The ISPS Code 1

The ISPS Code: Effects on Caribbean Cruise Terminal Security

Jose Domingo van der Linde - 16062

Columbia Southern University – Professor Dr. Michael Ewald

Research Methods – MBA 5652-04B

December 12, 2005

The ISPS Code 2

Abstract

This study examined the effects of the ISPS Code on the security awareness of Caribbean cruise

terminals and their preparedness in averting security threats. Participants were a number of

Caribbean port managers who completed a 10-question questionnaire, a Caribbean PFSO who

completed a 20-question questionnaire and a U.S. Government Agency that received a 10-

question questionnaire but, because of security information confidentiality, responded with a

general statement. Responses from participants were collected, compared and analyzed. We

predicted that cruise terminals that were in compliance with the ISPS Code would be less likely

to be attacked by terrorists. And the findings of the study have provided substantial support to

the hypothesis on the likelihood of terrorists’ attacks on cruise terminals that were in compliance.

But port managers should be on a continuous alert to terrorists’ attacks on their terminals and

should, at all times, be prepared to deal with these attacks.

The ISPS Code 3

The ISPS Code: Effects on Caribbean Cruise Terminal Security

On July 1, 2004, the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS),

representing a comprehensive set of measures to enhance security of ships and port facilities,

went into effect. The ISPS Code was developed in response to the perceived threats to ships and

port facilities in the wake of worldwide terrorists’ attacks. But could the ISPS security measures

provide the necessary methodology to port facilities to enhance their levels of security awareness

and preparedness, and more specifically, the security levels of cruise terminals in the Caribbean

Basin?

To date, and despite its importance in terrorism prevention, no study has tested the level

of security awareness and preparedness at Caribbean cruise terminals after the July 1, 2004

implementation of the ISPS Code. Our theory, however, is that cruise terminals in Caribbean

ports that are in compliance with the ISPS Code are less likely to be attacked by terrorists. And

the current study has been undertaken to test this hypothesis.

The number of pirate attacks worldwide has tripled in the past decade. Maritime piracy

and hijacking of merchant ships especially for their cargoes are attractive to pirates as these

cargoes represent highly profitable sources of funding. But new evidence suggests that piracy is

becoming a key tactic of terrorist groups.

The London-based security consultants Aegis Defence Services in its 2003 terrorism

report issued a warning on the growing threat that the partnership between maritime piracy and

marine terrorism posed. And intelligent services concluded that if there is indeed an explicit

alliance between piracy and terrorism that this partnership could mean “a frightening threat to

global security and trade that could go well beyond the simple threat of merchant piracy”

(Howland, 2004, p.1).

The ISPS Code 4

Clear evidences of a possible alliance between maritime piracy and marine terrorism

were the constant attacks by Al-Qaida and Al-Qaida affiliates on maritime targets in recent

years. For example in January 2000 Al-Qaida attempted to ram a boat loaded with explosives

into the USS The Sullivans in Yemen. In October 2000 Al-Qaida attacked the USS Cole off the

coast of Yemen, blew a hole in the hull of the vessel and killed 17 crewmembers.

In October of 2002 a similar attack by Al-Qaida occurred on the French supertanker MV

Limburg off the coast of Yemen. And in February of 2004 the Philippines-based Abu Sayyaf

claimed responsibility for an explosion on board a ferry that killed at least 100 people. According

to Howland (2004) this string of maritime attacks “offers a stark illustration of terrorist interest

in maritime targets” (p. 1).

Terrorist groups such as the Hezbollah, Jemaah Islamiyah, the Popular Front for the

Liberation of Palestine-General Command, and Sri Lanka’s Tamil Tigers are constantly trying to

expand their maritime capability. For example Al-Qaida and its affiliates own dozens of hijacked

vessels that have been repainted and renamed and are operating under false documentation.

While during the Cold War the United States (U.S.) with its global maritime surveillance

capability was able to keep track of a few hundred big Soviet warships, nowadays “you’ve got

thousands of little no-name ships all over the world and you have no idea who they belong to and

what they’re carrying” (Becker & Meek, 2003, p. 2).

Security experts have constantly been issuing warnings to governments that terrorists

might try ramming a ship loaded with an explosive cargo or a weapon of mass destruction into

vessels in major ports or terminals. These security experts also concluded that such attacks

“could bring international trade to a halt and could inflict a multi-billion-dollar damage on the

The ISPS Code 5

world economy” (Luft & Korin, 2004, p. 3). But the anticipated terrorist attack was not on a U.S.

vessel neither on a U.S. port facility, but on U.S. land-based structures.

On September 11, 2001, a group of Islamic terrorists, believed to be part of the Al-Qaida

network, hijacked four American Airlines planes in midair, took over the control over the planes,

and deliberately crashed two planes into the twin towers of the World Trade Center, ran one into

the Pentagon and crashing the fourth hijacked plane in a field near Pittsburgh. In addition to the

thousands of fatalities, the attacks had severely crippled both the U.S. and foreign economies.

After the September 11, 2001 terrorists’ attacks the U.S. government created the United

States Department of Homeland Security (DHS) and charged this agency with the protection of

the security of the American homeland. The DHS also included the activities of the U.S. Coast

Guard that was now in charge of maritime security.

Because of the poor security at U.S. port facilities the DHS firstly had to strengthen

security at all U.S. port facilities. And to accomplish this Congress in 2002 passed the Maritime

Transportation Security Act (MTSA) that mandated that all U.S. flagged ships and U.S. port

facilities, including oil refineries, LNG depots, nuclear power plants and others must have a

security plan in place to counteract terrorism. The U.S. maritime security strategy suddenly had

shifted from response to prevention.

But the contributing factor to the danger of a pirate/terrorist link in U.S. ports was not

only the relatively poor security at these U.S. ports but more significantly the poor security

conditions at foreign port facilities at which international vessels make port calls before

proceeding to U.S. ports. To eliminate the danger of this foreign terrorist link in U.S. ports the

U.S. government announced that vessels that were not in compliance with the requirements of

The ISPS Code 6

the MTSA or had been at foreign terminal facilities with security standards that did not meet

MTSA criteria would be banned from entry into U.S. ports.

And under this heavy U.S. pressure the International Maritime Organization (IMO) was

now forced to accelerate the completion of international security measures and procedures

comparable to the MTSA requirements. But the only way to get these requirements implemented

in a quick manner was to adopt existing resolutions.

On 12 December, 2002, the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS)

was adopted “by a resolution that was adopted earlier by the Conference of Contracting

Governments to the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, the SOLAS” (IMO,

2003, p. iii). And on July 1, 2004, as a chapter of the SOLAS, the International Ship and Port

Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) went into effect with as main responsibility the enhancing of

security of ships and port facilities worldwide, and including the port facilities in the Caribbean

Basin.

The Caribbean Basin has always been a security concern for the U.S. Government.

During the Cold War era and also in the post-Cold War era security in the Caribbean Basin was

the predominant theme in discussions which included subjects such as drug trafficking,

migration, and money laundering. The main concern with drug trafficking was that the huge

amounts from the illicit drug trade could easily influence governments and economies “as drug

barons can actually pay for political agitation to destabilize governments that oppose them and

giving rise to violent crimes” (Antoine & King, 2001).

These concerns reached unprecedented levels after reports were received on the

expansion of terrorism and on the presence of Al-Qaida in the Caribbean region. In July of 1990,

Islamic extremism hit Trinidad with a coup attempt by 114 radicals who blew up police

The ISPS Code 7

headquarters, took over parliament, television stations and held the country’s president hostage.

According to Maloney (2005) this was clearly an Islamic extremist action as “there’s simply an

absence of other groups in Trinidad that could be responsible for the attack”.

The coup attempt by radicals in Trinidad increased the concern among experts that new

attacks against the American homeland could come from the Caribbean Basin. Because of the

poor airport security in the region and no visa requirements Muslim terrorists could easily fly

into the region from Trinidad and other nearby countries with active Islamic communities and

from there terrorists could hijack airliners and ram them into U.S. installations such as “the

installations in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, where some of the Al-Qaida fighters captured in

Afghanistan are held” (Dougherty, 2002).

In an article on Al-Queda’s inroads into the Caribbean, Zambells (2005) concluded that:

”the Caribbean Basin remains a region of concern in the war on terrorism and that Al-Qaeda can

feed off of the institutional weakness, political and economic instability, poverty, and

lawlessness that characterize the Caribbean Basin” (p. 3).

With the ISPS Code becoming mandatory on July 1, 2004, this concern was somewhat

overcome as contracting governments to the SOLAS Convention were legally obliged to comply

with the requirements of the ISPS Code, including contracting governments in the Caribbean

Basin. Small Caribbean countries that were trading products with the U.S. or were handling

vessels that would visit U.S. ports were now forced to implement the requirements of the ISPS

Code or have their maritime relationship with the U.S. discontinued.

By July 1, 2004, Caribbean port facilities management received a “Statement of

Compliance” (IMO, 2003, p. 30) from their governments certifying that their compliance with

the provisions of the ISPS Code had been verified and that their facilities were now operating in

The ISPS Code 8

accordance with their approved security plan. However, not all security requirements of the ISPS

Code were completed by that date.

To many port facility managers the implementation of the ISPS Code requirements meant

that large modifications had to be undertaken at their facilities and which could take a long time

to complete. And specifically the cruise terminals required extra attention as these were

perceived as extremely vulnerable to terrorists’ attacks because passengers on board the visiting

cruise ships were mostly Americans.

But, on the other hand, the U.S. had been a very important partner for the Caribbean

states in their efforts to improve port facility and maritime security in the Caribbean. And

particularly with the ISPS Code compliance process many port facility managers in the

Caribbean benefited from the experience of the U.S. Coast Guard or from other U.S. government

agencies.

The U.S. Southcom, for example, on a regular basis had sent experts to the Caribbean

basin “to conduct port facility vulnerability assessments and has offered advice on methods to

ensure secure maritime commerce” (Cobb, 2004, p. 4). Port facility managers are now planning

the completion of their security requirements by the end of 2005 and expect that by that time

security conditions at their ports and terminals are in accordance to the provisions of their

security plans.

From the foregoing review of the literature on security of port facilities in the Caribbean

Basin and the reported presence of terrorist groups in this region, it is evident that Caribbean

cruise terminals could form potential targets for terrorist’s attacks. On the other hand, the July 1,

2004 implementation of the ISPS Code should have made these terminals more aware of the

The ISPS Code 9

threat of terrorism and, more importantly, should have improved their level of preparedness in

dealing with these threats.

But despite its importance in counteracting terrorism, to date, no study has tested the

level of compliance with the ISPS Code at Caribbean port facilities and how it has affected the

security at these facilities. It is important that studies are undertaken to test the level of ISPS

Code compliance and to test if these facilities are, in fact, adequately prepared to deal with

terrorists’ attacks.

This current study will help us examine whether the ISPS Code has had any effect on the

security conditions of Caribbean cruise terminals and whether these terminals are less likely to

be attacked by terrorists. But due to the absence of past researches on this particular theory, and

the lack of valuable sources of research material, the results of this study will depend for a great

deal on the cooperation of the participants and their contribution to the research. And because of

reasons of security and confidentiality, participants’ names and their country names are not

mentioned in this study.

Method

Participants

Participants were selected from a homogenous population in the Caribbean Basin and

were divided in three groups, that is, group A, group B, and group C. Group A consisted of

cruise terminal officials (port managers) from eight Caribbean states selected ad randomly from

an adjusted “table 1.3 selected visitation statistics” (Duval, 2004, p. 15).

For group B a Caribbean Port Facility Security Officer (PFSO), who was responsible for

security operations at its terminal, was selected, and for group C a U.S. Government Agency

was chosen which task consisted of overseeing security in the Caribbean Basin.

The ISPS Code 10

For the selection of group A firstly the aforementioned table 1.3 had to be corrected for

the countries that were not part of the Caribbean Basin such as the Bahamas and Bermuda. Then

another adjustment had to be made for the smaller islands having no significant cruise tourism

such as Saba and St. Eustatius. And finally because no contact was possible with comparable

population in Cuba, this state was also taken off the list.

The remaining 24 states were numbered from 1 to 24, and labels with these numbers were

placed in a container from which 8 labels were pulled out, ad randomly. These labels were given

a new number from 1 to 8 to substitute for the country names and, subsequently, their port

managers were numbered PM-1 through PM-8.

The sample size that was selected for group A represented a 1/3 of the population and

was deemed representative for that population by the author. Besides, a larger number would not

have provided the answers to the research questions in time. Any dropout in group A would be

accounted for with the addition of the PFSO.

For group B the same procedures were applied to select the PFSO from the remaining 16

Caribbean states. But, because the first selected PFSO was no longer able to participate in the

research a second PFSO had to be selected from the remaining 15 Caribbean ports using similar

selecting procedures. For group C this U.S. Government Agency was selected because of its task

of overseeing security in the Caribbean Basin.

The three groups, although from a homogenous population, represented perspectives

from different managerial angles. To be exact group A was responsible for implementing the

ISPS Code, group B had to ensure that the ISPS security measures were adhered to locally, and

group C had to control the overall level of the ISPS implementation in the Caribbean region. The

The ISPS Code 11

different perceptions of the three groups on the level of cruise terminal security would provide

the necessary research material to conduct this test.

Materials

Group A participants received a 10-question questionnaire (Table 1) on security issues at

their terminals and which had to be answered with yes or no. Initially the intention was to have a

personal interview with Group B on security issues at its terminal, but due to unforeseen

circumstances, the selected PFSO was no longer able to participate in this interview.

Insert Table 1 about here

A second PFSO was selected from the remaining Caribbean ports but a personal

interview was not feasible and instead the PFSO received a 20-question questionnaire (Table 2)

of which the first 10 questions were associated with security issues at its terminal and the last 10

questions with security issues in the Caribbean region. The U.S. Government Agency also

received a 10-question questionnaire, but on the overall level of implementation of the ISPS

Code in the Caribbean region.

Insert Table 2 about here

Procedures

All three groups were firstly approached by phone whereby they received information on

the intention of the author to do a research on the security of cruise terminals at Caribbean ports,

and on the contribution the author was looking for from the participants. The participants in all

the three groups were then asked to seek the approval of their superior(s) and, when having

received the approval, they would receive a questionnaire that was applicable to their group.

Group A would receive a questionnaire with 10 questions on security conditions at their

terminal and group B a questionnaire with 20 questions on security conditions existing at its

The ISPS Code 12

terminal and in the Caribbean region and both questionnaires to be answered with yes or no.

Group C would receive a 10-question questionnaire on the overall level of ISPS Code

implementation in the Caribbean region and all questions to be answered with high, medium or

low.

The questionnaires for group A and group B included two manipulation questions

(marked with *) to determine whether the participants were familiar with the security conditions

at their terminals. Questions for the different questionnaires were compiled based on security

information gathered from earlier ISPS courses and trainings that the author had received from

recognized security organizations in the U.S. such as the SeaSecure LLC.

The next step was to send an outline of the research and the questionnaires by email to

the different participants. Standard emails were sent to all participants (Table 3) and wherein

reference was made to the telephone conversation and also wherein the forwarding of the

questionnaires was confirmed.

Insert Table 3 about here

Participants were also asked to return the questionnaire as soon as possible, meaning two

weeks after receipt of the format, and were informed that if questions were not correctly put or if

participants were not fully at ease with certain questions, these should not be answered. And,

more importantly, the research confidentiality was repeated in the emails and the fact that names

of participants or countries would not be mentioned in the study.

This procedure also prevented group’s influence on participants in their completion of the

questionnaires and with the outcome of the study. All participants were given the opportunity to

contact the author’s superior for any reason they deemed necessary.

The ISPS Code 13

All “YES” answers in group A questionnaires were assigned a 5-point score and all “NO”

answers a 3-point score. The maximum score possible for a questionnaire from a participant in

group A was either 30 points (10 x 3) or 50 points (10 x 5). The median of a facility in group A

in this case was 40 points and the overall mean of group A facilities was also 40 (7 x 40 : 7).

For group B the first 10 questions on local security issues were scored separately using

the same scoring procedures as in group A. And the same scoring system was applied separately

to the last 10 questions on security issues in the Caribbean region.

Here again the median for the first 10 questions was 40 points and 40 points for the last

10 questions, and the overall mean of the PFSO facility computed at 40 points. With this the

overall facility mean of group A and group B facilities was computed at 40 points (2 x 40 : 2).

With respect to the U.S. Government Agency’s questionnaire, because of an agreement

with the Caribbean states, their assessments on the level of ISPS compliance could not be made

public and would be kept confidential unless the state was deemed a security risk. Instead the

Agency provided a statement on the level of compliance with the ISPS Code in the Caribbean

region.

The applied measurement process in the study involved the ordinal level of measurement.

Firstly, the scores for the security level at the individual terminals in group A were calculated by

totaling the questionnaire’s “YES” and “NO” scores individually, and by adding these two

numbers to determine the terminal score. This score would then be compared with the terminal

median and if equal or greater than the median (40) this would signify acceptable levels of

security at that terminal, and a score less than the median would require additional attention from

management on security conditions at that terminal.

The ISPS Code 14

Secondly, the score for the overall level of the ISPS compliance in the Caribbean Basin

was calculated by totaling the terminal scores of all cruise terminal facilities, including the PFSO

facility overall score, and by comparing this score with the overall facility mean (40). A score

equal to or greater than the overall facility mean would indicate that the level of compliance with

the ISPS Code and the overall security level in the Caribbean region were appropriate. But a

score less than the overall facility mean would signify that the level of compliance in the region

was not satisfactory and that actions would be necessary to increase the security awareness and

preparedness levels in the region.

This test using the selected population sample size and combined with aforementioned

procedures would be vital in the outcome of the research. They will not only ensure the

performance reliability of the scores but would also guarantee the validity of the outcomes of the

test.

Results

Only one participant in group A had not returned the questionnaire within the established

time span, and therefore only data from the 7 remaining participants (port managers) and the data

from group B (PFSO) were collected and analyzed. The distribution of port managers’ scores

(see Table 4) confirmed their correct responses to two test questions indicating their familiarity

with existing international security regulations at their terminals.

Insert Table 4 about here

Scores computed for the individual port facilities (see Table 5) were as follows: PM-1

(46), PM-2 (46), PM-3 (42), PM-4 (42), PM-5 (40), PM-6 (46), and PM-7 (44). Scores were

either equal to or greater than the individual facility median (40) and signifying that acceptable

levels of security awareness and preparedness existed at all the terminals.

The ISPS Code 15

Insert Table 5 about here

The PFSO was also well aware of the security regulations applied at its terminal as the

two manipulation questions in its questionnaire were also appropriately answered as indicated in

the distribution of the PFSO scores (see Table 6). The PFSO was, however, not comfortable with

question 12 and had not answered this. The first set of questions scored 46 points and in the

second set of questions the score came out 43 points. The total score for the PFSO was then

computed at 44.5 (89 : 2) and thus greater than the median.

Insert Table 6 about here

The score for the overall level of ISPS Code compliance in the Caribbean Basin was

computed in accordance to the foregoing procedures and the result of this calculation was a score

of 43.8 points (350.5 : 8) and greater than the overall facility mean. This signified that the level

of compliance with the ISPS Code in the Caribbean Basin was adequate.

From comparisons between port managers’ responses in group A, it could be

noted that although there was a general consensus in this group on security conditions at their

facilities, there were still some discrepancies in their answers. But, on the other hand, the

comparison between the port managers and the PFSO showed only consistencies in their

responses.

The current study has examined the effects of the ISPS Code on the level of security

awareness and preparedness of Caribbean cruise terminals. The results showed that security

levels at the individual terminals were acceptable while the levels of compliance with the ISPS

Code in the Caribbean Basin were adequate.

The ISPS Code 16

These results were consistent with the U.S. Government Agency’s statement which

confirmed that “during visits to several countries within the Caribbean region over the last 18

months they had seen successful implementation of the ISPS Code”.

Discussion

The purpose of this study was to examine whether the ISPS security measures had any

effect on the level of security awareness and preparedness of Caribbean cruise terminals in

dealing with security threats. We predicted that cruise terminals that were in compliance with the

security provisions of the ISPS Code would be less likely to be attacked by terrorists. And the

findings of this study have provided substantial support to our hypothesis on the likelihood of

terrorists’ attacks on these terminals.

In conclusion, the results of this study have offered very essential information on the

level of ISPS implementation in the Caribbean Basin and have given valuable insights on the

level of awareness and preparedness of cruise terminals after the implementation of the ISPS

Code in July of 2004. Port managers, including the PFSO, have confirmed that their facilities

were all in compliance with the ISPS Code, that they were more conscious of security threats,

were better prepared to counteract terrorists’ attacks, and, most importantly, that their cruise

terminals were safer than they were before the implementation of the ISPS Code.

And these findings have provided the necessary support to our hypothesis on the

likelihood of terrorists’ attacks on cruise terminals. But it should be emphasized that the

intention of the study was not to determine the intensity of terrorists’ attacks but just the

likelihood of terrorist attacks on cruise terminals. Port managers should continuously be alert to

possible terrorists’ attacks and should, at all times, be prepared to deal with these attacks.

The ISPS Code 17

References

Antoine, D. G., & King, M. I. (2001). Caribbean winds: threats to national security. Americas.

Volume 53. Issue: 3. Organization of American States. Gale Group. Retrieved November

27, 2005, from the World Wide Web:

http://www.questia.com/

Becker, M., & Meek, J. G. (2003). Terror lurks on high seas. New York Daily News. Global

Security.org. Alexandria, VA. Retrieved November 16, 2005, from the World Wide Web:

http://www.globalsecurity.org/

Cobb, S. M. (2004). Port Authority of Jamaica luncheon. Remarks by the Ambassador of the

United States of America to Jamaica. Embassy News. Embassy of the United States.

Retrieved November 16, 2005, from the World Wide Web:

http://kingston.usembassy.gov/

Dougherty, J. E. (2002). Could terrorists strike from Caribbean? Lax airport security reportedly

worries area’s officials. WorldNetDaily. WoldNetDaily.com. Retrieved November 16,

2005, from the World Wide Web:

http://www.worldnetdaily.com/

Duval, D. T. (2004). Tourism in the Caribbean: trends, development, prospects. Routledge. New

York. Retrieved November 16, 2005, from the World Wide Web:

http://www.questia.com/

Howland, J. (2004). Hazardous seas: maritime sector vulnerable to devastating terrorist attacks.

JINSA. The Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs. Washington, DC. Retrieved

November 16, 2005, from the World Wide Web:

http://www.jinsa.org/

The ISPS Code 18

IMO. (2003). The International Ship and Port Facility Security Code and Solas Amendments

2002. 2003 Edition. Arkle Print Ltd., Northampton. IMO 2003.

Luft, G., & Korin, A. (2004). Terrorism goes to sea. IAGS. Institute for the Analysis of Global

Security. Council of Foreign Relations. Retrieved November 16, 2005, from the World

Wide Web:

http://www.iags.org/

Maloney, B. (2005). New attack tied to Al-Qaeda: new terrorist bomb attack. The Radio

Equalizer – Brian Maloney. Retrieved November 16, 2005, from the World Wide Web:

http://radioequalizer.blogspot.com/

Zambells, C. (2005). Al-Qaeda’s inroads into the Caribbean. Terrorism Monitor. Volume 3. Issue:

20. Global Terrorism Analysis. Jamestown Foundation. Retrieved November 16, 2005,

from the World Wide Web:

http://jamestown.org/

The ISPS Code 19

Table 1

Sample of port managers (PM) questionnaire

Questions Yes No

1. Was your terminal a secure place for cruise ships prior to the ISPS effective date?

2. Were you at that time concerned with possible attacks on your terminal?

3. Were any specific precautions taken by your terminal to avert terrorist attacks?

4. Is your state party to the SOLAS Convention c.q. the ISPS Code?*

5. Is your terminal in compliance with the ISPS Code requirements?*

6. Are you more conscious of terrorist threats in the Caribbean than before?

7. Are you now concerned with possible attacks on your terminal?

8. Is your terminal better prepared to counteract terrorist attacks?

9. Do cruise ships request additional security measures at your terminal?

10. Is your terminal safer for cruise ships than before the ISPS Code implementation?

The ISPS Code 20

Table 2

Sample of PFSO questionnaire

Questions Yes No

1. Was your terminal a secure place for cruise ships prior to the ISPS effective date?

2. Were you at that time concerned with possible attacks on your terminal?

3. Were any specific precautions taken by your terminal to avert terrorist attacks?

4. Is your state party to the SOLAS Convention c.q. the ISPS Code?*

5. Is your terminal in compliance with the ISPS Code requirements?*

6. Are you more conscious of terrorist threats in the Caribbean than before?

7. Are you now concerned with possible attacks on your terminal?

8. Is your terminal better prepared to counteract terrorist attacks?

9. Do cruise ships request additional security measures at your terminal?

10. Is your terminal safer for cruise ships than before the ISPS Code implementation?

11. Were security threats of concern in the Caribbean before the ISPS implementation?

12. Were cruise terminals in the Caribbean safe from terrorist attacks before July, 2004?

13. Has the ISPS made cruise terminals more aware of terrorist attacks?

14. Are cruise terminals in the Caribbean in compliance with the ISPS Code?

15. Are cruise terminals better prepared to counteract terrorist attacks?

16. Is the detecting and assessing of security threats by cruise terminals effective?

17. Are cruise terminals able to deter terrorist attacks?

18. Are cruise terminals safer now than prior to the implementation of the ISPS Code?

19. Are cruise ships in the Caribbean now better protected than prior to the ISPS Code?

The ISPS Code 21

20. Did the ISPS Code contribute to greater security of cruise terminals in the Caribbean?

Table 3

List of Participants

Participant Country Email Address

Mr. Alvin Thomas Antigua & Barbuda athomas@candw.ag

Captain Ramon Frankel Curacao r.frankel@curports.com

Mr. Angus Mclean Cayman Islands Angus.mclean@egov.ky

Mr. Albert Peter Dominica maritime@cwdom.dm

Mr. Anthony Belmar Grenada grenport@caribsurf.com

Ms. Sharon Reyes Jamaica sreyes@jamaicaships.com

Mr. Jason Maloney St. Kitts & Nevis maquie@hotmail.com

Mr. Oliviere Cadet St. Lucia cadeto@slaspa.com

Mr. Garth Marcelle Trinidad & Tobago garthmarcelle2003@yahoo.com

Commander Robert Kirk U.S. Government rkirk@d7.uscg.mil

The ISPS Code 22

Table 4

Distribution of port managers’ scores

PM-1 PM-2 PM-3 PM-4 PM-5 PM-6 PM-7

Questions Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N Y N

Q-1 x x x x x x x

Q-2 x x x x x x x

Q-3 x x x x x x x

Q-4 x x x x x x x

Q-5 x x x x x x x

Q-6 x x x x x x x

Q-7 x x x x x x x

Q-8 x x x x x x x

Q-9 x x x x x x x

Q-10 x x x x x x x

The ISPS Code 23

Table 5

Distribution of port managers’ total scores

PM-1 PM-2 PM-3 PM-4 PM-5 PM-6 PM-7

Yes 40 40 30 30 25 40 35

No 6 6 12 12 15 6 9

Total 46 46 42 42 40 46 44

The ISPS Code 24

Table 6

Distribution of PFSO scores (first set of 10 questions)

Q-1 Q-2 Q-3 Q-4 Q-5 Q-6 Q-7 Q-8 Q-9 Q-10 Total

Yes x x x x x x x x 40

No x x 6

46

Distribution of PFSO scores (second set of 10 questions)

Q-11 Q-12 Q-13 Q-14 Q-15 Q-16 Q-17 Q-18 Q-19 Q-20 Total

Yes -- x x x x x x x x 40

No x -- 3

43

The ISPS Code 25