Research Report

International Water Management Institute

INTERNATIONALWATER MANAGEMENT INSTITUTE

P O Box 2075, Colombo, Sri LankaTel (94-1) 867404 • Fax (94-1) 866854 • E-mail iwmi@cgiar.org

Internet Home Page http: //www.iwmi.orgISSN 1026-0862ISBN 92-9090-392-9

38

An Assessment of the Small-ScaleIrrigation Management TurnoverProgram in Indonesia

Douglas L. Vermillion, Madar Samad,Suprodjo Pusposutardjo, Sigit S. Arif,and Saiful Rochdyanto

Research Reports

IWMI’s mission is to contribute to food security and poverty eradication by fosteringsustainable increases in the productivity of water through better management of irri-gation and other water uses in river basins. In serving this mission, IWMI concentrateson the integration of policies, technologies and management systems to achieve work-able solutions to real problems—practical, relevant results in the field of irrigation andwater resources.

The publications in this series cover a wide range of subjects—from computermodeling to experience with water user associations—and vary in content from directlyapplicable research to more basic studies, on which applied work ultimately depends.Some research reports are narrowly focused, analytical, and detailed empirical stud-ies; others are wide-ranging and synthetic overviews of generic problems.

Although most of the reports are published by IWMI staff and their collaborators,we welcome contributions from others. Each report is reviewed internally by IWMI’sown staff and Fellows, and by external reviewers. The reports are published and dis-tributed both in hard copy and electronically (http://www.iwmi.org) and where possible alldata and analyses will be available as separate downloadable files. Reports may becopied freely and cited with due acknowledgment.

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Research Report 38

An Assessment of the Small-ScaleIrrigation Management Turnover Programin Indonesia

Douglas L. Vermillion, Madar Samad,Suprodjo Pusposutardjo, Sigit S. Arif,and Saiful Rochdyanto

International Water Management InstituteP O Box 2075, Colombo, Sri Lanka

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The authors: Douglas L. Vermillion was a Senior Social Scientist at the InternationalWater Management Institute (IWMI) until September, 1998 and is now an independentconsultant. Madar Samad is a Research Associate at IWMI. Professors Pusposutardjo,Arif, and Rochdyanto are in the Faculty of Agricultural Engineering, Gadja MadaUniversity, Yogyakarta, Indonesia.

IWMI gratefully acknowledges the financial support for this study under the IrrigationManagment Transfer/Support System Project in Indonesia funded by the German Agencyfor Technical Cooperation (GTZ). Core funding to IWMI is provided by the Governmentsof Australia, Canada, China, Denmark, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and the UnitedStates of America; and by the Ford Foundation and the World Bank.

Vermillion, D. L., M. Samad, S. Pusposutardjo, S. S. Arif, and S. Rochdyanto. 1999.An assessment of the small-scale irrigation management turnover program in Indone-sia. Research Report 38. Colombo, Sri Lanka: International Water Management Insti-tute.

/ irrigation management / privatization / small-scale systems / irrigation systems / waterdistribution / performance / operation / maintenance / productivity / crop yield / economicimpact / costs / Indonesia /

ISBN 92-9090-392-9ISSN 1026-0862

Copyright © 2000 by IWMI. All rights reserved.

Responsibility for the contents of this publication rests with the authors.

The International Irrigation Management Institute, one of sixteen centers supported bythe Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR), was incorporatedby an Act of Parliament in Sri Lanka. The Act is currently under amendment to readas International Water Management Institute (IWMI).

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Contents

Summary v

Introduction 1

Small-Scale Irrigation Turnover Program in Indonesia 4

Management Efficiency, Organizational Viability, and Support Systems 12

Operational Performance 14

Maintenance Performance 18

Agricultural Productivity 21

Financial and Economic Impacts 22

Conclusions and Recommendations 26

Annex: Salient Characteristics of Systems Selected for the Study 32

Literature Cited 35

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Summary

The purpose of this study is to assess the resultsof the Small-Scale Irrigation Turnover Program inIndonesia. In 1987, the Government of Indonesiaadopted a policy to turn over to water userassociations (WUAs) the management of all publicirrigation systems—from the intake to drainagefacilities—in the country, which are 500 hectares orless in service area. The primary interest of thegovernment in the turnover policy is to lighten itscost burden for the irrigation subsector whileenabling farmers to sustain and even improve theproductivity of irrigated agriculture through themobilization of their own local resources. Generallyspeaking, the primary concern of farmers (in acontext where there is no volumetric water charge)is to maintain or increase the returns per unit ofland and labor.

This report examines to what extent theseaspirations of the government and the farmerswere realized through the turnover program. Thereport analyzes the impacts of managementturnover on irrigation management and irrigatedagriculture in selected small-scale systems inWest and Central Java. Impacts measured includecosts of irrigation to the government and thefarmers, quality of irrigation operations andmaintenance, agricultural productivity, financial andeconomic viability of irrigation systems, and socialimplications of management turnover. The keyresearch questions are: “To what extent has theturnover of irrigation systems from the governmentto the farmers directly affected irrigation systemmanagement?” and, more broadly, “To what extenthas irrigation system turnover had an impact onthe performance of irrigated agriculture?”

This study is part of a comparative researchprogram to examine the impacts of irrigationmanagement transfer in several countries using acommon methodology (Vermillion et al. 1996). TheInternational Water Management Institute andGadja Mada University in Yogyakarta, Indonesiacollaborated in this study.

The Small-Scale Irrigation Turnover Programhas led to modest efforts by farmers to improvemanagement efficiency and responsiveness.Turnover has not increased the costs of irrigationto farmers (at least in the short run). Waterdistribution in the four case study systems tendedto either improve or remain positive after turnover.However, it is apparent that significant futureexpenditures loom in the future unless the currentobserved underinvestment in maintenance byfarmers is halted. No significant changes wereobserved in agricultural performance or in theeconomic returns per unit of land and water. Themodest outcomes and lack of significant impactsof the program can be explained by the high levelsof agricultural production already achieved and themodest and partial nature of the reforms in Java.

The study recommends comprehensive, radicalreform of irrigation management, since a series ofmodest efforts at improvement has not proveneffective in improving performance or ensuringfinancial and physical sustainability of irrigation.Regional Indonesian irrigation services should berestructured towards a support service, with aregulatory and water basin focus, with financingcoming increasingly from payments for servicesdelivered rather than from government allocations.The threat of deterioration can be overcome byreplacing periodic rehabilitation with ongoingincremental infrastructure improvements jointlyfinanced by the government and the farmers.

WUAs should be granted clear water rights, thefreedom to federate to the system level, controlover infrastructure improvement and the right toadmit nonirrigator water users as members. Theturnover process should include farmerrepresentatives in the organizing process as wellas enhanced monitoring and evaluation. Whereneeded as part of turnover, rehabilitation shouldfollow rather than precede the formation of theWUAs.

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Introduction

Purpose of the Study

In 1987, the Government of Indonesia adopted apolicy to transfer the management of all publicirrigation systems in the country that are 500hectares or less in service area to WUAs. Thesesystems constitute about 21 percent of the totaldesign area and 70 percent of irrigation systemsin the public sector. The primary interest of thegovernment in the turnover policy is to lighten thecost burden to the government for the irrigationsubsector while enabling farmers to sustain andeven improve the productivity of irrigatedagriculture through the mobilization of their ownlocal resources. The primary concern of farmers(in a context where there is no volumetric watercharge) is to maintain or increase the returns perunit of land and labor.

This study examines the extent to which theaspirations of the government and farmers wererealized through the turnover program. The reportdeals with management turnover in the context ofsmall-scale irrigation systems in Indonesia, andrelates this to impacts on irrigation managementand irrigated agriculture in selected systems inWest and Central Java. Impacts measured includecosts of irrigation to the government and farmers,quality of irrigation operations and maintenance(O&M), agricultural productivity, financial andeconomic viability of irrigation systems, and socialimplications of management turnover. The keyresearch questions are, “To what extent has the

turnover of irrigation systems from the governmentto farmers directly affected irrigation systemmanagement?” and, more broadly, “To what extenthas irrigation system turnover had an impact onthe performance of irrigated agriculture?”

Although irrigation management transfer (IMT)is now a policy in many developing countries, atpresent there is a shortage of comparativeevidence at the international level to answer thesequestions (Vermillion 1997). This is part of acomparative research program of the InternationalWater Management Institute (IWMI) that examinesthe impacts of IMT in several countries, using acommon methodology (Vermillion et al. 1996).IWMI and the Gadja Mada University inYogyakarta, Indonesia collaborated in this study.

Study Methodology

This case study is part of a larger researchprogram assessing the impacts of irrigationmanagement transfer in different countries,including Colombia, India, Indonesia and SriLanka. 1 It documents basic information on theturnover policy and on the program andimplementation process at the national andoperational levels.

Observed results of turnover can be dividedinto outcomes and impacts. By outcomes wemean the direct effects of turnover on irrigationmanagement. These include practices and

An Assessment of the Small-scale IrrigationManagement Turnover Program in Indonesia

Douglas L. Vermillion, Madar Samad, Suprodjo Pusposutardjo, Sigit S. Arif,and Saiful Rochdyanto

1See Samad and Vermillion 1999; IIMA and IWMI 1999; Vermillion and Garcés-Restrepo 1998.

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achievements in operations, maintenance,financing, disputes and staff disposition. Pertinentoutcome indicatorsinclude relative irrigation supply,irrigation intensity, functional condition ofinfrastructure, cost of irrigation, ratio between costof repairing damaged structures to average annualmaintenance expenditures, financial solvency ofirrigation organizations, frequency of waterdisputes and average service area of managementstaff. Impacts are the longer-term effects ofturnover on the performance of irrigated agricultureand the relation between costs and benefits ofirrigation to farm families. They include suchindicators as cropping intensity, crop yield, andgross value of agricultural output per unit of landand water. Data collection and analysis werebased on five key hypotheses about the relationbetween irrigation management turnover andoutcomes and impacts. These are listed asfollows:

1. Irrigation management transfer will inducechanges in system management practicesthat will improve management efficiency andresponsiveness to farmer irrigationrequirements.

2. Management transfer will bring aboutimprovements in the quality of irrigationoperations and maintenance, and will result insustainable infrastructure maintenance.

3. Other agronomic factors being more or lessequal, turnover will be followed by adiscernible improvement in agriculturalproductivity of irrigated agriculture.

4. Management transfer will increase the cost ofirrigation to farmers.

5. Other economic factors being more or lessequal, turnover will be followed by animprovement in the economic returns per unitof land and water.

The study employed two kinds of comparisonsof differences in performance:

� before and after turnover (for the four selectedsystems in West and Central Java), and

� with and without turnover (for comparingperformance according to a small set ofindicators for a larger set of systems in bothprovinces).

Four systems were selected for intensiveanalysis: Cipanumbangan and Cinangka IIirrigation systems in West Java and Kaliduren andPlanditan systems in Central Java (figure 1).These systems were selected because of theirlarger-than-average service areas and becausethey are amongst the earliest systems to betransferred. The longer post-turnover period wouldprovide better insight into outcomes and impacts.In the early part of the transfer program, systemsselected by the government for turnover tended tobe the smaller ones. The selection of the largersystems available from this early cohort for thisstudy was done so that these systems wouldrepresent more typical systems that would beturned over eventually. Table 1 gives basic dataon the selected systems and annex 1 givesfurther information about the systems.

Data were collected from key informantsamong farmers and irrigation agency staff, fromwalk-through inspections of irrigation networks,from discussions among farmers, from a formalsurvey questionnaire for farmers and fromsecondary data kept by the Departments ofIrrigation and Agriculture. Informant interviewswere primarily used to obtain qualitative andhistorical information about the turnover processand management context and about changes thatwere made in management practices as a resultof turnover.

The walk-through inspections were used toobtain data on the functional condition of theirrigation network and the cost of repairing

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TABLE 1.Basic data of irrigation systems selected for the study.

Planditan Kaliduren Cipanumbangan Cinangka II

Province Central Java Central Java West Java West JavaYear built 1918 1918 1970 1980When turned over October 1992 October 1992 June 1990 June 1990Design area (ha) 131 193 150 441Irrigated area (ha) 68 190 150 430Water user association Harapan Jaya Guna Tirta Guna Mekar CibadugawiruMain soil type Latosol Latosol Latosol LatosolMain crop(s) Rice Rice Rice RiceWater source Klopo river Kodil river Cibojong river Citaal riverSystem type River diversion River diversion River diversion River diversionTurnout type Sluice gates Sluice gates Sluice gates Sluice gatesIrrigation structures 42 51 22 49Lowest water

measurement point Main canal Main canal None Main canalAverage annual rainfall (mm) 3,034 3,199 3,021 2,059Length of main canal (km ) 4.4 7.0 6.0 2.5Total length of canal network (km ) 4.4 7.2 6.5 7.8Area served/length of canal (ha/km) 15.5 26.2 23.1 55.1

FIGURE 1.Study locations in Java.

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damaged structures. The farmer survey eliciteddata on farmer perceptions of performance beforeand after turnover, crop yields, and costs ofirrigation. Farmers were selected by randomsampling, stratified by distance from the mainwater intake. Using layout maps, each systemwas divided into three blocks (head, middle andtail). Farm parcels in each block were givennumbers and parcels were selected randomlywithin each block with the aid of a table of randomnumbers. 2 Secondary data (where available andchecked for reliability) were used to compareirrigation intensities, yields, productivity andprofitability of irrigated agriculture between twosets of irrigation systems in both provinces:turned-over and non-turned-over systems. Data onwater irrigation issues were obtained from the

rainfall varies between 1,000 mm and 5,000 mm.In 1990, the total average annual water yield forall river basins in the country was approximately14,000 m3 per capita. However, due to the highpopulation densities in Java, the average percapita yield is less than one-tenth of the nationalaverage in several water basins. Due to rapidincreases in population (3 million added per year)and economic diversification, competition forwater—between irrigation, domestic and municipaluse and industry—is becoming severe in the moredensely populated and economically active regionsof Java, Bali and Sumatra.

The total irrigated area is approximately7.1 million hectares, of which about 5.5 million areserved by government irrigation systems and1.6 million are farmer-managed (Soeparmono andSutardi 1998). Small-scale irrigation is a vital partof the sector, with over 2.1 million hectares ofirrigated land being in irrigation systems that serve

2Sample sizes were 50 farmers in Kaliduren, 50 in Planditan, 44 in Cinangka II, and 62 in Cipanumbangan.3Farmland is counted as rice land if at least one rice crop per year is harvested.

records available with the irrigation agencies. Forthe extensive data sample, several irrigationsystems were deleted from the sample because ofunreliable data. The time line observed for thequantitative performance indicators was5 years before turnover and 5 years after turnover(if this much time had elapsed). Statistical testsof significance were done to analyze differences inlevels and trends of key quantitative indicators.Information on the management context andturnover process in the four irrigation systems wasobtained from farmer key informants and fieldoperations staff of the Sukabumi and KuninganDistrict Irrigation Services of West Java and theBogowonto District Irrigation Service of CentralJava.

Small-Scale Irrigation Turnover Program in Indonesia

Irrigated Agriculture in Indonesia

Agriculture contributes 16.5 percent to theIndonesian gross domestic product and employs44 percent of the labor force. The total crop-harvested area in Indonesia is approximately11.44 million hectares. This has been growing at arate of about 187,000 ha/yr. during the early1990s. The most important agricultural crop isrice. Of the 9 million plus hectares of ricefarmland in Indonesia, nearly 71 percent isirrigated.3 Nationwide, average rice yields are inthe range of 4 to 6 tons/ha. After rice, other majorirrigated crops are sugarcane, maize, legumes,tomato, chili, onion and other vegetables.

As a whole, Indonesia has relatively abundantsupplies of water. It has 21 percent of thefreshwater resources available to the Asia andPacific region with only 6.2 percent of thepopulation of the region. The average annual

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less than 500 hectares each. This is 30 percent ofthe entire irrigated area.

Between 1969 and 1994 about 1.44 millionhectares of new irrigated lands were createdthrough the construction of irrigation systems.Existing systems serving 3.36 million hectareswere rehabilitated, extended or upgraded. Duringthis period, Indonesia spent US$10 billion onirrigation development, 71 percent of which wasfunded through external loans (Soeparmono andSutardi 1998).

Between 1974 and 1983, under the SederhanaIrrigation Projects (I & II), the governmentrehabilitated or constructed 980 small-scaleirrigation systems, serving 400,000 hectares in23 provinces. The word sederhana means simple,which is how the government originally perceivedsmall-scale irrigation systems during this period.The project was highly centralized and rapidlyimplemented, which is a characteristic of greenrevolution programs. Except for a few pilotprojects, farmers were generally not consultedabout what improvements or structures wereneeded and were not expected to contribute anyof their own equity. Contractors normally carriedout construction and the Department of Agriculturewas responsible for the development of WUAs.

It is widely recognized that the SederhanaProject was riddled with problems of faulty designand construction. At the system level, followingproject implementation, confusion frequently aroseover whose responsibility it was to maintain andrepair structures that had been built by thegovernment. Where sizeable structures had beenbuilt, the government often installed a permanentstaff and reclassified the system from a villagesystem to a government system, incorporating itinto the public inventory of irrigation systems.4

Even in the systems that had remained as villagesystems, damaged structures were often leftunrepaired for years, because they were

irrelevant in the first place, farmers were notorganized or willing to make the repairs, orbecause the farmers and the government thoughtit was each other’s responsibility to make therepairs.

Lack of farmer participation, focus onphysical works, and lack of clarity about thestatus of the systems and responsibility formanagement have been typical of theorganizational culture of government-led small-scale irrigation development in Indonesia. As willbe seen below, these characteristics havecontinued to the present and have apparentlycreated a fundamental inconsistency betweenmeans and ends in the Small-Scale IrrigationTurnover Program. Nevertheless, the goals of thegreen revolution for immediate increases inagricultural production were met and theSederhana Project was considered a success.The average rice yields in project systems inJava rose from 2.4 tons/ha in 1968 to 4.5 tons/ha in 1983. An econometric analysis hasestimated that approximately 16 percent of theincrease in yields can be attributed to theenhancement of irrigation systems (Varley 1997).

With the green revolution the problem of lowproductivity had, apparently, been solved. But theproblem of unsustainability of the productionsystem itself was soon to follow. Today’senvironment is one of rising competition for waterand irrigated land, increasing multiple uses ofwater and growing commercialization ofagriculture. Observers argue that unless the WUAis granted stronger legal and political clout (vis-à-vis village governments and private-sectorinterests), it will be ineffective in dealing with theproblems of rising water scarcity and competition(see Ganjar, Avianto, and Bruns 1997) and withthe management of irrigation systems for multipleuses. It will be unable to effectively adopt abusiness orientation and fend for itself in an

4By law, all systems with government investment were classified as government systems. Central Java inventoried all systems over 10hectares and included them in the inventory of government systems.

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emerging environment where water will necessarilybe treated largely as an economic good (seeHelmi 1997).

By the mid-1980s, central and provincialgovernments were finding it increasingly difficult tofinance the recurring cost of O&M for the rapidlyexpanding irrigation service area. Infrastructurewas deteriorating rapidly, which necessitatedexpensive rehabilitation projects that becamerecurring events. Farmers were not paying the fullcost of O&M. Generally, they considered themanagement and financing of government-developed systems to be the responsibility of thegovernment. By the late 1980s there were strongpressures on the government to shift fromexpansion of irrigation to enhancement of irrigationmanagement, with an emphasis on findingsolutions to the problem of non-sustainability ofirrigation systems.

those serving less than 500 ha) would betransferred to WUAs by the year 2003. This wouldaffect 2.1 million hectares of public irrigationservice area. Systems with service areas of lessthan 150 hectares would be given first priority.Implementation began in 1987 with pilotimplementation of turnover in West Java and WestSumatra.

The policy stated that, after turnover, theWUAs would assume responsibility for O&M of allinfrastructure, water delivery and drainage from theintake to fields and drains. For small-scaleirrigation, the irrigation agency was to change itsrole from direct management to the provision oftechnical and physical assistance and regulatorysupport. The agency was to restrict its role indirect management to larger-scale irrigationsystems and river basins. The policy wasambiguous about who would be responsible formanagement of weirs and intakes.5

The following reasons were given for theadoption of the turnover policy (Soenarno1995):

� Inability of provincial governments to providesufficient funds for irrigation O&M.

� Inability of the central government to provide asufficient subsidy to provincial governments tofinance the cost of O&M (it could only provide50% of the estimated subsidy required).

� The Land and Building Tax and IrrigationService Fee were not effective and could notbe expected to alleviate the government’sfinancial shortfall in the irrigation subsector.

� Management of irrigation systems by theprovincial irrigation services was considered tobe unsatisfactory.

� Farmers managed many of the small irrigationsystems rehabilitated or extended under the

5The government has remained flexible on this issue and there is variation in practice between provinces and districts. However, thegovernment often retains staff to operate larger weirs and intakes.

Turnover Policy

In 1987, the Indonesian National Planning Board(Bappenas) issued the Government PolicyStatement of 1987 on the Operation andMaintenance of Irrigation Systems. The statementprovided new direction for the irrigation subsector.This included mandates to:

� turn over management of all public irrigationsystems of 500 hectares or less in servicearea to WUAs

� introduce an irrigation service fee for farmersin all public irrigation systems

� introduce more efficient O&M procedures inpublic irrigation systems

The policy for small-scale irrigation determinedthat all small-scale irrigation systems (defined as

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Sederhana Project before the projectreclassified them as public systems.

In addition to the above-announced reasons,there appear to be three other kinds of pressuremotivating the turnover policy.

First, rice yields on irrigated land hadapparently reached their peak by the mid-1980sand it was envisioned that future increases inproduction would have to come through increasesin cropping or irrigation intensity and extension offunctional command areas. These increases woulddepend more on improvements in watermanagement than in production inputs.

Second, by the late 1980s it had already beenmore than 10 years since rehabilitation of most ofthe Sederhana Project systems and many were inneed of repair (from the point of view of thegovernment). It was thought that the turnoverprogram would provide an avenue through whichfunds could be mobilized for the repair of small-scale irrigation systems.

Third, through the mid-1990s all turnoveractivity had been connected with external donorfunds. The donors have pushed for this reformand it is questionable whether the governmentwould have implemented the reform on its owninitiative. The major sources have been the WorldBank (Irrigation Subsector Projects I and II in10 provinces, and the Java Irrigation and WaterManagement Project, which covered fourprovinces in Java) and the Asian DevelopmentBank (Third Irrigation Sector Project, IntegratedIrrigation Sector Project, and Nusa TenggaraAgricultural Development Project, Sumatra, CentralJava, and Nusa Tenggara).

The immediate objectives of the turnoverprogram clarified in 1991 (Soenarno 1995) were:

� to increase farmer participation in the O&M ofsmall-scale irrigation systems

� to decrease or eliminate the dependence ofWUAs on government assistance andincrease their overall self-reliance

� to improve the O&M of small-scale irrigationsystems

These objectives were not necessarilymutually consistent. The key interest of thegovernment was to decrease its financial burdenin irrigation. It was assumed that decreaseddependence of farmers on the government wouldalso be of interest to the farmers and would leadto improved management performance. But itremains an empirical question as to whetherturnover has been in the financial and economicinterest of farmers. We assess the evidence below.

Turnover Process

Priority was given to provinces, which had largeconcentrations of small-scale irrigation systems.At the field-level, priority was given to systems,which

� were below 150 hectares in area

� did not require heavy repairs (not more thanUS$100/ha)

� did not have difficult or complex O&Mrequirements

� had existing WUAs and farmers who appearedreceptive to the turnover program

� used water in the systems almost entirely forirrigation

Hence, as is the case in other countries, thegovernment tended to transfer the easier andbetter performing systems in the early stages ofthe program. Over time, the program increasinglydealt with more problematic systems.

After a pilot phase between 1987 and 1989,the Ministry of Public Works published an officialregulation about implementing procedures forsmall-scale irrigation turnover and administrative

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powers of the WUA (GOI 1989). The first step inthe turnover process was for the provincial anddistrict irrigation agencies to make an inventory ofall eligible systems (Bruns and Atmanto 1992). Asfarmers were not consulted they had no choiceabout whether their system was included in theturnover program or not.

Basic data were collected from offices aboutnumbers of agency staff placed in the system,technical level and the functional condition ofinfrastructure and the existence of a WUA. Fromthese data, provincial and district officescategorized systems into three groups:

� public systems without any agency staff,which would simply be administrativelyreclassified as farmer-managed irrigationsystems (without going through the normalturnover process)

� public systems where agency staff wereassigned to help manage the system, butwhich did not need repair or improvement ofinfrastructure (which would only receive help inorganizing and developing the WUA, to theextent needed)

� public systems where members of the agencystaff were assigned to help manage thesystem and where significant repairs orimprovements were needed prior to turnover

After these classifications were made,provincial and district governments prioritizedwhich systems would be turned over in whichorder and made schedules for implementation. Atthe district level, annual budgets were estimatedwith the guideline that an average of US$100/hawould be spent for pre-turnover physical repairsand improvements for the last category of theabove-mentioned three systems.

At the system level, a WUA organizer andstaff of the subdistrict office carried out a “socio-technical profile.” The profile produced a detaileddescription of the management context andphysical condition of irrigation infrastructure. Italso included recommendations for whatimprovements should be made to theinfrastructure and “farmer versions” of the designof repairs and improvements, which were simplesketches of structures needed, prepared by farmerrepresentatives. The profile also includedrecommendations for what organizing efforts wereneeded for the WUA. One important finding thatemerged from the inventories and profiles wasthat, prior to turnover, farmers were alreadyperforming a lot, and often a majority of themanagement tasks in the systems, regardless ofwhether or not members of the agency staff wereformally assigned to the systems. Hence, formany, and probably most systems, turnover didnot constitute a major change in actualmanagement practices.

The profile was followed by the preparation ofa “technical version” of the design (which wassupposed to be based on the original farmerversion) by irrigation district staff or localconsultants. This included cost estimates and awork schedule. This was followed byconstruction, which normally involved the waterusers as laborers. Although this was not arequirement, farmers often contributed their ownlabor and materials to add to what thegovernment was financing.6 Despite the attemptsto elicit farmer suggestions for repairs andimprovements, it was clear to all that theinitiative and financing were coming from thegovernment. Furthermore, there was someuncertainty as to who would be responsible forrehabilitation and modernization of irrigationinfrastructure in the future—the government orthe farmers.

6Farmer contributions were a point of contention with World Bank supervision missions for ISSP I & II. At least during some periods,contributions were supposed to be mandatory, and they were monitored.

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These aspects of the process probably did nothelp reverse the conventional perception amongfarmers that the irrigation system was primarilythe government’s responsibility. Farmers who hadobserved an extended pattern of government-sponsored assistance were not easily dissuadedfrom their custom of deferring substantialmaintenance problems and speculating that thegovernment could easily be enticed to return andmake the repairs.

Parallel to the physical improvements, theirrigation institutional organizer and district stafffacilitated the organization of a WUA and trainingin system management. They also assisted withadministrative and legal tasks related toformalizing management turnover, which includeda formal acknowledgement of the bupati (head ofthe district) and the governor of the province.However, since the WUA was not formallyestablished until after the physical improvementshad been made by the government, the group ofwater users did not have the opportunity to arriveat an official group agreement about theimprovements beforehand. This is likely to havereinforced the notion among farmers that thesystem is not fully theirs and that the governmentis likely to return again in the future and makeother repairs when needed.

At the system level, the turnover process wassupposed to be completed within about 18months, spread over two budget years. Thismeant that the formation or restructuring of theWUA took place simultaneously with the designand construction of the physical repairs. Reportsfrom key informants and other researchersindicated that several problems or inconsistencieshave arisen during implementation of the turnoverprogram. The more significant ones are:

� Crop choices or quotas are often stillimposed by local government authorities,despite Basic Law 12 of 1992 about farmcultivation.

� Although farmer consultations were carried outduring design, construction was not done inaccordance with the design agreed withfarmers.

� The irrigation agency has reportedly been“preoccupied” with physical repair works(which are its normal focus) and has giveninadequate attention to, and been ineffectivein, organizing farmers (for which agency staffhave been ill-prepared).

� WUAs (P3A) or their federated representativesare not included as members of the provincial-or district-level panitia irigasi (irrigationcommittee), which has the role of decidingwater allocation and use restrictions.

� The WUA is still legally and politically weakalthough there are mounting pressures for it toexercise more legal clout (such as to requirefull payment for irrigation costs from allbeneficiaries, to settle water disputes, and toinvest in agribusiness or agro-industrialventures as a business cooperative).

� Neither the WUA nor the individual farmershave any legally valid water rights wherebythey can defend themselves from increasingcompetition for water.

� The turnover program has generally beenimplemented according to rigid administrativeguidelines, quotas, schedules, and standardtraining materials rather than according to aflexible process of negotiation and solvinglocal management problems.

� The agency charged with the responsibility toimplement the turnover program is itself themost inclined to resist the change. Due toreluctance or inability to transfer staff,members of the agency field operations staff

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often remain assigned to an irrigation systemeven after it has been formally turned over.

� It is apparent that the irrigation service agencyhas not adopted the role of providing technicalguidance to systems after they had beenturned over.

It was in 1990 that the first systems in WestJava and West Sumatra were turned over tofarmer management. The turnover program quicklyspread to most of the provinces in Indonesia. Themost concentrated attention in the early years wasgiven to Java, where most of the small-scaleirrigation systems were located. According to theinitial indications, the results of the turnoverprogram were relatively positive, without significantnegative consequences (Bruns, Kurnia, andTajidan1994; Mott-MacDonald InternationalLtd.1993). However, by 1997, after 10 years ofimplementation, only 420,000 hectares of small-scale irrigation service areas had been officiallyturned over to WUAs (Soeparmono and Sutardi1998). This was only 47 percent of the900,000-hectare target area, which is supposed tobe reached by the year 2003. The program isconsiderably behind schedule, reportedly due to thedecision, in practice, that all systems should haveimprovements built before turnover, which hasresulted in administrative difficulties with contracts,reluctance about the program by the provincial anddistrict irrigation services (which are the primaryimplementers), disagreements between thegovernment and farmers, and funding constraints.

selected for this study. Each of these systemshas a masonry weir that diverts water through anadjustable intake gate into a main canal, which iscompletely or mostly unlined. There is a staffgauge at the intake but there are no dischargemeasurement devices downstream of theheadworks. Water is diverted directly into fieldchannels from offtakes located along the maincanal. Overflow structures, silt flushing gates,division boxes, flumes and culverts are thecommon structures.

At the field-channel level, irrigation anddrainage are often integrated in the samechannels. Water often flows from field to field.Average farm sizes in Java are only betweemone-fourth and one-third of a hectare. Thegovernment estimates that the irrigationefficiencies of such small-scale systems are onlyabout 40 percent to 50 percent. However, this islargely irrelevant at the water basin level due tothe extensive and repeated return flows into theriver basin between the headwaters and the rivermouth.

Table 2 summarizes the powers vested withWUAs and the functions turned over to them inthe systems from West and Central Java selectedfor the study. Because irrigation turnover is anational program, the basic functions and powersdevolved are the same between provinces.However, due to differences in scale andcomplexity of structures, variation occurs betweensystems in the amount of the hydraulic networktransferred to farmer control. In Cipanumbangan

and Cinangka II in West Java, the agency

continued to control the intakes after turnover. It

even continued to exercise partial control over the

main canal systems in Planditan, Kaliduren and

Cinangka II after turnover. So, turnover is not a

singular phenomenon and often involves only a

limited degree of devolution of authority and all

four systems continued to have some form of

joint-management.

Turnover Context and Process inSample Irrigation Systems

The vast majority of irrigation systems inIndonesia are river diversion, surface canalsystems. This is particularly true of small-scalesystems and of each of the four systems

11

In all four systems, WUA became a legalentity and had the authority to make its own rulesand sanctions respecting irrigation. The maximumsanction authorized legally is temporarytermination of the water delivery service (which,however, may be problematic where water flowsfrom field to field). In theory, the WUA has fullauthority over O&M, setting water fees, hiringof staff, canal rights of way, entering intocontracts, and making profits. No water rights

are granted to the association or to individuals.Provisions for the transfer of assets werenot implemented. This resulted in ambiguityin the authority of WUAs to carry outimprovements to the physical infrastructure.7

The government allocates water accordingto administrative rules and priorities. Someof the key tasks carried out during and aftertransfer in the sample systems are listed intable 3.

TABLE 2.Powers devolved and functions turned over to WUAs.

Arrangements and function Planditan Kaliduren Cipanumbangan Cinangka II

WUA is legal entity Yes Yes Yes Yes

Authority to make rules and sanctions Yes Yes Yes Yes

Maximum sanction available to WUA Water stopped Water stopped Water stopped Water stopped

Maximum sanction given since turnover Warning Warning Warning Warning

Authority for O&M plan and budget Yes Yes Yes Yes

Authority to set water fees Yes Yes Yes Yes

Authority to hire or release staff Yes Yes Yes Yes

Legal water right at level of system or No, govt. No, govt. No, govt. No, govt. farmer organization allocation allocation allocation allocation

Control over intake Partial Partial No No

Control over main canal system Partial Partial Yes No

Control over subsidiary canal system Yes Yes Yes Yes

Responsibility for future rehabilitation Yes/NR* Yes/NR Yes/NR Yes/NR

Canal rights of way Yes Yes Yes Yes

WUA right to contract and raise funds Yes/NR Yes/NR Yes/NR Yes/NR

WUA right to make profits Yes/NR Yes/NR Yes/NR Yes/NR

*NR means not yet realized.

7It is reported there had been some transfer of assets.

12

An important concept for management transfer isthat devolution of management functions to waterusers is expected to induce changes in systemmanagement practices that would improvemanagement efficiency. This proposition is testedfrom data obtained from the four sample irrigationsystems from the Central and West Java. In thisstudy, two measures were used as indicators ofmanagement efficiency. These were:

� the perceived effort needed by farmers toarrange water deliveries to their fields

� the responsiveness of irrigation managementstaff to farmer suggestions and concerns

In Kaliduren and Planditan in Central Java,68 percent and 42 percent, respectively, offarmers interviewed perceived that efforts requiredto arrange water delivery to their fields in the

second season had changed from ‘difficult’ to‘easy’ after turnover (figure 2). About 26 percent inboth systems said this was ‘easy’ both before andafter turnover. In Cipanumbangan and Cinangka IIsystems in West Java, between 45 percent and55 percent of farmers said it was easy to arrangesecond-season water deliveries both before andafter turnover. Twenty to 35 percent felt thatarranging water deliveries had changed from‘difficult’ to ‘easy’ after turnover.

Regarding responsiveness of managementstaff to farmer concerns, the majority of farmers inKaliduren and Planditan reported either animprovement in responsiveness or no change,while about 20 percent in both systems reportedless-responsiveness of staff after turnover. Thismay be the perception of those who had specialpay-for-service relationships with government staffbefore turnover. In the Cipanumbangan andCinangka II systems in West Java, between

TABLE 3.Actions during and after the turnover process.

Transfer activity Planditan Kaliduren Cipanumbangan Cinangka II

Selection of WUA leadership by farmers Yes Yes Yes Yes

Establishment of WUAs Yes Yes Yes Yes

Training of farmer representatives Limited Limited Limited Limited

Training of management staff Minimal Minimal Minimal Minimal

Improvement of intake and/or main canal Yes Yes Yes Yes

Repair or improvement of subsidiary network No No No No

Have farmers helped prioritize improvement? Nominally Nominally Nominally Nominally

Investment in improvements by farmers No No No Minimal

Revision of O&M procedures and/or plans No Yes No Yes

Revision of water charge No No No No

Reduction or elimination of government financing Yes Yes Yes Yes

Removal of some government staff Yes No Yes Yes

Is future responsibility for rehabilitation known? Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain Uncertain

Management Efficiency, Organizational Viability,and Support Systems

13

60 percent and 75 percent of farmers interviewedreported no change in staff responsiveness afterturnover; about 18 percent in both systemsperceived an improvement in responsiveness ofmanagement staff after turnover.

The term organizational viability refers to thepost-turnover capacity of the local organization tomobilize the support and resources necessary tocontinue to meet its objectives in the long run.The indicators that most closely measureorganizational viability are:

� farmer support for the organization

� adequacy of fees paid by farmers to theorganization

� external legal recognition and politicalacceptance of the organization

There are reasons to be dubious about theorganizational viability of WUAs in Java, which

have as their area of jurisdiction the hydraulicservice area boundary of a river diversion weir.Survey data indicate that the ratio of farmers whouse water from the irrigation system but whohave no knowledge of the existence of the WUA(5 years after turnover), and have never joined ina meeting or maintenance activity is 40 percentin the Planditan system, 42 percent in theKaliduren system, and 30 percent in theCinangka II system. Over 80 percent of farmersinterviewed in these systems did not know aboutthe activities or water distribution arrangementsof the WUAs.

Second, there are no fees paid in cash byfarmers in any of the four systems. Traditionally,irrigation fees are paid in kind (paddy) to thevillage irrigation officer and unpaid labor iscontributed to seasonal canal maintenance. Thereare no fees of any kind in the two systems inCentral Java and the large majority of farmersinterviewed reported that the level of family laborfor canal maintenance is the same after turnover

FIGURE 2.Perceived efforts of farmers to arrange water delivery.

14

as before. In the Cinangka II system in WestJava, 65 percent of farmers interviewed reportedno change in the amount of payments in kindwhile 25 percent did not pay fees. Most reportedno change in the amount of labor inputs for canalmaintenance. In the Cipanumbangan system inWest Java, 89 percent of farmers sampled payfees in kind, of which 59 percent said their feepayments had increased after turnover and39 percent said they had remained the same. Thepicture is one of a rather weak and relaxedposture toward resource mobilization. Theimplications of this for the physical sustainabilityof infrastructure will be seen in the section onO&M performance below.

Third, the political apparatus of the statecomes down to the village level in Indonesia.Except in Bali and a few other local areas,irrigation has traditionally been managed at thelocal level by the desa (the village government).Water-sharing arrangements or disputes betweensubsections of an irrigation system, which cutacross different village boundaries, have beentraditionally handled between village governments.This is still the case, even after transfer. AlthoughWUAs may now be granted formal legal statuses,they lack political recognition. Banks are stillreluctant to make loans to them. WUAs that cutacross multiple villages (which is the case withmost systems below 500 ha in service area) stillmake rotational arrangements and settle disputes

through village governments rather than throughthe formal association.

According to the turnover policy, as thegovernment withdraws from routine O&M it issupposed to take on the role of providing supportservices to irrigation systems, which have beenturned over to farmer management (Bruns andHelmi 1996). These include:

� providing technical guidance foroperations

� preventive maintenance and modernization

� facilitating local investment in infrastructurerepairs or improvements

� regulating allocation of water along the rivercourse

� managing weirs and intakes

� helping the WUA improve its managementprocedures

Among the above types of services, so farthe only one that has been extended is directmanagement of the intake. The other supportservices are not being provided. Reportedly,district governments do not have a clear programand allocate only small budgets for thesefunctions.

Operational Performance

This section examines the impact of managementtransfer on the operational performance ofirrigation systems. It is hypothesized that turnoverleads to an efficient and more equitable waterdistribution and thus increased irrigation intensity.

Water Distribution

Quantitative data on water distribution are notavailable below the intake in any of the foursystems. Therefore, we collected data on farmer

15

interviewed perceived that the frequency of water-related disputes among farmers in the system haddecreased after turnover. Only a very smallnumber of farmers in any of the systems reporteda worse situation after turnover.

Regarding timeliness of water deliveries, themajority of farmers in Planditan, Cipanumbanganand Cinangka II reported no change, althoughbetween 20 percent and 30 percent of farmers inPlanditan and Cinangka II reported improvement.About 55 percent of farmers in Kaliduren reportedan improvement in the timeliness of water deliveryafter turnover. Another 40 percent reportedsatisfactory timeliness before and after turnover.

Irrigation Intensity8

The annual irrigation intensity between 1991 and1997 was compared for 66 small-scale irrigationsystems in West Java and Central Java:34 transferred and 32 non-transferred systems.

Figure 4 shows the mean annual irrigationintensities for the two groups of systems during1991–1996. It is evident that the mean irrigationintensity in the transferred systems is higher thanin the non-transferred systems. Regressionanalysis was carried out to compare the trend inirrigation intensity between the transferred and thenon-transferred systems during the period1991–1996. The regression model fitted was asfollows:

�������������������������������� ��������������� ���where,Y = Dependent variable (irrigation intensity),��� = 1 for turned-over systems,�����= 0 for non-turned-over systems,���= Time in years (1991–1996),��� = Intercept,��� = The difference in the dependent variable

(irrigation intensity) between transferred andnon-transferred systems,

perceptions about operational performance beforeand after turnover. We asked farmers in thesample systems about the five measures ofoperational performance and how they havechanged after turnover, if at all. We paid specialattention to the second irrigation season (April/May to July/ August) since this is a regular butwater-sensitive season. The four measures were:

� adequacy of irrigation water supplied to thefarm

� fairness of water distribution within the system

� frequency of water distribution conflicts

� timeliness of water delivery to the farm

Figure 3 gives the details on farmerperceptions about system operations in theselected systems. A majority of farmersinterviewed in Planditan, Cipanumbangan, andCinangka II reported no change in water adequacyafter turnover, some farmers saying it wasadequate both before and after turnover, andothers claiming it was inadequate before andafterwards. The exception was Kaliduren, wherethe majority of farmers reported an improvement inwater adequacy after turnover.

Farmer perceptions about the fairness of waterdistribution were more positive. A majority in allfour systems perceived that water distribution waseither fair before and after turnover or was unfairbefore turnover but had become fair afterwards. InKaliduren and Planditan, between 40 percent and50 percent felt water distribution had improvedfrom unfair to fair after turnover. InCipanumbangan, 20 percent felt that waterdistribution was unfair both before and afterturnover, but in the other systems this ratio wasmuch smaller.

It is significant that in all four systemsbetween 60 percent and 80 percent of farmers

8Irrigation intensity is defined as the ratio of the gross annual area irrigated to the irrigable area and is expressed in percentage terms.The design area is taken as the irrigable area.

16

FIGURE 3.Farmer perceptions about operational performance.

�����Slope coefficient giving the trend of the dependent variable (irrigation intensity) for the non-trans ferred systems during the period 1991–1996,�����Slope coefficient indicating the differential effects of the transferred systems on the trend in the dependent variable (irrigation intensity) during the period 1991–1996, and�����Error term.

The following parameter estimates (with t-statisticwithin parentheses) were obtained using equation (1):

Y�(irrigation intensity) = 203.79 - 8.118Di + 2.341.Xi + 5.911 ( DiXi )

(19.72) (-0.582) (0.917) (1.695)

R2=0.045 F statistic = 4.4

The results indicate that there is no

statistically significant difference (at the 5% level)

in the trend in irrigation intensity during the period

1991–1996 between the transferred and the

non-transferred systems.

17

FIGURE 4a.Trend in annual irrigation intensity of non-turned-over systems, West and Central Java.

FIGURE 4b.Trend in annual irrigation intensity of turned-over systems, West and Central Java.

18

This section assesses the impact of managementtransfer on the maintenance of irrigation facilitiesby farmers. It is hypothesized that managementtransfer will bring about improvements in themaintenance of the irrigation facilities. Theproposition was tested by carrying out an irrigationinfrastructure assessment survey in the foursystems selected for the study. The intake andfull length of all main and distributary canals wereinspected during the irrigation season in 1997 todetermine the functional condition of theinfrastructure after turnover. This provides insightinto the quality of maintenance after turnover, and,together with data on levels of spending onmaintenance, provides an indication of the extentto which the WUAs are keeping up or fallingbehind in maintenance.

Canal reaches and structures were classifiedas ‘functional,’ ‘nearly dysfunctional,’ and‘dysfunctional.’9 Canal lengths were considered‘defective’ if one of the following problems existedand if it interfered with the desired hydraulicoperation:

� constriction or enlargement of the canal crosssection

� visible siltation and/or encroachment offreeboard or adjacent road

� visible seepage

� slippage, scouring, or other defects in theembankment

� cracks or other damage to the canal lining

Table 4 shows the percentage of totalinspected canal length in each system that wasobserved to be functional, nearly dysfunctional,and dysfunctional. For three of the four systems,between 93 percent and 96 percent were fullyfunctional and there was only a modest degree ofnearly dysfunctional canal length. Cipanumbanganwas the only system that had a worrisome amountof nearly dysfunctional canal length (33%). Thisindicates what can be considered as a lack ofpreventive maintenance, or conversely, asignificant amount of “deferred maintenance.”

Control, conveyance, measurement, andancillary structures were considered defective(i.e., dysfunctional or nearly dysfunctional) if oneof the following conditions was present:

Maintenance Performance

9A functional structure is defined as one that can currently perform its basic design function and shows no signs of losing this capacitywithin about a year. A nearly dysfunctional structure is one that is considered likely to become unable to perform its basic function withinabout a year. A dysfunctional structure is one that was unable to perform its basic function at the time of the inspection. For canalreaches, dysfunctional means it is unable to convey at least 70% of the desired flow capacity. Nearly dysfunctional means it is likely tobecome dysfunctional within about a year.

TABLE 4.Functional condition of canal lengths inspected.

District Total length of Dysfunctional Nearly Functional length canal network (km) length (%) dysfunctional (%) length (%)

Planditan 4.0 0 6 94

Kaliduren 6.5 1 3 96

Cipanumbangan 6.5 0 33 67

Cinangka II 7.8 0 7 93

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17 percent to 18 percent were nearly dysfunctional(indicating some deferred maintenance). InCipanumbangan and Cinangka II, West Java, only55 percent and 68 percent, respectively, of allstructures were fully functional. InCipanumbangan, 41 percent of all structures werenearly dysfunctional even though physicalimprovements were made in the system just priorto turnover in 1992.10 As part of the inspections,cost estimates were made for the repair of alldysfunctional and nearly dysfunctional canalsections and structures in the systems.Dysfunctional canal sections and structures wereconsidered to be an “essential maintenance” cost.Nearly dysfunctional items were considered to bea “preventive maintenance” cost. Theaccumulation of both was considered as the totaldeferred maintenance requirement.

Table 6, compares post-turnover averageannual maintenance expenditure levels by WUAswith the accumulated deferred maintenancecosts. This comparison enables us to estimatethe percentage increase in maintenanceinvestment over current levels, which would berequired to handle current routine maintenanceand take care of all essential maintenancerequirements within 1 year as well as allpreventive maintenance requirements within3 years.

� scouring of canal around structures

� the approach section, rubble pack, or wings ofstructures are breaking apart

� the water control structure cannot control flowas intended (due to gates or sills missing,eroded, or damaged, significant leakage atgates, or damaged mechanism of movablestructures)

� the water measurement structure cannot beused to measure flow due to a damaged ormissing gauge, recorder, or other component

� the civil works of ancillary structures aredamaged or poorly constructed

Table 5 shows the number of structuresinspected that were found to be functional, nearlydysfunctional, and dysfunctional. In general, thefrequency of disrepair is more common forstructures than for canal lengths (to the extent thetwo can be compared). This is probably becausestructures tend to be movable, more difficult, orimpossible for farmers to repair, and their designis sometimes incompatible with farmer principlesof water allocation.

In both systems in Central Java only76 percent of structures were fully functional, and

10Apparently, this was due to the poor quality of rehabilitation works, which may be an indication that farmers did not play an importantrole in supervising rehabilitation.

TABLE 5.Functional condition of structures inspected.

District Total Dysfunctional Nearly Functionalstructures in structures (%) dysfunctional structures (%)

system structures (%)

Planditan 42 7 17 76

Kalidure 51 6 18 76

Cipanumbanan 22 4 41 55

Cinangka II 49 16 16 68

20

In table 6, last row (f) shows that substantialincreases in investment would be required inPlanditan (719%), Kaliduren (36%), andCinangka II (140%) to eliminate all deferredmaintenance as indicated. Data on currentmaintenance spending levels for Cipanumbanganare not available, due to lack of records. However,we can see that the cost of eliminating thebacklog of deferred maintenance inCipanumbangan is comparable with those ofCinangka II and Planditan. These findings indicatethat, after turnover, farmers have not begun toinvest in the long-term maintenance of theirrigation systems. The conventional pattern offarmers deferring some maintenance costs untilthe government might return with externalassistance for rehabilitation has apparently notbeen overcome by turnover.

The majority of farmers interviewed in thetwo systems in Central Java reported that the

condition of the canal network and structuresimproved after turnover. Most farmers in thetwo systems in West Java said thatmaintenance had either improved or was goodboth before and after turnover (figure 5). InPlanditan and Cipanumbangan, between15 percent and 20 percent of the farmersinterviewed said that the infrastructure wasworse afterwards. This was apparently due tosome dissatisfaction with the quality of repairwork done by contractors prior to turnover.When asked what the most importantmaintenance problems were, most farmersresponded that they constituted the poorcondition of the main or distributary canals.WUA leaders interviewed in all four systemsreported to researchers that they expected thegovernment would return within 5 years’ timeto finance another rehabilitation of theirsystem.

TABLE 6.Capacity for financing maintenance in systems turned over.

Maintenance expenditures Planditan Kaliduren Cipanum- Cinangka IIrequirements and bangan(June 1997 US$/ha)

a. Current average annual maintenanceexpenditure 3.37 11.83 na 13.63

b. Accumulated essential maintenance cost 22.7 2.24 19.67 17.83

c. Accumulated preventive maintenance cost 4.51 5.82 2.78 3.59

d. Total deferred maintenance requirement 27.2 8.06 22.45 21.42

e. Expenditure required for routine and essentialmaintenance (in 1 year) and preventivemaintenance (in 3 years) 27.57 16.01 20.50 32.66

f. Required annual budget increase

719% 36% na 140%

*In this context, dysfunctional structures are considered as an essential maintenance requirement. Nearly dysfunctional structures areconsidered as a preventive maintenance requirement. In Cipanumbangan, WUA representatives did not have data on recent annualmaintenance expenditures. na = data not availabe.

21

This section examines the impact ofmanagement transfer on agricultural production.The hypothesis advanced is that irrigationmanagement transfer will result in animprovement in agricultural productivity levels.The hypothesis is tested by comparing cropyields between systems that have been turnedover to farmer management and those thatare under agency management, and on the basisof farmer perceptions about changes in cropyield before and after turnover in the four casestudy systems selected from West and CentralJava.

FIGURE 5.Farmer perceptions about canal maintenance in the selected systems.

Agricultural Productivity

Crop Yields

Table 7 gives the mean seasonal paddy yield inthe sample of 35 turned-over and 36 non-turned-over systems from West and Central Java duringthe 5-year period 1991–96.11 The results of the t-test carried out indicate that there is nostatistically significant (at 5% level) difference inthe mean yield of paddy between the two groupsin the first and the third season. In the secondseason, the mean paddy yield in the non-turned-over systems is significantly higher than the yieldin the turned-over systems.

11The yields recorded in the systems in the two selected locations seem to be much higher than the national average yield.

22

TABLE 7.Mean paddy yield during 1991–96 in the turned-over and non-turned-over systems.

Season systems Turned-over systems Non-turned-over t-statistic(tons/ha) (tons/ha)

Season 1 6.0 6.2 - 0.796(1.1) (1.3)

Season 2 5.9 6.4 - 2.56*(1.2) (1.6)

Season 3 5.4 5.2 0.794(1.1) (1.3)

*Difference in mean yield between turned-over and non-turned-over systems is statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

The regression model specified in equation 1was fitted to compare the trend in paddy yieldsbetween the two categories of systems during theperiod 1991–1996. The data were adjusted forseasonal and locational (Central and West Java)variations in yields. Figures 6a and 6b give thetrend in the yields during the reference period inthe non-turned-over and turned-over systems,respectively. The parameter estimates (with

t-statistic within parentheses) obtained were as

follows:

Yield (tons/ha) = 5.498-1.826 Di+0.0075 Xi+0.018 (DiXi)

(1.738) (-0.461) (0.222) (0.427)

R2 =0.002 F = 1.470

The results indicate that there is nostatistically significant difference in the trend inpaddy yield between the turned-over and the

non-turned-over systems in West and Central

Java during the reference period.

Farmer Perceptions about AgriculturalPerformance

To ascertain farmer perceptions about the impactof management transfer on agriculturalperformance, farmers in the four case studysystems were asked to compare paddy yieldsafter transfer with those obtained beforemanagement transfer. Between 60 percent and 70percent of farmers interviewed in the two systemsin Central Java reported an improvement in ricecrop yields in the second season after turnover.In the two West Java systems between 70percent and 80 percent of farmers reported nochange in yield before and after turnover.12

12A study by Bruns, Kurnia, and Tajidan (1994) also found most farmers reporting no impact. However, it found that the changes forthose farmers reporting changes were substantial enough to suggest significant impacts on yields.

Financial and Economic Impacts

Cost of Irrigation to Farmers

With the transfer of the management of publicirrigation systems from the government to farmers,

the latter were expected to mobilize their ownresources to meet the cost of O&M of thesystems. It is hypothesized that irrigationmanagement transfer increases the cost of

23

FIGURE 6a.Trend in paddy yields in non-turned-over systems, 1991–1996.

FIGURE 6B.Trend in paddy yields in turned-over systems, 1991–1996.

24

prices of paddy. To account for locationalvariation in farm gate prices, output was valued interms of the national average price of paddy asthe standard. Prices were adjusted for domesticinflation over the period 1991–96 on the basis ofthe wholesale price index for Indonesia (1995=100)and the gross value of output was calculated interms of constant 1996 US dollar value.

Figures 8a and 8b illustrate the trend in theGVO/ha in the non-transferred and transferredsystems, respectively in West and Central Java.The regression model illustrated in equation 1(p.15) was fitted with GVO per hectare as thedependent variable and the same explanatoryvariables as in the equation to determine whetherthere is a significant difference in the trend inGVO per hectare between the two categories ofsystems.

The following parameter estimates (witht-statistic within parentheses) were obtained:

GVO/ha(US$/ha)= 2456.37+248.83 DI +6.40 Xi- 8.989(DiXi)

(19.515) (1.542) ( 0.198) (-0.217)R2 =0.04 F. statistic = 9.14

The results indicate that there is nostatistically significant difference (at the 5%level) in the trend in the gross returns perhectare of paddy between the turned-over andnon-turned-over systems during the period1991–96.

Data on water supply were inadequate tocompare the productivity of irrigation waterbetween the two groups of systems. Instead,the analysis was confined to comparing thereturns per unit of water diverted before andafter turnover in Cinangka II andCimpanumbangan systems in West Java. Dataon water issues in these systems wereobtained from the records maintained by thelocal irrigation agency. Figure 9 illustrates thegross returns per unit of water diverted in thetwo systems before and after transfer. InCinangka II, there has been a steady increase

irrigation to farmers. In small-scale irrigationsystems in Indonesia, water charges paid to thevillage or WUAs are normally paid in kind (paddy)rather than in cash. In the four systems studied itwas found that the associations’ records of feescollected and expenditures made were often notcomplete (which itself is probably an indication ofthe weakness in financial management).Therefore, the impact of management transfer onthe cost of irrigation to farmers was assessed interms of results of a questionnaire surveyconducted in the four systems selected for thestudy. A sample of farmers from the systemswas interviewed about their perception ofchanges in the costs related to irrigation beforeand after turnover. The results of the survey areillustrated in figure 7. The proportion of farmersreporting no change in the amount of water feespaid in kind were 45 percent in Kaliduren,65 percent in Planditan, 38 percent inCipanumbangan and 85 percent in Cinangka II(figure 7). In Planditan and Cipanumbangan35 percent and 60 percent, respectively, reportedan increase in the fee after turnover. In Kalidurenabout 55 percent reported a decrease in the fee.Generally, farmers did not express concern aboutthe reported increases or decreases beingworrisome or too dramatic. In Planditan andKaliduren the village irrigation officer, not theWUA, administers the fees.

Economic Impacts

This section analyzes the impact of managementtransfer on the gross returns per unit of land andper unit of water, measured in terms of the annualgross value of output (GVO) per hectare and percubic meter of water diverted. The GVO perhectare was estimated from data obtained for theperiod 1991–96 from the sample of 35 turned-overand 36 non-turned-over systems in West andCentral Java selected for the study.

For the small-scale systems in this study,GVO is a function of crop yields and farm gate

25

FIGURE 7.Farmer perceptions about changes in the cost of irrigation.

26

in the returns per unit of water diverted duringthe period 1986-1990. It had recorded a dropin 1992 the year of transfer and had shown anincreasing trend since then. In the

association generally lacks the legal and politicalclout to mobilize loans and enter into contractsthat would permit group involvement in agri-business and agro-industry ventures. Furthermore,it was typical to find in the small-scale irrigationsystems in Indonesia that, even before turnover,farmers were already heavily involved inperforming a variety of managerial functions,such as channel desilting and cleaning andorganizing water rotations in the dry season.However, these functions are often carried outwithin the context of a cyclical relationship ofcodependency (farmers rely on governmentsubsidy and, the agency “relies” on deteriorationto justify rehabilitation projects). The farmershandle tasks for immediate or seasonal needswhile deferring preventive maintenance andletting the government eventually deal with thehigh cost of rehabilitation. Correspondingly, theagency seeks to attract external funds, whichare justified by the deteriorated condition ofirrigation systems. Hence, for many small-scalesystems, turnover does not constitute adramatic change in management. The mainchange is the reduction of government subsidiesfor maintenance, and possibly, the removal ofsome or all agency staff from the system. Theremay be a shift in terms of the agency/farmerrelationship but the basic codependentrelationship is still in place.

There are reasons why the turnover process,as implemented, may have served more toreinforce dependency of farmers on thegovernment rather than to engender self-reliance.Generally, the WUAs were not formally organized

Conclusions and Recommendations

Conclusions

In the small-scale irrigation systems in West andCentral Java examined in this study, prior to andafter turnover, water and land resources werealready being intensively exploited. Croppingintensities are relatively high and water isgenerally recycled and reutilized between systemsalong river courses. The potential for improvingproductivity or profitability of irrigated agriculturethrough changes in irrigation system managementis, therefore, relatively limited, and this is a keyreason for the lack of substantial improvement inagricultural productivity after turnover.

We have seen that, in Indonesia, irrigationmanagement turnover is not a uniformphenomenon. In practice, it may or may notinclude replacement of agency staff with localpeople hired by the WUA, transfer of control overthe intake or main canal, and full financialresponsibility for future rehabilitation andmodernization. Reportedly, WUAs were not givenextensive training or empowerment. TheIndonesian small-scale turnover program involvesonly a limited degree of devolution of authority.The WUA has the mandate to operate andmaintain the irrigation system from the intake, ormain canal, to the drains. But it does not have aformal water right and does not own the irrigationinfrastructure (although this may change later).

In general, the WUA is virtually powerless tosettle disputes and enforce collection of irrigationservice fees in irrigation systems, which cutacross multiple villages, the norm in Java andother densely populated areas. Also, the

Cipanumbangan system, there has notbeen an appreciable difference in thereturns per unit of water before and afterturnover.

27

FIGURE 8a.Gross value of output per hectare in non-turned-over systems.

FIGURE 8b.Gross value of output per hectare in the turned-over systems.

28

until after the design and construction of pre-turnover repairs were underway or completed.Nominal inputs are obtained from a few “farmerrepresentatives” about priorities for repairs andimprovements and their preferred design. Typically,the large majority of farmers are not involved inplanning the physical improvements. Thegovernment paid farmers for their labor andgenerally no local investment was required.Uncertainty remains about whether, or under whatterms and conditions, the government maysubsidize future rehabilitation or modernization ofsmall-scale irrigation systems.

Farmers in Indonesia have grown accustomedto nearly four decades of nonparticipatorygovernment-sponsored assistance to small-scaleirrigation. It is a dubious proposition that theSmall-Scale Irrigation Turnover Program, asconceived and implemented, can, by itself,reverse the dependent and speculative attitudes offarmers about their irrigation systems.

In summary, the following factors mitigateagainst the Small-Scale Irrigation Turnover

Program having a substantial impact on irrigationsystem management or the performance ofirrigated agriculture:

� limited amount of authority devolved

� weak position of WUAs

� extensive farmer role in codependentmanagement prior to turnover

� current environmental limits to major advancesin the performance of irrigated agriculture

� effects of program implementation on reinforcingdependency of farmers on the government

It is against this backdrop that the findings ofthis study on the five hypotheses about impactsof management turnover are to be understood.The first hypothesis is that turnover will inducechanges in system management practices that willimprove management efficiency and

FIGURE 9.Gross value of output per unit of water diverted (US$/m3).

29

responsiveness to farmers. This study indicatesthat some measures were adopted after turnoverby the new WUAs to improve the efficiency ofmanagement (improved water distributionarrangements) and to make ditch tenders andassociation officers more responsive to farmers’concerns. The majority of farmers interviewedreported an improvement in managementefficiency and responsiveness after turnover or asatisfaction before and after turnover. This wasparticularly the case in Kaliduren. Only a very fewreported that things had worsened after turnover.

The second hypothesis is that turnover willresult in a significant improvement in the quality ofO&M of the infrastructure. As with managementefficiency and responsiveness, for operationalperformance, most farmers interviewed reportedeither an improvement in water distributionadequacy and fairness or satisfaction before andafter turnover. Only a very few reported a declinein performance after turnover. The most strikingaspect of operational performance was the reportby a large majority of farmers in all four systemsthat water distribution conflicts had decreased.The inspection of the canal network showed theexistence of a moderate amount of disrepair andindicated that farmers are substantially under-investing in the long-term maintenance ofinfrastructure.

The third hypothesis is that turnover willincrease the cost of irrigation to farmers. Thestudy indicates that farmers report no significantchange in the cost of irrigation to them.

The fourth hypothesis is that turnover will befollowed by improvements in agriculturalproductivity levels. An analysis of the sample ofirrigation systems in West and Central Javashows no significant difference in the irrigationintensity and crop yields between systems thathave and have not been turned over to WUAs.

The fifth hypothesis is that turnover will befollowed by a discernible improvement in theeconomic productivity of irrigated agriculture.The evidence shows there is no statisticallysignificant difference in the gross value of

output per hectare of irrigated agriculturebetween systems that have or have not beentransferred to farmer management. The resultsalso show that in the two case-study systems(Cinangka II and Cipanumbangan), there is noappreciable difference in the returns per cubicmeter of water diverted before and afterturnover.

In brief, we conclude that the Small-ScaleIrrigation Turnover Program has led to modestefforts by farmers to improve managementefficiency and responsiveness and mostfarmers report either an improvement or acontinuing positive situation. Turnover hasbrought about a modest reduction ingovernment expenditure on small-scaleirrigation systems. There has not been ageneral increase in costs of irrigation tofarmers, at least, in the short run. Regardingwater distribution, the situation in the four casestudy systems tended to either improve orremain positive after turnover. However, it isapparent that requirements for significant futureexpenditures loom ahead unless the currentobserved underinvestment in maintenance byfarmers is halted. No significant changes wereobserved in agricultural or economicproductivity related to turnover.

Recommendations

The following recommendations arise on thebasis of the findings of this study and evidencefrom other studies on the irrigationmanagement reforms in Indonesia. We believethat these recommendations are generic innature and are relevant to many countriesbesides Indonesia. Similar recommendationshave been made for management turnover ortransfer programs elsewhere (see Arriëns etal.1996; Merrey 1996; Vermillion and Garcés-Restrepo 1998; World Bank 1993). Werecognize that policy recommendationsnecessarily involve tradeoffs over values and

30

4. To more effectively obtain the support of themajority of farmers for the WUA and toempower farmers to have a more influentialrole in rehabilitation, it is advisable to fullyorganize the WUA and obtain bindingagreements among farmers regardingestablishment of the WUA and implementationof turnover before physical improvements aremade.13 In order to develop the WUA’scapacity to invest and enter into contracts,physical improvements prior to turnover shouldbe made in response to WUA’s requests forassistance and with known terms andconditions, which require local investment, inlabor, local materials or funds.

5. It appears that the use of agency staff asinstitutional organizers is rather ineffective.Aside from the problem of lack of experienceand skills in organizing farmers, agency staffoften perceives the turnover program as apossible threat to their jobs or the clout of theagency. Reports indicate that members of theagency staff tend to focus on design andconstruction and are generally ill-prepared toengage in institutional development activities.We suggest that consideration be given to thelow-cost approach used in the Philippines ofselecting, training and utilizing articulate andlocally-respected farmers as institutionalorganizers, not as a substitute but as asupplement to agency staff inputs (seeWijayaratna and Vermillion 1994; Raby 1997).

6. To reduce or eliminate farmer underinvestmentin maintenance and dependence ongovernment subsidies, a clear policy aboutfuture responsibility for rehabilitation andmodernization needs to be adopted andcommunicated consistently to farmers. If thegovernment adopts a policy to providesubsidies for rehabilitation and modernization,

1. It is apparent that WUAs need to be grantedclear water rights in order to be effective inmanaging their water, inspiring confidence intheir members and staking claims againstcompeting water users along a water basin.Also, WUAs need to have clear authority torepair, redesign or modernize irrigationinfrastructure within their areas ofjurisdiction. This may be seen as a preludeto a complete transfer of irrigation systemsincluding the ownership of assets.

2. Inasmuch as irrigation systems in denselypopulated areas of Java increasingly servewater uses other than agriculture, werecommend that research and policyanalysis be done to determine whether it isadvisable for other kinds of users to alsobe eligible to become members of WUAs.Excluding alternative water users fromalso bearing the cost of water will onlyweaken support for the WUA amongirrigators.

13This is the approach that has been followed, historically, by the US Bureau of Reclamation in organizing irrigation districts in theAmerican west. See Svendsen and Vermillion 1994.

other political considerations relative to whichthe authors’ expertise may not be relevant.Rather than making absoluterecommendations, we propose that theseideas be given consideration by decisionmakers.

3. Currently, the WUAs have no formalrepresentational linkage with the district orprovincial government irrigation committees orthe new water basin management authorities.Since governments are typically ineffective inregulating water without the participation oflocal users, we suggest that consideration begiven to providing a more substantial forum forWUAs to interact with the government and thelarger set of water users from other sectors.

31

and if the government policy is to stimulatelocal investment, then it may be advisable tocreate eligibility requirements whereby WUAscan qualify for future government assistance.Such requirements could include:

� proportional matching investment

by the WUA

� developing a long-term capitalreplacement fund by the association

� implementing approved maintenancepractices by the association, perhaps tobe certified by the irrigation agency orother thid party

7. Implicit in recommendations 5 and 6 is thenotion that irrigation service agencies at theprovince and district levels need to reorienttheir basic roles from control andimplementation for irrigation management tosupport and regulation, and from irrigationO&M to joint-management and regulation ofwater basins. Such changes in mandateswill require organizational restructuringincluding changes in staff deployment,skills needed, new forms of financing (basedmore onpayments for services deliveredthan central or provincial governmentallocations), and new incentive systems tomotivate the agency towards a service-delivery orientation.

32

Planditan system is located in the Purworejodistrict, Central Java. It serves 68 hectares offarmland located in four villages (see table 1).Soils are dark brown and reddish latosols andalluvials, located on a relatively flat terrain with anelevation of 120 meters.

The water supply is obtained by divertingwater from the upper reaches of the Klopo river bya weir with a gated intake and an open channelcanal system. The weir and main canal were builtin 1918 during the Dutch occupation. The maincanal is 4.4 kilometers long and has 17 fieldchannel offtakes along it, each of which serves anaverage field-channel area of about 3 hectares.

In this highly fragmented farmland 92 percentof farm parcel sizes are less than 0.14 hectareeach. There are 404 farmers cultivating land in thesystem, of which 96 percent are owner operators.The average annual farm income from thesesmallholdings is approximately US$130 to$155 per year. Farmers normally cultivate two ricecrops per year, and a third between November/December and August/September. Farms aregenerally left fallow between late September andearly November.

During periods of water abundance, water isdistributed by continuous flow throughout thesystem. During periods of water shortage,normally during the second and third seasons,water is rotated between blocks. Main, secondary,and field channels are cleaned of weeds andpartially desilted prior to land preparation for eachseason. This is done by farmers without pay andis arranged by the WUA or the villagegovernments. These procedures were not changedafter management turnover.

During the turnover process, the WUA was legallyestablished and its officers and ditch tenders wereprovided short-term training. Some repairs weremade to the main canal system but farmers werenot involved in decision making or investment inthe repairs. The government discontinuedexpenditures for the system and, in October 1992,removed one member of the staff from the systemafter turnover. Another member remained afterturnover and had partial responsibility formanaging the intake and main canal. The numberof government staff declined from two to one.

Kaliduren System

Kaliduren system is located in the Purworejodistrict of Central Java. Its service area is190 hectares, which cuts across five villages. Themain crop is paddy, with a small amount ofnonseasonal rice grown sometimes if there is athird season. Soils are dark brown to reddishlatosols and alluvials on a generally flattopography. The elevation is 152 meters.

The system diverts water from the upperreaches of the Kodil river, using a weir and openchannels for water distribution. The weir and maincanal were built in 1918. The main canal is6,942 meters long but the total length ofdistributary channels is only 300 meters. Thesystem has 3 branch canals and 29 field channelofftakes. Each field offtake has a sliding sluicegate and a discharge-measuring device. Theaverage field chanel block (or tertiary block) areais 5.75 hectares.

The system has 1,090 farm parcles, most ofwhich are highly fragmented, with an overallaverage size of 0.07 to 0.17 hectare per parcel.

ANNEX

Salient Characteristics of Systems Selected for the Study

Planditan System

33

Of the farm parcels 80 percent is less than0.07 hectare in size. Fifty-two percent of thefarmers are owner operators, 14 percent arerenters or sharecroppers and 34 percent havereceived land by allocation from the village fortheir service in the village administration. Theaverage annual farm income from these parcelswas in the range of only $130 to $155 in 1995.

The system has three potential seasons peryear. The main rainy season is from October/November through February/March. The secondseason is from March/April through July/August.In some years, there may be a short third seasonbetween August/September and October/November. Paddy is virtually the sole crop duringthe rainy season and the dominant second-seasoncrop. Groundnuts tend to be the main crop if thereis a third season.

During periods of water abundance, water isdistributed by continuous flow throughout thesystem. During periods of water shortage in thesecond season, water is rotated between blocks.Often during the third season, when water isespecially scarce, it is delivered on a first-requestbasis. Routine maintenance is arranged by theWUA or the village governments and implementedwith non-paid farmer labor, as in Planditan. Theseprocedures were not changed after managementturnover.

As part of the turnover process, the WUA wasestablished and made legally valid. Since thesystem traverses six villages (each of which hada WUA before turnover), a WUA federation wasestablished at the system level. However, village-level WUAs asserted their continuing superiorauthority over the federation and the federationWUA has been weak until the present. WUAofficers and staff were given training.Paradoxically, the agency actually increased itsstaff assigned to the system from two to four afterturnover, to improve O&M of the intake and themain canal. After turnover, the “federated” WUAtook over the management of the intake and themain canal from the West Java Irrigation Service.

Village-level associations took over themanagement of branch canals or distributarychannels.

Cipanumbangan System

The Cipanumbangan system is located in thePanumbangan village in the Sukabumi district,West Java. It irrigates 150 hectares. The averagefarm parcel size is 0.38 hectare. Main soil typesare red and yellow latosol, podsolic and alluvial,located in a hilly terrain, which experiencesfrequent landslides and soil erosion.

The water supply is diverted with a riverdiversion weir into open channels. The weir wasbuilt in 1970. The main canal is 6,000 meters longand has seven field-channel offtakes along itslength, each of which has adjustable sluice gatesbut no measuring devices. The total distributarycanal length is only 500 meters.

There are 101 farm operators in the system.Fifty-two percent are owner operators,33.5 percent are renters or sharecroppers, and14 percent have received use rights from thevillage. Farm parcels are slightly larger inCipanumbangan compared to the systems inCentral Java. Tenancy is also more common.Farmers plant two or three paddy crops peryear, with some non-rice seasonal crops grownduring the dry season between August andOctober.

Water distribution along the main canal andfield channels is by continuous flow to the fieldlevel when supply equals or exceeds demand.Water is rotated along the main canal duringperiods of pronounced scarcity. The main canaland field channels are cleaned prior to the start ofeach cultivation season. This is organized by theWUA and is implemented with unpaid farmer labor.These procedures did not change withmanagement turnover.

During the turnover process, the main canaland intake were repaired but without farmer

34

participation in either decision making orinvestment in the repairs. A WUA was legallyestablished and nominal training was given tofarmers. One member of the agency staff wasremoved from the system while one remained.

After turnover, in June 1990, a new system ofrotational distribution was initiated by the WUA atsubsystem levels to facilitate planting of morenon-rice seasonal crops during the dry season.After turnover, operation of the main canal wastaken over by the WUA but the intake was stillcontrolled by the agency. The local in-kind waterfee (which was to pay for farmer-levelmanagement activities before turnover) was5 kilograms of unhulled rice per hectare perseason between 1985 and 1992. After turnover,the fee was raised to 7.5 kilograms of unhulledrice (paddy) per ha per season.

Cinangka II System

The Cinangka II system is located in theKuningan district, West Java. It has a servicearea of 430 hectares and receives water from ariver diversion weir and a free intake (with apumping station). In 1980, the government builtthe current weir. The network has 6 distributarychannels and 18 field-channel offtakes. Waterdischarge is only measured at the intake. Thesystem has fertile latosol and podsolic soils on aflat to undulating terrain.

There are 1,217 farmers in the system,80 percent of whom are owner operators.Sixteen percent farm on a leasehold basis. Theaverage size of a farm parcel is 0.2–0.35 hectare.The system normally has two to three croppingseasons per year. Paddy is grown two or threetimes. Non-rice crops (especially soybean) aresometimes grown in the third season, betweenAugust and October. During each season, whenwater is abundant, it is distributed by continuousflow and, when it is in short supply, it isdistributed by rotation (at main-canal ordistributary and field-channel levels). Afterturnover, these procedures did not change andboth the intake and main canal continued to beunder the control of the agency.

In Cinangka II, the same basic turnoverprocess was implemented as in the othersystems. This included physical repair of the maincanal system, with limited participation by farmersand village leaders and some mobilized grouplabor for intake and canal repairs. The number ofmembers of the agency staff was reduced fromfive to one, and this number was retained tooperate the large intake. In meetings at the villagelevel, farmers elected village-level WUA officials,who, in turn, elected overall WUA leaders at thefederated level. The WUA was legally establishedand limited classroom training was provided to itsofficials. Turnover occurred in June 1990. However,as was the case in Kaliduren, the WUA federationat the system level has been in a weak positionrelative to its constituent village-level associations.

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Research Report

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An Assessment of the Small-ScaleIrrigation Management TurnoverProgram in Indonesia

Douglas L. Vermillion, Madar Samad,Suprodjo Pusposutardjo, Sigit S. Arif,and Saiful Rochdyanto