response-level communications workshophomelandplanning.nebraska.edu/...workshop_05022011.pdf ·...

OEC/ICTAPOffice of Emergency Communications / Interoperable Communications Technical Assistance Program

1

Response-Level Communications Workshop

Addressing National Emergency Communications Plan

(NECP) Goal 2 Requirements

State of Nebraska

June 23, 2011


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• Introductions and Brief Background on the NECP

Goals

• Response Level Communications Tool

• Determining County-level Interoperable

Communications Capabilities

• Assessing Response-Level Performance at a Multi-

Agency Incident or Event

• Common Policies & Procedures

• Responder Roles & Responsibilities

• Quality & Continuity

• Submitting Results & Conclusion

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Workshop Agenda


Introductions and Brief Background on the NECP Goals

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• Released July 2008

• Developed in coordination with 150+ representatives

from all major public safety organizations and private

sector

• Addresses operability, interoperability, continuity

• First National Strategic Plan

• 3 Performance-based Goals

• 7 Objectives that set priorities

• 92 Milestones to track progress

• Implementation

• Build capability/capacity (governance, exercises, SOP, usage)

• National Assessments

• Target resources (funding, technical assistance, training)

Vision – Emergency responders can communicate as needed, on demand,

as authorized; at all levels of government; and across all disciplines

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National Emergency Communications Plan


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NECP Goals• Goal 1: Urban Areas

• By 2010, 90 percent of all high-risk urban areas designated within the Urban Areas Security Initiative (UASI) are able to demonstrate response-level emergency communications within one hour for routine events involving multiple jurisdictions and agencies

o All 60 UASIs demonstrated capability at varying levels

o OEC providing targeted Technical Assistance to bolster UASI response capabilities and developing compendium of Goal 1 results

• Goal 2: Counties and County-Equivalents• By 2011, 75 percent of non-UASI jurisdictions are able to demonstrate response-

level emergency communications within one hour for routine events involving multiple jurisdictions and agencies

• Goal 3: All Jurisdictions• By 2013, 75 percent of all jurisdictions are able to demonstrate response-level

emergency communications within three hours, in the event of a significant incident as outlined in national planning scenarios


NECP Goal 1

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Events at all 60 UASIs were

observed and successfully met

NECP Goal 1 for response-level

communications

Over 1,000 Federal, State and

local agencies participated

More than 100 instances each of

Federal and NGO involvement


Feb.Dec. Apr. Jun. Aug. Oct. Dec.

Response-Level Communication Workshops and Webinars

NCSWIC Meeting12/14/2010

Data Collection with Counties/County-Equivalents

Regional Coordinator and Help Desk Support

Federal Activity

State/Local Activity

7

Oct.

2010 SCIP

Implementation Report

Methodology

Review and

Upgrade

Capabilities Reporting

(2011 SCIP

Implementation

Report)

Performance Reporting9/30/2011

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NECP Goal 2 Timeline


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NECP Goal 2 Counties and Equivalents

• Two types of data to be collected:

• Performance (response-level incident data)

• Capabilities (based on Interoperability Continuum lanes)

• County/county-equivalent data• Comprehensive look at emergency communications across the U.S.

• Identify emergency communications needs at the local levels

• Tribal data• OEC will reach out directly to Federally-recognized tribes

• States do not need to collect NECP Goal 2 data from Tribes


• Questions based on past efforts:• Interoperability Continuum

• 2006 Baseline Survey

• TICP Initiative

• Results should be generalized for the

entire county and county-equivalent

• Questions focus on Continuum lanes:• Governance

• SOPs

• Technology

• Training & Exercise

• Usage

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NECP Goal 2 Capability Data


• Counties/county-equivalents can use a variety of methods to measure performance:

• Real World Incidents

• Planned Events

• Exercises

• States/counties can use incidents, events, and exercises dating back to July 31, 2008

• Criteria is same as used for NECP Goal 1 UASI observations and focuses on 3 key areas:

• Common Policies & Procedures

• Leadership Roles & Responsibilities

• Quality & Continuity of Communications

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NECP Goal 2 Performance Data


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• High-level Support and Information (NECP Goals specific or General OEC assistance)

• NECP Goal 2 Questions, Data Collection and Adjudication

• Relationship Building and Outreach Assistance

Regional Coordinators

• Methodology Enhancement

• Action/Implementation Planning

• Data Management and Reporting

Implementation Support

• [email protected] or 202-630-NECP (6327)Email & Phone Number

Help Desk

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OEC Support: Regional Coordinators + Help Desk


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•SME support to provide insight on criteria / questions

•Technical support for problems with tool access, navigation, and trouble-shooting

On-Site Workshops

• SME Training on Capability and Performance questions / tool

• County participants can use workshop to complete NECP Goal 2 materials

• Includes question and answer session to address general or county-specific issues

• Dates/Times (Jan-Sept) and call information for two-hour sessions will be provided to the SWIC for distribution

Webinar

Response-Level Tool Support

• Conducted by OEC in coordination with the SWIC

• Provide SME Training on Capability and Performance questions / tool

• Participants can use workshop to complete NECP Goal 2 materials or as a train-the-trainer session for regional reps

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OEC Support: Technical Assistance


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Response Level Communications Tool


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Response-Level Communications Tool

• Assist SWICs with NECP Goal 2

data collection from counties

• Submission Process:

o Counties to SWIC

o SWIC to OEC

• Can be used as an emergency

communications assessment tool

by emergency responders at all

levels

• URL:

http://www.publicsafetytools.info

Response Level Communications

Tool (NECP Goal 2)

https://www.publicsafetytools.info/


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OEC/ICTAP Applications

Select

“Response-Level

Communications

Tool” from the list

of available

applications.


16

Security Certificate

If the

Certificate

Error screen

appears,

click

“Continue to

this Website”


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Security Use and Conditions

After reviewing

the security and

use conditions,

press the “Agree

and Proceed”

button


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First Time Log-In Screen

The Initial User Name

is your State’s name

(Note – If necessary

for your State, use a

_ between words).

The Initial Password

is N3CPt00L! (case

sensitive)


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Registration Screen

5) Registration Screen:

Select your State and County

affiliation from drop down lists.

Enter your official government

email, and confirm. Enter your

permanent password and

confirm (Note – password

must have at least 8

characters, 1 uppercase, 1

number, and 1 special

character). Press the register

button.


Enter your email address as user name and your newly established password to access and begin using the tool (Note –upon registration, a copy of your password will be e-mailed to you)

Official Log-In


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Determining Interoperable

Communications Capabilities in Your County


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Capability Evaluation

• Results should be

based on the county

as a whole.

• UASI counties should

complete this section

based on their

individual county

capabilities (not UASI

region)


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Governance

Capability Early ImplementationIntermediate

Implementation

Established

Implementation

Advanced

Implementation

Governance

Area decision-

making groups are

informal and do not

yet have a strategic

plan to guide

collective

communications

interoperability goals

and funding.

Some formal

agreements exist and

informal agreements

are in practice among

members of the

decision making

group for the area.

Strategic and budget

planning processes

are beginning to be

put in place.

Formal agreements

outline the roles and

responsibilities of an

area-wide decision

making group, which

has an agreed upon

strategic plan that

addresses sustainable

funding for

collective, regional

interoperable

communications

needs.

Area-wide decision

making bodies

proactively look to

expand membership

to ensure

representation from

broad public support

disciplines and other

levels of government,

while updating their

agreements and

strategic plan on a

regular basis.


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Governance Factors


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Standard Operating Procedures

CapabilityEarly

Implementation

Intermediate

Implementation

Established

Implementation

Advanced

Implementation

SOPs

Area-wide

interoperable

communications

SOPs are not

developed or have

not been formalized

and disseminated.

Some interoperable

communications

SOPs exist within

the area and steps

have been taken to

institute these

interoperability

procedures among

some agencies.

Interoperable

communications

SOPs are formalized

and in use by all

agencies within the

area. Despite minor

issues, SOPs are

successfully used

during responses

and/or exercises.

Interoperable

communications

SOPs within the area

are formalized and

regularly reviewed.

Additionally, NIMS

procedures are well

established among

all agencies and

disciplines. All

needed procedures

are effectively

utilized during

responses and/or

exercises.


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Standard Operating Procedures


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Technology

CapabilityRadio Cache/

GatewaysShared Channels Shared System

Standards-Based

Shared System

Technology

Interoperability

within the area is

primarily achieved

through the use of

gateways

(mobile/fixed

gateway, console

patch), shared radios,

or use of a radio

cache.

Interoperability

within the area is

primarily achieved

through the use of

shared channels or

talk groups.

Interoperability

within the area is

primarily achieved

through the use of a

proprietary shared

system.

Interoperability

within the area is

primarily achieved

through the use of

standards-based

shared system (e.g.,

Project 25).


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Technology Procedures


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Training and Exercise

Capability Early ImplementationIntermediate

Implementation

Established

Implementation

Advanced

Implementation

Training &

Exercises

Area-wide public

safety agencies

participate in

communications

interoperability

workshops, but no

formal training or

exercises are focused

on emergency

communications.

Some public safety

agencies within the

area hold

communications

interoperability

training on

equipment and

conduct exercises,

although not on a

regular cycle.

Public safety

agencies within the

area participate in

equipment and SOP

training for

communications

interoperability and

hold exercises on a

regular schedule.

Area public safety

agencies regularly

conduct training and

exercises with

communications

interoperability

curriculum

addressing equipment

and SOPs that is

modified as needed to

address the changing

operational

environment.


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Training and Exercise Procedures


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Usage

CapabilityEarly

Implementation

Intermediate

Implementation

Established

Implementation

Advanced

Implementation

Usage

First responders

across the area

seldom use solutions

unless advanced

planning is possible

(e.g., special events).

First responders

across the area use

interoperability

solutions regularly

for emergency

events, and in limited

fashion for day-to-

day communications.

First responders

across the area use

interoperability

solutions regularly

and easily for all day-

to-day, task force,

and mutual aid

events.

Regular use of

solutions for all day-

to-day and out-of-the-

ordinary events

across the area on

demand, in real time,

when needed, as

authorized.


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Usage Procedures


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Communications Equipment Use


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Communications Equipment Use


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Assessing Response-Level

Performance at a Multi-Agency Incident


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FOCUS: Response-Level Emergency Communications

Response-level emergency

communication refers to the

capacity of individuals with

primary operational leadership

responsibility to manage

resources and make timely

decisions during an incident

involving multiple agencies,

without technical or procedural

communications impediments.

(As reflected in organization

chart structure and defined in

the NECP)


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How to Determine Your Answer

• None of the time – During the event/incident the sub-element did not occur and was not noted.

• Some of the time- During the event/incident the sub-element either occurred or was noted up to, and including, 50% of the time.

• Most of the time - during the event/incident the sub-element occurred or was noted more than 50%, but less than 100% of the time.

• All of the time - during the event/incident the sub-element occurred or was noted 100% of the time.

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Element 1

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• Sub-Elements 1.1 & 1.2

– Did policies and procedures exist for interagency communications among the involved jurisdictions, agencies, and disciplines?

– Were they written?


Element 1- Sub-Element 1.1

• Policies and/or procedures existed which address interagency communications, either event-specific or standing procedureso Event-specific policies and procedures include IAPs,

Incident Briefing (ICS Form 201), operational orders

o Standing procedures include TICPs, agency-specific procedural documents, regional procedures, interagency communications plans, etc.

• Were interagency communications procedures written, verbal (informal procedure)

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Success Factors - Examples

• A single public safety IAP that included information from private organizations involved with the event

• Contingency plans incorporated into the IAP (plans included good, actionable procedures for how to respond to various emergencies or failures)

• Used current versions of the ICS formso Each form fully completed

o Information on all forms matched

o Operational time period specified

o Forms signed and approved, etc.

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Challenges - Examples

• Lack of written interagency communications procedures, including a TICP or regional communication plans

o Not having written copies of plans available at all key event locations

• Failure to collaborate with private organizations closely associated with running the event

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Element 2

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• Sub-Element 2.1

– Were established interagency communications policies and procedures followed throughout the event?


Element 2 – Sub-Element 2.1

• Followed applicable interagency communications procedures

• Followed the channel/talkgroup assignments listed in ICS Form 205

• Activated resources (e.g., patches, etc.) called for in the IAP, in accordance with established procedures

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Success Factors- Examples

• Conducted thorough briefings with incident/event personnel, to include an explanation of the IAP (or equivalent operational/procedural document) and a review of participant roles and responsibilities during the event

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• Plans and/or procedures “looked good on paper” but did not accurately reflect how response personnel operated

• Plans and/or procedures contained numerous errors or conflicting information among various documents or within portions of the same document

• A previous or outdated procedural document, IAP or communications plan was used that did not match the current event scenario and needs

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Element 2

60

• Sub-Elements 2.2 & 2.3– Did established policies and procedures exist between

responding agencies for request, activation, accountability, deactivation, and problem resolution of deployable interagency communications resources, such as mobile communications centers, gateways, and radio caches?

– If so, were they followed?



• There were documented policies and procedures for:

o Radio caches

o Mobile Communications Vehicles

o Mobile Gateways

o Other mobile assets used (mobile repeaters, satellite phones, etc.)

• If equipment was used in the event/incident, were applicable policies and/or procedures followed?

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• Maintained radio cache inventory, distribution, accountability, and training procedures

• Provided instructions for using cache radios

• Supplied a quick reference radio guide with each cache radio

• Provided COML/Communications Unit contact information

• Followed gateway activation, testing and monitoring procedures

• Ensured patch(es) were working correctly

• Conducted roll-calls and testing on patch(es) before activation

• Announced patch activation and deactivation

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• No policies and procedures regarding interoperable communications equipment

• Individual agency plans and/or procedures contained conflicting information, and did not reflect how assignments were actually performed

• Not all agencies were aware of the policies and procedures for equipment use

• COML (or equivalent) was not involved in coordinating activation or mobile assets leading to conflicting or unknown equipment activation

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Element 3

65

• Sub-Element 3.1

– Were interagency communications policies and procedures across responding agencies consistent with NIMS?



• Applicable policy and procedural documents (IAP, TICP, other SOPs, etc.) contained NIMS-consistent information such as:o Establishing Incident/Unified Command

o Establishing a Communications Unit and filling the COML position

o Policies and procedures requiring the use of plain language/common terminology and agency specific unit identification

• Appropriate differentiation in use of ICS Form 201 Incident Briefing form versus an IAP with the applicable ICS forms and attachmentso Sufficient documentation (ICS Forms 203, 204, 207) regarding the ICS

structure and personnel assignments for the event that depict a clear chain of command

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• Briefings for field and command personnel included distinct reminders/”just in time training” regarding NIMS principles and how to work within the established structure

• TICP includes pre-populated ICS Forms, such as ICS Form 217A Communications Resource Availability Worksheet and ICS Form 205 Incident Radio Communications Plan templates

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• Policies and procedures documents were not consistent with NIMS guidance

• No IAP or Incident Briefing form used

• Incorrect, incomplete, or outdated ICS forms used

• No policies and procedures provided relating to plain language or use of agency specific unit identification

• No single organized command structure

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Element 4

70

• Sub-Elements 4.1 & 4.2

– Does a priority order exist for use of interagency communications resources (e.g., life safety before property protection)?

– Was this prioritization of communications resource use followed?



• Policies and procedures contained in the TICP (or other procedural document) reflected a detailed and clear hierarchy for utilization of communications resources (e.g., large scale life threatening incidents listed as the top priority with smaller scale training or exercises listed as the lowest priority)

• Policies and procedures contained contingency planning for obtaining and utilizing additional communications resources if needed

71



• If competing requests were received for the same resources, priority order was utilized in accordance with established policies and procedures and alternate solutions were identified for the lower priority request

• Went beyond the standard TICP template language developing region-specific policies and procedures that detailed the hierarchy for utilization of communications resources

72



• No policies or procedures establishing priorities for utilization of communications resources

• TICP or policies/procedures delegated responsibility to the Incident Commander, but provided no details or guidelines (this approach would only address a single incident, but not multiple simultaneous incidents or events)

• Written policies and procedures do not match current practices in the region

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Element 5

75

• Sub-Elements 5.1 & 5.2– Was a primary interagency

communications talk path clearly established by procedures used during the event?

– If not, was such a talk path established ad hoc and communicated to responders early in the event?



• The ICS Form 205 (or equivalent communications assignments) clearly identified at least one talkpath designated for interagency communications, and included the intended or authorized users (e.g., primary operational leadership, Command and General Staff, response-level personnel, etc.)

• All communications assignments, including the designation of interagency talkpaths, were identified and documented

• For larger scale incidents or events, an interagency talkpath intended to serve as a Command Net was established, documented, and briefed to participants, whether or not command personnel were co-located

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Success Factors - Example

• The intended and proper use of the interagency talkpath(s) was briefed to appropriate personnel by the COML or designee

• A “Response Coordination” channel or talkgroup was designated (on the ICS Form 205) for use across disciplines (e.g., EMS and Law Enforcement) when responding to a common incident

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Challenges - Example

• Talkpaths identified for an event were not readily accessible by all designated users (e.g., not programmed in their radios; or end user did not know location in radio; or outside the coverage footprint for the talkpath)

• Interagency talkpath established, but due to the large number of users assigned would have become useless had it been needed

• Incident Command and other primary operational leadership personnel co-located in a Unified Command Post assumed that they did not need to identify a shared talkpath (Command Net) in the event personnel become physically separated

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Element 6

80

• Sub-Elements 6.1, 6.2, & 6.3– Was plain language used throughout the event?

– Did any communications problems arise amongst the primary operational leadership due to a lack of common terminology?

– Did any communications problems arise amongst other response-level emergency personnel during the event due to a lack of common terminology?


Element 6 - Sub-Element 6.1

• Plain language was used exclusively throughout the event (i.e., no codes or signals were heard during interagency communications)

• All county agencies and disciplines have policies and procedures requiring the use of plain language during multi-agency, multi-discipline events/incidents

• IAP and/or other event related policies and procedures directed the use of plain language for the duration of the event/incident

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Element 6 – Sub-Elements 6.2 & 6.3

• Primary operational leadership and response-level members representing multiple agencies, disciplines, and jurisdictions were able to communicate with each other by multiple means (face-to-face, radio, electronically, etc.) without communications impediments caused by lack of common terminology

82



• Agencies which use plain language on a day-to-day basis had no difficulty using plain language and common terminology during the event

• IAP documents contained policies and procedures requiring the use of plain language

• Radio codes and signals retained/used for the event were specifically retained for safety purposes; were used to pass information that needed to be conveyed discretely; and were universally understood by all responders involved

83



• Different versions of signals/codes were used by the agencies participating in the incident/event, not universally understood among agencies

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Element 7

86

• Sub-Elements 7.1 & 7.2– Were clear unit identification procedures

used amongst the primary operational leadership?

– Were clear unit identification procedures used amongst other response-level emergency personnel throughout the event?



• When using radio communications, primary operational leadership personnel utilized a consistent unit identification protocol for both staff members and for key event locations

• SOPs and TICPs contained policies and procedures requiring agency-specific identification during interagency communications

• ICS position titles for Command and General Staff, as well as the primary operational leadership, were used in place of agency-specific unit identifiers when managing an incident or event

• ICS position titles (or tactical call signs) for certain response-level personnel (e.g., Branch Directors, Division/Group Supervisors, Strike Team/Task Force/Unit Leaders, etc.) are used in place of agency specific unit identifiers when managing an incident or event

87



• IAP or other procedural documents listed radio identifiers for all personnel assigned to incident/event

• Proper method for unit identification explained to all participating personnel during pre-event briefings

• Utilized function- or location-specific unit IDs (tactical call signs) within the confines of the event/incident (e.g., South Gate Medical Team, Traffic Post 4, etc.)

88



• Agencies used a variety of inconsistent unit identifiers during the event (e.g., names, ICS position titles, post number, apparatus identifiers)

• Agency-specific identifiers not used during interagency communications as specified in TICP or other procedural documents

• Similar/repetitive names used to refer to multiple locations within the event venue (e.g., multiple “command posts” for different agencies, multiple “communications centers” for dispatch, etc.)

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Element 8

91

• Sub-Elements 8.1 & 8.2– Were common names used by all responding

agencies for interagency communications channels?

– Were standard names as identified in the National Interoperability Field Operations Guide (NIFOG) used for Federal Communications Commission (FCC)-designated interoperability channels?



• Common channel and/or talkgroup names are used when statewide, regional, or countywide radio systems used as primary communications system(s) supporting the incident/event

• Shared/common interagency channels or talkgroups in the county/region (not necessarily part of a common or shared radio system) are named identically

• Interagency channels and/or talkgroups are named identically in the following locations/mechanisms/documents:o Programmed into portable and mobile radioso Programmed into dispatch center radio consoles and control stationso Listed in the TICP, SOPs, plans, MOUs/MOAs, or other documentationo Listed in IAP documents, ICS Forms (e.g., ICS Form 201, 204, 205, or

217A), or in other event specific documentso When referred to verbally

92


Success Factors- Examples

• Statewide, regional, or countywide radio systems use common nomenclature for interagency channels/talkgroups for all radios (across all agencies) on the system

• Agencies on separate systems programmed the same interagency channels/talkgroups in their radios in the same place and order and with the same name

93



• Common channels not listed consistently on documents (e.g., TICP naming did not match naming on the ICS Form 205)

• Common channels named differently in various radios

• Names programmed into radios did not match event documents

94



• If FCC-designated interoperability channels were used during the event as primary or alternate channel assignments, channel naming matched standard NPSTC nomenclature in all locations:o All documents - TICP, IAP, 204, 205, 217A, other related

SOPso Programmed into all radios/consoleso Verbal reference

• FCC-designated interoperability channels were not used during the event, but they were named identically system-wide as described in first bullet above

95



• Channel naming for FCC-designated interoperability channels was common county-wide and aligned with the NPSTC standard nomenclature

• Channels programmed into radios (800 MHz primarily) with old and new names, (pre and post rebanding), including both sets of frequencies to allow communications regardless of the environment

96



• Re-banded vs. non re-banded sites

• Lack of awareness

• Differences in radio display capabilities

• Lack of resources precluded necessary reprogramming of radios (waiting for opportunities such as rebanding, narrowbanding, or other maintenance contact with the radio)

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Element 9

99

• Sub-Element 9.1

– Did a single individual carry out the Operations Section Chief responsibilities in each operational period?



• A single individual was responsible for directing the tactical functions during the incident or event

• A single Operations Section Chief was designated for each operational period and clearly functioned in the appropriate role o During smaller scale incidents or events, the Incident Commander may

be performing the duties of Operations Section Chief as well as other ICS positions

• For larger scale incidents or events, organized in compliance with NIMS/ICS Guidance, a single Operations Section Chief was supported by Branch Directors, Division/Group Supervisors, and other subordinate Units/Strike Teams/Task Forces as appropriate to manage the event

• Responders were always aware of and identified the appropriate individual serving as the Operations Section Chief

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• A single Operations Section Chief assigned and directed all agencies, disciplines, or jurisdictions associated with the event (the Incident Commander may function in this role during smaller scale incidents/events)

• Organization response was structured in compliance with NIMS/ICS guidelines

101



• No individual responsible for directing the tactical functions during the incident or event

• A single Operations Section Chief was designated, but did not exercise their responsibilities across all agencies

• Multiple Operations Section Chiefs were appointed representing separate disciplines and/or agencies

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Element 10

104

• Sub-Elements 10.1 & 10.2– Did the Operations Section Chief directly

manage more than seven subordinates at any time?

– Did first-level subordinates to the Operations Section Chief directly manage more than seven subordinates at any time?



• Did Operations Section Chief or subordinate supervisor exceed NIMS recommended span of control

• Event structure consistent with NIMS guidelines, with a single Operations Section Chief directly managing no more than seven subordinates (e.g., Deputies, Branch Directors, Division/Group Supervisors)

• Span of control documented on standard ICS forms (e.g., 203, 204, 207) with chain of command clearly reflected from the Incident/Unified Command Level down to the response level tactical functions

105


Success Factors -Examples

• Incident/event management structure was consistent with the organizational structure depicted in the IAP and/or other related documentation, and the NIMS recommended span of control ratio was maintained

• IAP and associated ICS forms were comprehensive and accurately depicted the organizational structure, clearly illustrating chain of command and span of control

106



• Incident management structure did not include sufficient Branches, Divisions/Groups, etc., to support the incident/event and were unable to maintain a reasonable span of control

• In some cases, the names used for position titles did not follow NIMS/ICS Guidance, making it difficult to identify and determine how the incident team was organized and the lines of authority and span of control

• Organizational structure listed in event documentation was not consistent with actual practice making it difficult to determine the ICS/IMT structure

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Element 11

109

• Sub-Element 11.1

– Was the ICS Communications Unit Leader (COML) position specifically filled during the event?



• Was COML position specifically filled

• The COML was clearly identified as the COML in all event related documentation, and was the author of the ICS Form 205 for the event

• The COML had completed All Hazards COML training

110


Element 11

111

• Sub-Elements 11.2, & 11.3– Were COML roles and responsibilities carried out,

either by the Incident Commander (or Unified Command), the COML, or another designee?

– Who by position or function carried out the responsibilities?



• All COML roles and responsibilities were carried out by the designated COML or delegated to other Communications Unit (or incident/event) personnel

• Communications Unit functioned in a centralized manner with all communications related roles and responsibilities coordinated through a single COML

112



• COML position was filled with a trained/qualified All Hazards COML; additional COMLs/COML Trainees were assigned to the event to support the primary COML

113



• When unexpected communications issues or problems surfaced the COML or designee was able to quickly come up with appropriate solutions and methods for resolution

• The COML briefed operational personnel on how to execute communications for the event, not just what was in use (did not simply distribute an ICS Form 205)

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• A COML was not designated or involved with the planning responsibilities

• A COML was not designated or involved with the planning responsibilities until late in planning phase

• COML was designated (on the IAP and ICS forms), but did not appear to be functioning as a COML in practice

• Multiple agency-specific individuals designated as COMLs, with no clarification as to the primary COML (if any)

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Element 11

117

• Sub-Elements 11.4, & 11.5

– Were necessary communications resources effectively ordered?

– Were they ordered using documented procedures?



• Established policies were in place (e.g., in the TICP or other procedural documents) to obtain and utilize the desired communications equipment

• The communications personnel and resources necessary to support the incident or event were either in place or ordered

• In the case of pre-planned events, the necessary communications resources were identified during the planning phase

118



• Additional communications resources were staged on site (Mobile Comm Vehicles, transportable towers, cache radios) or in the vicinity, if needed

• Contingencies/backup or additional resources (cache radios and radio accessories) were staged in multiple locations throughout the event venue to facilitate quick access by personnel

119



• Policies or procedures did not exist, or did not clearly document “owning agency” procedures for deployment of resources

• The COML or incident planners needed to identify contingency or back-up communications resources, and include a plan for rapid access, if required

120


121


Element 11

122

• Sub-Elements 11.6, & 11.7– Was a communications plan established

by procedure or developed early in the event?

– Did the communications plan meet the communications needs of the primary operational leadership?



• In the case of a planned event, a communications plan was developed prior to the event

• In the case of unplanned emergency incidents, a communications plan was rapidly established to sufficiently support the incident

• The Communications Plan was disseminated to all applicable sites (including public safety communications centers, EOCs, Mobile Comm Vehicles, etc.)

• ICS Form 205 was completed correctly, all appropriate information was included, data on ICS Form 205 matched other applicable ICS forms

• The Communications Plan included all primary and backup RF channel/talkgroup assignments for all participating agencies associated with the event

• Gateway or patch connections were listed and cross-referenced properly for each applicable channel or talkgroup associated with the patch

123



• Using the established Communications Plan, Command and General Staff, primary operational leadership, and response level emergency personnel were able to communicate effectively in order to manage the incident or event

124


Success Factor - Examples

• Quick reference sheets containing the talkgroup/channel assignments were distributed to response-level personnel

• COML verbally briefed personnel on the specifics on the (ICS Form 205) Communications Plan

• The Communications Plan designated sufficient RF resources to support primary operations, as well as to expand or activate back-up options if needed

125



• Multiple ICS Form 205s used, which appeared to be developed by individuals from multiple agencies and placed together in the IAP; did not produce a cohesive, over-arching, event-wide communications plan

• ICS Form 205 was incomplete, contained errors, was missing information, or did not match information on the ICS Form 204(s)

• Changes to the ICS Form 205 not always distributed and briefed appropriately

126


127


Element 12

128


– Were more than one out of every 10 transmissions repeated due to failure of initial communications attempts amongst the primary operational leadership?



• Little to no instances where radio transmissions had to be repeated for any reason

• Radio system(s) used provided effective coverage, transmissions consistently clear, good audio quality on all talkgroups/channels used

• Personnel were properly equipped with the necessary accessories (full over-the-ear noise canceling headsets/microphones, headsets for tactical dispatchers, etc.) to match the environment, particularly in high noise settings

129



• Tactical dispatch locations were separated in an area conducive to a dispatch operation: restricted access, low background noise or distraction

• Personnel were equipped with the necessary accessories (full over the ear noise canceling headset, headsets for tactical dispatchers, etc.)

• Field personnel communications were all funneled through team leaders, as opposed to individual personnel, to minimize radio traffic

130



• Operations conducted in noisy or crowded environment, making it difficult for tactical dispatchers or other personnel to effectively hear radio transmissions

• Multiple radios operating in close proximity and using external speakers that competed with each other

• Individual monitoring multiple radios or channels/talkgroups overloaded with radio traffic and unable to always hear some channels

131


132


Element 13

133

• Sub-Elements 13.1, 13.2, & 13.3– Was a back-up resource available for

communications amongst the primary operational leadership in case of failure of the primary mode?

– Did the primary mode fail during the event at any time?

– If so, was a back-up effectively provided?



• Backup options (using radio communications) were identified for critical command level and tactical channels/talkgroups

• Backup options were thoroughly documented on the ICS Form 205 for the event, and/or briefed to personnel

• Backup options were sufficient to restore communications for the given functions in the event of a failure (capacity, coverage)

• Backup options could be rapidly implemented if needed

134



• Backup options (using radio communications) were identified, listed on the ICS form 205 and were sufficient to restore communications for the event

• County-wide trunked radio system had multiple conventional backup repeaters which were completely separate and independent of the trunked system and programmed into all user radios

• Personnel briefed on a comprehensive “loss of radio communications plan”

• Transportable tower/repeater site with cache radios staged at the venue as a back-up command net

135



• No back-up options were identified

• Reliance on commercial cellular providers as a primary means of communications due to loading, priority, capacity problems

• Back-up options not sufficient to restore or provide comparable communications capabilities as the primary system (inadequate coverage, simplex channel, result in overloaded channels/talkgroups)

• Back-up options did not account for users across multiple frequency bands, addressed single-band solution only

136


137


Element 14

138


– Overall, was the primary operational leadership able to communicate adequately to manage resources during the incident or event?


Element 14- Sub-Element 14.1

• Members of primary operational leadership were able to communicate and manage resources without any noted impediments relating to operable or interoperable communications capabilities during the event/incident

• Command and Operations components were managed using a cohesive unified approach representative of all jurisdictions, disciplines, and agencies participating in the event

• A coordinated, effective, and efficient means of communications was consistently used when needed to manage resources (e.g., least complicated, direct communications as opposed to multiple relay points, least prone to error/failure)

139



• At the end of each operational period primary leadership conducted a short “hot wash” session prior to demobilization to discuss areas for improvement, and included communications-related issues

• For pre-planned events, all participants were involved in event planning to include operational leadership, event staff, communications personnel, NGOs, etc.

140



• All participating agencies not included in pre-event planning functions (local, state, federal, tribal, NGOs.)

• Unified Command approach following the NIMS compliant ICS structure not implemented to manage the event/incident

• No mechanism for communications and connectivity with “outside” participants having significant responsibilities during an event (e.g., NASCAR, air operations, maritime operations, Public Works, etc.)

141


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Submitting Results & Conclusion


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Discussion, Questions?

• [email protected] or 202-630-NECP (6327)Email & Phone Number

https://franz.spawar.navy.mil/

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