response to dwp commissioning strategy consultation

8/10/2019 Response to DWP Commissioning Strategy Consultation

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Response to Department of Work and Pensions Consultation

Commissioning Strategy 2013 Consultation

September 2013


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About NCVO

NCVO champions and strengthens the voluntary sector, with over 10,000 members, from the largest

charities to the smallest community organisations. Alongside our sister councils in Wales, Scotland

and Northern Ireland, we make sure the voluntary sector can do what it does best. www.ncvo-

vol.org.uk

NCVO convenes the Public Service Delivery Network, Special Interest group of sub-contractor

organisations involved in the Work Programme, and a Payment-by-Results working group that will

be making recommendations in 2013.
http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/


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Summary

NCVO welcome the Department of Work and Pensions (DWP) consulting on its Commissioning

Strategy and its recognition of the benefits of having Voluntary, Charity and Social Enterprise (VCSE)

organisations in welfare to work service delivery. Many VCSE organisations have the knowledge and

expertise to make a positive and lasting impact for individuals seeking employment.

In this response, NCVO has answered questions where we have specific expertise and

experience. We have also consulted with our membership on their views around DWP

commissioning strategy, and senior staff are available to discuss any elements of this response

or our work on public services more generally. NCVO has drawn heavily on experiences gained

from the Work Programme in this response. We have highlighted the concerns in the VCSE sector

surrounding binary Payment by Results (PbR) mechanisms, the ability and need of DWP to monitor

Prime-Sub relationships and have encouraged further engagement between the VCSE and DWP

Commissioners throughout all the stages of welfare to work programme delivery.

We recognise the efforts that officials have made in engaging with the VCSE in the consultation

process and would urge a continuing dialogue with a range of service providers of different sizes

and sectors.


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Q1: How should DWP balance its responsibility to strategically manage and steward a large,

developing market with our desire to maintain and develop the right specialist capability

throughout the supply chain? Please consider contracting arrangements in your answer.

1.1 We welcome DWPs recognition that providers with specialist capabilities need specific

attention from the Department within the CPA framework. These providers are often voluntary,

community and social enterprise (VCSE) sector organisations. Through the NCVO Work Programme

Specialist Interest Group (SIG)1of over 130 VCSE Work Programme providers we have evidenced the

need for greater direct support from the Department to the VCSE to ensure their specialist

capabilities are effectively supporting those furthest from the job market. To do this, these non-

profit providers need particular support in a Payment by Results (PbR) supply chain.

Pre-procurement

1.2Specialist VCSE providers are experts in identifying and addressing substantive and complex

needs in the welfare to work market. To extract the ful l value of this expertise and capacity we

recommend that the DWP should engage the sector in pre-design stages of the procurement. From

January 2014 changes to the EU Procurement Regulations will give even greater scope for pre-

procurement engagement with providers through the introduction of two new procurement

procedures2.

1Detai ls of the NCVO Work Programme Specia li st Interest Group (SIG) athttp://www.ncvo-

vol.org.uk/employmentskillstraining/SIG2The new innovation partnership approach and competitive dia logue with negotiation. These are added to

the two methods already available: negotiated procedure and competitive dialogue.
http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/employmentskillstraining/SIGhttp://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/employmentskillstraining/SIGhttp://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/employmentskillstraining/SIGhttp://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/employmentskillstraining/SIGhttp://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/employmentskillstraining/SIG


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1.3 Pre-procurement engagement enables providers to contribute towards improved evidence

about user needs, changes in those needs and best practice interventions.

1.4Pre-procurement engagement also supports the effective development of appropriate and

measurable metrics to design pre-job outcomes. This wil l enable the staggering of payments prior to

the later payments (job outcome payments and sustainability payments) which we recommend in

response to question four.

1.5 In pre-procurement we also recommend that the Department develops capacity in VCSE

specialist providers so they are better skilled to assess and manage the risks and opportunities

offered in contracts and sub-contracts. This has been an approach taken by Ministry of Justice in the

Transforming Rehabilitation procurement3. We have seen in the Work Programme that many

providers were unprepared and inexperienced in assessing risk and managing risk. For the VCSE

these skill s are particularly important as we are less able to absorb risk and lack the capital to offset

it. VCSE providers also have particular governance profiles (Boards, processes and mission

commitments) which make their ability to engage in PbR and supply chains particularly difficult. If

the Department is to overcome these barriers NCVO recommend that providers are engaged at pre-

procurement to better understand risk-management capabilities; and this is fol lowed by appropriate

skills-building support.

1.6 Importantly this pre-procurement engagement will help understand how risk affects

performance in the VCSE so appropriate incentives and additional performance management

3Trans forming Rehabil itation: A Strategy for Reform, p17.http://www.justice.gov.uk/transforming-

rehabilitation


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measures can be developed for the contract terms and/or market stewardship framework.

Evidenced understanding is required to understand how the transfer of financial risks affects

performance, investment, and disinvestment behaviours amongst VCSE providers who have a

distinct and different capital profile from larger or commercial provider organisations.

Proportionality of procurement process

1.7Pre-procurement engagement wil l give the Department sufficient evidence to understand how

the administrative burden of the subsequent procurement and development of supply chains is not

either wasteful or so weighty that it excludes VCSE organisations from entering supply chains. The

administrative burden arising from the requirement to fill out multiple and separate Expressions of

Interests when engaging with Primes is a widespread concern amongst the VCSE4. This caused

significant problems in the Work Programme procurement, detracting valuable resources from the

frontline and service improvement.

1.8As part of a review of proportionality of procurement procedures, NCVO recommend a single,

standardised Expression of Interest framework to be used to recruit all subcontractors. We

recommend that DWP learn from the model in use for the Ministry of Justic e Transforming

Rehabilitation procurement.

1.9 A current NCVO survey5 is showing that the greatest challenge for specialist providers in

procurement is the proportionality of PQQ and any other due dil igence hurdles, and the timeframe

for procurement. These factors frequently make it impossible or difficult for specialist providers to

4http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/sites/default/files/work_programme_concerns.pdf

5Resul ts not yet publ is hed.
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enter public service procurements. Shorter timescales also contribute to the bid candy problem

that has hampered the Work Programme6. Giving providers more time to establish relationships,

consider contracts, and develop supply chains will ensure more effective markets to be established.

We therefore recommend that through pre-procurement the DWP work with providers to agree a

suitable timeframe for procurement. A good timeframe enables providers to develop best-practice

service models, to build partnerships around service specialisms, and to sufficiently assess and plan

for risk management.

Bidder assessment criteria

1.10NCVO and the SIG recommend that future procurements demand prime providers show better

evidence how sustainable local supply chains are able to address current and changing local needs.

NCVO have evidenced the use of bid candy in the Work Programme. This has affected the

sustainability of specialist local providers and led to a subsequent impact on the quality and available

of provision to those furthest to the job market.

1.11NCVO would welcome the use of the DWP Best Practice Group as a forum for helping design

effective criteria for prime bidders to be assessed. This approach should aim to lead to genuine

partnership in both design and delivery.

Payment model

1.12NCVO understands that the DWP is committed to using a PbR funding model. We recommend

however that the DWP take on board the recommendations and research in the forthcoming

6http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/sites/default/files/sig_survey_june_2012_report_17.9.12.pdf
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(November 2013) NCVO report into PbR and the VCSE. There is as yet little evidence that PbR is an

effective model for driving performance amongst specialist providers and we ask that DWP

therefore considers alternative or adapted models of payment terms within any future PbR

procurement. We would refer DWP in this consultation to previous research by the SIG detail ing the

fundamental challenges for VCSE facing PbR payment terms and the detrimental impact this has had

in many cases, with many not seeing their contract as viable for the whole length on the contract7.

We would welcome on-going discussion with DWP about our evidence and potential solutions and

improvements to PbR models.

Service user segmentation, tariffs and referrals

1.13One of the key barriers to effective and sustainable delivery cited by the NCVO SIG has been the

poor management of referrals of those furthest from the job market. We recommend that review is

made of referral processes along the pathway and that improvements are made to ensure creaming

and parking is identified and halted.

1.14 In particular, we strongly recommend that DWP review the segmentation of users and the

tariffs attached to users. We ask that tariffs are designed that better reflect the complexity, greater

risks, and high levels of service resourcing required for those furthest from the job market. The

simplicity of current tariffs has enabled creaming and parking and created inequalities across user

groups that must be robustly addressed.

7http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/sites/default/files/sig_survey_june_2012_report_17.9.12.pdf
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1.15In order to best manage this, we ask that the DWP Best Practice Group is used to monitor and

address problems of tariff structures in the current Work Programme and this evidence is used to

make improvements to future tariff and payment models. We further recommend increasing

incentive payments to enhance provision to those furthest from the labour market; this should be

based on personalised provision to reflect user need.

1.16We recognise there are barriers to giving guaranteed referral figures. However this severely

affects business planning for specialist providers. We would therefore welcome review of the data

used to make referral predictions, and the updating of such data at regular intervals. Again, we

recommend that the DWP Best Practice Group and NCVO SIG are used to discuss improvements in

the way referral variations disproportionately affect specialist subcontractors.

Standard contract terms

1.17 NCVO and the SIG would welcome on-going discussion about the suitability of applying

standard contract terms across supply chains. There are advantages of protection to standard terms.

However we also recognise the need for commercial flexibility and the advantages it offers to all

parties.

1.18 Any terms should fully embed the principles of the Compact. As the MOJ has done in

Transforming Rehabilitation, we would welcome a clear commitment of DWP to ensure that in all

commissioning and contract behaviours the DWP state clear commitment to the Compact and to

embedding relevant principles in all documentation and procurement models.


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Monitoring

1.19 We welcome the review of the Merlin Standard and the role it can play in ensuring fair

treatment for specialist subcontractors. We recommend that into the DWP take learning from the

NCVO / Serco subcontracting guidance as well as building on the continued involvement of NCVO

and the SIG in ensuring relevant parts of the guidance are included in the revised Merlin Standard

and development of any standard contract terms.

Q2: How can we make competition more effective? How can we break down the barriers to

market entry through our contracting, for both our larger and smaller contracts? How could we

increase competition through the procurement process? What role can Open Data play?

2.1Firstly we must state that collaboration is an equally effective tool for driving improvement in

VCSE improvement as competition. The VCSE sector is highly fluid and collaborative. Innovation

requires a process of iterative learning and testing that works best in collaborative, supportive

contexts8. We therefore recommend that DWP gives equal weighting for means to better promote

collaboration and shared learning across CPAs. Like competition, this will also drive performance and

improvement.

2.2 DWP must recognise that prime contracts let at the size of the Work Programme (where primes

required 20million capital) present barriers of scale and capital that exclude the overwhelming

8http://www.bis .gov.uk/assets/BISCore/innovation/docs/I/09 -1640-innovation-hub-change.pdf, page 6
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majority of VCSE and specialist providers. Approximately 97% of VCSE organisations have incomes of

under 500,000.9This is a fundamental barrier to competition. The risks transferred in PbR and at

such scale inherently reduce the market share available to the VCSE and have led to, we believe,

markets that are insufficiently diverse.

2.3Larger VCSE providers or consortia of providers will be interested in accessing social investment

or commercial partnerships through which they can gain the necessary capital to enter the

market. However it is important that DWP take steps to understand why there were so few bids of

this nature to the Work Programme. Social investment is a new tool and research shows it takes a

considerable time to develop the evidence and mechanisms to ensure contract opportunities are

attractive. NCVOs confidential conversations with social investors showed the Work Programme to

have been an unattractive investment because of the short timeframe of procurement, the lack of

confidence in data and referral projections, and the scale of capital required.

2.4Consortia face similar barriers and requirements to enter markets. Consortia can bring wide

expertise and experience to markets but they also need long-lead in times. If consortia are to require

social investment this clearly makes lead-in times longer still.

2.5If the DWP wants to see VCSE entering prime competitions as consortia, partnership, or single

primes, NCVO recommends that sufficient lead-in is allowed before competition, and the length of

9http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/sites/default/files/work_programme_concerns.pdf
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this lead-in is calculated by agreement with investors with providers. Without such discussions, lead-

in time is unlikely to be appropriate.

2.6 Because of these barriers VCSE organisations are most likely to be sub-contractors in the welfare

to work market. Here, competition could be improved by DWP reviewing the level of market

diversity at each year of the Work Programme, and how this is different from DWPs stated

predictions and preferences for a diverse market in which the VCSE were a significant element of

provision. We welcome DWPs clear understanding that the VCSE has a significant role to play and

suggest that the achievement of this should be given due consideration and reporting.

2.7To enhance competition at sub-contractor level we refer you to the recommendations made in

our answer to question one. These include recommendations to build skills and confidence for

competing, and creating proportionate procurement processes and PQQ demands that ensure

specialist subcontractors are not unfairly excluded from bidding. Key to this, as we have argued, is

better evidence on which providers can plan their cash flows and business activities. Without this

organisations cannot quantify and manage the risks and rewards of contract opportunities. This

leads to organisations not bidding, or failing to sustain business over the life of a contract. In both

cases there is reduced competition and diversity.

2.8 We would again refer back to the impact of bid candy. This creates a distorted picture of

competitive supply chains, and also misleads providers into bel ieving they will play a role with a

prime. This is why we recommend that future procurements demand prime providers better

evidence how sustainable local supply chains are able to address current and changing local needs.


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2.9 For competition to become effective, the performance of the whole supply chain should be

published. This creates transparency, accountability, and a drive to improve and learn from best

practice. When publishing statistics, DWP should publish below prime referral and performance

levels.10

This will have several benefits. It allows sub-contractors to see how their performance

compares to other similar organisations in the supply chain and more widely. Secondly, enables both

DWP and Sub-contractors to hold Primes to account if they are not referring service users down the

supply chain. Finally, it more easily highlights best practice that can be shared.

Q3: DWP wants to work with the market to improve the effectiveness of subcontractual

relationships. What, if any, changes should be made to the Code of Conduct? What are your views

on the way the Merlin Standard is used? How can we create supply chains with the inbuilt

resilience and flexibility to cope with changing requirements and circumstances?

3.1NCVO welcomes the strengthening of the Merlin Advisory Board and the review of the Merlin

Standard. However there are major problems with current effectiveness of the Merlin Standard. As

the largest representative body of the VCSE sector NCVO are actively involved in the review of the

Merlin Standard.

3.2 We recommend that any revised Standard should be a requirement of primes before they bid. In

the Work Programme, Prime contractors had up to one year to achieve accreditation11

. This left sub-

10http://www.ncvo-vol.org.uk/sites/default/files/sig_survey_june_2012_report_17.9.12.pdf 11

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contractors who were experiencing non-Merlin compliant behaviours with no process to turn to. In

future welfare-to-work programmes, we would like to see Merlin Standard accreditation as

requirement for any winning bid.

3.3 Another failing has been the perceived overreliance on Prime contractors12

. Members of the

Work Programme Special Interest Group have informed NCVO that they fear Merlin Standard places

too much emphasis on the Primes self-assessment when deciding whether to award accreditation.13

Merlin assessors should engage with each sub-contractor in the Primes supply chain to get a more

detailed picture of how the Prime is working with its partners. The weighting placed on each

criterion needs to be made to allay fears that the assessment process is bias in favour of the Primes

and successful accreditation.

3.4 Due to the size of the CPAs in large welfare to work programmes, the Roundtable of Special

Interest Group members raised concerns that the Primes were too big to fail . The ultimate sanction

that the Merlin Standard can impose is the termination of the Prime Contract. However, there are

fears amongst sub-contractors that this ultimate sanction will not be imposed because of the

disruption this would cause DWP. DWP need to make clear the process that would drive any

termination of contracts and how it would mitigate any negative affects this sanctio n would have on

VCS sub-contractors in the supply chain.

12

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3.5DWPs Code of Conduct, which the Merlin Standard is designed to support, states that It takes

account of the Compact principles.14

Compact Principle 3.11 states that the government should:

Ensure all bodies distributing funds on the Governments behalf adhere to the commitments

in this Compact. This includes the relationship between prime contractors and their supply

chains.15

3.6To ensure that DWP Prime contractors do adhere to the principles of the Compact, as the DWP is

committed to doing16

, The Compact Principles should be embedded in DWPs Code of Conduct

Q4: What steps does DWP need to take, across its commissioning (from large-scale national

programmes to small-scale local commissioning), to maintain and promote a level playing-field for

providers?

4.1We refer you back to our answers on enabling specialist provision, competition and collaboration

in questions one and two.

4.2To this we would add further recommendations to adapt the PbR model.

4.3 The Work Programme PbR model is designed to transfer financial risk to capital-carrying

organisations at scale. However this does not reflect the profi le of many expert and VCSE providers

in the welfare to work market. These providers struggle to operate in such an environment. This is a

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http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/cs-rep-08.pdf15The Compact http://www.compactvoice.org.uk/sites/default/files/the_compact.pdf, Principl e 3.11.

16http://transparency.number10.gov.uk/content/cross -government-priori ty/the-compact
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fundamental tension andas we have discussed and evidencedreduces the level of competition

and diversity in the market. Therefore the DWP is right to recognise measures are required to

address an un-level playing fie ld.

4.4NCVO advice that PbR is not applied to organisations of an income beneath 500,000. Auditing

and accounting regulations17

do not subject organisations under 500,000to external audit18

. These

rules are based on proportionate expectations on skil ls and resources: the same logi c that a

commissioner when forming expectations of providers skills, experience and ability to carry high -

financial risks. These organisations have low reserves, cautious governance and insufficient assets

and income to manage late payments. They are therefore disproportionately affected by PbR and

are liable to be driven to disinvest from services quickly when problems arise so PbR acts as the

very opposite to a driver to improvement. We provide further detail on this recommendation in our

upcoming (November 2013) paper on PbR and the VCSE.

4.5We recommend that the DWP closely monitor the MOJ Transforming Rehabilitation programme.

This uses a three tier model in which the lowest tier is grant-funded and shielded from the financial

risks of PbR. This use of grants should be adopted by DWP. Alternatively, we ask that DWP provides

evidence that PbR is directly accountable for driving improvement in services and results amongst

smaller VCSE providers.

4.6We also recommend that DWP establishes a gaming commission, like that done under the

Department of Health drug and alcohol PbR pilots. This should be tasked with exploring the

17http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/publications/cc26.aspx

18http://www.charitycommission.gov.uk/publications/cc26.aspx
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development of milestone measures and payments to create a more staggered payment model.

The binary PbR employed in the Work Programme is not financially sustainable for many in VCSE

organisations. Rewarding milestones will mean that VCSE organisations are using their skills in

working with individuals with complex needs, whilst also ensuring the Prime can work with

individuals who are closer to the labour market.

4.7Such a payment model would reduce the overbearing risk of the current near 100% PbR model

which has prompted primes to focus on cutting costs and reducing risks, ahead of drivers to invest

and focus on improvements. A reduced burden on financial risk, for example to a 30% PbR end

payment would change investment behaviours along the supply chain. DWP is familiar with such a

model and could expand the hybrid system used in Work Choice19

where by 70% of the providers

contract price is paid as a monthly service fee, with a 30% of the payment being linked to results

achieved by the provider.

Q5: How should DWP develop the role of social investment in our commissioning?

5.1We are not providing an answer at this stage, but will look to develop future evidence.

19 http://www.dwp.gov.uk/docs/work-choice-section16.pdf


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Q6: How should DWP design outcomes and service standards for the hardest-to-help within

outcome-focused payment models?

6.1NCVO welcomes commissioning focused on outcomes. However the outcomes set in the Work

Programme were set by commissioners, often with no consultation with users or those providers

who have expertise in working with users to achieve change and who understand the pathways and

systems barriers to achieving that change. Consequently we have ended up with a focus purely on

job sustainabilityand the parking of users judged less likely to achieve those outcomes.

6.2We therefore strongly recommend that an outcomes and tariff model is designed for future

procurements that gives rewards agreed milestones. As we recommended in question four this

requires a gaming commission to model before milestones can be agreed and applied. This will

substantially reduce creaming and parking and drive equalities and better outcomes across future

procurements.

Q7: How can DWP efficiently and effectively monitor and manage service quality within the wider

framework described in this document?

7.1There are a number of methods for monitoring service quality. For NCVO it is crucial that all parts

of a supply chain are included in this discussion so that monitoring enables a view of each part of the

chain separately. This would enable better performing sub-contractors to be recognised and to be in

a strong position for wider delivery beyond their initial contract.


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8.4 For the mission-led VCSE user needs and users experie nce of quality is the driver of our

innovation and quality. It is important the DWP harness this drive and create an effective framework

through which users can monitor and feedback on quality and need for improvement. We therefore

recommend that the DWP establish discussions with providers and user groups to discuss how

better users can be involved in driving and monitoring service quality.

8.5Service user choice is an interesting idea and that should be explored. In any exploration of this

we recommend that DWP take learning directly from the providers and commissioners within the

adult social care market. Here, huge ambitions for enabling user choice have been substantially

disappointing in reality: in March 2013 100% or users were meant to have personal budgets20

.

Official statistics rate this as at only 53% now21

; however national VCSE providers have told us the

real figure they see is closer to 5-10% of users22

.

Q9: How, when assessing bids, should we balance price and quality?

9.1It is clear that the Social Value Act encourages a wider approach beyond lowest cost provider. It

is important that any commissioning ensures the full range of impacts is taken on board, including

wider savings to a department beyond the direct cost of the service. NCVO would be interested in

exploring how this local social impact can be measured and incorporated into future contracts

20https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads /attachment_data/file/136422/White-Paper-

Caring-for-our-future-reforming-care-and-support-PDF-1580K.pdfp54.21

http://www.communitycare.co.uk/articl es/28/08/2013/102669/direct-payments-personal -budgets-and-individual-budgets.htm22

Figures given anonymousl y, July 2013.
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136422/White-Paper-Caring-for-our-future-reforming-care-and-support-PDF-1580K.pdfhttps://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136422/White-Paper-Caring-for-our-future-reforming-care-and-support-PDF-1580K.pdfhttps://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136422/White-Paper-Caring-for-our-future-reforming-care-and-support-PDF-1580K.pdfhttp://www.communitycare.co.uk/articles/28/08/2013/102669/direct-payments-personal-budgets-and-individual-budgets.htmhttp://www.communitycare.co.uk/articles/28/08/2013/102669/direct-payments-personal-budgets-and-individual-budgets.htmhttp://www.communitycare.co.uk/articles/28/08/2013/102669/direct-payments-personal-budgets-and-individual-budgets.htmhttp://www.communitycare.co.uk/articles/28/08/2013/102669/direct-payments-personal-budgets-and-individual-budgets.htmhttp://www.communitycare.co.uk/articles/28/08/2013/102669/direct-payments-personal-budgets-and-individual-budgets.htmhttp://www.communitycare.co.uk/articles/28/08/2013/102669/direct-payments-personal-budgets-and-individual-budgets.htmhttps://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136422/White-Paper-Caring-for-our-future-reforming-care-and-support-PDF-1580K.pdfhttps://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/136422/White-Paper-Caring-for-our-future-reforming-care-and-support-PDF-1580K.pdf


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Q10: How can DWP incentivise innovation in future welfare-to-work commissioning? How can we

capture and share practice derived from successful innovations? What are the barriers?

10.1The current PbR model used in DWPs Work Programme, inhibits innovation. Innovation is, in its

nature, risky. The Work Programme puts most of the emphasis on a binary, long term result, and

consequently providers from all sectors will become very risk adverse.

10.2NCVO would recommend DWP look into the possibilities of setting up separately funded an d

commissioned programmes innovative approaches. As mentioned above, Social investment could

play a part in funding these. Alternatively, DWP could look into Programmes that are cross

department funded, take advantage of the European Social Fund and work with LEPs to encourage

the emergence of innovative approaches. DWP could also consider giving grants to organisations

that develop innovative models.

10.3Once innovative approaches have been tested, they could be expanded, or the best practice

shared. Best Practice can be shared via DWP forums or workshops across the country. The UK is

considered a key country in innovation in service design and these models could also be shared

internationally.

Q11: We have re-affirmed our view of the overall set of provider capabilities, giving particular

capabilities more emphasis. Are there key capabilities which we have not adequately captured?

11.1NCVO actively works to enhance the skills of VCSE providers to ensure that they are well placed

to engage in the commissioning process. It is clear that there is a continued need for specific training


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and support to enable VCSE organisations to: a) understand the commissioning process; b) engage in

co-design of services; c) bid for contracts individually or (more likely) as part of a wider consortium.

11.2These capabilities can be developed in partnership through joint support to commissioners,

prime contractors and sub-contractors. By engaging in joint training and support, there is an

additional advantage that this builds greater trust and mutual understanding.

Q12: Working within the high-level framework articulated in this document, how could DWP

become a more flexible partner, nationally and locally what are the barriers to more effective

partnerships?

12.1See our response to question 10.

Q13: What are the current barriers to co-commissioning?

13.1We are not providing an answer at this stage.


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Q14: DWP recognises the importance of the Social Value Act, but also has a clear remit to deliver

sustainable employment outcomes which offer good value-for-money to taxpayers. How can DWP

best consider Social Value through its commissioning?

14.1 NCVO welcomed the introduction of the Social Value Act. We would call for DWP

commissioners to consider social value on all contracts, not just the ones that go above the current

EU thresholds which currently stand at 113,057 for central government and 173,934 for other

public bodies.23

14.2This step would ensure that assessment of bids from VCSE organisations would have taken into

account the added Social Value their provisions may bring. It is already considere d best practice to

consider Social Value in all contracts, but NCVO would encourage DWP to enshrine this in the

Commissioning Strategy as a requirement.

14.3DWP should engage with the VCSE to develop an appropriate balance between the social value

a bid could bring and its f inancial value.

23http://www.cips.org/Documents/Knowledge/social_value_guide.pdf
http://www.cips.org/Documents/Knowledge/social_value_guide.pdfhttp://www.cips.org/Documents/Knowledge/social_value_guide.pdfhttp://www.cips.org/Documents/Knowledge/social_value_guide.pdfhttp://www.cips.org/Documents/Knowledge/social_value_guide.pdf


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Contact details:

For any enquiries relating to this response please contact:

Ramzi Suleiman

Partnerships and International, NCVO

Email: [email protected]

Direct line: 020 7520 2472