Editor’s Note:Hurricane Sandy,

also known as Super

Storm Sandy, Tropi-

cal Storm Sandy, or

just plain Sandy,

hit New York City

and the surrounding

areas on October 29,

2012. Storm-related

deaths totaled 285,

while cleanup costs are estimated at $71.4 billion,

making Sandy the second costliest storm to have

hit the United States. A year later, recovery efforts

are still underway in some areas.

Set against a backdrop of emergency prepared-

ness planning in America’s largest city, this article

describes the role that The City University of New

York’s (CUNY) Office of Environmental, Health,

Safety, and Risk Management (EHSRM) played in

helping to plan for and respond to this extreme

event. As the article makes clear, effective emer-

gency planning and risk management involves

constant refinement and reassessment to protect the

public, vital infrastructure, and the environment.

Hurricane SandyWhen Joseph Bruno, New York City’s Com-

missioner of the Office of Emergency Management

(OEM), speaks about coastal storms, he speaks

with the authority

of someone who de-

serves a great deal

of credit for the re-

siliency and conti-

nuity that the city

demonstrated in the

wake of Hurricane

Sandy. So when he

addressed a forum

at New York’s Time-

Warner Conference Center and explained the city’s

resilience during Sandy by saying simply, “Plan-

ning and preparedness is what we do,” (Bruno,

2013), a typical audience might be struck by the

understatement. Sandy was not your typical storm.

However, this was no typical audience, either.

It was a collection of hardened risk managers and

business continuity planners from major institu-

tions throughout New York with whom Commis-

sioner Bruno’s message clearly resonated.

Sandy struck New York City on Monday,

October 29, 2012, 14 months after New York

City’s Coastal Storm Plan (CSP) was tested by

Hurricane Irene (New York City OEM, 2013a).

But unlike Irene, which flooded some low-lying

areas and left relatively little lasting damage

in the city (Dolnick, 2011), Sandy inundated

Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem / Winter 2013 / 61

© 2013 Wiley Periodicals, Inc.Published online in Wiley Online Library (wileyonlinelibrary.com)DOI: 10.1002/tqem.21361

Howard N. Apsan

Resiliency and Continuity: Hurricane Sandy and The City University of New York

Environmental, Health, and

Safety (EHS) managers shoulder

additional responsibilities with

storm preparedness planning—

and play host to storm evacuees

Howard N. Apsan62 / Winter 2013 / Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem

to Hurricane Katrina, which struck the city of New

Orleans and the Gulf Coast of the United States in

2005, and had an estimated impact of $108 billion

(Blake, Landsea, & Gibney, 2011).

Sandy Hits New YorkAs late as October 24th, forecasters still expected

Sandy to turn east and run its course over the

Atlantic Ocean. However, two days later, it became

clear that Sandy was turning west and heading full

force into the New York Bight (Exhibit 1). The

New York Bight is a natural, geographic feature, an

streets, basements, subway tunnels, and electri-

cal vaults and left large swaths of the city with-

out power.

Sandy affected seven different countries and

24 states in the United States, and it caused severe

damage to coastal areas in New Jersey and New

York. It was responsible for 285 documented storm-

related deaths, 44 of which occurred in New York

City (The New York Times, 2012; The New York

Times News Service, 2013). And with a cleanup

cost estimate of $71.4 billion, it was the second-

costliest storm in recorded US history—second only

Exhibit 1. The New York Bight

Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem / Winter 2013 / 63Hurricane Sandy and The City University of New York

in preparing for and responding to this signifi-

cant coastal storm event.

Risk Management and Business Continuity at CUNY

CUNY is the United States’ largest urban

university system and the third largest university

system in the country. CUNY consists of 24 col-

leges, graduate schools, and professional schools,

and it serves approximately 540,000 matriculated

and nonmatriculated students. It also has 35,000

faculty members and other employees and more

than 23 million square feet of space in almost

300 buildings located

throughout New York

City’s five boroughs,

as Exhibit 2 shows.

CUNY is responsible

for keeping a popula-

tion of around 600,000

(including visitors and

passersby) safe under

normal circumstances.

In the event of an

emergency, this task

becomes ever more

daunting (Apsan, 2008).

At CUNY, as at other universities, risk man-

agement and business continuity are widely

shared responsibilities. Naturally, Chancellor

Matthew Goldstein and Allan Dobrin, CUNY’s

executive vice chancellor and chief operating

officer, are ultimately accountable. Nevertheless,

as noted in a 2008 article in the Annual Journal of

the University Risk Management and Insurance

Association (URMIA), the integrated structure of

the university fosters reliance on local campus

leadership, as well:

Although CUNY is an integrated univer-

sity, each campus is encouraged to take

advantage of its unique characteristics

indentation where the New York and New Jersey

coastlines meet to form a near-right angle. Unfor-

tunately, when hurricanes strike, the bight serves

to funnel storm surges into New York City.

Ultimately, Sandy generated a storm surge

of 13.88 feet—almost four feet higher than the

previous record documented during Hurricane

Donna in 1960. The storm generated two mil-

lion cubic yards of debris and forced 600 million

gallons of water into the city’s underground in-

frastructure. It knocked down 20,000 trees, dam-

aged or destroyed 40,000 homes, 3,500 cars, and

72 boats, and left more than 700,000 residences,

which were occupied by millions of people, with-

out power for an extended period.

The population in the flood zone evacuation

area was approximately 2.3 million—less than the

worst-case scenario of three million, but still the

size of a major city. For those with nowhere else to

go—approximately 7,000 people and 197 pets at

the peak of the displacement—evacuees were sent

to one of the city’s 65 evacuation shelters, ten of

which are located at the CUNY campuses, or to

one of the eight special medical needs shelters

(SMNS), five of which are located on CUNY cam-

puses. These facilities were staffed by more than

4,000 city employees and volunteers who, in addi-

tion to monitoring the shelters, served more than

four million meals (New York City OEM, 2012).

Sandy tested the resilience of New York

City—and CUNY. It also prompted a thorough

review of the city’s existing CSP as well as a se-

rious reexamination of New York’s waterfront

development planning in anticipation of a future

in which climate change may contribute to more

frequent and intense coastal storms.

Much has been written about the sustainabil-

ity of coastal cities (Cohen, 2011), and the impact

of Sandy on the New York metropolitan area will

doubtless generate much more. This article has a

more modest scope. It highlights the synergistic

relationship between New York City and CUNY

Sandy tested the resilience of New York City—and CUNY. It also

prompted a thorough review of the city’s existing CSP as well as

a serious reexamination of New York’s waterfront development

planning in anticipation of a future in which climate change may

contribute to more frequent and intense coastal storms.

Howard N. Apsan64 / Winter 2013 / Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem

they have been tasked with establishing

local campus risk management commit-

tees to focus on campus-specific concerns

and serve as the liaison to the CUNY Risk

Management Council (Apsan, 2008, p. 52).

An Expanded Role: Office of EHSRM Takes on Additional Responsibilities

That said, the day-to-day responsibility of co-

ordinating the university’s risk management and

business continuity efforts falls to CUNY’s Office

of EHSRM. As the quote in the previous two para-

graphs explains, EHSRM was established in 2006,

shortly after the horrific active-shooter incident at

another school in the United States, Virginia Poly-

technic Institute and State University, by adding the

because they benefit each college and the

university as a whole…. Although many

decisions are made consultatively (e.g.,

closing the campus because of a snow

storm), the college president is ultimately

accountable for… an emergency decision

that requires immediate and often unilat-

eral action (e.g., activating the CUNY alert

emergency notification system).

As a result, the college presidents are asked

to play a pivotal role in CUNY’s risk man-

agement effort. They have been asked to se-

lect their designee to the Risk Management

Council, and they seem to have all given the

selection due consideration. Additionally,

Exhibit 2. CUNY's Campus Locations Throughout New York City (College of Staten Island not shown on this map)

Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem / Winter 2013 / 65Hurricane Sandy and The City University of New York

A University of the City Joins the City’s OEM in Storm Planning

CUNY is not a New York City agency, but it

is of the city, and therefore, like a good neigh-

bor, it is often called upon to lend a hand. So

when the CSP team at New York City’s OEM

asked for assistance, CUNY was there. CUNY

has a number of large, accessible campuses—

with gymnasiums, showers, and cafeterias—

that are outside the flood zones and well

suited for evacuation centers and shelters.

Alas, as Sandy highlighted, CUNY also has a

number of campuses that are located within

the flood zones and also exposed to coastal

storm risks.

As a world-class city, New York City has

its share of emergencies, and its OEM, by

extension, has had a

lot of practice in disas-

ter preparedness and

recovery. In fact, the

experiences associ-

ated with the Septem-

ber 11, 2001, attacks

on the World Trade

Center established OEM as a national leader in

disaster planning and coordination. Further, as

America’s largest coastal city, New York has a

long history of hurricane planning, as explained

in a page from OEM’s website, which appears in

Exhibit 3.Much of the current version of the CSP was

developed by OEM in 2000. However, because of

the lessons learned in New Orleans and elsewhere

during and after Hurricane Katrina, which struck

the Gulf Coast of the United States in 2005, OEM

revised its plan significantly in 2006. Further,

the Mayor’s Office and OEM’s “Hurricane Sandy

After-Action Report” recommended updating the

evacuation zones and upgrading the city’s 311

telephone lines (Office of the Mayor, City of New

York, 2013).

risk management function to the existing CUNY

Office of Environmental, Health and Safety (EHS).

Just as the formerly named Office of EHS worked

to integrate environment, health, and safety through

standard-setting, auditing, training, and communi-

cation—and using technology as well as monthly

meetings of CUNY’s environmental, health, and

safety council to reinforce the message—EHSRM

tried to replicate previous successes by developing

equivalent risk management tools. These included

a CUNY risk management website, campus risk

assessment plans and templates, and monthly risk

management council meetings that include des-

ignees from each campus and representatives of

each of the university’s functional divisions.

EHSRM responsibilities continued to evolve

as university vulnerabilities were identified. Over

time, EHSRM was asked to play a key role in

business continuity (also referred to as continu-

ity of operations) and to organize an emergency

preparedness task force. Continuity of operations

plans and templates have been developed and

monthly meetings of a dedicated CUNY-wide busi-

ness continuity committee, which has since been

consolidated into a joint risk management and

business continuity council, has been established.

In addition, CUNY’s emergency preparedness

task force, whose members are predominantly

senior CUNY executives, meets monthly to ad-

dress significant incidents that have occurred and

prepares for anticipated future events. Modeled

after the crime-data-driven New York Police De-

partment (NYPD) CompStat program, campus

officials are often invited to share details and

lessons learned from incidents that transpired on

their campuses (Buntin, 1999).

Finally, EHSRM is tasked with developing

crisis-specific plans. These have included routine

threats, such as snow storms, power outages,

and transit disruptions, as well as extraordinary

threats, such as pandemic flu, student unrest, and

of course, coastal storms.

As a world-class city, New York City has its share of emergencies, and

its OEM, by extension, has had a lot of practice in disaster preparedness

and recovery.

Howard N. Apsan66 / Winter 2013 / Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem

Exhibit 3. New York City Office of Emergency Management Website Provides Essential Information on Planning for Emergencies

One of the toughest challenges in imple-

menting the CSP is the evacuation and shelter-

ing of coastal area residents. Because of New

York’s densely populated waterfront neighbor-

hoods, the scope of an evacuation can be stag-

gering, depending on the severity of the storm.

The onomatopoetic SLOSH maps—SLOSH

stands for Sea, Lake, and Overland Surges from

Hurricanes (United States Department of Com-

merce, NOAA, 1992)—are included in the CSP

and provide an illustration of the potential

range of impact.

Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem / Winter 2013 / 67Hurricane Sandy and The City University of New York

evacuation plans. Exhibits 5 and 6, respec-

tively, show the populations affected by evacu-

ations based on the severity of the storm and

fact-and-figure estimates for the CSP. Exhibit 7

shows a map of the evacuation zones.

An example of a SLOSH map appears in

Exhibit 4. The computer modeling that defines

the locations likely to experience storm surges

and supports the SLOSH maps is updated regu-

larly, which helps officials prepare and update

Exhibit 4. SLOSH Map of New York City During Category 1 to Category 4 Hurricanes (The legend shows which areas are susceptible to storm surges for each Hurricane Category)

Howard N. Apsan68 / Winter 2013 / Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem

Authority (MTA), and other governmental, cor-

porate, and not-for-profit organizations that may

play a response or recovery role. Virtually all of the

key players have a seat at OEM’s Emergency Op-

erations Center (EOC) during catastrophic events.

Countdown to Sandy’s LandfallOnce OEM begins its regular alerts and confer-

ence calls and prepares to activate the CSP, CUNY

and other key participants commence their own,

similar, internal procedures. For CUNY, this typi-

cally includes a series of university-wide confer-

ence calls an hour or so after the OEM call to

share and update information among campus

officials. In the case of Sandy, this process began

in earnest on Wednesday, October 24, five days

before the storm’s landfall.

On Thursday, October 25, OEM activated the

CSP and began to prepare for the implementa-

tion of its evacuation and sheltering components

(New York City OEM, 2012). Exhibit 8 shows

The Art and Science of Storm PlanningIn most cases, coastal storms do not reach

New York without warning. The United States’

federal meteorological agencies can identify most

major storms from their inception and track

them as they advance along the Atlantic coast

(Office of the Mayor, City of New York, 2013).

State and local emergency agencies are kept in-

formed, and the information is then shared with

other agencies. In New York City, OEM begins to

communicate storm information with relevant

agencies as soon as the storm is identified.

Initially, most of the communication is done

through e-mails and web-based alerts. However,

as the storm approaches and it becomes apparent

that there will be some impact, OEM begins to con-

duct citywide agency conference calls. These calls

include most city agencies as well as other partici-

pating institutions, such as CUNY, the American

Red Cross, the area’s electrical utilities, such as

Consolidated Edison, the Metropolitan Transit

Exhibit 5. Coastal Storm Evacuation Estimates by Hurricane CategoryCSP Evacuees by Zone

Order Scope Evacuees

Zone A (Category 1) 272,331

Zone B (Category 2) 677,940

Zone C (Categories 3 and 4) 1,380,388

Subtotal zone evacuees 2,330,659

Other evacuees 714,162

Total potential evacuees 3,044,821

(New York City OEM, 2009)

Exhibit 6. Estimated Facts and Figures of Coastal Storm PlanPopulation expected to evacuate 3.0 million

Population expected to seek public shelter 605,000

Evacuation centers 65

Hurricane shelters 501

Special medical needs shelters 8

Staffing requirement for a 24-hour period 34,000

Training requirement for shelter staff 68,000

City tax levy funds dedicated to logistics planning and supplies $20 million

Number for prepositioned start-up kits in schools 600

(New York City OEM, 2009)

Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem / Winter 2013 / 69Hurricane Sandy and The City University of New York

the UORC serves as the “air traffic controller”

for the shelters. CUNY had representatives at

the EOC and at the UORC, and Don Winters of

CUNY’s Office of Public Safety provided overall

coordination.

Throughout the weekend, CUNY continued

to monitor information from the US National

Hurricane Center and review OEM’s situation

a timeline for this process. The CSP has a set

structure for its sheltering system, as shown in

Exhibit 9. This structure includes the EOC, the

united operations and resource center (UORC),

the evacuation centers, and the hurricane shel-

ters, which include the SMNS and transitional

shelters. Although the mayor and his commis-

sioners discuss strategy and set policy at the EOC,

Exhibit 7. New York City Coastal Storm Evacuation Zones

Howard N. Apsan70 / Winter 2013 / Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem

agers could share critical information on issues

such as supplies and staffing resources. The

ability to communicate among the shelters be-

came especially important as unexpected chal-

lenges arose, such as the power outage south of

40th Street in Manhattan, which affected the

shelter at Baruch College and four other CUNY

campuses in lower Manhattan, and fuel shortages

that threatened CUNY buildings, vehicles, and

emergency generators.

reports, which were issued every few hours dur-

ing the storm and detailed essential health,

evacuation, and resource information. On Satur-

day, October 27, when evacuees began to arrive,

CUNY distributed shelter updates, keeping all

CUNY shelter leaders abreast of conditions at

each shelter. Exhibits 10 and 11 show two of

the CUNY shelters during the hurricane.

Because each CUNY shelter had at least one

CUNY manager and point-of-contact, these man-

Exhibit 8. OEM's CSP Shelter Timeline

Exhibit 9. Shelter System Organizational Structure Overview

Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem / Winter 2013 / 71Hurricane Sandy and The City University of New York

Exhibit 10. York College Special Medical Needs Shelter During Hurricane Sandy

Exhibit 11. Queens College Evacuation Shelter During Hurricane Sandy

Photo Credit: H. N. Apsan, 2012

Photo Credit: H. N. Apsan, 2012

Howard N. Apsan72 / Winter 2013 / Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem

On Sunday, October 28, one day before Presi-

dent Obama signed the emergency declaration

qualifying state and local governments for federal

assistance, New York Governor Cuomo ordered

the closure of the MTA, suspending all subway,

bus, and commuter rail service in New York City

(Office of the Governor, State of New York, 2012).

Finally, New York City’s Mayor Bloomberg or-

dered the evacuation of residents in “Zone A”

(Office of the Mayor, City of New York, 2012).

Sandy reached New York City on Monday,

October 29. The storm surge flooded neighbor-

hoods, left millions

without power, and

trapped those who

could not or would not

evacuate. Although

most “Zone A” evac-

uees made their way

to friends and family

on high ground, the

7,000 or so who had no such options arrived at

CSP Shelters, with 2,700 going to CUNY facilities.

Evacuees Stay Longer Than ExpectedUnder the CSP, planners had anticipated that

evacuees would remain in the shelters for a few

days at most, and then return to their homes.

However, that scenario assumed that residents’

homes would be habitable when the storm re-

ceded. That clearly was not the case with Sandy.

Entering the third week—two weeks after

Sandy had passed—CUNY still had 900 evacuees

in four remaining shelters, and classes could not

resume in those areas until the shelters were

closed. The challenge was not restricted to the

presence of the evacuees. Early on, there was a

shortfall of shelter volunteers and serious con-

cern that the shelters would be understaffed.

However, as the storm subsided, a vast number

of volunteers arrived. City employees, com-

munity emergency response teams, health and

hospital corporation personnel, federal disaster

medical assistance teams, and public health ser-

vice officers descended on the CUNY shelters.

In all cases, these additional hands were much

appreciated, but they had to be coordinated, and

in some cases, redirected to other shelters. At

times, certain shelters had more volunteers than

evacuees.

As the evacuees began to return home and

the shelters began to close, Mayor Bloomberg ad-

dressed New Yorkers and thanked them for their

efforts and perseverance during Sandy. When he

spoke about the shelters, he said that he must:

particularly thank [CUNY], which has

been a great partner to us in this effort.

The volunteers and city employees man-

ning these shelters have done a phenom-

enal job and they deserve all of our thanks

(CUNY Newswire, 2012, para. 3).

With still-open shelters and evacuees re-

luctant to leave, the congratulations were a bit

premature. It took another week before all CUNY

campuses were out of the sheltering business

and able to resume fully their higher education

missions.

Finally, on Sunday, November 18, CUNY

campuses were slowly returning to normal. Now,

in addition to resuming college activities, it was

time to conduct the postmortems for Sandy and

begin to assimilate lessons learned for the next

emergency. As CUNY’s executive vice chancellor

and chief operating officer Allan Dobrin said:

The one thing you can be sure of is you’re

going to have emergencies. You just don’t

know what they’re going to be. . . . So it’s

very important to have processes in place

that cover everything you can imagine,

and to make constant improvements

(CUNY Matters, 2013, para. 7).

Entering the third week—two weeks after Sandy had passed—CUNY still had 900 evacuees in four remaining shelters, and classes could not resume in those areas until the shelters were closed.

Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem / Winter 2013 / 73Hurricane Sandy and The City University of New York

to serve as emergency housing for several days, at

most, were forced to remain open for weeks. The

stress on shelter leaders, volunteers, coordinators,

and the evacuees themselves, led to mounting

pressure.

Second, the resources needed to accommodate

long-term sheltering tested the mettle of the EOC,

the UORC, and the many organizations that pro-

vided support. As a result, CUNY shelters began to

rely on each other for resources and help.

Third, the facilities, including the gymna-

siums, cafeterias, and bathrooms and showers,

began to suffer from over use. CUNY quickly

began a reassessment process with OEM to de-

termine whether certain facilities continue to be

appropriate for sheltering, especially for extended

periods.

Fourth, CUNY and

OEM had to develop

a better endgame to

ensure that, once the

shelters have com-

pleted their humani-

tarian mission, the

evacuees will return home or be moved to

alternative facilities so that CUNY campuses

could return to their roles as places of higher

education.

Additional ChallengesFor CUNY, though, the ultimate challenge

is exemplified by institutions such as Hunter

College. Hunter’s East 68th Street campus served

as a key shelter on the Upper East Side of Manhat-

tan, as shown in Exhibit 12. At the same time,

CUNY’s Brookdale Campus, located on East 25th

Street near the East River, was flooded by the

storm surge and lost electrical power along with

most of the rest of lower Manhattan. Its dormi-

tory was evacuated, its research labs were dam-

aged, and the impact to the building components

was dramatic.

ConclusionsFor CUNY and for the rest of New York, the

recovery from Sandy has been a long and arduous

process that is still incomplete a year later. Dur-

ing the planning process, it was uncertain how

the CSP would acquit itself when tested. Hurri-

cane Irene, which struck New York City in 2011,

was the CSP’s first real test; it passed—but not

without many hard lessons learned. In the “hot

washing” process—an after-action discussion and

evaluation of an agency’s performance following

an exercise—Irene was often referred to as the

“live fire” drill—a realistic scenario used to test

specific equipment and training—for the CSP,

and it raised the level of confidence in the plan.

Sandy’s devastating impact did not undermine

that confidence, but it reminded us squarely of

how unpredictable nature can be.

Citywide, Hurricane Irene provided valuable

lessons in logistics, communications, and man-

agement that mitigated the impact of Sandy. For

example, compared with Irene, during Sandy, the

delivery of supplies was generally much smoother

and better coordinated; communication between

the EOC and the UORC, and between the UORC

and the shelters was improved; and shelter man-

agement was better organized and, at least at

CUNY, led by campus managers and staff who

knew the facilities and had a stake in them. By

most counts, the needs of the city’s most vulner-

able—special medical needs evacuees, hospital

patients, and nursing home residents—were ad-

dressed more effectively during Sandy than dur-

ing Irene.

Lessons Learned Regarding Sheltering Evacuees

Within CUNY, lessons emerged, as well. First,

because Sandy’s effects were much more severe

than Irene’s, and many evacuees could not return

home for weeks after the storm, the sheltering

system was seriously strained. Shelters designed

For CUNY and for the rest of New York, the recovery from Sandy has

been a long and arduous process that is still incomplete a year

later.

Howard N. Apsan74 / Winter 2013 / Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem

storms like Sandy and for other emergencies that

the future holds.

EpilogueWe began this article with Commissioner

Bruno’s comment on emergency planning, so it

is fitting to end with another discussion that was

prompted by his presentation: the role of climate

change in future coastal storm planning. There

appears to be consensus that, regardless of the

extent of climate change, future planning must

address the possibility of an increasing frequency

and intensity of coastal storms. Specific research

about this linkage is included in the report of the

New York City Panel on Climate Change, which

was co-chaired by CUNY (Office of Long-Term

Planning and Sustainability, City of New York,

2011).

In addition to the challenges that the Hunter

College shelter faced, the Baruch College shel-

ter had to be evacuated because of the power

outage, and Kingsborough Community College

and Borough of Manhattan Community Col-

lege, both of which are on the waterfront, were

severely flooded. Striking a balance between

operating shelters and simultaneously caring

for storm-affected facilities had already been

acknowledged as a special CUNY challenge,

but the severity of Sandy has raised the level of

concern.

Despite these difficulties, CUNY remains

committed to the city’s CSP, and it will continue

to play an integral role in the planning and

evaluation process by sharing lessons learned and

striving for continuous improvement. After all,

that is the essence of resiliency and continuity in

Exhibit 12. Hunter College Served as a Special Medical Needs Shelter During Hurricane Sandy

Photo credit: H. N. Apsan, 2012

Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem / Winter 2013 / 75Hurricane Sandy and The City University of New York

AcknowledgementsThe author gratefully acknowledges the

research assistance of Jordan Fox and Krystal

Laymon of the CUNY Office of EHSRM.

ReferencesApsan, H. N. (2008). Understanding risk management through an environmental, health and safety template. Annual Journal of the University Risk Management and Insurance Association (URMIA), 49, 52. Available at: https://www.urmia .org/library/docs/journal/2008/2008Edition_Journal_Final .pdf#page=51

Blake, E. S., Landsea, C. W., & Gibney, E. J. National Climatic Data Center; National Hurricane Center (2011). The deadli-est, costliest and most intense United States tropical cyclones from 1851 to 2010 (and other frequently requested hurricane facts). NOAA Technical Memorandum NWS NHC-6. Retrieved from http://www.nhc.noaa.gov/pdf/nws-nhc-6.pdf

Bruno, J. F. (2013, April 3). Hurricane Sandy case study: Emer-gency planning, crisis management and continuity of opera-tions in a domestic environment. Presented at the New York Forum of the United States Department of State, Overseas Security Advisory Council, New York.

Buntin, J. (1999). Assertive policing, plummeting crime: The NYPD takes on crime in New York City (Kennedy School of Government Case Program, C16-99-1530.0). Cambridge, MA: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. Retrieved from http://www.case.hks.harvard.edu/casetitle .asp?caseNo=1530.0

Cohen, S. A. (2011). Sustainability management: Lessons from and for New York City, America, and the planet. New York, NY: Columbia University Press.

CUNY Matters. (2013, January 8). Day of the deluge. Retrieved from http://www1.cuny.edu/mu/forum/2013/01/08/day-of -the-deluge/

CUNY Newswire. (2012, November 1). Shelter from the storm: CUNY aids Sandy’s victims. Retrieved from http://www1 .cuny.edu/mu/forum/2012/11/01/shelter-from-the-storm -cuny-aids-sandy%e2%80%99s-victims/

Dolnick, S. (2011, August 28). New York spared brunt of storm: Suburbs hit hard. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/29/nyregion/wind-and-rain-from -hurricane-irene-lash-new-york.html?pagewanted=all

Eisenhower, D. D. (1957, November 4). Remarks at the National Defense Executive Reserve Conference. National Defense Executive Reserve Conference in Washington from White House. Washington, DC. Retrieved from http://thinkexist .com/quotation/in_preparing_for_battle_i_have_always_found _that/10642.html

New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM). (2009, March). New York City hazard mitigation plan coastal storms: Multi-hazard analysis for New York City. Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/downloads/pdf/hazard _mitigation/section_3f_coastal_storm_hazard_analysis.pdf

New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM). (2012). The coastal storm plan. The coastal storm plan and the sheltering

This report contains a number of recommen-

dations directly related to future coastal storm

planning. These include:

• The evacuation zones must be reevaluated

with some regularity. Demographic changes,

along with residential and commercial devel-

opment, must be reflected accurately in future

evacuation scenarios.

• Construction and land use changes should

be incorporated in storm resiliency planning.

Buildings in low-lying waterfront areas could

be elevated; boardwalks, levees, and other vul-

nerable structures could be strengthened; and

the remaining marshland and riparian buffers

that protect the uplands naturally should be

protected.

• Infrastructure repairs and future projects

should incorporate flood-resistant technology.

Electricity, steam, telecommunication, and

subway lines in New York City proved to be

too vulnerable.

• The stockpiling and delivery of essential emer-

gency materiel—such as the back-up generators

and the fuel to run them—has to be reassessed.

Sandy hit New York City and CUNY pretty

hard, but it could have been much worse. After

all, it wasn’t just a storm; it was the equivalent of

a storm, a transit strike, a gasoline shortage, and

a blackout all rolled into one. The event even

included a one-day snowstorm. The fact that the

City and CUNY were so resilient, and that the re-

covery is well under way, is a tribute to the many

who served and battled through Sandy. As for the

next storm, it would serve us well to remember

former US President and Army General Dwight

Eisenhower’s oft-quoted admonition:

In preparing for battle, I have always

found that plans are useless but planning

is indispensable (Eisenhower, 1957).

Howard N. Apsan76 / Winter 2013 / Environmental Quality Management / DOI 10.1002/tqem

Office of Long-Term Planning and Sustainability, City of New York. (2011, April). Climate change. PlaNYC 2030. Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/html/planyc2030/html/publications /publications.shtml

Office of the Mayor, City of New York. (2012, October 2012). Mandatory evacuation order for all people in Zone A: Mayor Bloomberg issues order for mandatory evacu-ation of low-lying areas as hurricane Sandy approaches New York City. Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/portal /site/nycgov/menuitem.c0935b9a57bb4ef3daf2f1c701c789a0 /index.jsp?pageID=mayor_press_release&catID=1194&doc _name=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.nyc.gov%2Fhtml%2Fom%2Fhtml%2F2012b%2Fpr377-12.html&cc=unused1978&rc=1194&ndi=1

Office of the Mayor, City of New York. (2013, May). Hurricane Sandy after action: Report and recommendations to Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg. Retrieved from http://www .nyc.gov/html/recovery/downloads/pdf/sandy_aar_5.2.13.pdf

United States Department of Commerce, National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA). (1992, April). SLOSH: Sea, lake and overland surges from hurricanes (NOAA technical report 48). Silver Spring, MD. Retrieved from http:// slosh.nws.noaa.gov/sloshPub/pubs/SLOSH_TR48.pdf

system. Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html /planning_response/planning_coastal_storm_plan.shtml

New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM). (2013a, April). NYC hazards: NYC hurricane history. Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/hazards/storms _hurricanehistory.shtml

New York City Office of Emergency Management (OEM). (2013b, April). Planning for emergencies: coastal storm plan. Retrieved from http://www.nyc.gov/html/oem/html/planning _response/planning_natural_hazards.shtml

The New York Times. (2012, November 17). Mapping hurri-cane Sandy’s deadly toll. The New York Times. Retrieved from http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/18/nyregion/hurricane -sandys-deadly-toll.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0

The New York Times News Service. (2013, June 27). Sandy claims 44th victim, NYC man’s body undiscovered for months. Newsday. Retrieved from http://us.covertimes.com /news/newsday-us_2013--06--27/sandy-claims-44th-victim -nyc-man-s-body-undiscovered-for-months/758480

Office of the Governor, State of New York. (2012, October 28). Governor Cuomo announces MTA to suspend service in advance of hurricane Sandy. Retrieved from http://www .governor.ny.gov/press/10282012mtasuspension

Howard N. Apsan, PhD, serves as the University Director of Environmental, Health, Safety, and Risk Management (EHSRM) for The City University of New York, the largest urban university system in the United States. He also teaches at Columbia University, is a member of the Editorial Board of Environmental Quality Management, and writes and lectures regularly.