip booby traps and mines because of hasteE 2b. Probably will expose themselves to fire from adjacent buildingE 2c. Probably will be surprised from fire through walls, floors, and

ceilingsE 2d. Probably will suffer casualties from their own grenades/roundsE 2e. Probably will not cover access/egress routes to adjacent buildings

Respondent #2

E 2a. Since no ropes or ladder, they will probably fail to secure bottomfloor first before moving up to second floor

E 2b. (Will not have) coordinated effort as assault elements clearbuilding

E 2c. Fail to use smoke grenades/CSC 2d. (Fail to) expand the foothold after the entire building is secured

Respondent #3

E 2a. Lack of proper clearing techniques (i.e., booby traps)E 2b. Lack of protection against adjacent buildingsE 2c. Lack of proper cover by remainder of squad while clearing rooms

Respondent #4

E 2a. Failure to check for booby traps in roomsE 2b. Failure to "cover" each other during search/clearingNA 2c. Failure to begin clearing from the top down (may be difficult

without grappling hooks/ropes)

Respondent #5

E 2a. Confusion and congestion while moving from room to room* 2b. Failure to appreciate the protective qualities of the walls

Code DefinitionE Error that was observed during exercise.C Cannot evaluate: exercise stopped too soon to evaluate.NA Not aprlicable. Scenario description stated squad did not have proper

equipment.* Just the opposite occurred; they thought they had protection but did not.

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Table 6

ERRORS PREDICTED TO BE MADE BY THE SQUAD PROVIDTNG SUPPORTIVE FIRE

CODE Respondent #1

E 3a. Will not have pecessary coordination with assaulting squad, therefore,(1) Will engage random suspected targets(2) Will have difficulty engaging enemy fires that are causing the

assault squad a problem(3) Will either lift or shift fires too soon, leaving the assault

squad in jeopardy, or too late, causing friendly casualtiesC 3b. Will not maintatn a steady base of fire"E 3c. Will not consider re-positioning when lifting or shifting fires

Respondent #2

E 3a. Failure to shift or lift supporting fires as the squads near theobjective. Will probably shoot frieLJ',y troops by not respondingquick enough to a ceasefire

E 3b. Positioning of supporting fires to cover building to be assaultedalong its long axis. Also, failure to plan fires on remainingbuildings (especially building to the south)

E 3c. Failure to isolate assaulted building by firesC* 3d. Machine guns not employed where flanking enfilade fire is possible

Respondent #3

E 3a. General lack of coordination with assaulting squadE 3b. Not set up properly to support by fire the entire area necessaryNA 3c. Bad fields of fireNE 3d. Weapons jamming because of lack of cleanliness

"Respondent #4

E 3a. Failure to lift/shiait fires to avoid hitting friendly troopsE 3b. Failure to provide suppreseive fires on targets around/adjacent to

objective buildingE 3c. Fallure to call for/plan indirect fires along likely avenues of

withdrawal/escape

Respondent #5

E 3a. Failure to shift fires to other likely enemy locations once theassault squad is in the building

C**3b. Failure to hit fleeting targets in target building

Code DefinitionE Error that was observed during exercise,C Cannot evaluate, Supporting squad had limited blank ammunition for entire

exercise. They concentrated their efforts on the assault phase.C* Cannot evaluate, due to absence of an opposing force and lack of informa-

tion regarding the enemy situation.C**Cannot evaluate. No way of assessing such casualties or even e.stimating

such effects.NA "Fields of fire" was not the consideration in this situation. Instead,

proper set-up for &upportiLng fire was the important element.NE This error was not made.

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DISCUSSION

Although the Investigation was restricted to a single training situation,was based on only one Infantry platoon, and had a limited number ofexperienced Infantrymen making predictions, the results indicate that theapproach har promise for future research efforts in the team training area.Obviously, tve staudv itrslf should be replicated, and more training situationsneed to be examined to determint the generalizatility of the findings. Twofindings are especially important in that they point to research designchanges that should be made ii future research dealing with such complex teamoperations as the Infantry squad MOUT mission. First, more than oneindividual should make predictions since there was little overlap among thesets of error predictions (e.g., only _9= error was predicted by everyone).Second, more than one expert is probably needed for observation as the expert

* in the present study did not formally record all of the errors he actuallyobserved. Other mehodological changes that might increase the agreementbetween the predicted and actual errors would be to use individuals to makepredictions who know the members of the units being trained and/or to reducethe free-response nature of the question*.

Before such diagnostic information can be used in the development ofinstructor guidebooks and training exercises, many additional questions needto be addressed. Such questions include can experienced training personnel atthe squad, platoon or company level predict the errors that will be the mostdifficult to correct, the errors that vary with the skill level or experienceof the individual and/or the squad, the training methods that are mosteffective in reducing such errors, and the best procedures for informinginexperienced leaders of such training problems.

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REFERENCES

Caviness, J. C., & Titus, T. L. KC-135 aircrew manatemjent_. Maxwell AirForce Base, Ala.: Air Universi.ty, May 1977. (DTIC No. AD 6020 444L)

''he 'or&y comnAder',s trainin__a.. l.ent lanning book. ST 21-6-188-2.No publisher, No date.

Department of the Army. Army training and evaluation program for Infantrybattalions (InfantryL Airborne, Air Assault. and RanIer). ARTEP 7-15.Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 1979.

Department of the Army. How tj_ptai~eeand conduct tFM 21-6. Washingtoa, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army,November 1975.

Department of the Army. Individual and collective training plan fordeveloping systems policy and procedures. TRADOC Circular 351-8. Ft.Monroe, Va.: U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, May 1980.

Department of the Army. Military o2peratiors on urbanized terrain (MOUT).FM 90-10. Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army,August 1979.

Department of the Army. Training management in battalions. TC 21-5-7.Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, December 1977.

Dyer, J. L., Tremble, T. R., & Finley, D. L. The structural, training, andoperational characteristics of Army teams (ARI Technical Report 507).Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral andSocial Sciences, 1980.

Funk, S. L., Johnson, C. A., latzer, H., Gambell, T., Vandecaveye, G., &Hiller, J. Combat trainin& detractors in a a of FORSCOM divisions:Reported impact and recommended approaches for mitigating their efforts-ARI Technlical Report). Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institutefor the Behavioral aad Social Scieuces, May 1980.

Mirabella, A. Criterion-referenced system approach to evaluation of combatunits (ART Resnarch Meinoraidum "7-8-21. Alexandria, Va.: U. S. ArmyResearch Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, Septembehr1978.

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